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PREFACE
The United Kingdom’s constitution, while of ancient origins, remains both
dynamic and vibrant. As every public lawyer is only too aware, nowadays,
the proper boundaries of constitutional and administrative law are both
increasingly wide and subject to debate. In compiling any textbook on this
subject, one of the principal preliminary tasks lies in defining the scope of
material to be included and the approach to be adopted in relation to that
material. The task of writing is made more problematic by the many and
varied depths in which, and the means by which, the subject is taught both in
the United Kingdom and overseas. Full time students; part time students;
students on long distance learning programmes such as the University of
London’s Programme for External Students and students combining both
constitutional and administrative law within a one year course, all have
differing needs. The aim in this book has been to provide sufficient detail to
meet all such needs in a user-friendly manner. 
As emphasised in the introductory chapters, the study of the United
Kingdom’s constitutional and administrative law involves rather more than a
learning of rules of law, and necessarily encompasses – over and above an
understanding of legal rules – an understanding of history, government,
politics and conventional practices which form the foundations of the
contemporary constitution. As a result, any constitutional and administrative
law textbook must incorporate sufficient information relating to such matters
so as to enable students to view the constitution in its historical, political and
conventional context. In this work, I have addressed the subject in this manner
in order to provide a rounded, contextual explanation of the United
Kingdom’s constitution, which goes beyond pure law while also adequately
covering the law.
As previously, the text is divided into seven main parts. Part I provides a
general introduction to the scope of constitutional law, the sources of the
constitution and the structure of the United Kingdom. In Part II, the
fundamental concepts of the constitution are considered: the rule of law,
separation of powers, the royal prerogative and parliamentary sovereignty. In
Part III, the European Union and Community is discussed. The material is
divided into two chapters. Chapter 8 considers the evolution, aims and
structure of the Union and Community and the principal institutions and their
respective powers. In Chapter 9, the sources of Community law and the
relationship between national and Community law are discussed.
In Part IV, the structure of government is discussed, Chapter 10
considering the role of Prime Minister, Cabinet and the Civil Service, Chapter
11 discussing the concept of responsible government and ministerial
responsibility and Chapter 12 the devolution of power to the Northern Ireland
Assembly, Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly and local government. 
Part V is devoted to the United Kingdom Parliament: ‘Westminster’.
Chapter 13 discusses the electoral system, Chapter 14 introduces students to
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the House of Commons. Chapters 15 and 16 are devoted to parliamentary
procedures for the scrutiny of legislative proposals and scrutiny of
government administration. The House of Lords, its role, functions and the
current reform proposals are considered in Chapter 17. Parliamentary
privilege is discussed in Chapter 18. Notwithstanding the devolution of
powers to regional and local government, Westminster remains technically
sovereign in its law making powers and central to ensuring the accountability
of the United Kingdom government to the electorate. Nevertheless, the impact
of devolution and other constitutional reforms – most notably the Human
Rights Act 1998 – is considerable, and introduces new restraints on the scope
of Parliament’s powers, an issue addressed in Chapter 15 in relation to the
legislative competence of Parliament and also Chapter 7 which addresses the
concept of sovereignty.
Part VI focuses on the individual and the state. The materials on civil
liberties are organised into three separate chapters. The rapidly changing
nature of constitutional law presents different challenges for each new edition.
Whereas the 1998 edition had to accommodate the government’s substantial
reform agenda, the 2000 edition was written against the background of these
reforms being largely, if not wholly, complete. With this fourth edition the
principal area of focus lies in Chapter 19, with the Human Rights Act 1998,
which has made an immediate impact on many areas of domestic law and
required the adoption of different techniques of statutory interpretation and
the development of the common law. The materials on civil liberties are
divided into three chapters. The subject of state security is discussed in
Chapter 23. 
Part VII introduces administrative law. Judicial review of administrative
action comprises two chapters, the first dealing with the role and scope of
judicial review and procedural matters; the second analysing the grounds for
judicial review. The complementary role, functions and powers of
Commissioners for Administration are considered in Chapter 26.
Over the years I have accumulated a debt to many colleagues. My
particular thanks in 2002 are to Kenneth Armstrong for his invaluable help
with the European Union, and to Ian Yeats for reviewing the chapters on
judicial review. As ever, the usual disclaimer applies: any errors remain my
sole responsibility. My thanks as ever to Sonny Leong and his team at
Cavendish Publishing, with whom as before it has been a pleasure to work.
Particular thanks go to Ruth Massey, who edited this edition and showed
great patience and skill with the numerous amendments.
As before, I would like to thank all the students, past and present – both at
home and, particularly, in the Far East – who, over the years, have deepened
my understanding of the difficulties they face in studying such a rich, varied
and essentially protean subject as that of the constitution of the United
Constitutional and Administrative Law
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Kingdom. Family and all friends are again owed a large and unquantifiable
debt of gratitude, not just for all their support, but also for allowing me the
necessary time and solitude in which to update the text.
Hilaire Barnett
School of Law
Queen Mary, University of London
July 2002
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INTRODUCTION:
THE SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Constitutional law is concerned with the role and powers of the institutions
within the state and with the relationship between the citizen and the state.
The constitution is a living, dynamic organism which at any point in time will
reflect the moral and political values of the people it governs, and accordingly,
the law of the constitution must be appreciated within the socio-political
context in which it operates.
The study of the constitution of the United Kingdom involves acquiring an
understanding of a variety of historical, legal, philosophical and political
factors which have, over the centuries, shaped the organisation of the state.
The United Kingdom appears to be almost unique in not having a constitution
which is conveniently set out in a single written document. Israel and New
Zealand share this constitutional feature. However, not too much weight
should be given to the ‘unwritten’ nature of the constitution. Under all
constitutions, not all of the rules will be written, and still less will they be
collected within a single document.
In the United Kingdom, by contrast with most other states, the
constitution is the product of many centuries of continuous and, mostly,
gradual, peaceful evolution. With the exception of the constitutional turmoils
of the seventeenth century,1 the United Kingdom’s constitutional
development has an unbroken history dating from 1066. Accordingly,
historical origins form the background for the study of the contemporary
constitution, and no meaningful appreciation of the present constitution can
be acquired without understanding this historical backcloth which reveals the
moral and political influences which have shaped the constitution as it exists
today. That said, it must always be remembered that the principal emphasis of
study is on the contemporary constitution of the United Kingdom rather than
on the many centuries of development which underlie it. With that point in
mind, it is necessary to draw on historical sources and events with a view to
understanding the contribution made to an evaluation of the many
constitutional issues which present themselves today.
It is particularly true of the United Kingdom’s constitution, which is more
the product of evolution than conscious rational thought, that it is difficult to
see clearly the demarcation lines between constitutional law, history,
philosophy and political science. In order, therefore, to study the United
Kingdom’s constitution successfully, it is necessary to gain an insight into the
history, politics and political philosophy which underpin the constitution.
This task is not easy, particularly as many students will come to constitutional
1 See, in particular, Chapters 2, 6 and 7.
law without a background in history, politics or political philosophy. It is,
however, an essential component of constitutional study, without which the
structure, law and policies of the state cannot be understood. More than any
other area of legal study except jurisprudence, constitutional law in the United
Kingdom involves far more than a learning of legal rules. Indeed, it may be
said, without exaggeration, that the non-legal rules and practices within the
constitution are at least as important – if not more important on many
occasions – as the legal rules. For example, in analysing and evaluating the
extent to which the individual citizen enjoys constitutional protection of
individual rights, it is necessary to appreciate the timeless and tireless quest to
ensure the legal protection of the rights of individuals. This study involves,
inter alia, an appreciation of natural law and social contract theories2 which
underpin the constitutional limitations on government power in order that the
rights of individuals are protected against the power of the state.
Also, by way of example, the study of the constitutional relationship
between the government and the legislature today encompasses a knowledge
of the political backcloth, the rules of parliamentary practice and the non-legal
or conventional rules which apply in a given situation. By way of further
illustration, when studying the legislative supremacy of parliament, it is of
fundamental importance to grasp that, in terms of classical constitutional legal
theory, the power of parliament – in the absence of a written constitution – is
omnipotent or sovereign.3 However, the constitutional and legal fact that
parliament has the ultimate law making power within the state, does not
mean that there are no restraints on what parliament may do. The law making
powers of parliament, while theoretically and legally unlimited, are in fact
constrained by the electorate to which parliament is accountable, and by
economic, moral and political necessities. In terms of accountability to the
electorate and the limits which this imposes on parliament’s powers, it is
necessary to appreciate the philosophical and historical foundations of
democracy and the idea of individual rights. Notwithstanding the lack of a
codified constituent document, under the constitution of the United Kingdom,
the principles on which the government operates today are precisely those
which govern the relationship between the government and the people under
a written constitution. Here, an understanding of the idea of ‘social contract’4
makes it possible to understand the complex relationship between ‘sovereign
power’ and the power of the people to determine who holds that sovereign
power and the manner in which it may – and may not – be exercised.
Nowadays, the ‘supremacy’ of parliament in the United Kingdom must
also be considered against the United Kingdom’s membership of the
European Union,5 which has significant implications for the classical doctrine
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2 See Chapters 4 and 19.
3 See Chapter 7.
4 See Chapters 4 and 19.
5 See Chapters 8 and 9.
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of sovereignty. Since 1972, when the United Kingdom acceded to the
European Community,6 the United Kingdom has in many respects ceased to
be an autonomous, independent state and has become a member of an ever-
expanding European political, economic and legal order, the impact of which
reaches to the heart of the constitution. In legal terms, it is undeniable that the
United Kingdom Parliament could decide to withdraw from the European
Union. It is, however, arguable that, in light of the non-legal restraints –
political and economic – there exists little real power to withdraw from the
Union. The non-legal restraints are in fact more important in this regard than
the simple legal rule that parliament is sovereign in its law making powers.
To illustrate further the distinction between absolute legal power and
practical power, in terms of law, the Crown has the right to appoint the Prime
Minister of its choice, and the power to dissolve parliament when it chooses.7
To know these rules, however, is not to know very much, for the legal powers
of the Crown are restricted – constrained – by non-legal, ‘conventional’ rules
which determine the conditions under which the Crown has a discretion to
exercise its powers. In order, therefore, to understand issues such as the
appointment of a Prime Minister and the rules regulating the dissolution of
parliament, it is necessary to understand the conventional rules which have
developed over time and have taken on binding force.
THE CONCEPT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM8
‘Constitutionalism’ is the doctrine which governs the legitimacy of
government action. By constitutionalism is meant – in relation to constitutions
written and unwritten – conformity with the broad philosophical values
within a state. Constitutionalism implies something far more important than
the idea of ‘legality’ which requires official conduct to be in accordance with
pre-fixed legal rules. A power may be exercised on legal authority; however,
that fact is not necessarily determinative of whether or not the action was
‘constitutional’. The doctrine of constitutionalism suggests, at least, the
following:
(a) that the exercise of power be within the legal limits conferred by
parliament on those with power – the concept of intra vires – and that those
who exercise power are accountable to law;
(b) the exercise of power – irrespective of legal authority – must conform to
the notion of respect for the individual and the individual citizen’s rights;
5
6 The original three Communities are now referred to as the European Community. This
forms a major part of the European Union, which came into being under the Treaty on
European Union 1992 (the Maastricht Treaty).
7 See Chapter 6.
8 See Bogdanor, 1988, ‘Introduction’; McAuslan and McEldowney, 1985, p 11 ff.
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(c) that the powers conferred on institutions within a state – whether
legislative, executive or judicial – be sufficiently dispersed between the
various institutions so as to avoid the abuse of power; and
(d) that the government, in formulating policy, and the legislature, in
legitimating that policy, are accountable to the electorate on whose trust
power is held.
In summary, constitutionalism suggests the limitation of power,9 the
separation of powers10 and the doctrine of responsible accountable
government. It is against these conceptual and practical requirements that the
constitution of the United Kingdom must be studied and evaluated.
WHAT IS A CONSTITUTION?
In lay terms, a constitution is a set of rules which governs an organisation.
Every organisation, whether social club, trade union or nation state, which has
defined objectives and departments or offices established to accomplish those
objectives, needs a constitution to define the powers, rights and duties of the
organisation’s members. This set of rules, in addition to regulating the internal
working of the organisation, will also make provision for the manner in which
the organisation relates to outside bodies. It can therefore be said that a
constitution looks to both internal and external regulation of the body to
which it relates.
In addition to the function of defining powers and duties and relationships
with other bodies, a constitution fulfils two related purposes – those of
definition and evaluation. In its defining function, the constitution is both
descriptive and prescriptive (or normative). Differently expressed, the
constitution will both define the manner in which the rules in fact operate and
dictate what ought to happen in a given situation. As such, the rule or
normative statement in question sets a standard of conduct or behaviour
which is regarded as correct and which is expected to be adhered to by those
to whom the rules are addressed. These constitutional rules – whether written
or unwritten – facilitate the stability and predictability of behaviour. Further,
when such normative rules exist, they provide a standard against which
actual conduct can be judged or evaluated. If the accusation is made that a
member of an organisation has acted ‘unconstitutionally’, the speaker is
claiming that those accused have acted in a manner which breaches the
required standards of behaviour as laid down in the body of generally
accepted pre-determined normative rules. In this sense, a constitutional rule,
in addition to being descriptive, normative and predictive, is evaluative and
judgmental.
9 See Chapter 4.
10 See Chapter 5.
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When examining the rules of any organisation, it becomes apparent that
individual rules have differing levels of importance and, moreover, that rules
may have differing degrees of specificity or generality. The manner in which
the rules are expressed may also differ; some may be written down, whereas
some may be discernible only through observation of actual conduct. And
thus it is with the constitution of a state, and particularly that of the United
Kingdom, in which the sources of constitutional law are varied. The legal
sources are represented by a mixture of statute and judicial precedent, and
these legal sources are supplemented by the binding, non-legal, conventional
rules and practices.11 The rules of constitutional law will also reveal
differences in the manner in which they may be changed to adapt to changing
circumstances. Under a written constitution, the constitution will itself define
the procedure for amendment and may provide for varying degrees of ease or
difficulty in amendment in relation to particular rules. The rules regarded as
the most important are characterised by the greatest degree of difficulty in the
process of amendment. Under the United Kingdom’s constitution, by way of
contrast, the manner in which constitutional change is effected will be
dependent not upon clearly defined written rules but, rather, by accepted
constitutional practice which has evolved over time.
DEFINING CONSTITUTIONS
Professor KC Wheare defines the constitution of a state as:
... the whole system of government of a country, the collection of rules which
establish and regulate or govern the government. [1966, p 1]
An older definition, that of Thomas Paine, reveals a more complex set of ideas:
A constitution is not the act of a government, but of a people constituting a
government, and a government without a constitution is power without right
... A constitution is a thing antecedent to a government; and a government is
only the creature of a constitution. [1792, Pt II, p 93]
From this second definition, it can be discerned that a constitution is
something which is prior to government, or, as Paine expresses it, ‘antecedent’
to government, giving legitimacy to the government and defining the powers
under which a government may act. As such, the constitution sets limits both
to the powers which can be exercised and to the manner in which they may be
exercised. Accordingly, the constitution defines the legality of power. This
notion is particularly apposite in a country with a written constitution and a
Supreme Court which is conferred with jurisdiction to rule on the legality of
government action. Under such a constitutional arrangement, it can be said
that everything which the government does is either lawful or unlawful
depending upon whether or not the contested conduct is held to be
11 See Chapter 2.
‘constitutional’ or not. Under a largely unwritten constitution, the position is
less clear-cut, and it may often be the case that conduct will be adjudged to be
‘unconstitutional’ and yet not be ‘unlawful’. This distinction will be returned
to in a subsequent discussion of the legal and non-legal sources of the
constitution. At this introductory stage, it need only be noted that the
unwritten nature of the United Kingdom’s constitution has given rise to
argument as to whether or not a constitution – as generally understood in the
majority of states – exists. Sir Ivor Jennings, author of The Law and the
Constitution, offers a balanced evaluation of this apparent paradox:
If a constitution means a written document, then obviously Great Britain has
no constitution. In countries where such a document exists, the word has that
meaning. But the document itself merely sets out rules determining the
creation and operation of governmental institutions, and obviously Great
Britain has such institutions and such rules. The phrase ‘British constitution’ is
used to describe those rules.12
CLASSIFYING CONSTITUTIONS
When looking for the salient characteristics of the constitution, it is helpful to
bear in mind the range of possible classifications which can be applied to any
constitution. Professor KC Wheare identifies the following classifications
(1966, Chapter 1):
(a) written and unwritten;
(b) rigid and flexible;
(c) supreme and subordinate;
(d) federal and unitary;
(e) separated powers and fused powers; and
(f) republican and monarchical.
Written and unwritten constitutions
A written constitution is one contained within a single document or a series of
documents, with or without amendments, defining the basic rules of the state.
The origins of written constitutions lie in the American War of Independence
(1775–83) and French Revolution (1789). More recent written constitutions
derive from the grant – or devolution – of legislative power from previously
imperial powers to former colonies and dominions,13 whether secured as a
result of peaceful settlement or violent revolution.14
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The feature which characterises all states with a written constitution is that
there has been a clear historical break with a previously pertaining
constitutional arrangement, thus providing the opportunity for a fresh
constitutional start. As Wheare explains:
If we investigate the origins of modern constitutions, we find that, practically
without exception, they were drawn up and adopted because people wished to
make a fresh start, so far as the statement of their system of government was
concerned ... The circumstances in which a break with the past and the need
for a fresh start come about vary from country to country, but in almost every
case in modern times, countries have a constitution for the very simple and
elementary reason that they wanted, for some reason, to begin again ... This
has been the practice certainly since 1787 when the American constitution was
drafted, and as the years passed, no doubt imitation and the force of example
have led all countries to think it necessary to have a constitution. [1966, p 4]
The absence of any such break in continuity in British history, from 1066 to the
current time,15 more than any other factor, explains the mainly unwritten
nature of the United Kingdom’s constitution.
The characterisation of constitutions into ‘written’ and ‘unwritten’ is,
however, too limited, for such classification tells neither the whole
constitutional story nor necessarily makes the constitution accessible to those
seeking to understand it. A written constitution will provide the basic rules,
but, for an understanding of the whole constitutional picture, it is also
necessary to examine subsequent interpretations of the constitution contained
in case law and the political practices which reveal the actual operation of the
constitution. At the heart of this matter lies one simple fact: all constitutions –
howsoever defined and categorised – are dynamic organisms. They are
dependent for much of their meaning and relevance on the societal
framework which surrounds them. Nowhere is this more apparent than in
relation to individual rights and liberties. The vast majority of states have
adopted both written constitutions and Bills of Rights stipulating the
inviolable rights of citizens – nevertheless, the political reality for many
citizens’ rights around the world is very different from the formally drafted
constitution. Irrespective of whether or not a state has a written constitution
and a Bill of Rights, it must be recognised that the actual protection of
individual rights, as with so much of the constitution, is explained not solely
by reference to written rules. Regardless of the form in which rights are
protected, in any society, it will be the democratic political process, political
practice and norms of acceptable governmental conduct which, while not
having the force of law, provide constitutional standards which determine the
respect accorded to individual rights.16 These constitutional features also
establish standards against which the probity of official conduct may be
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and 7).
16 See Bogdanor, 1988.
measured. It is for this reason that a true understanding of constitutions and
the concept of constitutionalism requires a deeper understanding than that
provided for by an analysis of the formal written rules.
Rigid and flexible constitutions
This classification rests primarily on the question whether or not constitutions
can be amended with ease. The framers of a written constitution,
endeavouring to provide a comprehensive legal framework for the state, will
naturally seek to protect its constitutional provisions from subsequent repeal
or amendment. Towards this end, all or many of the rules will be
‘entrenched’, that is to say the constitution will stipulate stringent procedures
to be followed in any attempt to amend the provision in question. As will be
seen later, entrenchment may take several forms, but its central characteristic
is that it either prevents, or makes difficult, amendment or repeal. By way of
example, the federal Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act of 1900
specifies the procedure to be adopted for its own alteration. An amending Bill
must pass through at least one House of Parliament by a specified majority
and the proposed amendment must be endorsed in a referendum which
approves the measure by an overall majority in at least four of the six states.17
In the 90 years between 1900 and 1990, 42 proposals for constitutional
amendment had been put forward. Of these, only eight were approved by a
majority of electors nationally and a majority of electors in a majority of states.
In this regard, it has been observed that ‘constitutionally speaking, Australia is
a frozen continent’.18 As a further example, under the United States’
constitution, constitutional amendments may be proposed either by a two-
thirds majority of both Houses of Congress or, following a request by the
legislatures of two-thirds of the States, by the convention summoned by
Congress. To be accepted, the proposed amendments must then be approved
by the legislatures of three-quarters of the states, or by conventions in three-
quarters of the states. Between 1813 and 1913, only three amendments had
been accepted; between 1913 and 1933 six amendments; and by 1951, only one
further amendment.19
The United Kingdom’s constitution, by comparison with the constitutions
of the United States and Australia, represents the height of flexibility. Under
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty examined in Chapter 7, parliament
is the supreme law making body and can pass any law, by a simple majority
vote in parliament, on any subject matter whatsoever. Moreover, no court
may hold an Act of Parliament to be void.20 Note for now, therefore, that
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under the United Kingdom’s constitution, no legal constraints can – under the
traditional doctrine of sovereignty – fetter parliament’s powers.21 Of
particular importance in this regard is the fact that no parliament may lay
down irreversible rules regulating future legislative procedures which must
be followed. The constitutional import of this lies in flexibility. It has been
argued, controversially, and continues to be argued, that the legislative
supremacy of parliament is constrained by various constitutional devices and
Acts of constitutional importance. However, it is significant that none of these
challenges has succeeded in limiting parliament’s theoretical power.
The issue of flexibility, however, should not be exaggerated. That there are
no legal restraints on what parliament does, does not mean that there are no
non-legal constraints. In practical terms, such ‘extra-legal’ constraints may be
as important as legal controls. By way of illustration of the distinction between
legal and non-legal constraints, Sir Ivor Jennings offers the example of
parliament passing an Act which bans smoking in the streets of Paris. As he
states, there is nothing in the constitution which prevents parliament from
doing precisely that: ‘If it enacts that smoking in the streets of Paris is an
offence, then it is an offence’ (1959b, p 170). The relevant Act so passed would
be valid and recognised by the English courts. However, the Act would be
totally ineffective and ignored by the courts and everyone else in France.
Equally, as Jennings states, ‘if Parliament enacted that all men should be
women, they would be women so far as the law is concerned’. Sir Leslie
Stephens, writing in the nineteenth century,22 asks what restrains parliament
from passing an Act providing that all blue-eyed babies be put to death? The
response to this question is that in legal-theoretical terms, of course
parliament could pass such a law, but in political terms, it neither could nor
would do so, for ultimately, parliament is dependent upon the support of the
electorate.
Supreme and subordinate constitutions
This constitutional category overlaps in many respects, although not totally,
with the classification into federal and unitary states. A ‘supreme’ constitution
refers to a state in which the legislative powers of the governing body are
unlimited. Conversely, a subordinate constitution is one whose powers are
limited by some higher authority.23
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22 See The Science of Ethics, 1882.
23 See Chapter 7 for discussion in relation to New South Wales (Australia) and South
Africa.
Federal and unitary constitutions
In many states, for example, the United States of America, Canada, Australia
and Malaysia, there exists a division of powers between central government
and the individual states or provinces which make up the federation. The
powers divided between the federal government and states or provinces will
be clearly set down in the constituent document. Some powers will be
reserved exclusively to the federal government (most notably, such matters as
defence and state security); some powers will be allocated exclusively to the
regional government (such as planning and the raising of local taxation); and
others will be held on the basis of partnership, powers being given to each
level of government with overriding power, perhaps, reserved for central
government. The common feature of all federal states is the sharing of power
between centre and region – each having an area of exclusive power, other
powers being shared on some defined basis. Equally common to all
federations is the idea that the written constitution is sovereign over
government and legislature and that their respective powers are not only
defined by the constitution but are also controlled by the constitution, which
will be interpreted and upheld by a Supreme Court.
The constitution of the United Kingdom presents a very different
arrangement from that outlined above. The state is unitary and there is no
defining written constitution controlling the powers of government or of the
legislature.24 Instead of a written constitution, there exists a sovereign
legislative body, which represents the ultimate law making power in the state.
Power is given to the Northern Ireland, Scottish and Welsh legislatures and to
local government, under Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament, to fulfil
defined functions such as the provision of services and raising of local
revenue to finance such services. However, no power is given to the regions
or to local government other than that decreed by parliament. Regional
parliaments and assemblies and local authorities are entirely creatures of Acts
of Parliament, and any power given can subsequently – subject only to
political acceptability to the electorate – be withdrawn. An illustration of this
point can be seen in relation to the statutory abolition of the Greater London
Council and other Metropolitan Borough Councils in 1985, under the Local
Government Act of that year. An example on a larger scale can be seen in the
grant of limited legislative authority to the Northern Ireland Assembly under
the Government of Ireland Act 1920. The law making power given in 1920
was later revoked by the United Kingdom Parliament by the Northern Ireland
Constitution Act 1973. Similarly, during the 1970s, the Labour government
planned to devolve limited legislative power to Scotland and Wales, and Acts
of Parliament were passed to this effect (Scotland Act 1978; Wales Act 1978).
Neither of those Acts was, however, brought into force, and legislative power
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in relation to both Scotland and Wales thus remained with the Westminster
Parliament.25 In 1998, however, devolution of power was again on the
constitutional agenda. The Scotland Act 1998, the Government of Wales Act
1998 and Northern Ireland Act 1998 each involve a decentralisation of power,
although ultimate sovereign power remains with the Westminster
Parliament.26
Separated powers and fused powers
The separation of powers is a fundamental constitutional concept which will
be discussed more fully in Chapter 5. With respect to the classification of
constitutions, the concept here requires outline consideration. The doctrine is
of great antiquity, dating back at least to Aristotle.27 John Locke, Viscount
Bolingbroke and Baron Montesquieu gave further expression to the idea.28
The essence of the doctrine is that the powers vested in the principal
institutions of the state – legislature, executive and judiciary – should not be
concentrated in the hands of any one institution.29 The object of such
separation is to provide checks on the exercise of power by each institution
and to prevent the potential for tyranny which might otherwise exist. A
constitution with clearly defined boundaries to power, and provisions
restraining one institution from exercising the power of another, is one in
conformity with the doctrine of separation of powers. This arrangement is
most readily achievable under a written constitution, although it is arguable
whether, under any constitution, a pure separation of powers is possible, or
indeed desirable, a point which will be returned to later. At the other end of
the spectrum of constitutional arrangements from a nearly ‘pure’ separation of
powers is a totalitarian state or a purely monarchical state. Under such a
constitution will be found a single figure, or single body, possessed with the
sole power to propose and enact law, to administer the state, and both to
apply and to adjudicate upon the law.
Under the largely unwritten constitution of the United Kingdom, the
separation of powers is difficult to ascertain and evaluate. There is undeniably
a distinct legislative body, executive, and judiciary, each exercising differing
powers. On further examination, however, it will be found that, in practice,
there are so many exceptions to the ‘pure’ doctrine that the significance of
separation of powers is called into question. Suffice to say at this introductory
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29 See Vile, 1967, Chapter IV.
stage that it is a doctrine which is respected under the constitution, despite
many apparent anomalies. 
Republican and monarchical constitutions
A republic is a state having as its figurehead a (usually) democratically elected
President, answerable to the electorate and to the constitution. Presidential
office is both a symbol of statehood and the repository of many powers. In the
name of the state, the President will enter into treaties, make declarations of
war, and represent the state on formal international and domestic occasions.
Additionally, as with the President of the United States of America, the
President has responsibility for proposing legislation to give effect to the
political programme which gave him the mandate of the people. The
President, however, has no formal power to initiate legislation, and it is the
Congress of the United States which will ultimately determine the
acceptability of legislative proposals. It may well be that the elected President
is from a different political party than that which dominates Congress.30
When that political situation pertains, the prospects for successful
implementation of Presidential election promises is weakened, and although
the President has a veto power over legislation passed by Congress, that veto
can be overridden by Congress voting with a two-thirds majority.
Looking at the United Kingdom as an example of a sophisticated Western
democracy based on constitutional monarchy, the position of the head of state
is very different.31 Queen Elizabeth II is the head of state, and all acts of
government are undertaken in the name of the Crown. This statement implies
that great power is accorded to the Queen. In reality, however, and with the
exception of important residual powers, this is not the case. As with the
President of the United States of America, the Queen is the figurehead – the
symbol of nationhood – on a domestic and international level. The Crown also
represents the continuity of the state. From an historical constitutional
viewpoint, it matters little which leader of which political party at any one
time occupies the office of Prime Minister, or whether he or she is a Labour or
Conservative Prime Minister, for he or she will be exercising all powers in the
Queen’s name. Unlike the position of the head of state under the United
States’ constitution, however, the Queen is, by definition, unelected and
unaccountable to the electorate in any democratic sense. The Crown enjoys
enormous legal-theoretical power but little practical power, save in
exceptional circumstances.
The legal powers held by the Crown are, for the most part,32 exercised in
her name by the elected government of the day. The rules which restrict the
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monarch’s powers are for the most part non-legal. The restrictions comprise
the all-important conventional rules of constitutional practice which regulate
so much of the United Kingdom’s constitution. Thus, for example, the Crown
has the legal power to withhold the royal assent from Bills passed by
parliament but, by convention, this assent will never be withheld (and has not
been withheld since 1708) unless so advised by the government.
In addition to representing the symbolic figurehead, the role of the Crown
may be said to be protective. The Queen, it has been said, has the power to
‘warn and advise’ the Prime Minister of the day.33 Queen Elizabeth II, since
her accession in 1952, has seen many Prime Ministers, both Conservative and
Labour, enter and leave office. Throughout that 50 year reign, the Queen has
quietly influenced government,34 and garnered vast experience in domestic,
international and particularly Commonwealth affairs. That experience
represents a wealth of knowledge at the disposal of the government in power.
While the role of the monarchy is a matter for contemporary debate, the
continuity and longevity of monarchy remains a distinguishing feature of the
United Kingdom’s constitution.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
UNITED KINGDOM’S CONSTITUTION
From the discussion of classification above, some conclusions can now be
reached about the characteristics of the United Kingdom’s constitution. In
summary, it can be said that it:
(a) is largely unwritten in character;
(b) is flexible in nature;
(c) is supreme;
(d) is unitary in structure, but, following the 1998 reforms, with some powers
devolved to a Scottish Parliament, to a Welsh Assembly, to the new
Northern Ireland Assembly and to local government;
(e) exhibits mainly but not completely separated powers; and
(f) is monarchical.
Each of these features will become clearer as we examine the constitution in
more detail.
THE CONSTITUTION IN FLUX
The absence of a written constitution, allied to the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty, enables constitutional change to be brought about within the
33 Bagehot (1867), 1993, Chapter II.
34 See Macmillan (1961–63), 1973; Wilson, 1976.
United Kingdom with the minimum of constitutional formality. The
constitution has evolved in a pragmatic and gradual manner over the
centuries. At the current time, however, the constitution is undergoing more
major change than in previous decades. The last and greatest constitutional
change occurred in 1973 when the United Kingdom joined the European
Communities.35 Joining the Community, which has now evolved as but one
part of the wider European Union, involved not only entering into an
agreement which affected the economic life of the country, but also joining a
unique legal order under which rights and obligations in matters regulated by
the treaties are ultimately defined and enforced by the European Court of
Justice. Moreover, the Treaties on European Union 1992 and 1997 mark new
and significant developments within the European Union in relation to
economic, monetary and political union and the evolution of common policies
in relation to co-operation in judicial and policing matters, home affairs and
security and foreign affairs policies.
It was the general election of 1997 which presaged further significant
constitutional change. The incoming Labour government had committed itself
to several constitutional reforms. Devolution of limited, but nonetheless wide
ranging, law making powers to Scotland and Wales was the first issue to be
addressed by the government.36 An elected ‘strategic authority’ for London
was also on the agenda, as was regional devolution in England. Reform of the
membership of the House of Lords, the ‘upper House’ of the United
Kingdom’s bicameral parliament, has already been effected, although the
ultimate role and powers of the Lords remains to be determined. The
settlement reached in April 1998 with regard to Northern Ireland has
culminated in devolved powers to a new Northern Ireland Assembly. The
government was also committed to the better protection of rights and
freedoms, and in order to achieve this objective, the Human Rights Act 1998
‘incorporated’ the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law,
thereby for the first time providing a ‘code’ of human rights which is not only
binding on public authorities and the courts and compels ministers to make
declarations of compatibility or incompatibility with Convention
requirements when presenting Bills to parliament, but also provides citizens
with the legal means by which to challenge the legality of administrative
action. As significantly, the Human Rights Act marks a change in perception
about freedoms and rights among the British people who, by contrast with
citizens living under written constitutions and Bills of Rights, have hitherto
been largely unaware of their rights and freedoms. 
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CHAPTER 2
As has been seen in Chapter 1, the United Kingdom’s constitution is classified
as ‘unwritten’. However, while there is no single constituent document, many
constitutional sources are of a written nature, albeit not conveniently
compiled within any one document. In order to give meaning to the
constitution as a whole, it is necessary to study the many fundamental
documents, statutes and cases together with the non-legal conventional rules
which surround and give meaning to the legal rules. In undertaking this
exercise, it must be remembered that what is being sought is not a rote-
learned catalogue of sources, but rather a broad appreciation of the
constituent elements of the constitution. 
DEFINITIONAL DIFFICULTIES
Defining the scope of sources which are correctly labelled ‘constitutional’
under an unwritten constitution is an inherently difficult exercise. Were the
United Kingdom to have a written constitution, all of the rules now contained
within various sources would be contained within it. By this means, a clear
picture would be obtained as to those rules which the framers of the
constitution regarded as being of ‘constitutional importance’. In the absence of
such a document, matters are less clear-cut and doubt exists as to precisely
which rules – statutory, common law or conventional – are correctly defined
as ‘constitutional’ rules. As Geoffrey Marshall explains:
[N]o easy logical limit can be set to the labour of the constitutional lawyers ...
any branch of the law, whether it deals prima facie with finance or crime or local
government, may throw up constitutional questions. [1971, p 6]
The disadvantage of such a lack of precision may be illustrated in relation to
the legal protection of civil liberties and human rights before the Human
Rights Act 1998. Hitherto, in the United Kingdom, having neither a
domestically enforceable Bill of Rights nor a written constitution, doubts as to
such sensitive matters had been resolvable under an application under the
European Convention on Human Rights1 and, in some instances, by the Court
of Justice of the European Community. However, because the European
Convention was not enacted into English law until the Human Rights Act
1998, no domestic court could provide a remedy for alleged abuses of rights
protected under the European Convention unless statute, common law or
rights under European Community law provided a remedy. As a result, an
individual citizen seeking to discover precisely what legal rights he or she had
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was obliged to scrutinise the statute book, the text of the European
Convention on Human Rights, and the treaties and case law relating to
European Community law. The Human Rights Act 1998 remedied this
deficiency by conferring jurisdiction on domestic courts of law to rule on
Convention rights.
It is even more difficult, in the absence of a written constitution, for the
citizen to discern, at a conceptual level, precisely what is and what is not a
‘constitutional issue’. As Marshall observes, all legal issues in the United
Kingdom are potentially capable of being interpreted as constitutional issues.
That fact is not, however, reassuring to the student of the constitution who is
trying to define its scope and limits.
To illustrate this definitional difficulty, questions as to the status of many
and differing statutes may be briefly examined. 
Employment law
Statutes regulating relations between workers and employers define the
extent to which an employee is free to withdraw his or her labour, to act in
support of a dispute between him or herself and his or her employer, and to
act in support of other workers in support of a dispute with employers. Such
matters raise the fundamental question of the individual’s right to withdraw
his or her labour and the conditions under which this is lawful. Are such
statutes ‘constitutional’ in nature?
Pornography
Also by way of illustration, in the United Kingdom, the Obscene Publications
Act 1959 (as amended), an ordinary Act of Parliament having no particular
‘constitutional status’, provides the legal rules relating to pornographic
literature. In contrast, in the United States of America, legal challenges to the
availability of and access to allegedly pornographic material fall under the
First Amendment to the Constitution.2 The subject of pornography in the
United States may accordingly be classified as a clearly constitutional issue,
being regarded as a question of freedom of ‘speech’.
Abortion
In the United Kingdom, the right to abortion is defined under the Abortion
Act 1967 (as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990).
In the United States of America, by contrast, the right to abortion falls under
the constitutional right to privacy provisions of the constitution. The
constitution of the Republic of Ireland prohibits abortion under its right to life
provisions, and a recent challenge to that prohibition was launched under the
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guise of restrictions on equal access to information and the right to free
movement to receive services under the law of the European Community.3
These examples are not intended to lead to an analysis of the substantive
legal and constitutional issues, but rather to demonstrate a very real and
important point of principle. That point is that under a written constitution, a
particular issue may be defined as a ‘constitutional’ issue. Under an unwritten
constitution, matters are far less certain. Pornography and abortion are clearly
regarded as constitutional matters in some jurisdictions.
There are obvious limitations to the utility of merely listing statutory and
common law sources of the constitution. It is, however, important at an early
stage of study to be familiar with the major statutory sources of the
constitution.
LEGAL SOURCES
The Magna Carta
One starting point is the Magna Carta of 1215.4 Historically, the Magna Carta
represented a formal settlement between the Crown and the barons. The
Charter represented settlement of the grievances of citizens and challenged
the untrammelled powers of the King. The settlement provided for freedom of
the Church, and the right of merchants to be free from exorbitant taxation.
Today, the document’s importance lies in its declaration of the confirmation of
the liberties enjoyed by ‘freemen of the realm’ and their future protection, and
in the protection to be given to the enjoyment of these liberties by the
requirement for trial by jury:
No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his freehold, or
liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise
destroyed; nor will we pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful
judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will
not deny or defer to any man either justice or right. [Holt, 1965, Chapter XXIX]
While of little legal importance today – for much of the original Magna Carta
has been repealed – the document has symbolic value as an early assertion of
the limits of monarchical power and the rights of individuals.
The Petition of Right 1628
The Petition of Right 1628 arose as a result of Darnel’s Case (the Five Knights’
Case) (1627), where the defendants had been convicted and imprisoned for
refusing to pay a loan imposed by King Charles I. The Petition forbade such
loans, taxes and other monetary demands without the consent of parliament.
The Petition, while still in force, was superseded by the Bill of Rights 1689.
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The Bill of Rights 1689
The background
The Bill of Rights 1689 is of greater contemporary constitutional importance
than the Magna Carta and the Petition of Right. The source of the Bill of
Rights lies, in large measure, in the tensions between Roman Catholicism and
the state, originating with the conflict between the Holy See of Rome and
Henry VIII (1491–1547). The Succession Act, Act of Supremacy and the
Treason Act 1534 had established the supremacy of the King as head of the
Church of England and destroyed formal papal authority in England.
Catholicism did not die out, but over the next 150 years, suspicion and fear of
‘popery’ remained high at a public level. The death of Charles II in 1685
heralded the succession of James II, an avowed Roman Catholic, who
nevertheless publicly declared himself bound ‘to preserve this government
both in Church and state as it is now by law established’.5 Despite such
assurances, in subsequent years James II strove to remove discrimination
against Catholics and to place Catholics in prominent public administrative
offices at both central and local level. Prominent Anglicans, dismayed by
James’s promotion of Catholicism, entered into negotiations with William of
Orange, the Protestant husband of James’s daughter Mary, with a view to
their seizing the throne. In the absence of a male heir, Mary was next in line to
the English Crown. However, in 1688, James’s wife gave birth to a son, thus
providing a Catholic heir. In July of that year, James dissolved parliament.
William of Orange landed in England with his army on 5 November 1688 and
James II fled the country, landing in France in December 1688.
The ‘Convention’ parliament
William summoned an assembly of peers, previous Members of Parliament
and aldermen of London. William, not yet king, had no legal power to
summon the assembly, and the assembly itself had no legal powers. The
assembly advised Prince William to summon a Convention of peers and
commoners. The Convention, meeting in January 1689, declared that James II
had subverted the constitution and abdicated and that, accordingly, the
throne was ‘vacant’. The House of Lords subsequently agreed with the
Convention, and on 13 February 1689, the Crown was offered to William and
Mary. The Convention then proceeded to declare itself to be the parliament of
England. The parliament had no authority to issue such a declaration: the only
lawful manner in which a parliament can come into being is by Writ of
Summons from the Crown, and it is for this reason that the Convention
parliament is widely regarded as having no law making powers:
Chapter 2: Constitutional and Administrative Law
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... it is difficult for a lawyer to regard the Convention Parliament as a lawfully
constituted assembly. By whom was it summoned? Not by a king of England,
but by a Prince of Orange. Even if we go back three centuries, we find no
precedent ... If, when the Convention met, it was no Parliament, its own act
could not turn it into a Parliament. The act which declares it to be a Parliament
depends for its validity on the assent of William and Mary. The validity of that
assent depends on their being king and queen; but how do they come to be
king and queen? Indeed, this statute very forcibly brings out the difficulty – an
incurable defect. [Maitland, 1908, pp 284–85]
Nevertheless, the Convention parliament passed the Bill of Rights, which
incorporated the Declaration of Right which set out the terms under which the
Crown was offered to William and Mary. The Convention parliament
continued in being until 1690 when a new parliament, correctly summoned by
the Crown, met.
William and Mary’s accession was not to be unconditional.6 The
Declaration of Right sought to resolve the actual and potential tensions
between Crown and parliament, Church and state. The terms of the Bill of
Rights marked a sharp alteration in the balance of power between Crown and
parliament – in parliament’s favour.7
The substance of the Bill of Rights
The principal provisions of contemporary importance are:
Article I the pretended power of suspending ... or executing laws by
the Crown without parliamentary consent is illegal;
Article IV the levying of money for use of the Crown under the
prerogative without parliamentary consent is illegal;
Article VI the raising or keeping of an army in peacetime without
parliamentary consent is illegal;
Article VIII elections of Members of Parliament ought to be free;
Article IX freedom of speech and debates in proceedings in parliament
ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or
place out of parliament;
Article X excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted;
Article XI jury trial is available; and
Article XIII for the redress of grievances, parliament ought to meet
frequently.
Subsequent to the Bill of Rights – and to give effect to its provisions – the
Crown and Parliament Recognition Act 1689 gave statutory force to the Bill of
Rights, and the Meeting of Parliament Act 1694 provided that parliament
must be summoned to meet at least once in three years.
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The Act of Settlement 1700
The Act of Settlement 1700 clarified the line of succession to the throne. The
Act also provided for security of tenure for the judiciary ‘during good
behaviour’,8 thus ending the power of the Crown to dismiss judges at will. In
relation to succession to the throne, the Act tied the succession to Protestant
heirs, thus prohibiting accession to the throne by persons who are Roman
Catholics, or who marry a Roman Catholic.
The Treaty of Union 1706
The Treaty of Union also has enduring constitutional effect. The Treaty united
England and Scotland under a single parliament of Great Britain. Prior to the
Treaty, each country enjoyed independent sovereign status. Scotland had its
own parliament and its own system of private law. Decades earlier, James VI,
King of Scotland and subsequently King of England (as James I (1603–25)),
had attempted but failed to bring about a union between Scotland and
England. By the late seventeenth century, negotiations were continuing with a
view to ending the historical conflicts between the two countries,9 and the
Treaty of Union represented the culmination of this process. See, further,
Chapter 7.
The major provisions of the Treaty of Union 1706
For current purposes, the most important provisions are as follows:
Article I that the two kingdoms of England and Scotland shall be
united in one kingdom by the name of Great Britain;
Article II that succession to the united throne be according to the Act of
Settlement 1700;
Article III that there be a single parliament;
Article XVIII that no alteration be made in laws which concern Scottish
private rights except for the evident utility of the subjects;
and
Article XVIX that the Court of Session in Scotland remain ‘in all time being
as now constituted’, and that lower courts remain subject to
alteration in their powers by parliament.
The European Communities Act 1972
The European Communities Act 1972, as amended, together with the Treaties
on European Union 1992, 1997 and 2000, regulate the United Kingdom’s
membership of the European Union and continue to have immense
significance for the constitution of the United Kingdom (see Chapters 8 and 9
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and, further, below). The law of the European Union and Community
represents an increasingly significant source of constitutional law. By acceding
to the European Community, and subsequently the Union, the United
Kingdom has undertaken the obligation to accept the law of the Union. To
understand the constitutional implications of membership of the European
Union, it is necessary to understand the scope of the Treaties and the law
making institutions, and the manner in which laws are made and enter into
force within the legal systems of the Member States. It is also necessary to
understand clearly the relationship between European law and domestic law
and the question as to which law has supremacy should a conflict between
them arise. Under the traditional doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, the
law of the United Kingdom Parliament alone has sovereign power. The
perception of the European Court of Justice – the highest court of the
European Union – is much different. As will be seen, the European Court has
long asserted the supremacy of Community law10 over the laws of Member
States, thus providing a fertile source for constitutional speculation about the
Diceyan theory of sovereignty. See Chapters 8 and 9.
The royal prerogative
The prerogative powers of the Crown are those powers which arise out of the
common law and which are unique to the Crown. Two definitions may be
given by way of introduction. To Dicey, the prerogative powers were ‘the
residue of arbitrary and discretionary powers legally left in the hands of the
Crown’ which, being exercised by the government in the name of the Crown,
entails ‘every act which the executive government can do without the
authority of an Act of Parliament’ ((1898), 1959, p 425).
Blackstone, in his Commentaries, offers a more limited definition:
... that special pre-eminence which the King hath over and above all persons,
and out of the ordinary course of the common law ... And ... only applied to
those rights and capacities which the King enjoys in contradistinction to others.
The prerogative will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
Acts establishing devolution
The Acts establishing a Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly and re-
establishing a Northern Ireland Assembly have decentralised the process of
government and law-making, giving greater national autonomy to Northern
Ireland, Scotland and Wales.
The Human Rights Act 1998
The Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporates the rights enshrined in the
European Convention on Human Rights and Freedoms into domestic law
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represents a fundamental change in the domestic protection of rights. The
impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 has already been felt across wide areas
of domestic law and provides citizens for the first time with a code of rights
which are enforceable in the domestic courts rather than in the European
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
Further illustrations
Further statutes of major constitutional importance – and the list is by no
means exhaustive – include the following:
(a) the Statute of Westminster 1931 gave statutory force to the conventions
regulating relations between the sovereign United Kingdom Parliament
and legislatures of the Dominions;
(b) His Majesty’s Declaration of Abdication Act 1936 varied the succession to
the throne established under the Act of Settlement 1700;
(c) the Regency Acts 1937–53 provided that if the Sovereign is under the age
of 18, regal powers shall be exercised through a Regent appointed under
the Acts; 
(d) the Royal Titles Act 1953, which founded a challenge from Scottish
lawyers to its compatibility with the Act of Union,11 provided that the
Sovereign may by Proclamation adopt such a style and titles as she may
think fit;
(e) the Treaty of Union with Ireland Act 1800, the Government of Ireland Act
1920, the Ireland Act 1949 and the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973
have all reflected the changing constitutional relationship between Ireland,
Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom.
Throughout history, the judiciary has, through case law, defined the
relationship between the institutions of the state – the Crown, the executive,
parliament and the judiciary – and defined the relationship between the state
and the individual. As with statutory sources of the constitution, the entire
study of constitutional and administrative law concerns the examination and
analysis of judicial precedents. The relationship between the judiciary and
parliament is discussed in detail in Chapter 5, but note at this introductory
stage the following points. With the rise in parliamentary supremacy in the
seventeenth century, the role of the judges changed significantly, and it has
long been accepted that the dictum of Coke CJ in Dr Bonham’s Case, to the effect
that the judges could declare an Act of Parliament void, does not – if indeed it
ever did12 – represent the law. The judiciary today has no power to question
the validity of an Act of Parliament.13 However, whilst Acts of Parliament are
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unchallengeable as to their validity, delegated or secondary legislation is not
immune from such review. Furthermore, the judges have the power to review
the legality of acts of persons and organisations acting under powers
conferred by Act of Parliament in order to ensure that they act intra vires the
powers conferred by parliament. Note also that, in relation to the conduct of
its business, parliament claims many privileges and immunities. As will be
seen, judicial deference to parliament extends to the judges declining
jurisdiction over any matter of parliamentary privilege, other than to rule
whether or not a matter is in fact a matter of privilege. Article IX of the Bill of
Rights 1689 confers the absolute privilege of freedom of speech in
parliamentary proceedings. Accordingly, a Member of Parliament is free from
any threat from the law of defamation by any person harmed by his exercise
of free speech.14
The extent to which judges have been able to protect individual rights
under the common law has – in the light of parliament’s supremacy – been
limited. Traditionally, the United Kingdom had no Bill of Rights in so far as
such a document provides a written source of protection for certain
fundamental rights and freedoms. In the absence of such guaranteed
protection – protection which would prevail even against an Act of Parliament
– the citizen remained dependent either upon ad hoc statutory provisions –
such as the Habeas Corpus Acts (1679, 1816, 1862), the Race Relations Act 1976
or the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 – or upon judicial protection under the
common law (see Chapters 19–22). By way of introductory illustration, the
very differing cases of Entick v Carrington (1765) and Liversidge v Anderson
(1942) may be cited. In the former case, the court ruled that a general warrant
issued by a Home Secretary for the entry into private property and seizure of
allegedly seditious material was contrary to law and amounted to a trespass
to property. This bold assertion of judicial power to rule on the legality of acts
of the executive and to control such acts is in stark contrast to the ruling in
Liversidge v Anderson. Here, in the context of a challenge to the legality of
detention without warrant under the order of the Home Secretary, the House
of Lords held that the courts could not, in times of emergency, review the
Home Secretary’s belief that detention was justified. Such conflicting
outcomes demonstrate that reliance on judicial protection from executive
action, under common law, is by no means certain, let alone guaranteed. The
Human Rights Act 1998, however, ‘incorporated’ the European Convention
on Human Rights into domestic law, and now enables citizens to challenge
the legality of government action against the provisions of the Convention. As
will be discussed in Chapter 22, the Act does not empower the courts to
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challenge the validity of Acts of Parliament, but rather preserves parliament’s
traditional sovereignty by empowering the courts to make declarations of the
incompatibility of a statute with the Convention requirements. Thereafter, it is
for the government and parliament to change the law if it wishes to comply
with the Convention requirements.
NON-LEGAL SOURCES OF THE CONSTITUTION
Constitutional conventions
The short explanation of the constitutional conventions is that they provide the
flesh which clothes the dry bones of the law; they make the legal constitution
work; they keep it in touch with the growth of ideas.15
Constitutional conventions form the most significant class of non-legal
constitutional rules.16 A clear understanding of their nature, scope and
manner of application is essential to the study of the United Kingdom’s
constitution. Conventions supplement the legal rules of the constitution and
define the practices of the constitution. Conventions, as Jennings states,
‘provide the flesh which clothes the dry bones of the law’ and represent the
‘unwritten maxims’ of the constitution. Conventions apply to virtually all
aspects of the constitution, and for this reason it is, in part, unrealistic and
unsatisfactory to attempt adequately to consider their role in a ‘vacuum’.
Nevertheless, given their central importance, conventions must be considered
at this early stage, while bearing in mind that many and varied further
illustrations will emerge throughout the course of study.
Conventions defined
Conventions are defined by AV Dicey as:
... conventions, understandings, habits or practices which, though they may
regulate the ... conduct of the several members of the sovereign power ... are
not in reality laws at all since they are not enforced by the courts. [(1898), 1959,
p clii]
Marshall and Moodie offer an alternative definition:
... rules of constitutional behaviour which are considered to be binding by and
upon those who operate the constitution but which are not enforced by the law
courts ... nor by the presiding officers in the Houses of Parliament. [1971,
pp 23–24]
A number of important questions arise concerning these non-legal rules,
namely:
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(a) What are the characteristics of a conventional rule?
(b) What is the source or origin of the rule?
(c) In what manner are conventions distinguishable from laws?
(d) Who is bound by the conventional rules?
(e) What is the consequence of a breach of the rule?
(f) Does the distinction between law and convention really matter?
(g) What is the attitude of the courts to conventional rules?
(h) How do conventions change?
(i) How best can these rules be analysed and understood? and
(j) Should conventions be codified?
Each of these questions, many of which overlap, must be addressed and
answered.
Conventions illustrated
Before turning attention to the task of further analysis, some examples of
constitutional conventions will aid understanding. Each of these conventions
will be discussed in greater detail later in this book. The number given at the
end of each paragraph indicates which chapter should be referred to for
further detail.
(a) Acts of Parliament are technically enacted by the Queen in Parliament –
the Crown, Commons and Lords. The Queen has the legal right to refuse
to give the royal assent to Bills passed by the House of Commons and
Lords. By convention, the Queen must assent to such Bills unless advised
to the contrary by her government (6);
(b) the Queen will appoint as Prime Minister the leader of the political party
with the majority of seats in the House of Commons (6);
(c) the Prime Minister must be a member of the House of Commons (6);
(d) the government must maintain the confidence of the House of Commons.
If a ‘vote of confidence’ on a matter central to government policy is lost,
the government must resign or advise the Queen to dissolve parliament
(6);
(e) the Crown exercises its right to dissolve parliament on the advice of
ministers (6);
(f) ministers of the Crown are individually and collectively responsible to
parliament (11);
(g) ministers must be members of either the House of Commons or the House
of Lords (10);
(h) parliament must be summoned to meet at least once a year (14);
(i) judges shall not play an active part in political life (5);
(j) Members of Parliament shall not criticise the judiciary (5);
(k) the opinion of the law officers of the Crown is confidential (11); and
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(l) when speaking for the government in the House of Lords, the Lord
Chancellor physically moves from the Woolsack which he occupies in his
capacity as Lord Chancellor and Speaker of the House of Lords.
This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but is sufficient to give a flavour of
the nature and scope of constitutional conventions.
The binding nature of conventions
The characteristics of conventions are suggested both by Dicey and by
Marshall and Moodie. The latter authors correctly introduce the concept of a
‘rule’, and it is this concept which is central to our understanding and which
requires further analysis. What is a rule? A rule may be defined as a statement
prescribing the conduct which is required in a given situation and which
imposes an obligation on those who are regulated by the rule.17 The idea of
obligation is of prime importance here, for if a person is under an obligation
which is recognised by observers of the constitution, and that person fails to
act in accordance with the obligation, then that failure will give rise to
legitimate criticism which will invariably be phrased in terms of
‘constitutionality’. To reiterate, the obligation imposes a standard of conduct
which is expected to be followed. The obligation is ‘normative’: by that is
meant that the rule is ‘prescriptive’ – that it dictates the appropriate form of
action in a particular situation. As Sir Ivor Jennings states, conventions ‘not
only are followed but have to be followed’ (1959a, p 2).
Dicey’s definition suggests that conventions are of the same quality as
‘understandings, habits or practices’. This view is inaccurate in so far as none
of these words conveys the idea of obligation – the normative (or prescriptive)
– the idea of what ought to be done in particular circumstances.
Conventions distinguished from habits
Conventions are conceptually different from ‘habits’ or ‘practices’ in that these
concepts do not prescribe or dictate what ought to happen but are merely
descriptive of what in fact does happen. To offer a simple but possibly
outdated example, consider the statement that ‘the English drink tea in the
afternoon’. Drinking tea is a habit: the statement is simply reflective of actual
observable conduct. There is nothing in the statement which requires that
conduct, or which states that it ought to happen. Accordingly, it is a
descriptive and not a normative statement. If the English fail to drink tea in
the afternoon, or drink coffee instead, that action is not going to give rise to
any criticism because a mere habit imposes no obligation. The observation is a
statement of what ‘is’, and not what ‘ought to be’. There is no obligation
imposed on the English to drink tea and hence no criticism will follow from
failure to do so. It is very different with a breach of a constitutional
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convention, which will invariably give rise to adverse criticism. Conventions
are thus distinguishable from habits.
Conventions distinguished from understandings
To what extent is Dicey correct in equating conventions with
‘understandings’? Once more, it is helpful to resort to definitions. The word
‘understanding’ connotes a mutual agreement between relevant actors as to
the pertinent subject matter, or the manner in which it is appropriate to
respond or react to a given situation. As such, any understanding rests on a
meeting of minds, and is capable of being the subject of misunderstanding, as
in cases where the actors, through a lack of understanding of the situation (or
as a result of a differing interpretation of the situation), fail to be of ‘one mind’.
An ‘understanding’ may well be relied on by the parties, as are conventions.
Understandings may also be brought about by some form of previous, or
precedent, conduct or mutual recognition: but this is not a prerequisite for
their existence or nature. Most importantly, an understanding, while
imposing some weak form of moral obligation will not, in the case of failure to
comply with its terms, give rise to a sanction in the form of criticism of the
same magnitude as that of a breach of a constitutional convention. The
explanation for this lies in the fact that an understanding – as opposed to a
convention – does not amount to a rule, and accordingly is not obligation-
imposing to the same degree as a convention.
Conventions distinguished from practices
The concept of a practice remains for consideration. A practice may be defined
as being ‘a usual or customary action or proceeding’.18 A practice, therefore, is
the normal manner in which a person or body will react to a factual situation
on the basis of some precedent form of conduct. In everyday life – whether in
commercial offices or in the professions of medicine or law – it is a
commonplace assertion that ‘it is our practice to do ...’. That statement
conveys the message that past experience of doing something in a particular
way is the correct way of proceeding, and that – unless there are justifiable
reasons for not so doing – the practice will be adhered to. A practice,
therefore, may be distinguished from a mere habit on the basis that it imports
a notion of reflectiveness, the idea of the ‘right’ way of reacting to a situation.
How, then, is a practice distinguishable from a convention? The borderline
between the two is admittedly fine. It may be, however, that the correct
dividing line is drawn on the basis of the concept of obligation and rule, and
that it is legitimate to argue that whilst a practice imposes some form of weak
obligation – and requires some justification for departure from the practice –
the practice is no more than an emergent or potential convention and has not
yet acquired the binding characteristic of a rule.
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Conventions distinguished from laws
Conventions are distinguishable from laws in a number of important respects.
First, the source of a legal rule is, for the most part, identifiable and certain. In
searching for a legal rule, its source will normally be found within a judicial
decision or within an Act of Parliament. Conventions are far less certain in
their origins, and it may at times be difficult to see whether a particular form
of conduct is, for example, one of practice or convention. Secondly, the core
content of a legal rule will generally have a settled meaning. One often-cited
example illustrates the point. In Chapter VII of The Concept of Law, Professor
HLA Hart offers the example of the correct interpretation of the word ‘vehicle’
in a statute or delegated legislation (for example, in local authority bylaws). A
judge, interpreting the word within the context of a trial concerning an alleged
violation of a bylaw prohibiting the use of vehicles in a public park, will be
clear, for example, that a motor car, van or armoured truck will fall within the
meaning of the word ‘vehicle’. But what of a skateboard or its successor,
rollerblades? A skateboard shares some of the characteristics of the other
examples given: a skateboard is a wheeled object and capable of conveying a
person from point A to point B. Is it then a ‘vehicle’? Professor Hart makes
two important points here. The first point is that to make sense of the word
‘vehicle’, the word must be placed within its broader context. That is to say,
the question must be asked: ‘For what purpose was the rule devised?’ In other
words, can the judge provide an interpretation which is meaningful within
the context of the legislature’s intention?
The second point, of greater significance to this discussion, is that most
words – legal or non-legal – have a ‘core of certainty and penumbra of doubt’,
and that while a motorised wheeled object designed for the carriage of
persons and goods is clearly a vehicle, an object designed for purely
recreational purposes may, or may not, subject to the court’s interpretation of
the purpose of the legislation, fall within the meaning of a particular word.
The foregoing discussion can be presented – albeit with recognition of
overlaps between, and ambiguities in, the concepts – in the following tabular
form:
HABITS UNDERSTANDINGS PRACTICES CONVENTIONS LAWS
Regularity
of conduct yes not necessarily yes yes yes
Reflectiveness no yes yes yes yes
Degree of 
obligation 
imposed none weak strong absolute absolute
Sanction none justification justification charge of unlawful
attending required required unconstitutional conduct
breach conduct
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Summary of the meaning of constitutional conventions
A constitutional convention is a non-legal rule which imposes an obligation
on those bound by the convention, breach or violation of which will give rise
to legitimate criticism; and that criticism will generally take the form of an
accusation of ‘unconstitutional conduct’.
The source of conventions
The question concerning the source of the constitutional convention is in part
interwoven with the characteristics of the convention. A conventional rule
may be said to exist when a traditional practice has been consciously adopted
and recognised by those who operate the constitution as the correct manner in
which to act in a given circumstance. A practice will be seen to have become a
convention at the point at which failure to act in accordance with it gives rise
to legitimate criticism.
Sir Ivor Jennings once suggested that three questions must be asked in
order to determine whether a convention exists. First, are there any precedents
for the convention? ‘Mere practice,’ he tells us, ‘is not enough. The fact that an
authority has always behaved in a certain way is no warrant for saying that it
ought to behave in that way.’ What more, then, is required? According to
Jennings, that turns on the normativity of the practice: 
... if the authority itself and those connected with it believe that they ought to
do so [behave in a certain way], then the convention does exist ... Practice alone
is not enough. It must be normative. [1959a, p 135]
Finally, Jennings argues that neither practice nor precedent is sufficient. In
addition, there must be a reason for the rule: ‘... the creation of a convention
must be due to the reason of the thing because it accords with the prevailing
political philosophy.’ This point is supported by JP Mackintosh. Accepting
Viscount Esher’s view that ‘precedent, like analogy, is rarely conclusive’ (1915,
p 167), Mackintosh argues that precedents have ‘no independent existence or
validity’. Rather, the precedent represents ‘a correct decision or action in
certain political circumstances’. Accordingly:
... searching for a precedent is really looking for a case where previous
exponents of the constitution have solved a similar difficulty in an approved
fashion. [Mackintosh, 1977, p 13]
Situations will arise for which there is no apparent precedent and where
accordingly there is no firm convention regulating a situation. Mackintosh
illustrates this phenomenon by reference to the dilemma in which George V
found himself in 1923 when the general election failed to produce a clear
majority for any one party, and thus left the King with a real choice as to who
should be appointed Prime Minister:
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... the King noted that ‘there are really no precedents for the present situation. I
must use my own judgment as each case arises’. [1977, p 13]
Whether the outcome is deemed to be correct or not will depend on the
acceptability of that action in light of current political practice.
With this brief discussion in mind, it can be said that, while the meaning
and scope of conventions frequently display a lack of certainty, it does not
necessarily follow that this is a conclusively distinguishing characteristic from
rules of law which may also display uncertainty as to their meaning.
Nonetheless, it must be conceded that the requirements of some conventional
rules are often difficult to discern. Sir Ivor Jennings cites Mr Stanley Baldwin,
Prime Minister during the periods 1912–24, 1924–29 and 1935–37:
The historian can tell you probably perfectly clearly what the constitutional
practice was at any given period in the past, but it would be very difficult for a
living writer to tell you at any given period in his lifetime what the constitution
of the country is in all respects, and for this reason, that almost at any given
moment ... there maybe one practice called ‘constitutional’ which is falling into
desuetude and there may be another practice which is creeping into use but is
not yet constitutional. [1959a, p 12]
Who is bound by constitutional conventions?
The question as to who is bound by the rules, for the most part, gives rise to
little practical difficulty. For example, it is a convention that the doctrine of
collective responsibility of ministers to parliament be observed. The
convention requires that all members of Cabinet, the inner core of
government, must speak in public with a united voice, and further, in order to
reinforce public confidence in government, Cabinet members may not
disclose the contents of Cabinet discussions. This issue will be discussed in
detail subsequently in Chapter 11; for current illustrative purposes, it is
sufficient to indicate the doubts which have been voiced as to the scope of this
convention. Members of Cabinet are appointed predominantly from the
elected House of Commons, but may also be appointed from the House of
Lords. In this manner, members of Cabinet are made accountable to
parliament, and through parliament to the electorate. Does the convention, for
instance, require that not only members of Cabinet – the Prime Minister and
16 to 20 senior ministers – but also junior ministers19 and their Parliamentary
Private Secretaries20 follow the decisions taken in Cabinet and refrain from
speaking against them? That would appear to be the consensus view, but no
definitive rule exists. For the most part, however, it is clear that the
conventional rules are understood by those actors on the constitutional stage.
For collective Cabinet responsibility to be a reality, it is essential that there
be full and frank discussion between its members and – in order that
Chapter 2: Constitutional and Administrative Law
32
19 Ministers who are not in Cabinet.
20 Elected Members of Parliament on the most junior rung of the ministerial ladder.
Sources of the Constitution
consensus appears to exist – that decisions are collectively reached. The
doctrine was put under much strain during Mrs Thatcher’s government
(1979–89). Professor Peter Hennessy has observed that:
Mrs Thatcher moved into Downing Street and subjected the conventions of
Cabinet government to their greatest hammering since David Lloyd George
refashioned the Cabinet system at the height of the First World War. [1986b,
p viii]
During Mrs Thatcher’s premiership, two practices emerged.21 The first was
that increasing use was made of decision making by a small group of Cabinet
members, an ‘inner Cabinet’, whose decisions were then, under the
convention of collective responsibility, made binding of all other members,
even though they had not participated in the decision making process. The
second practice was that the Prime Minister took advice on financial and
economic policy from an economist who was neither a member of Cabinet nor
even a Member of Parliament. Accordingly, a non-elected and democratically
unaccountable individual was involved in decision making with the Prime
Minister, whose decision – provided that she could secure the support of
Cabinet – would bind all ministers and others outside the Cabinet but holding
government office.22 One effect of this practice was to reduce the power and
influence of the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson. The
constitutional convention of collective responsibility is silent as to a situation
such as this, and doubts were expressed as to the propriety of the Prime
Minister’s conduct.23
The effects of breaching constitutional conventions
The question of consequences that flow from a breach of a conventional rule
constitutes both a simple and a complex issue. If – as a starting point for
discussion – the consequence of breaking a rule of law is examined, two basic
points must be recognised. The first point is that a breach of law normally, but
not invariably, leads to enforcement of the rule by the courts. The second
point is that when a rule of law is breached, the rule remains valid and in
force, unless repealed by parliament or overruled by the judges. With
conventional rules, the situation is very different. Being non-legal rules, there
is no question of a breach of convention being enforced by the courts: the
courts do not have the jurisdiction to enforce conventional rules, although
they may give recognition to them.24 However, it is also the case, as Dicey
argued, that breach of a convention may lead to a breach of law. The most
often cited example offered is that if parliament, in breach of convention, did
not meet annually, the consequence would be that money granted on an
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annual basis by parliament for the maintenance of the armed forces would not
be forthcoming. Accordingly, maintenance of the army would become
unlawful by virtue of Article VI of the Bill of Rights 1689, which provides that
the raising and keeping of an army in peacetime, without parliament’s
consent, is unlawful. Such consequences are the exception. For the most part,
the consequence of violating a conventional rule is political rather than legal.
That said, it is not possible to offer a single consequence. Much will turn
on the particular convention ‘broken’, the extent of the ‘breach’ and the
political mood of the country at the time. Conventions are obeyed because of
the potential political difficulties which would arise if a firmly established
convention was departed from without constitutional justification.
Two introductory illustrations of the very differing effects of breaching
conventional rules are provided by the doctrine of collective ministerial
responsibility and the House of Lords.25
Collective ministerial responsibility
The doctrine of collective ministerial responsibility provides an example of the
uncertainties entailed in the scope and binding nature of conventional rules.
In two situations the doctrine has been ‘waived’ in order to respond
effectively to political circumstances. In 1932, a coalition government was in
office.26 Following Cabinet disagreements over economic policy, the
government adopted an ‘agreement to differ’, whereby members of Cabinet
were free to express their divergent views both in parliament and in public.
Within months, the dissident members resigned from the Cabinet and
collective responsibility was reinstated. In 1975, the Labour government was
divided as to the benefits of continued membership of the European
Community. It was decided that the matter should be put to the electorate in a
referendum. The Cabinet itself was deeply divided on the question and the
Prime Minister decided to ‘lift’ the convention of collective responsibility in
order to facilitate full and free public debate. Thus, a convention was set aside
for a particular purpose, for a defined period of time and for a specific matter.
The convention remained effective in respect of other matters before the
Cabinet, and upon resolution of the issue, the convention was fully
reinstated.27 No adverse political consequences flowed from this, despite
criticisms that such a move was unconstitutional. It is arguable whether this
action represented a breach of convention at all, but it was clearly a departure
from normal constitutional practice. Above all, these situations demonstrate
the point that conventions can be adjusted, under certain circumstances which
are undefined, to suit the exigencies of a particular situation.
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The House of Lords 1908–10
A very different consequence followed a breach of convention by the House of
Lords between 1908 and 1910.28 Prior to the Parliament Act 1911, one major
conventional rule regulated the relationship between the House of Lords and
the House of Commons in legislative matters and most particularly in
financial matters: namely, that the Lords would ultimately give way to the
will of the elected House. This convention broke down in 1908 when the
House of Lords rejected the Finance Bill of the Commons. After a deadlock
between the two Houses, and a threat by the King to ‘flood’ the House of
Lords with sufficient new peers to secure a majority for the Bill, the
government introduced the Parliament Bill 1911. The Parliament Act, which
will be looked at in detail in Chapter 17, provided that the House of Lords
would no longer enjoy equal powers to approve or reject legislative proposals
and that its power would be restricted to a power to delay legislation subject
to strict time limits.29 It can be seen from this that where the breach of a
convention is deemed to be sufficiently grave, parliament can – in the exercise
of its sovereign power – place a convention on a statutory basis.
Further illustrations will present themselves throughout the course of this
book: conventional rules are of such fundamental importance that they
regulate virtually every aspect of constitutional law. The main point to be
understood here is that breaches of conventions have no automatic or defined
ramifications.
The differing importance of individual conventions
A related factor which should also be understood is that not all conventions
are of equal certainty or importance, and it is in part for this reason that the
consequences of a breach will vary. For example, in legal terms, the right to
assent or to refuse to assent to Bills passed by parliament rests with the
Crown. However, by convention, the Crown must assent to Bills passed by
parliament whenever so advised by the Prime Minister. So settled is the
convention that the Crown must assent to Bills passed by parliament that it is
difficult to foresee circumstances under which it would be broken.30 Perhaps
a political situation could present itself where a Bill had been duly passed by
parliament and where the government had a change of heart and, despite
parliamentary opposition, refused to present the Bill for assent. Would this
represent a breach of convention? Arguably not, for the convention requires
that the monarch give assent on the advice of her government. A situation
such as this would undoubtedly cause a political furore; but it is doubtful that
it would represent unconstitutional conduct on the part of the government,
and still less so by the Crown. It could also be asked, speculatively, what the
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position would be if a Bill was duly passed by parliament, the Bill was
presented for the royal assent and refused on the basis that public opinion
was so firmly set against the Bill that to assent would amount to defeating the
rights of the electorate. Such a situation raises some fundamental questions
about democracy and the relationship between the electorate and the elected
government. Geoffrey Marshall questions whether the power to refuse assent
to legislation is ‘now a dead letter’, and states that, ‘under present
constitutional arrangements, it may well be so’ (1984, p 22), while recognising
that the issue is not closed.
At the other end of the spectrum of the certainty of conventions and their
meaning, is the doctrine of individual ministerial responsibility.31 For further
discussion of this, see Chapter 11. In essence, individual ministerial
responsibility requires that ministers of the Crown are accountable to
parliament, and through parliament to the electorate, for their personal
conduct and for the conduct of their departments.32 The doctrine is expressed
in practical terms at Parliamentary Question Time, in debates, and in
committee proceedings, whereby parliament ensures that ministers explain
and, if necessary, defend their actions.33 In theory, if a minister’s personal
conduct falls below the high standard required of public figures, he or she
should resign. Equally, if the government department under a minister’s
authority is found to have misused or mismanaged its powers, it is the
minister who takes the responsibility in parliament. If the matter is of
sufficient gravity and the minister loses the support of his party and Prime
Minister, he or she may be forced to resign. But, as with responsibility for
personal conduct, there are no hard and fast rules. There exist no fixed criteria
from which it can be predicted in advance the consequence which will flow
from a breach of convention. In terms of consequences, this convention is the
most uncertain of all conventional rules.
Evolution and change
Implicit in the above discussion lies the answer to a further question: how do
conventions change? It has been seen that conventions come into being, unlike
legal rules, when a habit or practice becomes so established that it imposes
obligations on those to whom it applies, and takes on the characteristics of a
rule. And so it is with changes in conventions. A convention may change with
changing circumstances: individual ministerial responsibility is a prime
example of this feature of conventions. Conventions may adapt to meet
particular needs, as with collective responsibility in relation to the European
Community in 1975, discussed above. Conventions may be breached and
placed on a statutory basis, as with the House of Lords in 1911. A legal rule
has a relatively fixed and certain quality while in existence. If a legal rule is
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changed, either by judicial decision or by parliament, the previous rule will be
superseded by the new: it will ‘go out with a bang’. The same cannot be said
of conventions. For the most part, they evolve, adapt in amoeba-like fashion to
meet the constitutional needs of the time. It is for this reason that they present
the student of the constitution with such a fascinating challenge.
The courts and conventions
Given that conventional rules are non-legal rules, the attitude of the courts
towards constitutional conventions is inevitably different from their attitude
to legal rules. The courts do not have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon
conventions. This is not to say that a court must take no cognisance of
conventional rules, but rather, as Dicey asserted, conventions are not ‘court
enforceable’. The courts will give recognition to conventions, although they
are rarely called upon to do so. Two cases are illustrative. The first is that of
Attorney General v Jonathan Cape Ltd (1976). In 1976, the executors of the late
Richard Crossman, a former Cabinet minister, decided to proceed with
publication of the diaries he had kept while in government. The diaries
included records of Cabinet discussions which, under the doctrine of
collective ministerial responsibility, may never be revealed other than under
the conditions specified by law or on the authority of the Cabinet Secretary.
The government sought an injunction to restrain publication on the basis that
Cabinet meetings are, by convention, confidential and that the diaries,
accordingly, represented a breach of confidentiality.
This litigation required that the court recognise the convention, and it did
so. However, having no jurisdiction over conventional rules, the court could
not enforce the convention. The court ruled in favour of the government in
relation to the doctrine of confidentiality. In the event, however, the court
declined to suppress ‘secrets’ which were over ten years old. The court ruled
that, unless national security was involved (see Chapter 23), an eight to ten
year embargo was the maximum period that such material would be
protected.
Lord Widgery CJ recited the opposing arguments:
The Attorney General contends that all Cabinet papers and discussions are
prima facie confidential, and that the court should restrain any disclosure
thereof if the public interest in concealment outweighs the public interest in a
right to free publication. The Attorney General further contends that, if it is
shown that the public interest is involved, he has the right and duty to bring
the matter before the court.
The defendants’ main contention is that, whatever the limits of the convention
of joint Cabinet responsibility may be, there is no obligation enforceable at law
to prevent the publication of Cabinet papers and proceedings, except in
extreme cases where national security is involved. In other words, the
defendants submit that the confidential character of Cabinet papers and
discussion is based on a true convention as defined in the evidence of
Professor Wade, namely, an obligation founded in conscience only.
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Accordingly, the defendants contend that publication of these diaries is not
capable of control by any order of this court.
In reaching judgment, the Lord Chief Justice evaluated the doctrine of
collective responsibility, finding that there was ‘overwhelming evidence that
the doctrine ... is generally understood and practised and equally strong
evidence that it is on occasion ignored’.34 He recognised also that the Attorney
General’s submissions as to the duty of confidence owed by ministers to the
Crown were correct. Notwithstanding that acceptance, the Lord Chief Justice
opined that there was no one dominant rule to be applied to the situation.
Three factors had to be weighed in the balance, and in order to succeed, the
Attorney General had to establish three matters:
(a) that such publication would be a breach of confidence;
(b) that the public interest requires that the publication be restrained; and
(c) that there are no other facts of the public interest contradictory of and more
compelling than that relied upon.
Moreover, the court, when asked to restrain such a publication, must closely
examine the extent to which relief is necessary to ensure that restrictions are
not imposed beyond the strict requirement of public need. [p 755]
The injunction was refused.
In 1982, in the Canadian case of Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of
Canada (1982), detailed consideration was given to the relationship between
law and convention. The principal question for decision by the Supreme
Court of Canada was whether, as a matter of law, the constitution of Canada
could be amended without the consent of the Provinces. A second question
was whether the consent of the Provinces was required as a matter of
convention. The British North America Act 1867 created the Dominion of
Canada and set out the legislative and executive powers of the provincial and
federal legislatures. Amendment to the 1867 Act was possible only by a
further Act of the Westminster Parliament. At that time, the Statute of
Westminster 193135 provided, inter alia, that the United Kingdom Parliament
would not legislate for a Dominion ‘unless it is declared in that Act that that
Dominion has requested, and consented to, the enactment thereof’ (section 4).
Section 7 of the Statute, however, prohibited changes to the British North
America Act 1867, which affected the competence of provincial or federal
legislatures. In 1949, the United Kingdom Parliament passed the British North
America (No 2) Act, which gave substantial powers of amendment to the 1867
Act to the Canadian Federal Parliament. However, the power conferred was
not absolute, and the Canadian Parliament lacked the competence to enact
amendments altering the distribution of powers between the respective
legislatures without the request and consent of the provincial legislatures. One
of the principles intended to regulate amendments to the constitution, agreed
by all the Provinces and set out in a Canadian White Paper in 1965, stated that:
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... the Canadian Parliament will not request an amendment directly affecting
federal-provincial relationships without prior consultation and agreement with
the Provinces. This principle did not emerge as early as others but came in
1907, and particularly since 1930, has gained increasing recognition and
acceptance. The nature and the degree of provincial participation in the
amending process, however, have not lent themselves to easy definition.
It was argued by the Provinces that the ‘request and consent’ declaration
required under the Statute of Westminster meant the ‘request and consent’ of
both the Dominion and the Provinces if the Act were one affecting provincial
or federal competence.
By a majority, the Canadian Supreme Court – adopting Jennings’s test for
the existence of a convention – recognised the constitutional convention that
the Canadian Parliament would not request the Queen to lay before the
United Kingdom Parliament an Act to amend the constitution of Canada in a
manner affecting federal-provincial relationships and their respective powers
and rights without first obtaining the agreement of the Provinces.
Nevertheless, the court went on to hold that the Diceyan distinction between
convention and law remained and that the court could not accordingly go
beyond recognition of the convention and enforce it. By a majority, the
Supreme Court ruled that consent of the Provinces was not required by law
and, again by a majority, that consent was required by convention, but that
the convention could not be enforced by a court of law. The court declared
that:
The main purpose of constitutional conventions is to ensure that the legal
framework of the constitution will be operated in accordance with the
prevailing constitutional values or principles of the period.
Being based on custom and precedent, constitutional conventions are usually
unwritten rules ...
The conventional rules of the constitution present one striking peculiarity. In
contradistinction to the laws of the constitution, they are not enforced by the
courts. One reason for this situation is that, unlike common law rules,
conventions are not judge-made rules. They are not based on judicial
precedents but on precedents established by the institutions of government
themselves. Nor are they in the nature of statutory commands which it is the
function and duty of the courts to obey and enforce. Furthermore, to enforce
them would mean to administer some formal sanction when they are
breached. But, the legal system from which they are distinct does not
contemplate formal sanctions for their breach.
It should be borne in mind, however, that, while they are not laws, some
conventions may be more important than some laws. Their importance
depends on that of the value or principle which they are meant to safeguard.
Also, they form an integral part of the constitution of the constitutional system.
... constitutional conventions plus constitutional law equal the total
constitution of the country.
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Is the distinction between law and convention important?
Both Sir Ivor Jennings and John Mackintosh have suggested that the
distinction between conventions and laws is ultimately of little significance. In
The Law and the Constitution, Jennings asserts that:
... there is no distinction of substance or nature. The conventions are like most
fundamental rules of any constitution in that they rest essentially upon general
acquiescence. [1959b, p 117]
In The British Cabinet, John Mackintosh argues that:
There is a distinction between law and convention both from the view of the
practical politician and the student of government, but in the long term
development of the constitution, it is of no great importance. Both rest on the
necessities of political life. Laws can be repealed or conventions changed if this
is found to be desirable. The real difference between law and convention is just
that there is no formal procedure for enacting or enforcing conventions,
though some conventions (for example, the monarch shall not veto laws
passed by both Houses; the Prime Minister shall resign if he is defeated on a
major issue in the Commons) are as important as any laws and perhaps even
more difficult to alter. [1977, p 12]
Such views, while having merit from a political perspective, are overly
dismissive from a legal, constitutional standpoint. The significant difference
between laws and conventions is well demonstrated in both Attorney General v
Jonathan Cape Ltd (1976) and Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of
Canada (1982).36 In both cases, the lack of a legal remedy is explained by the
strict distinction between law and convention, and by the courts’ refusal to go
beyond recognition of the convention to enforcement thereof.37 Indeed, in the
latter case, judicial approval was given to Professor Colin Munro’s view that:
The validity of conventions cannot be the subject of proceedings in a court of
law. Reparation for breach of such rules will not be effected by any legal
sanction. There are no cases which contradict these propositions. In fact, the
idea of a court enforcing a mere convention is so strange that the question
hardly arises.
If, in fact, laws and conventions are different in kind, as is my argument, then
an accurate and meaningful picture of the constitution may only be obtained if
this distinction is made. If the distinction is blurred, analysis of the constitution
is less complete; this is not only dangerous for the lawyer, but less than helpful
to the political scientist. [1975, p 228]
Should conventions be codified?
One question asked earlier was whether or not constitutional conventions
should be codified. Again, no straightforward or simple answer to this
question presents itself. Much will turn on the perception of the value of the
status quo. Much also turns on the constitutional implications of attempting to
provide a comprehensive, binding code of constitutional conventions.
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The Australian experiment
In Australia, a constitutional crisis in 1975 contributed to the experiment in
codification of conventions into an authoritative but non-legally binding text.
The crisis involved the prerogative power of the Crown in the person of the
Governor General to dismiss the Prime Minister and appoint a caretaker
Prime Minister on the condition of ensuring the passage of financial
legislation and the holding of a general election. One outcome of the crisis – in
which the inherent vagueness of the conventional rules was revealed – was
formal consideration of the ‘codification’ of conventions, albeit in a non-legal
form. During the crisis, conventions had been ‘creatively interpreted and
ignored in a successful attempt to unseat the Labour government during the
depths of an international recession’.38 In 1983, a plenary session of the
Constitutional Convention adopted a set of 34 practices which were to be
‘recognised and declared’ as conventions of the Australian constitution.
Among those ‘recognised’ were the powers of the Crown in relation to the
Governor General, and his powers in relation to the dismissal of ministers and
powers over parliament, and the relationship between the Prime Minister and
the Governor General in relation to the dissolution of parliament.39
Professor Charles Sampford has analysed comprehensively the merits and
demerits of the codification of conventions. Among the many unanswered
questions raised are the following. Under what authority did the
Constitutional Convention act? What is the effect of the resolution? Is it
merely declaratory of the existing rules? If there is a conflict with the
restatement and actual practice, which should be authoritative? Professor
Sampford contends that there exist three possibilities here. If the code is
followed in preference to conventional practice, then the codification goes
beyond clarification and becomes a source of the rules themselves. This raises
the question ‘why should the old rules and old sources give way to the new?’.
The second approach is that the ‘declaration’ has whatever force the
constitutional actors accord to it: it would be absurd if the declaration were to
have no authority. Thirdly, it could be argued that the declaration is merely
evidence of the rule. This latter possibility, however, is unsatisfactory in so far
as the declaration was intended to be ‘sole and conclusive evidence for the
existence of the recognised convention. This effectively makes the
Constitutional Convention a new source for conventions’. Furthermore, what
is the position where a convention was agreed to only by a small majority?
What then happens to its authority? To what extent will the new conventions
be observed? What is the status of those pre-existing conventions which were
not ‘recognised and declared’? As can be seen, codification is – even if
desirable – by no means a simple matter.
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Conclusion
It is clear from the analysis thus far that conventions comprise a set of binding
rules, non-legal in nature, which supplement and inform the legal rules of the
constitution and which can adapt to meet changing circumstances. Viewed in
that light, their primary importance lies in their flexibility. On the other hand,
it may be argued cogently that for rules of such importance to be ill-defined,
uncertain in application and unenforceable by the courts is, at best,
anomalous, and at worst, a threat to the principle of government according to
law. 
Further considerations intrude upon the discussion. It has been seen that
conventions are flexible. In this feature lies much of their value, and it is to be
doubted whether, in relation to such a dynamic organism as the constitution,
it would be possible to identify, define and formalise conventions in such a
manner both to provide a comprehensive code and to allow for subsequent
constitutional development. It may prove to be the case that codification
would stultify the growth of the constitution. On the other hand, such
codification would undoubtedly provide greater insight into the rules
regulating government and thereby act as some check on the power of
government. Professor SA de Smith40 states that codification of conventions
would purchase certainty at the expense of flexibility, and this point must
carry great weight in evaluating the desirability of codification.
The relationship between the government and the courts must also be
weighed in the balance in this regard. It has been seen that the courts give
recognition to, but cannot enforce, conventions. If the effect of codification
were to give jurisdiction to the courts, this would represent a very real and
problematic shift in the balance of authority and power between the
government and the courts. In Chapter 5, the doctrine of the separation of
powers is considered in detail. Sufficient has been said by way of introduction
for it to be apparent that if the courts were to be given jurisdiction to
adjudicate upon and enforce, by way of legal sanction, the conventional rules
of the constitution, this would impinge greatly upon the concept of the
separation of powers.
For these reasons, the loss of flexibility and the separation of powers
doctrine, it can be argued that conventions should not be codified.
Authoritative works
Finally and in brief, mention should be made of the writings of eminent jurists
such as Blackstone, Dicey, Jennings and later commentators to whose works
the actors on the constitutional stage, including the judges, may make
reference for elucidation of matters of constitutional law.
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CHAPTER 3
The United Kingdom comprises England, Wales, Scotland (which together
comprise Great Britain) and Northern Ireland.1 The Channel Islands and the
Isle of Man, while not forming part of the United Kingdom other than for the
purposes of nationality law,2 are represented by the United Kingdom
government in international affairs.
While it is correct to speak of the constitution of the United Kingdom, it
should not be assumed that there is a single legal system within the
constitutionally defined area. The English legal system extends to England
and Wales. Scotland has its own system of private law which is distinct from
English law. Equally, in Northern Ireland, there exists a quite distinct legal
system. Nevertheless, it is the Westminster Parliament which has hitherto
legislated for each jurisdiction, and been supreme or ‘sovereign’. Change
came about in 1998, with devolution of law making powers to a Scottish
Parliament, a Northern Ireland Assembly and administrative powers to a
Welsh Assembly. Each enjoys limited legislative powers, which must be
considered alongside the legislative powers which remain with Westminster.
The United Kingdom will remain in being: the object of devolution is to
provide more representative and accountable regional government, and to
strengthen rather than undermine the union with England.3
To understand the constitutional arrangements, it is necessary to revert to
history, for the contemporary structure of the United Kingdom is the product
of forces of the past. While the ‘kingdom’ is now ‘united’, it has not always
been so. Rather, the United Kingdom has been forged in part out of conquest
(in the case of Wales and what is now the Republic of Ireland) and out of
Treaty (for example, with Scotland in 1706). As will be seen, in relation to each
part of the United Kingdom, the union with England has not always been
smooth, and the history of the United Kingdom is one marked by conflict,
with demands at different times in history from Ireland, Scotland and Wales
for self-governing status. Devolution – the granting of self-regulating
legislative powers – as mentioned above, has become a reality for Scotland
and Northern Ireland and, to a lesser extent, Wales.
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1 Interpretation Act 1978, Sched 1.
2 British Nationality Act 1981, s 50(1).
3 Devolution is discussed in Chapter 12.
NORTHERN IRELAND4
Northern Ireland has a land area of some 5,000 square miles and a population
amounting to three per cent of the United Kingdom population. The
constitutional position of Northern Ireland cannot be understood without
some appreciation of the history of Ireland as a whole – a matter which
remains of contemporary constitutional importance given the recent
initiatives to end the sectarian bloodshed and to achieve a lasting
constitutional settlement in relation to the status of Northern Ireland. Space
does not permit more than a brief overview of the rich and troubled history of
Ireland. 
Ireland: the early history – an overview
Ireland first came under the control of the English in the twelfth century
when, in 1155, Henry II (1154–89) had been awarded the overlordship of
Ireland by the English Pope, Adrian IV, for the specific purpose of reforming
the Irish Church. An Irish Parliament was established by the end of the
thirteenth century, although representation was confined to English settlers,
thereby excluding the native Irish population. At the time of Henry VII’s reign
(1485–1509) English rule in Ireland was confined to the Pale, a stretch of
coastal land running some 50 miles north of Dublin and 20 miles inland. An
early attempt at a form of self-government entailed the Irish Parliament’s
assertion that Acts of the English Parliament would extend to Ireland only in
so far as the Irish Parliament ratified the statute. The outcome of this claim to
independence was the reassertion of royal power and the passage of
Poyning’s Law5 in 1494, which provided that all Irish legislative proposals
must be approved by the King and his Council.
When Henry VIII (1509–47) broke with Rome6 and established himself as
Head of the Church of England, he ran the risk of incurring Irish Roman
Catholic hostility. In 1534, rebellion broke out, the leaders of which called on
the Pope and the Spanish Emperor for support against the King of England.
The result was military suppression of the rebellion by an invasion of an
English army under the leadership of Sir William Skeffington. Direct rule was
to be introduced with Skeffington appointed as the King’s Lord Deputy. In
1540, with the fall from favour of Henry’s Chancellor, Cromwell, Henry VIII
decided on conciliation with the Irish, and in 1541, the Irish Parliament finally
recognised Henry as King of Ireland. 
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The province of Ulster – then the nine northern counties of Ireland – was
largely unaffected by English rule until the sixteenth century, when
Elizabeth I (1558–1603) sought to extend her power beyond the Pale. On the
advice of the Privy Council, the Queen decided that government in Ireland
should be approximated as far as possible to that of England rather than
allowing governance on the basis of Ireland’s own history and experience. The
Queen’s decision was to alter the course of history. Beyond the Pale, the
‘Irishry’ had enjoyed their own language, customs and law. English was now
to become the official language and English law and administrative practices
were to extend to the whole territory of Ireland. In Munster, in the south, an
earlier rebellion against English rule – supported by Spanish and Italian
troops and financed by the Pope – started in 1569, and was finally suppressed
in 1583. 
Relations between the English and the Irish remained uneasy. Ireland
adhered to the Roman Catholic faith,7 whereas the immigrants from Scotland
and England were staunchly Protestant. The native tongue was Gaelic, a
language neither understood nor spoken by the English. When Hugh O’Neill,
the Earl of Tyrone, demanded that traditional rule by chieftains be allowed
and that there should be official tolerance of Roman Catholicism, Elizabeth
rejected these demands. In consequence of this rejection, a Spanish armada set
forth in support of Catholicism. The armada, whilst unsuccessful, heightened
the sense of Irish nationalism and antagonism towards the English. In 1603,
the rebellion was ultimately suppressed: Tyrone and others fled to France in
‘the flight of the Earls’. The province was taken over by the Crown and, in
1607, with the exile of the native aristocracy, was divided into counties on the
English model.
One effect of Irish suppression was to further English settlement of the
area, with land being confiscated and distributed to English and Scots
immigrants. In 1609, under James I (1603–25), a comprehensive scheme of
‘plantation’ began in Ulster, and by 1622, some 21,000 English, Scottish and
Welsh immigrants had settled in Northern Ireland. Fortified towns were built
by the incoming settlers as ‘control points’ across the province. 
As the number of Protestant immigrants increased, so too did the potential
for religious strife. Immigrants to Ulster changed its character into that of a
Protestant society, and the dispossessed Irish found themselves outsiders in
their own country. In 1641, the native Irish rebelled against the settlers.
Unable to send troops to suppress the rebellion, King Charles I accepted a
proposal whereby ten million acres of Irish land would be confiscated and
used to repay those who would lend money to suppress the rebellion. 
In the Interregnum of 1649 to 1660, during which time England was
governed by the Cromwellian Commonwealth, the Treaty of Kilkenny 1649
was agreed, which guaranteed religious toleration and an independent
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Parliament for Ireland. However, in light of continuing opposition to English
rule, Cromwell landed in Ireland in July 1649 with an army intent on
suppressing dissent. By May 1652, the conquest was complete. The terms of
settlement were set out in the Act for Settlement of Ireland, and included the
provision that every Irish landowner would have his estate forfeited unless he
could prove that he had shown ‘constant good affection to the interests of the
Commonwealth of England’. During the Commonwealth, an estimated 36,000
immigrant settlers were given land, much of it in Ulster. An estimated 8,000
Catholic landowners were thus displaced from their lands, to be replaced by
English soldiers, who accepted land in lieu of pay, and by those who had lent
money to the government for suppression of the rebellion. By 1660, when
Charles II was restored to the throne, the share of land owned by native
Catholics had declined from 60 per cent to 20 per cent of the total. An attempt
– under the Act of Settlement of 1661 – to preserve the land of existing
landowners and to restore land to those who had suffered in the Crown’s
cause was doomed to fail because, quite simply, there was insufficient land to
meet the claims. Notwithstanding such attempts to redress past injustices, the
Act of Explanation of 1665 declared that, in disputes between Catholics and
Protestants, Protestants were to be favoured. The Act of Settlement was to be a
continuing source of conflict.
James II, having fled England for Catholic France in 1688, arrived in
Ireland in 1689 in an attempt to restore his English Crown. The Irish
Parliament – in which, at that time, Roman Catholics formed a majority –
repealed the Act of Settlement and restored freedom of religion. In response,
William III despatched an army to Ireland, and at the Battle of the Boyne in
1690, James was defeated. Protestants were once again in the ascendancy.
Following James’s defeat, and the repression which followed, some 12,000
Roman Catholics went into exile. 
Throughout the reign of William and Mary (1689–1702), and that of Queen
Anne (1702–14), further measures were introduced to confirm Protestant
supremacy. Catholics were excluded from parliament, the civil service, armed
forces, local government and the professions. An Act of 1728 deprived
Catholics of the electoral franchise. Roman Catholics were prohibited from
acquiring land and from sending their children to university. On the death of
a Catholic, by law his lands were compulsorily divided between all his
children, but if there was a Protestant heir, he was to take precedence. By
these various means, Catholics were excluded from participation in public life.
Some redress occurred in 1792 when the Relief Act allowed Roman Catholics
to practise law and to vote, although not to stand for election to parliament
which by now had become a Protestant body. 
From 1541, when Henry VIII took the title of King of Ireland and Supreme
Head of the Church of Ireland, Ireland was subject to the King’s rule. In
William’s reign, however, the issue which became contentious was whether
Ireland was also subject to the English Parliament. From the standpoint of
England, Ireland was a colony and thus subject to the supremacy of the
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English Parliament. In 1719, a clash between the two Houses of Lords brought
the matter to the fore. Each House claimed the sovereign right to adjudicate
upon Irish law. The Declaratory Act of the English Parliament gave full power
to the English Parliament to legislate for Ireland and denied the Irish House of
Lords jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Irish courts. The Declaratory Act
was repealed in 1782, and the right of the Irish to be bound only by law
enacted by the Irish Parliament and the King was established. 
In 1791, the Society of United Irishmen was established in Belfast, with
Republicanism – full independence from England for an Irish State – as its
political platform. Although the majority of its membership was Protestant,
the Society favoured Catholic emancipation.8 In the north, however, in 1794,
the Protestant and staunchly Unionist Orange Order was established.
Mounting religious and political instability in Ireland culminated in the Great
Rising of 1798. 
The Act of Union 1800
In an attempt to quell unrest and reach a lasting settlement, negotiations were
undertaken towards establishing political union between Ireland and
England. The British Prime Minister, William Pitt, promised full Catholic
emancipation. The resulting Act of Union 1800, which came into effect on 1
January 1801, effected the union between Ireland and England on the
theoretical basis of equal independence for the two countries. The Kingdom of
Ireland and the Kingdom of Great Britain were united under the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Irish interests were to be represented in
the United Kingdom’s House of Lords by 28 Irish peers and four bishops.
Representation in the House of Commons was by 100 Irish members. The
House of Lords of the United Kingdom was the court of last resort. Demands
for the repeal of the Act of Union were soon to be heard from Catholics when
the promised emancipation was blocked by George III (1738–1820) – note that
the King’s veto resulted in Pitt’s resignation – and demands made for reforms
in relation to land law and education. These claims, in turn, were resisted by
Protestants who feared that dissolution of the union and a revived Irish
Parliament would favour the Catholics.
The movement towards Home Rule9
Following the Napoleonic War in 1815, economic disaster was to strike
Ireland. The economy was traditionally heavily dependent upon the potato
crop: in the mid 1800s, the crop failed. The effect of famine – starvation and
emigration – was to decimate the Irish population.10 Demands for Home Rule
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began following the famine when many felt that the British government had
taken inadequate steps to deal with the economic crisis. The famine once
again heightened demands for independence from England. 
Some reforms were introduced: in 1829, a Catholic Relief Act removed
discrimination in education and property and provided for Roman Catholic
entry to civic and military offices. This emancipation in turn gave rise to
increased solidarity in the Unionist communities of the north and to further
sectarian violence. In 1836, a paramilitary national police force was set up, to
be known from 1867 as the Royal Irish Constabulary.11
In 1869, the Anglican Church in Ireland was disestablished,12 and in 1870
and 1881, Land Acts were introduced to regulate land rents and tenure.
Electoral reforms in 1868, 1872 and 1884–85 introduced the secret ballot and
extended the franchise. These measures, however, were not enough to quell
Irish Catholic discontent. The land question was converted into a full scale
campaign for Home Rule for Ireland. Charles Stewart Parnell and Michael
Davitt (Member of Parliament for Meath) created the United Irish League, an
organisation designed to back Irish Home Rule members of the United
Kingdom Parliament. Between 1879 and 1882, a violent campaign against
landlords was undertaken. The government’s response was to suspend
habeas corpus, but at the same time to introduce further land reforms. The
violence nevertheless continued: Irish republican leaders were arrested but
subsequently released in order to try to stop the bloodshed. In 1881, the brutal
murder of the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Lord Frederick Cavendish, and
Chief Under Secretary Thomas Burke was to turn public opinion in England
against the Irish and put back the cause of Home Rule. 
With a total of 100 members, the Irish represented a significant block in the
Westminster Parliament. Following the 1885 general election, 85 of the 100
elected members supported Home Rule in Ireland. They proceeded to exercise
their power, blocking government legislation and campaigning for Irish
independence from Westminster. The Liberal Prime Minister, William Ewart
Gladstone,13 sponsored the cause of Home Rule, but not that of a fully
independent Irish State. The aim, for the Liberals, was to introduce
constitutional reform which would ensure a degree of autonomy for an Irish
Parliament whilst retaining the supremacy of Westminster. By this means, it
was hoped that some form of devolution of power would be acceptable to the
Unionists. 
This compromise solution was one adopted in other attempts at
devolution of power from Westminster. In 1867, by the British North America
Act, limited powers were devolved to Canada, as was later to be the case in
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relation also to Australia14 and South Africa.15 In each instance, the
Westminster Parliament retained ultimate sovereignty over the laws of each
country whilst conferring broad grants of legislative power to the colonial
legislature.16
Home Rule Bills were introduced in the British Parliament in 1886 and
1893, but both were defeated – the first failing to pass the House of Commons
and the latter rejected by the House of Lords. The defeat of the Bills both
disappointed the Nationalists and increased the insecurity of the Unionists.
Substantive defects in the Bills proved insurmountable, with the central
dilemma turning on taxation and representation. If Ireland was to have its
own legislature – albeit subordinate to Westminster – it followed that Irish
Members of Parliament should be excluded from Westminster, since they
should not be allowed to sit and vote on purely English and Scottish affairs.17
Yet, if this were to be the case, it raised the spectre of the Westminster
Parliament legislating for Irish taxation – a power reserved to the United
Kingdom Parliament – without Irish representation.
Relations between England and Ireland were to deteriorate throughout the
first 20 years of the twentieth century. In 1905, Sinn Fein was established, with
strongly nationalist objectives. In the years 1911–12, there was industrial
unrest in Ireland. By the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the scene
was set for Civil War in Ireland, an event only postponed by the War.
With Home Rule so firmly on the political agenda, Unionist opposition
intensified. For example, on 28 September 1912 (Ulster Day), some 400,000
Ulster Protestants signed the Covenant, committing themselves to use ‘all
means which may be found necessary to defeat the present conspiracy to set
up a Home Rule Parliament in Ireland’ and ‘to refuse to recognise its
authority’.18 In 1913, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), a private army of over
100,000 men, was formed to protect Unionist interests against Republican
demands. The forming of the UVF led directly to the foundation of the Irish
Volunteers, the forerunners of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). 
The issue of Home Rule for Ireland became, for the British, an issue which
demanded the separation of Ulster from the remainder of Ireland, rather than
Home Rule for the entire country. A Bill passed through parliament in 1914,
but with the outbreak of the First World War was never put into effect, and
the intractable issue of separation of north from south was thus delayed.19 At
Westminster, the question of Home Rule had by now become a straight and
passionate party political issue, with the Conservatives and Ulster Unionists
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opposing devolution and the Liberals and Irish members proposing
devolution. 
The Easter Rising 191620
In 1916, an event occurred which was to prove to be a decisive factor in the
Home Rule story. Nationalists in Dublin, under the leadership of Patrick
Pearse, James Connolly and Michael Collins, initiated an uprising. On Easter
Monday, some 1,600 members of the Irish Volunteers and Irish Citizen Army
embarked on a rebellion, proclaiming republican status for Ireland.21
Six days later, the rebels surrendered with a loss of life of 132 soldiers and
policemen and 397 wounded, and 318 civilian deaths and 2,217 wounded.
Three thousand five hundred people were arrested and court-martialled.
Fifteen men were executed: 14 in Dublin and one in Cork. While the uprising
was unsuccessful, its effect, and the brutal response of the British, was to
consolidate the nationalist cause and to win the support of the Catholic
Church. Sinn Fein membership grew and electoral success followed in the
1918 general election, with Sinn Fein members having a majority throughout
the country except in the staunchly Unionist area of the north east. Sinn Fein
secured 73 seats and 48 per cent of the votes cast. The Unionists secured only
29 per cent of votes.
Civil War: 1919–22
Sinn Fein was banned in 1918, and its leader, Eamon De Valera, arrested.
Members of Sinn Fein refused to take their seats in Westminster and instead
issued a Declaration of Independence and established the first Irish
Parliament – the Dail Eireann. Civil unrest again erupted, with the Irish War of
Independence22 lasting until 1921. The war was, essentially, a programme of
terrorism directed against the authorities. The government passed the
Restoration of Order in Ireland Act in 1920, providing for internment of
suspects while at the same time seeking to implement Home Rule. The
savagery with which the army and Royal Irish Constabulary dealt with the
troubles provoked disgust and outrage: pressure on the government from
public opinion at home and overseas necessitated a truce. 
Partition: the Government of Ireland Act 1920
By 1919, it had become clear that there could be no single Home Rule
Parliament for a united Republic of Ireland. In light of the continuing and
increasing sectarian bitterness and civil unrest, the British government became
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resigned to a divided Ireland. In 1920, the United Kingdom Parliament passed
the Government of Ireland Act under which the country was partitioned, with
six of the original nine Ulster counties being separated from the remainder of
Ireland.23 Under the Government of Ireland Act, a Council of Ireland was to
be established, having exclusive jurisdiction over a number of all Ireland
matters.24
Six northern counties,25 characterised by a majority population of
Protestants, were henceforth to be separately represented by a separate
parliament from that of southern Ireland. The Act provided for two Home
Rule Parliaments, with Westminster retaining ultimate sovereignty: 
Notwithstanding ... anything contained in this Act, the supreme authority of
the Parliament of the United Kingdom shall remain unaffected and
undiminished over all persons, matters, and things in Ireland and every part
thereof [Government of Ireland Act 1920, s 75].
The Parliament of Southern Ireland – the Dail – rejected the Act, and the war
of independence continued. In Northern Ireland, however, the Home Rule
Parliament opened in 1921. In December 1921, following intensive
negotiations, Articles of Agreement were signed by Irish delegates. The
Articles provided for the partition of Ireland; for the creation of an Irish Free
State with Dominion status26 under the Crown, to be represented by a
Governor General. By a narrow majority, the Irish Parliament, the Dail,
accepted the agreement.
The Anglo-Irish Treaty 1921
The Anglo-Irish Treaty gave to southern Ireland (the ‘Irish Free State’) self-
governing dominion status, equivalent to that of Canada, within the
Commonwealth. The Parliament of Northern Ireland was given the choice as
to whether or not it should be part of the Irish Free State. When it decided that
it should not, the Irish Free State (Consequential Provisions) Act of 1922
provided that the 1920 Act, which regulated the respective powers of the
southern and northern parliaments and their relationships with Westminster
should cease to apply to any part of the Irish Free State and that its operation
was confined to Northern Ireland. 
In 1922, the Irish Free State Constitution was published, and ratified by the
Westminster Parliament in the Irish Free State (Constitution) Act 1922. War
was not to end, however, and on 28 June 1922 the Irish Civil War began, with
the IRA leading the campaign against the Treaty. The war ended in 1923, but
the anti-treaty forces refused to surrender their arms.27
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Within the newly separated north, with a Protestant Unionist population
of 56.4 per cent of the total, sectarian strife continued. In two years, over 400
people died, the majority being Catholics. The government responded with
the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act of 1922, which provided for
internment of suspected terrorists without trial. The Act was to remain in
force until 1972; see, further, Chapter 23. 
The Constitution of the Irish Free State 1937
In 1931, the Statute of Westminster conferred greater freedom on the powers
of Dominions. In Ireland, the Prime Minister (the Taoiseach), Eamon de Valera
(1882–1975), introduced major changes: in 1933, it was announced that Ireland
was to become a de facto Republic. The Senate – the upper House of
Parliament – was abolished; the Governor General was stripped of his
powers. In addition, Irish citizens lost their British citizenship. The right of
appeal to the Privy Council was abolished. 
In 1937, de Valera drafted and published the Constitution of the Irish Free
State. The Constitution declared independence from the United Kingdom,
declaring in Article I that: 
The Irish nation hereby affirms its inalienable, indefeasible, and sovereign right
to choose its own form of government, to determine its relations with other
nations, and to develop its life, political, economic and cultural, in accordance
with its own genius and traditions.
Under Article 2, the constitution declared Ireland to be a unitary, not divided,
state, thus refusing to accept the constitutional position of Northern Ireland as
established under the 1920 Act:
The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the
territorial seas. 
Furthermore, it was declared in Article 5 that: 
Ireland is a sovereign, independent, democratic State.
It was not, however, until 1949 that the United Kingdom Parliament was to
accept separation and pass the Ireland Act 1949, which formally severed
constitutional ties. The Republic withdrew from the Commonwealth in the
same year. 
Self-government in Northern Ireland 1920–72
From 1920 until 1972, Northern Ireland enjoyed a measure of self-government
represented by the parliament at Stormont. The Northern Ireland Parliament
had powers to make laws for ‘the peace, order and good government of
Northern Ireland’. In effect, this meant law and order, the police and lower
courts, local government, health and social services, education, planning and
internal trade, agriculture and finance.28 Westminster retained reserved
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powers and ultimate sovereignty over the territory.29 Sectarian strife, in
addition to the reserved legislative powers, ensured that the United Kingdom
government continued to play a role in Northern Ireland. 
The Northern Ireland Parliament was bicameral, the House of Commons
being elected by the people, the Senate being elected by members of the
House of Commons. The Executive was headed by the Governor, appointed
by the Crown. In the first elected parliament of 1921, the Unionists held a
majority and thus formed the government, a feature which was to be repeated
in every election until the constitution was suspended in 1972. 
Not only was there a continuous Unionist majority in the House of
Commons, but there was also Unionist dominance in local government: a
contributing factor to the discontent of the Catholic community. Further
disquiet arose over the composition of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, and in
particular the force of ‘B Specials’,30 all Protestant, which gained a reputation
for violence. Catholic membership of the entire police force in Northern
Ireland was never to be above 20 per cent of the total. The allocation of public
housing also became a matter of discontent. In the attempt to separate
Catholics from Protestants, the housing allocated to Catholics proved to be of
a poorer standard than that offered to the Protestants. Education was
segregated, again on religious grounds. Mutual distrust between the two
communities within Northern Ireland intensified as a result of religion.
The ‘Troubles’: 1968–98
In 1968, a campaign of civil disobedience and unrest began. The target for the
violence was twofold: the discrimination which existed against Catholics in
many sectors of life – such as housing, employment and the local government
franchise – and the continued union with the mainland. The civil disturbances
led to a Commission of Inquiry which reported a ‘widespread sense of
political and social grievances for long unaudited and therefore ignored by
successive governments of Northern Ireland’.31 By the summer of 1969,
British troops were deployed in support of the police, whose operational
control over security matters became subject to military control. In 1970, the
Provisional Sinn Fein Party was formed and, in 1971, the Reverend Ian Paisley
founded the Democratic Unionist Party. The Civil Authorities Special Powers
Act (Northern Ireland) 1922 was used to intern suspected Irish Republican
terrorists without trial – a factor which increased rather than decreased
sympathy for the nationalist cause. On 30 January 1972, 13 Catholic civilians
were shot dead by British paratroopers in the course of a banned civil rights
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march in Derry (‘Bloody Sunday’). By the end of 1972, 474 deaths had
occurred in the escalation of sectarian killings by Protestant murderers and
the IRA. 
Internment and allegations of ill treatment of detainees led to legal
proceedings being initiated against the United Kingdom by the Republic of
Ireland government under the European Convention on Human Rights.32 The
Crompton Report of 197133 outlined the interrogation methods used as
including continuous noise, deprivation of food, water and sleep, and wall
standing. Three Privy Counsellors34 were appointed to examine the
procedures. Unable to reach agreement, two differing reports were
published.35 The majority report concluded that the techniques would be
acceptable provided adequate safeguards were introduced in relation to their
use. Lord Gardiner, however, a former Labour Lord Chancellor, ruled that the
procedures used were unlawful:
If it is to be made legal to employ methods not now legal against a man whom
the police believe to have, but who may not have, information which the police
desire to obtain, I, like many of our witnesses, have searched for, but been
unable to find, either in logic or in morals, any limit to the degree of ill
treatment to be legalised. The only logical limit to the degree of ill treatment
would appear to be whatever degree of ill treatment proves to be necessary to
get the information out of him, which would include, if necessary, extreme
torture. I cannot think that Parliament should, or would, so legislate.
The government accepted Lord Gardiner’s view, and the interrogation
procedures were abandoned. The European Court of Human Rights ruled
that the procedures amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary
to Article 3 of the Convention on Human Rights but that they did not amount
to torture. 
Some reforms designed to improve relations between the Catholic
community and the Unionists were introduced by the Northern Ireland
Parliament. A Northern Ireland Parliamentary Commissioner for
Administration was appointed to deal with complaints against public
authorities,36 and a Commissioner for Complaints37 established to investigate
allegations based on discrimination in employment. 
Prorogation of the Northern Ireland Parliament 1972
In 1972, with the violence unabated and the civilian death toll mounting, the
United Kingdom government once again assumed responsibility for the
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province.38 The Northern Ireland Parliament was prorogued indefinitely and
the powers of the Northern Ireland government transferred to a Secretary of
State for Northern Ireland. A review of the Special Powers Act and internment
was undertaken in 1972.39 Confirming the need for detention without trial as
a short term measure for certain alleged offences, the Committee
recommended the introduction of special courts which would sit without a
jury: the ‘Diplock Courts’.40
Power sharing 1973
In 1973, following the prorogation of Stormont and a referendum, a new
system of power sharing between the Northern Ireland Assembly and the
Westminster Parliament was introduced.41 Under the Northern Ireland
Assembly Act 1973 and the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, an
Assembly was to be established, having 78 members elected under the single
transferable vote system.42 The Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973
provided a statutory guarantee that Northern Ireland should remain part of
the United Kingdom until the time at which a majority of the people, voting in
a referendum, should determine otherwise.43 Representation of Northern
Ireland at Westminster was increased to 17 Members of Parliament. In a
referendum held in 197344 on the question of union with the United Kingdom,
a majority favoured continuation of the union.45
Direct rule 1974
The breakdown of that system resulted in the Northern Ireland Act of 1974,
the result of which was the restoration of direct rule by Westminster over
Northern Ireland. 
Further attempts were made to dismantle the discrimination which
continued to exist in fields of housing and employment.46 Section 17 of the
Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 provided that any Northern Ireland
legislation which discriminated against persons on the basis of religion or
political belief was void.47 The attempts proved largely ineffective and the
55
38 Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972.
39 Report of the Commission to Consider Legal Procedures to deal with Terrorist Activities in
Northern Ireland, Cmnd 5185, 1972, London: HMSO (the ‘Diplock Inquiry’).
40 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973.
41 Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals, Cmnd 5259, 1973, London: HMSO.
42 See Chapter 13.
43 See Hadfield, 1989.
44 Under the Northern Ireland (Border Poll) Act 1972.
45 Although only 58.7% of the electorate voted.
46 See McCrudden, ‘Northern Ireland’, in Jowell and Oliver, 1994, esp pp 327–31.
47 The Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976 makes discrimination in the fields of
either public or private employment void.
Policy Studies Institute reported that the legislation had little impact on the
attitudes of employers.48
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a virtual civil war existed.49 From 1971 to
1977, ‘an average of 252 persons were killed and 3,269 shootings have
occurred each year; for the years 1978–81, the averages have fallen,
respectively, to 82 and 1,574’.50 In 1975, a further attempt to devolve power to
the province was made when a Constitutional Convention was elected.51 The
attempt failed as a result of the Unionists’ insistence that they retain a majority
in any new Assembly. The Northern Ireland Act 1982 nevertheless provided
for a new Assembly, to be elected by proportional representation, which
initially was designed to be a debating and deliberative forum which would,
in the future, propose plans for a new form of devolved government in
Northern Ireland.52 The Social Democratic and Labour Party and Sinn Fein
members refused to take their seats. Faced with political deadlock, the
Assembly was dissolved in 1986. In 1983, the New Ireland Forum was
established, in which the major political parties in the south and north were
represented. The outcome of deliberations was the Anglo-Irish Agreement,
signed by the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and the Republic of
Ireland in 1985.53
The Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985
The Agreement endorsed the principle that no constitutional change
concerning the relationship between the north and south could come about
other than with the consent of a majority of the people in Northern Ireland.
That majority did not currently exist. In the absence of such consent, it was
agreed that there should be closer co-operation in relation to security,
economic, social and cultural matters and the promotion of reconciliation
between the two parts of Ireland. An Inter-governmental Conference was
established with a membership drawn from representatives of both south and
north to consider reforms across a range of issues. The British government
undertook to consider any recommendations made, although the ultimate
sovereignty over Northern Ireland remained firmly in the United Kingdom.
Under the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the work of the Inter-governmental
Conference was to be reviewed after three years. Reforms implemented since
the Agreement included the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1989,
which aimed at removing discrimination in employment, and the
introduction of an independent Commission for Police Complaints.
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The Joint Declaration 1993
In 1993, a Joint Declaration was signed between the British and Irish
governments. The Declaration recognised and renewed the commitment to
preservation of the union with the United Kingdom for as long as a majority
of the people of Northern Ireland so wished. The Declaration also, however,
indicated for the first time that the British government had ‘no selfish,
strategic or economic interest’ in Northern Ireland, thus officially giving
recognition to the neutrality of the government’s position over the long term
future of the province. In September 1994, the IRA announced a ceasefire of
hostilities. The British government responded with cautious optimism. In the
same month, and as a response to the ceasefire, the government announced
that the ban on live sound broadcasts by members of Sinn Fein would be
lifted. The exclusion order on the President of Sinn Fein, Mr Gerry Adams,
was also lifted.54
In 1995, with the lasting of the ceasefire in Northern Ireland, the prospects
for peace in Northern Ireland were higher than at any time in the past. Full
negotiations between Sinn Fein and the British government were, however,
delayed, in part by a dispute over the terms for negotiation and in part over
the refusal of the IRA to relinquish its armoury of weapons55 in advance of
peace talks.
The fragile hopes of 1995 were dashed in February 1996 when the IRA
bombed Canary Wharf in London, thus ending the ceasefire. Further IRA
action took place on the mainland, but not initially in Northern Ireland itself.
In December 1996, the British government announced the terms for including
Sinn Fein in all party discussions for the purpose of reaching a settlement.
These included the announcement of a permanent ceasefire – proof that the
IRA would bring the violence permanently to an end. The government’s
demands were rejected by Gerry Adams, and criticised by the Prime Minister
of the Irish Republic.
The 1998 peace settlement
The election of the Labour government in May 1997 led to renewed efforts to
revitalise the peace talks. In September 1997, following a renewal of the
ceasefire by the IRA, and Sinn Fein’s renunciation of the use of force, peace
talks commenced between all parties. In February 1998, however, following
renewed violence, Sinn Fein was expelled from the talks, but told that it could
return if violence ceased. The Chairman of the talks, George Mitchell, in
March set a 15 day deadline on the talks, which culminated in formal
proposals being drawn up. On Good Friday, 10 April 1998, agreement was
finally reached.
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The agreement centred on five principal points. First, the principle that
Northern Ireland would remain part of the United Kingdom was endorsed,
and the Republic of Ireland agreed to amend its Constitution to remove its
claim to Northern Ireland (Articles 2 and 3). Secondly, a Northern Ireland
Assembly of 108 members was to be elected under a system of proportional
representation. The Assembly is run by an executive of 12 members. Thirdly, a
North-South ministerial council was to be established by the Assembly in
order to co-ordinate relations between Ireland and Ulster. Fourthly, a Council
of the Isles was to be established, its membership to be drawn from the
parliaments at Westminster, Dublin, Edinburgh and the Welsh Assembly.
Finally, all participants expressed the commitment to the disarmament of
paramilitary organisations, a commitment the fulfilment of which was a
condition for the devolution of power.
In order for the agreement to take effect, referendums were held in both
the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. In Northern Ireland, the vote in
favour of the agreement was 71.12 per cent, with a turnout of 80.98 per cent. In
the Irish Republic, 94.40 per cent voted for the agreement, the turnout being
55.47 per cent. In June 1998, elections were held for membership of the
Northern Ireland Assembly. The results of the election produced an Assembly
with power shared by the four main political parties, with five minority
parties winning 18 seats between them.56
In 1999, the devolution of power was complete, the Assembly elected and
a power sharing executive in place. As noted above, however, the full
devolution of power was conditional on agreement being reached over the
decommissioning of paramilitary weapons. When the IRA refused to co-
operate and it became clear that decommissioning was not to occur, the
Assembly was suspended, and power returned to Westminster under the
Northern Ireland Act 2000, to be restored once again following further
negotiations. The position relating to the Northern Ireland Assembly will be
returned to in Chapter 12.
SCOTLAND57
Scotland has a total area of some 30,000 square miles representing an area
three-fifths the size of England, with a population of some ten per cent of the
United Kingdom total. 
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The early history – an overview
The historical relationship between England and Scotland is one marked by
conflict and war resulting from English attempts at seizing sovereignty over
Scotland. Perhaps the original force uniting the two countries was the
marriage, in 1503, of James IV of Scotland to Margaret, Henry VII’s daughter.
When Elizabeth I of England died in 1603, without leaving an heir to the
throne, Henry VII’s great-great-grandson – then James VI of Scotland –
succeeded to the throne of England as James I.58 Despite this union, each
country retained its own constitution and parliament and – separated by
religious differences and economic rivalry – the two countries were to remain
separate for a further century. 
In Calvin’s Case (1608), it was held that persons born in either of the
kingdoms, after James’s accession to the English throne, held dual nationality,
all owing allegiance to the same Crown. James’s accession was not, however,
to lay past conflicts to rest. James ruled Scotland from London, much of
government in practice being conducted by the Scottish Privy Council acting
on the King’s orders. The Scottish Parliament seldom met and was dominated
by the Lords of the Articles, who were royal nominees. Within Scotland,
conflict arose in the form of religious dispute with the King, who attempted to
curb the power of the Presbyterian Kirk in Scotland, in 1606 exiling one of its
leaders, Andrew Melville. In 1608, in the Five Articles of Perth, the King
ordered certain religious practices to be undertaken which were regarded by
the puritans as ‘popery’,59 as was the Prayer Book drawn up at James’s
command in 1619. 
It was in the reign of Charles I (1625–49) that open conflict on the religious
question emerged. Charles attempted to impose James’s Prayer Book on the
Kirk (the Scottish Church). The end result, in brief, was that the Scots
opponents of his attempted reforms – the Covenanters – played a significant
role in Charles’s defeat in the Civil War which led to his trial, conviction and
execution as ‘a tyrant, traitor, murderer and public enemy to the good people
of this nation’.60
From 1649–60, during the ‘interregnum’ (the period between the execution
of Charles I and the restoration of the monarchy), Scotland was to be ruled by
the military, whilst theoretically integrated into the Cromwellian united
Republic of England and Scotland. On restoration of the monarchy, religious
persecution of the Scottish Presbyterians was rife. The Scottish Parliament,
under the control of the Lords of the Articles, proved impotent, and was
dissolved by Charles II (1649–85; in exile until 1660). In 1666, provoked by
persecution, the Pentland Rising against the Crown occurred. While
unsuccessful, it prompted Charles towards greater religious tolerance. 
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58 See Wormald, 1983.
59 Adherence to the Roman Catholic faith.
60 Cited in Lockyer, 1985, p 288.
In 1688, when James II (1685–89) was forced to flee England, the Scots took
the opportunity to assert their constitutional and religious liberties against
William and Mary (1689–1702). The Claim of Right – the Scottish
constitutional settlement with the Crown – went much further than its English
counterpart, the Petition of Right. The Scots claimed that parliament had the
right to depose any King who violated the trust on which his powers were
held, and William was not to establish his supremacy in Scotland without
blood being shed. Rebellious Highland chiefs, who refused to submit to
William’s authority, were massacred at Glencoe in 1692, as an example to
others. Scottish hostility towards the Crown was further exacerbated by the
Navigation Acts, which treated Scotland and England as separate entities. As
a response, acting alone, and without royal support, the Scots raised revenues
for an expedition to Panama. Three expeditions set out but failed, being
decimated either by disease or military opposition from the Spanish Armada.
The English, meanwhile, continued to exclude Scotland from its commercial
empire. The Scottish response to such discrimination was to declare that
Scotland would not be committed to either war or peace by English policy61
and that the succession to the Hanoverian Crown62 would not be accepted by
Scotland unless and until constitutional, economic and religious liberties were
guaranteed to the Scottish people. 
The only long term solution to such conflicts of interest was the full union
of England and Scotland. The Act of Union with Scotland63 was passed in
1707, ‘abolishing’ the respective sovereign parliaments which became united
under the title of the Parliament of Great Britain. The Act of Union
represented the culmination of years of negotiations between the two
countries following centuries of intermittent hostilities. As will be seen in
Chapter 6, when union came about, it was to be subject to strict conditions
and terms. In particular, the Act of Union protects the separate Scottish legal
system – both in relation to private law and to the court structure – and
provided special protection for the Presbyterian Church. There was, however,
to be a common parliament, common flag, taxation and coinage: by this,
meaningful political and economic union was secured.
The Wars of Independence between England and Scotland in the Middle
Ages, culminating in the recognition of an independent Scotland in 1328, had
resulted in a complete break between English law and Scottish law. The
Scottish looked to continental Europe for their training and law, and thus
adopted the civil law system based originally on Roman law, which had never
been fully adopted in England. Under the terms of the union, the highest civil
and criminal courts – the Court of Session and the High Court of Justiciary –
were to remain outside the jurisdiction of the English courts. The High Court
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of Justiciary has remained the final court of appeal in Scottish criminal cases,
while in civil cases the House of Lords has appellate jurisdiction.64
Following the union, Scottish interests were represented by a Secretary of
State for Scotland. From 1745, responsibility for Scotland passed to a Secretary
of State who also held other responsibilities, such as Home Affairs. In 1885,
the office of Secretary for Scotland was established, which, from 1892, became
a Cabinet post. Administrative devolution to Scotland included Boards
created to administer agriculture, fisheries, local government, prisons, health
and education, each operating under the supervision of the Scottish Secretary
of State. 
In 1952, a Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs65 was appointed to
review government functions in relation to Scotland. Further responsibilities
were transferred to the Scottish Secretary of State: appointment of Justices of
the Peace, animal health, highways and electricity. Subsequently, road
passenger transport, ancient monuments, royal parks and palaces have been
transferred. The Scottish Office, established in 1945, comprises five
departments: Agriculture and Fisheries, Development, Education, Home and
Health. The administration is based in Edinburgh and headed by the
Secretary of State, ministers of state and under secretaries. 
Responsibility for the administration of the criminal law in Scotland lies
with the Lord Advocate who is normally a member of the House of Commons
but may, alternatively, be a member of the House of Lords, having been
conferred a life peerage. The Lord Advocate has responsibility for aspects of
government business affecting Scotland. Representation in parliament was
determined by the Act of Union at 45, but has since increased to 72.66
The Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969–7367 recommended the
devolution of legislative power to Scotland. As with Wales, the legislation
could only come into effect following a referendum which returned a majority
of voters in favour, having secured a minimum of 40 per cent of all eligible
voters.68 The results of the referendum in Scotland were 32.5 per cent in
favour of devolution, 30.4 per cent against, with 37.1 per cent of voters
abstaining. The statutory requirements for an electoral majority being unmet,
the Scotland Act 1978 was repealed.69
61
64 By custom, two Lords of Appeal in Ordinary are from Scotland.
65 Report of the Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs 1952–54, Cmnd 9212, 1954, London:
HMSO.
66 See the Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986.
67 Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969–73, Cmnd 5460, 1973, London:
HMSO, Vol 1.
68 See Bogdanor, 1980.
69 The Royal Commission had not been unanimous in its support of devolution for either
Wales or Scotland, and a powerful Memorandum of Dissent was published with the
report: op cit, fn 67, Vol 2.
Nevertheless, the devolution issue – particularly in relation to Scotland –
had not been finally laid to rest. Following the general election in 1987, the
Conservative government, despite having a majority of seats in England, won
only ten out of 72 seats in Scotland. The results of the 1992 election, whilst
slightly better in terms of government representation, still resulted in Scotland
being under-represented in parliament. 
The by-election of May 1995, following the death of a Conservative
Member of Parliament, resulted in the Scottish Nationalist Party winning the
seat. The Conservative government therefore had little electoral support north
of the border in general elections or by-elections, a fact which was also
reflected in local government elections. This ‘democratic deficit’ of the
Conservative government continued to fuel the fires of the demand for greater
devolution of power to Scotland. The 1997 general election resulted in there
being no Scottish Conservative Members of Parliament.
Devolution to Scotland70
The general election of 1997 presaged the devolution of power to a Scottish
Parliament. The government’s White Paper, Scotland’s Parliament,71 while
retaining the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament (paragraph 4.2),
envisaged devolution of law making power to the Scottish Parliament, and a
limited power to vary levels of taxation, while also reserving to the United
Kingdom Parliament legislative capacity in relation to certain matters.
Whether or not powers are devolved or reserved, the Scottish Parliament is
entitled to debate all matters (paragraph 2.5). The Scotland Act 1998 gave
effect to the proposals for devolution, approved by the people through a
referendum. The Scottish Parliament and the Executive are discussed in
Chapter 12.
WALES72
Wales covers an area of some 8,000 square miles, having a population
approximately five per cent of that of the United Kingdom. 
The early history – an overview
Wales was conquered by the English in 1282, and from 1284,73 Wales was
subject to English law. A rebellion in the early fifteenth century sought to
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overthrow English rule but, after initial success, collapsed. The enduring
union between England and Wales was formally effected by Act of Parliament
in 1536.74 English became the official language for Wales, and use of the
Welsh language officially banned, although in 1563, Elizabeth I ordered that
the bible be translated into Welsh in order to ensure compliance with the
Protestant religion, and by this means ensured that the Welsh language
survived.75 All Acts of Parliament were deemed to extend to Wales.
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, nationalist feeling
increased, with demands for greater recognition and representation of Welsh
interests. Nationalism became an overtly political issue at the end of the
nineteenth century with the establishment of the Wales of the Future
Movement (Cymru Fydd), although separatism was not a demand. Welsh
Liberals sought national educational institutions76 and disestablishment of the
Welsh Church rather than a Welsh Parliament.77 In 1925, Plaid Cymru was
established to promote the Welsh language and further Welsh interests and
parliamentary representation, although its electoral success was slight.
Administrative decentralisation to Wales has taken place in a number of
areas. In addition to education,78 national insurance was to be separately
administered in Wales,79 and agricultural interests separately represented.80
In 1951, the office of Minister for Welsh Affairs was established and, in
1964, the first Secretary of State for Wales was appointed with the
responsibility for overseeing the execution of national policy in Wales. In 1969,
the Royal Commission on the Constitution recommended by a majority that
there should be greater devolution of power to Wales.81 The scheme
envisaged establishing a Welsh legislature (a Senate) with the power to
legislate on specifically defined matters. Existing legislation of the United
Kingdom Parliament would continue to apply in Wales, but future legislation
– provided that the subject matter fell within the area of power devolved –
would be for the Welsh Parliament. The United Kingdom Parliament would
retain power to legislate over certain matters and the United Kingdom
government would retain sovereignty and the ultimate power in exceptional
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79 National Insurance Act 1911.
80 An Agricultural Commissioner for Wales and an Agricultural Council for Wales were
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81 Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969–73, Cmnd 5460, 1973, London:
HMSO, Vol 1.
circumstances to override legislation passed by the Welsh Senate. The Senate
would comprise a single, 100 member chamber, elected on the basis of
proportional representation and having a fixed term of four years. Welsh
interests would, however, continue to be represented in the United Kingdom
Parliament. The Wales Act 1978 gave effect to devolution. However, in order
for the Act to come into effect, it was necessary for those voting in favour of
devolution to be in a majority of the votes cast and to represent a minimum of
40 per cent of those entitled to vote. The voting in Wales was 11.9 per cent in
favour, 46.6 per cent against with 41.7 per cent abstaining. Accordingly, the
Act was not to be brought into effect. The Labour government elected in 1997
committed itself to devolution to both Scotland and Wales. In the case of
Wales, the proposal was for the establishment of a Welsh Assembly, with
principally administrative powers, and subject to the overriding sovereignty
of the United Kingdom Parliament. The reforms effected in 1998 are discussed
in Chapter 12. 
THE BRITISH ISLANDS
The United Kingdom, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man together
comprise the British Islands.82 Accordingly, while the islands are not part of
the United Kingdom, they are part of Her Majesty’s dominions. Citizens of the
islands are treated as citizens of the United Kingdom for the purposes of the
British Nationality Act 1981.
The Channel Islands83
The Channel Islands comprise the islands of Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney and
Sark. Historically part of the Duchy of Normandy, the Channel Islands
remained in allegiance to the King of England when Normandy was lost by
the English in 1204. The islands are organised under two separate Bailiwicks:
the Bailiwick of Jersey and the Bailiwick of Guernsey, which includes
Alderney and Sark. Each Bailiwick enjoys its own legislature, court structure
and system of law. Alderney and Sark, whilst part of the Guernsey Bailiwick,
enjoy a large measure of independence, having their own legislative
assemblies. 
The States of Jersey comprises 52 elected members and five non-elected
members. The States of Guernsey comprises 61 members. Official links
between the Crown and the United Kingdom government are through the
Lieutenant Governor of the Bailiwicks. The legislature – the States – is headed
by the Bailiff and Deputy Bailiff. 
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The Isle of Man
The Isle of Man became formally linked with England in 1405. From that time
until 1765, it was ruled by ‘Kings’ or ‘Lords’ of Man. Under Acts of Parliament
of 176584 and 1825,85 the Westminster Parliament assumed, in the name of the
Crown, the rights of the Lords. In 1958, under the Isle of Man Act of that year,
much control over the Isle was relinquished by Westminster. The Isle enjoys
full powers of self-government and has its own system of courts and law. The
head of the Executive, the Lieutenant Governor of the Isle of Man, is the
formal link between the local administration and the Crown and United
Kingdom government. The parliament (the Court of Tynwald) has executive
and legislative functions. It comprises the Lieutenant Governor, the
Legislative Council and the House of Keys. The lower House – the House of
Keys – has 24 members elected on a constituency basis for a five year term of
office. The Legislative Council comprises the senior Bishop, the Attorney
General, a judge and seven members elected by the House of Keys. 
The constitutional relationship between the islands and the
United Kingdom
The constitutional position of the islands is thus unique. In some respects, they
are like miniature States with wide powers of self-government ...86
The Crown has ultimate responsibility for the islands. Under international
law, the United Kingdom government is responsible both for the islands’
international relations and for their defence. Where legislative measures are to
extend to the islands, these are effected through the Privy Council. Acts of
Parliament only extend to the islands if the statute expressly so provides, or
where the Act applies to all Her Majesty’s dominions ‘by necessary
implication’.87 The Bailiwicks of Jersey and Guernsey do not accept that either
the United Kingdom Parliament or the Queen in Council have the power to
legislate for them without the consent of the local legislatures and registration
in the Royal Court. Contrary to the accepted doctrine of parliamentary
supremacy, the Channel Islands deny that Acts of Parliament or prerogative
acts, under Orders in Council, can take effect without local registration.
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THE ISLANDS AND EUROPE
The European Community and Union
When the United Kingdom signed the Treaty of Rome, special arrangements
had to be effected for the islands.88 Under Article 227(4) of the Treaty of
Rome, the Treaty extends to all territories for which Member States have
responsibility for their international relations. Were the Treaty to extend
automatically to the islands, it would confer power of the institutions of the
Community to legislate for the islands in matters such as taxation which the
United Kingdom Parliament, consistent with the convention, would have no
de facto power to legislate. Accordingly the islands sought special terms in
relation to membership of the Community. The resulting solution was that the
United Kingdom government negotiated special status for the islands in
relation to the Community: the islands are part of the Community for the
purpose of free movement of industrial and agricultural goods but not for the
purpose of free movement of persons or taxation provisions. 
The European Convention on Human Rights
While the position of the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man vis à vis the
European Community is the same, the position is different in relation to the
Convention. Initially, the Convention on Human Rights extended to both the
Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, and nowadays it continues to apply to
the Channel Islands.89 While the Convention initially applied to the Isle of
Man, the case of Tyrer v United Kingdom (1978) brought about a change. In
Tyrer’s case, the European Court of Human Rights held that judicial birching
in the Isle of Man of a juvenile amounted to degrading punishment in
violation of Article 3 of the Convention. As a result, the Isle of Man
government requested that the right of individual petition under the
Convention be withdrawn. The United Kingdom government acceded to the
request.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND AND WALES90
Local government antecedes central government by many centuries.
Consideration will be given to local government in Chapter 12. Suffice here to
note that the country is divided into local authorities, each having law making
and administrative powers as delegated by parliament. Local authorities are
entirely creatures of statute: accordingly, the only powers which they have are
those conferred by the sovereign Westminster Parliament. Increasingly,
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however, the law of the European Community requires action at local
authority level.
With the devolution of legislative power to the Scottish Parliament,
Northern Ireland Assembly and Welsh Assembly, and the government’s
commitment to give further consideration to extending the principle of
regional government to English regions, significant changes have occurred to
the governmental structure of the United Kingdom.
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND UNION
The United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union represents
perhaps the most significant challenge to the constitution. It is no longer
possible, realistically, to view the United Kingdom as an isolated
constitutional entity. Rather, it must be viewed as a distinctive nation (or
union of distinctive nations) within the larger union. The aims and institutions
of the Union, its law making powers and the relationship between the law of
the United Kingdom and European law will be discussed in Chapters 8 and 9.
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE COMMONWEALTH91
From Empire to Commonwealth
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Britain embarked on empire
building, although the original expansion of British interests overseas was
essentially undertaken by private commercial companies. Where territory was
taken over by conquest, it became the property of the Crown.92 Legal
authority over such territories vested in the Crown and political control lay
with the Privy Council.
The earliest ‘revolution’ against colonisation came with the American
Declaration of Independence in 1776 in which Britain was deprived of 13
North American colonies. By the end of the nineteenth century, vast swathes
of the world’s map were ‘coloured pink’ – that is to say, under British power
and control. The relationship between Britain and its colonies may be
characterised as the movement from full British sovereignty over the
territories through to increasing self-government and independence. In 1865,
the Colonial Laws Validity Act was passed by the British Parliament in order
to clarify the relationship between British law and colonial law and the
capacity of colonial legislatures for self-regulation. While the Act confirmed
self-regulating legislative capacity, it also affirmed the principle that such
devolved powers were subject to the overriding sovereignty of the imperial
parliament. 
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In 1867, Canada became the first self-governing Dominion (a status
implying equality with rather than subordination to Britain), to be followed
by Australia in 1900, New Zealand in 1907, South Africa in 1910 and the Irish
Free State in 1921. The recognition that the Empire was being transformed into
a Commonwealth of Nations came in 1884.
The desire for formal recognition and explication of the constitutional
relationship between Britain and the Dominions led to four-yearly Prime
Ministerial conferences, commenced in 1887. The Imperial Conference of 1926
adopted the Balfour Report which defined the Dominions as:
... autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no
way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external
affairs, though united by common allegiance to the Crown, and freely
associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.
The Statute of Westminster 1931 gave formal recognition to this definition.
Section 2 of the Act extended the powers of Dominion legislatures to amend
or repeal Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament, although this power did
not extend to going against the limits on the Dominion’s legislative capacity as
laid down in the Acts containing that country’s constitution.93
By the end of the Second World War in 1945, much of the remaining
British power had been repossessed by its rightful owners, either through
direct resistance to British rule (as in India) or negotiated constitutional
settlements between the British Crown and the formerly dependent
territory.94 From this time, what remained of the British Empire was
transformed into a loosely defined, voluntary Commonwealth of nations, of
which the British monarch represents the formal Head.95 While the
Commonwealth was originally characterised by its members’ allegiance to the
British Crown, the movement towards republicanism forced a change in
direction for the Commonwealth. It was Indian independence which
represented the catalyst for change. India had remained a Dominion under the
India Act of 1935, until independence in 1947. In 1949, India’s desire to
become a republic and yet remain within the Commonwealth posed a novel
question concerning the allegiance to the British Crown. The London
Declaration of 1949 revised the position and enabled India to enter as the first
republican member. Heads of government also agreed, however, at this
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meeting, that members would continue to recognise the Crown as the ‘symbol
of their free association and thus Head of the Commonwealth’, the position
which still pertains. 
The Commonwealth today
Unlike the European Union and Community, the Commonwealth is
undefined by legal texts; it is not established nor regulated by treaty; nor do
formal legal procedures regulate its inter-governmental relations. Rather, the
Commonwealth is characterised by ‘bonds of common origin, history and
legal traditions’. The Commonwealth is made up of 54 countries,96 ranging
from monarchies – either under Queen Elizabeth II or national monarchs – to
republics.97 Nowadays, 32 members are republics and five have national
monarchies of their own, while 16 are constitutional monarchies which
recognise Queen Elizabeth II as Head of State. The total population of the
Commonwealth is 1.7 billion. The shared history and traditions of Britain and
other Commonwealth members, including legal traditions, provides the basis
for this voluntary association of states, which spans six continents and five
oceans, and which operates without a formal Charter or Constitution.
The Commonwealth was defined in 1971 at the Commonwealth Heads of
Government Meeting (CHOGM) (CHOGMs take place every two years) as:
... a voluntary association of independent sovereign States, each responsible for
its own policies, consulting and cooperating in the common interests of their
peoples and in the promotion of international understanding and world
peace.98
Further, at the 1971 CHOGM held in Singapore, Heads of Government issued
the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles. The principles include:
(a) the commitment to international peace in order to ensure the security and
prosperity of mankind;
(b) commitments to the liberty of the individual, irrespective of race, colour,
creed or political belief and the individual’s democratic right to participate
in democratic political processes;
(c) a commitment to combating racial discrimination;
(d) an opposition to all forms of colonial domination;
(e) a commitment to removal of disparities in wealth between nations and to
raising standards of living; and
(f) a commitment to international co-operation.
These principles were reaffirmed and extended at the Harare CHOGM in
1991, which declared the Commonwealth’s commitment to promoting
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democracy, good government, human rights and the rule of law and gender
equality within the context of sustainable economic and social development.
Commonwealth members provide assistance to other countries in their
transition to democracy by drafting legislation and reviewing electoral
procedures. 
The Commonwealth Secretariat
The Commonwealth is headed by a Secretary General. Under his stewardship,
the Commonwealth Secretariat has been refashioned to enable it better to
achieve Commonwealth objectives. The Secretariat was formed in 1965 and
now has 12 separate divisions.99 The operational arm of the Secretariat is the
Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation, established in 1971,100
which, at the request of Commonwealth governments, provides: ‘… technical
assistance and expert advice on all issues within the Commonwealth’s
agenda.’101
Appeals from Commonwealth courts to the Privy Council 
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has jurisdiction to hear appeals
from ‘dependencies of the Crown’. Deriving from the royal prerogative, the
jurisdiction was given statutory force under the Judicial Committee Acts of
1833 and 1844. Appeals may be with special leave of the Privy Council, or
without leave. Appeals with special leave are predominantly criminal cases.
Appeals against the death penalty represent the majority of appeals.102
While, before independence, colonies had no power to abolish appeals to
the Privy Council, on independence, this power arose. As a result, a majority
of Commonwealth countries have abolished the right of appeal. The Privy
Council, however, continues to hear appeals from the Bahamas, Barbados,
Belize, the Gambia, Guyana, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mauritius, New Zealand,
Singapore, and Trinidad and Tobago.103
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PART II
FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTS

CHAPTER 4
Where laws do not rule, there is no constitution.1
INTRODUCTION
The rule of law represents one of the most challenging concepts of the
constitution. The rule of law is a concept which is capable of different
interpretations by different people, and it is this feature which renders an
understanding of the doctrine elusive. Of all constitutional concepts, the rule
of law is also the most subjective and value laden. The apparent uncertainties
in the rule of law and its variable nature should not cause concern, although,
inevitably, it will cause some insecurity. In the study of the rule of law, it is
more important to recognise and appreciate the many rich and varied
interpretations which have been given to it, and to recognise the potential of
the rule of law for ensuring limited governmental power and the protection of
individual rights, than to be able to offer an authoritative, definitive
explanation of the concept.
The rule of law may be interpreted either as a philosophy or political theory
which lays down fundamental requirements for law, or as a procedural device
by which those with power rule under the law. The essence of the rule of law
is that of the sovereignty or supremacy of law over man. The rule of law
insists that every person – irrespective of rank and status in society – be
subject to the law. For the citizen, the rule of law is both prescriptive – dictating
the conduct required by law – and protective of citizens – demanding that
government acts according to law. This central theme recurs whether the
doctrine is examined from the perspective of philosophy, or political theory,
or from the more pragmatic vantage point of the rule of law as a procedural
device. The rule of law underlies the entire constitution and, in one sense, all
constitutional law is concerned with the rule of law. The concept is of great
antiquity and continues to exercise legal and political philosophers today. 
The rule of law cannot be viewed in isolation from political society. The
emphasis on the rule of law as a yardstick for measuring both the extent to
which government acts under the law and the extent to which individual
rights are recognised and protected by law, is inextricably linked with
Western democratic liberalism.2 In this respect, it is only meaningful to speak
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of the rule of law in a society which exhibits the features of a democratically
elected, responsible – and responsive – government and a separation of
powers, which will result in a judiciary which is independent of government.
In liberal democracies, therefore, the concept of the rule of law implies an
acceptance that law itself represents a ‘good’; that law and its governance is a
demonstrable asset to society. 
CONTRASTING ATTITUDES TO THE RULE OF LAW
It should not be assumed that this acceptance of law as a benevolent ruling
force is universally accepted. In differing societies, subscribing to very
different political philosophies, the insistence on the rule of law – in the
Western liberal sense – has little application. For example, from a Marxist
perspective (on which see below, pp 82–83), the law serves not to restrict
government and protect individual rights but rather to conceal the injustices
inherent in the capitalist system. Accordingly, the concept of the rule of law –
denoting some form of morality in law – represents no more than a false
idealisation of law designed to reinforce the political structure and economic
status quo in society. Echoes of this thesis dominate the more moderate
socialist conceptions of the rule of law and the critique of liberalism. It can be
argued – from the socialist perspective – that liberalism pays too little regard
to true equality between persons and too great attention to the protection of
property interests. The liberal domain thus becomes one which, again, masks
true social and economic inequality while at the same time proclaiming
equality and justice under the rule of law.3
The rule of law, as understood in liberal democracies, also has little
relevance in a totalitarian state. While it is true that such a state will be closely
regulated by law, there will not be government under the law – as adjudicated
upon by an independent judiciary – which is insisted upon under the liberal
tradition.
In traditional Oriental society, the Western preference for law is an alien
notion. By way of example, in relation to traditional Chinese society, David
and Brierley write:
For the Chinese, legislation was not the normal means of guaranteeing a
harmonious and smooth-working society. Laws, abstract in nature, could not
take into account the infinite variety of possible situations. Their strict
application was apt to affect man’s innate sense of justice. To enact laws was
therefore considered a bad policy by traditional Chinese doctrine. The very
exactitude which laws establish in social relations, and the way in which they
fix the rights and obligations of each individual, were considered evils,
according to the Chinese, not benefits. The idea of ‘rights’, an inevitable
development of the laws themselves, ran counter to the natural order. Once
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individuals think of their ‘rights’ there is, it was thought, some form of social
illness; the only true matter of concern is one’s duty to society and one’s fellow
men.
The enactment of laws is an evil, since individuals, once familiar with them,
will conclude that they have rights and will then be inclined to assert them,
thereby abandoning the traditional rules of propriety and morality which
should be the only guides to conduct. Legal disputes become numerous, and a
trial, by reason of its very existence, is a scandalous disturbance of the natural
order which may then lead to further disturbances of the social order to the
detriment of all society. [1966, p 442; and see 3rd edn, 1985, Title III, Chapter 1
for the persistence of traditional ideas.]
In Japan, despite the nineteenth century adoption of codes based on French
and German models,4 law, in the Western sense, remained largely irrelevant
to traditional Japanese life:
Still essential for the Japanese are the rules of behaviour (giri-ninjo) for each
type of personal relation established by tradition and founded, at least in
appearance, on the feelings of affection (ninjo) uniting those in such
relationships. A person who does not observe these rules is seeking his own
interest rather than obeying the nobler part of his nature; he brings scorn upon
himself and his family. Apart from the contracts arising between important but
depersonalised business and industrial concerns, one does not attempt to have
one’s rights enforced in a court of law even though this is permitted by the
various codes … [David and Brierley, 1966, p 458; see 3rd edn, Title III,
Chapter 2.]
As the notion of the rule of law is dependent upon the political foundations of
a state, so, too, it is dependent – according to the approach adopted to the
concept – upon a nation’s economic resources. It may be that law, as a mere
regulator of individual behaviour, is perfectly feasible in an impoverished
state, and accordingly, a state which maintains law and order, and no more,
can conform to a narrow interpretation of the rule of law which insists simply
on a citizen’s unquestioning compliance with rules of the law. However, if the
rule of law implies more than mere regulation by law and is elevated to a
theory guaranteeing freedom from hunger and homelessness and entitlement
to a basic decent standard of life, then economic conditions are of paramount
importance to conformity with the rule of law. Such an approach is adopted
by the International Commission of Jurists, which in the New Delhi
Declaration of 1959 included – alongside traditional civil and political rights –
the realisation of social, economic, cultural and educational standards under
which the individual could enjoy a fuller life within the ambit of the rule of
law. On the other hand, reasoning such as this is anathema to radical
conservatives such as Friedrich von Hayek ((1944), 1994 and 1960), who
viewed the correct role of government as being best confined to establishing
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clear, fixed rules of law which ensure maximum economic freedom for
individuals, unimpeded either by planning controls or ideas of redistributive
justice. From von Hayek’s perspective, the rule of law requires no more than
the existence of a stable set of minimum rules which are to be applied in a
uniform, non-discretionary manner. A legal system is viewed as just – and in
conformity with the rule of law – if it exhibits both these features and an
absence of discretionary rules or practices.
UNCERTAINTY IN THE WESTERN RULE OF LAW
An understanding and appreciation of the rule of law is both politically and
culturally dependent. Moreover, it is also clear that the rule of law has more
than one meaning, even within the Western liberal tradition. To some
theorists, the rule of law represents an aspirational philosophy; to others, no
more than a device under which compliance with law – good or bad in
content – is secured. It has been remarked that:
It would not be very difficult to show that the phrase ‘the rule of law’ has
become meaningless thanks to ideological abuse and general over-use.5
Partly as a result of such ‘over-use’, some writers have refuted the claim that
the rule of law represents anything other than a purely procedural or
formalistic device. By way of example, Raz writes that the rule of law:
... says nothing about how the law is to be made: by tyrants, democratic
majorities, or any other way. It says nothing about fundamental rights, about
equality, or justice.6
Other writers have gone further. SA de Smith and R Brazier confine
discussion of the rule of law to a few paragraphs and, having acknowledged
the past influence of Dicey’s ideas (but denied their contemporary relevance),
state that it would not be ‘justifiable to examine the general concept of the rule
of law at length in this book’.7
Contrast such a dismissive view with that expressed in the following
statement:
The rule of law is a rare and protean principle of our political tradition. Unlike
other ideals, it has withstood the ravages of constitutional time and remains a
contemporary clarion-call to political justice. Apparently transcending partisan
concern, it is embraced and venerated by virtually all shades of political
opinion. The rule of law’s central core comprises the enduring values of
regularity and restraint, embodied in the slogan of ‘a government of laws, not
… men’. [Hutchinson and Monahan, 1987, p ix]
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In light of such divergent assessments, it must be recognised that any attempt
to align the rule of law with a broad philosophical doctrine – or indeed with
any other interpretation – is likely to meet with opposition from some
quarters. Notwithstanding such criticisms, the rule of law retains a secure
grasp on political and legal thinking: in the words of Raz (1979), it has
‘enduring importance as a central artefact in our legal and political culture’.
THE RULE OF LAW AS PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINE
The rule of law is an aspect of ancient and modern natural law thought.8 In
essence, the natural law tradition – of which there are many strands – insists
that the authority of law derives not from the power of any political ruler, but
from a higher source, either theological or secular. The laws of man must be
evaluated against the dictates of this ‘higher’ form of law. It is impossible to
provide more than a mere sketch of the rich history of natural law in Western
philosophy and political thought and the legacy it gives to modern
constitutions. Nevertheless, a basic understanding of its nature and evolution
is instructive, for it reveals the manner in which the requirements of good law
– morally worthwhile law – have been stipulated over centuries.
Natural law in ancient Greece and Rome 
Aristotle stated in The Politics that ‘the rule of law is preferable to that of any
individual’. The appeal to law as a control over naked power has been
apparent throughout history. At a philosophical level, the natural law
tradition, whether theological or secular, instructs that the power of man is
not absolute, but is rather controlled and limited by the requirements of a
higher law. To the ancient Greeks, man was under the governance of the laws
of nature – the natural forces which controlled the universe – although this
view is more closely aligned to the ‘law of nature’ than ‘natural law’ as it came
to be understood in later times. However, from the time of Socrates, Plato
(427–347 BC) and Aristotle (384–322 BC), the quest for virtue – or goodness or
justice under the law – has been a recurrent theme. Socrates, teacher and
philosopher, was accused, tried and convicted by the grand jury of Athens for
corrupting youth with his teachings. Despite the possibility of escape, Socrates
chose to accept the verdict of death which had been imposed upon him, in
order to demonstrate his fidelity to law. When pressed by Crito to escape,
Socrates considered the questions which would be put to him by the laws and
constitution of Athens were he to succumb to the temptation to escape the
penalty of the law:
Can you deny that by this act [of escaping] which you are contemplating you
intend, so far as you have the power, to destroy us, the laws, and the whole
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state as well? Do you imagine that a city can continue to exist and not be
turned upside down, if the legal judgments which are pronounced in it have
no force but are nullified and destroyed by private persons? [Crito, in
Hamilton and Cairns, 1989, p 50b] 
In submitting to death, Socrates was doing nothing other than giving
recognition to the supremacy of law: to the rule of law. An early – and famous
– formulation of the dictates of natural law was offered by Cicero (106–43 BC):
True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application,
unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts
from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does not lay its commands or
prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the
wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal
any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed
from its obligations by Senate or People, and we need not look outside
ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different
laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one
eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and for all times, and
there will be one master and one ruler, that is, God, over us all, for He is the
author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. [De Republica, cited
in d’Entrèves, 1970, p 25]
It is from ancient Greek philosophy that natural law enters into Roman law.
From the Corpus Iuris Civilis (AD 534) is derived ius civilis, ius gentium and ius
naturale. Ius civilis denotes the law of the state; ius gentium the law of nations;
and ius naturale ‘a law which expresses a higher and more permanent
standard’. It is the law of nature (ius naturale) which corresponds to ‘that
which is always good and equitable’ (d’Entrèves, 1970, p 24).
Christian natural law thought
The scriptures and gospel provided the basis for Christian natural law
thought which developed in the Middle Ages. Natural law was perceived as
God-given, communicated to man by Revelation, and remaining absolutely
binding upon man and unchanging in its content. As a result, the dictates of
natural law take precedence over man made laws. If the demands of the state
conflict with the laws of God, the obligation to God must prevail.
Undoubtedly, the most powerful writing of the Middle Ages comes from St
Thomas Aquinas (1225–74):
This rational guidance of created things on the part of God ... we can call the
Eternal Law. 
But, of all others, rational creatures are subject to divine Providence in a very
special way; being themselves made participators in Providence itself, in that
they control their own actions and the actions of others. So they have a share in
the divine reason itself, deriving therefrom a natural inclination to such actions
and ends as are fitting. This participation in the Eternal Law by rational
creatures is called Natural Law. [Summa Theologica, cited in d’Entrèves, 1970,
p 43]
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In the thirteenth century, Bracton proclaimed that ‘the King himself ought not
be subject to man but subject to God and to the law, because the law makes
him King’ (1968–77, f5 b). In 1534, Thomas More (1478–1535) – at the cost of
his life – refused to recognise Henry VIII as head of the Church, thereby
acknowledging the higher duty of obedience to God rather than the rule of his
temporal King. 
Natural law and international law
On an international level, natural law thought played a significant role in
establishing the overarching dictates of international law. Grotius (1583–1645),
for example, maintained that natural law was discernible by man by virtue of
his rationality and that a system of natural law would accordingly exist
independently of theological perceptions and dictates. In short, natural law
would exist even if God did not exist. In addition to the insistence on
rationalism, the emphasis of natural law at this time started to focus on the
individual, and from this period is discerned the origins of assertions of the
rights of man. AP d’Entrèves writes that:
... when we read the American or the French Declarations we know that we are
confronted with a complete architecture, about the style of which there can be
no mistake. It is a political philosophy based upon a particular notion of the
individual, of society and of their mutual relationship. [1970, p 57]
The idea of social contract 
It is from these beginnings that the theories of social contract and the rights of
man derive. The writings of John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Thomas
Paine are all infused with the doctrine of the inalienability of individual
human rights – rights which transcend the law of the state, which cannot be
overridden by the state, and which affirm the supremacy of the law of the
state with the important proviso that the law of the state is in compliance with
natural law.9
Natural law and common law
In the West, the sovereignty of law became inextricably linked with the
Christian faith. As seen above, in the thirteenth century, Aquinas asserted the
overriding obligation to God, as opposed to any temporal power. In England,
the break with the Roman Catholic Church in 1535 established Henry VIII as
head of the English Church. By assuming supreme power over both spiritual
and secular matters, Henry VIII ostensibly broke the logical separation of duty
towards God and the duty owed to the King: obedience to the sovereign now
became a religious as well as a political duty. The execution of Sir Thomas
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More in 1534 is illustrative of the King’s reaction to an individual refusal to
recognise the absolute supremacy of the King. Nevertheless, natural law
thought continued to permeate the common law of England before the
settlement of 1688 and the rise of parliamentary sovereignty. 
One of the classic exponents of the demand for the King to be subject to
the law – rather than above it – was Sir Edward Coke (1552–1634), whose
struggle with the King led to his dismissal as Chief Justice in 1616. James I10
viewed himself as imbued with ultimate power, derived from God under the
prerogative. To Coke, laws derived from parliament – comprising the King
and the three estates of the realm, that is of the Lords Spiritual, the Lords
Temporal and the Commons.11 The power of parliament was subject to the
common law, and hence it was that Coke declared:
It appears in our books that in many cases the common law will control the
Acts of Parliament and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void; for when
an Act of Parliament is against the common right or repugnant or impossible
to be performed the common law will control it and adjudge such Act to be
void.12
When, in 1608, Coke told the King that the common law protected the King,
the King regarded his speech as traitorous, proclaiming that ‘The King
protecteth the law, and not the law the King’.13 Coke’s insistence on the
supremacy of common law was not pure natural law thought, but rather the
philosophical view of the power of legal reasoning deriving from precedent.
Indeed it was the King who claimed natural law as being on his side, claiming
that the King was not ‘ignorant of any points [of law] which belong to a King
to know’.14 Sir Francis Bacon (1561–1626) favoured the King’s view, seeking to
limit the power of the judges: it was for the King to formulate policy and
make law (Advancement of Learning (1605), 1951). Coke’s view nevertheless
expresses an idea which is central to natural law thought, namely that there is
a higher authority – based on moral judgment – than the law of man. The
control of the prerogative power of the King was to dominate English
constitutional development until 1688. With the settlement of 1688 and the Bill
of Rights 1689, the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy over the King, the
prerogative and common law was established. Thereafter, there were to be no
assertions of any overriding higher law. The judges bowed to the sovereignty
of parliament.
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THE RULE OF LAW AS POLITICAL THEORY
Liberalism, conservatism and the rule of law 
The rule of law has been subjected to analysis by political theorists of all
persuasions. From the vantage point of the liberal democrat, the rule of law
will ensure the minimum rules in society to enable man to fulfil his life plan
according to law, but with the minimum interference of law. 
AV Dicey’s writing on the rule of law has had a lasting influence on
constitutional thought. His writing will be considered in detail below,
pp 91–102. However, Dicey has been criticised by Sir Ivor Jennings for being
motivated, in his writings, by his conservative views. Dicey, in expressing his
preference for clear and stable rules and the minimum of discretion within the
legal process, was, according to Jennings, revealing his conservative
preference for certainty within law rather than concern for the law being
directed towards social justice which necessarily entails much discretionary
power in the application of broad rules. Jennings (1959b, p 311) writes that
Dicey was ‘concerned not with clearing up of the nasty industrial sections of
the towns, but with the liberty of the subject’. For Jennings, Dicey’s view that
‘Englishmen are ruled by the law, and by the law alone’ is ‘not enough’:
The powers of Louis XIV, of Napoleon I, of Hitler, and of Mussolini were
derived from the law, even though that law be only ‘The Leader may do and
order what he pleases’. The doctrine involves some considerable limitation on
the powers of every political authority, except possibly (for this is open to
dispute) those of a representative legislature. Indeed it contains, as we shall
see, something more, though it is not capable of precise definition. It is an
attitude, an expression of liberal and democratic principles, in themselves
vague when it is sought to analyse them, but clear enough in their results.
[1959b, p 48]
For Jennings, the doctrine implies, first, that the state as a whole must be
regulated by law; secondly, that the separation of powers is implied within
the doctrine in order to prevent dictatorship or absolutism. Accordingly, there
are incorporated certain basic requirements15 of the law: equality before the
law; clearly defined police powers; clear general rules adjudicated upon by
the courts; non-retrospectivity in penal statutes; and the strict construction of
penal statutes. Thirdly, the doctrine incorporates the principle of equality: a
notion which Jennings concedes is as vague as that of the rule of law itself
(1959b, p 49). Moreover, and of prime importance, the rule of law implies the
notion of liberty.
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Marxism and the rule of law
Arguments against a formalistic perception of the rule of law adopted by, inter
alia, Dicey and von Hayek present a formidable target for attack from a
Marxist perspective. Where liberalism insists that law is neutral as between
persons and classes and favours maximum liberty for all under the law,
Marxism insists that law represents the interests of the powerful within
society. Law is an ideological device engaged by those with power to mask
the reality of that power in society, and the correlative powerlessness of the
ordinary citizen. The rule of law is thus portrayed as a means of subterfuge: it
is a mere pretence which hides injustice. Marxism stands in opposition to
liberalism and yet, paradoxically, seeks as its end result the complete liberty of
man. Law, from a Marxist perspective, is the reflection of economic power
within society, a power which is used to exploit the powerless. Thus it is that,
under capitalism, the worker is not rewarded with the full value of his labour:
rather, he receives a price for his labour to which is added production costs
and profits and together comprise the final price of a product. The laws which
regulate factories and employment terms are all underpinned by the
acceptance of the capitalist ideal. Laws which ameliorate the conditions of the
poor do not represent – as appears at first sight – real social justice, but rather
they represent a calculated means by which the poor are kept compliant
within their powerlessness.16 Accordingly, the welfare state is but a cynical
mask for maintenance of the status quo which defeats the movement towards
revolutionary economic and social change:
Far from hastening the revolution, the welfare state undermines efforts to
create working class solidarity. By preventing the fullest development of the
material degradation of the working class and by providing a limited
immunity from the vicissitudes of economic crises, a welfare state delays the
formation of class consciousness and thus prevents a revolutionary situation
from arising ... Many of these benefits, and hosts of others, have been won by
political struggles aimed at the introduction of legislation. But from the
Marxist perspective, they are a mixed blessing. Immediate results are traded
for long term disabilities in forming a dynamic, working class movement.
Welfare legislation obscures the structure of class domination based on the
relations of production and reduces the asperity of class antagonisms. [Collins,
1982, pp 126–27]
Whether law serves to oppress or merely to uphold the economic status quo –
and there exists dispute on this matter between Marxists themselves – law,
from a Marxist perspective, does not serve the interests of all in society. The
rule of law thus becomes a grand slogan under which is hidden the reality of
oppression and absence of liberty. The capitalist’s insistence on the rule of law
is seen as a ‘fetishism’ which must be removed along with economic
oppression (Cain, 1979, Chapter 5). Only when the capitalist system breaks
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down, and the law which serves it ‘withers away’, will society become truly
free. When that occurs, there will be no need for law and man will achieve
true freedom. 
Professor Joseph Raz and the rule of law
Professor Joseph Raz (1979) approaches the rule of law from a morally neutral
but conceptual standpoint, and asserts that: 
The rule of law is a political ideal which a legal system may lack or may
possess to a greater or lesser degree. That much is common ground. It is also to
be insisted that the rule of law is just one of the virtues which a legal system
may possess and by which it is to be judged. It is not to be confused with
democracy, justice, equality (before the law or otherwise), human rights of any
kind or respect for persons or for the dignity of man. A non-democratic legal
system, based on the denial of human rights, on extensive poverty, on racial
segregation, sexual inequalities, and religious persecution may, in principle,
conform to the requirements of the rule of law better than any of the legal
systems of the more enlightened Western democracies. [p 211]
Raz acknowledges that his claim will ‘alarm many’, but insists that it presents
‘a coherent view of one important virtue which legal systems should possess’.
In seeking to elucidate the ideal of the rule of law, Raz draws the analogy
between the rule of law and a knife. One quality of a good knife is sharpness.
However, the quality of sharpness says nothing as to the use to which the
knife might be put: beneficial surgery or murder. Sharpness is morally
neutral. And thus it is with the rule of law. However, the purpose of law is to
enable citizens to live within the law. Accordingly, there are certain principles
which must be respected if that goal is to be fulfilled. For the rule of law to
exist in society, certain qualities must be present. The law must be clear if it is
to be capable of being obeyed. In Merkur Island Shipping Corporation v Laughton
and Others (1983), for example, Lord Donaldson MR stated that:
The efficacy and maintenance of the rule of law, which is the foundation of any
parliamentary democracy, has at least two pre-requisites. First, people must
understand that it is in their interests, as well as in that of the community as a
whole, that they should live their lives in accordance with the rules and all the
rules. Secondly, they must know what those rules are ...
Lord Donaldson’s view was endorsed by Lord Diplock in the House of Lords:
Absence of clarity is destructive of the rule of law; it is unfair to those who
wish to preserve the rule of law; it encourages those who wish to undermine it.
[p 612]
The law must be publicised in order that citizens are aware of its demands;
reasonably stable in order that citizens can plan their lives according to law;
prospective so that the law does not require the impossible;17 non-
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contradictory for the same reason, and, in addition, the courts must be
accessible and staffed by an independent judiciary. Compliance with each of
these requirements will indicate that a society respects the rule of law. To
make such a statement is not to say that the legal system is one which is
necessarily morally ‘good’. As seen in Raz’s illustration with the quality of
sharpness in relation to the knife, the fact of sharpness does not dictate the
morality of the purposes to which the knife will be put. It is possible,
accordingly, for the rule of law to exist without the legal system necessarily
pursuing morally good ends.
Professor Lon Fuller and the rule of law
The writing of Professor Lon Fuller (1964) – who stands in contrast to Raz –
may be invoked here in order to develop further this idea. Fuller’s focus is on
the ‘morality of law’. For Fuller, the requirements of law, which are
substantially the same as those of Raz, lay down the basic minimum
requirements, not just of a system in accordance with the rule of law, but for
the very existence of a system to which he would accord the label ‘legal’.
These basic prerequisites form the ‘morality of duty’ or ‘inner morality of law’.
These principles provide the basic foundations of a legal system. To draw an
analogy with building construction, failure to lay sound foundations will
result in the edifice resting on an insecure and fragile base. In addition to a
secure foundation, for a legal system to be worthy of recognition – and to
impose the duty of obedience upon its members – it must serve the needs of
the people. Law does not exist in a vacuum separate from the society it
regulates. Recognition of this vital characteristic of law demands that the legal
system be directed towards altruistic, beneficial ends. This is the ‘morality of
aspiration’ towards which each valid legal system must strive. Thus, a
government must seek to provide the environment in which each citizen may
realise to his maximum potential the rational plan of life to which he aspires.
Society must be free and directed to the good of each of its members. Any
government which fails in a material degree to meet these requirements may
fail to deserve the label of a ‘legal system’.
The important point here is that Fuller is quite prepared to argue that a
system of government which contravened the basic requirements of a ‘good’
system of law might be recognised as some form of governmental regime but
would not be a government according to law, and hence would not be a ‘legal’
system. In order to deserve recognition as a system of law, the system must
respect the very fundamental moral requirements which Fuller identifies. 
Professor HLA Hart has argued that even a dictatorial regime with no
respect for morality or fundamental rights would be capable of meeting
Fuller’s requirements (see Hart, 1958). Fuller disputes this, arguing that an evil
regime, such as that of Nazi Germany, sooner or later would be compelled to
pass retrospective law or secret laws in order to pursue its evil objectives.
Moreover, Fuller argues that there is an additional quality of morality which
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must be present in a system of law: that the law serves the interests of the
people it governs. Thus, the law must be pursuing altruistic moral ends if it is
to have recognition. If it is not, then Fuller would have no difficulty in
denying that a ‘legal system’ existed at all.
Raz rejects the linkage between the rule of law and morality and claims
that Fuller’s thesis fails to establish a necessary connection between law and
morals. And yet, for some, the distinction may be a fine one.
Friedrich von Hayek and the rule of law
A further perspective of the rule of law is provided by Friedrich von Hayek.
The Road to Serfdom was written against the background of the Second World
War, and expressed von Hayek’s fundamental concern with the prospect of
the expansion of the state. This von Hayek opposed, other than at a basic level
necessary to guarantee freedom, and von Hayek describes the rule of law in
the following manner:
... stripped of all technicalities this means that government in all its action is
bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand – rules which make it
possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive
powers in given circumstances, and to plan one’s individual affairs on the
basis of this knowledge. [(1944), 1994, p 54]
The idea of a welfare state and the entailed notion of distributive justice which
entails the state operating under discretionary rules in order to provide a
minimum standard of living was firmly opposed by von Hayek. The rule of
law, for von Hayek, should be confined to the provision of clear, certain rules
which would enable people to plan their lives in a free society. To require that
people should contribute to the less well off in society through a system of
graduated taxation, coupled with discretion to determine entitlement and
quantum of recipients, violated his perceived ideal state. 
Modern expression of many of von Hayek’s ideas is to be found in the
writings of Robert Nozick, a clear and forceful advocate of the ‘minimal state’.
Nozick rejects any concept of distributive justice. Instead, he argues for
perceptions of justice based on the concept of rights expressed in the name of
entitlements. A state of affairs – and hence a state – will be ‘just’ if it respects
the principle of entitlement. As Nozick puts it:
Things come into the world already attached to people having entitlements
over them. From the point of view of the historical entitlement conception of
justice in holdings, those who start afresh to complete ‘to each according his ...’
treats objects as if they appeared from nowhere, out of nothing. [1974, p 160]
Justice therefore lies in the recognition of the justice of holdings. If the manner
in which property is acquired is lawful, if the manner in which property is
transferred is lawful, the society will be just. To deny the justice of this
situation – from a Nozickian perspective – and to argue for the forced
redistribution of wealth in society, is to defeat the rights of the individual
property holder.
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John Rawls’s theory of justice and the rule of law
Opposed to von Hayek and Nozick stands John Rawls, whose Theory of Justice
provides a detailed exposition of, and justification for, the interventionist state
committed to distributive justice. In essence, a society will be ‘just’ if it is
organised according to principles established by all its members in the
‘original position’ behind a ‘veil of ignorance’. Suffice to note here that the
‘original position’ and ‘veil of ignorance’ relate to a stage of decision making
about constitutional arrangements wherein the participants know nothing of
their own personal attributes and wants and little of the society in which they
live. They will accordingly choose principles of justice which are not self-
interested but based on maximising the position of those persons (of whom
the decision maker may turn out to be but one) who are in the least enviable
position in society. The principles which they will choose will be, first, the
priority of liberty for all, subject to the need to redistribute goods in society in
order to improve the lot of the ‘worst off’.
The rule of law, according to Rawls, is ‘obviously closely related to liberty’
(1973, p 235). Rawls calls for the ‘regular and impartial administration of
public rules’ which is the essence of a just legal system characterised by the
‘legitimate expectations’ of the people. Several requirements must be met:
rules of law must only command action which is possible; those who enact
laws must do so in good faith; like cases must be treated alike. Echoing Dicey,
Rawls states that there is no offence without a law – nulla poena sine lege – and
this requirement in turn demands that laws be known, that they be general,
and that penal laws should not be retroactive to the disadvantage of those to
whom they apply. Finally, the legal system must respect the dictates of
natural justice.18
‘Law and order’ and the rule of law: the obligation to obey law
An alternative perception of the rule of law may be labelled the ‘law and
order’ model.19 This view emphasises the peaceful settlement of disputes
without recourse to violence, armed force or terrorism. In legal philosophy,
the idea of absolute obedience to law is compatible with the analytical,
positivist school of thought which dominated much jurisprudential thought
from the nineteenth century until after the Second World War. Positivism is
the antithesis of natural law. The primary quest for positivists is to separate
legal and moral issues: to distinguish between the ‘is’ (that which exists as
fact) and the ‘ought’ (that which is desirable). Under positivist theory – which
is primarily concerned to explain law as it exists in fact – where valid law
exists, that is to say law which is accorded validity under the fundamental
constitutional rule in a state, there is an obligation on each citizen to obey that
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law. Hans Kelsen and other legal positivists regard the duty to obey validly
created norms as absolute.20
Taken to its logical conclusion, however, the ‘law and order’ view can lead
to the repression of freedom. By way of illustration, it is a common cry of
politicians that a demonstration by, for example, trade union members or
students, contravenes the ‘rule of law’. In a strict sense, any action which
involves protest will almost inevitably violate some legal rule – whether it is
the rule protested against or otherwise.21 Public protest, for example, will
often involve breach of rules against obstruction of the highway, of the police
in the execution of their duty, trespass, or criminal damage, even though those
laws are not the object of the protest. It becomes necessary, therefore, to
consider – albeit in outline – the nature of an individual’s obligation to obey
valid law. The fundamental question in this regard lies in the extent to which
citizens should be coerced into obedience to ‘unjust laws’. Is there an absolute
obligation to obey, irrespective of the quality of the law? Is the duty only prima
facie? Is there ever a duty to disobey the law in pursuit of a higher ideal? Each
of these vast and timeless philosophical questions underpins the concept of
the rule of law. 
Is there a duty to obey law?
To be balanced against the arguments for absolute obedience to law is the
legitimacy of protest within society. Since the time of Aristotle, it has been
argued that the law must be tempered with equity, which dictates the
standards of justice and rightness in society. Law derives its authority from
the obedience of the people.22 Laws must be directed to the ‘good’, not only to
comply with the dictates of morality, but also for the more pragmatic reason
of ensuring voluntary compliance with law. It may be argued that nowadays
in a responsive, democratic state, any dispute as to the rights of individuals
and grievances against government action will be dealt with through the
provided channels of complaint, for example through the individual’s
Member of Parliament or through an investigation by the Commissioners for
Administration.23 Alternatively, it may be argued that if many citizens are
commonly aggrieved, the media can be employed to influence government
and that, ultimately, at least once every five years,24 the electorate can express
its views through the ballot box. None of these avenues, however, may yield
the desired result, particularly if the aggrieved individual or group is a
minority without popular support.
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Is there a right to disobey law?
The question which then arises is whether the individual has a ‘right’ to
disobey the law?25 A government true to democratic precepts of
representativeness and fairness must be sensitive to demands for change. If it
fails in that regard, it is at least arguable that demands for change, while
entailing technical breaches of the law, should be accommodated within the
constitutional framework. 
In 1848, Henry Thoreau refused to pay taxes to support the slavery laws
and declared that: ‘... the place for a just man in such a community is in jail.’
In the same century, the suffragette movement resorted to unlawful
behaviour in the ultimately successful pursuit of the right to enfranchisement
– the right to vote.26 Mahatma Gandhi’s peaceful civil disobedience campaign
led to the independence of India in 1947. The Civil Rights movement in the
United States in the 1950s, led by Martin Luther King, resulted in reforms of
the law concerning racial segregation.27 The tide of protest over American
involvement in the Vietnam war had a direct impact on government policy
and further raised legal and political interest in civil disobedience. Major
social changes of such magnitude would have been impossible without
recognition that under certain limited conditions there exists a right of
legitimate protest, however inconvenient and uncomfortable this is for
governments. The ‘law and order’ model of the rule of law would fail to
respect any such ‘right’, and the reaction may be one of repression.28
However, it is not necessary to look to such major societal changes brought
about by defiance of law in order to refute the ‘law and order’ model and
proclaim some entitlement to dissent. 
John Rawls concedes a right to disobedience in pursuit of changing a
society’s ‘sense of justice’, but confines civil disobedience to peaceful protest.29
Rawls’s thesis is founded on the notion of social contract. That concept, as has
been seen above, involves the mutual recognition, inter alia, of the rights of
citizens and the rights of the state. The extent to which citizens participate in
the law making process is critical to an understanding of the extent to which
there exists an obligation to obey the law. Participation in the democratic
process may, however, be used as a means to deny any right to disobey. That
is to say, it may be argued that democratic participation implies the
individual’s acceptance of all laws within the state. Here it must be considered
what it is that citizens consent to when electing a government. It seems
implausible to argue that we each consent to every action of government
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throughout a possible five year term of office, irrespective of its merits.
However, Professor Plamenatz states that when a vote is cast:
... you put yourself by your vote under an obligation to obey whatever
government comes legally to power under the system, and this can properly be
called giving consent. For the purpose of an election is to give authority to the
people who win it and if you vote, knowing what you are doing and without
being compelled to do it, you voluntarily take part in the process, which gives
authority to those people. [1963, Vol 1, p 239]
This argument surely is contentious and represents a very limited view of the
requirement that a government should have moral authority to govern.
Richard Wasserstrom (1963), on the other hand, argues that, by the
participatory democratic process, a prima facie obligation to obey law is
imposed, but this prima facie duty can be overridden by the demands of
conscience.
Professor JM Finnis offers a contemporary natural law thesis in Natural
Law and Natural Rights. On the relationship between authority, law and the
duty to obey, he writes:
... the ruler has, very strictly speaking, no right to be obeyed; but he has the
authority to give directions and make laws that are morally obligatory and he
has the responsibility of enforcing. He has this authority for the sake of the
common good ... Therefore, if he uses his authority to make stipulations
against the common good, or against any of the basic principles of practical
reasonableness, those stipulations altogether lack the authority they would
otherwise have by virtue of being his. More precisely, stipulations made for
partisan advantage, or (without emergency justification) in excess of legally
defined authority, or imposing inequitable burdens on their subjects, or
directing the doing of things that should never be done, simply fail, of
themselves, to create any moral obligation whatever. [1980, p 359]
Finnis, however, is equivocal about the duty to obey unjust laws and silent as
to the dilemma such laws pose for judges and other officials. There is an
obligation to obey the law – not for the sake of ‘being law abiding’ but, rather,
in order to – and to the extent to which obedience will – ensure that the ‘just
parts of the legal system’ will not be rendered ‘ineffective’ (p 361). Such an
approach follows closely that of St Thomas Aquinas who argued that bad
laws do not bind the conscience of man, but that in considering whether or
not to obey such laws, the citizen must weigh up the consequences of his
actions for law as a whole. If, in the act of disobeying immoral law, the citizen
undermines the legal system as a whole – which is not morally bad – then the
act of civil disobedience itself would be morally culpable (Summa Theologica, I-
II, q 96). 
The appropriate response of the state to acts of civil disobedience is a
difficult matter. Professor Ronald Dworkin, for example, argues for official
tolerance in the face of dissent and law breaking which is undertaken in
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pursuit of rights – even where violence is employed.30 In Taking Rights
Seriously, Dworkin argues that the state should act with caution in prosecuting
civilly disobedient acts. First, the state should respect the stand taken in the
defence of rights, even if that stand should prove misguided when the matter
ultimately comes before the Supreme Court for a ruling on the validity of the
contentious legislation. The decision to prosecute should be decided on the
basis of utilitarianism.31 As Dworkin states in A Matter of Principle:
Utilitarianism may be a poor general theory of justice, but it states an excellent
necessary condition for just punishment. Nobody should ever be punished
unless punishing him will do some good on the whole in the long run all
things considered. [1986, p 114]
By prosecuting disobedience to law, the state upholds the positive law and
reinforces it. On the other hand, in prosecuting, the state may reveal the
defects in the law and may be seen to be enforcing that for which there exists
little or no popular support. By way of example, the acquittal of Clive Ponting
on charges of breaching section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 191132 is
illustrative: the jury refusing to convict despite a clear ruling by the judge as to
the illegality of Ponting’s conduct.33 It may also be argued that by rigid
enforcement the state enhances the moral claims advanced by the civilly
disobedient. In part, this was the view adopted by Socrates in submitting to
his fate. He drank the hemlock to show respect to the law and constitution of
Athens, although he must have known that in so doing he would bring the
positive law of the state into disrepute. What he could not foresee was the
timeless example that Athens, in executing Socrates, set for humanity.34
Is there a duty to disobey?
The converse position must also be considered: if a state violates the
requirements of the rule of law, to what extent is it the duty of citizens to
disobey the law? Furthermore, what justification, if any, is there for another
state or the international community taking action against the ‘guilty’ state?
The Nazi regime in Germany provides the most obvious – but not unique –
example. On individual duty, Professor Lon Fuller maintained that the citizen
is under no obligation to obey unjust law: ‘A mere respect for constituted
authority must not be confused with fidelity to law.’ Fuller goes further and
asserts that an evil regime, which grossly violates the basic precepts of
morality, is incapable of creating law at all.35 In HLA Hart’s view, this
represents confused thinking on Fuller’s part. His preferred approach is to
Chapter 4: Constitutional and Administrative Law
90
30 Dworkin, 1977, Chapters 7 and 8; and see MacGuigan, ‘Obligation and obedience’, in
Pennock and Chapman, 1970.
31 The doctrine which assesses the justification for a particular action according to the
overall increase in the sum of benefit to society as a whole.
32 Discussed in Chapter 23.
33 R v Ponting (1985); and see Barker, 1990, pp 183–84.
34 See Plato, ‘Socrates’ defence and Crito’, in Hamilton and Cairns, 1989.
35 Fuller, 1958.
The Rule of Law
recognise the validity of Nazi laws – however abhorrent in moral terms – but
also to recognise that moral obligations can outweigh the legal obligation to
obey.36 In addition to facilitating clarity about law, this approach enables the
regime to be held to account for its actions. Simply to deny – as does Professor
Fuller – that there was no law during Nazi rule is to remove the basis for
international legal sanctions.
AV Dicey and the rule of law37
In Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, AV Dicey offered a
prosaic description of the rule of law. Here, there are none of the ringing
proclamations of the theological or political philosophers. Nevertheless,
Dicey’s views have continued to exert their influence, despite many
challenges, and it is this influence which requires examination.
Dicey argued that the rule of law – in its practical manifestation – has three
main aspects:
• no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods
except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner
before the ordinary courts of the land. In this sense, the rule of law is
contrasted with every system of government based on the exercise by
persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of
constraint; 
• no man is above the law; every man and woman, whatever be his or her
rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable
to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals; and
• the general principles of the constitution (as, for example, the right to
personal liberty, or the right of public meeting) are, with us, the result of
judicial decisions determining the rights of private persons in particular
cases brought before the courts.38
Each of these requirements requires examination.
Lack of arbitrariness and retrospectivity
The first element of this analysis is self-explanatory. It requires that no one be
punished except for conduct which represents a clear breach of law.39
Designed to deny to governments any right to make secret or arbitrary laws,
or retrospective penal laws, and to limit the discretionary powers of
government, the rule protects the individual. In order to comply fully with
this requirement, laws should be open and accessible, clear and certain. In
part, this idea ties in with that of the ‘social contract’ and the reciprocal
relationship between the state and the individual. Under social contract
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theories, the individual citizen transfers his autonomous individual rights to
the government, to be held by that government on trust. To express the matter
differently, the citizen owes allegiance to the Crown in return for which he is
under the protection of the Crown.40 The doctrine of allegiance incorporates
the idea of obedience to law – both on the part of the citizen and on the part of
government. Laws which are arbitrary or secret are incapable of justification
on the basis of the mandate of the people and, accordingly, offend against the
reciprocal relationship on which constitutional democracy depends. Where
wide discretionary powers are conferred on the executive – whether it be in
the form of granting power to a minister of the Crown to act ‘as he thinks fit’
or on civil servants administering the social welfare system – it will be
impossible for the individual to know what rights he or she has. Moreover,
the delegation of broad discretionary power – albeit on the authority of the
sovereign parliament – renders such power difficult, if not impossible, to
challenge before a court of law or other adjudicatory tribunal.41
If retrospective penal liability is imposed, the individual is placed in the
position where his conduct was lawful at the time of his action but,
subsequently, he is held responsible as if his conduct was then unlawful. An
examination and evaluation of the relevance of this first proposition entails
drawing on relevant illustrations from both statute and case law. For example,
the courts construe penal statutes narrowly and will be slow to find that
parliament intended to impose retrospective liability. So important is the
concept of mens rea in the criminal law42 that it will rarely be appropriate for a
prosecution to succeed in its absence, and it is for this reason that the courts
employ the presumption of statutory interpretation against retrospectivity:
Perhaps no rule of construction is more firmly established than this – that a
retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing
right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matters of procedure, unless that
effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the
enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of
either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only.43
In Waddington v Miah (1974), the House of Lords interpreted the Immigration
Act 1971 in a manner which denied retrospective effect in relation to criminal
offences, using, as an aid to construction, Article 7 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees freedom from
retrospectivity. Nonetheless, the presumption will not be available where
parliament expressly provides for retrospectivity, as, for example, in the War
Damage Act 1965 and the War Crimes Act 1991.44 In Burmah Oil v Lord
Advocate (1965), where the House of Lords had awarded compensation to be
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paid for the destruction of oil installations in wartime, the government
speedily introduced legislation nullifying the effect of the decision under the
War Damage Act 1965. This case demonstrates clearly the subordination of
the judiciary to parliamentary supremacy and the limits thereby imposed on
the judges’ capacity to uphold rights. 
Notwithstanding the general prohibition against retrospectivity, there may
be instances where a decision which imposes, for example, criminal liability
may be upheld by the courts. For example, until 1990, there existed a time
honoured exemption from the law of rape for husbands who ‘raped’ their
wives. In the case of R v R (1991), however, the House of Lords upheld the
conviction of a husband for the rape of his wife, arguing that the rule against
liability for rape within marriage was anachronistic. In a challenge to this
decision under the European Convention on Human Rights, on the basis that
it infringed Article 7 of the Convention, which makes retrospectivity
unlawful, the Court of Human Rights ruled that the sweeping away of
husbands’ immunity from criminal prosecution and conviction for rape
represented an evolution towards greater equality between the sexes and was
consistent with that equality.45
Equality before the law: government under the law
Dicey’s second limb emphasises the notion that government itself is subject to
law and that everyone, irrespective of rank, whether official or individual,
shall be subject to the law,46 and subject to the same courts. Dicey viewed the
French system of special courts to deal with complaints against government as
abhorrent, fearing that specially constituted courts would unduly favour the
government over the citizen. Dicey has often been interpreted as requiring
that there be actual equality in terms of legal rights, powers and capacities.
Such an interpretation is, however, misguided. The idea of equality before the
law, irrespective of status, is subject to so many exceptions ‘that the statement
is of doubtful value’.47 In so far as equal powers are concerned, it must be
recognised that the police have powers over and above the citizen,48 that
ministers have power to enact delegated legislation (but subject to
parliamentary approval), that the Crown enjoys immunities under the law,
that the government acting in the name of the Crown may exercise
prerogative powers which may defeat the rights of individuals,49 that
Members of Parliament have immunity from the law of defamation under the
privileges of parliament,50 and that diplomats enjoy immunities not available
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to citizens. And, as Sir Ivor Jennings points out, no two citizens are entirely
equal: 
... pawnbrokers, money lenders, landlords, drivers of motor cars, married
women, and indeed most other classes have special rights and duties. [1959b,
Appendix II, p 311]
Against this catalogue, which is not exhaustive, must be set the extent to
which government and public officials are subject to law in the sense of being
accountable for their actions before the ordinary courts, for this, indeed, was
Dicey’s real argument. The doctrine acknowledges the need of a consistent
application of the law irrespective of status. No one is immune from criminal
prosecution (other than the monarch: ‘Against the King law has no coercive
power’).51 Official accountability to law is one of the foundations of the rule of
law. Following a detailed analysis of Dicey’s writing, Professor Jeffrey Jowell
concludes that: 
... its ghost has refused to rest. It rises still to haunt a minister who publishes
‘guidelines’ that cut across the powers of the statute under which he operates,
the minister who penalises local authorities for overspending without giving
them a fair hearing, a government department which decides in accordance
with a secret code not available to the public, or a Prime Minister who seeks to
deprive civil servants of their rights to remain members of a trade union. [‘The
rule of law today’, in Jowell and Oliver, 1989, p 23. See, now, 2000 edn,
Chapter 1]
Sir Ivor Jennings criticises Dicey’s emphasis on government according to law
on the basis that it is too narrow an interpretation: 
... it is a small point upon which to base a doctrine called by the magnificent
name of ‘rule of law’, particularly when it is generally used in a very different
sense. [1959b, p 312]
TRS Allan subjects Dicey’s analysis to detailed scrutiny which is devoid of the
dismissiveness of de Smith and Brazier or the scepticism of Sir Ivor Jennings,
and focuses on Dicey’s second principle: that of equality before the law.52
Allan seeks a solution to the apparent paradox presented by Dicey’s insistence
that both parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law comprise the
fundamental doctrines of the constitution – given that the former concept is
inherently capable of damaging the latter. Towards this end, Allan presents a
wealth of evidence directed to establishing a middle way between the
formalism of the ‘principle of legality’ and the vagueness of the ‘broad
political ideal’. In other words, what is sought is an explanation of the means
by which the power of sovereignty is restrained or restricted without
expounding a ‘complete social philosophy’ (1985a, p 114). The key to such an
understanding, according to Allan, lies in the role of the judiciary and in an
acceptance that it is the judges who – in applying the ‘juristic principle’ of the
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rule of law – limit the power of parliament. To summarise, Allan draws on the
principles of statutory interpretation (non-retrospectivity, clarity, mens rea in
penal statutes, etc); on the independence of the judiciary as ensured by the
separation of powers; on the right of access to the courts for all citizens; and
on the judiciary’s reluctance for the jurisdiction of judicial review to be
limited. By these and other means, Allan seeks to demonstrate that:
... the rule of law strengthens democracy by ensuring that government
operates only within rules adopted or sanctioned by Parliament ...
and that:
The constitutional principle of the rule of law serves, however, to bridge the
gap between the legal doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and the political
doctrine of the sovereignty of the people. In interpreting statutes in conformity,
so far as possible, with general notions of fairness and justice – in seeking to
apply those common standards of morality which are taken for granted in the
community – the judge respects the natural expectations of the citizen.
The rule of law therefore assists in preventing the subversion of the political
sovereignty of the people by manipulation of the legal sovereignty of
Parliament. [1985a, p 130]
In order to evaluate such contrasting views as those expressed above,
consideration of some evidence becomes necessary. 
Judicial review
Actions for judicial review of administrative action, employing concepts of
intra and ultra vires and the rules of natural justice, ensure that the executive
acts within the law. Judicial review – in its infancy in Dicey’s time – represents
the means by which the sovereignty of parliament is upheld and the rule of
law applied. Dicey, writing in 1915, analysed the significance of Board of
Education v Rice (1911) and Local Government Board v Arlidge (1915), claiming
that:
... each case finally lays down, as far as the courts of England are concerned, a
clear and distinct principle by which any department of the government, such
for example as the Board of Education, must be guarded in the exercise of
powers conferred upon it by statute.53
The means by which, and grounds upon which, judicial review may be
granted are considered in Chapters 24 and 25. It is sufficient for current
purposes to note that judicial review is the means by which administrative
authorities – whether ministers of the Crown, government departments, local
authorities or others with law making and administrative powers – are
confined by the courts within the powers granted to them by parliament. It is
for a court to determine – following the granting of an application for judicial
review – whether the body in question has acted intra vires or ultra vires (that
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is, inside or outside its powers). Judicial review is confined to matters of
public, rather than private law. Thus, where a relationship between an
aggrieved citizen and a body is based, for example, on the law of contract,
judicial review will not lie.54 It is also necessary – in the interests of good
administration – that aggrieved individuals have ‘sufficient interest’ – or locus
standi – in the matter to bring it to court.55 There are numerous grounds on
which judicial review may be sought. By way of illustration, a body may act
ultra vires if it uses its powers for the wrong purpose,56 or if it abuses its
powers,57 or if it adopts a policy which is so rigid that it fails to exercise a
discretion with which it has been invested.58 The law imposes standards of
reasonableness upon administrative bodies, and failure to act in a reasonable
manner may cause a body to act ultra vires.59 A body may act ultra vires if it is
conferred with delegated powers but delegates them further to another.60
Statute may require that administrators adopt particular procedures in the
exercise of these powers: should they not do so, and the procedures are
judicially deemed to be ‘mandatory’ (compulsory) rather than ‘directory’
(advisory), a body will be held to be acting ultra vires. If a public body under a
duty to act fails to act at all, the court can order it to do so by a mandatory
order. The rules of natural justice must also be observed in decision making:
where an individual has a right or interest at stake because of an
administrative decision, he is entitled to fair treatment.61 All of these grounds
for review have been rationalised by the House of Lords into three principal
categories: irrationality, illegality and procedural impropriety.62 The powers
of the court can only be exercised over a matter which it is competent to
determine. This introduces the concept of justiciability,63 and it is this latter
doctrine which most particularly undermines the concept of the rule of law. 
In Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service, the House of
Lords identified the categories of decision which would be immune from
judicial review – that is to say – non-justiciable. Amongst these – and the list is
not exhaustive – are the making of treaties, the dissolution of parliament, the
appointment of ministers, declarations of war and peace, and matters relating
to the granting of honours. What unites these categories is the fact that each
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involves matters of high policy which is most appropriately determined – in
the eyes of the judiciary – not by the courts but by the executive. Where this
applies, it may be said that the rule of law is undermined by respect for the
doctrine of the separation of powers: an ironic consequence.
The doctrine of judicial review nevertheless represents a bedrock for the
application of the rule of law, keeping those with law making and
discretionary powers within the law. From Entick v Carrington (1765) to R v
Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Fire Brigades’ Union and Others
(1993), wherein Kenneth Baker, the Home Secretary, was held to be acting
ultra vires when attempting to introduce a new tariff for compensation under
the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme under the royal prerogative
rather than under power conferred by statute, the principle is established and
reiterated.
The legal process
For the rule of law to be respected and applied, the legal process – civil and
criminal – must exhibit certain features. These features may be categorised as
accessibility and procedural fairness.
Accessibility 
The law must be accessible to all if rights are to be enforced. Accordingly,
there must not only exist a system of courts available locally but the cost of
having recourse to the courts must be such that there is real – rather than
symbolic – access to the courts. For the law to be attainable, adequate legal
advice and assistance must be provided at a cost affordable by all.64 The cost
of litigation in the United Kingdom is high. The cost of counsel defending in a
criminal trial is high. The statutory legal aid scheme is designed to mitigate
the cost of access to the law by providing financial assistance to defendants
and litigants who are unable to meet the full costs of a legal action.65 The
principles put forward by the Royal Commission on Legal Services were that:
Financial assistance out of public funds should be available for every
individual (not corporations) who, without it, would suffer an undue financial
burden in properly pursuing or defending his or her legal rights;
All those who receive legal services are entitled to expect the same standard of
legal service irrespective of their personal circumstances.66
The legal aid scheme, however, fell far short of these objectives. In 1990, the
proportion of eligible adults had decreased to 56 per cent, with 22 per cent
being eligible for free legal aid and 34 per cent eligible but subject to a
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contribution. As with civil legal aid, the criminal legal aid scheme employs the
merits and means tests. In terms of merits, the test is whether it is ‘in the
interests of justice’ for aid to be granted.67 The means test is administered by
the court clerks, and may result in a contribution being ordered, although, in
1990, of 510,000 legal aid applications granted by magistrates, only 47,000
(nine per cent) had contribution orders attached.68 Successive governments
strive to curtail legal aid.69
The right to a fair trial is protected under Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, and includes the right of the citizen: 
... to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing
or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free
when the interests of justice so require.
In Granger v United Kingdom (1990), the defendant had been denied further
legal aid to pursue an appeal against conviction. Granger, unable to afford
legal representation, acted in person. Representing the Crown were senior
government counsel. On an application under the Convention, Granger
alleged that he had been denied the protection of law. The Court of Human
Rights ruled that the denial of legal aid infringed Granger’s rights.
Procedural fairness
Justice and the rule of law demand that, in the conduct of legal proceedings,
procedural fairness be observed. Subsumed within this requirement are many
subsidiary conditions. The judge must be impartial: nemo iudex in sua causa.
Where jurors are involved, they, too, must be free from bias. In addition,
jurors should be reasonably representative of the society they serve. Evidence
gathered by the police must be acquired by lawful means. The evidence
admitted into court must be both of an admissible nature and fairly presented.
The proceedings should be conducted in such a manner as to be intelligible to
the parties, witnesses and jurors.70
The jury
The precise origins of trial by jury in its modern form are shrouded in mist.71
It is thought that by the end of the fifteenth century, the jury, as triers of fact,
was established in what today would be a recognisable form. Trial by jury for
serious criminal offences, and in civil cases where defamation, malicious
prosecution, false imprisonment and allegations of fraud are at issue,72 is
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67 Legal Aid Act 1988, s 21(2).
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69 Access to Justice Act 1999. See Slapper and Kelly, 2001, Chapter 12.
70 See, inter alia, Kafka, 1956; and Keedy, 1951 for illustrations of breaches of this
requirement.
71 See Maitland, 1908, pp 115–30. See, also, Denning, 1982, Pt 2.
72 Supreme Court Act 1981, subject to the proviso in s 69(1) which permits the court to
refuse trial by jury in cases of complexity or impracticality.
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regarded as the ‘bulwark of our liberties’.73 The decision of the jury is
regarded as conclusive and unimpeachable. Criticisms have long been made
of the lack of representativeness of the jury. Several factors militate against
representativeness: the accuracy of the electoral register from which jurors are
selected; the relative lack of randomness in jury selection; the vetting of
jurors;74 and challenges to members of the jury. Moreover, a wide range of
persons are either ineligible for jury service, or disqualified from sitting or
may be excused from jury service.75 When a jury is summoned, the presence
of a juror may be challenged ‘for cause’ – that is, where some fact relating to
the juror is known and gives rise to a challenge. Little is known about the
individual juror – only the names and addresses are given.76 This relative
anonymity of jurors contrasts starkly with the position in the United States of
America, where the selection of a jury entails a prolonged inquiry into the
lives and attitudes of prospective jurors. While the process is protracted,77 it is
designed to ensure that the jury ultimately selected will be one free from bias
in relation to the defendant. In the United Kingdom, a person may be excused
from service on the basis of personal knowledge of the case, bias, personal
hardship or conscientious objection to jury service. A juror should not be
excused on general grounds such as race, religion, political beliefs or
occupation.78
Evidence
For the rule of law to be observed, it is of central importance that the evidence
before the court be both complete and reliable. Contravention of this
requirement undermines the concept of a fair trial. Subsumed within this
question is the complex and controversial matter of the manner in which
evidence is obtained and the question of admissibility. While the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 198479 went some way to improving the safeguards for
the accused and was introduced, in part, to rectify deficiencies which had
come to light,80 the cases of the Birmingham Six,81 the Guildford Four and the
Maguire Seven82 illustrated the deficiencies in the criminal justice system. In
each of these cases, the defendants had served long terms of imprisonment for
alleged Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorist acts. In each case, the evidence
relied upon was unreliable. Their convictions were quashed by the Court of
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76 Prior to 1973, jurors’ occupations were made known.
77 Jury selection for the trial of John de Lorean took five weeks.
78 Practice Direction (1988).
79 See, inter alia, Zander, 1995.
80 See McConville and Baldwin, 1980.
81 R v McIlkenny and Others (1992).
82 See May, J, Interim Report on the Maguire Case, HC 556 (1990–91), London: HMSO.
Appeal following years of campaigning by relatives and friends for a review
of their cases. In each case, a serious miscarriage of justice had occurred and as
a result the integrity of the criminal justice system tarnished.
At common law, a confession which is improperly obtained is
inadmissible.83 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 places this rule on
a statutory basis, providing that if a confession has been obtained ‘by
oppression’, the court shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence
unless satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the confession – even if true –
has not been obtained improperly (section 76).
Whereas the rules on the admissibility of improperly obtained confessions
are relatively clear, the admissibility of other evidence obtained by either
dubious or unlawful means has proved less clear and less satisfactory. Until
1979, the judges exercised their discretion as to whether or not evidence
improperly acquired would be admissible.84 However, in R v Sang (1979), the
House of Lords ruled that no discretion existed to exclude evidence which
had been obtained by unlawful or improper means. The only basis on which
evidence could be excluded would be where the effect of admitting it would
prove unduly ‘prejudicial’ to the defence or ‘unfair’ to admit it. The fact that
the evidence was unlawfully acquired does not amount to ‘unfairness’ per
se.85 This position compares unfavourably with that pertaining in the United
States, where evidence improperly obtained is excluded,86 and that in
Australia, where such evidence is inadmissible unless the judge is satisfied
that there is some special reason why the impropriety should be excused.
The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure87 confirmed the test
propounded in R v Sang. However, the government rejected the
Commission’s view, and the position as to admissibility of such evidence is
now governed by section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984,
which provides that the court may refuse to allow evidence if:
... it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including
the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the
evidence would have such adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings
that the court ought not to admit it.
Professor Michael Zander describes the effect of section 78 as ‘nothing less
than startling’ (1993, p 414). He records that, from 1986 (when the Act came
into force) until early 1991:
… there had been close to a hundred reported decisions in which the courts
had given rulings under section 78 and that in the ‘great majority’ of these
cases the decision had been in favour of the accused. 
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Evaluation of Dicey’s ‘equality before the law’
The evidence for the notion of equality before the law is neither clear nor
uncontentious. As with so much of the constitution, there remains room for
doubt and argument. Nevertheless, it is submitted that there exists sufficient
evidence to suggest that Dicey’s approach remains a fruitful avenue for
inquiry and exploration. To dismiss – as some writers do – this aspect of
Dicey’s exposition of the rule of law, is to deprive the student of the
constitution of a valuable tool for analysis. 
The protection of rights under common law
The third limb of Dicey’s description of the rule of law reveals his preference
for common law protection of human rights over and above a specially
formulated code of rights, thus demonstrating a faith in the judiciary which is
not sustainable nowadays. Evaluation of this aspect of the definition must
await analysis of the Human Rights Act 1998 in Chapter 19 and the scope of
the protection which it gives to individual citizens.
The Human Rights Act 1998 for the first time ‘incorporates’ rights
protected under the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic
law. Accordingly, citizens no longer have to undertake the lengthy process of
applying to the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, but are able to seek a
remedy in the domestic courts. The method of incorporation adopted,
however, falls far short of enabling the judges to invalidate or set aside
domestic legislation. Instead, the judges of the higher courts are empowered
to make ‘declarations of incompatibility’ with Convention rights. Once such a
declaration has been made, it remains for parliament to approve an
amendment to the law. As a result, the Human Rights Act, far from elevating
individual rights proclaimed in the Convention to a higher status than statute,
preserves parliament’s sovereign law making and amending power, and also
maintains the separation of powers. 
Notwithstanding the Act’s status, the rule of law is undoubtedly
buttressed by the Act: every public body – by no means a simple concept88 –
is required to comply with Convention rights, and to fail to do so is to act
unlawfully save where there is no available alternative form of action because
of the requirements of primary legislation (section 6). To support rights
further, the Act requires that judges interpret primary and secondary
legislation ‘so far as it is possible to do so in a manner compatible with
Convention requirements’ (section 3(1)). Coming into effect in Scotland in
1999 and in England in 2000, the impact of the Act has been considerable.
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tribunals, and ‘any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature,
but does not include either House of Parliament or a person exercising functions in
connection with proceedings in Parliament’.
However, a flavour of the breadth of the impact is gleaned from the following.
The Act has spawned challenges to the criminal justice system, in relation to:
• the independence and impartiality of temporary judicial appointments; 
• the right not to incriminate oneself; 
• the rights of prisoners to privacy in relation to confidential correspondence
with legal advisers; 
• rights of prisoners in relation to the conditions of detention; 
• delays between parole board hearings for the consideration of release.
Mental patients have challenged successfully the burden of proof required
before they can be considered for release; and the length of delay in
determining their status. The Act has also had an impact on family law, with
children who have been made subject to secure accommodation orders
demanding that they be allowed to put their case at hearings, and absent
parents challenging decisions as to contact with children. Former soldiers
required to give evidence in Northern Ireland in the course of the Bloody
Sunday inquiry have successfully argued that the risk to their lives amounts
to a prospective violation of their right to life.
Even in its infancy, the Human Rights Act is having the effect of requiring
all public bodies to scrutinise their procedures for Convention compliance, or
to face legal action.
The rule of law in international dimension
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations, published
in 1948, declares that:
It is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to
rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be
protected by the rule of law.
The European Convention also recognises the concept of the rule of law. The
preamble states that:
The governments of European countries which are like-minded and have a
common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law ...
have agreed as follows ...
On an international level, the rule of law is also advanced by the International
Commission of Jurists, which strives to uphold and improve the rule of law
within the legal systems of its members. The Declaration of Delhi, issued
under the auspices of the International Commission of Jurists, affirms the rule
of law and its value in promoting the protection of civil and political rights
and linked such rights with the development and protection of social and
economic rights. The Congress of the International Commission of Jurists met
in 1959 in order to ‘clarify and formulate a supranational concept of the rule of
law’.89 The Declaration of Delhi 1959 recognised that:
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... the rule of law is a dynamic concept for the expansion and fulfilment of
which jurists are primarily responsible and which should be employed not
only to safeguard and advance the civil and political rights of the individual in
a free society, but also to establish social, economic, educational and cultural
conditions under which his legitimate aspirations and dignity may be realised
...
Accordingly, clause I of the report of the committee stipulates that:
The function of the legislature in a free society under the rule of law is to create
and maintain the conditions which will uphold the dignity of man as an
individual. This dignity requires not only the recognition of his civil and
political rights but also the establishment of the social, economic, educational
and cultural conditions which are essential to the full development of his
personality.90
Such aspirational statements recognise the need for the economic foundations
to be such that the dignity of man can be a reality in society. It is meaningless
to speak of the rule of law as insisting on decent, or even minimal, standards
of living within the context of poverty and disease. In order to secure any such
standards, a sufficient level of economic wealth must be achieved. Even where
such standards do exist, there will remain resistances to any formulation of
social and economic rights as enforceable positive legal rights, for such
formulations require the allocation of resources within society. Whereas
governments may be willing – indeed obliged – to respect civil and political
rights in a democracy, the protection of such rights generally will be effected
without significant national resource implications. The protection of freedoms,
such as freedom of speech and association, requires no more than a restraint
on government. The protection of social and economic rights requires positive
action, at a high cost.91
CONCLUSION
The rule of law – in its many guises – represents a challenge to state authority
and power, demanding that powers both be granted legitimately and that
their exercise is according to law. ‘According to law’ means both according to
the legal rules and something over and above purely formal legality and
imputes the concepts of legitimacy and constitutionality. In its turn, legitimacy
implies rightness or morality of law. The law is not autonomous but rests on the
support of those it governs. The law is the servant of the sense of rightness in
the community, and whilst the rule of law places law above every individual –
irrespective of rank and station – it remains, paradoxically, subject to the
ultimate judgment of the people. 
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CHAPTER 5
The separation of powers, together with the rule of law and parliamentary
sovereignty, runs like a thread throughout the constitution of the United
Kingdom. It is a doctrine which is fundamental to the organisation of a state –
and to the concept of constitutionalism – in so far as it prescribes the
appropriate allocation of powers, and the limits of those powers, to differing
institutions. The concept has played a major role in the formation of
constitutions. The extent to which powers can be, and should be, separate and
distinct was a central feature in formulating, for example, both the American
and French revolutionary constitutions. In any state, three essential bodies
exist: the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. It is the relationship
between these bodies which must be evaluated against the backcloth of the
principle. The essence of the doctrine is that there should be, ideally, a clear
demarcation in function between the legislature, executive and judiciary in
order that none should have excessive power and that there should be in place
a system of checks and balances between the institutions. However, as will be
seen, there are significant departures from the pure doctrine under the United
Kingdom’s constitution, and it must be conceded that, while the doctrine is
accorded respect, it is by no means absolute. 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The identification of the three elements of the constitution derives from
Aristotle (384–322 BC). In The Politics, Aristotle proclaimed that:
There are three elements in each constitution in respect of which every serious
lawgiver must look for what is advantageous to it; if these are well arranged,
the constitution is bound to be well arranged, and the differences in
constitutions are bound to correspond to the differences between each of these
elements. The three are, first, the deliberative, which discusses everything of
common importance; second, the officials; and third, the judicial element. [Bk
iv, xiv, 1297b35]
The constitutional seeds of the doctrine were thus sown early, reflecting the
need for government according to and under the law, a requirement
encouraged by some degree of a separation of functions between the
institutions of the state.
The constitutional historian FW Maitland traces the separation of powers
in England to the reign of Edward I (1272–1307): 
In Edward’s day all becomes definite – there is the Parliament of the three
estates, there is the King’s Council, there are the well known courts of law.
[1908, p 20]
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Viscount Henry St John Bolingbroke (1678–1751), in Remarks on the History of
England, advanced the idea of separation of powers. Bolingbroke was
concerned with the necessary balance of powers within a constitution, arguing
that the protection of liberty and security within the state depended upon
achieving and maintaining an equilibrium between the Crown, parliament
and the people. Addressing the respective powers of the King and parliament,
Bolingbroke observed that:
Since this division of power, and these different privileges constitute and
maintain our government, it follows that the confusion of them tends to
destroy it. This proposition is therefore true; that, in a constitution like ours,
the safety of the whole depends on the balance of the parts. [1748, pp 80–83]
Baron Montesquieu (1689–1755, living in England from 1729–31) stressed the
importance of the independence of the judiciary in De l’Esprit des Lois (1748):
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in
the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty ... Again, there is no
liberty if the power of judging is not separated from the legislative and
executive. If it were joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject
would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would then be the
legislator. If it were joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with
violence and oppression. There would be an end to everything, if the same
man, or the same body, whether of the nobles or the people, were to exercise
those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing public affairs, and
that of trying crimes or individual causes.
Here is the clearest expression of the demand for a separation of functions. It
has been remarked that Montesquieu’s observations on the English
constitution were inaccurate at the time, representing more a description of an
idealised state than reality.1 Moreover, it should not be assumed that
Montesquieu’s preferred arrangement of a pure separation of powers is
uncontroversial. Throughout history, there has been exhibited a tension
between the doctrine of separation of powers and the need for balanced
government – an arrangement depending more on checks and balances within
the system (as emphasised by Bolingbroke) than on a formalistic separation of
powers. Sir Ivor Jennings has interpreted Montesquieu’s words to mean not
that the legislature and the executive should have no influence over the other,
but rather that neither should exercise the power of the other.2 Sir William
Blackstone, a disciple of Montesquieu, adopted and adapted Montesquieu’s
strict doctrine, reworking his central idea to incorporate the theory of mixed
government. While it was of central importance to Blackstone that, for
example, the executive and legislature should be sufficiently separate to avoid
‘tyranny’, he nevertheless viewed their total separation as potentially leading
to dominance of the executive by the legislature.3 Thus, partial separation of
1 Vile, 1967, pp 84–85.
2 Jennings, 1959b, Appendix I.
3 Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765–69), Vol I.
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powers was required to achieve a mixed and balanced constitutional
structure. 
THE CONTEMPORARY DOCTRINE
The separation of powers doctrine does not insist that there should be three
institutions of government each operating in isolation from each other.
Indeed, such an arrangement would be unworkable, particularly under a
constitution dominated by the sovereignty of parliament. Under such an
arrangement, it is essential that there be a sufficient interplay between each
institution of the state. For example, it is for the executive, for the most part, to
propose legislation for parliament’s approval. Once passed into law, Acts of
Parliament are upheld by the judiciary. A complete separation of the three
institutions could result in legal and constitutional deadlock. Rather than a
pure separation of powers, the concept insists that the primary functions of
the state should be allocated clearly and that there should be checks to ensure
that no institution encroaches significantly upon the function of the other. If
hypothetical constitutional arrangements within a state are considered, a
range of possibilities exists:
(a) absolute power residing in one person or body exercising executive,
legislative and judicial powers: no separation of powers;
(b) power being diffused between three separate bodies exercising separate
functions with no overlaps in function or personnel: pure separation of
powers; and
(c) powers and personnel being largely – but not totally – separated with
checks and balances in the system to prevent abuse: mixed government
and weak separation of powers. 
It is to this third category that the constitution of the United Kingdom most
clearly subscribes.
Geoffrey Marshall states that the phrase ‘separation of powers’ is ‘one of
the most confusing in the vocabulary of political and constitutional thought’.
In part, as Marshall explains (1971, p 97), this is because it has been used ‘with
varying implication’ by historians and political scientists, and because the
concept manifests itself in so many arenas: ‘... judicial independence,
delegation of legislative powers, executive responsibility to legislatures,
judicial review, and constitutionality of arbitral bodies exercising mixed
functions.’
DEFINING THE INSTITUTIONS
The executive
The executive may be defined as that branch of the state which formulates
policy and is responsible for its execution. In formal terms, the sovereign is the
head of the executive. The Prime Minister, Cabinet and other ministers, for the
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most part, are elected Members of Parliament.4 In addition, the Civil Service,
local authorities, police and armed forces, constitute the executive in practical
terms.
The legislature
The Queen in Parliament is the sovereign law making body within the United
Kingdom. Formally expressed, parliament comprises the Queen, House of
Lords and House of Commons. All Bills5 must be passed by each House and
receive the royal assent. 
Parliament is bicameral, that is to say there are two chambers, each
exercising a legislative role – although not having equal powers – and each
playing a part in ensuring the accountability of the government. By way of
introduction, it should be noted that membership of the House of Lords is not
secured by election and is accordingly not accountable in any direct sense to
the electorate. The House of Commons is directly elected, and a parliamentary
term is limited under the Parliament Act 1911 to a maximum of five years. In
practice, the average life of a parliament is between three and four years. The
House is made up of the majority party: the political party which secures the
highest number of seats at the election, which will form the government. The
head of that party will be invited by the Queen to take office as Prime
Minister. In turn, it is for the Prime Minister to select his or her Cabinet. The
opposition parties6 comprise the remainder of the now 659 Members of
Parliament.7 The official Opposition is the party which represents the second
largest party in terms of elected members. In principle, the role of the official
Opposition is to act as a government in waiting, ready at any time to take
office should the government seek a dissolution of parliament.8
The judiciary
The judiciary is that branch of the state which adjudicates upon conflicts
between state institutions, between state and individual, and between
individuals. The judiciary is independent of both parliament and the
executive. It is the feature of judicial independence which is of prime
importance both in relation to government according to law and in the
protection of liberty of the citizen against the executive. As Blackstone
observed in his Commentaries:
... in this distinct and separate existence of the judicial power in a peculiar body
of men, nominated indeed, but not removable at pleasure by the Crown,
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Election.
8 For consideration of the role of the Opposition, see Chapters 14–16.
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consists one main preservative of the public liberty which cannot subsist long
in any state unless the administration of common justice be in some degree
separated both from the legislative and from the executive power [Vol 1,
p 204].
It is apparent, however, that, whilst a high degree of judicial independence is
secured under the constitution, there are several aspects of the judicial
function which reveal an overlap between the judiciary, parliament and the
executive. The first of these lies in the office of Lord Chancellor.
The office of Lord Chancellor9
It is the office of Lord Chancellor which is most frequently cited as being a
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. It is certainly a most notable
exception to that doctrine. The office derives from the Norman Conquest
when the King’s secretary became known as the royal ‘chancellor’. The first
Chancellor is recorded in 1068. In the Middle Ages, the primary role of the
Chancellor was to preside over parliament. From the fourteenth century, his
functions have been both parliamentary and judicial, in the latter role
presiding over the Court of Chancery until 1875.10 A glance at the several
roles he undertakes reveals why the office is claimed to breach the doctrine of
separation of powers. 
Functions in relation to the courts
The Lord Chancellor is head of the judiciary and is formally recognised as
President of the Supreme Court under the Supreme Court Act 1981. The
administration of the Supreme Court (Court of Appeal, High Court and
Crown Courts) and the county courts is the responsibility of the Lord
Chancellor.11 Magistrates are appointed by the Lord Chancellor. High Court
judges, circuit judges and recorders are appointed by the Crown on his
advice.12 The dismissal of magistrates,13 without showing cause, and circuit
judges for incapacity and misbehaviour is within the Lord Chancellor’s
powers.14
The Lord Chancellor has responsibility for the court service,15 legal aid
and advice schemes, the Land Registry16 and the Public Records Office.17 He
also presides over the Court of Protection.18
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12 Supreme Court Act 1981, s 10.
13 Justices of the Peace Act 1979, s 6.
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15 Ibid, s 27(1).
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Law reform
The Lord Chancellor works closely with the Law Commission of England and
Wales (note: not the Scottish Law Commission) established by the Law
Commissions Act 1965. The task of the Law Commission is to:
... take and keep under review all the law with which [it is] concerned with a
view to its systematic development and reform, including in particular the
codification of such law, the elimination of anomalies, the repeal of obsolete
and unnecessary enactments, the reduction of the number of separate
enactments and generally the simplification and modernisation of the law.
[Law Commissions Act 1965, section 3(1)]
The Lord Chancellor may refer matters to the Law Commission for
investigation, or the Commission may investigate issues of its own motion. 
Member of the executive
The Lord Chancellor is a member of the executive arm of government. He is a
senior member of Cabinet and, as such, may be dismissed by the Prime
Minister.19 It is perhaps this feature of the Lord Chancellor’s office which
gives rise to the greatest disquiet when evaluated against the doctrine of the
separation of powers, for the obvious impression is given that there is too
close an association between the head of the judiciary and the central body of
the executive – the Cabinet. Nevertheless, there is some justification for this
arrangement. Lord Chancellor Birkenhead (1872–1930), for example, defended
the link between the head of the judiciary and the Cabinet in 1922:
... it is difficult to believe that there is no necessity for the existence of such a
personality, imbued on the one hand with legal ideas and habits of thought,
and aware on the other of the problems which engage the attention of the
executive government. In the absence of such a person, the judiciary and the
executive are likely enough to drift asunder to the point of a violent separation,
followed by a still more violent and disastrous collision. [1922, Chapter 4]
More recently, Lord Hailsham, Lord Chancellor 1979 and 1987, argued that it
is vital that:
... the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law should be defended
inside the Cabinet as well as in Parliament. The Lord Chancellor must be, and
must be seen to be, a loyal colleague, not seeking to dodge responsibility for
controversial policies, and prepared to give to Parliament a justification for his
own acts of administration. [1975]
Equally strong support for this constitutionally unusual relationship between
the judiciary and the executive came from Lord Mackay of Clashfern, the
former Conservative Lord Chancellor. Lord Mackay conceded that there is an
inevitable tension between the role of Lord Chancellor as a judge and his role
as a member of the executive. Nevertheless, Lord Mackay argued that these
tensions are offset by the benefits which are perceived to flow from the close
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relationship. First, he supported Lord Hailsham’s view that the Lord
Chancellor should be able to advance and defend the cause of the
administration of justice within Cabinet. Secondly, Lord Mackay stated that
the linkage promotes a realisation that:
... both the judiciary and the executive are parts of the total government of the
country with functions which are distinct but which must work together in a
proper relationship if the country is to be properly governed. [1994, p 18]
Speaker of the House of Lords
The Lord Chancellor is a member of the House of Lords and presides over its
proceedings as ex officio Speaker. He is the principal spokesman for the
government in the Lords (on which see, further, below). The Lord
Chancellor’s salary as Speaker is paid under the Ministerial and Other Salaries
Act 1975. 
As a member of Cabinet, the Lord Chancellor cannot be a politically
impartial figure, nor can he be politically impartial when acting in his capacity
of government spokesman and head of the House of Lords in its legislative
capacity. Some separation of function in this latter regard is secured by
convention. When speaking for the government in debate, the Chancellor
removes himself from the Woolsack20 and speaks from a spot appointed by
King Henry VIII.21 It is by this means that he can be identified as having
changed from the impartial Speaker of the House of Lords to government
spokesman. 
The Lord Chancellor and judicial proceedings
The Lord Chancellor is a member of the House of Lords Appellate Committee
and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and, accordingly, will
participate in decisions which affect both common law and statutory
interpretation. In relation to his judicial functions as member of the House of
Lords, it is by convention that the Chancellor will not preside over, or be
judicially involved in, cases which involve the government or are overtly
political in nature. Some Lord Chancellors sit rarely in their judicial capacity;
others are judicially active. Lord Gardiner, for example, presided over only
two appeals in six years, whereas Lord Hailsham presided over 37 appeals in
eight years. Lord Mackay of Clashfern presided over five appeals in the first
five months of entering office, although in each case the appeals were argued
before he assumed the office of Lord Chancellor, the judgments being handed
down after he had taken office.22 The extent to which Lord Chancellors ought
to participate in appeals – and the type of appeals they should hear – is a
matter for debate. It is clear that the Lord Chancellor should not sit on appeals
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in which the government is a party to the proceedings, or where the
government has a clear interest in the matter litigated. 
The requirements of judicial impartiality, however, were tested before the
European Court of Human Rights in a judgment which has implications for
the role of the Lord Chancellor. In McGonnell v United Kingdom (2000), a case
relating to the position of the Deputy Bailiff of Guernsey as President of the
States of Deliberation (Guernsey’s legislative body) and subsequently as the
sole judge of law in proceedings relating to the applicant’s planning
application which had been refused, the Court of Human Rights held that the
Deputy Bailiff’s position was ‘capable of casting doubt’ on his ‘impartiality’
and as a result was in violation of Article 6(1) of the European Convention of
Human Rights, which guarantees ‘a fair and public hearing ... by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law’. The Bailiff in
Guernsey occupies a number of positions. He is a senior judge of the Royal
Court and is ex officio President of the Guernsey Court of Appeal. In his non-
judicial capacity, the Bailiff is President of the States of Election, of the States
of Deliberation, and of four states committees (the Appointments Board, the
Emergency Council, the Legislation Committee and the Rules of Procedure
Committee). He also has a role in communications between the Guernsey
authorities and the United Kingdom Government and the Privy Council.
Referring to its earlier decision in Findlay v United Kingdom (1997),23 the Court
re-stated the requirements of ‘independence’ and ‘impartiality’. On
independence, the Court declared that, in establishing whether the court or
tribunal was independent, regard had to be had, inter alia, to the ‘manner of
appointment of its members and their term of office, the existence of
guarantees against outside pressures and the question whether the body
present an appearance of independence’. On impartiality, the Court re-stated
the proposition that the tribunal:
... must [first] be subjectively free of personal prejudice or bias. Second, it must
also be impartial from an objective viewpoint, that is, it must offer sufficient
guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect ...
In the instant case, there was no question of actual bias on the part of the Bailiff;
nevertheless, the Court considered that ‘any direct involvement in the passage
of legislation’, or of executive rules, was likely to be sufficient to cast doubt on
the judicial impartiality of a person subsequently called on to determine a
dispute over whether reasons exist to permit a variation from the wording of
the legislation or rules at issue. Accordingly, ‘the mere fact that the Deputy
Bailiff presided over the court ... was capable of casting doubt on his
impartiality...’. There was, accordingly, a violation of the requirements of fair
trial before an independent and impartial tribunal.
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The Lord Chancellor’s Department
The Lord Chancellor is assisted in his work by the Lord Chancellor’s
Department. The Department is divided into divisions dealing with judicial
appointments and legislation, court service management, policy and legal
services, establishment and finance. 
Concerns over the democratic accountability of the Department and the
Lord Chancellor have long been voiced (see, further, below). The Lord
Chancellor’s membership of the House of Lords precludes any personal
accountability to the House of Commons. The Attorney General, until 1992,
deputised for the Lord Chancellor in the Commons and acted as a ‘courier’
between the Commons and the Lords. Since that time, there has been a
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State to the Lord Chancellor in the House of
Commons, and it is hoped that, by this means, the Commons will be able to
ensure enhanced accountability. From 1991, the House of Commons Home
Affairs Select Committee has included review of the work of the Lord
Chancellor’s Department. In addition, the Department is subject to the
scrutiny of the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons. 
A Minister of Justice?
The parliamentary accountability of the Lord Chancellor has long been
criticised and various proposals made to introduce the office of a Minister of
Justice. Rodney Brazier points to the ‘undesirable’ consequences which flow
from the separation of responsibility for criminal law reform, which is a
matter for the Home Office, and civil law reform, which is for the Lord
Chancellor’s Department, but for which there is no minister with
responsibility accountable to the House of Commons. Brazier calls for nothing
less than fundamental reform of the present arrangements with abolition of
the office of Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chancellor’s Office and the
introduction of a new Department of Law.24 The term ‘Ministry of Justice’ is
avoided deliberately by Brazier on the basis that, whenever the phrase is used,
the reaction of the judiciary is one of alarm. Lord Chancellor Hailsham, for
example, regarded the proposal25 by the Social Democratic Party and Liberal
Party Alliance (now merged into the Liberal Democrat Party) for a new
Department of Justice26 as ‘constitutionally very dangerous’ and ‘a menace to
the independence of the judiciary’.27 Lord Mackay of Clashfern rejected the
need for a Ministry of Justice, arguing that the new forms of accountability in
the House of Commons – through the Parliamentary Under Secretary and the
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Home Affairs Select Committee – would prove sufficient in securing adequate
accountability.28
The judiciary
Appointment
The Lord Chief Justice, Master of the Rolls, President of the Family Division,
Vice Chancellor, Lords of Appeal in Ordinary and Lord Justices of Appeal are
appointed by the Queen.29 By convention, the appointments are made on
consultation with the Prime Minister, who will have consulted the Lord
Chancellor. The Lord Chancellor makes appointments to the High Court
bench. Candidates must meet the qualification requirements. For
appointments to the High Court, the candidate must be a barrister of ten
years’ standing, or a solicitor with rights of audience in the High Court, or a
circuit judge of two years’ standing. For appointment to the Court of Appeal,
the candidate must either be a barrister of ten years’ standing, a solicitor with
rights of audience in the High Court, or a current member of the High Court
Bench.30
The socio-economic and educational background of the judiciary has been
subjected to much research. In brief, the picture presented is one of a middle
and upper class, middle aged, white, predominantly male, judiciary
dominated by public school and Oxford or Cambridge University
education.31 The process of selection has traditionally been shrouded in
secrecy, with records of eligible candidates, who in practice will be successful
practitioners, being maintained by the Lord Chancellor’s Department. The
criteria for selection are ability, experience, standing, integrity and physical
health.32 It has been argued that the appointment of senior judges should be
made by a Judicial Commission rather than on the recommendation of the
Lord Chancellor alone.33 For appointments at High Court level and above, the
Lord Chancellor consults with a number of senior judges, but the ultimate
decision rests with the Lord Chancellor. At circuit judge level and below,
appointments are filled by open competition, with public advertisements and
interviews of candidates by selection boards which include lay members.34
Tenure
The Act of Settlement 1700 secured a senior35 judge’s tenure of office during
‘good behaviour’. More modern expression is given to this protection under
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the Supreme Court Act 1981,36 which provides that a person appointed shall
hold office during good behaviour, removable only by Her Majesty on an
Address presented to her by both Houses of Parliament. Senior judges cannot
be dismissed for political reasons. They can be removed by compulsory
retirement if they are incapacitated or unable to resign through incapacity.37
Judges can be dismissed for misbehaviour, and under an Address to the
Crown made by the two Houses of Parliament. ‘Misbehaviour’ relates to the
performance of a judge’s official duties or the commission of a criminal
offence. Not every judge convicted of an offence will be dismissed: six judges
have been convicted for driving with an excess of alcohol in their blood but
have continued in office. In 1830, Sir Jonah Barrington was removed from
office in Ireland under the Address procedure for the embezzlement of
monies paid into court. Theoretically, a judge can also be removed by
‘impeachment’ for ‘high crimes and misdemeanours’, although this procedure
has not been used since 180538 and is thought to be obsolete.39 In Scotland,
judges can only be removed on the grounds of misconduct.40
The Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act 1993 introduced the retirement
age of 70, which may be extended to 75 if in the public interest. From 1959, the
retirement ages were set at 75 for a High Court judge and 72 for a circuit
judge, although judges appointed before this date were permitted to remain in
office.41
Salaries
In order further to protect the judiciary from political debate, judicial salaries
are charged on the Consolidated Fund.42 Judicial salaries are relatively high,
on the basis that it is in the national interest ‘to ensure an adequate supply of
candidates of sufficient calibre for appointment to judicial office’.43
Disqualifications
Holders of full time judicial appointments are barred from legal practice,44
and may not hold paid appointments as directors or undertake any
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professional or business work. Judges are also disqualified from membership
of the House of Commons.45 Membership of the House of Commons does
not, however, disqualify that person from appointment to the Bench. 
Immunity from suit
All judges have immunity from legal action in the performance of their
judicial functions. Provided that a judge acts within jurisdiction, or honestly
believes he is acting within his jurisdiction, no action for damages may lie.
Judges are immune from the law of defamation and, even if ‘actuated by
envy, hatred and malice and all uncharitableness’, he is protected.46 In Sirros v
Moore (1975), Lord Denning MR and Ormrod LJ ruled that every judge –
irrespective of rank and including the lay magistracy – is protected from
liability in respect of his judicial function provided that he honestly believed
that the action taken was within his jurisdiction.47 The Crown Proceedings
Act 1947 also provides protection for the Crown from liability for conduct of
any person discharging ‘responsibilities of a judicial nature vested in him’ or
in executing the judicial process.48
Bias or personal interest
A judge is under a duty not to adjudicate on cases in which he has either an
interest – whether personal or financial – or where he may be influenced by
bias. A fundamental doctrine of natural justice is that ‘no man should be judge
in his own cause’: nemo iudex in sua causa. 
Financial interests
In Dr Bonham’s Case (1609) Lord Coke held that members of a board which
determined physicians’ fines could not both impose and receive the fines, thus
giving early judicial expression to the requirement of freedom from bias.
Rather more recently, in Dimes v Grand Junction Canal Proprietors (1852), the
propriety of Lord Cottenham LC adjudicating was challenged on the basis
that the Lord Chancellor held shares in the canal company involved in
litigation. The House of Lords set aside the decision of the court despite the
fact that:
No one can suppose that Lord Cottenham could be in the remotest degree
influenced by the interest ... It is of the last importance that the maxim that no
man is to be judge in his own cause should be held sacred. [p 793]
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Thus, the mere existence of a financial interest, even where it does not in fact
result in actual bias but may present the appearance of bias, will be sufficient
to disqualify a judge from adjudication. The same position prevails in the
United States of America,49 where the issue of financial interests of federal
judges is expressly covered by law. The Ethics in Government Act 1978
requires that Supreme Court and Federal judges must make a public
declaration of ‘income, gifts, shares, liabilities and transactions in securities
and real estate’,50 a protection which is conspicuously absent in the United
Kingdom. 
A financial interest in a case which does not go beyond the financial
interest of any other citizen does not disqualify judges from sitting. Thus, in
Bromley London Borough Council v Greater London Council (1983), for example,
the fact that all the judges in the Court of Appeal were taxpayers and users of
public transport in London did not disqualify them from hearing the case. 
Other bias 
Judges, like everyone else, may be biased by virtue of race, sex, politics,
background, association and opinions.51 When adjudicating they must,
however, be demonstrably impartial. This impartiality involves:
... the judge listening to each side with equal attention, and coming to a decision
on the argument, irrespective of his personal view about the litigants ...
and, further, that:
Whatever his personal beliefs, the judge should seek to give effect to the
common values of the community, rather than any sectional system of values
to which he may adhere.52
Where a judge himself feels that he has a bias against one of the parties to
litigation he may disqualify himself from sitting on the case, as did Lord
Denning MR in Ex parte Church of Scientology of California (1978). There,
counsel for the Church requested that he disqualify himself as a result of eight
previous cases involving the Church on which he had adjudicated, and in
which, in the eyes of the Church, he displayed bias against them. 
Nineteen eighty-nine witnessed the start of a high profile case in which the
doctrine of judicial impartiality was re-stated by the House of Lords. Earlier in
the year, the former President of Chile, Senator Pinochet, arrived in Britain on
a private visit for medical tests. The Spanish government sought the arrest
and extradition of Pinochet on charges involving the murder, torture and the
hostage-taking of Spanish citizens in Chile between 1973 and 1979. Two
provisional warrants for Pinochet’s arrest had been granted following the
Spanish proceedings. Pinochet then sought judicial review of the decision to
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grant an arrest warrant and an order of certiorari to quash the decision. At
first instance, the Queen’s Bench Division ruled that Pinochet enjoyed
sovereign immunity as a former Head of State.53 On appeal to the House of
Lords, the court ruled – by a majority of three to two judges – that former
Heads of State enjoyed immunity from arrest and extradition proceedings in
the United Kingdom only in respect of official acts performed in the exercise
of their functions as a Head of State. Torture and hostage-taking could not be
regarded as part of Pinochet’s official functions and therefore were excluded
from immunity. In the course of the hearing before the House of Lords,
several organisations – including Amnesty International – had been granted
leave to intervene and submit evidence to the court. Following the decision,
Senator Pinochet’s lawyers complained to the Home Secretary that one of the
judges, Lord Hoffmann, was a director of the Amnesty International
Charitable Trust and, as a result, was disqualified from sitting, on the basis
that his participation raised the question of bias: of a judge ‘sitting on his own
cause’. Senator Pinochet accordingly applied for the decision to be set aside.
Lord Hoffmann had been one of the three majority judges. In an
unprecedented move, and in the light of extensive national and international
publicity, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, the most senior of the 12 Law Lords,
convened a differently constituted panel of judges to reconsider the case. All
five judges agreed that the earlier decision could not stand. Lord Browne-
Wilkinson, reiterating the principle that it was ‘of fundamental importance
that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly
be seen to be done’,54 stated that ‘once it was shown that the judge was
himself a party to the cause, or had a relevant interest in its subject matter, he
was disqualified without any investigation into whether there was a
likelihood or suspicion of bias. The mere fact of his interest was sufficient to
disqualify him unless he made sufficient disclosure’.55
The Pinochet case, a unique and unprecedented case which brought the
highest domestic court under public scrutiny, spawned further challenges
against judges, alleging bias of one form or another. It also led to calls for a
register of judges’ interests, in which any interests which might raise the
question of bias could be recorded and made public, a proposal rejected by
Lord Browne-Wilkinson as unworkable: whereas it was generally clear when
Members of Parliament’s interests conflict with their professional duties, as he
put it, ‘a judge [unlike Members of Parliament] may be dealing with anything,
any local club or society ... there’s no end to it’.56
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXECUTIVE 
AND LEGISLATURE; LEGISLATURE AND 
JUDICIARY; EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIARY
In light of the doctrine of separation of powers, it is necessary to evaluate the
manner in which, and extent to which, separate functions are allocated
between the differing bodies and kept separate. This task is most conveniently
undertaken by examining the relationship between first, the executive and
legislature, secondly, the legislature and judiciary and, thirdly, the executive
and judiciary.
Executive and legislature
The personnel of government
Parliament provides the personnel of government. ministers of the Crown,
including the Prime Minister, must be members of either House of Parliament.
By convention, the Prime Minister must be a member of the House of
Commons and it is for this reason that Lord Home renounced his peerage in
1963, under the Peerage Act of that year, to revert to being Sir Alec Douglas-
Home, Leader of the Conservative Party and subsequently Prime Minister. It
is thus immediately apparent that the executive, far from being separated
from the legislature, is drawn from within its ranks. It is for this reason that
Walter Bagehot in The English Constitution denounced the theory of the
separation of powers under the English constitution. For Bagehot, this feature
of the constitution, however, far from being a dangerous divergence from an
ideal separation of powers, had clear merits. To Bagehot, the close relationship
between executive and parliament represented ‘the efficient secret of the
English constitution’ which:
... may be described as the close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the
executive and legislative powers. No doubt by the traditional theory, as it
exists in all the books, the goodness of our constitution lies in the entire
separation of the legislative and executive authorities, but in truth its merit
consists in their singular approximation. The connecting link [between the
executive and parliament] is the Cabinet. [Bagehot (1867), 1993, pp 67–68]
There are, however, opposing views. Lord Hailsham, the Lord Chancellor in
the 1979–87 parliament, asserted57 that the current electoral process which,
generally, but not invariably, returns a government with a large majority of
seats in parliament, contributes to what he termed an ‘elective dictatorship’ –
that is to say, a situation in which the executive controls the legislature. While
Bagehot’s view may have been tenable at the time in which he wrote, it is
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nowadays too simplistic and inaccurate a description of the working of the
constitution.58
Prima facie, this close union of executive and legislature would suggest that
the potential for abuse against which Montesquieu warned exists at the heart
of the constitution. This would be so if it were to be demonstrated that the
executive controls parliament. Judgment on that matter must be suspended
until the working of parliament has been examined in detail, in Chapters
14–16. There exist, however, tenable grounds for such an argument, but these
must be set against the extent to which procedural mechanisms in parliament
avoid an actual or potential abuse of power by the executive. The
constitutional principle entailed in this close union between executive and
legislature, deriving from historical practice, is that of ‘responsible
government’: that is to say that the powers of government are scrutinised
adequately by a democratically elected parliament to whom every member of
government is individually and collectively responsible.
Statutory limits on membership
There exist statutory limits on the extent to which the executive can dominate
parliament. The House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975 preserves the
separation between the executive and legislature by providing that certain
categories of people are disqualified from holding parliamentary office. Under
section 2, holders of judicial office, civil servants, members of the armed forces
and the police and members of foreign legislatures are debarred from office.
The Act also limits the number of government ministers in the House of
Commons to 95 (section 2). Despite this limitation, 95 ministers, when
considered together with their loyal Parliamentary Private Secretaries,59
ensures that the government will generally enjoy the automatic support of
some 120 Members of Parliament. Where the government has been elected
with a strong majority of seats – as in 1983, when the Conservative Party had a
majority of 144, and in 1997, when the electorate returned a Labour
government with a majority of 179 – it must be conceded that the potential for
dominance exists. An evaluation of this matter depends upon the adequacy of
parliamentary procedures.
Political and procedural checks on government
The government, it must be recognised, irrespective of the size of its majority
of seats in parliament, is dependent upon parliament for its continuance in
office. The loss of a vote of confidence on a matter of policy central to a
government’s programme will cause the government to fall, as occurred in
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1979 when the Labour Prime Minister, Mr James Callaghan, was forced to
seek a dissolution of parliament and call a general election. Furthermore,
parliamentary procedures are devised to secure adequate scrutiny for
legislative proposals, and it cannot merely be assumed that the government
will always get its legislation through in the form which it envisaged. By way
of example, in 1983–84, the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill was
substantially amended following pressure from politicians of all parties,
pressure groups, academics and lawyers. In 1986, the government – despite
having a strong majority in parliament – was forced to abandon its plans for
legislation to deregulate Sunday trading due to parliamentary pressure. In
1994, the Conservative government faced unprecedented opposition over
membership of the European Community and Union. While the government
narrowly won a vote of confidence in the Commons, eight of its own members
refused to support the government and the Conservative Party whip60 was
withdrawn. The constitutional effect of losing eight members under the whip
was to place the government in the position of a minority government.61 In
the following week, the government lost a vote, on an increase in the level of
VAT on domestic fuel in the European Finance Bill, when eight of its members
supported the Opposition and a further seven members abstained from
voting. As a result, the government became dependent upon the uncertain
support of Members of Parliament not subject to party discipline and of
support from members of opposition parties. The Chancellor of the Exchequer
immediately announced that the Bill would be dropped and that the requisite
revenue would be raised through other means, namely the introduction of a
‘mini budget’ in December 1994. 
The Opposition
The role of the official Opposition must also be considered. Her Majesty’s
Loyal Opposition is, constitutionally speaking, a ‘government in waiting’. Not
only is it the function of the Opposition to question, challenge and oppose the
government, but it also puts forward alternative policies and solutions to
problems. In order to ensure that there is adequate opportunity for the
Opposition to fulfil its constitutional role, 20 days per session are set aside for
debate on subjects chosen by the Opposition.62
Question Time, debates and select committees
Question Time and debates in parliament ensure the accountability of
government to parliament. The administration of the state is scrutinised by a
system of Select Committees in parliament with wide powers of inquiry.
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The House of Lords
In addition to checks within the House of Commons, the House of Lords may
cause government to modify or abandon proposed legislation. The House of
Lords has the power to amend and delay non-Money Bills for approximately
a year before the Bill can receive the royal assent under the Parliament Acts
1911 and 1949. Rather than risk the delay of legislation, the government may
prefer to compromise its proposals and accept proposed amendments from
the Lords.
The electorate
Finally, the electorate, in addition to its role in a general election, can also
express its displeasure with government policies during a parliamentary term
at by-elections and local government elections. In the 1993 county council
elections, the government lost control of many of the councils which had been
its traditional supporters – clear evidence that no government can afford to
ignore the views of the people. Subsequent by-elections confirmed the
government’s loss of electoral support, as did the general election on 1 May
1997, when the Conservative government suffered a humiliating defeat.
Delegated legislation and the separation of powers
Delegated – or secondary – legislation raises important questions relating to
the separation of powers. Delegated legislation refers to laws, rules and
regulations, made by government departments, local authorities and other
public bodies, under the authority of an Act of Parliament: ‘... every exercise of
a power to legislate conferred by or under an Act of Parliament.’63
The principal justification for the delegation of such law making power is
efficiency. By granting delegated power, parliament is freed from scrutinising
every technical detail of a Bill. Delegated power also enables ministers and
others to ‘fill in the details’ after the parent Act is in force. AV Dicey approved
of delegated powers on this basis.64 Delegated power has, however, been
questioned. In 1929, Chief Justice Hewart65 criticised delegated legislation as
being an abuse of power. An Interdepartmental Committee of Inquiry on
Ministers’ Powers66 exonerated ministers from this charge and defended both
the necessity and desirability of delegated legislation. 
In any parliamentary year, some 60 to 70 Acts of Parliament will be
passed. The volume of delegated legislation, however, may amount to some
2,000 statutory instruments per year. While general Bills – public and private –
are subjected to full parliamentary scrutiny, it will be seen in Chapter 15 that
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delegated legislation receives far more cursory examination by parliament as a
whole. The implication of delegated legislation in constitutional terms is that a
legislative function is being exercised by the executive and not parliament.
The delegation of law making power is a necessity given the heavy legislative
programme and the modern complexity of legal regulation. Provided that
parliamentary scrutiny is adequate, and that the courts are vigilant and
effective in ensuring that delegated powers are exercised consistently with the
law – intra vires – it may be concluded that this ostensible breach of the
separation of powers is unavoidable, although whether it is subject to
adequate scrutiny and control remains questionable.
Legislature and judiciary
It has been stated above that parliament is sovereign and that the judiciary is
subordinate to parliament. It has also been stated, perhaps paradoxically, that
the judiciary is independent. This raises the question of how such apparently
conflicting assertions can be reconciled. At the head of the judiciary is the
Crown. The Crown represents the ‘fountain of justice’ and all judicial acts are
carried out in the name of the Crown. In law, it is the Crown which appoints
all senior judges, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister and the Lord
Chancellor. 
Rules against criticism of the judiciary
To reinforce the independence of judges, convention dictates that there should
be no criticism levelled at them from members of the executive – but not from
other Members of Parliament. Parliamentary practice prohibits the criticism of
judges other than under a motion expressing specific criticism or leading to an
Address to the Crown for the removal of a judge. It was not, however,
regarded as a breach of conventional rules when the then Prime Minister, Mrs
Thatcher, in parliament, criticised the light sentence imposed on a child
molester.67 There have, however, been other incidents where judges have
been criticised in parliament. In 1977, for example, motions were tabled for the
dismissal of judges who had reduced a sentence for rape. Further, a judge
who described a rape victim as guilty of contributory negligence was
criticised in parliament.68 The manner in which Members of Parliament are
controlled in terms of what they may, or may not, say is through the powers
of the Speaker of the House of Commons. These powers will be considered in
Chapters 14 and 18.
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The subjudice rule
Where civil proceedings are either before a court or awaiting trial, Members of
Parliament are barred from raising them in debate. If the matter has not yet
reached the courts, debate may be barred if the Speaker considers that there
would result a real and substantial danger of prejudice to the trial arising as a
consequence. No reference may be made to criminal proceedings from the
time of the charge being made until the final appeal is determined.
Parliamentary supremacy and the judicial function 
The doctrine of parliamentary supremacy entails the necessary constitutional
subordination of judges to parliament and has several implications. First, it is
well established that the sovereign parliament can overturn any court decision
by way of legislation.69 Secondly, the judiciary’s primary role in relation to the
interpretation of statutes is to give effect to the latest expression of the will of
parliament.70
Judges as legislators
One of the most debated aspects of the relationship between the legislature
and the judges lies in the question: ‘Do judges make law?’ In constitutional
terms, the issue is whether by making law – either by virtue of the doctrine of
precedent or through the interpretation of statutes – the judges are usurping
the legislative function or, in other words, violating the separation of
powers.71
The rules of statutory interpretation, devised by the judges themselves, are
designed to limit judicial creativity. Statutory interpretation is not
straightforward, even though Acts of Parliament are couched in detailed
language in order to maximise clarity and minimise vagueness or obscurity.
Despite this attempt to achieve clarity in statutory language, it is artificial to
deny that judges ‘make law’. Every new meaning conferred on a word, every
application of a rule to a new situation, whether by way of statutory
interpretation or under common law, ‘creates’ new law. Judges have
themselves abandoned the fiction of the ‘declaratory theory’ which asserts
that they do not ‘make’ law but merely discover its true meaning. From the
separation of powers perspective, judicial law making should cause disquiet
only if judges display overtly dynamic law making tendencies. By way of
illustration, in Magor and St Mellons Rural District Council v Newport Corporation
(1965), Lord Denning MR was accused by Lord Simonds in the House of
Lords of ‘naked usurpation of the legislative function’.
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Lord Simonds, in the House of Lords, reviewing Lord Denning’s
approach, roundly rejected Lord Denning’s broad ‘gap filling’ attitude to
interpretation:
The court, having discovered the intention of Parliament and of ministers too,
must proceed to fill in the gaps. What the legislature has not written, the court
must write. This proposition, which restates in a new form the view expressed
... in the earlier case ... cannot be supported. It appears to me to be a naked
usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of interpretation.
And it is less justifiable when it is guesswork with what material the legislature
would, if it had discovered the gap, have filled it in. If a gap is disclosed, the
remedy lies in an amending Act.72
Lord Denning’s contribution to developing the law was marked in many
areas. His judicial ‘campaign’ to protect the occupational rights of deserted
wives73 ultimately led to enactment of the Matrimonial Homes Act 1967,
giving statutory protection to rights of occupation in the matrimonial home.
Placed within the context of separation of powers and the position of judges
as subordinate to parliament, it can be seen that the courts developed the
common law to a point where parliament felt it necessary to legislate. Burmah
Oil v Lord Advocate (1965) further illustrates the point. The government, being
dismayed at the implications of the House of Lords’ decision over
compensation rights for property destroyed in wartime, passed the War
Damage Act 1965 to nullify the decision retrospectively. Such is the
sovereignty of parliament.
The reference by judges to government publications and records of
parliamentary proceedings, for the purposes of interpreting statutes, has
traditionally been regarded as improper. In Davis v Johnson (1979), Lord
Denning MR stated that privately he looked at Hansard in order to establish
the true construction of a statute, a revelation not approved of by the House of
Lords. The Renton Committee’s Report on the Preparation of Legislation74 and
the Law Commission’s Report on the Interpretation of Statutes75 had both ruled
against any relaxation of the rules on the basis, inter alia, that such reference
was of doubtful benefit, difficult in practice and costly. Exceptions to this rule
existed. For example, in Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke AG
(1975), the House of Lords accepted that reference could be made to Law
Commission reports and to the reports of parliamentary committees in order
to establish the defect in the previous law which parliament was seeking to
redress. Further, in Pickstone v Freemans plc (1989), reference to Hansard was
regarded as justified for the purpose of determining the purpose of the
legislation and government policy. Until the case of Pepper v Hart (1992), it had
been widely accepted that the courts should not, except under these
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circumstances, consult materials preparatory to the enactment of the statute or
the records of parliamentary proceedings in connection with its passage in
order to assist with the task of interpretation. In Pepper v Hart, however, the
House of Lords conceded the limited right to resort to Hansard as an aid to
interpretation. The Attorney General had argued that any relaxation in the
rules would amount to a questioning of the freedom of speech in debate in
parliament contrary to Article IX of the Bill of Rights 1689. Lord Browne-
Wilkinson, for the majority, rejected that reasoning, declaring that far from
‘questioning the independence of parliament and its debates, the courts would
be giving effect to what is said and done there’. For post-Pepper v Hart
developments, see Chapter 18.
The High Court of Parliament 
Parliament has the sovereign power to regulate its own composition and
procedure. Under parliamentary privilege – derived from the law and custom
of parliament and thus part of the common law – parliament, and not the
courts, has jurisdiction to rule on its own powers. Parliament cannot, however
– other than by an Act of Parliament – extend its own privileges.76 The role of
the judges in relation to privilege is to rule on its existence and extent. Once
the court is satisfied that a particular matter falls within parliament’s domain,
it will defer to parliament. Accordingly, if, for example, a citizen is defamed
by the absolute privilege of free speech in parliamentary proceedings,77 there
is no legal redress. Privilege will thus protect the Member of Parliament from
the law of defamation and leave the aggrieved individual without a legal
remedy. 
Privilege also extends to regulating the legislative process. It is for
parliament alone to determine the procedure by which an Act of Parliament
should come into being. It is clearly established that, in order to become an
Act of Parliament, a Bill must pass its legislative stages in the Commons and
Lords (except where the Parliament Acts apply) before receiving the royal
assent. Once that process is complete, it is not for the judiciary to inquire
behind the parliamentary roll.78
Executive and judiciary
With regard to the relationship between the executive and the judiciary,
several matters having implications for the separation of powers require
examination: the attitude of the courts in matters entailing the exercise of the
royal prerogative; parliamentary privilege; judicial review; the role of judges
in non-judicial functions; and the role of the Law Officers of the Crown. 
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The royal prerogative
Detailed consideration of the royal prerogative will be undertaken in Chapter
6. The royal prerogative has significant implications for the separation of
powers. Being the residue of monarchical power, the prerogative is part of the
common law and thus amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts. Today, the
vast majority of prerogative powers are exercised by the government in the
name of the Crown. As will be seen later, the substance of many prerogative
powers is political, entailing matters of policy which the judges are not
competent to decide or – to phrase it differently – matters which, if ruled on
by the judges in a manner inconsistent with the interpretation of the executive,
would place the judges in a sensitive constitutional position and open to
accusations of a violation of the separation of powers. That is not to suggest,
however, that the courts have no role to play with respect to the royal
prerogative. The traditional role of the courts is to rule on the existence and
scope of the prerogative, but – having defined its existence and scope – to
decline thereafter to rule on the exercise of the power. However, in Council of
Civil Service Unions v Minister of State for Civil Service (1985) (the GCHQ case),
the House of Lords made it clear that the courts have jurisdiction to review
the exercise of executive power irrespective of whether the source of power is
statutory or under the prerogative. Having seemingly extended the
jurisdiction of the courts in relation to the prerogative, the House of Lords,
nevertheless, proceeded to rule that there exists a wide range of ‘non-
justiciable’ matters which should be decided by the executive rather than the
courts: a clear expression of the separation of powers. 
By way of further example of the relationship between the executive and
the courts in prerogative matters, the power to enter treaties under
international law is a hallmark of a sovereign state and derives from the royal
prerogative. The courts have consistently declined to become involved in
matters of treaty making or its implications. When, in 1993, Lord Rees-Mogg
sought to challenge ratification of the Maastricht Treaty under the prerogative
by an application for judicial review, the court declined jurisdiction.79 At the
time, the Speaker of the House warned the courts against interference with the
business of parliament.80 To claim and exercise jurisdiction over such a matter
would place the judges above the executive – effectively alter the balance
within the constitution – and place ultimate power in an unelected,
unaccountable judiciary. It is for this reason that the judges are traditionally
cautious when matters of prerogative are involved, and that caution is
protective of the separation of powers, but may also prove to be detrimental to
the concept of the rule of law. 
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Law Officers of the Crown
The Law Officers of the Crown – the Attorney General and the Solicitor
General – are members of the government. The Attorney General may also be
a member of Cabinet. The Attorney General is bound by conventions which
serve to limit the overlap in functions. Thus, where his consent to prosecution
is required, by convention the Attorney General must avoid party political
considerations, and may not take orders from government. This is a
particularly delicate matter when essentially political prosecutions are being
contemplated.81
The Law Officers are advisers to government and its ministers, and, by
convention, this advice must never be disclosed. In 1986, this convention was
breached when Leon Brittan, then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry,
revealed advice given on the Westland Helicopter rescue plan.82
Judicial review
Judicial review of administrative action is designed to keep those persons and
bodies with delegated powers within the scope of the power conferred upon
them by parliament: the doctrine of intra vires. Thus, if a minister of the Crown
or a local authority exceeds the power granted, the courts will nullify the
decision taken and require that the decision maker reach a decision according
to the correct procedure. Judicial review is concerned with the process by
which decisions are made, not with the merits of the decision itself, nor with
the merits of the legal rules which are being applied by the administrator.
From this perspective, it may be said that the judges are merely upholding the
will of parliament in controlling the exercise of powers delegated by it to
subordinate bodies. It could be said that the judges are here upholding both
the rule of law and the sovereignty of parliament. From another perspective,
however, serious questions are raised for the separation of powers. If
parliament confers on a minister of the Crown the power to decide a matter
‘as he thinks fit’, to what extent is it constitutionally proper for a court of law
to intervene and question the manner of the exercise of his decision making
power? Does this represent an intrusion into executive power on the part of
the judiciary? Does it amount to judicial supremacy over the executive? 
Judicial review thus presents a constitutional paradox, representing, on the
one hand, a check on the executive – arguably infringing the doctrine of
separation of powers – and, on the other hand, keeping the executive within
its legal powers, thus buttressing the sovereignty of parliament and the rule of
law. Public and press criticism of the judiciary’s role in keeping the executive
under check led to the former Lord Chief Justice, Lord Taylor of Gosforth,
publicly defending the role of the judges. Speaking at an annual judges’
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dinner, Lord Taylor rejected recent charges that the ‘senior judiciary have
decided to mount a bloodless coup and seize the commanding heights of the
constitution’. Recent cases involving the government – for example, the
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the declaration that the government had
acted unlawfully in relation to funding the Pergau Dam project in Malaysia,
the appointment of Scott LJ to inquire and report on the arms to Iraq affair,
and the appointment of Nolan LJ to inquire and report on standards in public
life83 – have all recently raised the public profile of the judges. Lord Taylor
rejected the criticisms, stating that:
... nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed their [the judges’] aim and
function is quite the reverse. It is to ensure that powers are exercised by those
to whom parliament has given them and in the way in which parliament has
specified. 
Lord Taylor added that the judiciary was conscious that it must avoid
usurping the functions of the legislature or the executive – thus, reaffirming
the doctrine of separation of powers.84
Contemporary issues for the separation of powers doctrine
Two of the Labour government’s constitutional reform measures raise
particularly difficult questions for the separation of powers, namely, the
Human Rights Act 1998, which ‘incorporates’ the European Convention on
Human Rights into domestic law, and the devolution of legislative and
administrative powers to regional assemblies. 
In relation to the Human Rights Act, the legislation was consciously
drafted in such a manner as to preserve the balance of power – and separation
of power – between the judiciary and parliament. As will be seen more fully in
Chapter 19, this is accomplished by providing that primary (but not
secondary) legislation remains immune from judicial invalidation even where
that legislation is ruled to be incompatible with Convention rights. Where
judges in the higher courts make ‘declarations of incompatibility’, the matter
is referred back to the executive to determine whether, and in what form,
amending primary legislation should be enacted by parliament. While the
Human Rights Act came into force in England in October 2000, it was in effect
in Scotland on the devolution of power to the Scottish Parliament and it was
from Scotland that early indications of the impact of the Act were discerned.
Specifically relevant to the position of judges and their independence – a
crucial aspect of the separation of powers – is the appointments system. In
Starrs and Chalmers v Procurator Fiscal (1999), the Court of Session ruled that
the right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal,
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guaranteed under Article 6(1) of the Convention, would be violated where the
presiding judge held a temporary position with no guarantee of permanent
appointment and security of tenure, unless so offered by the Lord Advocate
who enjoys discretion. In the case of Scotland, temporary sheriffs are
appointed to serve one year, renewable terms, and they hear a large
proportion of Scottish criminal cases. The Court of Session ruled that such an
appointments system, the lack of security of office and the discretion of the
Lord Advocate was incompatible with the right to fair trial. The sheriffs were
not sufficiently independent of the executive, and could only be so if there
were ‘adequate guarantees that the appointed judge enjoys security of tenure’.
The court recognised that the fact that the executive appoints judges does not,
of itself, signify a threat to judicial independence. Nevertheless, where a judge
is appointed on a temporary basis, and his or her re-appointment lies at the
discretion of the executive, judicial independence may be threatened by a
judge’s awareness of the power the executive holds over his or her judicial
career. The Starrs and Chalmers case has widespread implications for the
system of judicial appointments throughout the United Kingdom and the
Lord Chancellor’s power to appoint tribunal members, Assistant Recorders
and deputy High Court judges who lack security of tenure.
The Convention right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial
tribunal raises a further questions concerning judicial independence,
questions which were highlighted in the course of the Pinochet case, discussed
above (pp 117–18), which in turn re-invigorated interest in the issue of judicial
bias.85 At the root of the problem of judicial independence and public
confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary, lies the system of appointments
and promotions. As noted above, while appointments are theoretically made
by the Crown, in practice, the Prime Minister and Lord Chancellor enjoy
virtually untrammelled powers. The British appointments system is
inherently secret, relying for the most part on the knowledge of the Lord
Chancellor gleaned from ‘soundings’ taken within the profession.86 Despite
attempts to broaden the base from which judges are drawn, the profile of
judges remains predominantly white, Oxbridge educated and male. The
selection procedure remains immune from public gaze and from independent
scrutiny from a body, such as a Judicial Appointments Commission, which
could ensure impartiality in appointments and promotions and thereby dispel
the disquiet which arises from a closed system, controlled by the Lord
Chancellor, who is himself a political appointee. 
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The devolution of power to the Northern Ireland Assembly, Scottish
Parliament and Welsh Assembly also raises issues for the separation of
powers. The legislative and administrative powers devolved must not only
comply with the Human Rights Act 1998, but must also be intra vires the scope
of power devolved. Each of the Acts devolving power specifies the power
which is ‘excepted’, ‘reserved’ or ‘devolved’ to the body in question. While the
Government of Scotland Act 1998 includes a limited list of reserved matters
(‘reserved’ meaning that the United Kingdom Parliament retains legislative
power over the matter), and provides an extensive list of devolved power, the
Northern Ireland Act 1998 is less clear in relation to those powers reserved or
excluded than it is in legislative powers devolved which in effect are the sum
of those subjects not excluded or reserved. The position under the
Government of Wales Act 1998 is more straightforward: the Act devolves
primarily administrative powers and not legislative power. Notwithstanding
the scope of power devolved, and its nature, however, disputes concerning
devolved issues will fall to the courts. In 1999, a Practice Direction was issued,
laying down the procedure to be followed where a challenge arose over
whether a devolved body had acted or proposed to act within its powers,
which includes not acting incompatibly with the Convention on Human
Rights and Community law, or whether it had failed to comply with a duty
imposed on it. The effect of the dispute resolution procedure is to highlight
further the role of the judges. Given that challenges to competence may be
motivated by political forces, and the consequence of a ruling adverse to the
devolved body being inherently political, the public profile of the judiciary
will inevitably be raised. It may be argued that, in essence, there is little novel
about the judiciary keeping constitutionally subordinate bodies (such as local
authorities) within the power granted by parliament, and there is much force
in this. On the other hand, the political stakes in devolution matters are rather
higher than in relation to local government and, as high profile cases of
judicial review in relation to local government have shown in the past,
controversial decisions – such as the House of Lords’ decision in relation to
the then Greater London Council’s transport subsidy policy – give rise to
criticism and allegations of political bias. All the more important, then, that
the independence of the judiciary from the executive, its policies and the
politics of devolved institutions, be put and maintained beyond any doubt.
Judges as fact finders
It has become increasingly common for the executive to appoint judges as
chairmen of tribunals of inquiry.87 That this should be so is unsurprising.
Judges are equipped by training and experience to review evidence with
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impartiality and rigour and to present findings in a logical manner. In recent
years, inquiries have been conducted by judges in the following matters:88
(a) Interception of communications (Birkett LJ);
(b) Security matters: security in the public service (Lord Radcliffe);
(c) Vassall (Lord Radcliffe);
(d) Profumo (Lord Denning);
(e) ‘D Notices’ (Lord Radcliffe);
(f) Industrial disputes: miners and electricity supply industry (Lord
Wilberforce);
(g) Disturbances in Northern Ireland in 1969 (Scarman J);
(h) Interrogation methods (Lord Parker);
(i) Collapse of Vehicle and General Insurance Company (James J);
(j) Legal procedures in relation to terrorism (Lord Diplock);
(k) ‘Bloody Sunday’ in Londonderry (Lord Widgery CJ);
(l) Anti-terrorist legislation (Lord Gardiner);
(m)Public disorder: Red Lion Square, Brixton (Lord Scarman);
(n) Industrial dispute: Grunwick (Scarman LJ);
(o) Interrogation methods (Bennett J);
(p) Crown agents (Croom-Johnson);
(q) Bradford City Football Club disaster (Taylor J);
(r) Hillsborough Football Club disaster (Popplewell J);
(s) Arms to Iraq (Scott LJ);89
(t) Standards in public life (Lord Nolan/Lord Neill);90
(u) Dunblane shootings (Lord Cullen);91 and
(v) BSE in cattle (Lord Phillips).
Many of these inquiries involve sensitive political issues. As a result, it is
inevitable that judges will attract criticism from one quarter or another. There
exists the potential for charges of political bias in the report, or that the judge
has avoided the issue and effected a ‘whitewash’, or that the inquiry has not
been conducted properly. To place judges in the position where criticism is
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likely to ensue is to create the possibility that their independence and
impartiality will be damaged. 
CONCLUSION
Some academic constitutional authorities either deny, or minimise, the
relevance of the doctrine of separation of powers under the United Kingdom’s
constitution. Geoffrey Marshall, for example, writes: 
To sum up: the notion of the Separation of Powers seems to suffer from the
following deficiencies:
First, it is rarely clear whether, and in what sense, there is such a separation.
The argument that legislative, executive, and judicial powers are
constitutionally declared to be vested in particular persons is inconclusive.
Secondly, if there is a separation of powers, it is unclear what it is that is
separated, since the notions of ‘legislation’, ‘adjudication’, and ‘execution’ have
not proved capable of precise definition ...
In short, the principle is infected with so much imprecision and inconsistency
that it may be counted little more than a jumbled portmanteau of arguments
for policies which ought to be supported or rejected on other grounds.92
On the other hand, it has been judicially asserted by Lord Diplock that:
... it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the British constitution, though
largely unwritten, is firmly based on the separation of powers: parliament
makes the laws, the judiciary interprets them.93
Equally, Sir John Donaldson MR has stated that:
... it is a constitutional convention of the highest importance that the legislature
and the judicature are separate and independent of one another, subject to
certain ultimate rights of parliament over the judicature ...94
As Professor Munro has said, ‘there is something of a puzzle here ...’.
The separation of powers is certainly neither an absolute nor a
predominant feature of the British constitution. Nevertheless, it is a concept
which is firmly rooted in constitutional tradition and thought. Judicial
assertions of the importance of the doctrine are explainable in light of the
constitutional position of judges in relation to parliament. The concept of
separation of powers offers the judiciary a protective device both for the
protection of the independence of the judiciary and against allegations of
judicial intrusion into matters more appropriate to parliament or the
executive. The reluctance of judges to be drawn into such matters is reflected
particularly strongly in relation to matters of the royal prerogative and
parliamentary privilege.95 Accordingly, to deny the relevance of some form of
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separation of powers would be to misconstrue the evidence. The separation of
powers is a principle respected under the constitution which exerts its
influence on each of the fundamental institutions of the state. While the
separation of powers is ill defined, and is not accorded absolute respect, it
ought not to ‘be lightly dismissed’.96
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CHAPTER 6
The King should not be over man, but under God and the law.1
INTRODUCTION
Under the constitution of the United Kingdom, all actions of government are
undertaken in the name of the Crown. Any account of the prerogative is an
account of power, and the prerogative, historically and contemporarily,
concerns the power of the Crown.2 The prerogative today represents one of
the most intriguing aspects of the unwritten constitution. In order fully to
appreciate the meaning of the term ‘the Crown’, an analysis of both who in
fact exercises various powers in the name of the Crown, and the source of the
power exercised, needs to be examined. The question to be asked is: is the
power (to be exercised) a prerogative power or is it the outcome of statute? As
will be seen, there is no certainty as to either the existing prerogative powers
or the manner in which these may be extinguished. It is, however, clear that
no new prerogative powers can be created.
THE PREROGATIVE DEFINED
Blackstone defines the prerogative in his Commentaries (1765–69) as:
... that special pre-eminence which the King hath over and above all other
persons, and out of the ordinary course of the common law, in right of his
regal dignity. It signifies, in its etymology (from prae and rogo) something that
is required or demanded before, or in preference to, all others.
Dicey, on the other hand, describes the prerogative in the following manner:
... the residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, which at any time is
legally left in the hands of the Crown ... Every act which the executive
government can lawfully do without the authority of an Act of Parliament is
done in virtue of this prerogative. [(1898), 1959, p 424]
From these differing definitions, the following can be deduced: first, that these
are powers which are inherent in, and peculiar to, the Crown; secondly, that
the powers derive from common law; thirdly, that the powers are residual;
fourthly, that the majority of the powers are exercised by the executive
government in the name of the Crown; and, finally, that no Act of Parliament
is necessary to confer authority on the exercise of such powers. 
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Joseph Chitty, whose work remains the most comprehensive account of
the prerogative, explains the need for prerogative power in the following
manner:
The rights of sovereignty, or supreme power, are of a legislative and executive
nature, and must, under any form of government, be vested exclusively in a
body or bodies, distinct from the people at large. [1820, p 2]
In Chitty’s analysis, the power of the King is but part of a reciprocal
relationship between monarch and subject. To the King is owed a duty of
allegiance on the part of all subjects; to the subjects is owed the duty of
protection.
THE PREROGATIVE BEFORE 1688
The King and parliament
It was for the King to summon parliament and to prorogue it. The King could
suspend parliament’s sittings and dissolve it. Parliaments were held regularly
from 1295, and in 1311, it was decreed that parliament should meet twice a
year.3 In 1330, the first statute was passed requiring that parliament meet at
least once a year – and more frequently if necessary. At that time, parliament
did not sit for a term of years, but rather was summoned to meet de novo each
year. The record was by no means constant: there were, for example, no
parliaments in the years 1364, 1367, 1370, 1373–76, 1387, 1389, 1392, 1396 or
between 1407–10. Under Edward IV (1442–83), only six parliaments met in the
course of his 22 year reign. Under Henry VII (1457–1509), there were but
seven parliaments, despite the Act of Edward III remaining on the statute
book. Whether and when a parliament should meet was much dependent
upon the King’s need for revenue, for it had been established by the middle of
the fourteenth century that it was unlawful for the King to impose direct taxes
without parliament’s consent. On taxation, see, further, below, pp 140–42.
In the reign of Henry VIII, between 1491 and 1547, nine parliaments met in
38 years, although one of these lasted for seven years between 1529–36; under
Edward VI (1547–53), two parliaments met, the second of which lasted four
and a half years. Mary reigned for over five years (1553–58) and parliament
met annually throughout her reign. Under Elizabeth I (1558–1603), by way of
comparison, a mere ten parliaments met, although one parliament lasted for
11 years. In the reign of James I (1603–25), four parliaments met in 22 years,
one lasting for nearly seven years. 
The absoluteness of the King’s power came to a head in the reign of
Charles I (1600–49) when Charles confronted parliament over taxation to meet
the cost of war, imprisoning over 70 people who refused to pay the forced
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loan, including the ‘five knights’4 who sought a writ of habeas corpus against
the King. Sir Edward Coke supported members of the Commons who sought
to petition the King against unparliamentary taxation, imprisonment without
good cause, the billeting of troops and the imposition of martial law. Charles
accepted the Petition of Right but, faced with continued opposition from
parliament, prorogued parliament in June 1628. Parliament was again
summoned in 1629 but confrontation was again rife, with the Commons
criticising the King’s religious policy and refusing to vote supply for the
Crown. Charles decided to adjourn parliament in 1629 and there commenced
an 11 year period of personal monarchical rule. In 1641, under the leadership
of Pym, the ‘Grand Remonstrance’ was drafted – listing the grievances of the
country under the rule of prerogative. While the Commons was divided over
the Remonstrance, it represented a starting point in history, one which was to
lead to the Civil War, Charles’s execution and the rule of Oliver Cromwell
under the only Republican constitution Britain has ever experienced.5
The Crown and the Council
Members of the King’s Council were appointed and dismissed by the King at
pleasure. While most matters of government and administration were decided
by the Council, the King was under no duty to heed their advice, and, under a
strong King, the Council had little real power. Under a weak King, however,
real power vested in the Council, and in the course of a King’s minority, the
‘Council has ruled England’.6 Under King Edward II (1307–27), the Council
became a more formal body, with members being sworn in. The King in
Council legislated, raised taxes and dispensed justice. FW Maitland observed
that it is difficult to discern, during that time, whether a particular act of
government was effected by parliament or the King in Council. From 1386, the
proceedings of the Council were recorded, and the Council was established as
a permanent part of the machinery of government. 
Law making powers of the Crown
Proclamations
In Chapter 2, the constitutional upheavals of the seventeenth century were
discussed, and it is in this period of history, and in particular with the
constitutional settlement of 1689, that the origins of parliamentary sovereignty
are to be discovered. It will be recalled that it was Henry VIII (1509–47) who
asserted the power to make law by way of proclamations: ‘... the most
extraordinary act in the Statute Book.’7 The statute did not affect the common
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law or existing Acts of Parliament, and it prohibited the use of the death
penalty for breach of proclamations. This, nevertheless, left a wide – and ill
defined – scope for the Crown to legislate without parliament. The Act was
repealed in the reign of Edward VI (1547–53). Its repeal was of great
constitutional and symbolic importance in that it denied, by implication, the
supremacy of the King over parliament and declared that it was the ‘King in
Parliament’ which represented the lawful legislature. Nevertheless, both Mary
I (1553–58) and Elizabeth I (1558–1603) continued to rule by proclamation.
However, when James I (1603–25) asserted his right to rule by proclamation,
his assumed power was challenged by an application from the King’s Council
to the courts. In the Case of Proclamations (1611), Chief Coke CJ declared that:
... the King by his proclamation or other ways cannot change any part of the
common law, or statute law, or the customs of the realm.
... the King cannot create any offence by his prohibition or proclamation, which
was not an offence before, for that was to change the law, and to make an
offence which was not.
Also, it was resolved that the King hath no prerogative but that which the law
of the land allows him.
Dispensing and suspending powers of the Crown
The King’s assent was needed for the enactment of statutes, but he also had
the power to dispense with statutes and suspend their application. According
to Coke, where statute affected the prerogative power, the King could
suspend the Act.8 The conflict between Crown and the courts in the
seventeenth century is illustrated by the cases of Thomas v Sorrell (1674) and
Godden v Hales (1686). In Thomas v Sorrell, it was declared that the King could
not dispense with a penal law made for the good of the public. However, in
Godden v Hales, the court accepted that the King could dispense with a penal
law – under specific circumstances – where that law fell within his
jurisdiction. In 1687, James II, intent on removing obstacles to Roman
Catholics holding public office, issued a Declaration of Indulgence which
condemned the principle of religious compulsion and announced that all
penal laws in ecclesiastical matters be suspended. In 1688, he went further,
issuing a second Declaration of Indulgence which he instructed all Anglican
clergy to read from the pulpit. On an appeal from the seven bishops who
questioned the legality of such a dispensing power, James II ordered their
arrest on a charge of seditious libel. In the Seven Bishops’ Case (1688), they were
acquitted. 
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The King and the courts
It was within the King’s prerogative to establish new courts of justice. The
Court of Star Chamber, exercising extensive criminal jurisdiction with little of
the formality of judicial proceedings and without the use of juries, was
established either under the Statute of 1487 or under the Crown’s inherent
prerogative: doubt exists as to its source. Unlike the ordinary courts, the Court
of Star Chamber used torture. It became one of the most feared and powerful
weapons under the control of the Crown until its abolition in 1641. 
The King’s claim to dispense justice in his own right and without the
judges was dispelled in 1607. In Prohibitions Del Roy (Case of Prohibitions)
(1607), the King sought to settle a dispute concerning land. In the Resolution
of the Judges, Coke declared:
... it was answered by me, in the presence, and with the clear consent of all the
Judges of England, and Barons of the Exchequer, that the King in his own
person cannot adjudge any case, either criminal, as treason, felony, etc, or
betwixt party and party, concerning his inheritance, chattels, or goods, etc, but
this ought to be determined and adjudged in some Court of Justice, according
to the law and custom of England; and always judgments are given ... so that
the Court gives the judgment ...
His Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of England, and causes
which concern the life, or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of his subjects are
not to be decided by natural reason [which the King claimed] but by the
artificial reason and judgment of the law, which law is an art which requires
long study and experience, before that a man can attain to the cognisance of it
...
When, in 1617, the King ordered the Court of King’s Bench to adjourn
proceedings until he had been consulted, Chief Justice Coke refused, declaring
that:
Obedience to His Majesty’s command to stay proceedings would have been a
delay of justice, contrary to the law, and contrary to oaths of the judges.9
Coke was dismissed from the Bench. 
Whether a writ of habeas corpus would lie against the King was
determined in 1627. In Darnel’s Case (the Five Knights’ Case) (1627), it was held
that, where the King detained a prisoner under special order, the court would
not look behind the order. Thus, while the King could not determine cases, he
could nevertheless hold a subject free from interference by the judges. The
Petition of Right 1628 declared such power to be unlawful, and in 1640, the
Habeas Corpus Act guaranteed that habeas corpus would lie against the
Crown.
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Regulation of trade and defence of the realm
Historically, much of the commerce and trade of the country was under the
prerogative of the Crown: according to Sir William Blackstone, the King ‘is the
arbiter of commerce’ (Commentaries). But, if such a prerogative ever existed in
relation to foreign trade, it was effectively abolished by various statutes and,
today, no commentator on the prerogative includes trade and commerce as
being within its ambit. The King’s duty as to the protection of the realm
encompassed the powers to restrict imports of the raw materials of war, and
the right to erect ports and havens. As Chitty observed, in 1820:
It is indisputably established, that the right to erect ports and havens is in
general vested exclusively in the Crown ...
The King has not merely the prerogative power of erecting ports and havens,
but he possesses prima facie the priority of ownership in all ports and havens
within his dominions, though the public have the right to use them; and even
though the right to a port or haven be vested by charter or prescription in a
subject, yet he holds it charged or affected with the jus regium or royal
prerogative, as it relates to ports and havens. [p 174]
As a corollary, the King had the prerogative power of erecting beacons and
lighthouses. Under statute, Elizabeth I vested power to erect beacons and
lighthouses for the protection of seafarers in Trinity House at Deptford, but
the Act did not affect the King’s prerogative powers over beacons and
lighthouses on the shores of non-coastal waters. 
The Crown and taxation
The early history of finance for the Crown is inextricably linked to the notion
of the King as ultimate lord of all land. The King was the largest landowner in
the Kingdom and exercised his right to collect revenues from the land. In
addition, the King received profits from legal proceedings in the form of fees
paid by litigants and fines. Pardons were also sold. FW Maitland records that
in the twelfth century:
... the King’s revenue was the King’s revenue, no matter the source whence it
came; it was his to spend or to save, as pleased him best; all was his pocket
money; it is to later times that we must look for any machinery for compelling
the King to spend his money upon national objects. [1908, p 94]
The granting of supply to the King by parliament from direct taxation had
been established in 1215, from which time it was accepted that the King had
no power to levy direct taxation without parliamentary consent.10 The
position of indirect taxation was, however, unclear. The power to regulate
trade, including the power to establish, open and close ports, was within the
royal prerogative. Accordingly, it could be argued that the correlative power
to levy taxes on imports and exports was within the power of the Crown. In
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Mary I’s reign, the Queen imposed indirect taxes on the exportation of cloth,
and, in Elizabeth I’s reign, a tax was imposed on the importation of wine. A
legal challenge to this assumed power of the Crown was instigated in James
I’s reign (1603–25) over the increased taxation on currants. In Bate’s Case
(1606), the Court of Exchequer ruled in the King’s favour, accepting that:
The matter in question is a material matter of state, and ought to be ruled by
the rules of policy; and, if so, the King has done well to execute his
extraordinary powers. All customs, old or new, are effects of commerce with
foreign nations; but commerce and affairs with foreigners, war and peace, the
admitting of foreign coin, all treaties whatsoever, are made by the absolute
power of the King. The King may shut the ports altogether; therefore he may
take toll at the ports.
The indirect taxation issue was again to be tried in the courts in the reign of
Charles I, from 1625 to 1649. In 1628, Charles had announced that in future all
counties would contribute towards the cost of the navy: the contribution being
either in the form of the provision of ships or money in lieu thereof. In 1634,
this scheme was put into effect, and thereafter Ship Money was levied
annually. Whilst this undoubtedly was within the King’s prerogative, it
enabled the King to avoid the constitutional convention that there should be
no taxation without parliament’s approval. In the Case of Ship Money (R v
Hampden) (1637), Hampden had refused to pay taxes levied by Charles I to
raise money for the navy in times of emergency. The King argued that it was
for the Crown to determine whether or not an emergency situation existed
and that this determination was conclusive of his right to exercise his
prerogative power to raise revenue. The courts upheld the power of the
Crown:
The King pro bono publico may charge his subjects for the safety and defence of
the Kingdom, notwithstanding any Act of Parliament, and a statute derogatory
from the prerogative doth not bind the King and the King may dispense with
any law in cases of necessity. 
... Acts of Parliament to take away his royal power in the defence of the
Kingdom are void; they are void Acts of Parliament to bind the King not to
command the subjects, their persons and goods, and I say their money too; for
no Acts of Parliament made any difference. [pp 826–1315]
The Shipmoney Act of 1640 reversed the decision, and Article IV of the Bill of
Rights 1689 declared it illegal for the Crown to raise money without
parliamentary approval. The King’s power included the right to debase the
coinage,11 although Blackstone was doubtful whether such a power was
lawful.12 Establishing markets for trading and granting monopolies over their
usage was within the King’s power, generating much income for the Crown. 
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Protest against Charles I’s reign by prerogative was fuelled by a rebellion
in Ireland, during which an estimated 2,000 English settlers were massacred.13
The Grand Remonstrance of 1641 listed the grievances of the country ruled
under the prerogative. The House of Commons, following debate, voted in
favour of the Remonstrance by 159 votes to 148.14
In 1685, James II inherited a Crown which was in debt. The question of
indirect taxation had not been fully resolved. James, though granting
generous sums for the army, requested an increased grant. When parliament
refused, in 1685, James prorogued parliament. When James II fled to France in
1688, the throne was offered to William and Mary of Orange under the terms
set out in a Declaration of Right. Following acceptance of its terms, the Crown
and Parliament Recognition Act 1689 was passed by the Convention
established to reach a settlement. Parliament, as then constituted, proceeded
to enact the Bill of Rights 1689, providing, inter alia, that there should be
regular meetings of parliament; that elections should be free; that the Crown’s
power to raise taxation15 was subject to parliament’s approval, as was the
power to maintain an army; that the powers of suspending or dispensing with
laws by the Crown16 were illegal; and, of the greatest significance, that the
‘freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in parliament ought not to be
impeached or questioned in any court or place out of parliament’.17
From this time, the supremacy of parliament over the Crown was
established and the prerogative powers of the Crown continued in existence
or were abolished or curtailed as parliament determined. No new prerogative
powers may be claimed by the Crown: as Diplock LJ stated in BBC v Johns
(1965): ‘... it is 350 years and a civil war too late for the Queen’s courts to
broaden the prerogative.’ 
Miscellaneous prerogatives 
Miscellaneous prerogatives included the right to raise revenue from the
demesne lands of the Crown as ‘lord paramount of the soil’,18 to the
ownership of tidal riverbeds, and to the land beneath a non-tidal riverbed –
provided that it had not become a dry riverbed, whereupon the ownership of
the soil is equally owned by the owners of the adjoining banks. Equally, the
King, by virtue of his prerogative, was owner of the shores – the land lying
between the high and low water mark – of seas and navigable rivers within
his dominions. The ancient right of the King to wild creatures, to franchises of
forest, ‘free chase’, park or free warren have been abolished19 with the
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exception of the right to royal fish (sturgeon) and swans, which is expressly
reserved by the Act. Additionally, the Crown had the right to treasure trove,
now regulated under the Treasure Act 1996.20
THE PREROGATIVE TODAY
The constitutional questions requiring answer include those relating to the
relationship between statute and prerogative and the control, judicial or
political, of the prerogative. The most significant question which continues to
intrigue and to concern constitutional theorists today relates to the very
existence and scope of the powers themselves, together with the constitutional
implications of this ill defined reservoir of power. As Maitland observed, and
as remains true in the twenty-first century, examination of the prerogative is: 
... set about with difficulties, with prerogatives disused, with prerogatives of
doubtful existence, with prerogatives which exist by sufferance, merely
because no one has thought it worthwhile to abolish them. [p 421]
Under the United Kingdom’s constitutional monarchy, the Queen is part of
the legislature: parliament comprises the Crown, Lords and Commons. The
Queen is the ‘fountain of justice’ – and while the Queen has no power to make
laws or suspend laws or to act in a judicial capacity,21 the entire
administration of justice is conducted in the name of the Crown. The Queen is
Supreme Head of the Church of England.22 The Queen is head of state in
relation to foreign affairs. The Queen is head of the executive, and all acts of
government, whether domestic or foreign, are conducted in the name of the
Crown. The right to summon and dissolve parliament remains a legal power
vested in the Crown. The Queen is the Fountain of Honour, and all honours in
the United Kingdom are conferred by the Crown. 
While regal powers are exercised in the name of the Crown by the
government of the day, the Crown nevertheless retains important residual
powers. Of these, the dissolution of parliament and the appointment of Prime
Minister are the most significant. These are discussed below. It must also be
recognised that a few powers remain the personal prerogative of the Crown.
Illustrations include the grant of honours such as the Order of Merit, and the
Orders of the Garter and Thistle. More importantly, there still remains the
prerogative notion that the Crown never dies and that the Crown is never an
infant (thus, ensuring continuity of monarchy), and that the Crown can ‘do no
wrong’, thus placing the Queen outside the jurisdiction of the courts and
guaranteeing immunity from prosecution in her own courts. Beyond these
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limited powers and immunities, the sovereign has, in the words of Bagehot
(1867): ‘... under a constitutional monarchy such as ours, three rights – the
right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn.’ The influence
of the monarch should not be underestimated; this will be returned to below.
In legal theory, however, the position is much different. As Bagehot stated:
Not to mention other things, she could disband the army (by law, she cannot
engage more than a certain number of men, but she is not obliged to engage
any men); she could dismiss all the officers, from the General Commander in
Chief downwards; she could dismiss all the sailors too; she could sell off all
our ships of war and all our naval stores; she could make a peace by the
sacrifice of Cornwall, and begin a war for the conquest of Brittany. She could
make every parish in the United Kingdom a ‘university’; she could dismiss
most of the civil servants; she could pardon all offenders. In a word, the Queen
could by prerogative upset all the action of civil government within the
government, could disgrace the nation by a bad war or peace, and could, by
disbanding our forces, whether land or sea, leave us defenceless against
foreign nations. [(1867), 1993, ‘Introduction’ and pp 287–88]
On the other hand, FW Maitland observes:
There is one term against which I wish to warn you, and that is the term ‘the
crown’. You will certainly read that the crown does this and the crown does
that. As a matter of fact, we know that the crown does nothing but lie in the
Tower of London to be gazed at by sightseers. [1908, p 418]
Maitland’s warning is apt, but cannot be taken at face value. The point being
made is that, in order to understand the power of the Crown, it is necessary to
look beyond the superficial phrase ‘in the name of the Crown’. The actual
power which is exercisable by the Crown is limited in two ways. First, by
convention, the majority of powers are exercised by Her Majesty’s
government or Her Majesty’s judges in her name. Secondly, the existence and
scope of a purported prerogative power is subjected to the scrutiny of the
courts: ‘The King has no power save that allowed by law.’23 However, that
should not be considered as equivalent to a power to control the
prerogative.24
THE PREROGATIVE ILLUSTRATED 
Before examining the nature, scope and constitutional significance of the
prerogative, some examples are necessary to indicate the areas of power
which fall under the prerogative. Under the United Kingdom’s unwritten
constitution, there exists no formal and agreed text as to the prerogative. In
order, therefore, to ascertain the contents of the prerogative, an examination of
the historical attributes of the Crown and the attitude of the courts to the
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prerogative is required. It is paradoxical – but undeniable – in a modern
democracy, that there is no comprehensive, authoritative ‘catalogue’ of
prerogative powers.25
To make an analysis of prerogative powers manageable, they may be
separated into two categories:26 those relating to foreign affairs and those
relating to domestic affairs. Under foreign affairs can be subsumed:
• the power to make declarations of war and peace;
• power to enter into treaties;
• the recognition of foreign states;
• diplomatic relations; and
• disposition of the armed forces overseas. 
Within the domestic category falls:
• the summoning and dissolution of parliament; 
• appointment of ministers;
• royal assent to Bills; 
• the granting of honours; 
• defence of the realm;
• the keeping of the peace; 
• the parens patriae jurisdiction of the courts; 
• the power to stop criminal prosecutions – nolle prosequi;
• the prerogative of mercy;
• reduction of sentences; 
• pardoning of offenders; 
• regulation of the terms and conditions of the Civil Service; and 
• the right to royal fish and swans.27
It can be seen from this list, which is by no means exhaustive, that the powers
are wide and diverse.
THE PREROGATIVE AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS
The dissolution of parliament
The dissolution of parliament refers to the process by which an existing
parliament is brought to an end with a new parliament coming into being
following a general election. The dissolution of parliament lies within the
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prerogative of the Crown. It is perhaps the most important residual
prerogative exercised personally by the sovereign, and represents the greatest
potential for controversy. Three aspects of the right to dissolve parliament
require consideration: first, whether the Crown has the right to dissolve
parliament on its own initiative; secondly, whether the Crown has the right to
refuse a dissolution when requested by the Prime Minister or other ministers;
and thirdly, whether, by refusing to assent to a Bill contrary to the advice of
the Prime Minister, the Crown can indirectly force a dissolution.
Royal dissolution on the initiative of the Crown
The last occasion on which the Crown – on its own initiative – dissolved
parliament was in 1835. The dismissal of his government by William IV in
1834–35 reveals the constitutional dangers of the exercise of monarchical
power. The government had lost its leader, but was nonetheless viable as a
continuing ministry. The King, misjudging the strength of public opinion
against the government, forced it out of office only to be replaced by an
unsuccessful successor. Bagehot evaluates the 1834–35 situation thus:
So that the last precedent for a royal onslaught on a ministry ended thus: in
opposing the right principles, in aiding the wrong principles, in hurting the
party it was meant to help. After such a warning, it is likely that our monarchs
will pursue the policy which a long course of quiet precedent at present directs
– they will leave a ministry trusted by Parliament to the judgment of
Parliament. [(1867), 1993, p 231]
It has been suggested that ‘a royal dissolution in our times would not merely
be unpolitical; it would also be unconstitutional’.28 This view has the support
of Sir Ivor Jennings, who argues that, since the dissolution involves ‘the
acquiescence of ministers’,29 the Queen is accordingly unable to achieve a
dissolution without advice. In Jennings’s view, ‘if ministers refuse to give such
advice, she can do no more than dismiss them’.30 The matter cannot be left
there, however, for uncertainty remains over this issue. Walter Bagehot,
writing in 1867, observed that the Crown’s power to dissolve parliament,
other than following a Prime Ministerial request, ‘has almost, if not quite,
dropped out of the reality of our Constitution’ (p 230). Bagehot continued:
Nothing, perhaps, would more surprise the English people than if the Queen
by a coup d’etat and of a sudden destroyed a ministry firm in the allegiance and
secure of a majority in Parliament. That power, indisputably, in theory,
belongs to her; but it has passed so far away from the minds of men that it
would terrify them, if she used it, like a volcanic eruption from Primrose Hill.
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Dicey was of a different view. In Dicey’s judgment, the Crown has the right –
in extreme circumstances – to ‘dismiss a ministry who commands a
parliamentary majority, and to dissolve the parliament by which the ministry
are supported’ ((1898), 1959, p 433). Dicey continued:
The prerogative, in short, of dissolution may constitutionally be so employed
as to override the will of the representative body, or, as it is popularly called,
‘The People’s House of Parliament’. This looks at first sight like saying that in
certain cases the prerogative can be so used as to set at nought the will of the
nation. But in reality it is far otherwise. The discretionary power of the Crown
occasionally may be, and according to constitutional precedents sometimes
ought to be, used to strip an existing House of Commons of its authority. But
the reason why the House can in accordance with the constitution be deprived
of power and of existence is that an occasion has arisen on which there is fair
reason to suppose that the opinion of the House is not the opinion of the
electors. A dissolution is in its essence an appeal from the legal to the political
sovereign. A dissolution is allowable, or necessary, whenever the wishes of the
legislature are, or may fairly be presumed to be, different from the wishes of
the nation.
Dicey recognised, however, that the dissolution of 1834–35 was ‘a mistake’,
the King wrongly interpreting the will of the nation. That judgment is not
conclusive of the constitutionality of the King’s action, although Dicey
conceded that it ‘is hard to speak with decision’ over that dissolution. As
Dicey argued, if there is a constitutional right to appeal directly to the people
by dissolving parliament, then that right cannot itself be defeated merely
because of a mistaken judgment. The precedent of 183431 is cited as authority
for the proposition that the Crown has the right to dissolve parliament, other
than on the advice of ministers, where the main objective of dissolution is to
‘ascertain that the will of parliament coincides with the will of the nation’
(Dicey, p 435).
Whatever may be the answer given by historians to this inquiry, the
precedents of 1784 and 1834 are decisive; they determine the principle on
which the prerogative of dissolution ought to be exercised, and show that in
modern times the rules as to the dissolution of Parliament are, like other
conventions of the constitution, intended to secure the ultimate supremacy of
the electorate as the true political sovereign of the state; that, in short, the
validity of constitutional maxims is subordinate and subservient to the
fundamental principle of popular sovereignty. [Dicey, p 437]
Queen Victoria (1837–1901) was in little doubt that she retained the power to
dissolve parliament without the advice of her ministers. Lord Salisbury
summarised the consequences of such use of the prerogative:
A dissolution by the Queen, against the advice of her ministers, would, of
course, involve their resignation. Their party could hardly help going to the
country as the opponents of the royal authority; or, at least, as the severe crisis
of the mode in which it had been exerted ... There must be some hazard that, in
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the end, such a step would injure the authority of the Queen. It ought not,
therefore, to be taken unless there is an urgent reason for taking it. No such
reason exists at present. It may ultimately be necessary in order to escape from
a deadlock.32
Whether such a power continues to exist as a practical reality is, accordingly,
in doubt. However, in so far as prerogatives continue in existence until
expressly abolished by parliament, in legal-theoretical terms, Dicey’s view
would appear to be correct. There are, however, principled objections to this
position. The power of control over the executive lies within parliament and
the parliamentary process. With the parliamentary process of government and
opposition functioning correctly, there should never be a situation arising in
which an exercise of prerogative power would become necessary. A situation
in which the Crown felt obliged to protect the ‘sovereignty of the people’
against its democratically elected parliament would represent an extreme
paradox. 
Refusal of dissolution on Prime Ministerial request
Two illustrations of refusal of a dissolution can be drawn from the
Commonwealth. In 1926, the Governor General of Canada refused a
dissolution to the Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, who resigned. The
Governor General wrongly believed that the Leader of the Opposition could
form a viable government with the support of parliament. After only four
days in office, the incoming government was defeated and the Prime Minister
requested, and was granted, a dissolution. A similar situation arose in 1939 in
South Africa. In each case, the Governor General was much criticised. It is,
however, by no means clear whether the position of a Governor General is
identical to that of the Crown. A Governor General is appointed by the
Crown, on the advice of Commonwealth ministers, for a fixed term of office.
Once appointed, the Governor General acts on the advice of Commonwealth
ministers. His position is therefore not identical to that of the monarch, and it
cannot be assumed that the precedents of 1926 and 1939 can be invoked
unqualifiedly to demonstrate the position of the Queen.33
Professor Markesinis questions whether the Crown retains the right – if it
ever existed – to refuse a dissolution on the request of a Prime Minister. On
the other hand, he states that:
... no one in particular was or is quite sure whether a convention has emerged
that virtually allows the Prime Minister a free hand in the matter. [1972, p 116]
What does appear clear is that the Crown – if it is to exercise this personal
prerogative – must at least have the support of some ministers.34 The claim
that the advice on which the Crown acts to dissolve parliament is Prime
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Ministerial advice appears to derive only from 1918.35 However, the situation
could arise whereby the Prime Minister wishes a dissolution to take place, but
other ministers do not. The Queen would then have to exercise a personal
choice. In this regard, Geoffrey Marshall, cites The Times newspaper’s editorial
view, expressed in relation to the Labour government of 1966–70:
If a Prime Minister defeated in Cabinet, unable to carry his policy in the party
meeting, were to ask for a dissolution for the apparent purpose of
unnecessarily involving his party in his own downfall, the Queen would have
ample grounds for refusing and dismissing him, provided an alternative
leader of the majority party was in sight. [1984, p 46]
It is arguable that if there is no discretion remaining, then the prerogative is at
least in abeyance, or at most, is no longer truly a prerogative power.36 It could
be argued, alternatively, that the supposed convention that the responsibility
of the Prime Minister for the exercise of this prerogative is no true convention
at all. As Geoffrey Marshall puts it:
It can be argued that it lacks the essential quality that should mark a
constitutional convention, namely the combination of consistent historical
precedents, and a convincing raison d’être. [1984, p 45]
Sir Ivor Jennings was of the opinion that, while ‘the Queen’s personal
prerogative is maintained in theory, it can hardly be exercised in practice’
(1959a, p 426).
Dissolution following refusal of the royal assent
A ‘forced’ dissolution would inevitably come about if the Queen were to
refuse to assent to a Bill against the wishes of her Prime Minister. During the
Home Rule for Ireland debate, King George V (1910–36) was encouraged to
veto the Home Rule Bill (see Chapter 3 on Home Rule). In legal theory, the
Queen has the right to refuse her assent to Bills, but by convention, assent is
always given. The right to refuse assent has not been exercised since the reign
of Queen Anne in 1704. George V, however, believed that he had the power to
refuse assent to the Irish Home Rule Bill under the Parliament Act 1911 in
1913 and 1914.37 In relation to this, Sir Ivor Jennings states that:
It was assumed by the King throughout that he had not only the legal power
but the constitutional right to refuse assent. On the other hand, he recognised
that his exercise of the power would involve the resignation of ministers, a
dissolution of Parliament, and a general election in which the main issue
would be the prerogatives of the Crown. There is something to be said for a
power to dismiss an unconstitutional ministry or to dissolve a corrupt
Parliament, but nothing to be said for a power to refuse assent to a Bill because
the King thinks it wrong. [1959a, p 400]
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Doubt exists as to whether the Queen can refuse the royal assent, dissolve
parliament against the government’s will, and dismiss the government. No
government has been dismissed by the Crown since 1783, although the
question arose in 1913–14 over the issue of Irish Home Rule, and the right to
dismiss ministers was claimed to exist by George V, but not exercised. Sir Ivor
Jennings states that:
The Queen’s function is ... to see that the constitution functions in the normal
manner. It functions in the normal manner so long as the electors are asked to
decide between competing parties at intervals of reasonable length. She would
be justified in refusing to assent to a policy which subverted the democratic
basis of the constitution, by unnecessary or indefinite prolongations of the life
of Parliament, by a gerrymandering of the constituencies in the interests of one
party, or by fundamental modifications of the electoral system to the same end.
She would not be justified in other circumstances; and certainly the King
would not have been justified in 1913. [1959a, pp 403, 407–12]
On this alleged right to withhold assent to Bills, Geoffrey Marshall speculates
as to whether the Queen could refuse to follow the advice of ministers if a
Private Members’ Bill was approved by both Houses but opposed by
government, and whether, if parliament approved a Bill in a manner required
by procedural rules, the Queen could refuse assent – but there is no definitive
answer to these questions (see Marshall, 1984, pp 21–23).
As can be seen, many doubts surround the prerogative of the dissolution
of parliament. It is claimed nowadays that, whilst the dissolution of
parliament is technically for the Queen, it is exclusively within the Prime
Minister’s domain to request a dissolution at a time of his or her choice. This
alleged exclusivity of Prime Ministerial – rather than Cabinet – choice stems
only from the 1920s. Until 1918, when the convention was first challenged, it
was thought that the decision rested with Cabinet. However, in 1935, Prime
Minister Baldwin asserted his independent right to decide on the date of
dissolution, resulting in criticism that the Prime Minister had unilaterally
increased the importance of the Prime Ministerial office by assuming the
discretionary power of the Crown.38 Sir Ivor Jennings states that:
No dissolution since 1918 has been brought before the Cabinet, and all Prime
Ministers since Mr Lloyd George have assumed the right to give the advice.
[1959a, p 419]
Geoffrey Marshall doubts the accuracy of this assertion, citing 1950, 1966 and
1970 as dates on which the Cabinet was consulted before a decision was
reached, whilst also citing Harold Wilson’s statement that ‘there is no
obligation on the Prime Minister to consult’.39
While, for the most part, the timing of a dissolution will be within the
Prime Minister’s discretion, there may arise situations where the Crown may
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have a constitutional duty to exercise its powers. By way of example, a
minority government – shortly after a general election – might form a pact
with an opposition party on whose co-operation it depended for a working
majority in parliament. If, as a result of political disagreement, the pact broke
down and the opposition party united with other opposition parties, the
resultant situation would cause the Prime Minister either to resign or to seek a
dissolution of parliament in order to test the support of the electorate.
However, if the newly combined opposition parties had a leader who could
command a majority in the House of Commons, it is by no means certain that
the Queen would grant the dissolution requested. The Queen would, in effect,
be confronted by two opposing constitutional principles. The first of these is
that the dissolution of parliament is a matter for the Prime Minister and
accordingly must be granted. The second principle is that the Queen should
appoint as Prime Minister the leader of that party – or parties – which could
command a majority in the House of Commons. In such a situation, the
Crown clearly would have to exercise its powers of decision making, and
might, in the interests of continuity of parliament and the avoidance of
another general election, refuse a dissolution and call the leader of the
opposition parties to form a government.40
The Labour government of 1974 reveals the potential difficulties and
uncertainties concerning the power of dissolution. It also reveals the inherent
vagueness in the concept of votes of confidence following the loss of which
governments – by convention – are expected to seek a dissolution of
parliament. The general election resulted in the Labour Party holding 301 (37
per cent) seats, the Conservative Party 297 (38 per cent), the Liberal Party 14
and the other parties 23 seats. The Labour Party was accordingly 34 seats short
of an overall majority.41 Given the indeterminate election result, neither the
Labour Party nor Conservative Party was keen for there to be a dissolution in
the near future. The Labour government accordingly made it clear that a
defeat in the Commons would not force the government to seek a dissolution,
other than where the government had made it clear to all members of the
House that it was treating the matter as one of confidence. Between March
and October 1974, the government suffered 17 defeats in the Commons.42 A
general election took place in October 1974 when the opinion polls appeared
favourable to Labour. The resulting election results produced an overall
majority of three seats for the Labour Party.43
Between 1977 and 1978, the Labour government entered into a pact with
the Liberal Party. While the Labour Party had won a narrow overall majority
in the general election of October 1974, by 1976 this majority had been lost.
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Having failed to reach agreement with the Ulster Unionist Party, the Prime
Minister, James Callaghan, entered negotiations with the Liberal Party leader,
David Steel, out of which the ‘Lib-Lab Pact’ was born. The pact did not
amount to a coalition government; no Liberals held government posts, nor
was the government committed to accommodate Liberal policy within its
legislative programme. Despite the government’s lack of a majority (from
1976) and its dependency on the Liberal Party for its survival in office, the
Party asserted the constitutional right of the Prime Minister – and no one else
– to determine the dissolution of parliament. The matter should not be
regarded as so certain. SA de Smith and R Brazier have written:
Perhaps the following proposition would command a wide measure of
support: the Queen may properly refuse a Prime Minister’s request for a
dissolution if she has substantial grounds for believing (i) that an alternative
government, enjoying the confidence of a majority of the House of Commons,
can be formed without a general election, and (ii) that a general election held at
that time would be clearly prejudicial to the national interest. [1994, p 129 (see,
now, 8th edn, 1998)]
An illustration from the Republic of Ireland
There is no precedent within the United Kingdom from which firm
conclusions can be drawn. However, in the Republic of Ireland, the matter has
been tested. In November 1994, following a controversial appointment of a
former Attorney General (Harry Whelehan) to the position of President of the
High Court, the 22 month coalition government of Fianna Fail and the Labour
Party collapsed. Article 13.2.2 of the Constitution provides that:
The President44 may in his absolute discretion refuse to dissolve Dail Eireann
on the advice of a Taoiseach who has ceased to retain the support of a majority
in Dail Eireann.
It is also clear, however, that the President cannot refuse a dissolution to a
Prime Minister who retains the support of a majority in the parliament (Dail).
Three possible solutions could be sought. First, the President could grant a
dissolution on Prime Ministerial request and a general election would take
place. Secondly, the opposition parties could try to form a coalition and the
President appoint its leader as Prime Minister. Thirdly, the Fianna Fail (the
governing party) ministers could replace the Prime Minister with another
leader who could secure a continued coalition government, in which case
neither a dissolution nor a general election would be required. Should the
Prime Minister (the Taoiseach) lose majority support by losing a formal vote of
confidence, he would be obliged to resign.45 When the Deputy Prime
Minister, Dick Spring, announced that he would vote against the Prime
Minister, Albert Reynolds, in a vote of confidence, the Prime Minister
resigned.
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On 15 December, after five weeks of political turmoil, John Bruton, Leader
of the Fine Gael Party, with the support of the Labour and Democratic Left
Party, was elected Prime Minister. The new coalition government had a
majority of four in the Dail. Dick Spring, Leader of the Labour Party, was
reappointed as Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.46 Thus, the
second option had been favoured and a new government – albeit fragile –
formed without a dissolution of the Dail. 
An illustration from Australia
The Australian political crisis in 1975 provides a further example of this
uncertain constitutional situation.47 Under section 2 of the Commonwealth of
Australia Constitution Act 1900, the Governor General:
... shall have and may exercise in the Commonwealth during the Queen’s
pleasure, but subject to this Constitution, such powers and functions of the
Queen as Her Majesty may be pleased to assign to him. 
Section 5 states that:
The Governor General may appoint such times for holding the sessions of the
Parliament as he thinks fit, and may also from time to time, by proclamation or
otherwise, prorogue the Parliament, and may in like manner dissolve the
House of Representatives.
Section 64 provides that:
The Governor General may appoint officers to administer such Departments of
State of the Commonwealth as the Governor General in Council may establish.
Such officers shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor General.
In October 1975, the Senate refused supply to the government by resolving not
to proceed with legislation giving effect to the Labour government’s financial
programme until the government agreed to a general election for the House of
Representatives. When the Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, refused to accede
to this demand, supply was denied. On 11 November 1975 the Prime Minister
called on the Governor General, Sir John Kerr, to request that writs be issued
for elections to be held for 50 per cent of the Senate seats. Rather than granting
the writs, the Governor General informed the Prime Minister that his
commission had been withdrawn. In so doing – among other things – the
Governor General prevented the Prime Minister from telephoning the Queen,
as was his right whilst in office. Subsequently, the Governor General called for
the Opposition Leader to act as caretaker Prime Minister, subject to two
conditions. The first related to ensuring the granting of supply; the second to
advising the Governor General to dissolve both Houses. In the ensuing
general election the Opposition Leader, Malcolm Fraser, was returned with a
majority of seats and the impasse ended.
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One cause of the problem was the constitution itself, for while ministers
must be in the lower House – the House of Representatives – the Senate had
been given the power to withhold finance from a ministry formed from the
House of Representatives. Compare this situation with the pre-1911 position
of the House of Lords in the United Kingdom whereby – by convention – the
House of Lords traditionally gave way to the Commons on matters of supply,
and now the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 which regulate the position. In
Australia, there had been no serious conflict until the situation of 1975.48
The intervention of – and actions of – the Governor General was much
criticised, and whilst acting within his constitutional powers, the Governor
General was seen to be directly involved in a political controversy. The
criticisms were the greater for the fact that, in so acting, he was dismissing a
Labour Prime Minister and the ministry of the House of Representatives and
was seen to be favouring the upper House.49
David Butler identified four questions implicit in the crises of 1975, two of
which have immediate relevance: 
(1) What should the Queen have done if Mr Whitlam had the chance to
‘phone her to demand the instant dismissal of the Governor General?
(2) Is ‘the Governor General in Council’ the only power that can dissolve
Parliament, necessarily the Governor General and ministers of the Crown:
or could the Governor General have called an Executive Council composed
of Councillors not currently ‘on summons’ as ministers?
To neither of these questions were answers forthcoming to David Butler in his
discussions.50 More than anything else, the Australian saga reveals that the
constitutional position of the monarch – in the representative form of a
Governor General – can be as uncertain under a written constitution as under
a largely unwritten one.
Circumstances requiring dissolution
Loss of confidence vote
By convention, a government must resign or seek a dissolution of parliament
from the Queen if a confidence vote is lost in the House of Commons. A vote
of confidence was described by Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald in 1924 as
being a vote on ‘substantial issues, issues of principle, issues which really
matter, a matter which strikes at the root of proposals made’. In 1979, the
Labour government had been defeated by two votes in a vote over its
economic policy. The then Leader of the Opposition, Mrs Margaret Thatcher,
said that:
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The government has been decisively defeated and discredited on a matter
central to their whole economic policy. Such a defeat is unprecedented in
modern times.
In the light of the decision of the House of Commons, I call upon the
government to resign or seek a vote of confidence forthwith.
The Prime Minister, James Callaghan, tabled a vote of confidence and won the
vote. Nevertheless, in light of the political uncertainty, the Prime Minister
sought and was granted a dissolution, and a general election followed at
which the Labour Party was defeated.
During the first term of the incoming Conservative government’s tenure of
office, many ‘votes of no confidence’ were tabled (put down) by the
Opposition, yet none led to a dissolution of parliament.
THE APPOINTMENT OF PRIME MINISTER
In constitutional theory, the Queen – under the royal prerogative – may
appoint whomsoever she pleases to the office of Prime Minister.51 In practice,
the position is governed by convention and the Queen must appoint the
person who can command a majority in the House of Commons; this, under
normal circumstances, will be the leader of the political party which secures
the greatest number of parliamentary seats at a general election.52 Several
differing situations present themselves: the government of the day may be
returned by the electorate with a majority and the Prime Minister will remain
in office. Alternatively, the government may lose the election, and the
incoming Prime Minister will be the leader of that political party which
commands a majority of seats in the House of Commons. More difficult is the
position where the election produces no outright winner, resulting in no one
party having an overall majority. Here, the spectre of a ‘hung parliament’
arises. The situation may also arise where a Prime Minister resigns from old
age or ill health during the course of his term of office – as was the case in 1935
(Ramsey MacDonald), 1955 (Winston Churchill) and 1957 (Anthony Eden) –
or dies in office (Campbell-Bannerman, 1905–08). Finally, it may be the case
that a Prime Minister chooses to retire, as occurred in 1937 (Stanley Baldwin)
and 1976 (Harold Wilson).
Appointment of Prime Minister following a general election
Where general elections are involved, for the most part, as will be seen later,
the electoral system in the United Kingdom returns a single party with an
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overall majority, and so no question arises as to whom the Queen should
appoint as Prime Minister. It is not out of the question, however, for a
different political scenario to present itself. Should the Queen send for the
leader of the party having the largest number of seats, or the leader of the
party which will hold the balance of power? There is much debate over this
issue,53 but once again no clear cut answer.
In February 1974, the Conservative Party lost the general election by a
small number of seats and could command no overall majority in the House
of Commons. Following the election results, the Prime Minister, Edward
Heath, did not tender his resignation immediately but rather entered into
negotiations over the following weekend with the Liberal Party, with a view
to forming a political pact which would ensure a majority over the opposition
parties. When those negotiations broke down, Mr Heath immediately
resigned, and the Queen invited the Leader of the Labour Party to become
Prime Minister. The question arising at the time was whether there had been
any unconstitutional conduct involved in Mr Heath not relinquishing office
the moment the election results were known.54 The answer would appear to
be that Mr Heath had the constitutional right to attempt to form a coalition
which would avoid the need for a further election. 
Appointment of Prime Minister following retirement of the
incumbent
When the Prime Minister retires, the government still retains the mandate of
the people and hence the choice of the new Prime Minister will be dictated by
the wishes of the Party. It may be that there is a ‘Prime Minister in waiting’
who commands the support of the Party and will hence be appointed without
delay. Under such circumstances, it is unrealistic to speak of the Crown
having any choice in the matter. Where no Party consensus as to a successor
exists, the political process will come into play. Nowadays, each of the major
political parties utilises a method of election of its leader, and it is that process
which will determine the successor: again, the Queen has no practical ‘say’ in
the matter. It was not always thus. 
In 1957, Sir Anthony Eden resigned office, and there was no obvious
successor – nor was there in place at that time an electoral process within the
governing Conservative Party which would produce a successor. The Queen
was thus left with a choice. The Queen consulted elder statesmen of the
Conservative Party and acted upon their advice that Harold Macmillan be
appointed. Had she not acted upon impartial advice, the Crown could have
been damaged by charges of political decision making. One consequence of
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the 1957 dilemma was that the Labour Party announced its intention to
introduce a selection procedure for its leader: a move designed to remove any
discretion from the Crown. The Conservative Party did not react in this
manner until after the difficulties revealed in 1963. The resignation of Harold
Macmillan fell at a time when there were several contenders for leadership of
the Party. The matter was resolved by the appointment of Lord Home, a
Conservative peer who relinquished his peerage and took a seat in the House
of Commons as Sir Alec Douglas-Home. However, the saga emphasised the
uncertainties in the choice of Party Leader and an electoral system for the
leadership of the Party was subsequently introduced. 
In 1976, Harold Wilson resigned office. In The Governance of Britain, Wilson
describes the theory and practice in the handover of power:
In the relatively simple handover of what is in fact, though not
constitutionally, a continuing government, the test, given the normal
circumstances of a party majority, is whether A or B can in fact command a
majority in the House of Commons. Where the party’s procedure for selecting
a leader is laid down and is seen to have worked, for example, the eliminating
ballot procedure used by the Parliamentary Labour Party in March–April 1976,
the selection is fairly clear, though it still has to be made. The Parliamentary
Party was not in fact electing a Prime Minister; it was electing a new party
leader.
When the process is complete, the outgoing Prime Minister goes straight to the
Palace and formally tenders his resignation; the most he needs to do is to
inform the monarch, who will have been given the figures already, that the
ballot has produced a given result, probably adding that, in his view, the
newly elected leader can command a majority in Parliament ...
Contrary to widespread belief, there is no duty on the Prime Minister, still less
any inherent right, to recommend the man to be sent for. It is the sovereign who
decides whom to send for and invite to form a government.55
THE PREROGATIVE OF MERCY
Nowadays, the prerogative of mercy entails two aspects: the power to grant
pardons which in turn has two elements and the power to enter a nolle
prosequi. 
Pardons and commutation of sentence
A complete pardon is used to remove the ‘pains, penalties and punishments’
which flow from a conviction for a criminal offence, but does not eliminate the
conviction itself.56 The right of pardon does not extend to civil matters. The
power is exercisable in England and Wales on the advice of the Secretary of
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State for the Home Department, who is accountable to parliament. The Crown
therefore has no personal involvement in its exercise. Commutation of
sentence is a limited – or conditional – form of pardon. The sentence will be
reduced on conditions: ‘... a condemned murderer is pardoned on condition of
his going into penal servitude.’ As Maitland comments (1908, p 480): ‘It is a
nice question whether he might not insist on being hanged.’ Commutation is
distinguishable from remission of sentence. The latter reduces the sentence
imposed but does not alter its form. 
RFV Heuston, writing in 1964, examined the unusual situation which
arose in 1948. The Criminal Justice Bill included a clause – accepted by the
Commons on amendment – abolishing the death penalty for a period of five
years. The government was clear that the House of Lords would reject the
amendment. The Home Secretary announced that he proposed to advise the
Crown ‘to exercise the prerogative of mercy in every case of the death
sentence being pronounced until a definite decision had been come to by
Parliament’ (Heuston, p 7). In debate in the House of Lords, Lord Goddard CJ
took the view that the proposal of the Home Secretary came close to ‘being an
exercise of the suspending and dispensing powers claimed by the Stuarts and
prohibited by the Bill of Rights’. In Heuston’s view, the dispensing and
suspending powers are distinguishable from the power of pardon: the former
affects the legality of the act, the latter simply ‘frees a guilty person from the
legal consequences of his admittedly illegal act’ (p 71).
The prerogative of mercy has traditionally been regarded as unreviewable
by the courts. In 1976, in De Freitas v Benny (1976), Lord Diplock was to state
that: 
At common law, this has always been a matter which lies solely in the
discretion of the sovereign, who by constitutional convention exercises it in
respect of England on the advice of the Home Secretary to whom Her Majesty
delegates her discretion. Mercy is not the subject of legal rights. It begins where
legal rights end.57
In Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (1985), Lord
Roskill confirmed that the prerogative of mercy was not ‘susceptible to
judicial review’. (For further discussion of this case, see below, p 169.)
However, as will be seen further below, the review of the prerogative is not a
static matter, and is one which evolves over time. Judicial doubt on refusal to
review the prerogative was expressed in the New Zealand Court of Appeal in
Burt v Governor General (1992). In that case, while the court ruled that, in light
of the safeguards which existed under the New Zealand criminal justice
system, there was in the instant case no good reason to review the exercise of
the prerogative of mercy; nevertheless, the court stated that ‘it would be
inconsistent with the contemporary approach to say that, merely because it is
a pure and strict prerogative power, its exercise or non-exercise must be
immune from curial challenge’ (p 678). 
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The case of Bentley (1993) illustrates the contemporary position regarding
the review of the prerogative of mercy in the United Kingdom. In 1952, Derek
Bentley, aged 19, and with a mental age of an 11 year old, was convicted of the
murder of a policeman. At the time, the death penalty was the mandatory
sentence for murder. Derek Bentley was hanged in 1953, a mere three months
after the murder. His co-defendant, Christopher Craig, who fired the fatal shot
at the police officer who died, was also convicted of murder, but escaped
execution because he was aged only 16. Despite a recommendation by the jury
that mercy be exercised, the Home Secretary decided not to exercise the
prerogative. In 1992, the then Home Secretary refused to recommend a
posthumous free pardon on the grounds that, while he personally agreed with
the view that the death sentence should not have been carried out, it was the
long established policy of Home Secretaries not to grant a free pardon unless
the person concerned was both ‘morally and technically innocent’ of any
crime and that his review of the case did not establish Bentley’s innocence. In
an application for judicial review brought by Derek Bentley’s family, the court
considered the question whether the prerogative of mercy was amenable to
judicial review.58 The applicant sought a declaration that the Home Secretary
had erred in law in declining to recommend a posthumous free pardon, and
mandamus to require the Home Secretary to reconsider the matter. 
Counsel for the Home Secretary argued that the exercise of the royal
prerogative of mercy was not reviewable in the instant case, on the basis that
the criteria upon which the pardon should be granted was a question of
policy, which was not justiciable. Counsel for the applicant argued that the
prerogative of mercy is an important feature of the criminal justice system,
and that ‘it would be surprising and regrettable ... were the decision of the
Home Secretary to be immune from legal challenge irrespective of the gravity
of the legal errors which infected such a decision’ (p 452 per Watkins LJ). The
court ruled that the view that ‘the formulation of the criteria for the exercise of
the prerogative by the grant of a free pardon was entirely a matter of policy
which is not justiciable’ was ‘probably right’ (p 453). However, it ruled that
the Home Secretary failed to recognise that the prerogative of mercy is
‘capable of being exercised in many different circumstances and over a wide
range’, and should have considered the form of pardon which might be
appropriate to the facts of the case. This the Home Secretary did not do, and
this failure was reviewable by the courts. The court, citing Burt v Governor
General, endorsed the view that the prerogative of mercy is now ‘a
constitutional safeguard against mistakes’. The court also ruled, however, that
it had no power to direct the way in which the prerogative of mercy should be
exercised, but that it had a role to play by way of judicial review. The court
declined to make any formal order, but invited the Home Secretary to
reconsider the matter ‘in light of the now generally accepted view that this
young man should have been reprieved’ (p 455).
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In 1998, the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, on a reference by the
Criminal Cases Review Commission under section 9 of the Criminal Appeal
Act 1995, quashed Derek Bentley’s conviction for murder. In a powerful
judgment, the Court of Appeal criticised a number of aspects of Bentley’s trial.
In particular, the court ruled that the then Lord Chief Justice, Lord Goddard,
had failed to direct the jury adequately on the standard of proof to be met;
had, in effect, reversed the burden of proof from the prosecution to the
defence; had shown partiality to the police evidence over that of the defence;
that the summing up by the Lord Chief Justice represented ‘a highly rhetorical
and strongly worded denunciation of both defendants and their defence’; and
that, by failing adequately to direct the jury on the law then in force as to ‘joint
enterprises’, the judge had ‘failed to grapple with that ground of appeal’,
which should have succeeded. As a result, the effect was to deprive Bentley of
the protection which jury trial should have afforded: ‘The summing up here
was such as to deny Bentley that fair trial which was the birthright of every
British citizen.’ The Court of Appeal ruled that the conviction had been
unsafe, and the conviction for murder was quashed (R v Bentley (1998)). Thus,
45 years after the event, Bentley’s name was cleared by the courts on the basis
that his conviction had been unsafe, the royal prerogative of mercy in the
hands of the politicians having failed to provide a remedy. 
Nolle prosequi
On proceedings on indictment, the Attorney General, in the name of the
Crown, can enter a nolle prosequi, the effect of which stops the legal
proceedings. The power is not subject to the control of the courts: R v
Comptroller of Patents (1899). The grant of a nolle prosequi does not amount to an
acquittal, and accordingly, the accused may be brought before the court on the
same charge. The effect of this would be to invite a further application for a
nolle prosequi. 
POWER TO ESTABLISH NON-STATUTORY AGENCIES
The Criminal Injuries Compensation Board was established under the
prerogative in 1964. Its objective was to provide compensation for the victims
of criminal offences59 through ex gratia payments calculated on the same
principles as compensation paid to victims of tort. The Board was
reconstituted under statute in 1988,60 although the provisions had not been
brought into force. Was the setting up of the Board in 1964 the exercise of a
true prerogative? Reverting to Blackstone’s definition, the answer must be
negative. The power to establish such a scheme clearly fell within parliament’s
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jurisdiction, as the Criminal Justice Act 1988 proves. However, under Dicey’s
definition, the government is effectively given a choice in the manner of
establishing such bodies: a surely questionable prerogative? In R v Criminal
Injuries Board ex parte Lain (1967), Lord Diplock stated:
It may be a novel development in constitutional practice to govern by public
statement of intention made by the executive government instead of by
legislation. This is no more, however, than a reversion to the ancient practice of
government by royal proclamation, although it is now subject to the limitations
imposed on that practice by the development of constitutional law in the
seventeenth century. [p 886]
Professor HWR Wade denies that this was an exercise of a true prerogative:
So far as the Crown came into the picture at all, it was exercising its ordinary
powers as a natural person, which, of course, includes the power to transfer
property, make contracts and so on. Blackstone was quite right, in my opinion,
in saying that such powers are not prerogative at all.
The truth seems to be that judges have fallen into the habit of describing as
‘prerogative’ any and every sort of government action which is not statutory. It
may be, also, that the responsibility for this solecism can be loaded onto that
popular scapegoat, Dicey. [1989, p 61]
In 1993, when the relevant provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 had still
not been brought into force – despite a statutory obligation being imposed on
the Home Secretary by section 171 – the government published a White Paper
announcing its intention to implement a different scheme. In June 1993, the
House of Lords introduced – and passed – an amendment to the Criminal
Justice and Public Order Bill which would have required the Home Secretary
to perform his statutory duty under the 1988 Act. The House of Commons
removed the amendment.61 When the Home Secretary introduced changes to
the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme – claiming to act under the royal
prerogative – proceedings for judicial review of his decision were instigated.
The outcome was the judicial verdict that the Home Secretary had acted ultra
vires.62
THE GRANTING OF HONOURS
Whilst legally still in the hands of the Crown, the effective control over the
granting of the majority of honours lies with the executive. The Queen has the
personal right to confer the Order of the Garter, the Order of the Thistle, the
Royal Victoria Order and the Order of Merit. Otherwise, the conferment of
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government suffered another defeat when the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr
Douglas Hurd, was held to have acted unlawfully in relation to aid granted for the
Pergau Dam project in Malaysia. See, further, Chapter 25.
honours is by the Queen, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister who is, in
turn, advised by a Political Honours Scrutiny Committee comprising three
Privy Councillors.63
REGULATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE64
The control of the Civil Service is vested in the Crown and civil servants, like
ministers, are servants of the Crown. However, the appointments are
permanent, subject to ‘good behaviour’, although, in practice, a civil servant
will not be dismissed other than for misconduct.65 Civil servants have no
contractual relationship with the Crown.66 Salaries and other benefits are
prescribed by statute, but for the most part, the Civil Service is governed
under the prerogative.67
REGULATION OF THE ARMED FORCES
As with the Civil Service, members of the armed forces are regulated under
the royal prerogative, and statutory protection of employment in, for example,
the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, does not apply to
members of the armed forces.68
The sovereign is Commander in Chief of the armed forces. The Bill of
Rights 1689 prohibits the maintenance of an army by the Crown in peacetime
without the consent of parliament. The control, organisation and disposition
of the forces are within the prerogative and cannot be questioned in a court of
law.69
IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES OF THE CROWN
These are considered in outline in Chapter 10. 
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63 Cmnd 1789, 1922, London: HMSO; Honours (Prevention of Abuses) Act 1925; and see
Wagner, and Squibb, 1973.
64 See, further, Chapter 8. The structure and conditions of employment are outside the
scope of this work: see Hood Phillips and Jackson, 1987, Chapter 17.
65 Fulton Committee Report, Cmnd 3638, 1971, London: HMSO.
66 CCSU v Minister for the Civil Service (1985), p 419.
67 For a detailed and critical analysis of the Civil Service, see Hennessy, 1990.
68 For details of the organisation and control of the armed forces, see Hood Phillips and
Jackson, 1981, Chapter 18.
69 China Navigation Company Ltd v Attorney General (1932); Chandler v Director of Public
Prosecutions (1964). See, also, Crown Proceedings Act 1947, s 11.
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THE PREROGATIVE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Acts of State70
An act of the executive as a matter of policy performed in the course of its
relations with another state, including its relations with the subjects of that
state, unless they are temporarily within the allegiance of the Crown.71
Acts of State in relation to foreign states
The recognition of foreign states and government, diplomatic relations –
including the sending of diplomats and the reception of foreign diplomats –
declarations of war and peace, and the annexation or cession of territory fall
within this part of the definition. 
Recognition of foreign states
The recognition of foreign states is within the prerogative of the Crown.
Several statutes regulate the privilege and immunities enjoyed by heads of
foreign states72 and their diplomatic representatives.73
Diplomatic relations
In 1708, the Diplomatic Privileges Act was passed after a Russian Ambassador
had been arrested for debt. The Russian Czar, Peter the Great, regarded this
action as a criminal offence. The Court of Queen’s Bench was uncertain as to
the legal position.74 The Act of 1708 provided that no judicial proceedings
could be brought against diplomats or their servants and that it was an
offence to commence proceedings.
Under the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964, diplomatic staff enjoy full
immunity – both civil and criminal – whereas administrative and technical
staff have immunity for actions taken in the course of their duties but are
otherwise civilly – but not criminally – liable for other acts. Members of
service staff are only immune for official acts. Whether a particular member of
diplomatic staff falls within a certain category is determined by the Foreign
Secretary by means of a certificate. The court will determine whether the
action performed is within – or without – the individual’s official duties.
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71 Wade, ECS, 1934, p 103.
72 State Immunity Act 1978.
73 Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964. On immunities and privilege accorded to international
and commonwealth organisations, see the International Organisations Acts 1968 and
1981; Diplomatic Immunities (Conferences with Commonwealth Countries and
Republic of Ireland) Acts 1952 and 1961; International Headquarters and Defence
Organisations Act 1964.
74 Mattueof’s Case (1709).
Where an individual enjoys immunity from the courts, the only redress
will be for the Foreign Secretary to request the diplomat’s government to
recall him as persona non grata. 
Declarations of war and peace
Where a declaration of war has been made, the status of nationals of the
enemy state within the United Kingdom is altered. If the Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs issues a certificate to the effect that a state
of war exists, this must be accepted by the courts.75
Annexation and cession of territory
In 1955, the Crown exercised its prerogative power to take possession of the
island of Rockall, which subsequently was incorporated into the United
Kingdom as part of Scotland.76 Once territory has been annexed, the Crown
has a discretion as to the extent to which it will take over the liabilities of the
former government of the state.77
The Crown also has the power to alter the limits of British territorial
waters.78 However, while this prerogative seems firmly established, there are
doubts as to the power of the Crown – without parliamentary approval – to
cede territory and thereby deprive British citizens of their nationality and
other rights under United Kingdom law.79 When the Crown sought to cede
Heligoland to Germany in 1890, parliamentary approval was sought. While
the law may be doubtful, there is at least a convention that parliament’s
approval will be sought and granted.
Issue of passports
Consistent with the Crown’s power to regulate its boundaries and those who
enter and leave is the power to issue passports: again, under Blackstone’s
definition, this is a questionable prerogative power, for the government is
doing no more than what it is free to do under statute and the power has no
legal effect as such. Nevertheless, the conventional classification of the right to
issue and withhold passports is that of the prerogative. At common law,
citizens have the right to enter and leave the realm. It is nevertheless
extremely difficult in practice to travel without a passport, which is issued
under the prerogative. In R v Foreign Secretary ex parte Everett (1989), the court
for the first time held that the granting and withholding of passports was
subject to review by the courts. The position in the United Kingdom – both
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75 R v Bottrill ex parte Kuechenmeister (1947).
76 Island of Rockall Act 1972.
77 West Rand Central Gold Mining Company v The King (1905).
78 R v Kent Justices ex parte Lye (1967); Post Office v Estuary Radio (1968).
79 Anson, 1933, pp 137–42; Holdsworth, 1942. See, further, Chapter 22.
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uncertain and unsatisfactory – may be contrasted with that in the United
States of America where the Supreme Court has held that freedom of travel is
a basic constitutional liberty.80
The ancient right to issue the writ ne exeat regno – forbidding a person from
leaving the realm – is declared by Hood Phillips and Jackson (1987, p 132),
relying on Felton v Callis (1969), to be ‘obsolescent’. The doctrine of
obsolescence has never been one accepted in English law. The rationale for
such acceptance in relation to the writ ne exeat regno, and that of impressment
into naval service, is that offered by Lord Simon of Glaisdale in McKendrick v
Sinclair (1972) to the effect that:
... a rule of English common law, once clearly established, does not become
extinct merely by disuse ... but may ‘go into a cataleptic trance’ ... and revive in
propitious circumstances ... but not revive if it is ‘grossly anomalous and
anachronistic’. 
That it is not obsolete is confirmed by two recent cases. In Al Nahkel for
Contracting Ltd v Lowe (1986), the writ was used to prevent a defendant
leaving the country to avoid a judgment of the court. In Parsons v Burk (1971),
an unsuccessful attempt was made to prevent the New Zealand rugby team
from leaving the country to play in South Africa.
In an unusual case, R v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office and Another ex parte Bancourt (2000), the lawfulness of the exercise of the
prerogative under an Order in Council,81 authorising the removal of the
inhabitants of a British dependent territory – the Chagos Islands in the Indian
Ocean – in order to establish a military base on the islands, was tested. The
last inhabitants of the Chagos Archipelago were removed in 1973. None of the
indigenous people owned land. The High Court nevertheless ruled that they
had a fundamental constitutional right to ‘reside in or return to that part of the
Queen’s dominions of which he was a citizen: where he was a “belonger”’.
The power of the Crown was to provide for the ‘peace, order and good
government’ of any territory. That power did not include the right to forcibly
remove people from their homeland. They had been excluded from their land,
albeit for good reasons of high policy, but they were not reasons which could
‘reasonably be said to touch the peace, order and good government of the
territory in the Wednesbury sense, or even by a less intrusive reasonableness
test’. Laws LJ ‘doubted whether the Royal Prerogative power enabled the
Queen in Council to exile her subjects from the territory where they belonged’,
and said that ‘sending a Chagos belonger out of the Queen’s dominions
altogether could only be done by statute’. The 1971 Ordinance was quashed
and the government obliged to pay for the repatriation of those exiled and pay
compensation.
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(1958).
81 The British Indian Ocean Territory Ordinance No 1 of 1971 authorised by the 1965
British Indian Ocean Territory Order in Council (SI 1965/1920).
Treaty making powers
The power to enter into treaties under international law is a feature of the
sovereignty of a state. In the United Kingdom, it is generally accepted that
such power is an emanation of the prerogative. As such, the entry into treaties
is regarded as a matter solely for the executive and not for parliament. A
treaty is defined as a written agreement between states governed by
international law.82 It will be seen in Chapter 7 that under the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty, an Act of Parliament alone can alter domestic law.
Accordingly, a treaty – being a creature of international law – cannot alter
national law without being given effect by an Act of Parliament.83 It is for this
reason that, inter alia, the European Communities Act 1972 was enacted to
provide for the entry and application of European Community law into the
United Kingdom. 
There is debate as to whether treaty making power is truly a prerogative
power. Blackstone’s definition insists that a prerogative power be unique to
the Crown: if it is exercisable by anyone else, it ceases to be a prerogative. The
second aspect is – according to HWR Wade – whether the prerogative
produces ‘legal effects at common law’ (1985). It follows, therefore, that a
treaty – having no legal effect in the absence of statute – is not a true
prerogative. However, the preferred judicial view is in line with Dicey: a
prerogative act is any action of government not authorised by statute. 
The treaty making power of the executive was challenged in R v Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ex parte Rees-Mogg (1994). In
February 1991, the Heads of Government of the Member States of the
European Community signed the Treaty on European Union – the Maastricht
Treaty (see Chapter 8). The Treaty was to come into effect on ratification by
the Member States. In some countries, ratification was dependent upon the
approval of the majority of the people voting in a referendum, as for example
in France and Denmark. Under the constitution of the United States of
America, treaties are ratified by the President with the advice and consent of
two-thirds of the Senators present and voting. 
In the United Kingdom, no such constitutional arrangements exist. Under
constitutional practice, a treaty need only be approved by parliament if it
requires a change in legislation or the grant of public money. Otherwise, the
power of parliament is confined to the political process, and in the last resort,
the forcing of a government’s resignation through the withdrawal of the
confidence of the House of Commons. However, a convention has been
established whereby parliament approves certain treaties. Under the
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Ponsonby Rule,84 the government undertakes to lay every treaty, when
signed, for a 21 day period before ratification, and secondly to inform the
House of all other ‘international agreements and commitments which may
bind the nation to specific action in certain circumstances’.
Erskine May records the convention as follows:
When a treaty requires ratification, the government does not usually proceed
with ratification until a period of 21 days has elapsed from the date on which
the text of such a treaty was laid before Parliament by Her Majesty’s
command. This practice is subject to modification, if necessary, when urgent or
other important considerations arise. [1989, p 215 (see, now, 1997)]
The Ponsonby undertaking also included the commitment on the part of
government to make time for debate on a treaty if there is a formal demand
from the Opposition or other party. The issue raised in Rees-Mogg was
whether the government had the power to ratify the Maastricht Treaty
without the approval of the House of Commons. It was clear that there was
substantial opposition to the Treaty on all sides of the House, and the
government was not confident that any vote would approve the Treaty. As a
result, or as a failsafe device, the Prime Minister announced that, if necessary,
the Treaty would be ratified under the prerogative: thus avoiding the risk of
parliamentary disapproval. The Queen’s Bench Division refused to grant an
application for judicial review: the matter was within the prerogative of the
Crown. In the long run, the Bill bringing the Treaty into effect in the law of the
United Kingdom was passed by the Commons and Lords. 
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE PREROGATIVE
... the King hath no prerogative, but that which the law of the land allows
him.85
Statute and the prerogative86
Although there is a degree of certainty as to the existence and scope of the
prerogatives discussed above, the discussion of all prerogatives must be
regarded as overlain with a degree of doubt. Consistent with the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty, parliament has the right and power to abolish,
restrict or preserve prerogative powers. For example, historically, the Crown
owed the duty of protection to those under a duty of allegiance to the Crown
who were either under the age of majority87 or suffering mental incapacity.
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86 Note that the Human Rights Act 1998 provides that prerogative orders (Orders in
Council) are not subject to challenge by the judiciary. This appears to confuse the
distinctive status of Acts of Parliament with the prerogative. See, further, Chapter 19. 
87 Now age 18 (Family Law Reform Act 1969, s 1).
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This duty of protection – the concept of parens patriae – manifested itself in the
wardship jurisdiction conferred on the Court of Chancery.88 The Law Reform
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1949 gave statutory force to the jurisdiction,
which was further amended under the Supreme Court Act 1981. The Children
Act 1989, while not affecting the entire wardship jurisdiction, removes the
right of local authorities to apply to ward a child (section 100). However, the
Act also makes provision for local authorities to apply to the court (section
100(4)) for an order under the inherent jurisdiction. The effect of this provision
is still unclear, but the constitutional implication is that, whilst the prerogative
of parens patriae in wardship has been placed on a statutory footing under the
1949 and 1981 Acts, the Children Act 1989 nevertheless recognises and
preserves a form of prerogative inherent jurisdiction.
Where an Act of Parliament seeks to regulate a matter previously falling
under the prerogative but does not expressly abolish the prerogative, the
statute will prevail. In Attorney General v de Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd (1920), the
court was faced with a claim for compensation by the owners of the hotel,
under the Defence of the Realm Act 1914, for compensation due as a result of
occupation by the armed forces in wartime. The government sought to rely on
the prerogative under which a lesser discretionary sum of compensation
would be payable. The House of Lords rejected the government’s right to rely
on the prerogative, holding that, once a statute had been enacted, the
prerogative power fell into ‘abeyance’, that is to say, it was set aside for the
duration of the life of the statute. Should the statute be repealed, the
prerogative would once more come into operation.
In Laker Airways v Department of Trade (1977), statute and prerogative were
considered once again. The facts involved regulation of the transatlantic air
route. Under the Bermuda Agreement of 1946, the United States and United
Kingdom governments agreed that air carriers should be approved by both
governments: the ‘designation’ requirement. In 1971, the Civil Aviation Act
was passed by parliament, providing for the licensing of airlines by the Civil
Aviation Authority (the CAA). The Act provided that the Secretary of State
could give ‘guidance’ to the CAA as to the policy to be followed in the
consideration of licence applications. Mr Freddie Laker had both applied for
designation under the Bermuda Treaty and had been granted a licence under
the Civil Aviation Act 1971. 
A change in government led to a change in policy, and it was decided that
British Airways should have a monopoly on the trans-Atlantic route.
Accordingly, the Secretary of State issued ‘guidance’ to the CAA to the effect
that Mr Laker’s licence should be withdrawn. The Secretary of State also
requested that the United States government did not proceed to grant
designation to Laker Airways under the Treaty. In an application for judicial
88 Now the Family Division of the High Court.
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review by Mr Laker, it was argued that the Secretary of State’s ‘guidance’ was
ultra vires. The court agreed, regarding the instruction given to the CAA as
beyond the normal meaning of the word ‘guidance’. The court also rejected
the government’s argument that it had the right, under the prerogative, to
deny Laker Airways’ right to fly the Atlantic route. The government could
not, it was held, defeat a statutory right by use of a prerogative power.
In Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister of State for Civil Service (1985),
the prerogative returned to the courts. The Prime Minister, as the Minister for
the Civil Service, by a prerogative order (an Order in Council) terminated the
right of workers at the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)
to belong to trade unions. The order followed industrial unrest which
threatened to disrupt the interception of signals intelligence. The Union
challenged the order under judicial review proceedings, claiming that they
had a legitimate expectation to be consulted prior to their rights to
membership being withdrawn. The Unions won at first instance, but lost both
before the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. 
The House of Lords accepted that the terms and conditions of
employment of civil servants were within the prerogative powers of the
Crown.89 Their Lordships likewise accepted that the employees had a
legitimate expectation to be consulted before their rights were adversely
affected. Nevertheless, the government’s plea of national security trumped the
interests of the union members.90
The significance of the GCHQ case in relation to prerogative power is
twofold. On the question of the reviewability of the royal prerogative, the
House of Lords declared that the exercise of the prerogatives of the Crown
were, in principle, as reviewable as powers exercised under statute. However,
having boldly declared the principle, the court proceeded to qualify the
approach by stating that a number of matters would not be subjected to
review. Utilising the concept of ‘justiciability’, the court held that matters such
as the appointment of ministers, dissolution of parliament, grant of honours,
treaties, and par excellence matters of national security were not appropriate
subjects for review by the courts. Each of these matters was regarded as
involving matters of high policy which it should be for ministers to decide,
and by implication for parliament to control.91 It remains the case after GCHQ
that many significant attributes of the prerogative remain immune from
judicial review.
The case of R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte
Northumbria Police Authority (1988) reveals a far less robust judicial attitude
towards the control of the prerogative than did the Laker Airways case. Once
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91 See, also, Patriotic Front – ZAPU v Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs
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again, the issue involved was the relationship between statute and the
prerogative. The Police Act 1964 sets out the respective powers of the Home
Secretary, the police authorities and the Chief Constables of police with regard
to, inter alia, the supply of equipment to police forces (sections 4 and 5). 
The Secretary of State, by way of a Circular, advised that the Secretary of
State would be making available supplies of riot control equipment to police
forces, irrespective of approval by the police authorities. The Northumbria
Police Authority sought judicial review of the legality of the Circular. The
Home Secretary argued first that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, he
had power to issue the equipment, and that, independent of the statutory
power which he claimed, he had the power under the prerogative to issue the
weapons. On the point of statutory interpretation, the Court of Appeal held
that no monopoly was reserved to the Police Authority and that, accordingly,
the Secretary of State had not acted ultra vires. 
On the prerogative aspect, the court’s reasoning was both surprising and
interesting. First, the Court of Appeal accepted that the Police Act 1964 left
unaffected the prerogative powers to keep the peace. Little evidence was
adduced as to the existence of such a prerogative, but nevertheless, Croom-
Johnson LJ felt able to hold that he had ‘no doubt’ that the Crown had such a
prerogative. Nourse LJ stated that there was no historical or other basis for
denying that a prerogative to keep the peace could be viewed as a ‘sister’
prerogative to the power to declare war, without making any reference to
Blackstone’s division of prerogatives into ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ categories.
Recalling that it had never been possible to identify all the prerogatives of the
Crown and that their existence could be ascertained only by means of
piecemeal decisions, Nourse LJ declared that there had never been ‘a
comparable occasion for investigating a prerogative of keeping the peace
within the realm’: 
The Crown’s prerogative of making war and peace, the war prerogative, has
never been doubted ... it is natural to suppose that it was founded, at least in
part, on the wider prerogative of protection ...
The wider prerogative must have extended as much to unlawful acts within
the realm as to the menaces of a foreign power. There is no historical or other
reason for denying to the war prerogative a sister prerogative of keeping the
peace within the realm ...
More surprisingly, the judge argued that the fact that no evidence existed was
almost conclusive proof that it did exist. In the seminal case of Entick v
Carrington (1765), Lord Camden had asserted that, if there existed authority
for the lawful exercise of power, it would be found ‘in the books’. It might be
thought that in passing the Police Act, parliament considered that it was
providing comprehensive regulation of the terms and conditions under which
each regulatory body could act. It cannot have been contemplated that, by
plea of a previously unconsidered prerogative, the provisions of the Act could
be circumvented. Nevertheless, Purchas LJ was clear that:
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... the prerogative powers to take all reasonable steps to preserve the Queen’s
peace remain unaffected by the Act and these include the supply of equipment
to police forces which is reasonably required for the more efficient discharge of
their duties. 
The Northumbria Police Authority case is indicative of the fine line to be drawn
between updating a prerogative and creating a new prerogative. Prerogatives,
being a feature of monarchical power are, as Dicey stated, residual.
Accordingly, for the judges to give recognition to an alleged prerogative, it
must be shown that the prerogative claimed existed before 1688. In BBC v
Johns (1965), Lord Diplock gave judicial expression to this in the statement: ‘...
it is 350 years and a civil war too late for the Queen’s courts to broaden the
prerogative.’
In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Fire Brigades’ Union
and Others (1995), the matter in issue was whether the Secretary of State,
having failed to implement the statutory scheme provided in the Criminal
Justice Act 1988, was free to implement a different scheme under the royal
prerogative.92 The scheme introduced a ‘tariff’ for compensation for injuries at
a substantially lower rate than provided for under the statute.
In the Court of Appeal, Sir Thomas Bingham stated that:
... the old non-statutory scheme was established by a proper exercise of
prerogative power. In the absence of statute, there would not, in law, have
been anything to prevent the Home Secretary exercising his prerogative
powers to modify the old scheme or to revoke it and substitute a new one
devised on different principles.
Even after the 1988 Act had been passed, he would not have been open to legal
challenge had he continued the old scheme without bringing the new statutory
provisions into force, so long as his reasons for postponement fell within the
wide discretion accorded him.
But was he, while those provisions remained unrepealed, legally free to
exercise prerogative powers to establish a scheme radically different from
those provisions?
Attorney General v de Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd (1920) and Laker Airways Ltd v
Department of Trade (1977) did not concern statutory provisions not brought
into force and so provided no direct answer to the question.
Again, the Home Secretary’s argument had given too little weight to the
overriding legislative role of parliament. It had approved detailed provisions
governing the form which, underpinned by statute, the scheme should take.
The 1988 provisions were not a discussion paper but a blueprint approved in
the most solemn form for which our constitution provided ...
The Master of the Rolls accepted that the Home Secretary had the power to
invite parliament to repeal the provisions or to seek enactment of the tariff
provisions in statute or, alternatively, to seek to have the statutory provisions
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abolished and then implement the tariff provisions under the royal
prerogative. But:
... what he could not do, so long as the 1988 provisions stood unrepealed as an
enduring statement of parliament’s will, was to exercise prerogative powers to
introduce a scheme radically different from what parliament had approved ...
Accordingly, the Secretary of State could not avoid the requirements of the
1988 Act and introduce – by means of the prerogative – a different scheme. 
The House of Lords ruled, by a majority (Lord Keith of Kinkel and Lord
Mustill dissenting), that the decisions of the Secretary of State not to
implement the statutory scheme, and to introduce an alternative scheme
under the prerogative, were unlawful. The House of Lords refused, however,
to rule that the Secretary of State was under a legally enforceable duty to bring
the statutory scheme into effect at a particular date. 
However, the Secretary of State did not enjoy an unfettered discretion as to
whether to bring the scheme into effect, and he could not, through use of the
prerogative, defeat the purpose of the statute. Lord Keith, dissenting, argued
that the court should not become involved in a matter which was for
parliament to determine. Lord Mustill was of the same mind, relying
specifically on the Bill of Rights 1689:
Absent a written constitution, much sensitivity was required of the
parliamentarian, administrator and judge if the delicate balance of the
unwritten rules evolved successfully in recent years was not to be disturbed
and all the recent advances undone.
Some of the argument addressed would have the court push to the very
boundaries of the distinction between court and parliament established in, and
recognised ever since, the Bill of Rights 1689.
Three hundred years had passed since then and the political and social
landscape had changed beyond recognition, but the boundaries remained.
Here, within one case, are seen differing considerations weighing on the
judges in the House of Lords. The majority decision rests squarely on the rule
of law and the preference for statute over the prerogative. The minority view,
however, leans far more clearly in favour of the doctrine of separation of
powers and the supremacy of parliament in regulating its own affairs and in
calling ministers to account.93
POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE PREROGATIVE
Political control over the exercise of the prerogative, while preserving the
separation of powers between the executive and judiciary, may in practice
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prove to be inadequate. In theory, the prerogative, as is the case with any
other act of government, is capable of being subjected to the full range of
parliamentary procedure.94 Thus, Question Time, debates and select
committees may be utilised in order to scrutinise prerogative acts. However,
under parliamentary practice, there exists a number of issues on which
ministers conventionally decline to provide information, and many of these
matters are precisely those which fall within the scope of the prerogative. The
dissolution of parliament is a matter for Prime Ministerial determination
alone: not even a duty to consult Cabinet is imposed, and the matter will
certainly not be for parliamentary scrutiny. Likewise, the grant of honours is a
matter not for parliamentary discussion. On matters of the disposition of the
armed forces, weaponry for the armed forces, government contracts, judicial
appointments, and investigations by the Director of Public Prosecutions, the
government will decline to answer questions. Aside from such specific
matters, the government may plead such wide notions as national security,
confidentiality or the public interest in order to avoid scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
Under all constitutions, written or unwritten, there will be a number of
powers reserved to the executive, powers which are exercisable without the
passage of legislation. Such powers may include the entering into treaties,
declarations of war and peace, recognition of foreign states and diplomats.
Such powers are referred to as ‘inherent executive powers’, or ‘prerogative
power’. Section 2 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900
confers on the Governor General ‘such powers and functions ... as Her
Majesty may be pleased to assign to him’. In 1900, these powers entailed the
power to summon, prorogue or dissolve parliament, to appoint judges and
other public officials. Section 61 of the Constitution confers the executive
power of the Commonwealth in the Queen and declares that this executive
power is vested in the Governor General. Other powers were expressly
assigned to the Governor General in 1954 and 1973, implying that, for such
powers to exist, they must be express and cannot exist by implication or by
analogy with the prerogative powers of the Crown. 
The scope of the powers has been the subject of judicial disagreement in
the High Court of Australia, some judges adopting a narrow view of the
powers, others a broader interpretation. In Commonwealth v Colonial Combing
Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd (1922), Higgins J adopted the narrow approach:
... the Governor General is not a general agent of His Majesty, with power to
exercise all His Majesty’s prerogatives; he is a special agent with power to
carry out the Constitution and the laws, and such powers and functions as the
King may assign to him.
94 This is to be discussed in more detail in Chapters 15 and 16.
In Barton v Commonwealth (1974), Mason J took a broader view of the powers
conferred under section 61:
... enables the Crown to undertake all executive action which is appropriate to
the position of the Commonwealth under the Constitution and to the spheres
of responsibility vested in it by the Constitution. It includes the prerogative
powers of the Crown, that is, the powers accorded to the Crown by the
common law.
These two brief examples illustrate the point that, even under a written
constitution, the scope of prerogative power is capable of differing
interpretations.95
Under the United Kingdom constitution, it may be concluded, quite
reasonably, that parliamentary control over the exercise of prerogative power
is less than adequate. Set alongside or juxtapositioned with the excluded areas
of judicial review under the concept of justiciability, it can be seen that there
exists a reservoir of power, much of which is undefined or at best ill defined,
which is not amenable either to judicial or to parliamentary control. 
REFORM OF THE PREROGATIVE?
It is precisely for the reasons discussed above that, in 1988, the Rt Hon Tony
Benn MP introduced a Private Members’ Bill to place prerogative powers
under statutory authority. That Bill did not proceed through the legislative
process but such a proposal requires careful consideration. 
The Crown Prerogatives (House of Commons Control) Bill 1988 provided
a list of prerogative powers which would require the assent of the House of
Commons before having legal effect. Most significant of these are the powers
to declare war, to make peace, to recognise foreign governments, to sign or
ratify treaties, to grant pardons, to confer honours, and more generally to
exercise all other executive powers not conferred by statute. Clause 2 of the
Bill conferred on the Speaker of the House the sole responsibility for advising
on the dissolution of parliament and the issue of an invitation to a person to
attempt to form a government. In respect of both of these matters, the assent
of the House of Commons was required and that assent binding on the
Crown. The power of the Crown to assent to Bills and of the House of Lords
to approve legislation would have been removed under clause 4 of the Bill.
The extent to which such a proposal would clarify questions as to the
existence and control of the prerogative is necessarily a matter for speculation.
Nowhere in the Bill was the role of the courts mentioned. Once the House of
Commons had given its assent to the proposed exercise of power, the courts
would be precluded from examining the parliamentary process leading up to
that assent.96 The power of judicial review, however, would remain, and it
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would be within the courts’ jurisdiction to determine whether the power
exercised was a power authorised by the assent. It has been seen in relation to
the GCHQ case that the courts have now developed a category of non-
justiciable matters, and the majority of the powers identified in the Bill fall
within this category. To that extent, placing the prerogatives under statutory
authority would, arguably, make little difference. Remaining powers, covered
in the general power ‘to issue all other executive powers not conferred by
statute’, would continue to be reviewable according to their subject matter.
However, the prerogative has been seen to be an elusive constitutional
animal which is capable of appearing in novel form under unforeseen
circumstances. Recalling the Northumbria Police Authority case, it was there
seen that the prerogative ‘to keep the peace’ was pleaded as an alternative to
the existence of power within the Police Act 1964: a reserve power claimed as
insurance against the court finding that the minister had acted ultra vires the
statute. That the Court of Appeal upheld the minister’s claim was by no
means a foregone conclusion, and to do so in the virtual absence of authority
and precedent, and with little analysis, quite remarkable.
The Northumbria Police Authority case illustrates the fundamental difficulty
of prerogative power: that of identification and definition. In March 1993, the
Prime Minister, in a written reply to a request for a list of the occasions of
which the prerogative had been exercised over an 18 month period, declined
to provide the list, on the basis of ‘the complexity of the relationship between
statutory and prerogative power’.97 The Prime Minister could have confined
his excuse to ‘the complexity of the prerogative’. 
It can be agreed that there is little to suggest that replacing such powers by
statute, even if they could be identified, would lead to fewer abuses of power.
Further, it may be added that, even if the powers could be identified, given
their wraith-like nature, it would be impossible, conclusively, to define their
scope and application. For this reason, the prerogative – a paradox in a
modern democratic state – is likely to retain its uncertain form, thus leaving to
government a residue of largely uncontrolled power.
The Prime Minister (Office, Role and Functions) Bill, introduced into the
Commons in 2001, if passed, inter alia provides that the Prime Minister may
advise the Crown on the use of the royal prerogative, other than that of
dissolving or proroguing parliament, and that the Prime Minister has
responsibility for the use of prerogative powers with the consent of the Crown
(clause 6(1) and (2)). The Bill also provides that any use of the power
conferred in clause 6 shall be reported to the House of Commons within seven
days, subject to such restrictions agreed by the Speaker of the House as are
necessary to protect national security, or in the interests of the administration
of justice or the prevention and detection of serious crime. The prerogatives
175
97 HC, Official Report, 1 March 1993.
exercisable by the Prime Minister are detailed in Schedule 1, which includes
the following powers: 
• the making of Orders in Council; 
• declarations of war and committing the armed forces to conflict; 
• command of the armed forces; 
• requiring persons to perform military or other service in times of armed
conflict or emergency; 
• the signing or ratification of treaties; 
• recognition of foreign governments; appointment of ambassadors,
permanent secretaries of departments, heads of security services, members
of the Defence Staff, Royal Commissions and members of public bodies; 
• declarations of states of emergency; 
• orders for the confiscation, forfeiture or seizure of property and assets; 
• issuing of pardons, ordering the detention of felons or the insane during
pleasure; 
• instituting or quashing legal proceedings; 
• asserting Crown immunity in legal proceedings and granting of public
immunity certificates; 
• powers relating to intestacy, trusts, treasure trove, mineral rights, wrecks,
sturgeon, swans, whales, territorial waters and ownership of the foreshore
of the United Kingdom.
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CHAPTER 7
INTRODUCTION
The sovereignty, or supremacy, of parliament is ‘the dominant characteristic
of our political institutions’.1 Sovereignty as a doctrine has long caused
controversy amongst philosophers, lawyers and political scientists and is a
concept which assumes – as does the rule of law – differing interpretations
according to the perspective being adopted. By way of example, international
lawyers are concerned with the attributes which render a state independent
and sovereign within the international community. Political scientists are
concerned with the source of political power within the state. Legal theorists
and constitutional lawyers, particularly in the United Kingdom where the
matter remains contentious, are concerned to identify the ultimate legal power
within a state.
DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF ‘SOVEREIGNTY’
Political and legal sovereignty – from the standpoint of sovereignty within the
state as opposed to sovereignty as understood in international law – may be
analysed as meaning either the supreme legal authority within a state or the
supreme political authority within a state.2
Sovereignty as supreme legal authority
It is this interpretation with which AV Dicey and later constitutional writers
are concerned. As this meaning is the central focus of our concern in
understanding legislative – or parliamentary – sovereignty, consideration will
be postponed until other interpretations of the concept have been considered. 
Sovereignty as supreme political authority
The essence of this idea is that lawful power and authority must be in
conformity with moral dictates: some form of ‘higher law’ or ‘natural law’.
Political theorists of the eighteenth century contributed much to an
understanding of the idea of ultimate authority. Four broadly similar
approaches, each entailing the idea of a ‘social contract’, may be outlined here.
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Laslett, 1975, Chapter IV.
Thomas Hobbes3 offered the most extreme version of the social contract
theory, arguing that man by nature is incapable of regulating his life in peace
and harmony with his fellow man. Hobbes’s view of man in a society lacking
a restraining all-powerful sovereign was inherently pessimistic, an attitude
encapsulated in the often quoted phrase that life is ‘solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish and short’. In order for there to be civil order, it was necessary for each
man to surrender to the state his own sovereignty in exchange for security.
Such a surrender was revocable only if the state abused its trust. The
requirement of obedience to law is strict: and yet there are limits: 
If the Soveraign command a man (though justly condemned) to kill, wound, or
mayme himselfe; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the
use of food, ayre, medicine, or any other thing, without which he cannot live;
yet hath that man the Liberty to disobey. 
Further, Hobbes states that: 
The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign, is understood to last as long, and
no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them. For the
right men have by Nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect
them, can by no Covenant be relinquished.
According to Jean-Jacques Rousseau,4 the citizen enters into a ‘contract’ with
the state, surrendering to the state individual rights in exchange for the
protection of the state. The state, according to Rousseau, is thus embodied in
the ‘general will’ of the people and becomes both the agent and ruler of the
people in the peoples’ name. Rousseau’s vision of man differs markedly from
that of Thomas Hobbes – far from living in a state of ‘war’ with one another,
men in the ‘natural state’ of primitive society would have nothing to fight over
and would be united in a community of endeavour to secure the essential
provisions of life. Man comes together – from necessity – within civil society,
and, through participation in the decision making processes, produces a
democratic society. Rousseau distinguishes between supreme power –
sovereignty – and the government. Sovereignty lies with the people, and is
absolute and inalienable. The government’s power is less absolute, established
to implement the will of the people and accountable to the people. The
government is dependent upon the sovereign people for the continuation of
its power, and the people retain the right to revoke the power devolved.
Thus, for Rousseau, sovereignty is a concept which entails moral approval
and acceptance by the people whose ‘collective will’ sovereignty represents.5
Indeed, for Rousseau:
... the sovereign, being formed wholly of the individuals who compose it,
neither has nor can have any interest contrary to theirs; and consequently the
sovereign power need give no guarantee to its subjects, because it is impossible
for the body to wish to hurt all its members. We shall also see later on that it
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cannot hurt any in particular. The sovereign, merely by virtue of what it is, is
always what it should be. [p 177]
Thomas Paine advances a social contract theory in which the rights of the
individual are given central importance.6 Paine both influenced and was
influenced by the French and American Revolutions. In Rights of Man, Paine
argued that the citizen gives up his rights to the state, but on a conditional
basis. The state is placed in the position of trustee of the rights of man, and
should that trust be broken, the citizen has the ultimate – or sovereign – right
to depose the government. Paine argues that man has natural rights, ‘those
which appertain to man in right of his existence’. These rights are both
individualistic and civil. The former category includes:
... all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind, and also all those rights of
acting as an individual for his own comfort and happiness, which are not
injurious to the natural rights of others.
By way of distinction:
Civil rights are those which appertain to man in right of his being a member of
society. Every civil right has for its foundation, some natural right pre-existing
in the individual. [p 90]
These natural and civil rights are held by government on trust for the people,
and should – under an ideal constitution – be protected from governmental
abuse by a Bill of Rights. Such an approach is also taken by John Locke who
regards the people, as a collectivity, holding the sovereign power which is in
some sense delegated to the government on trust, and who may accordingly
exert their sovereign power to remove the government if it violates its sacred
trust.
In Two Treatises of Government (1791), John Locke advances powerful
arguments for the limits of governmental power and the ultimate political
sovereignty of the people. In Book II,7 Locke argues that men come together in
civil society and tacitly consent to be ruled by government directed to ‘the
peace, safety, and public good of the people’. Hence, the power accorded to
government is not absolute, but whilst in existence, the legislative power is the
‘supreme power’. Nevertheless, Locke concludes that if the people:
... have set limits to the duration of their legislative, and made this supreme
power in any person or assembly only temporary, it is forfeited; upon the
forfeiture of their rules, or at the determination of the time set, it reverts to the
society, and the people have a right to act as supreme, and continue the
legislative in themselves or place it in a new form, or new hands, as they think
good. [p 242]
Sovereignty, then, is limited and conditional: government holds supreme power
on trust for the people. On this view, the authority of the constitution will be
dependent upon its conformity with a higher law. As KC Wheare explains:
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This view of government limited by the natural rights of man lies at the basis
of the American Constitution and finds a place ... in many modern
constitutions. It provides a moral basis upon which a government’s actions can
be judged and, what is more, upon which the validity of a constitution can be
tested. A constitution binds in so far as it is in accordance with natural law.
Neither a government nor a citizen may disregard the authority of a
constitution except in so far as the action can be justified by the law of nature.
This is indeed a ‘higher law’ than a constitution. [1966, p 65]
DISTINGUISHING LEGAL AND POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY
It is often difficult to distinguish clearly between legal and political
sovereignty. The distinction is nevertheless one insisted upon by authorities
such as Sir Edward Coke, Sir William Blackstone and, in particular, AV Dicey.
As with so much of the United Kingdom’s constitutional law, contemporary
thinking about sovereignty remains influenced by the legacy of Dicey. Dicey’s
interpretation of parliamentary sovereignty will be examined below
(pp 192–215). At this introductory stage, however, it is necessary to note that
Dicey drew a strict separation between legal sovereignty and political
sovereignty (as did Coke and Blackstone). In Dicey’s view, the people hold
political sovereignty whilst legal sovereignty rests with the ‘Queen in
Parliament’. In large measure, this clear demarcation between the political and
the legal is explained by the unwritten nature of the United Kingdom’s
constitution. In the majority of states having a written constitution, the
constitution defines the limits of governmental power. In the United
Kingdom, by way of contrast, the powers of government – whilst ultimately
dependent upon the electoral ‘mandate’ – remain unconstrained by any
fundamental written document and subject only to parliament’s approval. All
law making power thus derives, not from the power conferring and power
delimiting constitutional document, endorsed by the people, but from the
sovereignty of the legislature: parliament.
LEGAL THEORY AND SOVEREIGNTY
Legal theory contributes to an understanding of legal and political
sovereignty within the constitution. In the overview of the theories of John
Austin, Hans Kelsen and HLA Hart which follow, it will be seen that, in each
case, the jurist is seeking an explanation of the source of ultimate authority, its
identifying characteristics and the manner in which sovereignty is upheld
within a legal order. By revealing the characteristics of valid law, it becomes
easier to understand the distinction between laws and other rules in society –
such as moral rules – which have binding effect, but which do not have the
force – and enforceability – of legal rules. 
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John Austin
Within every civil society – or polity – there will be found, as a social and
political fact, one supreme power. The nineteenth century jurist John Austin8
was one of the earliest ‘modern’ theorists to offer an in depth analysis of
sovereignty, and his work – while much criticised by later writers – still marks
a useful starting point for analysis of the concept. Austin’s theory was an
attempt to define law in the positivist tradition.9 Law is nothing more or less
than the commands of the identifiable, illimitable and indivisible sovereign
body. The sovereignty conferred exhibits itself in the habit of obedience of the
people, which in turn is instilled by the fear of sanctions which attach to all
laws and thus underpin the legal system. Laws are nothing more nor less than
the general commands of this sovereign, to which sanctions are attached:
... every positive law, or every law strictly so called, is a direct or circuitous
command of a monarch or sovereign number in the character of a political
superior: that is to say, a direct or circuitous command of a monarch or
sovereign number to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author.
And, being a command (and, therefore, flowing from a determinate source),
every positive law is a law proper, or a law properly so called. [Austin (1832),
1954, p 134]
While the model most closely accords with the criminal statute, it is difficult to
endorse in relation to much of the civil law and in relation to those laws which
regulate the law making and law enforcing institutions within the state.
However, in every state, whether monarchical or parliamentary, unitary or
federal, there must be some body which demonstrates the characteristics of a
sovereign. For Austin, sovereignty as a legal concept within the United
Kingdom lies with the Queen in Parliament: as a political concept, the
ultimate sovereignty vested in the people. 
Austin’s analysis of both sovereignty and law is somewhat crude. It is
difficult, for example, to adapt his idea of sovereignty to a federal state where,
to cite but one example, the distribution of power may confer co-equal
legislative powers on both the individual provincial legislatures and the
federal government and provide for judicial review of the constitutionality of
primary legislation.10 Today, his theory is the more difficult to apply when
considered in light of the United Kingdom’s membership of the European
Union.11
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HLA Hart
A thorough critique of Austin’s analysis is offered by Professor HLA Hart.
Hart portrays the legal system as being one of rules rather than commands.
For Hart, Austin’s jurisprudence is tainted by its overtly coercive nature, as
exemplified in the command plus sanction portrayal of law. Austin has
missed, according to Hart, an important dimension of law: the concept of a
rule. Rules, for Hart, are distinguishable from commands in several significant
respects. Legal rules may, as with the criminal law, lay down specific
prohibitions, breach of which will be met with punishment. Nevertheless,
there are laws which do not exhibit the characteristics of prohibition and
sanction. Many rules of law confer the power on individuals and groups to
act, but evince no element of coercion: rules of contract, of making wills, of
entering into marriage, fall within this category. These rules Hart labels
‘power conferring rules’: rules which are permissive and the breach of which
will result in a ‘nullity’, a concept which is difficult to conceptualise as an
Austinian ‘sanction’. 
By distinguishing between rules which stipulate prohibitions and rules
which confer powers, Hart is able to construct a theory of law which is
represented as a union of primary and secondary rules. Each legal rule within
the system is identified according to accepted criteria: what Hart calls the ‘rule
of recognition’. At the apex of the hierarchy of laws – whether bylaws of a
local authority, judicial decisions, delegated legislation or statute – is the
‘ultimate rule of recognition’. This ultimate rule, while involving some
complexity and uncertainty, is mostly explained in the form that ‘what the
Queen in Parliament enacts is law’.
Hart analyses the problems surrounding the nature of sovereignty. In The
Concept of Law (1961), Hart discusses the concepts of continuing sovereignty and
self-embracing sovereignty, an issue which, as will be seen further below, has
attracted continuing academic debate. Hart argues that the conventionally
understood Diceyan concept of sovereignty is an interpretation which has
been accepted as the criterion of legal validity, but that that interpretation is
‘only one arrangement among others, equally conceivable’ (p 145). The
Diceyan view is that parliament enjoys continuing sovereignty – that is to say,
that each parliament, irrespective of time, has equal legislative competence to
that of any other parliament. However, Hart argues, parliament’s sovereignty
could be interpreted to be a form of self-embracing sovereignty – a sovereignty
which would permit the exercise of power to delimit parliament’s legislative
powers in the future. This power, however, being the ultimate power, would
be exercisable only once. Hart draws the analogy with God in the following
manner:
... on the one hand, a God who at every moment of his existence enjoys the
same powers and so is incapable of cutting down those powers, and, on the
other, a God whose powers include the power to destroy for the future his
omnicompetence. [p 146]
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In the former case, God enjoys continuing sovereignty; in the latter, self-
embracing sovereignty. Furthermore, neither of these interpretations, Hart
instructs:
... can be ruled out as wrong or accepted with confidence as right; for we are in
the area of open texture of the system’s most fundamental rule. Here at any
moment a question may arise to which there is no answer – only answers.
[p 147]
Hans Kelsen
Hans Kelsen analysed sovereignty both within a state and within the
international legal order.12 Kelsen’s theory involves nothing less than an
attempt to formulate a scientific global analysis of law. For Kelsen positive,
man made, law is best expressed as a ‘norm’:
By ‘norm’ we mean that something ought to be or ought to happen, especially
that a human being ought to behave in a specific way. [1967, pp 4–5]
Each norm will be a valid legal rule if it is validated by a higher norm. Thus, a
bylaw will be valid if it is properly enacted under an Act of Parliament. A
legal decision will be valid provided that the judge is acting within his
jurisdiction. An Act of Parliament will be valid if enacted in the
constitutionally accepted correct manner. Taken together, the individual legal
norms will form a system which itself is validated according to the ‘basic
norm’ or ‘grundnorm’. While for Kelsen, unlike Austin, it is not necessary that
every legal rule have an attendant sanction, it is crucial that the legal order as
a whole is a coercive order:
As a coercive order, the law is distinguished from other social orders. The
decisive criterion is the element of force – that means that the act prescribed by
the order as a consequence of socially detrimental facts ought to be executed
even against the will of the individual and, if he resist, by physical force.
[pp 33–34]
At an international level, Kelsen recognises that the existence of a valid
national legal order is dependent upon the recognition of the state under
international law. Where a revolution occurs within a state, it is international
law which will determine the validity of claims to exercise legitimate power
and hence law making power. Thus, by this means, it is possible to view law
globally. 
THE VALIDITY OF LAW AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LAW
In addition to identifying the characteristics of valid law, each of the above
theorists also seeks to explain the relationship between – and distinctions
between – the concepts of validity and effectiveness. The importance of the
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distinction between validity and effectiveness of law lies in explaining the
ultimate source of authority or Sovereignty within a state. One question which
frequently arises is whether, if a law is ineffective (perhaps because it is
morally disapproved of by a majority of citizens, or because it is regarded as
futile), that law loses its validity within the legal order. The commonly agreed
position adopted by Austin and Hart is that such a law – provided that it
conforms with the constitutional criteria for law – remains valid despite being
ineffective. However, it is also a point of agreement that if a legal system were
to cease to be effective overall – that is to say, if a state of anarchy existed –
then the ultimate sovereign power would be under threat, and would
probably be forced to change. The people, in rejecting the ultimate power
within the state, would be taking back the power which they had entrusted to
the sovereign. Accordingly, it can be seen that the legal sovereign is
dependent ultimately upon the political sovereign power in society – the
people. 
The effectiveness of law, while it does not per se determine legal validity,
nevertheless interrelates with law’s validity. Under the constitutional theory
of the United Kingdom, an Act of Parliament does not become invalid under
the doctrine of desuetude (disuse). As a result, statutes of great antiquity –
although never or seldom used – retain the force of law, and may be relied
upon at any time.13 Equally, a statute – of whatever date – is valid if it meets
the criteria of validity, irrespective of whether or not it is effective in achieving
its objectives. This is the point made by Sir Ivor Jennings in relation to the
banning of smoking on the streets of Paris. A more realistic example of the
relationship between the effectiveness and validity of law stems from the
system of local taxation in the 1980s. The government decided that the existing
system of taxation based on the rateable value of properties – irrespective of
the number of persons living in the property – was inequitable. Accordingly,
the government introduced the Community Charge14 (or Poll Tax) which
levied a flat rate of tax on each person within a local government area. The
system was first introduced in Scotland and was met with condemnation and
evasion. As a result of its ineffectiveness – based on the rejection of the law by
the people – the government was forced to change the law. The law did not
become invalid as a result of its ineffectiveness: rather, the ineffectiveness
created a political reason as to why the law should be repealed. 
If that one instance of an ineffective law is extrapolated to the legal system
as a whole, the manner in which effectiveness affects validity can be seen
more clearly. If a legal system comes under strain to a significant degree, a
point will be reached at which there is civil unrest, anarchy or revolution. The
law will cease to be effective. The law, however, under the theory of
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sovereignty, remains valid. At some point on the scale between general
effectiveness and more or less total ineffectiveness – and the point cannot be
precisely determined – the underlying explanation for the validity of law will
cease. Effectiveness, accordingly, can be seen to be the prime condition for
meaningful statements about validity.15
In a revolutionary situation – as explained by Kelsen – there is a point
where the basic norm – or sovereign power – changes. The ultimate validity of
law depends on its effectiveness. When there is a revolution, the basic norm
may change, brought about by a change in the power structure within a
society ultimately creating a new basic norm. 
Ultimate validity and effectiveness: an illustration
The relationship between the ultimate validity of a legal system and
effectiveness is well illustrated by the position in Rhodesia, as it then was, in
the 1960s. Until 1965, the governance of Rhodesia was under the sovereignty
of the United Kingdom, with Rhodesia enjoying self-governing powers to the
extent allowed under the Constitution of Rhodesia. By convention, the United
Kingdom Parliament would not legislate for the colony without the express
request or consent of the Rhodesian Parliament. In 1965, however, the Prime
Minister of Rhodesia, Mr Ian Smith, issued a unilateral declaration of
independence from the United Kingdom and asserted the full right of self-
government. The response of the United Kingdom’s government was to
reassert its own powers, reaffirming its right to legislate for Rhodesia in the
Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 and thus overriding the convention. Between
1965 and 1979, when a constitutional conference resulted in full independence
being conferred on the renamed Zimbabwe,16 there was thus doubt as to
which parliament represented sovereignty within the state of Rhodesia. 
Jurisprudentially, Hans Kelsen had argued that one of the conditions for
change in the sovereignty of the state – or, in his phraseology, the ‘basic norm’
of a state – lay in revolution, whether by act of force or change in the
allegiance of the judiciary. The case of Madzimbamuto v Lardner Burke (1969)
provided the opportunity to test the revolutionary position in relation to
sovereignty. 
Madzimbamuto had been detained on order of the government of
Rhodesia under a provision enacted by the Rhodesian government post-UDI
(the unilateral declaration of independence). Challenging the legality of his
detention, Madzimbamuto claimed that the Act was ultra vires the powers of
the Rhodesian government. On appeal to the Privy Council, the traditional
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty was affirmed. Lord Reid declared that:
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It is often said that it would be unconstitutional for the United Kingdom
Parliament to do certain things, meaning that the moral, political and other
reasons against doing them are so strong that most people would regard it as
highly improper if Parliament did these things. But that does not mean that it
is beyond the power of Parliament to do these things. If Parliament chose to do
any of them, the courts could not hold the Act of Parliament invalid. 
Accordingly, the sovereignty over Rhodesia remained – from the English
courts’ point of view – that of the United Kingdom Parliament. The Rhodesian
government had de facto power; de jure power remained in the United
Kingdom. An impasse was thus reached: to the government of Rhodesia – and
ultimately the Rhodesian courts – the alleged sovereignty of the United
Kingdom was an irrelevance. To the United Kingdom, however – as
illustrated by Madzimbamuto’s case before the Privy Council – the ‘basic norm’
of the constitution of Rhodesia remained the sovereign power of
Westminster.17 Nevertheless, from the point of view of the judges within
Rhodesia, there was a dilemma: how to react to legislation promulgated by
the de facto sovereign power. From 1965 to 1968, the Rhodesian courts refused
to acknowledge the lawfulness of the Smith government, following the view
of the Privy Council that, since the government was unlawful, so too were all
of its acts. However, to continue to deny the force of law to any acts of the
unlawful government was to produce uncertainty and doubt. The doctrine of
necessity was employed by the judges to give legal effect to what was
constitutionally invalid. Gradually, the continuing effectiveness of the Smith
regime was to result in recognition of the validity of its Acts, thus further
revealing the complexities in maintaining a clear separation between the
criterion of legal validity and effectiveness.18
In a revolutionary situation, a change in the basic norm, or grundnorm,
will take place when the judges accept the new source of sovereign power. As
JW Harris explains:
Being merely a hypothesis of juristic thinking, the grundnorm does not change
the moment the revolutionaries shoot the King. It cannot change until jurists
change their thinking, that is, until lawyers begin to make post-revolutionary
assertions to the effect: ‘The law in the country now is ...’ where ‘now’ refers to
some revolutionary, established source of law.19
Kelsen’s theory of revolutionary change in the grundnorm has not been
universally accepted, but it marks an effort to deal with the difficult issue of
change and continuity in a legal order. By way of example, in The State v Dosso
(1958), the Supreme Court of Pakistan, applying Kelsenian theory, accepted
the validity of a coup and that the successful coup conferred sovereign power
on the victors. However, in Asma Jilani v Government of Punjab (1972), the
Supreme Court rejected the notion that any person seizing power could claim
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the authority of sovereign power. Rather, sovereign power could only be
conferred on the successful revolutionary party under the constitution of the
state expressing the will of the people through the medium of chosen
representatives.20
THE ULTIMATE RULE IS EXTRA-LEGAL
When one comes to search for the ultimate higher authority which itself
validates the basic norm, a logical impasse is reached. Accordingly, it is
necessary to look outside this discrete structural system in order to find the
authority which confers ultimate validity. On a domestic basis,21 we find this
validating force in ‘juristic consciousness’ – in other words, the acceptance of
legal validity by the judges. Kelsen’s view on the source of ultimate sovereign
power is analysed by HLA Hart in The Concept of Law. While keen to
distinguish his own theory of law from that of Kelsen and that of John Austin,
there are similarities between Kelsen’s and Hart’s view of the ultimate validity
within a legal system. For Hart, the ultimate rule of recognition is validated by
the sociologically observable fact of official acceptance. By this, Hart means
that the officials’ – and most importantly the judges’ – acceptance of authority
can be seen in operation whenever one observes a court of law. A judge may
perhaps personally disapprove of a precedent case or of a statutory provision,
but his acceptance of its validity is demonstrated by his application of the law.
Expressed differently, it is the judges who uphold and reinforce the
sovereignty of parliament – the basic norm of the constitution. 
In Kelsen’s analysis, the ‘basic norm’ within any state will be the
historically traceable first constitution. In many instances, this will prove a
workable test. In the United States of America, the Constitution of 1787 will be
the basic norm; in the Republic of Ireland, the Constitution of 1937, and in
Australia, the Commonwealth Constitution of 1900, as amended. The position
in the United Kingdom is less clear cut on this analysis, which will assume
importance when considering the status of the Acts of Union with Scotland
and Ireland.22 Since the Norman Conquest in 1066, there has been an
unrivalled continuity in constitutional development in the United Kingdom,
interrupted by only two major historical events and a fundamentally
important, more contemporary, change. The first of these, the Civil War of
1642–46, resulted in the execution of Charles I in 1649, and the abolition of the
monarchy and rule by Cromwell until the restoration of the monarchy in 1660.
The second significant constitutional change came with the uniting of the
sovereign parliaments of Scotland and England under the Act of Union 1706,
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creating the state of Great Britain, and later the Union with Ireland, 1800, by
which Act the state of the United Kingdom came into being. The third change,
which has wide ranging implications for the constitution and law was
Britain’s accession to the European Community which took effect from 1973.
Most recently, devolution to regional assemblies and ‘incorporation’ of the
European Convention on Human Rights under the Human Rights Act 1998
have significant implications for the scope of legislative power which
parliament retains while these measures remain in force. These issues are
discussed below at pp 220–24.
SOVEREIGNTY AND WRITTEN CONSTITUTIONS
Where a written constitution exists, it will have come into being either by a
grant of independence from a previously sovereign power or through a
revolution – peaceful or otherwise. Where the constitution arises from the
native authority of the people, it is ‘autochthonous’: 
... [the people] assert not the principle of autonomy only; they assert also a
principle of something stronger, of self-sufficiency, of constitutional autarky ...
of being constitutionally rooted in their own soil. [Wheare, 1960, Chapter 4]
Where autochthony23 exists, the authority for the constitution arises from the
people. The phrase ‘We the People’ has powerful psychological – and legal –
force, and the resultant document, the constitution, will be supreme. As KC
Wheare explains in relation to the United States of America:
The constitution of the United States expresses the essential supremacy of a
constitution in a federal government in the passage: ‘This Constitution and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof ... shall be
the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound
thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding.’ [1963, p 54]
All power entrusted to government comes from the people: it is accordingly
understandable that, under such a constitutional arrangement, there is a
strongly held belief that government holds its power on ‘trust’ for the people.
It may be said, as a result, that both law making and executive powers are
conditionally conferred on those who hold public office, subject to the
doctrine of trust which will be enforced by the courts in the name of the
people. All constitutions – written and unwritten – exist against the backcloth
of historical, political and moral evolution: none exists in a vacuum. However,
under a written constitution, this background has a particular significance.
The constitution, being the expression of the political morality of its age –
updated by the judiciary through interpretative methods – is a constant
reflection and reminder of the will of the people and the restraints which that
will imposes on government. 
Chapter 7: Constitutional and Administrative Law
188
23 See Marshall, 1971, Chapter III.4.
Parliamentary Sovereignty
Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v Madison (1803), explained the power
of the constitution:
It is a proposition too plain to be contested that the constitution controls any
legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution
by an ordinary act. Between these two alternatives, there is no middle ground.
The constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by
ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other
acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it. If the former part of
the alternative is true, then a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not
law; if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on
the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature illimitable. 
It is possible, accordingly, under such a constitutional arrangement, for the
constitutional court24 effectively to redefine the relationship between the
governors and the governed, the state and its citizens. By this means, the
constitution is renewed and reinvigorated. By way of example, the American
Bill of Rights, enacted as amendments to the 1787 Constitution, provides that: 
All persons born or naturalised in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws ...25
This ‘equal protection’ clause has been the focus of the development of equal
civil and political rights in the United States of America. In 1896, the Supreme
Court was called upon to determine whether the policy of segregation of black
and white citizens was lawful under the Constitution. The court ruled that
‘separate but equal treatment’ laws did not amount to a denial of the equal
protection of law.26 When, however, in 1954, the question of ‘equal protection’
came before the Supreme Court concerning segregation in the schools of the
states of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia and Delaware, the court was to rule
that such ‘treatment’ violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the
constitution.27
THE SOURCE OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
The sovereignty of parliament is not itself laid down in statute: nor could it be,
for the ultimate law maker cannot confer upon itself the ultimate power. As
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legal theorists28 have demonstrated, when searching for ultimate legal power,
there comes a point of inquiry beyond which one cannot logically move. In
order to understand the ultimate authority of law, whether expressed in terms
of the ‘basic norm’ (Hans Kelsen) or the ‘ultimate rule of recognition’ (HLA
Hart) or sovereignty, the inquirer must move beyond the law itself. As has
been seen above, for both Kelsen and Hart, the key to ultimate power lies in
its acceptance – but not necessarily moral approval – by the judges within the
legal system. Each theorist expresses a similar idea in different terms. To
reiterate: for Kelsen, the acceptance of sovereign power can be seen in ‘juristic
consciousness’. Hart is rather less mysterious, although still abstruse, stating
that the existence of sovereign power can be demonstrated in the everyday
workings of the machinery of the law. The test for acceptance, according to
Professor Hart, lies in the attitude of the officials in the legal system and most
importantly the judges, what Hart terms the ‘internal aspect’ of law. This
internal aspect entails acceptance by the judges that the existence and
acceptance of the authority of a legal rule is justification for acting in a
particular manner: that is to say, for reaching a judgment in a particular case.
SOVEREIGNTY AS A RULE OF COMMON LAW
Sovereignty is thus the fundamental rule of the common law, for it is the
judges who uphold parliament’s sovereignty. For as long as the judges accept
the sovereignty of parliament, sovereignty will remain the ultimate rule of the
constitution. As Salmond explains:
All rules of law have historical sources. As a matter of fact and history they
have their origin somewhere, though we may not know what it is. But not all
of them have legal sources. Were this so, it would be necessary for the law to
proceed ad infinitum in tracing the descent of its principles. It is requisite that
the law should postulate one or more first causes, whose operation is ultimate
and whose authority is underived ... The rule that a man may not ride a bicycle
on the footpath may have its source in the bylaws of a municipal council; the
rule that these bylaws have the force of law has its source in an Act of
Parliament. But whence comes the rule that Acts of Parliament have the force
of law? This is legally ultimate; its source is historical only, not legal ... It is the
law because it is the law, and for no other reason that it is possible for the law
to take notice of. No statute can confer this power upon Parliament, for this
would be to assume and act on the very power that is to be conferred.29
Accordingly, the rule which confers validity on legislation is ‘logically
superior to the sovereign’. The logical consequence of this is stated by HWR
Wade:
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... if no statute can establish the rule that the courts obey Acts of Parliament,
similarly no statute can alter or abolish that rule. The rule is above and beyond
the reach of statute ... because it is itself the source of the authority of statute.30
The sovereignty of parliament will only be lost under two conditions. The first
condition would be where parliament decided – perhaps on the authority of
the people tested in a referendum – to abolish its sovereignty and to place its
residual authority under that of a written constitution to be adjudicated upon
by the judiciary. The second condition would be where the judiciary itself
underwent a ‘revolution’ in attitude, and accepted that parliament was no
longer the sovereign law making body and that the judges owed allegiance to
an alternative – or different – sovereign power. These points will be returned
to when considering challenges to the traditional Diceyan view of sovereignty. 
In the United Kingdom, in the absence of a written constitution which
asserts the sovereignty of the people and the sovereignty of the constitution –
as interpreted by the judiciary – over the legislature and executive, the
‘vacuum’ is filled by the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, or supremacy.
Under this doctrine, political sovereignty vests in the people: legal sovereignty
vests with parliament over which no legal controls are exerted, but which
remains responsible to the electorate for the continued, and regularly
renewed, grant of law making and executive authority. The means by which
the constitution is renewed is through the democratic process and the concept
of a responsive responsible government, rather than through the means of a
Supreme Court reinterpreting the constitution according to judicial
perceptions of the mores in society. This is not to suggest that under a written
constitution, there is no responsive, accountable and democratic government
or that the evolution of the constitution lies solely within the domain of the
judges. Rather, the point to be emphasised is that, under a written
constitution, there is an additional element in effecting constitutional change.
Depending upon the independence, integrity and motivation of the courts,
acts of the executive and legislature can be subjected to the control of the
constitution. 
The origins of parliamentary sovereignty
In Chapter 6, the manner in which the near absolute powers of the Crown31
were reduced by the courts and parliament was discussed. With the reduction
in the King’s prerogative powers, there came about the correlative rise in the
sovereignty of parliament. From 1688, the supremacy of parliament over the
Crown was established. From this time, the prerogative powers of the Crown
continued in existence or were abolished or curtailed as parliament
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determined. No new prerogative powers may be claimed by the Crown, as
Diplock LJ stated in BBC v Johns (1965).
AV DICEY AND SOVEREIGNTY
The classical definition of sovereignty, offered from a constitutional law rather
than a jurisprudential perspective, is that of AV Dicey (1898). Dicey had been
critical of John Austin’s account of sovereignty, arguing that Austin confused
political and legal sovereignty. From a legal-theoretical point of view, it
remains imperative to separate the political from the legal and to recognise
that, as matters stand, legal sovereignty remains with the United Kingdom
Parliament, although there may be political restraints which effectively inhibit
the exercise of those powers. On sovereignty, Dicey stated that:
The principle of parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than
this: namely, that Parliament thus defined has, under the English constitution,
the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or
body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set
aside the legislation of Parliament.
A law may, for our present purpose, be defined as ‘any rule which will be
enforced by the courts’. The principle, then, of parliamentary sovereignty may,
looked at from its positive side, be thus described: any Act of Parliament, or
any part of an Act of Parliament, which makes a new law, or repeals or
modifies an existing law, will be obeyed by the court. The same principle,
looked at from its negative side, may be thus stated: there is no person or body
of persons who can, under the English constitution, make rules which override
or derogate from an Act of Parliament, or which (to express the same thing in
other words) will be enforced by the courts in contravention of an Act of
Parliament. [(1898), 1959, p 39]
From this description can be deduced three basic rules:
(a) parliament is the supreme law making body and may enact laws on any
subject matter;
(b) no parliament may be bound by a predecessor or bind a successor;
(c) no person or body – including a court of law – may question the validity of
parliament’s enactments.
It is the correctness of this definition which must be tested and evaluated.
Having considered the concept of sovereignty in theoretical terms,
examination of the manner in which this is translated into a practical legal
doctrine is required. Dicey’s description of sovereignty will provide the
framework for discussion.
Parliament’s unlimited law making power
This aspect of sovereignty is the easiest both to explain and to understand: the
rule means that there is no limit on the subject matter on which parliament
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may legislate. Thus parliament may legislate to alter its term of office. In 1716,
the life of a parliament was limited to three years under the Act of 1694.
Fearing the effects of an election, the government introduced, and parliament
passed, the Septennial Act, extending the life of parliament to seven years. The
consequence of this Act was to confer authority on the Commons to legislate
without the express consent of the electorate: thus usurping the rights of the
people.32 The Septennial Act, under a written constitution such as that of the
United States, would be legally invalid. Nevertheless, as Dicey argued,
‘Parliament made a legal though unprecedented use of its powers’ ((1898),
1959, p 47). Parliament also extended its own life between 1910 and 1918, and
the parliament elected in 1935 was to endure until 1945.33 Parliament may
also legislate to alter the succession to the throne, as with the Act of Settlement
1700 and His Majesty’s Declaration of Abdication Act 1936. Parliament may
‘abolish’ itself and reconstitute itself as a different body, as occurred with the
Union with Scotland Act 1706. Parliament may also legislate to alter its own
powers, as with the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949, whereby the powers of the
House of Lords in respect of legislation were curtailed. Parliament may grant
independence to dependent states, whether dominions or colonies, as with the
Nigeria Independence Act 1960 and the Zimbabwe Independence Act 1979.
Furthermore, parliament may legislate to limit its own powers in relation to
dependent territories, as shown by the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 and
the Statute of Westminster 1931.34
Parliament may also legislate with retrospective effect, as with the War
Damage Act 1965. The War Damage Act effectively overruled the decision of
the House of Lords in Burmah Oil Company v Lord Advocate (1965). In 1942,
British troops had destroyed oil installations in Rangoon, with the intention of
preventing them from falling into the hands of the Japanese. The British
government made an ex gratia payment of some £4 million to the company.
Burmah Oil sued the government for some £31 million compensation. The
House of Lords held that compensation was payable by the Crown for the
destruction of property caused by the exercise of the prerogative power in
relation to war. The government immediately introduced into parliament the
War Damage Bill to nullify the effect of the decision. 
Parliament may legislate with extra-territorial effect, that is to say,
parliament may enact laws affecting the rights and duties of citizens and non-
citizens outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. For
example, certain offences committed in a foreign state will be triable in this
country. Thus, murder, manslaughter, treason, bigamy and tax offences
committed abroad will not render the accused immune from prosecution in
this country.35 Parliament may expressly legislate for overseas territory, as in
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the Continental Shelf Act 1964, under which exploration and exploitation
rights of the continental shelf vest in the Crown. However, it is a presumption
of statutory interpretation that statutes will not be given extra-territorial effect
other than where it is expressly or impliedly provided for under the Act.36
Such statutes will normally be passed in order to give effect to obligations
undertaken under an international treaty.37 The Hijacking Act 1971, for
example, gave legislative effect to the Convention for the Suppression on
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. Section 1 of the Aviation Security Act 1982,
which succeeded the Hijacking Act 1971, provides that the crime of hijacking
is committed when a person on board an aircraft in flight unlawfully seizes
control of the aircraft and exercises control over it by the use of force or by
threats. The jurisdiction of the United Kingdom courts, with limited
exceptions, extends to an act of hijacking, wherever it occurs, and irrespective
of the nationality of the hijacker.38
The most often quoted and best remembered examples of parliament’s
theoretically untrammelled legislative powers are those offered by Sir Ivor
Jennings: parliament can legislate to ban smoking on the streets of Paris;
parliament can legally make a man into a woman; and Sir Leslie Stephens
(1882): parliament could legislate to have a blue eyed babies put to death. In
The Law and the Constitution (1959), Jennings writes:
Parliamentary supremacy means essentially two things. It means, first, that
Parliament can legally enact legislation dealing with any subject matter
whatever. There are no limitations except political expedience and
constitutional convention ... if Parliament enacted that all men should be
women, they would be women so far as the law is concerned. In speaking of
the power of Parliament, we are dealing with legal principles, not the facts.
Though it is true that Parliament cannot in fact change the course of nature, it
is equally true that it cannot in fact do all sorts of things. The supremacy of
Parliament is a legal fiction, and legal fiction can assume anything.
Parliamentary supremacy means, secondly, that Parliament can legislate for all
persons and all places. If it enacts that smoking in the streets of Paris is an
offence, then it is an offence. Naturally, it is an offence by English law and not
by French law, and therefore it would be regarded as an offence only by those
who paid attention to English law. The Paris police would not at once begin
arresting all smokers, nor would French criminal courts begin inflicting
punishments upon them. But if any Frenchman came into any place where
attention was paid to English law, proceedings might be taken against him. If,
for instance, a Frenchman who had smoked in the streets of Paris spent a few
hours in Folkestone, he might be brought before a court of summary
jurisdiction for having committed an offence against English law. [pp 170–71]
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These extreme, hypothetical examples illustrate the distinction between what
is theoretically possible and what is practically possible, or to express it
differently, the distinction between validity and effectiveness discussed above.
The distinction is important and helps to explain the apparent paradox of
unlimited legislative power. 
An Act of Parliament will be valid if it has passed through the requisite
parliamentary stages and received the royal assent. The manner in which the
judges deal with this ‘enrolled Bill’ rule is discussed further below. All that
need be noted for now is that, provided an Act of Parliament is ‘on the
parliamentary roll’, it will be held to be good law. That is not to say that every
rule making power exercised by parliament results in an ‘Act of Parliament’
which alone can alter the law, and is thus ‘sovereign’. 
Acts of Parliament alone are supreme
Resolutions of parliament
Resolutions of either House of Parliament – for example, decisions of the
House of Commons – do not have the force of law and cannot alter the law of
the land and thereby affect individual rights and duties.39 For a resolution to
have the force of law, it must be placed on a statutory basis. 
Proclamations
Proclamations of the Crown, issued under the royal prerogative, do not have
the force of law. To understand the status of proclamations, it is necessary to
turn to the reign of Henry VIII. Under the Statute of Proclamations 1539, the
King was given wide – though not unlimited – power to make law without
parliament’s consent. The Act was repealed in 1547, although monarchs
continued to ‘legislate’ by proclamation. The Case of Proclamations (1611)
clarified the constitutional position. The most significant aspects of the case
lay in the findings, first, that the King could not by proclamation create an
offence previously unknown to law, and secondly, that the King had only
such prerogative power as was granted under law. 
Treaties
Treaties entered into under the royal prerogative cannot alter the law of the
land. The courts have made it clear that treaties can take legal effect only
under the authority of an Act of Parliament.40 This point will be returned to
when the constitutional relationship between the United Kingdom and the
European Community is examined in Chapters 8 and 9. It is sufficient to note
here that a treaty has no legal force under domestic law unless and until its
provisions are incorporated into law by way of statute.
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Resolutions, proclamations and treaties are but three species of ‘law
making’ which are distinguishable from statute: and it is the statute alone
which will be valid, provided that the required parliamentary procedures
have been followed. 
Intrinsic and extrinsic limits on parliament’s power
As seen above, the criterion of effectiveness underlies the supremacy of
parliament and represents one important – albeit extra-legal – constraint on
parliament’s power. As Dicey says, sovereignty ‘is limited on every side by
the possibility of popular resistance’ ((1898), 1959, p 79). Leslie Stephens
makes the same point and is quoted at length by Dicey:
Lawyers are apt to speak as though the legislature were omnipotent, as they
do not require to go beyond its decision. It is, of course, omnipotent in the
sense that it can make whatever law it please, in as much as a law means any
rule which has been made by the legislature. But, from the scientific point of
view, the power of the legislature is of course strictly limited. It is limited, so to
speak, both from within and from without; from within, because the
legislature is the product of a certain social conditions, and determined by
whatever determines the society; and from without, because the power of
imposing laws is dependent upon the instinct of subordination, which is itself
limited. If a legislature decided that all blue eyed babies should be murdered,
the preservation of blue eyed babies would be illegal; but legislators must go
mad before they could pass such a law, and subjects be idiotic before they
could submit to it. [p 81]
These views are indicative of the constitutional role of government today. In a
representative democracy, the proper purpose of government is to serve the
people. In former times, when government was conducted by the King in
Council, this was not necessarily the case. But even then, there were limits on
monarchical and aristocratic power: ultimately, law cannot be enforced
against the will of the governed. Compliance – in the absence of a military or
police state – depends for the most part on voluntary acquiescence, not on the
application of power. One of Hart’s principal objections to Austin’s ‘command
backed by sanction’ theory of law turns on this point. As Hart explains, the
law is largely ‘self-enforcing’ and ‘self-enforced’. By this, he means that it rests
on acceptance, by and large, by the people. Nowadays, with a more or less
democratic House of Commons, the internal and external constraints
discussed by Dicey and Stephens coalesce. As Dicey explains:
The aim and effect of such (representative) government is to produce a
coincidence, or at any rate diminish the divergence, between the external and
the internal limitations on the exercise of sovereign power.
Where a Parliament truly represents the people, the divergence between the
external and the internal limit to the exercise of sovereign power can hardly
arise, or if it arises, must soon disappear. [(1898), 1959, pp 82–83]
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No parliament may be bound by its predecessor or bind its
successor
The rationale for this aspect of Dicey’s definition of sovereignty lies in the
recognition that for a body to be sovereign it must be, in Austin’s word,
illimitable. For a sovereign body to be subordinate to another body would be
a logical contradiction:
The logical reason why Parliament has failed in its endeavours to enact
unchangeable enactments is that a sovereign power cannot, while retaining its
sovereign character, restrict its own powers by any particular enactment ...
‘Limited sovereignty’, in short, as in the case of a parliamentary as of every
other sovereign, is a contradiction in terms. [(1898), 1959, p 68]
It follows, therefore, that each parliament must enjoy the same unlimited
power as any parliament before it. No parliament can enact rules which limit
future parliaments.41 It is this aspect of Dicey’s definition which gives rise to
the most argument and which requires the most careful analysis. 
The doctrine of implied repeal
The doctrine of implied repeal provides the mechanism by which the judge
gives effect to the rule against parliament being bound by previous
parliaments or being able to bind subsequent parliaments, and thereby
guarantees contemporary sovereignty. Parliament may, of course, repeal any
previous law by expressly declaring that law to be repealed. The position of
the judiciary is then clear: they must give effect to the latest expression of
sovereign will and judges are not free to apply the earlier statute. The
position, however, may not always be so clear cut. Parliament may pass,
perhaps through inadvertence, a statute, which while not expressly repealing
an earlier Act, is inconsistent with it. When the judges are thus faced with two
apparently conflicting statutes, the doctrine of implied repeal will come into
play, the judges applying the latest statute in time and deeming the earlier
provisions to be impliedly repealed. 
Two cases which illustrate the principle in operation are Vauxhall Estates
Ltd v Liverpool Corporation (1932) and Ellen Street Estates Ltd v Minister of Health
(1934), each of which entailed similar facts. Section 7(1) of the Acquisition of
Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act 1919 provided that:
The provisions of the Act or order by which the land is authorised to be
acquired ... shall ... have effect subject to this Act and so far as inconsistent with
this Act those provisions shall cease to have or shall not have effect ...
The Housing Act 1925 provided for a less generous scheme for compensation
on the compulsory acquisition of land than the 1919 Act. In both cases, the
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plaintiffs argued that section 7(1) of the 1919 Act was binding on the courts
and should be applied in preference to the Housing Act 1925. If that claim
were to succeed, the constitutional position would be that the provisions of
the 1919 Act were effectively ‘entrenched’ – that is to say, have a superior legal
status to that of other Acts of Parliament and therefore binding – on a future
parliament. In the Vauxhall Estates case, the Divisional Court held that the 1925
Act impliedly repealed the conflicting provisions in the 1919 Act and, in the
Ellen Street Estates case, the Court of Appeal again ruled that the 1919 Act
must give way to the 1925 legislation. Maugham LJ stated that:
The legislature cannot, according to our constitution, bind itself as to the form
of subsequent legislation, and it is impossible for parliament to enact that in a
subsequent statute dealing with the same subject matter there can be no
implied repeal. If, in a subsequent Act, parliament chooses to make it plain that
the earlier statute is being to some extent repealed, effect must be given to that
intention just because it is the will of the legislature.42
With the doctrines of express and implied repeal firmly in mind,
consideration must now be given to the special problems allegedly posed for
legislative supremacy by grants of independence, the Acts of Union with
Scotland and Ireland, ‘manner and form’ and ‘redefinition’ theories. The
impact of membership of the European Community and Union also requires
careful consideration, as does the recent devolution of power to the Scottish
Parliament and the Northern Ireland and Welsh Assemblies, and the Human
Rights Act 1998.
Grants of independence
The Statute of Westminster 1931 was enacted to give statutory force to the
constitutional convention that the United Kingdom Parliament would not
legislate for Dominions without their consent. Section 4 provides:
No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the commencement
of this Act shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to a Dominion as part of the
law of that Dominion unless it is expressly declared in that Act that that
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the political climate of the time rather than as an illustration of objective legal analysis.
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Dominion has requested, and consented to, the enactment thereof.
Where parliament confers partial competence on a subordinate legislature, the
question arises as to whether the United Kingdom Parliament can revoke that
grant of power. The principle that parliament cannot be bound by the Acts of
its predecessor has already been established. The issue here is the relationship
between the sovereign parliament and a parliament dependent for its powers
upon Westminster. This issue arose in British Coal Corporation v The King
(1935). The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had to determine whether
or not the Canadian legislature had the power to regulate or prohibit appeals
in criminal matters to the King in Council. A determination of that matter
entailed consideration of the scope of legislative competence of the legislature.
The relevant Acts were the British North America Act 1867, the Colonial Laws
Validity Act 1865, the Statute of Westminster 1931 and the Canadian Criminal
Code which prohibited appeal to the courts of the United Kingdom. The
Statute of Westminster had removed any legislative incompetence from the
Canadian legislature and accordingly the legislature had full power to enact
the section in question. It was accepted by the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council that, whilst the power of the Imperial Parliament remained ‘in theory
unimpaired’ and that, ‘as a matter of abstract law’, section 4 of the Statute of
Westminster could be repealed by the parliament of the United Kingdom, in
practice it could not be: ‘... legal theory must march alongside practical
reality.’ British Coal Corporation v The King is, however, no more than a
recognition of the extrinsic or practical limitations on the exercise of
sovereignty, and not of any legal limitations on parliament’s supremacy. 
In Ndlwana v Hofmeyer (1937),43 the Appellate Division of the South
African High Court adopted the view that such a restriction amounted to a
fetter on parliament’s powers: ‘... freedom once conferred cannot be
revoked.’44 Again, however, it is to be noted that such judicial utterances do
no more than recognise the practical political restraints which are imposed on
parliament, not its legal powers. It is correct, therefore, to view such obiter as
reflecting the distinction between legal and political sovereignty: a point
emphasised by Dicey himself.
The question of the status and effect of section 4 of the Statute of
Westminster arose once more in Manuel and Others v Attorney General (1982).
The issue concerned was whether the Canada Act 1982 passed by the United
Kingdom Parliament, at the request and consent of Canada, was a valid
enactment. The plaintiffs’ argument was that the United Kingdom Parliament
had no power to amend the Constitution of Canada to the detriment of the
native population without their consent. It was argued that section 4 of the
Statute of Westminster required not just the consent of the federal parliament
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but also that of all the provincial legislatures and the native minority
population. The application failed: the Statute of Westminster, as interpreted
by the Court of Appeal, did not require the actual consent of a Dominion, but
rather the mere recital on the face of the request that the United Kingdom
legislate for the Dominion. Having thus failed on that point, the plaintiffs
proceeded to argue that the conventional rule, which predated the Statute of
Westminster 1931, had hardened into a rule of law and was thus as effective
as section 4 of the statute. The Court of Appeal rejected that reasoning,45
maintaining the traditional distinction between conventions and rules of law.
The Acts of Union with Scotland 1706/1707 and Ireland 180046
The Acts of Union, their status and their effect on parliament’s sovereignty
have provided a fertile source for academic debate which represents a
powerful argument against the unlimited freedom of any parliament at any
time to legislate as it pleases. The whole debate centres on the notion that the
new United Kingdom Parliament was, in the words of Professor JDB
Mitchell,47 ‘born unfree’. The idea being conveyed here is that the Acts of
Union have some form of ‘higher law’ status which binds and limits the
powers of parliament.
The union with Scotland
As discussed in Chapter 3, prior to the accession to the throne of James I
(James VI of Scotland), England and Scotland were both independent
sovereign states, each having its own monarch and parliament. With James’s
accession to the English throne in 1603, the two countries were united under
one monarch but retained their sovereign parliaments until 1706. The Treaty
of Union 1706 effected, conceptually, the abolition of both parliaments and the
birth of the Parliament of Great Britain. 
Article I of the Act of Union provides: 
That the two kingdoms of England and Scotland shall upon the first day of
May which shall be in the year one thousand seven hundred and seven and for
ever after be united into one Kingdom by the name of Great Britain ...
The sovereignty issue has been argued in three cases concerning the Act of
Union with Scotland. In MacCormick v Lord Advocate (1953), MacCormick
sought an injunction against the Lord Advocate, as representative of the
Crown, preventing the use of the title Queen Elizabeth II of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain. The objection to the use of the title was based on
historical inaccuracy48 and a contravention of Article I of the Treaty of Union
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which provided for the union of the two countries from 1707. The petition was
dismissed as was the subsequent appeal. Lord Cooper, the Lord President,
however, proceeded to discuss the doctrine of sovereignty:
The principle of the unlimited sovereignty of parliament is a distinctively
English principle which has no counterpart in Scottish constitutional law. It
derives from Coke and Blackstone, and was widely popularised during the
19th century by Bagehot and Dicey, the latter having stated the doctrine in its
classic form in his The Law of the Constitution. Considering that the Union
legislation extinguished the Parliaments of Scotland and England and replaced
them by a new parliament, I have difficulty in seeing why it should have been
supposed that the new Parliament of Great Britain must inherit all the peculiar
characteristics of the English Parliament but none of the Scottish Parliament, as
if all that happened in 1707 was that Scottish representatives were admitted to
the Parliament of England. That is not what was done. Further, the Treaty and
the associated legislation, by which the Parliament of Great Britain was
brought into being as the successor of the separate Parliaments of Scotland and
England, contain some clauses which expressly reserve to the Parliament of
Great Britain powers of subsequent modification, and other clauses which
either contain no such power or emphatically exclude subsequent alteration by
declarations that the provision shall be fundamental and unalterable in all time
coming, or declarations of a like effect. 
I have not found in the Union legislation any provision that the Parliament of
Great Britain should be ‘absolutely sovereign’ in the sense that that Parliament
should be free to alter the Treaty at will.
In Gibson v The Lord Advocate (1975), the issue tested was whether allowing
fishermen of Member States of the European Community to fish in Scottish
coastal waters infringed Article XVIII of the Act of Union. Article XVIII
provides that:
... no alteration be made in laws which concern private right except for the
evident utility of the subjects within Scotland.
The claim was dismissed, Lord Keith ruling that the European Community
Regulations did not confer rights or obligations on individual citizens and
accordingly were matters of public and not private law and, accordingly, that
Article XVIII could not be invoked. On the sovereignty question, Lord Keith
stated that:
There were addressed to me interesting arguments upon the question of
jurisdiction and the competency of the action. These arguments raised
constitutional issues of great potential importance, in particular whether the
Court of Session has power to declare an Act of the United Kingdom
Parliament to be void, whether an alleged discrepancy between an Act of that
Parliament and the Treaty or Act of Union is a justiciable issue in this court,
and whether, with particular reference to Article XVIII of the Act of Union, this
court has power to decide whether an alteration of private law bearing to be
effected by an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament is ‘for the evident utility’
of the subjects in Scotland. Having regard to my decision on relevancy, these
are not live issues in the present case ...
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Like Lord President Cooper, I prefer to reserve my opinion what the position
would be if the United Kingdom Parliament passed an Act purporting to
abolish the Court of Session or the Church of Scotland or to substitute English
law for the whole body of Scots law. I am, however, of the opinion that the
question whether a particular Act of the United Kingdom Parliament altering a
particular aspect of Scots private law is or is not ‘for the evident utility’ of the
subjects within Scotland is not a justiciable issue in this court. The making of
decisions upon what must essentially be a political matter is no part of the
function of the court, and it is highly undesirable that it should be. The
function of the court is to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the
individual person, natural or corporate, in relation to other persons or, in
certain instances, to the state. A general inquiry into the utility of certain
legislative measures as regards the population generally is quite outside its
competence.
In Sillars v Smith (1982), a similar challenge was lodged over the validity of the
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980, on the basis that the United Kingdom
Parliament, which had passed the Scotland Act 1978, which created a
legislative Assembly for Scotland, had no power to repeal that Act – as had
been done – and accordingly, parliament, it was argued, had no power to pass
the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act. The claim was dismissed, the court
adopting the classical view expressed in Edinburgh and Dalkeith Railway
Company v Wauchope (1842) by Lord Campbell:
All that a court of justice can look to is the parliamentary roll; they see that an
Act has passed both Houses of Parliament, and that it has received the royal
assent, and no court of justice can enquire into the manner in which it was
introduced into parliament, what was done previously to its being introduced,
or what passed in parliament during the various stages of its progress through
both Houses of Parliament. I therefore trust that no such enquiry will hereafter
be entered into in Scotland, and that due effect will be given to every Act of
Parliament, both private as well as public, upon the just construction which
appears to arise upon it.
Despite the questioning dicta of Lords Cooper and Keith on sovereignty, the
evidence to date goes clearly against the notion that the Act of Union is legally
unalterable. To take but one example, the Protestant Religion and Presbyterian
Church Act 1707 provision that ‘the true Protestant religion and the worship,
discipline and government’ of the established church were ‘to continue
without any alteration to the people of this land in all succeeding generations’
was incorporated into the Treaty of Union and declared to be ‘a fundamental
and essential condition of the ... Union in all times coming’. The Act also
required that teachers in universities and schools had to subscribe to the faith.
Yet, in 1711, the Scottish Episcopalians Act and the Church Patronage
(Scotland) Act were passed to reflect greater religious toleration, and by the
Universities (Scotland) Act 1853 and the Parochial and Burgh Schoolmasters
(Scotland) Act 1861, the requirement that teachers must subscribe to the
Protestant faith was removed. Further changes in the organisation of the
Church were made in the Church of Scotland Act 1921. 
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The union with Ireland
The Act of Union with Ireland 1800 has given rise to similar arguments,
although these arguments are even less convincing than those addressed to
the Act of Union with Scotland. The Act of Union was declared to ‘last
forever’. Article 5 provided for a United Church of England and Ireland that
‘shall be and shall remain in full force for ever, and that this be deemed and
taken to be an essential and fundamental part of the Union’. Nevertheless, in
1869 the Irish Church was disestablished under the Irish Church Act of that
year. In Ex parte Canon Selwyn (1872), a clergyman sought an order of
mandamus against the Lord President of the Council ordering him to petition
the Queen for adjudication of the question whether the giving of the royal
assent to the Irish Church Act 1869 was contrary to the coronation oath and
the Act of Settlement. The coronation oath contained a commitment to
maintain a unified and established Church of England and Ireland. The court
dismissed the petition on the basis that the statute was supreme and could not
be questioned in a court of law.
The Acts of Union49 provided for the permanent union between Ireland
and Great Britain. However, the Ireland Act 1949 recognised republican status
and independence of southern Ireland, thereby terminating the union. The
1949 Act also provided that Northern Ireland:
… remains part of His Majesty’s dominions and of the United Kingdom and it
is hereby affirmed that in no event will Northern Ireland or any part thereof
cease to be part of His Majesty’s dominions and of the United Kingdom
without consent of the Parliament of Northern Ireland. [s 1(2)]
Under the Northern Ireland Constitution (Amendment) Act 1973, the United
Kingdom Parliament reiterated the statutory guarantee that Northern Ireland
would not cease to be part of the United Kingdom unless and until a majority
of voters should determine otherwise. That commitment is reiterated in
section 1 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. However, such assurances, whilst
morally and politically binding on the government, do not amount – under
Diceyan theory – to a legal restriction on parliament’s powers. Parliament
remains free, in legal theoretical terms, to legislate contrary to such
undertakings, although the political implications of so doing guarantee that
parliament will not do so. 
AV Dicey and the Acts of Union
AV Dicey had argued that the Acts of Union had no greater legal status than
the Dentists Act 1878, or indeed any other unimportant Act.50 Moreover, as
has been seen, Dicey viewed the Acts of Unions as being ordinary Acts of
Parliament by which – in the case of the Union with Scotland – the English
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and Scottish Parliaments ‘abolished’ themselves, to be reconstituted as the
Parliament of Great Britain, and in the case of the Act of Union with Ireland,
were reconstituted as the Parliament of the United Kingdom. The key passage
which reveals his view is the following: 
Let the reader, however, note that the impossibility of placing a limit on the
exercise of sovereignty does not in any way prohibit either logically, or in
matter of fact, the abdication of sovereignty ... A sovereign power can divest
itself of authority in two ways, and (it is submitted) in two ways only. It may
simply put an end to its own existence. Parliament could extinguish itself by
legally dissolving itself and leaving no means whereby a subsequent
Parliament could be legally summoned ... The Parliament of England went
very near doing this when, in 1539, the Crown was empowered to legislate by
proclamation; and though the fact is often overlooked, the Parliaments both of
England and of Scotland did, at the time of the Union, each transfer sovereign
power to a new sovereign body, namely, the Parliament of Great Britain. This
Parliament, however, just because it acquired the full authority of the two
legislatures by which it was constituted, became in its turn a legally supreme
or sovereign legislature, authorised therefore, though contrary perhaps to the
intention of its creators, to modify or abrogate the Act of Union by which it
was constituted. If indeed the Act of Union had left alive the Parliaments of
England and Scotland, though for one purpose only, namely, to modify when
necessary the Act of Union, and had conferred upon the Parliament of Great
Britain authority to pass any law which did not infringe upon or repeal the Act
of Union, then the Act of Union would have been a fundamental law
unchangeable legally by the British Parliament: but in this case, the Parliament
of Great Britain would have been, not a sovereign, but a subordinate,
legislature, and the ultimate sovereign body, in the technical sense of that term,
would have been the two Parliaments of England and of Scotland respectively.
[p 69]
Alternative interpretations of the Acts of Union
The power of parliament to ‘abolish itself’ and to be reconstituted as a ‘new
parliament’ is one of the principal matters to which opponents to Diceyan
theory address their arguments. Professor JDB Mitchell (1963), for example,
questions Dicey’s insistence on the equal legal status of Acts of Parliament,
distinguishing between rules which create and represent the foundation of the
state, and other derivative rules of law: ‘... the one set of rules creates or is the
legal foundation of the state, the other is built upon that foundation.’
The Acts of Union of Scotland and England creating the unified
Parliament of Great Britain represents a ‘fresh starting point’. In Mitchell’s
view, the Acts of Union, being antecedent to the Parliament of Great Britain,
imposed valid legal limitations on its powers. Conceding that many legislative
changes have been made to the provisions of the Acts of Union, Mitchell
nevertheless argues that the provisions, at least in relation to the Church of
Scotland and the Court of Session, are essential limitations on parliament’s
powers.
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Professor Neil MacCormick also challenges Diceyan orthodoxy.51 In
MacCormick’s view, the Acts of Union amounted to a rudimentary written
constitution. Adopting Kelsenian terminology, the Anglo-Scottish Treaty of
1706 and the Union with Ireland 1800 represent the ‘historically first
constitution’ of Great Britain and the United Kingdom respectively, and
accordingly have a very special status in constitutional law. Harry Calvert
(1968) specifically rejects Dicey’s view of the effects of the Acts of Union as
‘untenable’. Calvert adopts Professor RVF Heuston’s arguments (1964a,
pp 20–30) regarding the legal status of the Acts of Union and proceeds to
argue that the royal assent could be denied – in a departure from
constitutional convention – to a Bill purporting to sever the union between
Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom against the wishes of the
people, the expression of which has been provided for by statute. Such a
severance would, in Calvert’s view, be unconstitutional. Accordingly, it
would be for the Crown to defeat any attempt to act unconstitutionally:
[A]t all events, it cannot readily be conceded that a constitutional monarch has
no constitutional power to resist being implicated in unconstitutionality by his
ministers. The bounds of the British constitution are very widely drawn. There
is very little that a Prime Minister, supported by his Cabinet and a majority of
the House of Commons, cannot do. But if there is nothing that he cannot do,
there is no constitution at all. [1968, p 32]
Manner and form and redefinition theories
Parliament, in the exercise of its sovereign power, may specify particular
procedures which must be undertaken in order to enact legislation. It has been
seen, for example, that the Northern Ireland Constitution (Amendment) Act
1973 provided that the six counties of Northern Ireland shall not cease to be
part of the United Kingdom unless the proposed separation is approved by a
majority of the electorate in a border poll (referendum). This may be
interpreted to mean either that parliament has specified the procedure – or
manner and form – for enacting laws, or that parliament has ‘redefined’ itself
for the purposes of enacting laws, by including in the definition of parliament
the electorate of Northern Ireland. Any provision relating solely to procedure
but not affecting the composition of parliament may be termed a ‘manner and
form’ provision; whereas when the actual composition of parliament is
altered, the appropriate term is ‘redefinition’. The Northern Ireland
(Amendment) Act straddles both theories.
The essential question to be asked is whether such provisions, however
labelled, are capable of binding a future parliament. If that were to be the case
– and, as will be seen, there are supporters for that view – two possible
conclusions would follow: first, that parliament has unlimited power –
exercisable, as HLA Hart argues (see above, pp 182–83), only at one single
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point in time, forever after to limit the sovereignty of future parliaments; and,
secondly, that future parliaments would be less than sovereign – a
contradiction in terms, for it would not then be correct to speak of parliament
having unlimited sovereignty.
A seminal case illustrating manner and form theory is that of the Attorney
General for New South Wales v Trethowan (1932). In 1929, the government of
New South Wales, Australia, sought to prevent a subsequent government
from abolishing the Legislative Council (the upper chamber). An Act of
Parliament was passed, amending the Constitution Act 1902, providing that
any Bill purporting to abolish the upper House must have the approval of
both legislative chambers and of two-thirds of the members of each chamber.
Further, there had to be popular electoral support for the abolition, to be
determined in a referendum. In addition, to prevent a subsequent parliament
ignoring the provisions of the 1929 Act, it was provided that any Bill
attempting to repeal the 1929 Act must follow the same procedure: a device
known as ‘double entrenchment’. In 1930, following an election, the incoming
government decided to abolish the upper chamber and to do so by ignoring
the provisions of the 1929 Act. Members of the Legislative Council sought an
injunction restraining the grant of the royal assent to the Bill, and a declaration
that such a grant of assent would be unlawful, being ultra vires the lower
House. The High Court of Australia ruled that the provisions of the 1929 Act
could not be avoided, and that the royal assent could not be given to the Bill.
The matter was referred to the Privy Council which affirmed the judgment of
the High Court of Australia.
The constitutional reason underlying the court’s rejection of the
government’s claim that the 1932 Bill could lawfully receive the royal assent
was that the parliament in New South Wales was a legislative body having
subordinate and not supreme power. Such powers as the legislature enjoyed
were derived from the sovereign United Kingdom Parliament under the
Constitution Acts 1902–29 and the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865. The
Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 represented a landmark in the clarification of
powers between the sovereign United Kingdom Parliament and subordinate
colonial legislatures. The Act gave statutory affirmation to the non-legal
conventional rule that laws enacted in the colony which were contradictory to
statute or the common law of the United Kingdom would not be held to be
invalid by the courts of the United Kingdom. The Act further clarified the
extent to which the colonial legislature had power to amend its own
composition and procedure. Section 5 is the all-important provision for
current purposes. Section 5 provides that:
... every representative legislature shall ... have and be deemed at all times to
have had, full power to make laws respecting the constitution, power, and
procedure of such legislature; provided that such laws shall have been passed
in such manner and form as may from time to time be required by any Act of
Parliament, letters patent, Order in Council, or colonial law, for the time being
in force in the said colony.
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It is this section which dictated the decision in Attorney General for New South
Wales v Trethowan (1932). The government of New South Wales was not free to
introduce the 1931 Bill and to attempt to enact it other than in conformity with
the requirements of section 5. Section 5 required that the legislature complied
with the ‘manner and form’ provisions in force. The specific ‘manner and
form’ provisions were those laid down in the 1929 Constitution Act, and these
requirements could not merely be ignored by the subordinate legislature.52 In
the High Court of Australia in the Trethowan case, Rich J denied the
proposition that the New South Wales Parliament had unlimited sovereign
power. 
A similar constitutional arrangement can be seen demonstrated by the
South African case of Harris v The Minister of the Interior (1952), which tested
the validity of the Separate Representation of Voters Act 1951. The South
Africa Act 1909, an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament, established the
constitution of South Africa. Section 152 of the South Africa Act provided that
no repeal or alteration of section 35 (relating to the qualification of Cape
coloured voters) should be valid unless the Bill was passed by both Houses of
Parliament sitting together, and the third reading was agreed to by not less
than two-thirds of the members of each House. 
In 1931, the United Kingdom Parliament passed the Statute of
Westminster. The Statute of Westminster gave statutory effect to the
constitutional convention which previously governed the relationship
between the United Kingdom and its Dominions.53 Section 2 of the Act
provided that:
(1) The Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 shall not apply to any law made after
the commencement of this Act by the Parliament of a Dominion.
(2) No law and no provision of any law made after the commencement of this
Act by the Parliament of a Dominion shall be void or inoperative on the
ground that it is repugnant to the law of England, or to the provisions of
any existing or future Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom, or to any
order, rule or regulation made under any such Act, and the power of the
Parliament of a Dominion shall include the power to repeal or amend any
such Act, order, rule or regulation in so far as the same is part of the law of
the Dominion.
Section 4 of the Act provided that:
An Act of the United Kingdom Parliament passed thereafter shall not extend,
or be deemed to extend, to a Dominion as part of the law of that Dominion
unless it expressly declared in the Act that that Dominion has requested, and
consented, to its enactment.
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In 1951, the South African Parliament purported to pass the Separate
Representation of Voters Act, depriving voters in the Cape of the right to vote,
disregarding the provisions of section 152 of the South Africa Act. It was
argued before the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa
that the Statute of Westminster had conferred full legislative authority, or
sovereignty, on the South African Parliament and that, accordingly,
parliament was no longer bound by the South Africa Act 1909. The Supreme
Court rejected that argument, stating that the South Africa Act was a
constitutional Act whose provisions could not be indirectly amended by the
Statute of Westminster. The Court held that the Statute of Westminster was
not intended to alter the South Africa Act, but rather to confer additional
powers on the legislature. Cantilevres CJ drew a distinction between a truly
sovereign legislative body, such as the United Kingdom Parliament, and a
legislative body which was less than sovereign: ‘... a state can be
unquestionably sovereign although it has no legislature which is completely
sovereign.’
In Bribery Commissioner v Ranasinghe (1965), section 55 of the 1946
Constitution of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) required that the appointment and
dismissal of the holders of judicial office be vested in a Judicial Services
Commission. Section 29(4) of the constitution required that amendments to
the constitution required a certificate stating that the amendments had been
passed by the requisite two-thirds majority.
In 1954, a Bribery Act was passed (with the necessary certificate) giving to
the Attorney General powers to investigate and prosecute allegations of
bribery. In 1958, a Bribery Tribunal was established, headed by a Bribery
Commissioner. No certificate was produced as required under section 29(4).
The central issue was whether or not the legislature was free to avoid
provisions of the constitution. The Supreme Court held that it could not. On
appeal to the Privy Council, Lord Pearce stated:
... it has been argued that the court, when faced with an official copy of an Act
of Parliament, cannot inquire into any procedural matter and cannot now
properly consider whether a certificate was endorsed on the Bill. That
argument seems to their Lordships unsubstantial and it was rightly rejected by
the Supreme Court. Once it is shown that an Act conflicts with a provision in
the constitution, the certificate is an essential part of the legislative process ...
The English authorities have taken a narrow view of the court’s power to look
behind an authentic copy of the Act. But, in the constitution of the United
Kingdom, there is no governing instrument which prescribes the law making
powers and the forms which are essential to those powers ... The courts have a
duty to look for the certificate in order to ascertain whether the constitution has
been validly amended. Where the certificate is not apparent, there is lacking an
essential part of the process necessary for amendment ...
These cases demonstrate one fundamental principle: that legislative bodies do
not necessarily enjoy full sovereign power, and that some form of ‘higher law’
may control their powers. In each of these cases, the powers of the legislatures
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of New South Wales, South Africa and Ceylon (as it then was) had been
established under an Act of the sovereign United Kingdom Parliament. That
being so, the legislative bodies had to comply with the constitutional laws in
force, and failure to do so would give the courts the jurisdiction to declare a
legislative act void. 
No one may question the validity of an Act of Parliament
True it is, that what the Parliament doth, no authority on earth can undo.54
As has been seen, an Act will be accepted as valid by the courts provided that
it has passed through the requisite legislative stages and received the royal
assent. Early evidence of this fundamental rule is revealed in The Prince’s Case
(1606):
If an Act of Parliament be penned by assent of the King, and of the Lords
Spiritual and Temporal, and of the Commons, or, it is enacted by authority of
Parliament, it is a good Act; but the most usual way is, that it is enacted by the
King by the assent of the Lords, Spiritual and Temporal and of the Commons
... but if an Act be penned, that the King, with the assent of the Lords, or with
the assent of the Commons, it is no Act of Parliament, for three ought to assent
to it, [namely] the King, the Lords, and the Commons, or otherwise, it is not an
Act of Parliament ... 
Regardless of the subject matter of the Act, it will be upheld by the judges.55
In the time before the 1688 settlement, it was not uncommon for judges to
proclaim that an Act of Parliament could be held to be invalid because it
conflicted with some higher form of divine law. Blackstone expressed the
view that a human law which conflicted with the law of nature would be
invalid (Commentaries). 
In Dr Bonham’s Case (1610), there is the often-cited obiter dictum of Coke CJ
to the effect that:
When an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant,
or impossible to be performed, the common law will control it, and adjudge
such act to be void. 
Such views, while appealing to the senses, were of doubtful validity when
expressed and have no authority today. The opinion of Lord Reid expressed
in Pickin v British Railways Board (1974) represents the correct contemporary
judicial view on the authority of statute:
In earlier times many learned lawyers seem to have believed that an Act of
Parliament could be disregarded in so far as it was contrary to the law of God
or the law of nature or natural justice, but since the supremacy of Parliament
was finally demonstrated by the revolution of 1688 any such idea has become
obsolete.
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Non-legal constraints on parliament powers
Political acceptability to the electorate represents the strongest external basis
of restraint. All governments are accountable to the electorate, albeit in terms
of a direct vote only periodically. But elections do not of themselves always
provide the means of sanctioning governments, nor do they guarantee that
government invariably acts in accordance with the electorate’s wishes. Still
less can the electorate be regarded as exercising any power to enact law.
Whilst the electorate may be correctly regarded as politically sovereign, and
can, at the ‘end of the day’, oust a government which violates its trust, on the
exercise of the franchise the electorate conditionally transfers sovereign
legislative power to parliament. As Dicey puts it: 
The electors can in the long run always enforce their will. But the courts will
take no notice of the will of the electors. The judges know nothing about any
will of the people except in so far as that will is expressed by an Act of
Parliament, and would never suffer the validity of a statute to be questioned
on the ground of having been passed or being kept alive in opposition to the
wishes of the electors. [(1898), 1959, pp 73–74]
Whereas, therefore, the power of the electorate is great at the time of a general
election, it is a more limited power during a government’s term of office –
most particularly where the government has a strong majority in parliament.
It is the task of parliament as a whole, both Commons and Lords, to scrutinise
government policy and legislative proposals, and that a range of procedural
devices exists which facilitate such inquiry. It is through parliament that the
will or wishes of the electorate for the most part find expression. Parliament
may be seen as the sounding board of the nation. As John Stuart Mill
observed:
Parliament ... [is] at once the nation’s Committee of Grievances, and its
Congress of Opinions: an arena in which not only the general opinion of the
nation, but that of every section of it, and as far as possible of every eminent
individual whom it contains, can produce itself in full light and challenge
discussion; where every person in the country may count upon finding some
body who speaks his mind, as well as or better than he could speak it himself –
not to friends and partisans exclusively, but in the face of opponents, to be
tested by adverse controversy; where those whose opinion is overruled, feel
satisfied that it is heard, and set aside not by a mere act of will, but for what are
thought superior reasons, and commend themselves as such to the
representatives of the majority of the nation ... [(1865), 1958, Chapter V,
pp 99–100]
No government can afford to ignore parliament and, ultimately, a
government can be brought down if its policies are such that it loses the
confidence of the House as a whole. On votes of confidence, see Chapter 6. If
parliament is truly the ‘sounding board of the nation’, parliament must reflect
the political morality within society.56
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A further political restraint imposed on governments relates to
international relations. No state today exists in isolation from its neighbours.
The United Kingdom, as with most states, is bound by numerous treaties
under international law which impose restrictions on the freedom of
government action. Across virtually every aspect of government, such
restraints are visible: environmental protection, protection of human rights,
the protection of children from abduction, the regulation of currency
exchanges, agreements on trade and tariffs and so on. In addition to such
treaties, the United Kingdom is bound in practical terms by membership of
the European Union and the United Nations. In theoretical terms, therefore,
parliament may remain free to enact laws violating any or all of the United
Kingdom’s international obligations: in practice, it would not and could not.
ACADEMIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST 
THE TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGNTY
We have seen above that there are a number of sophisticated academic
arguments concerning the traditional doctrine of sovereignty. In this brief
section, the differing approaches are brought together for further
consideration.
In Bribery Commissioner v Ranasinghe (1965), Lord Pearce had asserted that: 
The proposition which is not acceptable is that a legislature, once established,
has some inherent power derived from the mere fact of establishment to make
a valid law by the resolution of a bare majority which its own constituent
instrument has said shall not be a valid law unless made by a different type of
majority or by a different legislative process.
Geoffrey Marshall seizes upon this dictum and argues that Lord Pearce:
… seemed to imply equally that both non-sovereign and sovereign legislatures
may be made subject to procedural rules entrenching parts of the law from
simple majority repeal.
Marshall goes further and states that:
What can be certainly inferred from Ranasinghe is that a legislature whose
constitutional instrument places procedural restraints upon the forms of law
making may not ignore them simply because it is sovereign in the sense of
having plenary power to make law for the peace, order and good government
of the territory. [1971, pp 55–56]
His conclusion from an examination of Ranasinghe is significant:
It helps to confirm that existing English authority does not rule out the
possibility that the Queen in Parliament might legislate so as to provide a
special manner and form for specified types of legislation. [p 57]
Sir Ivor Jennings has also questioned the orthodox Diceyan view. In The Law
and the Constitution, Jennings distinguishes two situations:
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If a prince has supreme power, and continues to have supreme power, he can
do anything, even to the extent of undoing the things which he has previously
done. If he grants a constitution, binding himself not to make laws except with
the consent of an elected legislature, he has power immediately afterwards to
abolish the legislature without its consent and to continue legislating by his
personal decree. [p 152]
But if the prince has not supreme power, but the rule is that the courts accept
as law that which is in the proper legal form, the result is different. For when
the prince enacts that henceforth no rule shall be law unless it is enacted by
him with the consent of the legislature, the law has been altered, and the courts
will not admit as law any rule which is not made in that form. Consequently a
rule subsequently made by the prince alone abolishing the legislature is not
law, for the legislature has not consented to it, and the rule has not been
enacted according to the manner and form required by the law for the time
being.
The difference is this. In the one case, there is sovereignty. In the other, the
courts have no concern with sovereignty, but only with the established law.
‘Legal sovereignty’ is merely a name indicating that the legislature has for the
time being power to make laws of any kind in the manner required by law.
That is, a rule expressed to be made by the Queen, ‘with the advice and
consent of the Lords spiritual and temporal, and Commons in this present
Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same’, will be recognised by
the courts, including a rule which alters this law itself. If this is so, the ‘legal
sovereign’ may impose legal limitations upon itself, because its power to
change the law includes the power to change the law affecting itself. 
Sir Ivor Jennings then illustrates his thesis by reference to Attorney General for
New South Wales v Trethowan (1932), Ndlwana v Hofmeyer (1937) and Harris v
The Minister of the Interior (1952). Jennings concedes that the decisions do not
necessarily ‘determine the law as it applies in the United Kingdom’, and leaps
from that proposition to one which claims that Dicey ‘failed to prove that that
law made the King in Parliament a sovereign law making body’ (1959b,
p 156). Such a view is unconvincing. The constitutional justification for the
decisions examined lay precisely in the fact that both the legislatures of New
South Wales and South Africa had legislative powers conferred upon them by
a fully sovereign superior sovereign body – the United Kingdom Parliament.
Only once such complete sovereignty was conferred would the legislative
fetters be removed. No such controlling device pertains to the Parliament of
the United Kingdom itself. 
Arguing from the proposition that parliament may redefine itself – as in
the Parliament Act 191157 – and may alter its own composition – as in the Life
Peerages Act 1958, Professor JDB Mitchell turns to ‘the purported self-
limitations of Parliament’ (1968, p 78). On section 4 of the Statute of
Westminster, Mitchell argues that there are two possible interpretations when
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looked at from the point of view of the United Kingdom judges. The first is
that section 4 amounts to a rule of construction directed to the courts, which
does not raise the problem of limitation on parliament. If, however, section 4
is understood to mean that parliament has forfeited its legislative capacity –
by conferring that capacity on the recipient legislature – then there ‘is quite
clearly a purported limitation of the United Kingdom Parliament’ (p 79).
Parliament has redefined itself in a manner which excludes its power to
legislate for the Dominion. 
Mitchell cites in support of the argument the dictum of Lord Radcliffe in
Ibralebbe v The Queen (1964) in which Lord Radcliffe argues that while the
United Kingdom Parliament has the legal power to legislate for Ceylon (as it
then was), to use such power would be ‘wholly inconsistent’ with the powers
of legislation conferred on the legislature of Ceylon.
Further authorities could be offered in support of this view. As seen above,
in British Coal Corporation v The King (1935), Lord Sankey LC said, in relation to
section 4, that:
... indeed, the Imperial Parliament could, as a matter of abstract law, repeal or
disregard section 4 of the statute. But that is theory and has no relation to
realities. [p 520]
Further, in Ndlwana v Hofmeyer (1937), Lord Denning asserted that ‘freedom
once given cannot be revoked’. How should such claims be evaluated? First,
as Dicey made clear, the United Kingdom Parliament – in the exercise of its
sovereign power – clearly has the power to abolish itself, or to surrender its
sovereignty in favour of another legislature, as in grants of independence. In
political terms, it is, of course, unthinkable that parliament would attempt to
revoke such independence. The more troublesome question is whether
parliament retains the capacity to revoke such grants of freedom in legal
terms. On this, Dicey was very clear: 
‘Limited sovereignty’, in short, is, in the case of a Parliamentary as of every
other sovereign, a contradiction in terms. [(1898), 1959, p 68]
Dicey exemplifies his view by reference to the Taxation of Colonies Act 1778.
Section 1 of the Act provides that parliament:
... will not impose any duty, tax, or assessment whatever, payable in any of His
Majesty’s colonies, provinces, and plantations in North America ... 
Is this a self-limiting ordinance which fetters sovereignty? Dicey continues:
The point calling for attention is that, though policy and prudence condemn
the repeal of the Taxation of Colonies Act 1778 or the enactment of any law
inconsistent with its spirit, there is, under our constitution, no legal difficulty in
the way of repealing or overriding this Act. If Parliament were tomorrow to
impose a tax, say, on New Zealand or on the Canadian Dominion, the statute
imposing it would be a legal valid enactment. [(1898), 1959, p 67]
Professor RVF Heuston has put forward a ‘new view’ of sovereignty. This
view is summarised as follows:
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(a) sovereignty is a legal concept: the rules which identify the sovereign and
prescribe its composition and functions are logically prior to it;
(b) there is a distinction between rules which govern, on the one hand: (i) the
composition; and (ii) the procedure, and, on the other hand; (iii) the area of
power, of a sovereign legislature;
(c) the courts have jurisdiction to question the validity of an alleged Act of
Parliament on grounds b(i) and b(ii), but not on ground b(iii); and
(d) this jurisdiction is exercisable either before or after the royal assent has
been signified – in the former case by way of injunction, in the latter by
way of declaratory judgment.58
To what extent is it correct to state that the judiciary may ‘question the
validity of an alleged Act of Parliament’ on the grounds of the composition
and the procedure adopted within parliament? Clearly, as demonstrated by
Attorney General for New South Wales v Trethowan (1932) and other comparable
cases, under certain circumstances, it is within the jurisdiction of the courts to
question whether or not an Act is valid. Those circumstances invariably arise
within jurisdictions having subordinate rather than supreme legislatures.
In this regard, it may be said that the judges are protecting the sovereignty
of the United Kingdom Parliament by keeping subordinate legislatures within
the powers conferred. In the United Kingdom, however, parliament is
distinguishable by the absence of any such controlling powers. The orthodox
position is that expressed in British Railways Board v Pickin (1974), where the
House of Lords, affirming its earlier decision,59 endorsed the ‘enrolled Bill
rule’. Thus, once the Bill has proceeded through parliament, either under the
normal legislative process or under the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949, and
received the royal assent, the Bill becomes a validly enacted Act of Parliament
and will not be impugned by the courts. The courts have jurisdiction to
determine what is an Act of Parliament. As has been seen earlier, the courts
have held, by way of illustration, that mere resolutions of the House of
Commons are incapable of having legal effect in the same manner as an Act:
Stockdale v Hansard (1839) and Bowles v Bank of England (1913) are clear
authorities for that view. Nevertheless, the procedure adopted by parliament
is not a matter within the jurisdiction of the courts and, on the authority of
Pickin’s case, it is not for the courts to go behind the ‘parliamentary roll’ and
inquire into procedural aspects of law making. Sovereign power entails the
right to determine composition and procedure.
The central distinguishing feature between the jurisdictions concerned in
the ‘manner and form’ cases and the United Kingdom lies in the existence of a
higher legislative authority. In each case, it was the United Kingdom
Parliament which defined and limited the powers of a subordinate legislative
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body. Only once a parliament enjoys full sovereignty can it be free of such
constraints. The United Kingdom Parliament, by contrast, is ‘uncontrolled’:
there exists no higher source of legal authority than parliament itself. For this
reason, to draw an analogy between the legislatures of New South Wales or
South Africa and the United Kingdom misses the vital dimension of unlimited
power which is enjoyed by the United Kingdom Parliament.
The last words on the manner and form arguments shall be left to
Professors Wade (1989) and Munro (1999). Professor Wade summarises his
views on manner and form theorists as follows:
But, in the end, what is the substance of their argument? It is simply their
prediction, made with varying degrees of dogmatism, that the judges will, or
should, enforce restrictions about manner and form and abandon their clear
and settled rule that the traditional manner and form is what counts. But if it is
vain for Parliament to command the judges to transfer their allegiance to some
new system of legislation if the judges are resolved to remain loyal to the old
one, it is still more vain for professors to assert that they should. The judicial
loyalty is the foundation of the legal system and, at the same time, a political
fact.
Professor Munro finds the arguments as to manner and form equally
unconvincing, stating that ‘the cases cited by the “manner and form” school
do not, in the end, seem very helpful’.
PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY AND 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND COMMUNITY
In Chapters 8 and 9, the aims, organisation and law making power of the
institutions of the European Union are considered, and the relationship
between the law of the United Kingdom and European law will become
clearer after those chapters have been studied. Nonetheless, it is necessary to
consider here, in outline, the impact of membership of the European Union on
the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy. 
The United Kingdom became a member of the European Communities60
in 1973. The original Communities – now termed European Community –
have their own constitutional structure as defined in the Treaties. The Court of
Justice of the Communities has, since the 1960s, asserted the supremacy of
Community law over the laws of any Member State.61 As will be seen later,
the Court of Justice has adopted the view that, by becoming signatories to the
Treaties, Member States have limited their own legislative competence in
Community matters, conferring the supreme power to legislate on these
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matters on the law making institutions of the Community. Note that, since the
European Union was established in 1992, the European Community is but a
part, albeit the most significant part, of the European Union.
The laws of the Community – the Treaties, laws enacted by the
Commission, Council of Ministers and the European Parliament together with
the judicial decisions of the European Court – are binding on all Member
States. In the United Kingdom, the acceptance of Community law is under the
European Communities Act 1972 – an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament.
Accordingly, all Community law derives its force and authority under this
Act, which, as with any Act, has no special legal status within the constitution.
However, membership of the Community raises some unique questions for
the sovereignty of parliament.
The principal issue for consideration is the attitude of the judges – both
domestic and Community – towards Community law. It is clear that, from the
perspective of the European Court, Community law prevails over domestic
law, and that domestic legislatures have no power to enact binding legislation
contrary to the requirements of Community law. From the domestic
perspective, however, the issue is not so clear-cut. The issues which require
explanation are:
(a) the extent to which the judges are prepared to accept and apply
Community law;
(b) the manner in which, and extent to which, inadvertent or deliberate
parliamentary Acts are reconciled with the requirements of Community
law; and
(c) whether membership of the Community entails an irrevocable
relinquishment of parliamentary supremacy.
The application of Community law
Section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972 provides that Community
law shall have direct applicability in the United Kingdom:
(1) All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to
time created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and
procedures from time to time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in
accordance with the Treaties are without further enactment to be given
legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall be recognised and
available in law, and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly; and
the expression ‘enforceable Community right’ and similar expressions
shall be read as referring to one to which this sub-section applies. 
Section 2(4) provides for the primacy of Community law, without expressly
stating that the law of the Community is supreme:
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The provision that may be made under sub-section (2) above62 includes,
subject to Schedule 2 of this Act, any such provision (of any such extent) as
might be made by Act of Parliament, and any enactment passed or to be
passed, other than one contained in this part of this Act, shall be construed and
have effect subject to the foregoing provisions of this section.
Accordingly, all the rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions
provided for under section 2(1) are to be given effect by the courts, and section
2(4) operates as a rule of construction to the courts to interpret law in
accordance with the requirements of Community law. The manner in which
the courts have achieved the objectives expressed in the European
Communities Act 1972 are considered in Chapters 8 and 9 as is the view of the
European Court of Justice on the supremacy of Community law. However, it
would be misleading to leave this chapter on the traditional Diceyan theory of
sovereignty without giving some introductory overview of the challenge
which European Community law has posed. The European Court of Justice
(the ECJ) adopts as its guiding principle the supremacy of the law of the
Community. In the Court of Justice’s view, a new legal order has been
founded, a sovereign legal order within its sphere of competence. The
sovereignty of Community law must, according to the ECJ, be respected by
Member States, because through accession to the European Community,
Member States have ‘surrendered’ their sovereign power in relation to those
matters now regulated by the Community and Union. 
The European Court of Justice has adopted several means by which to
expand the applicability of Community law and to assert its supremacy. First,
the Treaty of Rome, as amended, under Article 10, imposes a duty on all
Member States to comply with Community law and not to impede the
application of Community law. Secondly, Article 249 of the EC Treaty
provides that regulations63 made under the Treaty (in part) ‘shall be binding
in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States’. This principle of
‘direct effect’ has been adapted and developed by the ECJ to ensure the
harmonious application of Community law throughout the legal systems of
the now 15 Member States. The doctrine of ‘indirect effect’ is also a concept
developed and expanded by the ECJ, and, as will be seen, has far-reaching
implications for the courts and legislatures of each Member State. Where
provisions of Community law have direct or indirect effect, the individual
citizen of that state has a right of redress against the Member State, or against
bodies which the ECJ deems to be ‘emanations of the state’, and, under certain
circumstances, the right to compensation from the state. Moreover, while the
ECJ does not expressly rule on the validity of domestic legislation, it will,
when its jurisdiction is raised, rule on the requirements of Community law as
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interpreted by the Court, and, once that interpretation is received by the
domestic courts, that interpretation must be given effect – notwithstanding
incompatible domestic law. 
While it would be premature to reach firm judgment on the fate of
conventional Diceyan theory before studying the structure, organisation and
objectives of the European Community and Union, some tentative conclusions
may be suggested. Without rehearsing the arguments set out above, there are
two differing approaches which may be taken to this conundrum. First, it may
be argued that unreconstructed Diceyan theory remains unimpaired, despite
all appearances and arguments to the contrary, on the basis that the United
Kingdom voluntarily acceded to the European Community, the force of
Community law within domestic law deriving from the 1972 European
Communities Act. That Act, as seen, is consistent with constitutional law and
convention – not entrenched (nor could it be) – and remains, in legal theory,
repealable. From this perspective, parliamentary sovereignty remains the
fundamental rule of the common law, and the key to the source of sovereignty
lies with the judges. While the judges continue to cling to the rationale that
Community law is given effect – even to the point of setting aside legislation64
– because of the rule of construction provided under section 2 of the European
Communities Act 1972, judicial loyalty remains unaffected. The clearest
evidence for this view is expressed by Lord Bridge in R v Secretary of State for
Transport ex parte Factortame (No 2) (1991), when he states that:
By virtue of section 2(4) of the Act of 1972, Part II of the Act of 1988 [the
Merchant Shipping Act] is to be construed and take effect subject to
enforceable Community rights – this has precisely the same effect as if a
section were incorporated in Part II of the Act 1988 ...
Moreover, it will be seen from the cases of Macarthys v Smith (1979) and
Garland v British Rail Engineering Ltd (1983) that both the Court of Appeal and
House of Lords, respectively, endorsed the view that, while effect must, in
accordance with section 2(4) of the European Communities Act 1972, be given
to Community law, if parliament chose expressly to legislate contrary to
Community law, that intention would be given effect by the judges. No more
so would this be clearer than if parliament, implausible though this
hypothesis may seem, chose to repeal the 1972 Act. 
Alternatively, it could possibly be argued, as HWR Wade has argued,65
that, for the first time in constitutional history, parliament succeeded in
‘entrenching’ a provision (section 2(4) of the 1972 Act), so as to bind future
parliaments. This position, Wade submits, is more than evolutionary: it
represents more than a rule of construction to be applied by the courts, and is
rather an illustration of the parliament of 1972 imposing ‘a restriction upon
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the Parliament of 1988’ (p 570). If this argument had substance, there would
indeed have been a ‘revolution’ in the constitution. However, the argument
does not convince in light of the dicta of the judges, exemplified by that of
Lord Bridge cited above, which confirms the conventional allegiance of the
judiciary to the United Kingdom Parliament. Moreover, successive cases
raising questions on Community law have come before the Court of Appeal
and House of Lords in which the courts have found the requisite
interpretative mechanism to accommodate the requirements of Community
law as interpreted by the Court of Justice. Judicial interpretative techniques
are the essence of the common law, and the essence of the common law is its
capacity to evolve in accordance with the socio-political and legal domain
within which it resides. There is little that is ‘revolutionary’ – in relation to the
ultimate ‘rule of recognition’ of the constitution – in the seminal cases which
have, for example, in the development of judicial review incorporated into
statutory requirements the common law rules of natural justice and restricted
parliament’s capacity to exclude (or oust) the jurisdiction of the courts, even in
the face of apparently clear statutory language to the opposite effect. In this
light, the insistence on the part of the domestic courts that section 2(4) of the
European Communities Act 1972 is a rule of construction to be applied to
future legislation is hardly ‘revolutionary’ but rather more a recognition of the
requirements of the European legal order and the overriding force of
Community law for which the 1972 Act provided. 
The preoccupation with parliamentary sovereignty is understandable
given that conventionally sovereignty has, in the absence of a written
constitution, represented the ‘cornerstone’ or foundation of the British
constitution. Membership of the European Community and Union, and the
insistence of the European Court of Justice on the supremacy of Community
law, inevitably challenges traditional understandings of that concept, and
raises hitherto unforeseen questions. While traditional Diceyan theory can
accommodate membership of the Community and Union, it can do so only by
clearly demarcating, as did its author, the realms of the legal and political.
Legal theory resides against the backcloth of the political. Political
sovereignty, while the United Kingdom remains a member of the Community
and Union, may (arguably) lie in the institutions and law making processes of
the Community and Union, in which every Member State participates, and
which is supported by the political will of the citizens of the Member States.
That political sovereignty, while membership continues, has a profound
impact on the extent to which the domestic legislature may legislate over
areas within the ambit of the treaties establishing the Community and Union.
Thus, as Dicey himself argued, back in the nineteenth century under
fundamentally different socio-economic and political conditions, the extra-
legal may de facto limit the exercise of sovereign power. This de facto
limitation on legal sovereignty remains ultimately conditional on the political
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commitment of the United Kingdom government and people to continued
membership of that unique legal order which it voluntarily joined in 1972.
Constitutional reform and parliamentary sovereignty
As noted above, the devolution of power to regional assemblies (in the case of
Wales and Northern Ireland) and the Scottish Parliament and the Human
Rights Act 1998, which ‘incorporates’ the European Convention on Human
Rights into domestic law, both raise the issue of sovereignty. While full
discussion of these matters is found in Chapters 12 and 19 respectively, it is
useful here to consider the sovereignty issue. 
Devolution
The Scotland Act, Government of Wales Act and Northern Ireland Act 1998
each establish a system of self-government, in differing degrees, for the
nations of the United Kingdom other than England. In London, as a pilot
project, a new layer of government has been introduced with the new Greater
London Authority and the office of Mayor for London. Since the powers
devolved are the will of parliament, the continued existence of such power
remains dependent upon parliament’s will. This ultimate power to confer and
rescind powers granted to subordinate bodies is nothing new: at a lower
governmental level, there is the granting of limited autonomy, defined by Act
of Parliament and controlled by the courts, whereby local authorities have
long enjoyed a measure of self-governance. This statement, however, and the
legal provisions which give it expression, disguise a fundamentally important
factor in the devolution debate: the dependence of legal-theoretical
sovereignty upon the political sovereignty of the people of the nations.
It is the devolution of legislative power to the Scottish Parliament which
illustrates the complexity of the sovereignty issue most starkly. Northern
Ireland, which has enjoyed devolved power in the past (from 1922 to 1972),
and, in practice, extensive autonomy from Westminster, has, because of its
troubled history, always been a special case: the partition of the North from
the South and the Protestant majority in the North has resulted in a highly
Unionist state, notwithstanding the republican ambitions of the Irish
Republican Army and its political arm, Sinn Fein. Wales, on the other hand,
although demonstrating varying degrees of nationalism, has never in recent
history previously enjoyed self-government, nor expressed a majority opinion
in favour of separation from the United Kingdom. By contrast with Northern
Ireland and Wales, Scotland retained a strong sense of national identity since
the union with England in 1707, has a memory of national independence and
a distinctive identity expressed through its own legal system. 
The Labour Government, while enthusiastic about devolution to the
regions, was also intent on preserving the United Kingdom and the
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sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament. This was expressed strongly
in the Government’s White Paper, Scotland’s Parliament:66 ‘... the United
Kingdom Parliament is and will remain sovereign in all matters.’ Section 28(7)
of the Scotland Act gives clear expression to this intention: ‘... this section does
not affect the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws
for Scotland.’ In order to reinforce the Union with Scotland, Scottish
representation was not, in the short term, to be reduced at Westminster. The
Scotland Act did, however, provide for a future reduction in Scottish
representation – with section 86 of the Act providing that the rule that
Scotland is to have no less than 71 parliamentary constituencies in the
Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986 be amended to remove the over-
representation of Scotland at Westminster. 
However, notwithstanding expressions of intent as to continued
sovereignty and adjustments to Scottish representation at Westminster, the
political reality of the transfer of legislative power and the authority given to
the Scottish Parliament by virtue of the referendum result paints a rather
different picture. While Westminster retains the right to legislate over
‘reserved matters’, which are adjudged to be of United Kingdom-wide
concern rather than national concern, the legislative powers devolved are
considerable. The theoretical stance that Westminster remains free to legislate
for Scotland over such matters must be in doubt. While Northern Ireland
enjoyed devolved power, the convention developed that Westminster would
not legislate over areas devolved and, moreover, that domestic affairs of
Northern Ireland would not even be debated at Westminster. Were the United
Kingdom Parliament to attempt to legislate over Scottish domestic affairs
which have been devolved to Edinburgh, against Scottish wishes, real conflict
would arise — and no assertions of the sterile sovereignty of Westminster
would quell political dissent from north of the border. Further, while the
government chose to continue the office of Secretary of State for Scotland, his
or her role is purely one which facilitates communication and co-operation
between Edinburgh and London. Real power lies with the First Secretary — in
effect, if not in name, the ‘Prime Minister’ of Scotland — and it is to him that
the people look for political leadership in relation to Scottish affairs. The First
Secretary’s role extends to direct participation in European Union matters,
thus giving Scotland an individual voice separate from that of the rest of the
United Kingdom and one which can represent particular Scottish concerns
over all issues falling within the European Union remit.
All of this adds up to considerable legislative and political autonomy for
Scotland and its people. What, then, is left of ‘the sovereignty of the United
Kingdom Parliament’ in conventional Diceyan terms? Theoretically, two
aspects of sovereignty remain. The first is the ability – notwithstanding the
political unreality – to legislate for Scotland contrary to Scottish wishes. The
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second is the power to abolish the Scottish Parliament and to reclaim the
powers devolved. Given that the government chose first to seek the
endorsement of the people for devolution before devolving power, the
likelihood of either theoretical power being exercised, without the support and
consent of the people of Scotland, is negligible. It will be recalled that, in
MacCormick v Lord Advocate (1953), Lord Cooper questioned the notion that the
Treaty of Union resulted in the adoption of the ‘distinctively English principle
[of sovereignty] which has no counterpart in Scottish constitutional law’.
Under Scottish constitutional law, it has always been the case that it is the
people, and not a parliament, which is sovereign: the Scottish people exercised
their sovereignty in choosing to have their own parliament. Whether the
future entails an independent Scotland outside the United Kingdom, or
Scotland within some form of quasi-federal relationship with the rest of the
United Kingdom, must be a matter for the political judgment of the Scottish
people.
The use of referendums67
The use of referendums raises the question of whether or not parliament
redefines itself to include the people – in a direct expression of their views –
for the purpose of legislating. The referendum has been used in relation to
constitutional matters in Northern Ireland in 1973 and 1998; in relation to
devolution to Scotland and Wales in 1977 and 1997; in London in 1998 in
relation to the establishment of a directly elected mayor the re-establishment
of a London-wide elected authority; and in the United Kingdom as a whole in
1975 in relation to the United Kingdom’s continued membership of the
European Communities. The Labour government first elected in 1997 is
committed to the use of referendum in relation to constitutional reform.
Accordingly, further referendums are planned in relation to devolution to
English regions, and are expected to be used in relation to reform of the House
of Lords and a single European currency. However, referendums, as
conceived in the United Kingdom, do not affect parliament’s legal
sovereignty. While the opinion of the people may be regarded as morally
binding on government, parliament’s sovereignty is preserved through
regarding the result of a referendum as not legally binding the government or
parliament. 
The Human Rights Act 1998
As with the devolution of power to the nations, the manner in which the
government chose to ‘incorporate’ the European Convention on Human
Rights into domestic law is based on the premise of ensuring that parliament
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Parliamentary Sovereignty
retains its sovereignty over law making. Whereas under most constitutions
which include fundamental guarantees protecting human rights, those rights
are protected from encroachment by the legislature, and the legislature
thereby limited in what it may enact – and subject to the rulings of a
constitutional court – the Human Rights Act 1998 utilises a peculiarly British
device which preserves parliament’s theoretical sovereignty. The Act provides
that judges in the higher courts may issue ‘declarations of incompatibility’
between statute and the Convention rights incorporated under the Act. Where
such a declaration is made, the matter is then transferred to the executive,
which may choose whether and how to amend the law to bring it into line
with Convention rights. Further, where proposals for legislation are
introduced into parliament, the relevant minister must declare whether the
Bill in question accords with Convention rights. If it does not, an explanation
as to the necessity for the legislation must be given. While both of these
measures undoubtedly improve the protection of rights and generate a more
rights conscious society, they fall far short of making individual rights and
freedoms immune from legislative change. Moreover, consistent with
conventional constitutional theory, the Human Rights Act 1998 has not been
accorded any special status: its existence and scope remains – as with other
seminal acts of constitutional import – subject to parliament’s will. 
However, the traditional theory of sovereignty, as applied to the Human
Rights Act 1998, disguises the importance of the constitutional change which
the Act represents. All aspects of policy and practices of public and quasi-
public bodies now fall for scrutiny in accordance with Convention
requirements. The Human Rights Act has quickly become established at the
heart of the legal system, providing a yardstick against which all actions of
government and other public bodies may be judged. Of immediate concern
here is the issue of sovereignty.
While the government adopted a constitutional mechanism which
preserves parliament’s sovereignty, and maintains the conventional (and
subordinate) role of the judiciary, the working of the Act is more subtle than
the re-statement of sovereignty implies. The judges are under a duty to
interpret legislation in a manner which gives effect to Convention
requirements, save where such an interpretation is impossible. Here, there is a
significant shift in the process of judicial reasoning which traditionally focuses
on interpreting the ‘latest will of parliament’ as expressed in legislation. The
requirement that ministers must state that legislative proposals are in
compliance with Convention requirements, coupled with the directive to
judges to interpret in line with Convention rights, gives rights a special
constitutional, moral and legal status. That the ultimate decision to amend the
law in line with a declaration of incompatibility rests with the executive and
parliament does not suggest a lessening in the importance of rights so much
as an ingenious device by which to keep constitutional fundamentals –
sovereignty and separation of powers – intact, rather than turning the
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constitution on its head by reversing the balance of power between judges and
parliament. Nevertheless, the Act does give to judges an unprecedented scope
for statutory interpretation and development of the common law in line with
Convention rights: the extent to which judges grasp the opportunity remains a
matter for future evaluation, as does the judgment as to the extent to which
moral prior restraints have been imposed on the executive and parliament.
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PART III
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND UNION

CHAPTER 8
INTRODUCTION
To understand the origins of the Union, it is necessary to look back to 1945
and a Europe which had been devastated by war: economically, politically
and socially. In the desire to attain some form of harmony in order to
guarantee peace and to rebuild Europe, the movement towards the
integration of European countries was started. The movement took several
forms. In 1948, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) was established with financial aid from the United States of America
in order to restructure the European economies. In 1949, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO) was formed as a military alliance between the
United States, Canada and Europe. 
In 1949, the Council of Europe was established, out of which the European
Convention of Human Rights was born. In 1950, under the leadership of the
French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, a plan was devised whereby the
raw materials of war, coal and steel, would be placed under the control of a
supra-national organisation and, thus, the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) was established under the Treaty of Paris, signed in 1951.
The original Member States were Germany, France, Belgium, Italy,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Initiatives were being introduced to
provide supra-national regulation of the non-military use of atomic energy. At
the same time, the move towards greater economic co-operation and the
creation of a European trading area was underway. The results of these
developments took the form of the Treaties of Rome signed in 1957,
establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). 
The EEC had the broadest aims of the three communities, seeking to create
a European common market and close co-operation between Member States.
The common market is based on four basic freedoms: of persons, goods,
capital and services.
The law relating to the European Community is now a wide ranging
subject. European Community law intrudes upon, and affects, an ever
increasing volume of domestic law and now represents an important source
of law in the United Kingdom. The original treaties establishing the three
European Communities have been much amended. Moreover, in 1992, the
Treaty on European Union was signed by the heads of the governments of
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Member States. The 1992 Treaty (in force November 1993) brought into being
the European Union, the aims of which go far beyond the original objectives
of the European Economic Community and seek to provide the further
integration of the laws and policies of Member States. The 1992 Treaty (TEU
1992) also extended the competence of the institutions of the Community. The
Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 amends the EC Treaty and the TEU 1992 and
represented:
... a new stage in the process of European integration undertaken with the
establishment of the European Communities. [Preamble]
The Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 confirmed the Union’s ‘attachment to the
principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law’.2 The political objectives of the
Union are extensive, seeking to achieve European economic and monetary
union, the promotion of economic and social progress, ‘taking into account the
principle of sustainable development and within the context of the
accomplishment of the internal market and of reinforced cohesion and
environmental protection’, common defence and foreign policy,3 and the
complete elimination of border controls within the Union. These objectives are
expressed in Article 2 of the TEU as follows:
The Union shall set itself the following objectives:
– to promote economic and social progress and a high level of employment
and to achieve balanced and sustainable development, in particular
through the creation of an area without internal frontiers, through the
strengthening of economic and social cohesion and through the
establishment of economic and monetary union, ultimately including a
single currency in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;
– to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the
implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the
progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a
common defence, in accordance with the provisions of Article 17;
– to strengthen the protection of rights and interests of the nationals of its
Member States through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union;
– to maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and
justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction
with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls,
asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime;
– to maintain in full the acquis communautaire and build on it with a view to
considering to what extent the policies and forms of co-operation
introduced by this Treaty may need to be revised with the aim of ensuring
the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the institutions of the Community. 
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The objectives of the Union shall be achieved as provided in this Treaty and in
accordance with the conditions and the timetable set out therein while
respecting the principle of subsidiarity as defined in Article 5 of the Treaty
establishing the European Community. 
The principles on which the Union is based are set out in Article 6 of the TEU:
1 The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles
which are common to the Member States.
2 The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they
result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as
general principles of Community law.
3 The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States.
4 The Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its
objectives and carry through its policies.
The current membership of the Union, with dates of accession, is as follows:
Austria (1995), Belgium (1957), Denmark (1972), Finland (1995), France (1957),
Germany (1957), Greece (1981), Ireland (1972), Italy (1957), Luxembourg
(1957), Netherlands (1957), Portugal (1985), Spain (1985), Sweden (1995),
United Kingdom (1973).4
EVOLUTION OF THE UNION
The Treaty establishing the ECSC provided for four institutions which today
form the nucleus of the institutional framework of the Community/Union: the
Commission, being the executive body serving the interests of the
Community; the Council, being the executive representing the interests of
Member States; the Assembly (a non-elected parliament),5 and the European
Court of Justice (ECJ). On the introduction of Euratom and the EEC, separate
Commissions and Councils were established, all three Communities sharing
the Assembly and the Court.
Having established three Treaties with different organs and differing
powers, the next logical step was to merge the institutions. This merger came
about in 1965 (coming into force in 1967), under a Treaty establishing a single
Council and single Commission of the European Community: the Merger
Treaty. 
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The current organisation of the Community derives from the increasingly
dynamic movement towards greater economic and political union between
the now 15 Member States. A brief examination of the evolutionary stages in
the Community makes the position clearer.
The original Common Market, created under the European Economic
Community Treaty (EEC Treaty) signed in 1957 – which the United Kingdom
joined in 1973 – has changed markedly. From 1957 until 1987, the EEC Treaty
remained unchanged, although membership of the Community expanded
from the original six6 Members to 12.7
The Single European Act 19868
In 1986, the Single European Act (SEA) was passed.9 This Act – a European
Treaty – provided a timetable for realising the objectives of the original
treaties – namely the free movement of capital, goods, persons and services –
by 31 December 1992. In addition, the Single European Act increased the
powers of the European Parliament. The Single European Act also changed
the voting procedure to be adopted in many areas of decision making in
Europe. It did this by weakening the requirement of unanimous voting for
decisions made by the Council of Ministers and increasing the extent to which
the ‘qualified majority voting system’ would apply (see, further, pp 251–53).
By doing this, the Single European Act provided that individual Member
States could be outvoted in decision making, thus making Europe stronger
and the power of the individual Member States to block European legislation
weaker.10 Furthermore, the Single European Act increased the competence of
the Community institutions, including new areas such as the environment
and regional development policy,11 consolidated the legal basis of the
European Monetary System,12 and took steps towards greater political co-
operation and foreign policy making.
The Treaty on European Union 1992 (Maastricht) 
In December 1991, a new agreement was reached by Heads of Government in
Maastricht which significantly expanded the aims and objectives of the
Community. This agreement resulted in the Treaty on European Union (TEU)
– the Maastricht Treaty – which was signed in February 1992. It was to come
into force once ratified (approved) by individual Member States, according to
Chapter 8: Constitutional and Administrative Law
230
6 France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland.
7 The United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark joined in 1973, Greece in 1981, Spain and
Portugal in 1986.
8 See Campbell, 1988 and Pescatore, 1987.
9 Given domestic effect under the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1986.
10 See EC Treaty, Article 205.
11 See Krämer, 1992; Scott, 1995, 1998.
12 In de facto operation since 1979.
Structure and Institutions
their own constitutional arrangements. Because of difficulties with
ratification,13 it was to be November 1993 before the Treaty came into force.
The Treaty, resulting from inter-governmental negotiations, represented a
compromise between the federalists (or ‘integrationists’) and the anti-
federalists (or ‘inter-governmentalists’). It needs to be understood that, in the
development of the Community, there has been exhibited a constant tension
between those Member States who see the movement towards almost total
political and economic union, whereby the Community would take on the
characteristics of a federal state, and those Member States (particularly the
United Kingdom) who have reservations about greater fusion in Europe and
wish to retain a higher degree of autonomy from Europe than the federalists
would wish to see. These Member States, the anti-federalists or inter-
governmentalists, accordingly resist the drive towards federalism, preferring
development to proceed along more piecemeal lines and to be pursued
through inter-governmental agreement rather than movements from the
centre of the Community.
As a result of these tensions, rather than drafting a Treaty to supplement
the existing Treaties and to provide a coherent working ‘constitution’ for
Europe, based on the principle of a more federalist Union, the Treaty has
produced a structure in which the Union is ‘founded on the European
Community, supplemented by the policies and forms of co-operation’14 laid
down by the Treaty on European Union. The Treaty has two main sections.
The first group of provisions represent a series of amendments to the EEC
Treaty (and the ECSC and Euratom Treaties). The provisions make it clear
that, in future, the EEC Treaty is to be known as the EC Treaty and the
European Economic Community as the European Community. The EC Treaty
now comprises the original Treaty of Rome, as amended by the Single
European Act, as further amended by the Treaties on European Union 1992
and 1997. Once again, the aims and powers – or competence – of the
Community are extended, and changes are made in the relationship between
the various Community institutions. Consumer protection, culture and public
health represent three areas over which Community powers have been
extended, albeit to limited extents, and there are restrictions of European-wide
harmonisations in these areas. There is further consolidation in some areas, for
example, regional development and the environment. The EC Treaty also
provides a framework and timetable for progress towards economic and
monetary union. Article 17 of the revised EC Treaty confers citizenship of the
European Union on all nationals of Member States within the Union. 
The Treaty on European Union 1992 involved the creation of the European
Union. The Union – of which the EC forms the central legal and institutional
pillar – has aims broader than the economic core of the EC. Accordingly, the
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second part of the Treaty on European Union provided a framework for co-
operation on future developments. The areas concerned were common foreign
and security policy and justice and home affairs. There are now three ‘pillars’
which represent the structure of the Union. The first pillar amends the EEC
Treaty (and renames it the EC Treaty). The second pillar introduces and
regulates common foreign and security policy. The third pillar concerns police
and judicial co-operation in criminal matters. The Common Foreign and
Security Policy and Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters
pillars are, however, fundamentally different from the first. The first pillar,
comprising European Community law, is regulated by the institutions of the
Community – the Council of the EU, the European Commission, European
Parliament and the European Court of Justice. In relation to the second and
third pillars, the decision making process is quite different. In relation to both
foreign and security policy and co-operation in criminal matters, decisions are
to be reached by way of inter-governmental co-operation. This means that
decisions will be reached through agreements to co-operate and co-ordinate
policy – agreements which will require ratification or implementation at
national level. In relation to these matters, in pillars two and three, the
European Court of Justice will have no jurisdiction other than where the
Treaty so provides. Accordingly, while it may be argued that there is a single
legal system underpinning the EU, its effects are not uniform across all policy
areas.15
The Maastricht Treaty also introduced two new Community institutions
which are discussed further below. The European Central Bank is given law
making and other powers16 and will play a pivotal role in economic and
monetary union. The Court of Auditors, having responsibility for scrutinising
Community administration, became the fifth institution of the EC, its
members having a six year renewable term of office and being under the same
requirements of independence from governments as the Commission (Article
246 of the EC Treaty). Article 8 of the EC Treaty provides that a European
System of Central Banks (ESCB) shall be established, and a European Central
Bank (ECB), whose powers are derived from the Treaty and from the Statute
of the ESCB. The timetable for monetary union was set by the Treaty on
European Union 1992, which anticipated that Member States satisfying the
‘convergence criteria’ should withdraw their own currencies17 and adopt the
euro in 199918 – unless the Member State has derogated (or opted out) from
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this provision. Central to this process is the role of the European Central Bank,
which was established under the Maastricht Treaty.19 The Bank is under a
duty to ‘translate the objective [of economic and monetary union] into
monetary targets and to work towards their achievement’. The euro came into
existence as a currency in 1999. Notes and coins came into circulation in
January 2002. The United Kingdom, while meeting the convergence criteria
for joining, has opted out of this scheme,20 but is free to opt in in the future,
and the Labour government intends to take Britain into the economic and
monetary union at the earliest appropriate moment, having established first
how the initial stage of monetary union is working. 
Monetary union
The Maastricht Treaty involved economic and monetary union as a central
process towards further European integration. Jacques Delors, former
President of the Commission, envisaged economic and monetary union as the
‘left boot and right boot for Europe to wear in its advance towards the ever
closer union of the peoples of Europe’.21
The Treaty of Amsterdam22
While the 1992 Maastricht Treaty established the Union and the principles on
which it is based, many matters remained unresolved and for future
determination. As a result, the Treaty provided for an inter-governmental
conference to be convened in 1996 in order to reach decisions on matters
which remained outstanding. Paradoxically, while the Maastricht Treaty,
particularly in the United Kingdom, was attended by great political debate
and controversy, the Treaty of Amsterdam,23 which gives substance to many
of the commitments undertaken in principle at Maastricht, was concluded
with relatively little public debate.
The objectives determined for the 1996 inter-governmental conference
were both to remedy some of the perceived defects of the Maastricht Treaty
and to prepare the Union for its proposed expansion to 26 Members. In
summary, the Treaty of Amsterdam marked significant changes in respect of
four principal areas: 
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(a) freedom, security and justice; 
(b) the Union and the citizen; 
(c) common foreign and security policy;
(d) the Union’s institutions. 
Each of these is considered below. Since the creation of the European Union,
the original Communities exist side by side with the expanded objectives of
seeking common policies on foreign and security policy and police and
judicial co-operation. The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced significant
alterations to the three pillars, in addition to making a number of other
important changes which are discussed below. In relation to the structure of
the Union, the 1997 Treaty transferred aspects of free movement of persons,
asylum and immigration out of the third pillar and into the European
Community. 
Closer co-operation
The difficulties experienced in accommodating differing perceptions
concerning the Union, and incorporation into domestic systems of all Union
and Community measures, has led to the adoption of flexibility, under the
guise of ‘closer co-operation’. Difficulties over the social protocol, European
monetary union, border controls and common defence policy represent some
of the areas over which a lack of unity exists. The Treaty of Amsterdam
formalised the concept by inserting a general flexibility clause into the
common provisions of the Treaty on European Union and also made
provision for Member States to avail themselves of Community institutions
and procedures, in order to establish closer co-operation between themselves,
subsequent to authorisation by the Council and under the preconditions laid
down in Article 43 TEU. The Council acts by qualified majority on a proposal
from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament.24
Limitations on the degree of flexibility permissible are provided in Article
11 of the EC Treaty, which provides, in part, that action taken by Member
States in pursuit of closer co-operation:
(a) does not concern areas which fall within the exclusive competence of the
Community;
(b) does not affect Community policies, actions or programmes;
(c) does not concern the citizenship of the Union or discriminate between
nationals of Member States;
(d) remains within the limits of the powers conferred upon the Community by
this Treaty; and
(e) does not constitute a discrimination or a restriction of trade between
Member States and does not distort the conditions of competition between
the latter.
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Special rules apply to the situation where a Member State considers that the
proposed action would adversely affect important aspects of national policy.
Where that arises, a vote in Council shall not be taken on a qualified majority,
but rather the Council may request that the matter be referred to the European
Council of Heads of Government for a decision to be taken unanimously. In
effect, this formalises the Luxembourg Accords, on which, see, further, below,
and enables a single Member State to block proposals for closer co-operation. 
Freedom, security and justice
Fundamental rights and freedoms
Article 6 of the TEU provides that:
1 The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rules of law, principles
which are common to the Member States.
2 The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they
result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as
general principles of Community law.
3 The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States.
4 The Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its
objectives and carry through its policies.
The Maastricht Treaty had reaffirmed the commitment of the Union to
fundamental rights and freedoms as secured under the European Convention
on Human Rights. In order further to advance the protection of rights, the
Treaty of Amsterdam introduced three new elements. First, the Treaty
confirmed that the European Court of Justice has the power to review respect
for fundamental rights by the Community institutions. In relation to the
European Convention, to which all Member States of the Union, but not the
Union itself are signatories, the Treaty provides that Community law is
subject to the European Convention. Limited judicial review is also available
in respect of the third pillar. In relation to matters pertaining to foreign and
security policy, however, judicial review does not lie, this issue having proved
too contentious at the Intergovernmental Conference.
In addition to affirming respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, the
Treaty of Amsterdam introduced a system of penalties for Member States that
fail to respect rights. If the Heads of Government discern a breach of the
principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, following a proposal by one third of Member States or
by the Commission, and after obtaining the assent of the European
Parliament, the Council may decide, by a qualified majority, to suspend some
of the Member State’s rights, including its voting rights in the Council (TEU,
Article 7). In addition, admission to membership of the Union is dependent
upon applicant states demonstrating a commitment to individual rights.
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Freedom from discrimination 
Article 13 of the EC Treaty provides for non-discrimination in relation to sex,
racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.
Measures to combat discrimination under Article 13 have been undertaken by
the Council of the EU. The resultant Directives are capable of being directly
enforceable by individuals.25
Freedom of movement and law enforcement
Under the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, Justice and Home Affairs represented the
third pillar, and were, accordingly, to be regulated under the inter-
governmental decision making process, rather than under Community law.
Under the Maastricht Treaty, 11 areas of policy fell for decision:
(a) asylum policy; 
(b) rules on external borders of the Member States;
(c) immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries;
(d) conditions of entry and movement by non-EU citizens within the EU;
(e) conditions of residence of the above;
(f) combating drug addiction;
(g) combating fraud on an international scale;
(h) judicial co-operation in civil matters;
(i) judicial co-operation in criminal matters;
(j) customs co-operation;
(k) police co-operation in relation to terrorism, drugs and other international
crime.
However, the 1997 Treaty significantly amended the third pillar, transferring
many powers from the Union to the European Community. Title IV of the EC
Treaty regulates visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to the
free movement of persons. 
The transfer of power from the third pillar to the Community represents
one of the most significant changes introduced under the Treaty of
Amsterdam. Whereas under the third pillar, regulation is by way of
conventions agreed through the inter-governmental process, the transfer
means that this area is now regulated under Community law by way of
regulations or directives. The European Court of Justice has jurisdiction, albeit
limited, to review the decisions of domestic courts of last instance, in relation
to these matters. On the role of the ECJ, see, further, below.26 Furthermore, the
Commission is given the sole right of initiative in respect of such issues, with
the exception of matters relating to the abolition of controls at internal
borders. 
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The Schengen Agreement, which provided for the abolition of border
controls between the Union and participative Member States, discussed
further below, was also formally incorporated into Community law via a
protocol annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam. Before the Treaty entered into
force, it was necessary to identify those issues of the Schengen acquis27 which
related to crime and police matters, which were accommodated in the third
pillar, and those relating to free movement of persons, which became matters
of Community law in the first pillar. Special provisions relate to Denmark,
Ireland and the United Kingdom. All three countries have formally derogated
from these measures, because of their special geographical boundaries.
Iceland and Norway are to be associated with the provisions on the basis of
their existing agreements with Schengen members, but are free to revoke all or
part of the protocol. In relation to Title IV of the EC Treaty, on an area of
freedom, security and justice, and on police and judicial co-operation in
criminal matters, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom have negotiated
special conditions. They may join in the future and may decide to participate
in Union initiatives, thereby demonstrating the necessary flexibility which
exists in relation to some areas of decision making.
The Court of Justice has examined the compatibility with Community law
of national legislation governing identity checks on citizens when crossing
frontiers. It has ruled that the right of freedom of movement is not
unconditional, and that, until all Member States are required, through
harmonisation of laws provisions, to abolish all controls at frontiers, they are
entitled to require that the person seeking entry is able to establish that he or
she has the nationality of the Member State.28
The third pillar as amended: police and judicial co-operation
In respect of the third pillar, following reform, a number of amendments may
be noted. First, the European Parliament is to have a role through the
requirement to consult. Secondly, the European Commission now has the sole
right of initiative. Thirdly, the Court of Justice is given limited jurisdiction to
review the legality and interpretation of acts, and to give preliminary rulings,
provided that each Member State has individually accepted its jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the Treaty of Amsterdam introduces a new form of law
making in respect of the third pillar. Formerly, aspects of Justice and Home
Affairs were regulated under Conventions signed by the Member States, but
rarely ratified, and hence of limited value. Under the new arrangements, a
‘framework decision’ is to be introduced. Similar to a directive, a framework
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decision is aimed at harmonising laws between Member States, and is binding
on the objective to be achieved, whilst leaving a measure of discretion in
relation to the methods adopted to achieve the objective. However, unlike
directives, the framework decision is stated not to have direct effect – see,
further on this, Chapter 9.
The Union and the citizen
The Treaty of Amsterdam reaffirms citizenship of the Union introduced by
the Maastricht Treaty: ‘Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not
replace national citizenship.’29
Citizenship of the Union, and its consequences as determined by the
European Court of Justice, is likely to have an increasingly significant impact
on domestic rules, and on the supremacy of Community law. In Maria
Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern (1998), the Court, on a reference under Article
177 (now Article 234), was called upon to rule on the definition of worker, and
the impact of citizenship of the Union on the rights of workers to family
benefits. Mrs Sala, a Spanish national, had lived in Germany since 1989 but
did not have German nationality, a residence entitlement or a resident permit
which would have entitled her to benefits. The Court of Justice ruled that
Community law does not prevent a Member State from requiring nationals
from other Member States lawfully resident in its territory to carry a
document certifying their right of residence provided that the Member State
imposes the same requirement on its own nationals. However, to require non-
nationals, but not nationals, to possess a residence permit in order to qualify
for benefit represented unequal treatment which amounted to discrimination
under Article 6 of the EC Treaty (now Article 12).
One of the principal concerns over the relationship between the citizen
and the Union has been the perception that the Union is remote, lacking in
sufficient democracy, and overly complex. The principle of subsidiarity,
discussed below, is one means by which Member States may retain a measure
of control over decision making in areas which otherwise would fall to
Community control. In order to clarify the principle of subsidiarity, and the
related concept of proportionality, the Treaty of Amsterdam included a
protocol which has legal status. Accordingly, whereas subsidiarity was
formerly considered to be a guiding, but non-legal, and unenforceable,
principle, it now has legal force.30
The Treaty of Amsterdam also strives to promote openness and
accessibility for the citizen.31 A right of access to Council, Parliament and
Commission documents has been provided. The right of access to information
founded the basis for an application for annulment of a Commission decision
29 EC Treaty, Article 17.
30 See de Búrca, 1998.
31 See Dyrberg, 1999.
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in 1996 confirming its refusal to grant access to certain documents.32 The Code
of Conduct drawn up to give effect to the right of access states that ‘the public
will have the widest possible access to documents held by the Commission
and the Council’. The factors which may be relied on for rejecting a request for
access include refusal where disclosure would undermine the protection of
the public interest (public security, international relations, monetary stability,
court proceedings, inspections and investigations, the protection of the
individual and of privacy, the protection of commercial and industrial secrecy,
the protection of Community financial interests, and the protection of
confidentiality, including the confidentiality of the institutions’ proceedings).
Where exceptions are pleaded by an institution, those exceptions must be
interpreted strictly. Further, reasons must be given for the refusal. Merely to
state that the institution relies on an exception is inadequate. In Interpoc Import
und Export GmbH v Commission, the Court had occasion to rule on the refusal
to disclose information by the Commission which relied on the public interest
in relation to court proceedings. The Court ruled that the access to information
provisions were designed to make: 
... the Community more open, the transparency of the decision making process
being a means of strengthening the democratic nature of the institution and the
public’s confidence in the administration.
Where the Commission relied on the exception relating to court proceedings,
it could not use that exception to exclude documents drawn up in connection
with a purely administrative matter. The decision was annulled.
Common foreign and security policy
The second pillar of the Union structure established under the Maastricht
Treaty 1992 is that of Common Foreign and Security Policy, and represents
one of the most politically difficult areas of the Union. Title V of the TEU
regulates the matter. Article 13 of the TEU provides, in part, that:
1 The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines
for the common foreign and security policy, including matters with
defence implications.
2 The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be
implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States have
important interests in common.
Decisions are to be taken by the Council acting unanimously (Article 23(1) of
the TEU). However, in light of political sensitivities, the Treaty of Amsterdam
also made two concessions to Member States. First, Article 23 of the Treaty on
European Union provides for abstentions, which will not prohibit the Union
reaching decisions by a qualified majority. Member States who abstain are
under a duty not to impede the action. Secondly, as noted above, a Member
State may attempt to block decisions on the basis of important national
239
32 Case T-124/96: Interpoc Import und Export Gmbh v Commission (1998).
interests. Where this occurs, the matter is referred to the European Council for
unanimous decision. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam also furthered the goal of a common foreign and
security policy. The Secretary General of the Council acts as High
Representative for foreign and security policy issues. The Secretary General is
to continue to be appointed by governments. In relation to security and
defence and enforcement capabilities, difficulties arise due to the differing
memberships of the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance
(NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU). The Amsterdam Treaty
enables the Council to take decisions for the Union in relation to humanitarian
and rescue tasks and peacekeeping tasks, and enables the Union to avail itself
of the WEU to implement the political decisions relating to these tasks. 
THE TREATY OF NICE 2001
The Nice Treaty, like the Amsterdam Treaty, amends the EC Treaty and
Treaty on European Union, reforming the institutions in preparation for the
accession of new Member States. The principal changes are to the size and
organisation of the Commission, revision of the weighted voting system in the
Council, extending qualified majority voting in Council and the power of co-
decision of the European Parliament. The Treaty also changes the distribution
of seats in the Parliament after enlargement and makes changes to the Court
of Justice and the Court of First Instance. Also reformed are the ‘enhanced co-
operation’ procedures which facilitate Member States’ co-operation in
different areas even though not all Member States wish to take part.33
The United Kingdom and Europe
The United Kingdom stood aloof from the early development of the
Community, rejecting the call of Sir Winston Churchill in 1949 for a ‘United
States of Europe’.34 Instead, Britain formed the European Free Trade Area
(EFTA) together with Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and
Switzerland. In part, EFTA was formed as a defensive action to fend off the
potentially adverse effects of the free trading area established under the EEC.
By 1961, the Conservative government of Mr Harold Macmillan had
decided to seek entry to the Community, an application which was initially
blocked by France. It was not until 1972 that the Final Act was signed
containing the instruments of accession of the United Kingdom along with
Ireland, Denmark and Norway.35
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34 Speech at University of Zurich, 19 September 1946.
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THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Aims and objectives
The original aims of the EEC (now EC) were set out in a Resolution of Foreign
Ministers of the ECSC in June 1955:
The governments of Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg and The Netherlands consider that the moment has arrived to
initiate a new phase on the path of constructing Europe. They believe that this
has to be done principally in the economic sphere and regard it as necessary to
continue the creation of a united Europe through an expansion of joint
institutions, the gradual fusion of national economies, the creation of a
common market and the gradual co-ordination of social policies. Such a policy
seems indispensable if Europe is to maintain her position in the world, regain
her influence and achieve a steady increase in the living standards of her
population.
These broadly expressed objectives found expression in Article 2 of the EC
Treaty, which provides that:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and
an economic and monetary union and by implementing the common policies
or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 4, to promote throughout the
Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, a
high level of employment and of social protection, equality between men and
women, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of
competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, a high level of
protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising of
the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion
and solidarity among Member States.
Article 3 of the EC Treaty now provides that the activities of the Community
shall include:
(a) the prohibition, as between Member States, of customs duties and
quantitative restrictions on the import and export of goods, and of all other
measures having equivalent effect;
(b) a common commercial policy;
(c) an internal market characterised by the abolition, as between Member
States, of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and
capital;
(d) measures concerning the entry and movement of persons in the internal
market as provided for in Title IV;
(e) a common policy in the sphere of agriculture and fisheries;
(f) a common policy in the sphere of transport;
(g) a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted;
(h) the approximation of the laws of the Member States to the extent required
for the functioning of the common market;
(i) the promotion of co-ordination between employment policies of the
Member States with a view to enhancing their effectiveness by developing
a co-ordinated strategy for employment;
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(j) a policy in the social sphere comprising a European Social Fund;
(k) the strengthening of economic and social cohesion;
(l) a policy in the sphere of the environment;
(m) the strengthening of the competitiveness of Community industry;
(n) the promotion of research and technological development;
(o) encouragement for the establishment and development of trans-European
networks;
(p) a contribution to the attainment of a high level of health protection;
(q) a contribution to education and training of quality and to the flowering of
the cultures of the Member States;
(r) a policy in the sphere of development co-operation;
(s) the association of the overseas countries and territories in order to increase
trade and promote jointly economic and social development;
(t) a contribution to the strengthening of consumer protection;
(u) measures in the spheres of energy, civil protection and tourism.
In all the above activities, the Community ‘shall aim to eliminate inequalities,
and to promote equality, between men and women’ (Article 3(2) of the EC
Treaty) and to take into account the need for environmental protection.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights
In 2000, the European Council approved the setting up of a convention
consisting of representatives of the 15 national governments, 30 national
parliamentarians, 16 MEPs and the Commission, charged with drafting a
Charter of Fundamental Rights for the European Union. The European Court
of Justice and the Council of Europe had observer status at the Convention.
The draft Charter covers principally civil and political rights, but also extends
to economic and family rights. The Charter is not legally binding.
A UNIQUE LEGAL ORDER
The European Community is the creation of the original EEC Treaty, as
amended. Community law, however, is not international law as normally
understood in the sense of merely establishing mutual obligations between
contracting states. Community law involves not only mutual obligations
between Member States but also the transfer of sovereign rights to the
institutions of that system and the creation of rights and obligations for their
citizens, ‘who thereby became subjects of the Community’ (Mathijsen, 1995,
p 7). The Community is, therefore, a unique constitutional entity, having its
own institutions and law making powers, capable of creating rights and
duties within the legal systems of the Member States, and represents far more
than a mere form of institutionalised inter-governmental co-operation, the
success of which rests on the full approval of each Member State. The law
making powers of the Community’s institutions, as will be seen below, are far
reaching. When duties are imposed on Member States, these may imply rights
for individuals which may be enforced in the domestic courts and, in respect
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of the duties of Member States, also ultimately in the European Court of
Justice (ECJ), the Community’s judicial forum. 
In constitutional terms, the Community is not a ‘state’, neither is it a
‘federation’, rather it is a unique supranational organisation. When new
Member States are admitted to the Union, they become automatically bound
by the entire law of the Community – in European terminology, the acquis
communautaire.36 Under international law, when a state becomes a signatory
to a Treaty, it becomes bound by the provisions of that Treaty, but not bound
by any acts done under the Treaty before that state’s accession. It is different
with the Community, and new Member States become automatically
committed to the Treaties, all secondary legislation, judicial and non-judicial
decisions made by the institutions of the Community, together with non-
binding opinions and resolutions of institutions. The concept of acquis
communautaire was given prominence in the Treaty on European Union 1992,
Articles 2 and 3 of which provide that:
The Union shall set itself the following objectives:
– to maintain in full the acquis communautaire and build upon it with a view
to considering, through the procedure referred to in Article N(2), to what
extent the policies and forms of co-operation introduced by this Treaty
may need to be revised with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the
mechanisms and institutions of the Community.
– The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall
ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in
order to attain its objectives while respecting and building on the acquis
communautaire.
The status of the Community will become clearer as its structure is examined
in more detail.
The major constitutional issues
From the constitutional law perspective, the issues which require scrutiny are:
(a) the nature of the Community, the institutions and their law making
powers;
(b) the nature and sources of Community law;
(c) the effect of membership of the Union on the constitution of the United
Kingdom;
(d) the relationship between Community law and domestic law.
The allocation of functions between Community institutions and
Member States
In any federal or quasi-federal state or organisation, the functions of the
federal government and the regional governments must be allocated. As
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discussed in Chapter 1, the concept of federalism involves the allocation of
powers which may reserve some powers to the exclusive competence of the
federal government, some powers which will be concurrently held by the
federal and regional governments, and some powers over which the regional
government has exclusive competence. In the European Community, the
manner in which powers are allocated and exercised is largely determined by
the Treaty provisions. However, in order to achieve a realistic balance
between Community competence and the autonomy of Member States, the
principle of subsidiarity has come to play a major role and requires
examination. While subsidiarity does not effect competence per se, it
significantly affects the manner in which it is to be exercised.
The principle of subsidiarity37
Subsidiarity is a fundamental concept in federal states and the approach to
subsidiarity taken in the Community has been said to be very like the
approach adopted in Germany. The principle of subsidiarity is enshrined in
the treaties, although the precise allocation of powers is not laid down as one
might expect in a constitutional text such as this. The principle of subsidiarity
is central to Community law, although doubts remain as to its precise
meaning, as shown below.
Discussion of the principle in the Community context, even before its
incorporation into the Maastricht Treaty, reveal that it is capable of no less
than 30 different meanings. Designed to determine the appropriate level of
action across the whole spectrum of public activity, international (in the
widest sense), Community, national, regional and local, it has been invoked in
the Community context to assist in determining the exercise of Community
powers. In this context, it has been described, variously, as ‘the principle of
necessity, or proportionality, of effectiveness, an elementary principle of good
government, or simply a principle of good sense’. It has been interpreted as
meaning that the Community should only act:
(a) where the objective cannot be achieved by regulation at national level;
(b) where the objective can be better, or more effectively, achieved by action at
Community level (the ‘efficiency by better results’ criterion); or
(c) where the matter in question can be more effectively regulated at
Community level (the ‘administrative efficiency’ criterion).38
Failure to formulate specific detailed rules regarding subsidiarity led the one
time President of the Court of Justice (1984–88), the late Lord Mackenzie
Stuart, in 1991 to argue that the inter-governmental conference at Maastricht
should be ‘getting down to the detailed rules of detailed competence’, rather
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than leaving subsidiarity as a ‘hopelessly ill defined concept’,39 but his words
were not heeded. Article 5 of the EC Treaty40 provides:
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by
this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community
shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and so
far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by
the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to
achieve the objectives of this Treaty.
The closely related principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are thus both
provided for under Article 5. The Protocol on the Application of the Principles
of Subsidiarity and Proportionality restates the principles, listing guidelines to
be followed in reaching decisions as to whether action should be taken at
Community level or at national level. Now a clear legal concept, it will be for
the Court of Justice to adjudicate on its scope and application. The Protocol
also makes clear that subsidiarity is a concept which is dynamic and flexible,
allowing decisions on the appropriate level at which action should be taken to
develop on a case by case basis. The doctrine of proportionality is one which is
largely alien to – until recently – English lawyers (see, also, Chapter 25), but
one familiar to European lawyers and one utilised by the ECJ. Sir William
Wade explains that the principle of proportionality ‘ordains that
administrative measures must not be more drastic than is necessary for
attaining the desired result’.41 The protocol on the application of subsidiarity
also clarifies the distinction between subsidiarity and proportionality.
The application of subsidiarity
Exclusive competence
As the text of Article 5 makes clear, where the Community has ‘exclusive
competence’, the subsidiarity principle has no application. The Community
has sole power of decision and therefore no question arises as to whether
others share that power, or the extent to which they should be entitled to act.
However, many issues remain unclear from the text of the Treaty. For
example, there is no definition as to what areas fall within the Community’s
exclusive competence, and the Commission itself has accepted that there was
‘no clear line of demarcation between exclusive and shared power’. On the
other hand, it is generally accepted that common agricultural and commercial
policies and aspects of common fisheries policies fall within the exclusive
245
39 Mackenzie Stuart (Lord), ‘Subsidiarity and the challenge of change 1991’, in the
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40 Inserted by the TEU 1992.
41 Citing Schwarze, p 680; see, also, Boyron, 1992.
competence of the Union. Furthermore, the Commission argued that even
where exclusive power exists, it does not mean that ‘all responsibility for the
activity in question is covered by exclusive competence. The text of the Treaty
cannot be interpreted so broadly as to leave common sense out of account’.42
Concurrent powers 
Notwithstanding the above observation, it is the concept of subsidiarity which
lies at the heart of the distribution of powers between Member States and the
Community – and thus determines the scope of Community powers. Where a
Member State has a concurrent power, the power to act remains, so long as
the Community has not exercised that power. However, if the Community
takes action itself, the power of the Member State is pre-empted, and the
power to act – once pre-empted – remains with the Community.43 Where the
Community has exclusive power, the Member State has no power to act
unless the legislation in question contains a specific authorisation by the
Community in favour of the Member States.44 Secondly, the Court has ruled
that, where the Community has exclusive competence to act but has not so
acted and urgent action is needed, the Member States may act as ‘trustees of
the common interest’.45 Only time, political practice and the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Justice, will reveal which view is correct. Josephine
Steiner provides a further argument as to the need for subsidiarity, stating
that the principle of subsidiarity is an essential safeguard to protect the
interests of differing groups and regions within the Community, and that any
transfer of power away from Member States to Europe requires justification:
... if competence is to be transferred to centralised authorities, the transfer must
be justified. The burden is on the Community institutions to show that there is
a real need for Community action, by reference to the scale or effects of the
problem, and that the particular action proposed is appropriate and necessary
to achieve specific Community goals. [Steiner, 1996, p 63]
The concept of subsidiarity was debated at the meeting of the European
Council at its summit meeting in December 1992 (the Edinburgh Summit),
which resulted in guidelines being laid down, guidelines which now have a
legal basis under the protocol to the Treaty of Amsterdam. These are
summarised by Nicholas Emiliou in the following manner:
1 Is the proposed action within the limits of the powers conferred on the
Community by the Treaty and aimed at meeting one or more of the Treaty
objectives?
2 If so, can the objectives of the proposed action not be sufficiently achieved
by Member States?
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3 If not, what should be the nature and the intensity of Community actions?
[1994, p 76]
Issues of subsidiarity will inevitably fall for the Court to consider. For
example, if the Community legislates on a particular area, a Member State
may wish to resist that legislation by invoking subsidiarity, and thus the
Court will be obliged to make a decision. The power to do so has been
criticised on the basis that subsidiarity is a political, rather than a legal
concept.46
THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY
The European Commission47
Originally called the High Authority, the Commission is centrally concerned
with all aspects of Community decision making at all levels and on all fronts:
the Commission is the very heart of the Community, exercising both powers
of initiative and powers of enforcement. As envisaged by the authors of the
original treaties, the Commission, while acting independently of governments
and in pursuit of the objectives of the Community, would help preserve the
interests of individual Member States. The Commission was intended to be
the engine which drives the Community forward. 
Articles 211–19 of the EC Treaty established the powers of the
Commission. Article 211 sets out the basic powers:
In order to ensure the proper functioning and development of the common
market, the Commission shall:
(a) ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the
institutions pursuant thereto are applied;
(b) formulate recommendations or deliver opinions on matters dealt with in
this Treaty, if it expressly so provides or if the Commission considers it
necessary;
(c) have its own power of decision and participate in the shaping of measures
taken by the Council and by the Assembly [Parliament] in the manner
provided for in this Treaty;
(d) exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the implementation
of the rules laid down by the latter.
The Commission accordingly has powers of initiative and powers of
supervision and enforcement.
The Commission currently consists of 20 Members, appointed by the
governments of Member States in consultation with one another. The number
of Commissioners may be altered by the Council, acting unanimously.
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Commissioners must be nationals of one of the Member States and no more
than two may be nationals of the same Member State. The five largest Member
States (Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) each have two
Commissioners, other Member States one. Commissioners are appointed for a
renewable five year term of office, and cannot be dismissed during their term
of office by governments.48 Commissioners remain in office until replaced, or
compulsorily retired.49 The Commission has a staff of approximately 15,000.
Decisions in the Commission are reached by majority voting.
The increasing size of the Community – and its projected further
expansion to a membership of 26 – has led to an examination of the size of the
Commission.50 Provided that all Member States ratify the Nice Treaty, with
effect from January 2005, the Commission shall include one national of each
Member State. When the Union consists of 27 Member States, the number of
Commissioners will be less than the number of Member States, being chosen
on a rotation system to be devised, on the principle of equality, by the
Council.51 The European Parliament has the power, under Article 201 of the
EC Treaty, to pass a motion of censure to remove the Commission en bloc.
However, when, in 1999, allegations of waste and mismanagement in the
Commission surfaced, Parliament failed to pass a motion of sanction. In the
event, the entire Commission, including the President, resigned.
Once appointed, Commissioners must act entirely independently of
government: they are not representatives of government. Article 213(2) of the
EC Treaty, as revised, provides, in part, that:
The Members of the Commission shall, in the general interests of the
Community, be completely independent in the performance of their duties. 
In the performance of these duties they shall neither seek nor take instructions
from any government or from any other body. They shall refrain from any
action incompatible with their duties. Each Member State undertakes to
respect this principle and not to seek to influence the Members of the
Commission in the performance of their tasks.
The Members of the Commission may not, during their term of office, engage
in any other occupation, whether gainful or not.
The Commission is headed by a President, appointed from among the
Commission in common agreement with Member States and subject to the
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approval of the European Parliament. The office is held for a renewable two
year term. The Presidency is the most prestigious job in the EC, carrying with
it the responsibility for the sense of direction and co-ordination of effort
within the Community. The Commission may, under Article 217, appoint a
Vice President or two Vice Presidents from among its number. The Treaty of
Amsterdam has strengthened the role of the President in several respects.
First, in the appointment of Commissioners by Member States, the President
has a right to object to a nominee. Secondly, Article 219 of the EC Treaty
provides that the Commission shall work under the political guidance of its
President. 
Organisationally, the Commission is divided into Directorates General,
each headed by a Director responsible to the relevant Commissioner. Each
Commissioner holds one or more portfolios, that is to say, special
responsibility for some area of Community policy, and is assisted by a Cabinet
of six. 
The broad and ill defined power conferred under Article 211 of the EC
Treaty and the role of the Commission can only be understood within the
framework of the European Union as a whole. It is clear that it is the
Commission which is charged with the duty to act in the interests of the
objectives of the Community as expressed in the treaties. It is the Commission
which puts forward proposals for decision by the Council of the EU (see
below), having negotiated widely with representatives of Member States’
governments and with interest groups within the Community. The Council of
the EU may, in some instances, request the Commission to draft proposals,
and the European Parliament has always been given the right to request the
Commission to submit a proposal for legislation. Where the Commission is
under an obligation to submit legislative proposals within a certain time laid
down in the Treaty, failure to act within that time will render the Commission
liable to a challenge before the ECJ. When such proposals assume the force of
law, it is again the Commission which is charged primarily with the task of
law enforcement. 
The Commission’s broad powers of initiative should not be understood to
mean that the Commission has total freedom of action. The working of the EC
depends on a variety of factors, actors and forces. In the final analysis, the
Community can only be effective in achieving the goals set out in the treaties
if its proposals can carry the support of the Member States. The effectiveness
of Community law within the legal systems of all Member States is ultimately
dependent upon the political acceptability of that law. It is for this reason that
the role of the Commission is so important, for the Commission – having the
sole power to formulate proposals for the implementation of Treaty objectives
– is responsible for ensuring that proposals have the support of Member States
before they are hardened into law. As originally envisaged by the drafters of
the original treaties, only a body acting with complete independence was
competent to negotiate with Member States and formulate acceptable policies.
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It must be remembered that the Community comprises 15 states of vastly
differing sizes and populations, and that, within these states, there are regions
with differing interests and needs. It is vital, therefore, that there is some
guarantee that the interests of the smaller Member States, and regions in all
Member States, are protected against the power of the larger states.
Accordingly, in the process of formulating policies, one of the Commission’s
principal tasks is to reconcile the differing interests at stake and to make the
resulting law acceptable to all.52 It is for this reason that, as a general rule,
where the Commission drafts a proposal, the Council of the EU, which has the
formal law making power, may adopt a proposal of the Commission by a
‘qualified majority vote’, but may amend the proposal only by a unanimous
vote. 
Where a Member State is in default of Treaty obligations, the Commission
has the power to deal with the breach. Article 226 of the EC Treaty, as revised,
specifies the procedure to be followed:
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an
obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter
after giving the state concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. 
If the state concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid
down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of
Justice.
Most matters are settled at an early stage – infringements being due not to
wilful disregard of the law, but rather from genuine differences of opinion as
to the meaning of requirements, or from administrative delay. Where,
however, a Member State fails to fulfil its Community obligations, the
Commission will take the case to the Court of Justice. Where the Court rules
that the Member State is in default of its obligations, the Court, at the request
of the Commission, may impose a financial penalty on the Member State.
The Council of the EU (formerly known as the Council of
Ministers)
Articles 202–10 of the EC Treaty apply here. The Council of the EU has
legislative and executive powers and functions. It is the Council which
defends the interests of Member States. The Council has no fixed membership
and its composition varies depending upon the subject matter under
discussion. Accordingly, when the subject on the agenda is agriculture, the
Council will consist of the Ministers of Agriculture from all Member States,
when the subject is transport, the membership will be made up of the
respective Ministers of Transport. Article 202 of the EC Treaty, as revised, sets
out the powers of the Council:
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To ensure that the objectives set out in this Treaty are attained, the Council
shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty:
(a) ensure co-ordination of the general economic policies of the Member
States;
(b) have power to take decisions;
(c) confer on the Commission powers for implementation of rules which the
Council lays down. The Council may impose certain requirements in
respect of the exercise of these powers. The Council may also reserve the
right, in specific cases, to exercise directly implementing powers itself. The
procedures referred to above must be consonant with principles and rules
to be laid down in advance by the Council, acting unanimously on a
proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the opinion of the
European Parliament.
Article 203 of the EC Treaty provides that:
The Council shall consist of a representative of each Member State at
ministerial level, authorised to commit the government of that Member State.
The Office of President shall be held in turn by each Member State for a six
month term ...
The Council is the most powerful political institution of the EC, and the
Council has interpreted and developed its role in such a manner so as to
increase its powers. As seen from Article 203, it is the Council which has
power to take decisions, and this represents one of the law making powers in
the Community. While the Council has the majority of power in the law
making process, the Single European Act 1986 and the Treaty on European
Union have extended the powers of the European Parliament in relation to
legislation. See, further, below. 
When the Communities (now Community) were originally established, it
was envisaged that the role of the Council would decline as Member States
developed mutual trust, and that much of the running of the Communities
would be in the hands of the Commission. It was also felt that governments
would become less concerned about their own state’s sovereignty and let the
Communities grow in a supra-national way under the direction of the
Commission. Neither of these two predictions has fully taken place, and the
increase in the power of the Council has been at the expense of the power of
the Commission.
The voting system for decision making53
Central to Community development is the voting system used in the Council.
The Treaty provides for three basic methods by which the Council can reach a
decision: unanimously, by qualified majority vote or by a simple majority
vote. Unanimity is normally required where a new policy is to be initiated or
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the existing policy framework is to be developed or modified. Unanimity is
also required when the Council wishes to amend a Commission proposal
against the wishes of the Commission. While the Union and Community rests
on consensus, and there is little point in adopting a procedure which will
cause national parliaments’ resentment or reluctance on the part of state
authorities to implement decisions, a balance is needed between respecting
the interests of the Member States while not impeding Community
development. 
Article 205 of the EC Treaty states that, unless otherwise provided in the
Treaty, that is to say, under specific articles, the Council shall act by majority
vote. In some specific cases the Council is required to act by a qualified
majority, for which purpose the votes of Member States are weighted, the
largest states having a weighting of ten, the remaining, according to size,
eight, five, four, three or two. Where the Council adopts a matter on a
proposal from the Commission, 62 votes are required (Article 205). Where
unanimity is required, the abstention of a Member State shall not prevent the
Council adopting a matter (Article 205). The voting system was designed in
order to minimise the circumstances in which one state could block
Community progress. It became clear in the 1960s, however, that this was
unworkable – most notably when France refused to co-operate in any
decisions and caused a constitutional crisis. 
The outcome of the crisis was an agreement contained in what is known as
the Luxembourg Accord of 1966, which provided that:
Where in the case of decisions which may be taken by majority vote on a
proposal from the Commission, very important interests of one or more
partners are at stake, the Members of the Council will endeavour, within a
reasonable time, to reach solutions which can be adopted by all Members of
the Council while respecting their mutual interests and those of the
Community in accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty. [Bulletin of the European
Community 3/66, p 5]
The French government insisted that where very important state interests are
at stake, the discussion should continue until unanimous agreement is reached.
This Accord had no formal legal status. It was an informal agreement, and
probably unlawful. However, the Accord profoundly affected decision
making, and the French amendment has been interpreted to mean that any
state has the right to exercise a veto on questions which affect its vital national
interests, and it is for the states themselves to determine when such interests
are at stake. However, this does not mean that whenever a Member State
asserts that a matter is a ‘matter of vital national interest’ that the Community
will accept the statement. For example, in 1982, the United Kingdom was
opposed to a decision on agricultural prices, and claimed that this was a
matter of vital national interest: the Council, however, refused to accept the
plea.54 Under the Treaty of Amsterdam, however, the issue of important
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national interests has been resurrected and formalised in the EC Treaty in
relation to the provisions for closer co-operation. As noted above, Article 11 of
the EC Treaty, provides that, in relation to authorisation by the Council for
measures aimed at closer co-operation between Member States, where a
Member State raises the objection of important national interests, the Council
shall refer the matter to the European Council for unanimous decision. As the
Editorial notes, ‘predictions of the demise of the Luxembourg Compromise
were thus distinctly premature: it has been given a new lease of life, no longer
in the demi-monde of political deals but as part of the legal machinery of the
EC Treaty’.55
The Treaty of Amsterdam made limited reforms to the voting system. The
use of qualified majority voting is extended to most of the new Treaty
provisions: those relating to incentives in employment and social matters,
equal opportunities, social exclusion, public health, anti-fraud measures,
openness and the outermost regions. Of the major existing provisions of the
Treaty, the research framework programme is under qualified majority
voting, and qualified majority voting may be used in relation to decisions
under the second pillar, common foreign and security policy. The Treaty of
Nice makes provision for the voting in Council with effect from January
2005.56 Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom shall have 29 votes
each, Spain 27, the Netherlands 13, Belgium, Greece and Portugal 12, Austria
and Sweden ten, Denmark, Finland and Ireland seven votes, and Luxembourg
four votes. To adopt a measure proposed by the Commission there must be at
least 169 votes in favour cast by a majority of the Members. In relation to other
matters 169 votes are required, cast by at least two-thirds of the Members.57
The Council represents a major law making body within the Community.
The legislative capacity of Council is limited by the Commission’s power of
proposal, although Article 208 does provide the means whereby the Council
may request the Commission to undertake enquiries the Council considers
desirable for the attainment of common objectives, and to submit proposals to
the Council.
Because the Council has a fluctuating membership and is not permanently
in session,58 the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) acts as
the permanent body engaged in Council work (Article 207 of the EC Treaty).
The Committee is divided into two: the first Committee dealing with social
affairs and transport, and the second dealing with foreign affairs, economic
and financial affairs. Because agriculture is so central to the Community, it is
served by a separate Committee on Agriculture. Beneath this structure is a
complex structure of committees, dealing with every subject.
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The European Parliament59
Originally called the Assembly, Article 189 of the EC Treaty provides that:
The Assembly which shall consist of the peoples of the states brought together
in the Community, shall exercise the advisory and supervisory powers which
are conferred upon it by this Treaty.
Members of the Assembly, now Parliament, were initially delegates
designated by the parliaments of Member States. In constitutional terms, the
delegates had a dual mandate: that of membership of both the domestic and
European Parliaments. The Treaty, however, envisaged that the Assembly
should draw up proposals for direct elections and that the Council would lay
down the appropriate provisions, which it would recommend to Member
States for adoption. It was to be in 1976 that agreement could be reached on
the proposals drawn up in 1960, and only in 1979 did direct election take place
in the United Kingdom. The Council Decision and Act of September 1976 on
Direct Elections simply stated that the representatives in the European
Parliament of the peoples of the states brought together in the Community
shall be elected by direct universal suffrage.60 The European Parliamentary
Elections Act 1999 regulates elections to the European Parliament in the
United Kingdom.
Article 189 of the EC Treaty provides that the number of members shall
not exceed 700. Seats in the European Parliament, the name formally adopted
in 1962, are allocated according to the size of population of the Member States,
although there is no absolute equality in voting powers. For example,
Germany now has 99 seats and France, Italy and the United Kingdom now
have 87 seats, whereas Luxembourg has six seats; although the population of
the United Kingdom is 150 times that of Luxembourg, yet the number of seats
is less than 14 times that of Luxembourg.61 Representative are elected for a
term of five years.62
An elected European Member of Parliament may also be a Member of the
national parliament. This arrangement has both advantages and
disadvantages. On the one hand, it facilitates close links being maintained
between the two parliaments, on the other hand, retaining a dual mandate
may involve a conflict of interests.63
Under the European Parliamentary Elections Act 1999, the United
Kingdom is divided into electoral regions. England is divided into nine,
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland each constitute a single electoral region.
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The number of MEPs elected in the United Kingdom is 87, of whom 71 are
elected for England, eight for Scotland, five for Wales and three for Northern
Ireland (s 1). With effect from January 2004, the number of United Kingdom
representatives will be 72.64
The Members of Parliament do not sit in groupings organised by
nationality but rather by political party groupings. Article 191 of the Treaty
recognises the importance of political parties as ‘a factor for integration within
the Union. They contribute to forming a European awareness and to
expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union’. The major political
parties are the Socialists, European Peoples’ Party, European Democrats,
Communists and Liberals. Unless otherwise provided for under the Treaty,
the Parliament acts by an absolute majority of the votes cast.65
The European Parliament is required to hold an annual session, and may
meet in extraordinary session at the request of a majority of its Members or at
the request of the Council or of the Commission.66 In practice, the Parliament
meets approximately 12–14 times a year for a few days per session. Members
of the Commission may attend all parliamentary meetings and are entitled to
address the Parliament.67 The Parliament holds plenary sessions in
Strasbourg, committee meetings and additional plenary sessions in Brussels
and has its secretariat based in Luxembourg. Much of the work of Parliament
is undertaken by committees on, for example, agriculture, legal affairs and so
on. Before a matter goes before Parliament sitting in plenary session, it will
normally be considered by the relevant standing committee. 
The original intention in relation to Parliament’s function was that it would
be a ‘supervisory and advisory’ body, with no legal effect being attached to its
deliberations. Under specific Treaty articles, the Council of the EU is obliged to
seek the advice of the Parliament, and failure to consider Parliament’s view
would cause the Council to be in violation of an essential procedural
requirement of Community law, and could cause the decision of the Council to
be declared void by the European Court of Justice.68 As will be seen, the
powers of the European Parliament have been increasing since 1986 (under the
Single European Act 1986), but even now it remains a very different
constitutional institution from that of domestic parliaments.
The European Parliament can adopt its own ideas and try to persuade the
Commission to adopt them. Usually this takes the form of an initiative report
– around 100 a year are approved by the European Parliament. However,
Parliament has no power to insist that the Commission adopt a proposal from
Parliament – the right of initiative is firmly in the hands of the Commission
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itself, other than where the European Parliament or the Council requests a
proposal from the Commission.
The European Parliament has decision making powers regarding the
annual budget. This power in relation to the Community budget has always
been of significance. The revenue of the Community comes primarily from
agricultural levies, customs duties on imports from outside the Community
and value added tax (VAT) levied within the Community. When the draft
budget is drawn up by the Council, after receiving proposals from the
Commission, it is then submitted to Parliament which has power to accept,
amend or reject the budget. The right of amendment depends on the type of
expenditure proposed. There are two categories of expenditure: compulsory
expenditure, which necessarily arises from Treaty provisions, and non-
compulsory expenditure. The non-compulsory expenditure can be amended
but, in relation to compulsory expenditure, Parliament may suggest
amendments but the Council of the EU has the last word.
Parliament has the power to reject the Community budget in total if there
are ‘important reasons to do so’: Article 272 of the EC Treaty. There must be a
majority of votes in Parliament and also two thirds of the votes cast. Rejection
of the budget occurred in 1979, when a new budget was subsequently drawn
up.
Parliament has the right to question the Commission and Council,69 and
replies are given both orally and in writing, and published in the Official
Journal of the European Communities. Parliament also has the power to dismiss
the entire Commission on a vote of censure if the vote is carried by a two
thirds majority of the votes cast, a vote which must represent an overall
majority of the votes in Parliament.70 If the vote is carried, the Commission
resigns as a body. However, in one sense, the power is too great to be
effective, for Parliament has no power to force the incoming Commission to
adopt a different policy from that of its predecessor. Under the TEU, however,
nominations for appointment to the Commission must hereafter be approved
by Parliament.71
Extension of Parliament’s powers
The powers of the European Parliament have been extended significantly. The
legislative process is now more complex and, in specific instances, it is
necessary to consult the substantive Articles of the Treaty in order to establish
the precise procedure to be followed.
The co-operation and co-decision procedures
The Single European Act 1986 provided for a new ‘co-operation procedure’,
which applied to many, but not all, instances in which the Treaties require
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Parliament to be consulted. This procedure, which gave the Parliament the
power to propose amendments to legislative proposals, has been largely
superseded by the co-decision powers introduced at Maastricht. The co-
operation procedure does continue to apply, however, to some issues relating
to European monetary union. 
Under the Treaty on European Union 1992, Parliament was given legal
powers in addition to its consultative powers.72 The Parliament was also
given powers of co-decision in relation to the internal market, education,
consumer affairs and other areas. The Treaty on European Union 1992 further
extended Parliament’s role in the legislative process.73 The procedure adopted
extends the role and power of Parliament to a considerable extent – although
not to the point where it can be equated with the normally understood
meaning of a democratic legislature. Articles 251–54 of the EC Treaty regulate
the legislative process and consolidates the provisions relating to the
European Parliament.
Articles 251 and 252 of the EC Treaty, as revised, define the procedure to
be followed where references are made to it in the substantive Treaty articles.
The 1997 Treaty has considerably extended the Parliament’s right to co-
decision with the Council. The new areas to which the co-decision procedure
applies include: non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality; freedom of
movement and residence; social security for migrant workers; right of
establishment for foreign nationals; rules governing professions;
implementation of transport policy; provisions arising from the social
protocol; decisions implementing the Social Fund; vocational training; public
health; provisions relating to trans-European networks; decisions
implementing the European Regional Development Fund; research; the
environment; development co-operation; equal opportunities and equal
treatment; openness; measures to counter fraud; statistics; creation of an
advisory body on data protection; incentive measures for employment;
customs co-operation; incentive measures for combating social exclusion.74
Where Parliament is given a role in the decision making process,
Parliament will give an opinion on a Commission reading. The first reading is
concluded when the Council adopts a common position. A time limit then
applies to Parliament reaching its decision, on the expiry of which the Council
may adopt the measure in accordance with its common position. Article 251
requires that, at second reading, Parliament must act by an absolute majority
of its Members in order to reject or amend the common position adopted by
the Council. If the Parliament rejects the common position, then the measure
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fails completely. Parliament also has the right to request the Commission to
submit legislative proposals, although this power is limited.75 There is no
power given to Parliament to draft a proposal itself if the Commission does
not act within the time limit suggested by the Parliament. 
The Treaty on European Union 1992 provided that Parliament shall
appoint an ombudsman to inquire into allegations of maladministration
within the Community.76 Article 195 of the EC Treaty, as revised by the
Amsterdam Treaty, now regulates this matter. Parliament may also establish
committees of inquiry to investigate allegations of maladministration.77 It was
a committee of inquiry which led to the downfall of the Santer Commission in
1999.78
How should the Parliament’s role be evaluated? Prior to the extension of
Parliament’s legislative role under the Single European Act and the Treaty on
European Union, in many instances, the European Parliament had limited
control over what happened after it had been consulted. The Council could in
many areas, if acting unanimously, ignore the views of Parliament. Nor was
the Council bound by Opinions issued by the Parliament. If a matter required
urgent attention, the Council might act without gaining Parliament’s opinion.
Parliament was not consulted on all Council legislation. For example,
traditionally, no consultation was required on external trade agreements
which the Council concluded on behalf of the Member States. 
The Single European Act gave the Parliament power to agree or to veto
special trade agreements. The Single European Act also extended Parliament’s
role in the admission of new Member States, whose admission must be
approved by a majority, thus giving the Parliament a power of veto. Where
Parliament is given a role in the legislative process under Article 251, as
revised, its role is subject to the limitations of being required to act by an
absolute majority – rather than simple majority – of its Members, and the time
limits imposed, although extendable (Article 249), represent a real restriction
on what Parliament may be expected to accomplish – particularly given the
relative infrequency of its meetings, and the short duration of its sessions. 
With the powers of Parliament enhanced under the Single European Act
and the Treaties on European Union and, most significantly, the extensive
increase in the areas over which the Parliament has a right of co-decision with
the Council introduced by the Maastricht Treaty but reformed under the
Amsterdam Treaty, the European Parliament has gradually been given the
powers needed to offset the perception that the Parliament lacked a real role
in legislation, including a properly functioning veto power.
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The European Council79
The year 1974 saw the formalisation of an informal arrangement which had
pertained from the 1960s. A communiqué was issued at the Paris Summit of
Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers of Member States, of which the
following is the most important:
Recognising the need for an overall approach to the internal problems
involved in achieving European unity and the external problems facing
Europe, the Heads of Government consider it essential to ensure progress and
overall consistency in the activities of the Community and in the work on
political co-operation.
The Heads of Government have therefore decided to meet, accompanied by
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, three times a year and, whenever necessary, in the
Council of the Community and in the context of political co-operation.
The constitutional implications of the communiqué are twofold. In the first
place, the communiqué represented an adjustment of the institutional
arrangements of the Community (now Union) which were brought about
without recourse to the formal Treaty amending provisions, a mechanism
demonstrating the dynamic and flexible means by which the Community and
Union can evolve. Secondly, the motivation behind the communiqué lay in
the perception that the role of the Commission had been reduced by the
Member States’ insistence on protection of their national interests, as
exemplified in the increasing use of the unanimous vote in Council which had
the effect of stultifying the growth of the Community. The first official
recognition of the communiqué, which had no legal standing, is found in the
Single European Act 1986,80 which specified the membership of the European
Council and reduces the minimum number of annual meetings from three to
two. The Treaty on European Union confirms this arrangement and Article 4
of the Treaty states that:
The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for
its development and shall define the general political guidelines thereof. 
...
The European Council shall submit to the European Parliament a report after
each of its meetings and a yearly written report on the progress achieved by
the Union.
The Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers accordingly meet twice a
year, together with the President of the Commission, two Members of the
Commission and officials. A primary purpose of the meetings is to review
economic and social matters such as inflation, economic growth,
unemployment, the European monetary system, international political issues,
reform of the Common Agriculture Policy and constitutional issues such as
applications for membership of the Union and political integration.
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The decisions reached are political, the European Council having no law
making powers. The impact on the Commission, Council of the EU and
Parliament are of constitutional significance. The Commission loses its own
power of initiative, the Council of the EU loses power because decisions are
reached at Head of State level, and the Parliament is bypassed in the decision
making process.
The Court of Auditors
The Court of Auditors originates in the Financial Provisions Treaty of 1975 but
has now been given formal recognition as an institution of the European
Union under the Treaty on European Union 1992: see Articles 246–48 of the
EC Treaty. The Court of Auditors comprises 15 members, appointed under
similar terms and conditions to judges of the European Court of Justice. The
term of years is six, and Members are under a duty to act completely
independently in the performance of their duties and to act in the general
interests of the Community. A President of the Court, appointed for a
renewable term of three years, heads the Court of Auditors. It is the Court of
Auditors which has responsibility for monitoring the expenditure of the
Community. It carries out audits, examining the accounts of all revenue and
expenditure of the Community. At the end of each financial year, the Court of
Auditors is under a duty to draw up an Annual Report which is forwarded to
the other institutions of the Community and published, with replies from
these institutions, in the Official Journal of the European Communities.
The significance of the Court of Auditors being given the status of a
Community institution under the Maastricht Treaty is that it makes available
to the Court the full range of legal remedies available to other institutions,
thus reinforcing the safeguards which ensure that it is able to perform
effectively. The Court of Auditor’s task is to assist the European Parliament
and the Council in exercising their powers of control over the implementation
of the budget. The Court may also submit observations on specific questions
and deliver opinions at the request of one of the European institutions.
The Court of Auditors is required to provide the Council and Parliament
with a Statement of Assurance relating to the reliability of accounts and the
legality of the underlying transactions. In its auditing function, the Court of
Auditors may examine records in the European institutions and the Member
States. The Court of Auditors examines the accounts of Community revenue
and expenditure and considers whether these have been received and
incurred in a lawful manner and whether the financial management has been
sound. The Court of Auditors is independent and has the power to carry out
its audits at any level. In addition to monitoring the internal revenues and
expenditure of the Union, the Court of Auditors also monitors co-operation
agreements between the European Union and many developing countries,
and the system of Community aid to Central and Eastern Europe.
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The Economic and Social Committee
The Economic and Social Committee is appointed by the Council, and
currently has 222 members, appointed on the basis of the populations of
Member States.81 The Member States submit lists of nominees for
appointment, and are required to nominate twice as many persons as will be
appointed (Article 259 of the EC Treaty). Members of the Committee are
representative of different occupational and social groups. Article 257 of the
EC Treaty stipulates that the Committee has advisory status. Article 257 also
stipulates that, in particular, the Committee shall have representatives of
producers, farmers, carriers, workers, dealers, craftsmen, professional
occupations and representatives of the general public.
The Committee of the Regions
Under the Treaty on European Union 1992, the Committee of the Regions,
currently comprising 222 representatives of regional and local bodies, was
established, with advisory status (Articles 263–65 of the EC Treaty). With
enlargement, the number of members will increase to 344. It advises the
Council and Commission on education, culture and regional development.
The Committee, headed by a Chairman, meets at the request of the Council or
Commission, and may also meet on its own initiative. The Committee must be
consulted by the Council or the Commission where the Treaty so provides.
The European Investment Bank
Established under the Treaty on European Union 1992 (see Articles 266–67 of
the EC Treaty), the European Investment Bank is charged with the task of
promoting the ‘balanced and steady development of the common market in
the interest of the Community’. The Bank operates on a non-profit making
basis, and grants loans and can give guarantees which facilitate the financing
of a number of projects, including projects for developing less developed
regions, modernising or conversion projects and projects of common interest
to several Member States.
The European Court of Justice82
The judges in the European Court of Justice (ECJ) are appointed by ‘common
accord of the governments of Member States’. Each state makes one
nomination. Unlike superior judges in the United Kingdom, the qualification
for appointment to judicial office in the ECJ is that candidates are ‘persons
whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications
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required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective
countries or who are jurisconsults of recognised competence’. Judges are
appointed for a six year term of office (Article 223).
The Court is presided over by a President who holds office for a three year
term. Assisting the judges are eight Advocates General, whose duties are
defined in Article 222 of the Treaty as ‘acting with complete impartiality and
independence, to make, in open court, reasoned submissions on cases brought
before the Court of Justice ...’. It is the Advocates General who will examine
each case and present the legal arguments to the Court for its decision.
Pressure on the ECJ resulted in a Court of First Instance being introduced
under the Single European Act 1986. Starting work in 1989, the Court of First
Instance consists of 15 Members with the majority of cases being heard in
Chambers comprising three or five judges. The Court of First Instance is not
empowered to hear and determine questions referred for a preliminary ruling
under Article 234 of the EC Treaty, on which see further, Chapter 9.
The role of the ECJ is provided for in the most general terms by Article 220
of the EC Treaty: ‘The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation
and application of this Treaty, the law is observed.’ At first sight, given that
the jurisdiction of the Court is derived solely from the treaties, Article 220
would seem to confine the ECJ to consideration of Community law, a point
reinforced by the wording of Article 234 of the Treaty. In the early days, the
Court adopted this narrow interpretation of its jurisdiction and the Court
rejected any invitation to draw on the law of Member States in the forming of
decisions. From the 1970s at least, a change in attitude can be discerned in the
reasoning of the Court. From that time, judges felt able, indeed compelled, to
make recourse to domestic law of Member States in order to ensure both the
effectiveness of Community law within a particular Member State and to
produce harmony between the laws of all Member States. The Court
accordingly draws particularly on fundamental concepts existing in the laws
of Member States in order to enable common legal concepts to be incorporated
into Community law.83 However, the ECJ can only rule on the interpretation
and legality of EC/EU law: it has no power to rule on the domestic laws of
Member States. It is the need for uniformity of the law within the legal
systems of Member States which represents a major function of the Court. 
Under Article 226 of the Treaty, the Court of Justice may make rulings on a
matter brought before it by the Commission alleging breach of the treaties by
a Member State. Prior to bringing the matter to the ECJ, the Commission
exercises a quasi-judicial function. The Commission must first consider that a
Member State has failed to fulfil a Treaty obligation and, secondly, give a
reasoned opinion to that state and advise as to the action which must be taken,
and the time limit for action to be taken to comply with the opinion. Only if a
Member State fails to comply with the opinion will the matter be taken to the
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ECJ. In Commission of the European Communities, supported by Kingdom of Spain
and United Kingdom v French Republic (1997), the Court of Justice ruled that
France had failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty (Article 28, in
conjunction with Article 10), in that it had failed to adopt appropriate
measures to prevent farmers and others from obstructing the free movement
of fruit and vegetables. The Court ruled that the free movement of goods was
one of the fundamental principles of the Treaty. The French government had
failed to prevent violent and obstructive behaviour by farmers and others and
therefore its failure placed it in breach of the Treaty requirements.
In Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland (2000), the Commission sought a declaration that the
United Kingdom had failed fully to comply with a Directive84 concerning the
protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural
sources. The United Kingdom authorities had identified only surface waters
intended for extraction of drinking water, whereas the Directive also required
the identification of surface freshwaters not intended for the abstraction of
drinking water which contained excessive nitrate concentrations or could do
so. In addition, no ‘vulnerable zones’ had been identified in Northern Ireland,
and those areas which had been designated had been designated on the
incorrect criteria, as in the rest of the United Kingdom. The fact that the
authorities were now taking action to remedy the failure did not exclude the
state’s liability for breach of its obligations under the Directive.
Two early examples of the circumstances giving rise to the use of this
power are provided in Commission v Italy (1979) and Commission v United
Kingdom (1979). In the latter case, a Regulation issued by the Council came
into effect on 1 January 1976, requiring Member States to introduce
tachographs85 into certain commercial vehicles. In February 1976, the United
Kingdom government sent a draft statutory instrument, which showed the
intention to introduce a voluntary rather than compulsory scheme. The
Commission reiterated the compulsory nature of the scheme and, in May
1977, the government indicated that it would not comply. In October 1977, the
Commission initiated action under Article 169 of the EC Treaty (now Article
226). In January 1978, the government stated that, due to trades union
objections, it was unable to comply. In February 1978, the Commission gave
its reasoned opinion requiring compliance and a two month period in which
to comply. In June 1978, the matter went to the European Court. In February
1979, the ECJ ruled that the United Kingdom was in breach of the Treaty.
Failure to transpose a Directive into national law by the stipulated date will
not be excused on the basis that transposition required revision of provisions
of a Member State’s constitution. The Court of Justice so held in Commission v
Kingdom of Belgium (1998), in which an action was lodged under Article 169 of
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the EC Treaty for a declaration that Belgium had failed to bring into force
within the prescribed period the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions necessary to comply with Council Directive 94/80/EC, which laid
down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and to stand
as a candidate in municipal elections by citizens of the Union residing in a
Member State of which they are not nationals. 
Under Article 227 of the Treaty, one Member State may bring a fellow
Member State before the Court. Again, a procedure is specified which gives
the Commission a quasi-judicial function. Before an action is brought before
the Court the aggrieved Member State must bring the matter to the attention
of the Commission. Once again, the Commission must give a reasoned
opinion, the Member State having been given the opportunity to make oral
and written submissions on the allegation. Once this procedure has been
completed, the Member State has a discretion whether or not to bring the
matter before the Court. If the Commission fails to act and deliver its opinion
within three months from the date of the allegation, then the aggrieved state
may proceed with the action before the Court. 
Article 228 of the Treaty provides that, if the ECJ finds that a Member State
has failed to fulfil its obligations, the state shall be required to take the
necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court. However, one
of the principal defects in the ECJ’s power lay in its inability to impose
sanctions. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced two significant reforms. In relation
to policies relating to free movement of persons, visas, asylum and
immigration, the Court of Justice is given jurisdiction to make rulings on
questions of interpretation of the relevant Treaty provision and to rule on the
validity or interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community. This
right is confined to courts or tribunals against which there is no judicial
remedy, and provides that that tribunal or court must refer the matter for a
ruling. The Court may also give rulings on the interpretation of these matters
when requested by the Council, Commission or a Member State. The Court
does not have jurisdiction, however, to rule on any measure relating to the
maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.86 The
Court’s jurisdiction is also extended in relation to the third pillar (Police and
Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters, formerly Justice and Home
Affairs), to give preliminary rulings, in respect of which Member States have
made a declaration stating that they accept this jurisdiction. The Court also
has jurisdiction to rule on any dispute between Member States or between the
Member States and the Commission in respect of the third pillar. 
The increasing volume of work undertaken by the Court of Justice and the
Court of First Instance, has led the Court to propose reforms designed to
improve efficiency. The Court had advocated a form of accelerated or
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simplified procedure for dealing with cases of a ‘manifestly urgent nature’,
and for dealing with certain cases on the basis of written procedure alone. In
relation to preliminary rulings (under Article 234, on which see below), while
the system should remain, the Court has proposed that where an answer to a
question is apparent from existing case law, it should rule more frequently by
way of simple order, and that Member States could set up judicial bodies with
responsibility for dealing with references for preliminary rulings within their
territorial jurisdiction.
With the future membership of the Union being set to increase, the Court
has expressed concern that the increasing number of judges would ‘cross the
invisible boundary between a collegiate court and a deliberative assembly’, a
development which could pose a threat to efficiency and the consistency of
case law.
Penalties for failure to comply with rulings of the European Court
The Treaty on European Union empowered the Court to impose a lump sum
or penalty payment against a Member State which fails to respect the
judgment of the Court.87 In January 1997, the Commission agreed the
procedures for the imposition of fines on Member States who fail to comply
with rulings of the European Court of Justice. Where a Member State is in
breach of Community law, the Commission will apply to the Court for a
determination of the fine. The levels of fines will be relative to the size of the
economy of the state. 
Article 230 of the EC Treaty provides the ECJ’s jurisdiction to review the
legality of acts adopted ‘jointly by the European Parliament and the Council,
of acts of the Council [and] of the Commission ...’. The Court is also given
jurisdiction to rule on complaints brought by Member States, the Council or
the Commission on grounds of ‘lack of competence, infringement of an
essential procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of
law relating to its application, or misuse of powers’. If an action is well
founded, the Court may declare the act concerned to be void.88 It is by these
means that the ECJ controls the exercise of powers by the institutions of the
Community.89
Article 232 of the Treaty provides the means whereby Member States and
institutions of the Community can challenge the Council and Commission on
the basis that they have failed to act as required under the Treaty. The use of
Article 232 is illustrated by the European Parliament’s attempt to push the
Council over the implementation of direct elections to Parliament. Article
138(3) of the original EC Treaty (now Article 190(4)) stated that the Assembly
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shall draw up proposals for direct elections, which it did in 1960. Article
138(3)(2) stated that the Council shall, acting unanimously, lay down the
appropriate measures for the elections and make recommendations to
Member States for their implementation. The Council failed to act and in 1969
the Assembly again requested action, threatening the Council with an action
under Article 175 (now Article 232) for failure to act. Agreement was finally
reached and direct elections took place in 1979. Article 138 also provided that
the voting procedure employed within Member States for the election of
Members of the European Parliament would be ‘uniform’. This measure
lapsed in 1979, when it became clear that uniformity would not be
achievable.90 Article 190(4) now simply provides that representatives in the
European Parliament ‘shall be elected by direct universal suffrage’.
Article 234 of the EC Treaty91
The single most important jurisdiction in terms of ensuring that Community
law is uniformly interpreted within national legal systems is that conferred on
the Court to give preliminary rulings under Article 234. The Court may rule
on the interpretation of the Treaty, and on the validity and interpretation of
acts of the institutions of the Community. Article 234 provides that:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community
and of the European Central Bank (ECB);
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the
Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State
that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is
necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a
ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal
of a Member State against whose decision there is no judicial remedy under
national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of
Justice.
It is this Article which raises directly the nature of the legal system of the
Community and the relationship between Community law, the European
Court of Justice and domestic law and the role of judges in national courts.
Article 234 is crucial to the development of Community law and the Treaty of
Rome (the EEC Treaty, now the EC Treaty) extended the jurisdiction of the
Court in a significant manner. Under the European Coal and Steel Treaty, the
Court had power to rule on the validity of Community actions when the issue
was in question before the national court – but it did not, unlike the Court of
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Justice under the EEC Treaty, have jurisdiction to interpret the Treaty. There is
a vast difference in power between being able to rule on the vires of an action
of an institution and the power to interpret the Treaty provisions themselves.
The latter power gives to the Court a dynamic function as opposed to the
more limited review function, which, whilst important, did not entail any
development of substantive law by interpretative methods. Under Article 234,
the ECJ has been given a role in the creation of law at least as important as the
legislative powers of the Commission and Council. This power, as utilised, is a
matter of some controversy with the European Court, being both criticised
and praised for adopting a deliberate policy making stance which goes
beyond that of interpretation of the Treaty.92
Article 234 envisages a partnership approach between the domestic courts
and the European Court of Justice. It is important both as a matter of principle
and as a practical matter that the domestic courts are actively involved in the
application of Community law, and that a measure of discretion is left to
domestic courts in the matter of referring a matter to the ECJ under Article
234. It must also be recognised, however, that the discretion left to domestic
courts carries with it the potential for a distortion of the meaning of
Community law within the 15 legal systems. A particular difficulty faces the
courts in the United Kingdom, whose traditional approach to the
interpretation of statutes has been one very much constrained by the detailed
wording of statutes and the pedantic literal, golden and mischief rules. By
contrast, in civil law systems,93 the judges are experienced in interpreting
broadly phrased statutory provisions, using the teleological94 interpretative
method. Lord Diplock explained the approach of the European Court in Henn
and Darby v Director of Public Prosecutions (1981):
The European Court, in contrast to English courts, applies teleological rather
than historical methods to the interpretation of the Treaties and other
Community legislation. It seeks to give effect to what it conceives to be the
spirit rather than the letter of the Treaties; sometimes, indeed, to an English
judge, it may seem to the exclusion of the letter. It views the Community as
living and expanding organisms and the interpretation of the provisions of the
Treaties as changing to match their growth. [p 852]
Under Community law, both the common law and civil law systems must
coexist in a manner which best promotes the harmony of the new legal system
created by the treaties. For harmony to be achieved, it is axiomatic that judges
with very differing backgrounds and experience adopt a common approach
both to interpretation and to the circumstances under which it is appropriate
and necessary to refer a matter to the European Court of Justice for
interpretation. In order to understand the relationship between the European
Court of Justice and national courts, and the issue of the supremacy of
267
92 See Rasmussen, 1988; Slynn, 1984.
93 Defined as those deriving primarily from Roman law.
94 That is to say, seeking the interpretation which most closely fits the objective sought by
the legislature.
Community law, it is first necessary to examine the sources of Community
law, and the manner in which Community law comes into effect in domestic
law. This matter is discussed in the next chapter. 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms – drafted and enacted in 1950 under the aegis of the Council of
Europe95 – establishes a charter of rights and freedoms which are protected by
the Commission and Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.96 The Treaty of
Rome 1957 (now Article 303 of the EC Treaty) envisaged close links with the
Council of Europe.97 The EC itself, however, has not as such been bound by
the Convention.98
In 1979 the Commission of the European Community adopted a
Memorandum endorsing the option of accession by the EC to the
Convention.99 A number of obstacles lie in the way of such accession. First, it
would enable the rights enshrined in the Convention to enter indirectly into
those dualist states100 which had not incorporated the Convention into
domestic law. Secondly, it would further increase the workload of the already
stretched Strasbourg machinery. Thirdly, it would pose problems for the
enforcement of rights in those states seeking admission to the European
Community which do not yet conform to the principle of the rule of law and
protection of rights which underlies membership of the European Community
and Union.101
The Preamble to the Single European Act 1986 had already made explicit
the concern for the protection of human rights within the Community. The
Preamble stated a:
... determination to promote Democracy on the basis of the Fundamental
Rights recognised in the constitutions of the Member States, in the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and the European Social Charter, notably
freedom, equality and social justice.
Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union goes further, and states that:
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The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional
traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community
law.
The original Treaties gave no explicit reference to the protection of individual
rights in their entirety, although Treaty articles such as Article 119102 provide
for equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment. The
manner in which the ECJ has developed the jurisprudence on rights is linked
inextricably with its insistence on the supremacy of Community law over the
domestic law of Member States. In 1969, the Court of Justice turned its
attention specifically to the status of fundamental individual rights in relation
to the principles of Community law. In Stauder v City of Ulm (1969), the ECJ
stated that it had a duty to protect the rights of individuals as provided for by
the constitution of the Member State, and that such provisions formed part of
the general principles of Community law. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft
mbH v EVST (1970) clarified the relationship between domestic constitutional
law and Community law in matters of rights. The ECJ expressed its opinion
that respect for fundamental rights ‘forms an integral part of the general
principles of law protected by the Court of Justice. The protection of such
rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional traditions common to the Member
States, must be ensured within the framework of the structures and objectives
of the Community’ (p 1134). In Nold v Commission (1974), a case concerning a
person’s status as a wholesaler, the ECJ ruled that, consistent with its earlier
judgment in Handelsgesellschaft, constitutional rights protected under Member
States’ constitutions must be respected, but also declared that ‘international
treaties for the protection of human rights’ can ‘supply guidelines which
should be followed within the framework of Community law’ (para 13). The
European Convention on Human Rights,103 the International Labour
Organisation treaties,104 the Council of Europe’s European Social Charter, the
International Covenants on Civil and Political and Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights105 have all been cited by the ECJ as aids to interpretation of
Community law. 
On a piecemeal, case by case basis, the ECJ has gradually and steadily
incorporated the protection of individual rights into its case law. However,
while all Member States of the Community are signatories to the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the EC is not a party to the ECHR, and
the relationship between the EC and ECHR remains indistinct. The ECJ
accepts the significance of the ECHR, and regards the ECHR provisions as
part of the general principles of Community law. However, that position does
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not go so far as to amount to the ECHR being regarded as a central, integral
part of Community law. Academics disagree as to whether the ECHR is
binding on the law of the EC. HG Schermers has argued that the EC is bound
by the ECHR.106 Conversely, A Dremczewski argues that the ECHR does not
bind the EC.107 Whatever the precise status of the ECHR, and its relationship
with the Community, it is clear that the ECJ is committed to the protection of
rights. What remains unclear is the breadth of the protection which the ECJ
will afford to provisions of the ECHR. On the question of whether accession
by the Community to the European Convention on Human Rights was
compatible with the Treaty establishing the Community, the European Court
of Justice has itself ruled that there is no legal basis in the Treaty for such
accession, and that accession could only be brought about by amendment of
the Treaty.108
The Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, reiterating the fundamental commitment
of the Union to human rights and fundamental freedoms, introduces the
power to issue penalties to Member States who are in breach of rights. Aware
of the potential problems entailed in the enlargement of the Union and the
admission of Member States with a poor record on human rights, the Treaty
provides for a penalty falling short of expulsion from the Union, a penalty
which itself could undermine the protection of rights of that Member State’s
citizens. Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (formerly Article F.1)
provides that:
The Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or Government
and acting by unanimity on a proposal by one third of the Member States or by
the Commission and after obtaining the assent of the European Parliament,
may determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a Member
State of principles mentioned in Article 6(1), after inviting the government of
the Member State in question to submit its observations.
Where such a determination has been made, the Council, acting by a qualified
majority, may decide to suspend certain of the rights deriving from the
application of this Treaty to the Member State in question, including the voting
rights of the representative of the government of that Member State in the
Council. In doing so, the Council shall take into account the possible
consequences of such a suspension on the rights and obligations of natural and
legal persons.
The principle of respect for human rights is also binding on Member States
when acting within the scope of Community law, namely when implementing
an EC measure,109 or seeking to derogate from a fundamental freedom.110
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CHAPTER 9
SOURCES OF COMMUNITY LAW
Having examined the structure, institutions and law making process of the
European Union and Community in the previous chapter, it is now necessary
to turn attention to the forms of Community law and the interaction between
Community law and domestic law. The primary sources of Community law
are the Treaties, as amended. Secondary legislation is law made by the
Community institutions, and includes the interpretation of both primary and
secondary sources by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Secondary
legislation comprises regulations, directives and decisions. Article 249 of the
EC Treaty defines these terms as follows:
In order to carry out their task, the Council and Commission shall, in
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, make regulations, issue
directives, take decisions, make recommendations or deliver opinions ...
• A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its
entirety and directly applicable in all Member States;
• A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each
Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national
authorities the choice of form or methods;
• A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is
addressed;
• Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force. 
It is clear from Article 249 that regulations and directive have ‘binding effect’
in all Member States, but, as discussed below, this takes different forms.
Decisions and recommendations, on the other hand, have more limited effect,
the former binding those to whom they are addressed, the latter having ‘no
binding force’. There are, however, other ‘sources’ which, while not having
legally binding force, nevertheless have a significant impact on the working of
the Community and Union.1 The institutions of the Union, for example,
formulate their own procedures for self-regulation. In addition, as will be seen
below, the Council has the power to enter into international agreements
between the Community and non-EU states on behalf of the Member States of
the Union. In addition, there are measures which are labelled ‘soft’ (as
opposed to ‘hard’) law. In addition to recommendations and opinions under
Article 249, Jo Shaw (2000) cites ‘communications, conclusions, declarations,
action programmes and communiqués’ as examples of soft law. Joint actions
taken by Members States in pursuit of Union objectives also fall within soft
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law, as do conventions and ‘framework decisions’ made in relation to policy.
While the principal concern in this chapter is with the ‘hard law’ of the
Community and Union, it must also be recognised that these disparate
mechanisms exist in order to further European objectives across wide ranging
fields of policy on which it may not be possible always to secure complete
agreement between all 15 Member States, and therefore translate a soft law
measure into hard law which has binding legal effect.
DIRECT APPLICABILITY AND DIRECT EFFECT2
The principles of direct applicability and direct effect3
As can be seen from the text of Article 249, a regulation is ‘binding in its
entirety’ and has direct applicability. By ‘direct applicability’ it is meant that
the measure leaves no discretion to the Member States but, rather, confers
rights and duties within the Member States without further legislative
participation. In other words, the provision is self-executing. On the other
hand, a directive, whilst binding in its objective, leaves to the Member State
some leeway in its introduction and the manner in which a Member State
implements and achieves the objectives set by the Council, Commission and
European Parliament.
In order to understand the way in which Community law operates within
Member States’ legal systems, the principle of direct effect must be examined.
The basic principle of direct effect of Community measures is that nationals of
Member States may invoke certain provisions as conferring direct rights,
which individuals may rely in national courts. While Article 249 states
specifically that regulations are directly applicable, the Article is silent as to
the legal consequence of this applicability, and as to whether a Treaty provision
itself, or regulations or directives, can have direct legal effect on individuals.4
The principle of direct effect is linked to Article 10 of the EC Treaty which
provides, in part, that:
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or
resulting from action taken by institutions of the Community. They shall
facilitate the achievement of Community tasks. They shall abstain from any
measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this
Treaty.5
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As can be seen from Article 10, Member States are under a legal duty both to
take action to ensure compliance with Community law and to refrain from
any action which might impede the application and effectiveness of
Community law. Article 10 forms the basis for much of the jurisprudence of
the ECJ, and the foundation for the enforcement of individual rights against
Member States.
Direct effect and Articles of the Treaty
In 1963, the ECJ articulated the theoretical basis for the principle of direct
effect in Van Gend en Loos (1963), a case which involved a reference to the ECJ
from the Dutch courts. From this case, many significant later developments of
Community law can be seen to originate. Under Article 25 of the EC Treaty
(formerly Article 12):
Customs duties on imports and exports and charges having equivalent effect
shall be prohibited between Member States. This prohibition shall also apply to
customs duties of a fiscal nature.
Before 1958, and the coming into force of the EC Treaty, the Dutch firm of Van
Gend en Loos had been importing glue from Germany, applying a customs
duty of three per cent. In 1959, the Dutch government ratified an agreement
with other countries establishing an eight per cent duty. The company
protested to the Customs Court, relying on the direct effect of Article 12 of the
EC Treaty. The Court referred the matter to the ECJ under Article 177 (now
Article 234). The principal question for the court was whether, as claimed,
Article 12 had direct effect on the legal position on the company. The Treaty
Article did not stipulate its legal effect, and Article 189 of the EC Treaty (now
Article 249) refers only to regulations having direct applicability. The ECJ held
first that, if a Treaty provision is to confer individual enforceable rights, it
must indicate that it applies not just to Member States but also to individuals
within the state. Secondly, the provision must be clear and precise. Thirdly,
the provision must be unconditional and unqualified and not subject to any
further measures on the part of Member States. Finally, the provision must be
one which does not leave any substantial latitude or discretion to Member
States.
Specifically in relation to Article 12, as it then was, the ECJ held that the
text was clear and unconditional, that it required no legislative intervention by
the Member State and that the Member State had no power to subordinate
Article 12 to its own law. Thus, it can be seen that both provisions in the
Treaty and regulations are capable of having direct effect if they satisfy the
requirements laid down by the ECJ.
The principle of direct effect of Treaty provisions was examined by the
House of Lords and the ECJ in Henn and Darby v the Director of Public
Prosecutions (1979–81). In that case, the accused defended a criminal
prosecution on the basis that the subject matter of the charge offended against
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Treaty provisions. The accused were charged with conspiracy to import
obscene materials contrary to the law of the United Kingdom. Article 28 of the
EC Treaty (formerly Article 30), however, prohibits quantitative restrictions
on imports. The House of Lords referred the matter to the ECJ under Article
177 (now Article 234), asking the ECJ to interpret Article 30 (now Article 28) in
order to establish whether English law was bound by the restriction in Article
30. In response, the ECJ ruled that English law infringed Article 30 but that
lawful restrictions on pornography could be imposed by a Member State
under Article 36 of the EC Treaty (now Article 30), which provides that
restrictions on imports otherwise contrary to Article 30 are justified on the
grounds of, inter alia, public morality, public policy or public security.
Accordingly, the prosecution was able to proceed, but the point was
established that the defendants could raise the direct effect of Article 30 in
their defence.6
Directives and direct effect7
A further question which arises is whether directives are similarly capable of
having direct effect. It has been seen from Article 249 that directives leave no
discretion as to their objectives, but do leave some discretion as to manner of
implementation. Nevertheless, the ECJ has found provisions of directives to
be capable of having direct effect. The reasoning of the ECJ is revealed in Van
Duyn v Home Office (1975). Article 39 of the EC Treaty (formerly Article 48)
provides (in part) that:
1 Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the
Community.
2 Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination
based on nationality ... as regards employment, remuneration, conditions
of work and employment.
3 It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public
policy, public security and public health to accept offers of employment ...
Yvonne Van Duyn, a Dutch national, arrived in England in May 1973, having
accepted a job as a secretary with the Church of Scientology. Immigration
Officials refused Ms Van Duyn admission to the United Kingdom on the basis
that the Secretary of State considered employment with the Church
undesirable. In an action against the Home Office, Ms Van Duyn sought to
rely on Article 48 of the EC Treaty and a reference was made to the ECJ under
Article 177 (now Article 234 of the EC Treaty).
The directive in question was that of the Council8 which set out the
objective of co-ordinating measures concerning movement and residence. The
public policy issue, relied on by the Home Office, was regulated by Article
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3(1) of Directive 64/221, which stipulates that: ‘... measures taken on grounds
of public policy and public security shall be based exclusively on the personal
conduct of the individual concerned.’ 
The ECJ held that it would be incompatible with the binding effect
attributed to a directive to exclude in principle – as the United Kingdom
government sought to argue – the possibility that the obligation which it
imposed might be invoked by those concerned: that the Directive’s usefulness
would be weakened if an individual could not rely on it before national
courts. Since the directive laid down an obligation which was not subject to
any exception or condition, and by its nature did not require intervention on
the part of the Community or Member States, it followed that the directive
was to be regarded as directly effective and conferred enforceable individual
rights which national courts must protect.
Thus, it can be seen that, in some cases, directives, as well as regulations
and Treaty provisions, may have direct effect – depending on their wording
and clarity and whether or not Member State action is required as a
prerequisite to implementation. The deadline for implementation of the
Directive must, however, have passed.9 Where a directive is not precise, and a
right insufficiently defined, it will not have direct effect. The Court of Appeal
so ruled in Gibson v East Riding of Yorkshire Council (2000). At issue was Article
7 of the Working Time Directive, which requires Member States to take
necessary measures to ensure that workers are entitled to ‘paid annual leave
of at least four weeks’ in accordance with relevant national legislation.
Mummery LJ stated that the right that the applicant wished to assert against
the council was quite simply not sufficiently defined in Article 7 to be
enforceable by an individual in national courts and tribunals. Compare,
however, the approach taken by the ECJ in Francovich (1991), where the fact
that an amount payable was determinable was enough – in principle – to be
directly effective, even if the Member State had a discretion to award a greater
amount.
Vertical and horizontal effect of Community law
In addition to the concept of direct effect, Community law utilises the notion
of vertical and horizontal effect of legal provisions, and this complicating
factor is one which is the subject of a good deal of argument. In essence, the
concept of vertical effect means that a Community measure – whether a
regulation or directive (depending on whether the qualifying criteria are met)
– is directly enforceable by an individual against the Member State. In other
words, the rights conferred and obligations imposed by Community law are
enforceable at the suit of an individual against his or her own Member State,
which is responsible for giving effect to the Community provision. For
example, in Van Duyn v The Home Office (above), the citizen was challenging
the decision of a government minister: the action was thus vertical in nature
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and the Directive could be invoked. Of greater difficulty is the question of
whether an enforceable obligation exists which entitles an individual to
pursue his or her rights, not directly against the Member State, but
horizontally against institutions, organisations or individuals within the
Member State other than the government of the state. The form of direct effect
– that is to say, vertical or horizontal – will determine the liable body
concerned.
With vertical effect, Community law imposes a duty on the Member State
to comply and confers an enforceable right on the citizen. The Member State is
thus responsible to the citizen for the enforcement of his or her Community
rights. Directives enjoy vertical, but not horizontal, effect and can only be
invoked against the state and emanations of the state. The Court of Justice
denies the possibility of horizontal direct effect of directives,10 which would
extend the liability for failure to comply with Community law requirements to
non-state bodies or individuals. However, the concept of indirect effect (on
which, see below) of directives complicates this theoretically straightforward
position. Under the concept of indirect effect, the Court of Justice insists that
national courts have a duty to interpret national law in a manner consistent
with Community law directives so far as possible. This doctrine applies even
in actions between two individuals, and regardless of whether the directive or
national law is earlier in time. Where indirect effect applies, therefore, a
directive appears to have been given horizontal effect. 
PUBLIC AND QUASI-PUBLIC BODIES
In Defrenne v SABENA (1978), the ECJ confirmed the principle of horizontal
direct effect of Treaty provisions. In that case, the provision in question was
Article 119 of the EC Treaty (now Article 141). Gabrielle Defrenne, an air
hostess with the Belgian airline SABENA, was required, under the contract of
employment, to retire at the age of 40, whereas men did not have to retire at
that age. Moreover, she was paid less than male employees, and would
receive a smaller state pension then men. The state pension question went to
the ECJ, which ruled that Article 119 of the EC Treaty did not cover state
pension rights.11 Ms Defrenne then commenced actions against her employer,
on the issue of equal pay and on the discriminatory retirement ages. In
relation to the question of equal pay (but not retirement age), the action was
successful.12 The matter was referred to the ECJ, which ruled that Member
States were obliged to implement Article 119 by the end of a transitional
period, and that the principle of direct effect of the Article entitled individuals
to rely on Article 119, (now Article 141 of the EC Treaty) against both public
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and private sector employers, even where the provisions implementing the
principle of equal pay had not been implemented by the state.13
The duty imposed on Member States under Article 10 of the EC Treaty is
clear, and forms the basis for the European Court’s jurisprudence on direct
effect. The question of whether a directive could be relied on by individuals
against employers was tested in the English courts in Marshall v Southampton
and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority (1986). The UK Sex
Discrimination Act 1975 enabled differing retirement ages to be fixed for men
and women. Mrs Marshall challenged the legality of the requirement for
women to retire at the age of 60, alleging that the Act was contrary to the
European Community’s Equal Treatment Directive.14 Two issues, therefore,
fell for consideration by the court. First, were different retirements ages in
breach of the EC Directive and, secondly, if so, could an individual rely on the
Directive to challenge an Area Health Authority? In other words, the issue
was whether the Directive was directly effective against an employer in its
contractual relationship with an employee or, alternatively, whether the Area
Health Authority was an ‘emanation of the state’. An Area Health Authority
was deemed to be a public (as opposed to a private) body, and accordingly
bound by Community law. The ECJ made clear that in principle a directive
could not, of itself, create obligations for non-state actors.
In Foster v British Gas plc (1991), however, which also entailed differing
retirement ages for employees, the Court of Appeal had held that British Gas,
a statutory corporation, was not a public body against whom the Directive
could be enforced. The House of Lords sought clarification on this issue from
the ECJ under Article 177 (now Article 234). The ECJ refused to accept British
Gas’s argument that there was a distinction between a nationalised
undertaking and a state agency and ruled that a directive might be relied on
against organisations or bodies which were ‘subject to the authority or control
of the state or had special powers beyond those which result from the normal
relations between individuals’. The Court accordingly ruled that a directive
might be invoked against ‘a body, whatever its legal form, which has been
made responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted by the state, for providing a
public service under the control of the state and has for that purpose special
powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in
relations between individuals’. Therefore, British Gas was a public body
against which a directive might be enforced, a ruling which the House of
Lords subsequently accepted. In Doughty v Rolls Royce plc (1992), however, the
Court of Appeal distinguished Foster and held that Rolls Royce plc, although
‘under the control of the state’ had not been ‘made responsible pursuant to a
measure adopted by the state for providing a public service’. Rolls Royce was
277
13 For further discussion of the ECJ’s decisions in relations to equality between men and
women, see Chapter 20.
14 Directive 76/207/EEC.
at the time a nationalised body, responsible for providing defence equipment.
However the court distinguished between services for the public and services
provided to the state, and thereby ruled Rolls Royce not to be a public body
for the purposes of the effectiveness of directives.
The European Court of Justice, in Faccini Dori v Recreb srl (1994), re-
examined the principle of the horizontal effect of directives. An EC consumer
directive,15 which had not yet been implemented by the Italian authorities,
founded a claim against a private undertaking. The Advocate General argued
that the ECJ should extend the principle of direct effect of directives to claims
against all parties (irrespective of their public or private nature). The ECJ
declined to do this, and reasserted its view that directives could not be
invoked directly against private bodies. However, the ECJ referred to the
possibility that directives could be deemed to be indirectly effective and also
that they might be enforceable via the principle of the liability of the state to
give effect to Community measures, as seen in Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy
(1992) (on which, see below). 
In relation to directives, the Court of Justice has ruled that these can, at
best, have vertical effect against an emanation of the state – as laid down in
Marshall v Southampton Area Health Authority (No 1) and subsequently
confirmed, as in Faccini Dori v Recreb srl (1994) – and not horizontal effect. The
role of directives in ensuring the harmonisation and approximation of laws
within the legal systems of the Member States of the Union, and the manner in
which direct effect ensures harmonisation is illustrated by the case of CIA
Security International SA v Signalson SA and Securitel SPRL (1996),16 which also
has significant implications on the direct effect of directives. Involved in this
case was the interpretation of Article 30 of the EC Treaty (free movement of
goods) and of Directive 83/189/EEC, which came before the European Court
of Justice under a reference under Article 177 (now Article 234 of the EC
Treaty).17
Articles 8 and 9 of Directive 83/189 lay down procedures for the provision
of information in the field of technical standards and regulations. Under these
provisions, Members States must notify the Commission of all draft technical
regulations, and, except in particularly urgent cases, suspend their adoption
and implementation for specified periods until the requirement of notification
has been complied with. The provisions are unconditional and sufficiently
precise in terms of their content to have direct effect and so enable an
individual to rely on them before a national court, which must decline to apply
a national technical regulation which has not been notified in advance in
accordance with the directive. The purpose of making such regulations
inapplicable is in order to ensure the effectiveness of Community control for
which the directive is made. The Court of Justice ruled that:
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It is settled law that, wherever provisions of a directive appear to be, from the
point of view of their content, unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may
be relied on against any national provision which is not in accordance with the
directive. [CIA v Signalson (1996), judgment, para 42]
This decision appears to undermine the clear rule against the horizontal effect
of directives as expressed in Faccini Dori. Where previously an individual who
suffers from the failure of a Member State to implement a directive could
resort to a claim for compensation, the decision in CIA Security enables an
individual to claim in a national court that the directive in question is
unenforceable, even in proceedings between private parties.18
The principle of indirect effect
Whereas the principle of direct effect entails rights which are directly
enforceable against the Member State or an emanation of the state, indirect
effect provides a more subtle mechanism for ensuring compliance with
Community law. Indirect effect involves the application of the duty imposed
on Member States, including courts of law under Article 10 of the EC Treaty,
which provides that:
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall
facilitate the achievement of the Community’s tasks. They shall refrain from
any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this
Treaty.
In securing the uniformity of the application of Community law within
Member States, the European Court of Justice has utilised Article 10 to great
effect. National courts are required to interpret all national law in light of
Community law, and that duty exists irrespective of whether a Community
measure has direct effect.
In Von Colson v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (1984), Article 5 of the EC Treaty
(now Article 10) and the Equal Treatment Directive 76/207 fell for
consideration by the ECJ (see, also, Harz v Deutsche Tradax GmbH (1984)). As
seen above, Article 10 of the Treaty provides that Member States are under a
duty to ‘take all appropriate measures’ to ensure fulfilment of their
Community obligations. Ms Von Colson’s application for employment in the
prison service was rejected. The rejection was based on gender, and was
justifiable according to the German court. Under German law, the only
compensation payable to Ms Von Colson was her travelling expenses. The
question arose as to whether such compensation gave effect to the
requirements of Article 5, as it then was. On a reference under Article 177
(now Article 234), the ECJ examined Article 5 (now Article 10) of EC Treaty.
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The ECJ ruled that Article 5 imposed a duty not just on the governments of
Member States, but on all national authorities, including the courts. It is
therefore the duty of the domestic courts to interpret national law in such a
way as to ensure that the obligations imposed by Community law are
achieved. The result is that, although a provision is not directly effective, it
may be applied indirectly as law by means of interpretation. 
The question of the relationship between domestic law and subsequently
introduced Community law came before the ECJ in the Marleasing case in
1989. In Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA (1992),19
the ECJ, on a reference from a Spanish court, had ruled that, whereas a
directive cannot of itself impose obligations on private parties, national courts
must as far as possible interpret national law in order to achieve a result
pursued by a directive, and that this must be done whether the national
provisions in question were adopted before or after the directive. In
Marleasing, no legislation had been passed to comply with the directive: the
duty was nevertheless on the courts to give effect to the Von Colson principle,
that is to say, the court must interpret domestic law in accordance with
Community law. This principle enables directives to have horizontal effect ‘by
the back door’. A gap in protection, however, still remained. Where there was
no domestic law on a Community matter and where, as a result, there was no
domestic provision to construe in line with Community law, a problem would
remain. The Court of Justice reaffirmed the interpretative duty in Centrosteel
Srl v Adipol GmbH (2000), in which the Court stated that it was well settled that
‘in the absence of proper transposition into national law, a directive cannot of
itself impose obligations on individuals’. However, the Court went on to state
that: ‘... when applying national law, whether adopted before or after the
directive, the national court that has to interpret that law must do so, as far as
possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive so as to
achieve the result it has in view ...’ Note, however, that this is linked to the
date on which the implementation period expires. This requirement is
designed to frustrate the argument that horizontal effect should not be created
on grounds of legal certainty.20
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The liability of the state
As seen above, Article 10 imposes an obligation on Member States to facilitate
and not to impede the objectives of the Community. Where a Member State
has failed to undertake its duty, the concept of state liability arises. In
Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy (1991), employees were seeking compensation
against Italy for failure to implement a directive which was designed to
guarantee the payment of arrears of wages to employees in the event of their
employer’s insolvency. The time limit set down by the Community for
implementation of the directive had expired and, as a result, Italy was held to
be in breach of its Community obligations under Article 5 (now Article 10).21
The ECJ held that, while the directive was not sufficiently clear to be
directly effective against the state, as regards the identity of institutions
responsible for payments, Italy was under an obligation to implement the
directive under Article 5 of the EC Treaty. Accordingly, since Italy had failed
in its obligation, it was under a duty to compensate individuals for damage
suffered as a result of its failure.22 The ECJ laid down three conditions which
applied to the issue of compensation for loss, namely that:
(a) the directive confers individual rights;
(b) the content of those rights can be identified on the basis of the provisions
of the directive; and
(c) there is a causal link between the state’s failure and the damage suffered
by individuals affected.23
Under such conditions, an individual may proceed directly against the state.
Accordingly, the importance of the principle of direct effect diminishes, and
liability falls not on the employer – whether public or private – but on the
state, by virtue of its obligations under the Treaty. 
However, many questions remained unanswered. Was the state liable only
for failure to implement the directive? Was the state liable, irrespective of
whether there was any fault involved on the part of the state? Furthermore,
was the state liable for loss incurred prior to the ECJ finding the Member State
in breach of its obligations? What form of compensation is recoverable? Does
it include loss of profits? Is compensation confined to economic loss? 
In Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Federal Republic of Germany (1996)24 and R v
Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd (No 4) (1996), the
European Court of Justice ruled on the principles which regulate the grant of
compensation to bodies suffering damage as a result of Member States’ breach
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of Community law. Member States are obliged to make good the loss suffered
by individuals when: 
• the national legislature, executive or judiciary is responsible for the breach
of Community law;
• the rule of law breached is intended to confer rights on individuals; 
• the breach must be sufficiently serious, defined as a manifest and grave
disregard of the limits on the Member State’s discretion; and 
• there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation and
the damage suffered. 
As to the degree of seriousness of the breach, the considerations to be taken
into account by the court considering the issue of compensation, as stipulated
by the Court of Justice, are:
... the clarity and precision of the rule breached; the measure of discretion left
by that rule ...; whether the infringement and the damage caused was
intentional or involuntary; whether any error of law was excusable or
inexcusable; the fact that the position taken by a Community institution may
have contributed towards the omission, and the adoption or retention of
national measures or practices contrary to Community law.
On any view, a breach of Community law will clearly be sufficiently serious if
it has persisted despite a judgment finding the infringement in question to be
established, or a preliminary ruling or settled case law of the court on the
matter from which it is clear that the conduct in question constituted an
infringement. [Ex parte Factortame (No 4) (1996)]
Note that Brasserie and Factortame concerned loss suffered as a result of
breaches of Treaty provisions that are directly effective. In other words, the
scope of state liability is neither limited to the failure to implement directives
nor to the absence of direct effect. Member States must compensate
individuals at a level which is commensurate with the loss or damage
suffered. Further, if damages could be awarded under English law to similar
claims based on domestic law, it is possible to award exemplary damages for
the breach of Community law.
The question of compensation was also considered by the Court of Justice
in R v HM Treasury ex parte British Telecommunications plc (1996). The United
Kingdom had incorrectly transposed a directive into domestic law. The
Divisional Court referred the matter to the Court of Justice which ruled that
compensation for loss caused was only payable under the circumstances laid
down in Factortame (No 4) (above). In the instant case, no reparation was
payable because the breach was not sufficiently serious. The directive was
imprecisely worded and was reasonably capable of being interpreted in the
manner adopted by the United Kingdom.
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In R v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte Hedley Lomas
(Ireland) Ltd (1996), the European Court of Justice ruled that the United
Kingdom had an obligation to pay compensation for damage caused to an
individual by its failure to comply with Community law. The United
Kingdom authorities decided that they would not issue export licences for the
export of live animals intended for slaughter in Spain, on the basis that Spain
did not comply with the directive on the welfare of animals and that, if the
export licence was granted, the animals would suffer treatment contrary to the
directive. However, the export licence was intended to enable the export to a
specific slaughterhouse in Spain, which complied with Community directives
on animal welfare, and the United Kingdom authorities had no evidence that
it did not so comply. As a result, the United Kingdom was in breach of Article
34 of the Treaty (now Article 2a), and its action could not be justified under
Article 36 (now Article 30) (justifications for quantitative restrictions on
exports). The breach was sufficiently serious and there was a direct causal link
between the breach and the damage sustained by the individuals.
In Dillenkofer and Others v Federal Republic of Germany (1996), the European
Court ruled, once again, that, if a Member State failed to take ‘timeous’
(timely) action to implement a Community directive, individuals injured by
that failure were entitled to seek reparation from the Member State. Member
States had been required to bring a directive25 into effect before 31 December
1992. Germany brought the directive into effect as from July 1994. Travellers
adversely affected by this delay sought compensation for their loss. The Court
of Justice held that:
The first question to be answered concerned the conditions under which a state
incurred liability towards individuals where a directive has not been
transposed within the prescribed period.
The crux of that question was whether such a failure was sufficient per se to
afford individuals who had suffered injury a right to reparation, or whether
other conditions had to be taken into account ...
Reciting Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy (1991), Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Federal
Republic of Germany (1996), R v HM Treasury ex parte British Telecommunications
plc (1996) and R v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte Hedley
Lomas (Ireland) Ltd (1996), the Court stated that individuals who had suffered
damage were entitled to compensation where the three conditions set out
above were met. Germany had argued in its defence that the time allowed for
full implementation of the directive was too short. This argument, however,
did not succeed and the Court ruled clearly that failure to implement a
directive within the specified time period per se constituted a sufficiently
serious breach of Community law.
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THE INTERACTION BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS 
AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: ARTICLE 234 
OF THE EC TREATY (FORMERLY ARTICLE 177)26
Article 234 represents a vital means by which the harmony of laws between
Member States is achieved. The European Court of Justice is insistent both
that Community law has supremacy and that it be uniformly applied within
Member States. And yet, the treaties establish a partnership between the
judges within the national legal systems and the European Court. It is not
difficult to see that the task of uniformity is a difficult one as 15 nation states
adopt and adapt to the requirements of Community law. For optimum
effectiveness, a balance needs to be struck between making references to the
ECJ where necessary and the domestic courts being able to apply Community
law without undue delay or cost. 
The text of Article 234 is set out in Chapter 8 (see p 266) and, from this, it
can be seen that courts or tribunals may refer a question, provided that it is a
question of Community law – and not national law – which requires
interpretation, and provided also that a decision of the ECJ is necessary to
enable the national court to reach a decision in the case.27 A reference becomes
mandatory when the question of Community law is before a court or tribunal
of last resort, that is to say, a court or tribunal from which there is no further
appeal. This does not always mean the House of Lords: in many cases, the
appeal structure will end lower in the hierarchy, or leave to appeal may be
needed and be refused. Accordingly the court of last resort may effectively be
at any level in the judicial hierarchy. If no appeal is possible and the other
criteria of a question of Community law and the necessity for interpretation
exist, a reference must be made. In Costa v ENEL (1964), the reference was
from a magistrates’ court and involved a claim of less than £2.00 in value: no
right of appeal existed because the amount in issue was so small. 
The English Court of Appeal, in Bulmer v Bollinger (1974), considered the
question of when references to the ECJ should be made and Lord Denning
laid down the following guidelines for English courts to apply when a
reference was a matter of discretion:
(a) the decision must be necessary to enable the court to give judgment – a
court must feel that it cannot reach a decision unless a reference is made;
(b) the decision of the question must be conclusive to the case – not just a
peripheral issue;
(c) even if the court considers a reference to be necessary, regard must still be
paid to:
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• the delay involved;
• the expense;
• the difficulty of the point of law;
• the burden on the European Court.
These ‘guidelines’ are questionable in so far as they may impede the
willingness of a court to refer matters to the ECJ, and they represent a gloss on
the wording of Article 234. A further impediment to referral may arise from
the doctrine of acte clair – the concept which states that if a matter is so
obvious in its meaning to the domestic court, then no reference need be made.
As with the Bulmer v Bollinger guidelines, the doctrine of acte clair can lead to
distortions in interpretation within domestic legal systems. The ECJ has itself
considered the circumstances under which courts should refer, and the
doctrine of acte clair,28 in the CILFIT case of 1983.29 The Court was asked to
consider the meaning of Article 177(3) (now 234(3)) which relates to
mandatory references from a court of last resort. The Court ruled that:
(a) there is no duty to refer where a question of Community law was
irrelevant – that is, if the interpretation can have no effect on the outcome
of the case;
(b) there is no duty of refer when the question is one substantially the same as
one previously answered by the ECJ;30
(c) there is no need to refer where no real doubt about the law exists. The
national court must, however, be satisfied that the matter is equally
obvious to courts of other Member States and to the ECJ. To this limited
extent, the doctrine of acte clair is endorsed.
In CILFIT, the ECJ emphasised that the purpose of Article 177 (now Article
234 of the EC Treaty), in general, was to ensure the proper application and
uniform interpretation of Community law in all Member States and to prevent
divergencies occurring within Member States.
Whereas national courts have some discretion as to whether to refer a
matter to the ECJ, the position is different in relation to matters of validity – as
opposed to interpretation – of Community law. It is clear that the ECJ has the
sole power to rule on whether a measure of Community law is invalid. It is
not for national courts to rule on that question. National courts only have the
power to uphold the validity of Community legislation.31
The House of Lords had adopted a similar approach to that endorsed by
the ECJ in the CILFIT case, in Henn and Darby v Director of Public Prosecutions in
1981, discussed above. The Court of Appeal had ruled that quantitative
restrictions on imports prohibited by Article 30 did not amount to a total ban
on such imports, and had refused to refer the case to the ECJ. On appeal to the
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House of Lords, a reference was made to the ECJ, which ruled that a total ban
could be within Article 30 of the EC Treaty (now Article 28). The House of
Lords warned that lower courts should be slow to assume that a matter was
‘clear’. As Lord Diplock put it:
... judicial minds can differ on questions of interpretation ... this serves as a
timely reminder to English judges not to be too ready to hold that because the
meaning of the English text (one of the nine equally authoritative EC
languages) seems plain to them that no question of interpretation can be
involved.
As seen from the text of Article 234 of the EC Treaty, the questions which may
be referred are:
(a) interpretation of the treaties;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of institutions of the Community:
regulations, directives, etc;
(c) the interpretation of statutes of bodies established by acts of the Council.
Once the ECJ accepts jurisdiction – and a discretion is conferred on the ECJ
over whether or not to accept jurisdiction – and gives a ruling, the matter is
then returned to the domestic court for application, thus preserving the
partnership ideal. 
THE QUESTION OF LEGAL SUPREMACY
The question of legal supremacy can be examined both from the standpoint of
the Community itself and from that of national law.
The European Court of Justice’s view
The ECJ claims that Community law is supreme over national law. This claim
carries the following implications:
(a) Community law confers rights on individuals to which national law must
give effect;
(b) national law cannot prevail over Community law;
(c) the effectiveness of Community law must be the same in all Member
States – it cannot vary in effect from one Member State to another;
(d) courts of Member States must follow the interpretation of laws given by
the ECJ or, where there is no authority, and under certain conditions, must
refer the matter to the ECJ under Article 234 of the Treaty;
(e) where the ECJ gives a ruling, Member States are under an obligation to
amend their national laws so as to conform to Community law.32
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The ECJ has asserted the supremacy which Community law assumes on many
occasions. The early cases lay the foundations for the current relationship
between domestic law and Community law. The starting point is once again
the case of Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Tariefcommissie (1963), in which the
ECJ enunciated the view that, by signing the treaties, the Member States had
created a new legal order, in which individual states had limited their
sovereign rights. In Costa v ENEL (1964), this view was reaffirmed by the ECJ:
The transfer by the states from their domestic legal system to the Community
legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with
it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights against which a subsequent
unilateral act incompatible with the concept of Community law cannot prevail.
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v EVST (1970) takes the principle of
Community supremacy further. Under Community law, in order to export
produce, the company was required to obtain a licence, for which a
‘permanent deposit’ had to be paid. If the goods were not exported within the
licence period, the deposit was to be forfeited. The company paid the deposit,
failed to complete the export, and forfeiture was made. The firm sued the
agency involved for return of the deposit, arguing that the forfeiture was
contrary to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. The
Constitution provided that powers could be transferred to international
organisations, but that no transfer could be made of powers which the central
government itself did not have. Since the retention of the deposit was contrary
to the Federal Constitution, it could not, according to German law, be lawful
under the law of the Community. The matter was referred to the ECJ under
Article 177 (now Article 234). 
The ECJ declared that giving effect to rules or concepts of national law
contained even within the constitution of a state, for the purposes of judging
the validity of Community measures, would have an adverse effect on the
uniformity and efficacy of Community law. The validity of Community
measures could be judged only in the light of Community law and could not
be affected by allegations that the measures ran counter to fundamental rights
as formulated by the constitution of the Member State. Having made this
unequivocal and controversial statement, the ECJ softened its tone, ruling that
the respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the ‘general
principles of law’ protected by the Court of Justice, and that the protection of
such rights, inspired by traditions common to Member States, must be ensured
within the framework of the structure and objectives of the Community. 
The Simmenthal case (1976–80) further developed the jurisprudence of the
ECJ in relation to supremacy. Simmenthal imported beef from France into
Italy. Under Italian legislation of 1970, fees for veterinary and health checks
had to be paid by the importer at the frontier. Simmenthal sued the Italian
Minister of Finance for return of the money, arguing that the fee was
equivalent to a customs duty and was contrary to Article 12 (now 25) of the
Treaty and Community regulations on the common organisation on beef
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imports. The national court ordered the Ministry to return the money. The
minister pleaded that the domestic 1970 Act was binding unless and until set
aside by the Italian Constitutional Court. 
The Italian court was thus faced with a conflict between Article 12, as it
then was, of the Treaty and a later Italian statute. A reference was made under
Article 177 (now Article 234), the question at issue being whether directly
applicable regulations issued under Article 189 (now Article 249) required
national courts to disregard subsequently passed domestic legislation,
without waiting for the Constitutional Court to declare it invalid. The ECJ
held that regulations take precedence over previous and subsequent domestic
legislation and that a national court, whatever its position or role in the
national judicial hierarchy, must set aside any provision which conflicts with
Community law and apply Community law in its entirety, without waiting
until the domestic legislation had been set aside by the Constitutional Court.
The European Road Transport Agreement (ERTA) case (Commission v Council)
(1971) offers another perspective.33 In 1962, several European states, five of
which were EC Member States, others being Eastern European states, signed
the European Road Transport Agreement, which sought to establish common
rules concerning conditions of work of long distance lorry drivers crossing
several state boundaries. As such, the Agreement was not an EC agreement.
In 1969, the EC had acted for the (then) six Member States by issuing a
regulation covering the same issue. In 1970, the matter was further
complicated by the Council meeting to attempt to find a common basis for a
new transport agreement. The Commission attempted to have the
proceedings of the Council annulled on the basis that the Council was not
competent to reach agreements of this kind.34
At the heart of the matter lay the question as to who had the power –
Member States, the Council or the Commission – to make such ‘international’
agreements. If Member States retained the power to enter into international
agreements (and such a power is a basic attribute of sovereignty), then the
Council proceedings were merely recommendatory; if the Council had power
then the proceedings took on more of a law making character, which deprived
the Member States of competence to act either unilaterally or collectively. The
Court held that, having regard to the legal personality of the Community and
the exercise of Community competence in 1969, the sole power to enter into
such agreements lay with the Community institutions, thus depriving
Member States of any capacity in this regard. The ECJ’s decision had thereby
conferred an implied external relations power on the Community. 
Under the EC Treaty, express powers to enter into treaties is provided
under Article 310. It might have been thought that, given such powers, there
would be no need for the ECJ to confirm that the Community has implied
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powers, as in ERTA. In summary, the effect of these early cases is that, since
1962, the ECJ has declared the existence of a new legal order, one to which
Member States have limited their sovereign rights by transferring these to the
Community. These rights include even the protection of constitutionally
guaranteed individual rights. Further, it matters not whether a domestic law
in conflict with Community law was passed prior to accession to the EC or
subsequently: neither can prevail over Community law. Thirdly, where the
Community has the power to act on behalf of Member States in the making of
international agreements, Member States have lost that capacity.
It is clear that Community law prevails not only over domestic law, but
also over issues of domestic policy. In R v Secretary of State for the Environment
ex parte Royal Society for the Protection of Birds; the Port of Sheerness Ltd, intervener
(1995), for example, a Council directive35 on the conservation of wild birds fell
for interpretation by the Court of Justice on a reference from the House of
Lords under Article 177 of the EC Treaty (now Article 234).36 The questions
referred by the House of Lords were:
(a) whether a Member State was authorised to take account of the economic
requirements mentioned in Article 2 of the Birds Directive when
designating a special protection area and defining its boundaries;
(b) whether a Member State, when designating a special protection area and
defining its boundaries, was allowed to take account of economic
requirements as constituting a general interest superior to that represented
by the ecological objectives of the Directive;
(c) whether a Member State could take account of economic requirements to
the extent that they reflected imperative reasons of overriding public
interest of the kind referred to in Council Directive 92/43/EC on the
conservation of the natural habitats of wild fauna and flora.37
The Court of Justice ruled that the Secretary of State was not entitled to take
economic considerations into account when designating a special protection
area for wild birds and defining its boundaries. 
Before examining the position of the English courts, it is necessary to
consider the means by which Community law is received into English law.
THE RECEPTION OF COMMUNITY 
LAW INTO THE UNITED KINGDOM
The concepts of monism and dualism
At a conceptual level, the manner in which international law, of which
Community law may be regarded as a sui generis (that is to say, unique)
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example, is dependent upon whether a particular state adopts a monist or
dualist approach to international law. Monism is the doctrine whereby
international law and national law form a single whole, or part of the same
conceptual structure, in which international law takes precedence. Under this
doctrine, adhered to by, inter alia, France and Italy, the obligations of
international law, once assumed, enter automatically into the legal system,
needing no domestic legislative acts. Once entered, the obligations take
precedence over national law. 
Dualism, on the other hand, regards the systems of international law and
national law as separate: in order for international law to enter into national
law, some domestic legislative action must be enacted by the national
parliament. This is the view adopted by the United Kingdom and is one
consistent with the sovereignty of parliament; see Chapter 7. Treaties are part
of international law, and can have no effect in domestic law unless and until a
statute of the sovereign United Kingdom Parliament is enacted to give them
effect. (Note that this matter assumed primary importance in the debate over
the ratification of the Treaty on European Union, the Maastricht Treaty, in
1993.)
In 1972, Lord Denning MR confirmed this view in Blackburn v Attorney
General (1971):
Even if a Treaty is signed, it is elementary that these courts take no notice of
treaties as such. We take no notice of treaties until they are embodied in laws
enacted by Parliament, and then only to the extent that Parliament tells us.
[p 1382]
Accordingly, the signing of the EC treaties, without any further parliamentary
action, had no effect in English law. In order to have effect, it was necessary
for parliament to pass the European Communities Act 1972.
The European Communities Act 1972
Section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972 provides that:
(1) All such rights powers liberties obligations and restrictions from time to
time created or arising by or under the treaties, and all such remedies and
procedures from time to time provided for by or under the treaties ... are
without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United
Kingdom shall be recognised and available in law and be enforced,
allowed and followed accordingly ...
(2) Subject to Schedule 2 of this Act, at any time after its passing Her Majesty
may by Order in Council and any designated Minister or Department may
by regulations make provision:
(a) for the purpose of implementing any Community obligation of the
United Kingdom, or of enabling any rights enjoyed or to be enjoyed by
the United Kingdom under or by virtue of the treaties to be exercised ...
(4) The provisions that may be made under section 2(2) include, subject to
Schedule 2, any such provision (of any such extent) as might be made by
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Act of Parliament, and any enactment passed or to be passed ... shall be
construed and have effect subject to the foregoing provisions of this section
...
Section 3(1) provides that:
For the purposes of all legal proceedings any question as to the meaning and
effect of any of the treaties, or as to the validity, meaning or effect of any
Community instrument, shall be treated as a question of law (and if not
referred to the European Court of Justice, be for determination as such in
accordance with the principles laid down by and any relevant decision of the
European Court).
Here, then, are the most fundamental provisions of the Act – specifying that
rights and duties which are directly applicable or effective are to be given
legal effect within the United Kingdom; that the executive has the power to
give effect to Community obligations, and that existing and future enactments
are to be interpreted and have effect and that the meaning or effect of Treaty
provisions is to be decided according to Community law.
The view of the United Kingdom courts
The manner in which, and extent to which, the United Kingdom courts have
accommodated Community obligations requires consideration. First, it should
be noted that nothing in the European Communities Act (ECA) 1972
represents an attempt to entrench its provisions, that is to say, to make them
immune from amendment or repeal. There is no statement in the Act
purporting that EC law is a ‘higher form of law’, or that the Act cannot be
repealed, or could be repealed but only by some specified ‘manner and form’. 
Nevertheless, section 2(4) has produced controversy among
commentators, given that it directs the courts to interpret Acts of Parliament
passed in the future in conformity with the principle expressed in section 2(1).
The dominant view is that this section does not achieve entrenchment as such,
but rather should be viewed as a directive to the courts in the form of a rule of
construction (interpretation) which must give way to an express contrary
intention expressed by parliament.
Two early challenges were made to the signing of the Treaty on the basis
of the potential or actual loss of parliamentary sovereignty. In Blackburn v
Attorney General in 1971, the plaintiff sought a declaration that the
government, by signing the Treaty of Rome, would surrender part of
parliament’s sovereignty which it could not lawfully do, as no parliament
could bind another. In R v Home Secretary ex parte McWhirter (1969), the
plaintiff adduced that joining the EC was contrary to the Bill of Rights 1689,
which declared that all powers of government are vested in the Crown and
parliament could not, therefore, by means of a Treaty, transfer those rights.
In both cases, the arguments were disposed of with speed. In Blackburn,
Lord Denning MR stated that ‘even if the Treaty is signed, it is elementary that
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the courts take no notice of [it] until embodied in an Act of Parliament’.
Further, in McWhirter, Lord Denning stated that ‘even though the Treaty of
Rome has been signed, it has no effect as far as the courts are concerned until
implemented by Act of Parliament. Until that day, we take no notice of it’.
A challenge to the government’s Treaty making power also came in R v
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ex parte Rees-Mogg (1994).
Lord Rees-Mogg sought a declaration from the court to the effect that the
government could not lawfully ratify the Treaty on European Union 1992, the
Maastricht Treaty, without the consent of parliament. The Court of Appeal
gave short shrift to the argument, relying on the earlier precedents, and no
appeal was made to the House of Lords.
Conflicts between Community law and domestic law38
One area of law which has given rise to an instructive array of case law
concerning the relationship between domestic law and Community law is that
of sex discrimination. There are, of course, a variety of ways in which
discrimination on the basis of sex may arise: in relation to equal pay or equal
treatment in respect of access to employment, promotion, training, working
conditions, social security and retirement ages. Article 141 and directives39
form the framework of the law of the Community. 
In Macarthys v Smith (1981), Mrs Smith was employed by Macarthys as a
stockroom manageress. The man who had previously held the position had
been paid a higher wage than Mrs Smith. The applicable domestic legislation
was the Equal Pay Act 1970, as amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975,
which provided, inter alia, that men and women employed in the same job
should be paid equal amounts. The Act was silent, however, as to whether
employers were required to pay the same wage to a woman who came to the
job after the man had left their employment. The relevant point for
interpretation, therefore, was whether men and women, employed at differing
times for the same job, were required to be paid equally.
Article 119 of the EC Treaty (now 141) provides for equal pay for men and
women. This Article is couched in far broader terms than those used by the
Equal Pay Act 1970. The matter was referred by the Court of Appeal to the
European Court of Justice under Article 177 (now Article 234). The ECJ held
that Article 119 required equal pay for men and women whether they were
employed contemporaneously or in succession. On receiving the judgment of
the ECJ, the Court of Appeal ruled in favour of Mrs Smith. Lord Denning’s
judgment is of particular significance:
We should, I think, look to see what those [EC] provisions require about equal
pay for men and women. Then we should look at our own legislation on the
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point – giving it, of course, full faith and credit – assuming that it does fully
comply with the obligations under the Treaty. In construing our statute, we are
entitled to look to the Treaty as an aid in its construction: and even more, not
only as an aid, but as an overriding force. If on close investigation it should
appear that our legislation is deficient – or is inconsistent with Community law
– by some oversight of our draftsmen – then it is our bounden duty to give
priority to Community law. Such is the result of section 2(1) and (4) of the
European Communities Act 1972.
Thus far, I have assumed that our Parliament, whenever it passes legislation,
intends to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty. If the time should come when
our Parliament deliberately passes an Act with the intention of repudiating the
Treaty or any provision in it – or intentionally of acting inconsistently with it –
and says so in express terms – then I should have thought that it would be the
duty of our courts to follow the statute of our Parliament.
Article 119 fell for further consideration in Garland v British Rail Engineering
Ltd in 1983, this time by the House of Lords. British Rail made concessionary
travel facilities available to the children of male employees reaching
retirement, but not to the children of women reaching retirement. The
question was whether this policy amounted to discrimination contrary to
Article 119, as it then was, of the Treaty, and whether the courts in the
England should construe the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 in a manner so as to
make it compatible with the requirements of Article 119. The House of Lords
referred the matter to the ECJ, which ruled that the policy amounted to
discrimination contrary to Article 119, and that Article 119 must prevail. 
In Duke v GEC Reliance Ltd (1988), the House of Lords considered the
construction of section 6(4) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. In the Duke
case, the plaintiff’s claim for damages based on unequal treatment was for a
period prior to parliament’s amendment of the Sex Discrimination Act to
bring English law into line with the requirements of Community law. The
House of Lords declined to give retrospective effect to the amendment in light
of parliament’s express decision not to amend the Act retrospectively. One
interpretation of Duke is that, being a pre-Marleasing case – which makes it
clear that the Article 5 duty is imposed on national courts – the House of
Lords was in line with the ECJ’s interpretation of the Community law at the
time. 
In Litster v Forth Dry Dock Ltd (1990), however, the House of Lords
interpreted a domestic regulation contrary to its clear meaning in order to
comply with a directive as interpreted by the Court of Justice. The domestic
regulation had been introduced for the purpose of complying with the
directive and, accordingly, the House of Lords was complying with its duty
under section 2(4) of the European Communities Act 1972 to give effect to
Community law.40 Thus, from the House of Lords’ perspective, one important
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factor in the matter of the interpretation and application of Community law is
the response which parliament has made to the Community measure. If
parliament had implemented a measure before a directive was made, or if
parliament has responded to the requirements of Community law by not
amending domestic law in line with Community law, the judges may hold
that domestic law prevails over Community law. Where, however, parliament
has responded by amending the law, with the intention of bringing English
law into line with Community law, the English courts would undoubtedly
give effect to the Community law, even where the wording of a domestic
regulation required imaginative interpretation to give primacy to Community
law.41
For example, in Pickstone v Freemans plc (1989), the applicants were female
warehouse workers – operatives – who were paid the same as male operatives
but claimed that their work was of equal value to that of warehouse checkers,
who were paid more than they were. The Equal Pay Act 1970 did not
encompass the concept of equal value, but had been amended in 1983, by
statutory instrument under section 2(2) of the ECA 1972, following a ruling by
the ECJ that the Equal Pay Act was in breach of a Community directive. The
1983 amendment was intended to bring the Equal Pay Act protection in line
with Article 119 and the Community directive, but had been obscurely
worded. The result was that the House of Lords was forced to strain to
achieve an interpretation which could give effect to what Lord Oliver
described as the ‘compulsive provision of section 2(4)’ of the ECA 1972. The
required result was achieved by the House of Lords departing from the strict
literal interpretation of the text and implying words to fill the legislative gap
in order to reach conformity with Community law.
In Webb v EMO Cargo (UK) Ltd (1992), the issue of dismissal on the basis of
pregnancy was considered in relation to the EC’s Directive on Equal
Treatment. See, further, Chapter 20. The English Trades Union Reform and
Employment Rights Act 1993 provides that dismissal on the grounds of
pregnancy is unfair.42 However, in Webb v EMO Cargo (UK) Ltd (1992), the
Court of Appeal ruled, and the House of Lords affirmed, that a woman who
was dismissed from employment because of her pregnancy was not
unlawfully dismissed, since – comparing her to a man with a temporary
physical disability who would also have been unable to work – the man
would also have been dismissed. Under Article 177 (now Article 234), a
reference was made to the European Court of Justice. The ECJ ruled that
English law was inadequate and held, first, that pregnancy was not a
pathological condition to be compared with illness and, secondly, that a
pregnant woman’s inability to work was temporary and not permanent.
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Accordingly, the dismissal had amounted to sex discrimination.43 The Court
ruled that the Article ‘precludes dismissal of an employee who is recruited for
an unlimited term with a view, initially, to replacing another employee during
the latter’s maternity leave and who cannot do so, because, shortly after
recruitment, she is herself found to be pregnant’. The House of Lords, in Webb
v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd (No 2) (1995) ruled that sections 1(1)(a) and 5(3) of
the 1975 Act were to be construed in accordance with the ECJ’s ruling and that
in the case where a woman was engaged for an indefinite period, the fact that
the reason why she would be temporarily unavailable for work at a time
when her services would be particularly required was pregnancy was a
circumstance relevant to her case, being a circumstance that could not be
present in the case of the hypothetical man.44
In Grant v South West Trains Ltd (1998), the Court of Justice apparently
reached the limits of its respect for equality. A Southampton industrial
tribunal had referred a question under Article 234 of the Treaty concerning
whether the female partner of a lesbian woman was entitled to the same
employment benefits enjoyed by married or cohabiting heterosexual couples.
The applicant had enjoyed a stable relationship for over two years. When she
applied for the same benefits as heterosexual couples enjoy for her partner,
she was refused on the basis that concessions were only granted to cohabiting
couples who were heterosexual. The Court of Justice ruled that there had been
no violation of the Treaty on the basis of sexual inequality. 
Undoubtedly, the most constitutionally significant British case revealing
the relationship between Community law and domestic law is that of R v
Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame (1991). In 1970, the Council of
Ministers passed a regulation relating to the common organisation of the
market in fishery products. The basic principle employed was that, subject to
certain exceptions, there should be equal access for the fishing vessels of all
Member States to the fishing grounds of fellow Member States. In 1983, due to
fears of over-fishing caused by such open access, the Council established, by
way of regulation, a system for the conservation and management of
resources. This entailed, in part, setting limits to the amount of fish to be
caught in certain periods by way of ‘total allowable catches’ – the allocation of
total allowable catches being fairly distributed among the Member States by
way of national quotas. The quotas were based on the number of ships flying
the flag of a Member State or registered in a Member State.
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Spain acceded to the EC in 1986. Before 1986, the extent to which Spanish
vessels could ship in British waters was determined under agreements
between the Spanish and United Kingdom governments. Under English law,
the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 prohibited non-British nationals from owning
British fishing vessels but did permit corporate ownership by British
companies. Thus, directors/shareholders of Spanish vessels were able to
register under the 1894 Act. Some 96 Spanish fishing boats were registered
under the Act, and each of these vessels counted as part of the United
Kingdom’s quota under Community law.
The United Kingdom government, understandably alarmed at the
restrictions imposed on the domestic fishing industry and the ability of
foreign companies to register and therefore take up part of the United
Kingdom’s quota, imposed additional conditions for registration which came
into force in 1986. The three principal conditions for registration were to be
that a proportion of the catch was to be sold in the United Kingdom; that 75
per cent of the crews were to be EC nationals ordinarily resident in the United
Kingdom; and that all crew were to be required to contribute to the National
Insurance Scheme.
In 1988, the United Kingdom Parliament passed the Merchant Shipping
Act and enacted fresh merchant shipping regulations. The new system of
registration45 entailed qualification on the basis of a ‘genuine and substantial
connection with the United Kingdom’. The revised conditions required that
not less than 75 per cent of vessels be owned by United Kingdom citizens
resident in the United Kingdom; or wholly owned in the United Kingdom,
with 75 per cent of shareholders and directors in the United Kingdom; or part
owned, with 75 per cent of owners in the United Kingdom; and, further, that
vessels be effectively operated from the United Kingdom. Registration would
be lost with effect from 31 March 1989 until vessel owners could satisfy the
government that they were eligible for registration. 
As a result, Factortame, which did not comply with these more stringent
requirements, challenged the domestic requirements as incompatible with EC
law, on the grounds of discrimination on the grounds of nationality contrary
to Article 14 of the Treaty and the rights of companies to establishment under
Articles 43–48. The Divisional Court wanted to refer the matter to the ECJ
under Article 177 (now Article 234) – a move opposed by the plaintiffs unless
the Divisional Court was prepared to grant an interim order protecting their
putative Community rights by way of an injunction restraining the
government from imposing the requirements of the new regulations. The
Divisional Court, in 1990, granted an interim injunction against the
government restraining it from applying the Merchant Shipping Act
regulations until final judgment was made following a reference to the ECJ
under Article 177.
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The government appealed to the Court of Appeal, which ruled that the
court had no jurisdiction to grant interim relief disapplying an Act of
Parliament. On appeal to the House of Lords, the decision of the Court of
Appeal was upheld: injunctive relief against the Crown was not within the
court’s jurisdiction.
Lord Bridge of Harwich stated that:
In this situation, the difficulty which faces the applicants is that the
presumption that an Act of Parliament is compatible with Community law
unless and until declared incompatible must be at least as strong as the
presumption that delegated legislation is valid until declared invalid. ... if the
applicants fail to establish their claim before the European Court of Justice, the
effect of interim relief granted would be to have conferred upon them rights
directly contrary to Parliament’s will ... I am clearly of the opinion that, as a
matter of English law, the court has no power to make an order which has
these consequences.
It has been seen previously that Community law is supreme and requires the
protection – by domestic courts – of Community rights and that English courts
cannot rely on parliamentary sovereignty to justify the denial of protection
unless there is a clear and unequivocal parliamentary intention to defeat
Community law.46 Three complicating and constitutionally significant factors
arose in Factortame. First, whether the court could protect alleged rather than
established rights under Community law; secondly, whether – contrary to all
previous precedent – the provisions of Community law could confer
jurisdiction on the English courts to grant injunctive relief against the Crown;
and, thirdly, the conditions under which, should such jurisdiction exist, such
relief could be granted.
The ECJ, in its preliminary ruling on the first point (Case 213/89), held
that the offending provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act should be
suspended, pending a full determination of Factortame’s claim, stating that:
The full effectiveness of Community law would be impaired if a rule of
national law could prevent a court seized of a dispute governed by
Community law from granting interim relief in order to ensure the full
effectiveness of the judicial decision to be given on the existence of rights
claimed under Community law.
The ECJ reverted to its decision in Simmenthal (1979), reiterating that directly
applicable rules were to be fully and uniformly applied in all Member States
in accordance with the principle of precedence of Community law over
national law. Article 5 of the EC Treaty (now Article 10 of the EC Treaty)
imposes an obligation, as has been seen above, to ensure the legal protection
which is provided for under the principle of direct effect. The House of Lords
in R v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd (No 2) accepted the
ECJ’s ruling and granted interim relief.
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While legal action being pursued by Factortame was in progress, a
separate action was commenced by the Commission, alleging that the United
Kingdom was in breach of its Treaty obligation, and seeking an order that the
United Kingdom should suspend the Merchant Shipping Act in respect of
fishing vessels.47 The ECJ held that an interim order could be granted, on the
basis that the Act could be in breach of the prohibition against discrimination
on the grounds of nationality under Articles 43 and 294.48
In R v HM Treasury ex parte British Telecommunications plc (1993) (the BT
case), the applicant sought an interim injunction which would have had the
effect – as in Factortame – of causing national legislation to be disapplied while
the substantive issue was being considered by the ECJ. In Factortame, great
weight was attached to the very strong prima facie case put forward by the
applicants. In the BT case, the Court of Appeal cautioned against over-reliance
on the likelihood of success in the ECJ as a basis for granting relief. In part,
this caution was based on the fact that a reference had been made to the ECJ
under Article 177 (now Article 234), and that to give great weight to the
prognosis for success was to pre-judge the interpretation to be given by the
ECJ. The fact that a reference had been made meant that the English court was
uncertain as to the question in issue. Accordingly it would be inappropriate to
prejudge the issue by granting relief at an interim stage. The Court of Appeal
also warned of the difficulties in disapplying domestic legislation. As the
court stated, there should be a distinction drawn between a ‘major piece of
primary legislation’ and a ‘minor piece of subordinate legislation’. In relation
to the former, the court ruled that it would be far more circumspect than in
relation to secondary legislation. In the instant case, unlike Factortame, the
issues were not clear-cut. The court, ruling that it would only grant an interim
order ‘in the most compelling circumstances’, declined to grant the
injunction.49
The question of the compatibility of domestic law with Community law
arose once more in the case of R v Secretary of State for Employment ex parte
Equal Opportunities Commission and Another (1995) (the EOC case). There, the
Equal Opportunities Commission had brought an action challenging allegedly
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discriminatory employment protection provisions in English law, arguing that
these contravened European Community legislation. The House of Lords, in a
bold decision, granted a declaration to the effect that national law was
incompatible with Community law. However, the House of Lords did not go
so far as to rule that the English provisions were void, rather, the House
confined its ruling to the compatibility issue – thus avoiding any potential
conflict with parliament and the concept of sovereignty.
In Ratcliffe and Others v North Yorkshire County Council (1995), the House of
Lords ruled that the County Council had violated section 1 of the Equal Pay
Act 1970. The action had been brought by Unison, the public service union, on
behalf of 1,300 dinner ladies employed by the Council, whose pay had been
reduced from £3.31 per hour to £3.00 per hour, a rate below that of dustmen,
gardeners, cleaners and street sweepers, with whom they had been compared
for equal pay purposes. Section 1 of the Equal Pay Act 197050 provides that:
‘An equality clause shall not operate in relation to a variation between the
women’s contract and the man’s contract if the employer proves that the
variation is genuinely due to a material factor which is not the difference of
sex ...’ Under the Local Government Act 1988, local councils were obliged to
put the provision of school meals out to tender, and could only lawfully
continue to provide such services if their own tender was accepted. In order to
render its bid competitive, the Council had made a number of women
redundant and re-employed them at lower hourly rates of pay. The House of
Lords ruled that the Council ‘had paid women less than men engaged on
work rated as equivalent’. There was no material difference between the case
of the women and that of their male comparators and, accordingly, the
Council had discriminated against the women.
The Equal Opportunities Commission welcomed the decision, pointing
out that women still received wages which on average were only 79 per cent
of those earned by men, and that any clarification which would eliminate
inequalities was a step forward. 
In a significant case for part time women workers, the European Court of
Justice, in Magorrian and Another v Eastern Health and Social Services Board and
Another (1998), ruled that national provisions which limited access to
occupational pensions for part time workers amounted to indirect sexual
discrimination and were contrary to the Treaty. The Occupational Pension
Schemes (Equal Access to Membership) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 1976
violated the right to equality enshrined in Article 141, in specifying limited
rights to membership of pension schemes.51
In Marschall v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (1997), the Court of Justice ruled
that the equal treatment directives of the Community were not breached
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where a national rule allowed female candidates for promotion to be favoured
over equally qualified male applicants, where women were under-
represented in a particular field of employment, provided certain conditions
were met. The purpose of the national legislation was to correct the imbalance
in employment opportunities, which discriminated against women. The goal
was accordingly to achieve greater gender based equality, not to discriminate
against men.52
In 1994 and 1995, public concern over animal welfare in the export of live
animals to Europe for slaughter on the point of destination led to incidents of
public disorder and the disruption of exports of animals. In April 1995, the
Chief Constable of Sussex decided that no policing would be provided to
protect the transport of livestock to the port of Shoreham other than on two
consecutive days a week or four consecutive days per fortnight, excluding
Fridays, weekends or bank holidays. The Chief Constable later resolved not to
change the earlier decision or to delay its implementation. International
Traders’ Ferry Ltd challenged the decision in an application for judicial
review. 
In R v Chief Constable of Sussex ex parte International Traders’ Ferry Ltd (1995),
the Court of Appeal ruled that the Chief Constable’s restrictions on policing
could be justified under Article 36 of the EC Treaty (now 30), and were
proportionate. The export of live animals from the United Kingdom was
considered by the Court of Justice on a reference to the Court by the High
Court in R v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte Compassion in
World Farming Ltd (1998). The Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals (RSPCA) and Compassion in World Farming Ltd (CIWF) had asked
the minister to prohibit the export of veal calves for rearing in veal crates.
They contended that the Government had power under Community law to
restrict exports to other Member States where the system of rearing calves was
contrary to the standards in force in the United Kingdom53 and the
international standards laid down by the European Convention for the
Protection of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes, to which all the Member
States and the Community had agreed to adhere. Council Directive
91/629/EC laid down minimum standards for the protection of calves, which
were lower than the standards laid down by the Convention. CIWF accepted
that a ban or restriction on the export of live calves would constitute a
quantitative restriction on exports contrary to Article 34 of the Treaty, but
nevertheless maintained that such a restriction would be justified having
regard to Article 36 (inter alia, restrictions justified on the grounds of public
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morality, public policy or the protection of health or life of animals). The
Court ruled that a Member State cannot rely on Article 36 in order to justify
restrictions where the Commission has adopted harmonised rules to regulate
the area. Directive 91/62a/EC laid down standards and, even though these
were less stringent than the national provisions, the Directive overrode the
national requirements. 
CONCLUSION
As the discussion of the aims, development and structure of the European
Union and Community in Chapter 8 demonstrates, the original aims of the
Community established under the Treaty of Rome have been expanded and
developed into an ambitious, expansive and vigorous Union and Community,
founded on the principles of individual rights and the rule of law. European
integration has extended from the limited goals of a common market to
incorporate full economic and monetary union and towards ever closer co-
operation in relation to matters concerning common defence and security
policies and matters relating to co-operation in police and judicial matters. As
the aims and objectives of the Union have expanded, so too has the law of the
Community. The European Court of Justice, through its dynamic approach,
has ensured the supremacy of Community law over domestic law, to the
extent that the Court of Justice’s early statement that the Community
represents a ‘unique legal order’ is now a reality which touches on
increasingly wide aspects of domestic law. 
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PART IV
CENTRAL, REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

CHAPTER 10
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, the structure and roles of the institutions of central
government – the Crown, Privy Council, Prime Minister, Cabinet, ministers
and government departments – are examined. In Chapter 11, the concept of
responsible government is introduced, and the fundamentally important
concept of ministerial responsibility is considered. If government is to be
conducted under the law, and in line with the principles of democracy and
constitutionalism, it is of the utmost importance that those holding power
should be accountable to citizens through their elected legislature. The
responsibility of ministers of the Crown is thus fundamental to the
constitution, and the more so in the absence of an authoritative constitutional
document which defines the scope and limits of ministerial power. Note that
the procedural means by which parliament scrutinises government action is
considered in Chapter 16. 
THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT
THE CROWN
It is commonly hidden like a mystery, and sometimes paraded like a pageant,
but in neither case is it contentious. The nation is divided into parties, but the
Crown is of no party. Its apparent separation from business is that which
removes it both from enmities and from desecration, which preserves its
mystery, which enables it to combine the affection of conflicting parties – to be
a visible symbol of unity to those still so imperfectly educated as to need a
symbol.1
While the Monarch is titular head of the government and all governmental
acts are carried out in the name of the Crown, the role of the Queen is largely,
but not completely, formal and ceremonial. In the study of the government it
is necessary to bear in mind that the United Kingdom remains a constitutional
monarchy and that the Crown is the symbolic head of the executive,
legislature and judiciary. The remaining prerogatives of the Crown have been
discussed in Chapter 6, which should be referred to for discussion of the
Crown’s role in the appointment of the Prime Minister and the dissolution of
parliament. 
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1 Bagehot (1867), 1993, p 90.
Succession to the Crown
The Act of Settlement 1700 provides that succession to the throne is confined
to members of the Protestant religion and specifically excludes Roman
Catholics, or those married to Roman Catholics, from succession to the
throne.2 This religious exclusion has been under recent discussion. Any
amendment to the Act of Settlement would require the consent of the
parliaments of the United Kingdom’s Dominions,3 and may also require the
assent of the parliaments of all independent member countries of the
Commonwealth which recognise the Queen as Head of State.
The line of succession
Succession to the Crown traditionally devolves according to the principles of
primogeniture, that is to say that male heirs, and their children (irrespective of
sex), take precedence over female heirs. Again, this matter is said to be under
current discussion with a view to reform. Because of primogeniture, the current
line of succession is Prince Charles, his sons Prince William and Prince Henry,
Andrew, Duke of York, his daughters, Princess Beatrice and Princess Eugenie,
Prince Edward, Princess Anne, the Princess Royal, and then her children,
Peter and Zara Phillips, and thereafter to other members of the Royal Family
in a predetermined line of succession.
Were the Queen to abdicate, in favour of an early succession by Prince
Charles, the assent of the parliaments of the Dominions would be required.
The only precedent case is that of King Edward VIII, who abdicated in 1936 in
order to avoid the constitutional crisis which was perceived to be imminent if
he persisted in his intention to marry the American divorcee, Wallis
Simpson.4
The Regency Acts
Should the Crown fall ‘vacant’, through death or (more rarely) abdication, or
the Monarch becomes too ill to fulfil his or her constitutional duties,5 and the
successor has not yet reached the age of majority, there will be a need for the
appointment of an adult with responsibility for the Crown’s duties during the
successor’s minority. This situation is regulated under the Regency Acts
1937–53. 
The Regency Act 1937 provides that the Sovereign may appoint
Counsellors of State, charged with the responsibility of carrying out the
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Zealand ceased to be a Dominion in 1987: see the Constitution Act 1986 (NZ), s 26.
4 See His Majesty’s Declaration of Abdication Act 1936.
5 As occurred in the reigns of George III (in 1811) and George VI (in 1938).
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Sovereign’s duties whenever he or she is either absent from the United
Kingdom, or suffering from temporary physical or mental illness. Those
eligible to be appointed include the Monarch’s spouse and the next four
persons in line of succession.
Where there is the need to appoint a Regent, the Regency Act 1937
provides that, until the heir to the Throne reaches the age of 18, his or her
duties will be carried out by a Regent.6 The appointment of a Regent
continues until it is declared to be no longer necessary by the wife or husband
of the Monarch, the Lord Chancellor, the Speaker, the Lord Chief Justice and
the Master of the Rolls.
The Royal Titles Act 1953
By statute, the Monarch may assume whatever title she thinks fit, with the
assent of member governments of the Commonwealth. The Royal Titles Act
provides the title:
Elizabeth II by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and of her other Realms and Territories Queen, Head of the
Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith.
Within the Commonwealth, it was agreed in 1952 that the title of the Monarch
within the Commonwealth was for each state to determine.7 Accordingly, the
only title of the Monarch which is uniform throughout the Commonwealth is
that of ‘Head of the Commonwealth’. 
Prince Charles has recently made it known that he would prefer, on
succession, to be known as ‘Defender of Faith’, rather than Defender of the
(Protestant) Faith.
The Civil List
The Civil List is a fund provided by parliament for the financing of
expenditure on official business by the Monarch and specified members of her
family. The Civil List is designed to offset expenditure incurred on official
business; the cost of maintaining royal residences and the salaries and
pensions payable to employees of the Crown.8 The List was established in the
reign of George III (1760–1820) and represents an agreement whereby
parliament will vote monies for the official business of the Royal Family in
exchange for the surrender of hereditary revenues held by the Crown.9 The
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succeeded to the throne, the Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh would be appointed
Regent.
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8 The amount awarded is variable: see the Civil List Act 1972, which provides that sums
may be increased from time to time by statutory instrument, s 6; and the Civil List Act
1975.
9 With the exception of revenues from the Duchies of Cornwall and Lancaster.
revenues are paid directly into the Exchequer and become part of the
Consolidated Fund.10 Payments under the Civil List are provided for by the
Civil List Act 1952, as amended.11 The Civil List Act 1972 made separate
provision for the Duke of Edinburgh and other members of the Royal Family
who undertake public duties in the name of the Crown. In 1992, the Queen
took over financial responsibility for members of the Royal Family, although
the Duke of Edinburgh still receives separate provision under the Civil List, as
did the late Queen Mother. Financial provision for the Prince of Wales is made
from the revenues accruing from the Duchy of Cornwall.
Taxation and the Sovereign
Until 1992, the Sovereign was not liable to pay tax on her private property12
unless an Act of Parliament so determined. From 1993, the Queen, on her own
undertaking, has paid tax on her private income. 
The Crown Estate
Revenues from Crown lands and from other sources are managed by the
Crown Estate Commissioners13 under the authority of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer and the Secretary of State for Scotland. The Commissioners lay an
annual report before parliament. It is these revenues which are exchanged for
provision under the Civil List.
The role of the Monarch in the United Kingdom’s constitutional
democracy
In Walter Bagehot’s often-quoted phrase, the Monarch has the right to ‘be
consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn’ (1867). As such, the
Queen must be fully informed of the actions of her government, and given
adequate opportunity to express her views.
If the role of the Monarch is to remain respected by governments of all
political persuasions, and the nation, it is axiomatic that the Queen be seen
formally to be immune from party-political differences and to fulfil her duties
in an even-handed manner. This is not to suggest that the Queen has no views
on her government’s policies or that she should not express them to the Prime
Minister. What is required, however, is the absolute confidentiality of
discussions between herself and the Prime Minister, and, should there be a
disagreement over policy, it is required that, once the Monarch’s views are
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under the Crown Private Estates Act 1862.
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made known, irrespective of her approval or otherwise, she follows the advice
of her Prime Minister on policy matters.14
Queen Elizabeth II, since her accession to the throne in 1952, has presided
over 35 years of Conservative rule and 15 years of Labour rule. She has thus
accumulated a wealth of experience in political matters unmatched by her
individual Prime Ministers. 
The ‘modernisation’ of the monarchy? 
Public perceptions that the monarchy is out-dated and needs reform have
been recognised by the Royal Family. The Queen heads the ‘Way Ahead
Group’, which comprises senior members of the Royal Family and meets to
consider reform. Among recent proposals are that the use of the royal title
HRH should be confined to the monarch and his or her immediate successors;
that, in the future, the right of those members of the Royal Family entitled to
take their seats in the House of Lords should be removed;15 and that the state
opening of parliament should be less formal. It has also been suggested that
Kensington Palace, former home of the late Diana, Princess of Wales, and
home to other members of the Royal Family, should become an art gallery
housing the royal art collection. On the matter of style, the Queen supports the
view that people should not be required either to curtsey or bow on meeting
the monarchy.
The state opening of parliament
At the start of each new parliamentary session, the Monarch formally opens
parliament. The Queen’s Speech is formally delivered to the House of Lords
with members of the House of Commons having been summoned to the
Lords by Black Rod. The Speech outlines the government of the day’s
proposals for legislation in the forthcoming session. Thereafter, there is a four
or five day debate on the Speech in the Commons.
THE CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION 
BETWEEN CROWN AND GOVERNMENT
Government papers
The Monarch receives copies of all significant government papers. She also
receives copies of reports from ambassadors abroad and Commonwealth
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14 See the letter to The Times, by the Queen’s Press Secretary, Sir William Heseltine, 29 July
1986.
15 This proposed reform is consistent with the government’s plans to abolish the right of
hereditary peers to sit in the House of Lords. See, further, Chapter 17.
High Commissioners. All Cabinet papers and the minutes of Cabinet meetings
are received by the Queen. 
The weekly prime ministerial audience
Whatever the pressure of work, the Prime Minister attends a weekly half to
one hour audience with the Queen. It is at this weekly meeting that issues will
be discussed and the Queen’s views made known to the Prime Minister.16
Channels of communication are facilitated by the Queen’s Private Secretary,
whose appointment is the choice of the Queen, and who on appointment will
become a Member of the Privy Council. The Private Secretary may not belong
to any political party. Very rarely will the Queen’s Private Secretary be drawn
into public debate although, in 1986, the then Private Secretary, Sir William
Heseltine, wrote to The Times (following public claims that the Queen and
Prime Minister – then Mrs Thatcher – disagreed on policy matters). In his
letter, Sir William Heseltine spelled out three main points concerning the
relationship between the Crown and the Prime Minister:
(a) the Sovereign has the right and duty to counsel, encourage and warn her
government. She is thus entitled to have opinions on government policy
and to express them to the Prime Minister;
(b) whatever the Queen’s personal opinions may be, she is bound to accept
and act on the advice of her Ministers;
(c) the Sovereign is obliged to treat communications with the Prime Minister
as entirely confidential.17
Privy Council meetings
See below.
THE PRIVY COUNCIL
Historical origins
Since 1066, the monarch has appointed a Chancellor, who was head of the
King’s administration and had custody of the Great Seal. The Chancellor had
responsibility for the administration of law, drawing up royal writs and
exercising judicial powers. The Chancellor has always been a Member of the
King’s Council. The Privy Council may be viewed as the successor to the Curia
Regis, the supreme legislative, executive and judicial body. The Council is
traceable to the thirteenth century. It was through the Privy Council that
monarchs would rule without recourse to parliament. Under Edward I
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(1271–1307), it was difficult to discern whether legislative acts emanated from
the King in Parliament or the King in Council.18 Throughout the fourteenth
century, however, there were serious conflicts between the Council and
parliament and, in the reigns of Henry IV (1399–1423) and Henry V (1413–22),
there is evidence of the Commons petitioning the King against the jurisdiction
seized by the Council. The Council by this time was exercising judicial powers
in relation to both criminal and civil litigation. Enforcement of the criminal
law, where offences against the state were alleged or officers of state were
involved, was effected by the feared Court of Star Chamber.19 To this claim to
wide civil and criminal jurisdiction came parliamentary objection on the basis
that the Star Chamber was usurping the function of the common law courts.
FW Maitland writes of the Council at this time that:
The Tudor reigns are, we may say, the golden age of the Council: the Council
exercises enormous powers of the most various kinds; but it is not an
independent body – as against the King it has little power or none at all. [1908,
p 256]
By the reign of Henry VIII (1509–47), the Council comprised Privy Councillors
– the elite King’s advisers – and ordinary Councillors – lawyers and
administrators. Over time, the Council fragmented into committees dealing
with specified matters. The Council survived the abolition of the Star
Chamber, although its powers were much weakened. Following the
restoration of the monarchy, it became the body on which the King relied for
advice. With the abolition of the Star Chamber, did the Council lose all its
judicial powers? From early times the Council had asserted jurisdiction over
territory overseas which fell under the suzerainty of the English Crown. With
the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man coming under the Crown’s protection
in the thirteenth century, the seeds were sown for the Privy Council’s
jurisdiction over civil and criminal appeals from the British Empire and
Commonwealth. 
With the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the rise of parliamentary
sovereignty, the role of the Council changed. Under William, the inner circle
of the Council became known as the Cabinet Council. Through this Cabinet,
the King could exercise all his powers, although he had to have recourse to the
wider membership of the Privy Council in order to undertake acts which
required Orders in Council, the formal means by which such prerogative acts
came into effect. It was the Privy Council which determined the summoning
and dissolution of parliament, although it seems clear that the King would act
through Orders in Council published after consultation with an inner circle of
the Privy Council. The early origins of Cabinet government can be seen here.
As FW Maitland observed:
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We now see how it is legally possible for the work of government to fall into
the hands of a small number of the Council – those Members who hold the
high offices of state and who have control over the seals of office. If the King
has with him the Chancellor, the Treasurer or First Lord of the Treasury, the
Lord Privy Seal, and the Secretaries of State, he can get his work done without
consulting the mass of Privy Councillors. If, for any purpose, an Order in
Council is required, a meeting of the King with just these few intimate advisers
will be a good enough meeting of the Privy Council at which Orders in
Council can be made. So much is the legal possibility of Cabinet government.
[1908, p 394]
While King William and Queen Anne attended Council meetings regularly, a
change of practice occurred with the reign of George I (1714–27) and George II
(1727–60). Neither could speak English, and nor were they particularly
concerned with English matters. Accordingly, the Cabinet began to meet
without the King. Under George III (1760–1820), the same situation prevailed,
the Cabinet meeting without the King and communicating its decision to the
King. Again, we find the origins of today’s Cabinet, with the three principles
of Cabinet government becoming apparent: those of ‘political unanimity,
common responsibility to parliament and a common leader’.20 With the rise of
the Cabinet system of government in the eighteenth century, the Privy
Council gradually lost much of its power.21
Composition of the Privy Council
The Privy Council has some 420 members, half of whom are peers, half
commoners. There is no fixed number of members. Appointments are made
by the Crown, with the advice of the Prime Minister. By convention, all
present and past Cabinet members are appointed to the Privy Council. Also
included in the membership are members of the Royal Family, senior judges,
two Archbishops, British Ambassadors, the Speaker of the House of
Commons, present and former leaders of the Opposition, and leading
Commonwealth spokesmen and judges. On appointment, a new member of
the Council takes the oath of allegiance, or affirms loyalty. The Privy Council
oath binds the member to secrecy in relation to any matters discussed in the
Council.22
Meetings of the Privy Council
The Privy Council may meet wherever the Queen so decides although,
normally, the Council will meet at Buckingham Palace. The quorum is three. 
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FUNCTIONS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL
Proclamations and Orders in Council
Proclamations are used for the summoning, proroguing and dissolving of
parliament and declarations of war and peace. Orders in Council give effect to
decisions reached under the royal prerogative and under statute. Orders in
Council may be legislative, executive or judicial. 
Committees of the Privy Council
The majority of Privy Council functions are undertaken in committees.
Miscellaneous committees have been established. These include committees
dealing with scientific research, universities and the granting of charters. The
most important committee is the Judicial Committee. 
The Judicial Committee was established under statute by the Judicial
Committee Act 1833. The Judicial Committee Act 1844 provided that the
Queen may, by Order in Council, admit appeals from courts of British
colonies or overseas territories. The Judicial Committee is composed of the
Lord Chancellor, Lord President and former Lord Presidents of the Council,
Lords of Appeal in Ordinary and the Lord Justices of Appeal, former Lord
Chancellors and retired Lords of Appeal; senior judges or former judges of
those Commonwealth countries from which a right of appeal still lies.23
In addition to its appellate jurisdiction, the Judicial Committee will on
occasion examine and report on matters of constitutional importance. It has,
for example, examined the legality of telephone tapping, issues of State
security, and British policy in relation to the Falkland Islands. 
THE OFFICE OF PRIME MINISTER24
As with so much of the United Kingdom’s constitution the office of Prime
Minister is one which developed by convention rather than by law. The office
dates from the early eighteenth century,25 but had become firmly established
as a necessary and inevitable post in the latter half of the nineteenth century,
when the extension of the franchise combined with the growth of political
parties to produce both a (reasonably) accountable government and an
opposition party. The first official recognition of the post of Prime Minister
derives from the Treaty of Berlin 1878, and statutory and other formal
references to the office remain scant.26
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Ministerial and Other Pensions and Salaries Act 1991.
In 1889, Lord Morley27 stated that:
... the Prime Minister is the keystone of the Cabinet arch. Although in Cabinet
all its members stand on an equal footing, speak with an equal voice, and, on
the rare occasions when a division is taken, are counted on the fraternal
principle of one man, one vote, yet the head of the Cabinet is primus inter pares,
and occupies a position which, so long as it lasts, is one of exceptional and
peculiar authority.
Little has changed over the intervening century and the judgment expressed
above remains true today. Sir Anthony Eden28 has written that:
A Prime Minister is still nominally primus inter pares, but in fact his authority is
stronger than that. The right to choose his colleagues, to ask for a dissolution of
Parliament and, if he is a Conservative, to appoint the Chairman of the party
organisation, add up to a formidable total of power.
Contemporary interest focuses on the power of the office, the relationship
between the Prime Minister and the Cabinet and the occasional dominance of
the Prime Minister over Cabinet colleagues.29 One question which inevitably
arises is whether government has changed from being parliamentary
government, through to being best described as Cabinet government and now
through to prime ministerial government.30 The assessment of this question is
a matter for evaluation on consideration of the evidence. It must be
recognised, however, that the extent to which there exists prime ministerial
dominance will depend very much upon the individual personality of the
incumbent Prime Minister: there can be no broad generalisations. It must also
be recognised that, whatever the personal power of the Prime Minister, he or
she is ultimately dependent upon the support of Cabinet, party and
parliament; and, in turn, that support is dependent upon the support of the
electorate expressed not just through the vote at a general election, but
continually expressed in that amorphous concept ‘the mood of the people’. As
the resignation of Mrs Margaret Thatcher in 1990 demonstrated,31 even a
seemingly invincible Prime Minister, who had enjoyed success at three
general elections, can fall victim to the loss of the vital support of Cabinet and
consequently the loss of office. 
The Prime Minister, in addition to being the figurehead of government
both within the United Kingdom and internationally, holds more than one
office. The Prime Minister holds office as First Lord of the Treasury32 and is
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29 See Hennessy, 1986b, Chapter 3.
30 See Wolf-Phillips, 1984; Brazier, 1991a. On this question and the role of Mrs Thatcher,
see Doherty, 1988; Marshall, 1991.
31 See, inter alia, Alderman and Carter, 1991; Alderman and Smith, 1990; Marshall, 1991;
Blackburn, ‘Margaret Thatcher’s resignation as Prime Minister’, in 1992.
32 Ministerial and Other Salaries Act 1975. As First Lord of the Treasury the Prime
Minister has responsibility for the civil service which is controlled by the Treasury.
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formally in charge of the Treasury, although in practical terms it is the
Chancellor of the Exchequer who runs the Treasury. It is in part because of the
role of First Lord of the Treasury that the Prime Minister must be a Member of
the House of Commons which has parliamentary supremacy over financial
matters.33 Since 1937, the Ministers of the Crown Act has assumed that the
office of Prime Minister and First Lord are held by the same person. Since
1968, the Prime Minister has also held responsibility for the Civil Service as
Minister for the Civil Service.34 On occasions, Prime Ministers will assume
other offices. For example, Ramsey MacDonald also held office as Foreign
Secretary (Labour government, 1924); Winston Churchill was also Minister of
Defence.
The Prime Minister and membership of the House of Commons
Between 1837 and 1902, six Prime Ministers were peers.35 However, as early
as 1839, the Duke of Wellington expressed the view that:
I have long entertained the opinion that the Prime Minister of this country,
under existing circumstances, ought to have a seat in the other House of
Parliament, and that he would have great advantage in carrying on the
business of the Sovereign by being there.36
With the extension of the franchise in 1832, 1867 and 1884, the supremacy of
the Commons over the Lords was firmly established and the role of the House
of Lords in legislation was reduced significantly by the Parliament Acts of
1911 and 1949. There are good reasons – aside from the office of First Lord of
the Treasury – for arguing that the Prime Minister must be a member of the
House of Commons. First, he is today the elected leader of the parliamentary
party and must lead that party into a general election for an affirmation – or
denial – of the party’s, and hence his own, mandate. Secondly, the doctrine of
individual and collective ministerial responsibility applies to the Prime
Minister as it does to all other holders of office. Above all, the doctrines
require that a minister is accountable to the electorate through parliament. For
the Prime Minister not to be accountable to the democratically-elected House
of Commons would effectively defeat the concept of collective responsibility
and would be an affront to democracy and the very idea of constitutionalism.
Certainly, no breach of law would follow if the Queen invited a peer to take
office as Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury: but it would clearly fly
in the face of convention. 
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(1985).
35 Lords Melbourne, John Russell, Derby, Aberdeen, Beaconsfield, Salisbury.
36 Parl Debs 3rd Ser Vol 47 Col 1016, cited in Jennings, 1959a, p 21.
The choice of Prime Minister37
A change in Prime Minister will be brought about by either resignation or
death or – rarely – dismissal of the office holder. Resignation from office may
stem from electoral defeat at a general election, from conflict within the
government, from losing the support of the party, from losing a vote of
confidence in the House, from a challenge to the leadership of the party, from
illness or old age, from death, from voluntary retirement or from loss of
support of the Cabinet.38
Whatever the explanation for a change in Prime Minister, it is for the
monarch to appoint the succeeding Prime Minister. It was seen in Chapter 6
that it is the prerogative right of the Crown to appoint whosoever she please,
but that by convention rather than law the Queen appoints as Prime Minister
the leader of the political party who can command a majority in the House of
Commons. In the days before the major parties chose their leaders by some
form of election, some discretion was left to the Queen as to the choice of
Prime Minister. Nowadays, such discretion is all but dead, other than where a
general election produces a situation where there is no overall majority party
in the House of Commons.
The actual choice of Prime Minister will thus be dictated by the election
process within the major political parties39 and, where relevant, by the result
of a general election.40 The three major parties, Conservative, Labour and
Liberal Democrat, all differ in their approach to choice of leadership. The
Conservative Party elects its leader annually, by ballot, at the start of the new
parliamentary session. If there is only one nomination, as may occur where
there is unity as to the choice of a new leader, or where the incumbent leader
continues to enjoy the support of the Party, that person is declared leader.
Should there be a contest for the leadership, as in 1990, the choice will be
determined by up to three secret ballots among the Party’s Members of
Parliament. In order to win on the first ballot the candidate must receive an
overall majority of the votes cast and 15 per cent more votes than any other
candidate.41 If the matter goes to a second ballot, all candidates must resubmit
their names and the result will be determined by a simple majority. If no
candidate wins an outright majority of votes on the second ballot, a third
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38 Defeat: 1945, 1951, 1964, 1970, 1974, 1979. Conflict: as in 1931. Loss of party support: Mrs
Margaret Thatcher’s resignation, 1990. Loss of confidence vote: 1895, 1923, 1979.
Leadership challenge: Thatcher, 1990. Illness: Campbell-Bannerman, 1908, Bonar Law,
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support: Mrs Thatcher in 1990.
39 See Brazier, 1990, Chapter 1.
40 As in 1906, 1918, 1922, 1931, 1935, 1950, 1955, 1959, 1966, October 1974, 1983, 1987, 1992
where the Government was returned with a clear majority in the House of Commons.
41 See Procedure for the Selection of the Leader of the Conservative Party.
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ballot will be held on which Members choose between the three candidates
who secured the highest number of votes on the second ballot. At this final
ballot, each Member has two votes, the first for the candidate of his
preference, the other for his second preference. By a system of redistributing
the votes cast for the candidate with the least votes among the other
candidates according to their second preference, an overall winner will
emerge.42 Until 1993, the Labour Party’s arrangements were complex and
involved not only Members of Parliament. The Party’s Constitution provided
that the Leader and Deputy Leader of the Party shall be elected from members
of the Parliamentary Labour Party at the annual Party Conference, with votes
given to Members of Parliament, Trade Unions (but not their individual
members) and members of local parties, each being proportionally
determined. The procedure for the election of Leader of the Labour Party was
reviewed in 1992–93, with John Smith being determined to reform the system
in order to give one vote to each member of trade unions, thus replacing the
‘block’ union vote. Following John Smith’s death in 1994, Tony Blair was
elected under the reformed system.
The Constitution of the Liberal Democrats provides the circumstances
under which a leadership election may be called for, and the rules for election,
which include entitlement to vote by Liberal Democrat Members of
Parliament and members of local parties and specified associated
organisations.43
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE PRIME MINISTER44
Formation of Cabinet45
Once in office, the first task of the Prime Minister is to form his Cabinet.
Constitutionally, the appointment of all ministers is a decision for the
monarch but, in practice, it is the Prime Minister who determines who shall be
appointed. The Prime Minister decides which government departments
should be represented in Cabinet although, by convention, certain
Departments are always represented. Thus, the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Home
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44 The Prime Minister (Office, Role and Functions) Bill 2001 provides, inter alia, for the
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prorogation of parliament.
45 See Jennings, 1959a, Chapter III.
Secretary, the Lord Chancellor, the Secretary of State for Defence, the
Secretary of State for Scotland and the Leader of the House of Commons
always hold a seat in Cabinet. Further constraints on membership exist. For
example, under the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975, certain Cabinet positions
are allocated to Members of the House of Lords. Accordingly, the Lord
Chancellor and three other ministers are appointed from that House. Further,
under the Ministerial and Other Salaries Act 1975, the size of Cabinet is
effectively controlled – if indirectly – by limiting the number of ministers who
may draw a ministerial salary. 
It is also for the Prime Minister to decide whether Cabinet Members
should remain in office, and he has the right to require a member to resign
and, if he refuses, to request the Queen to dismiss him. This form of control
was most strikingly seen in 1962 when Harold Macmillan in ‘the night of the
long knives’ removed seven ministers (from a Cabinet of 20) overnight. The
Cabinet normally comprises approximately 20 senior members of the
government of the day. The actual membership is not fixed, and is (subject to
convention) for the Prime Minister to determine. 
THE CABINET
Organisation of the Cabinet in Tony Blair’s government46 is as follows:
OFFICE
Prime Minister, First Lord of the Treasury and Minister for Civil Service
Deputy Prime Minister and First Secretary of State
Chancellor of the Exchequer
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Lord Chancellor
Secretary of State for Home Department
Secretary of State for Education and Skills
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
Secretary of State for Scotland
Secretary of State for Defence
Secretary of State for Health
Leader of the House of Commons and President of the Council
Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
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Secretary of State for Wales
Secretary of State for International Development
Secretary of State for Transport
Leader of the Lords
Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury and Chief Whip
Chief Secretary to the Treasury
Minister without Portfolio and Party Chairman
Cabinet meetings
The Prime Minister has almost total control over the conduct of Cabinet. The
holding and conduct of Cabinet meetings is a matter for the Prime Minister to
decide. Traditionally, but not invariably, full meetings of Cabinet are held
twice a week. Under the leadership of Mrs Thatcher, the number of full
Cabinet meetings was reduced, and the number of Cabinet Committees
increased. Matters which are to be discussed in Cabinet are for the Prime
Minister to determine.47 In the course of the ‘Westland affair’ (discussed
below, p 348) the Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Heseltine, was
expecting to be able to put his case for the European rescue bid of the
helicopter company to a Cabinet meeting. The Prime Minister, however,
allegedly cancelled that meeting, thus precipitating Heseltine’s resignation
from office.48
Timing of dissolution of parliament
The timing of the dissolution of parliament is within the Prime Minister’s
discretion and there is no requirement, either in law or convention, that the
Prime Minister submit his choice of date to the Cabinet. On the dissolution of
parliament, see, further, Chapter 6.
Appointments
The Prime Minister has significant powers and influence over the
appointment of persons to senior positions. For example, it is the Prime
Minister who is responsible for the appointment of a Commission to oversee
the work of the Security Service, and his consent is required for the
appointment of most senior civil servants. Prime Ministerial nomination leads
to the appointment of, inter alia, senior judges, bishops, and the Parliamentary
Commissioner for Administration. His advice is given to the Queen on the
granting of new peerages, on honours and on appointments to the Privy
Council. 
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The role and functions of Cabinet49
A Cabinet is a combining committee – a hyphen which joins, a buckle which
fastens the legislative part of the state to the executive part of the state. In its
origins, it belongs to the one and in its functions, it belongs to the other.50
The Cabinet represents the nucleus of government. It is the Cabinet as a whole
which, at least in theoretical terms, formulates, initiates and implements the
policy of the government. Because there is no written constitution defining
and controlling the working of Cabinet, it is not possible to give a fixed
picture of its role. The use and working of Cabinets will vary with different
governments and the different style and personality of the Prime Minister of
the day. 
As the central decision making body, the Cabinet has great power in
relation to parliament as a whole, in relation to the political party it represents
and in relation to the Prime Minister. While the Prime Minister may control
the composition and working of Cabinet, no Prime Minister can ultimately
survive in office without the support of Cabinet and party.51 The style of
leadership will depend upon the personality of the premier, and an evaluation
of whether it is parliamentary government, Cabinet government or Prime
Ministerial government will also depend upon the strength of the Prime
Minister vis à vis his or her colleagues.
Cabinet committees
In order to facilitate efficiency, the Cabinet is supported by a system of
committees which, again, is largely determined by the Prime Minister.52 Some
of these are standing committees which will exist for the life of the
government. Ad hoc committees may be established to consider particular
matters. In addition, a whole range of official committees staffed by civil
servants exist to complement the work of Ministers. Professor Peter Hennessy
has analysed the pattern of committee formation under several governments:
Attlee accumulated 148 standing and 313 ad hoc groups in six and a quarter
years, and Churchill 137 and 109 respectively in three and a half years. The
figures for Eden are incomplete, and those for Macmillan and Home remain a
mystery which the current Cabinet Secretary refuses to resolve. Thanks to Mrs
Castle’s Diary we have some intelligence on Wilson Mark I. Elected in October
1964, he had by early 1969 (that is, after four and a quarter years) reached his
236th ad hoc group. The Heath era is another unknown. Wilson Mark II,
between March 1974 and March 1976, ran up a total of somewhere around 120
ad hoc groups. Callaghan, in the three years between April 1976 and April
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1979, commissioned about 160 ad hoc committees, a similar growth rate to
Attlee’s. Judging by the Cabinet committee criterion, Mrs Thatcher has done
exceedingly well. Under her, there have been 30–35 standing committees and
just over 120 ad hocs in six and a half years. So Cabinet and Cabinet committee
discussion is down. [1986b, pp 100–01]
While the use of committees is both necessary and inevitable, it raises
important constitutional questions concerning the doctrine of collective
responsibility. Collective responsibility requires that each member of Cabinet,
and all government ministers and Parliamentary Private Secretaries, is bound
by the decision of the Cabinet. The extent to which the doctrine will in practice
be binding will depend upon the extent government members are prepared to
maintain confidentiality and unanimity over decisions in which they may
have played no part.
The Prime Minister’s Private Office
While often mooted, and its absence an apparent anomaly in a sophisticated
system of government, there has never been a ‘Prime Minister’s Department’
dedicated to the task of organising, co-ordinating and liaising on behalf of the
Prime Minister. Instead, a British Prime Minister’s team comprises civil
service support and non-civil service political support in the form of a
specially appointed team of advisers. Heading the Prime Minister’s support
system is his Principal Private Secretary who heads the Private Office, who
has close relations with both the Cabinet Secretary and the Queen’s Private
Secretary. A civil servant, usually seconded from the Treasury for a three year
period, it is the Private Secretary who co-ordinates the work of the Prime
Minister, controlling the flow of paper into Number 10, and prioritising
matters for prime ministerial attention. In addition to the Private Secretary,
there is a Private Secretary for Overseas and Defence Affairs, Economic and
Home Affairs, Europe, Central and Constitutional Affairs and Security and
Intelligence. The Private Secretaries link the Prime Minister with Cabinet,
other government ministers and civil servants, and attend prime ministerial
meetings and Cabinet meetings. The Prime Minister’s Diary Secretary – a
political appointment since 1979 – also plays a key role in the inner corpus of
prime ministerial support, controlling the Prime Minister’s time and
engagements. A Duty Clerk is responsible for maintaining links between
Number 10 and the outside world, and manning the Prime Minister’s office in
the absence of the Private Secretary. The Prime Minister’s secretariat, known
as the ‘Garden Room Girls’ (sic) since Lloyd George’s premiership, completes
the support staff at Number 10. These appointments represent the Prime
Minister’s staff in his role as head of government. In addition, the Prime
Minister must maintain close links with his parliamentary party and with the
party in the country. Given the requirement of political neutrality in civil
321
servants, this would be an inappropriate task for the Private Office and, as a
result, this responsibility falls on the Prime Minister’s Political Secretary, a
post funded by the party rather than the taxpayer. Harold Wilson was the first
Prime Minister to formally appoint a Political Secretary, Marcia Williams, and
all subsequent Prime Ministers have felt the need for this particular support
mechanism. A Parliamentary Private Secretary, a Member of Parliament,
assists in liaison with the party, meeting Members of Parliament,
accompanying the Prime Minister for Prime Minister’s Question Time and
generally facilitating lines of communication between the party and its leader. 
The Cabinet Office53
The daily working of Cabinet is assisted by the Cabinet Office,54 established in
1917, headed by the Secretary to the Cabinet. It is the Secretary to the Cabinet
who is responsible for the recording of Cabinet meetings and circulation of the
agreed conclusions. Within the Cabinet Office, there exists a number of
secretariats, including the Economic Secretariat; Overseas and Defence
Secretariat; European Secretariat and Home and Social Affairs Secretariat.55
Between 1970 and 1983, there existed within the Cabinet Office the Central
Policy Review staff whose principal task was to keep policy choices and
implementation under review and to advise ministers.56 The Central Policy
Review staff – or ‘Think Tank’ – stood between the Civil Service and the
Cabinet and was regarded as invaluable by Prime Minister James
Callaghan.57 However, in Mrs Thatcher’s first administration,58 some of the
Think Tank’s proposals were too radical and the unit was destined to be
closed down,59 to be replaced with a Policy Unit whose function is to serve
the Prime Minister rather than Cabinet as a whole.
THE CIVIL SERVICE60
A civil servant has been defined as: ‘... a servant of the Crown, other than
holders of political or judicial offices, who is employed in a civil capacity and
whose remuneration is paid wholly and directly out of monies voted by
Parliament.’61
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The constitutional relationship between the Civil Service and the
government of the day is a matter directly linked to ministers’ responsibility
to the electorate – through parliament – and the extent to which that
responsibility is affected by the role of civil servants. Before considering the
relationship between ministers and departments, some preliminary points
require attention. Some doubt exists as to the precise number of personnel in
the Civil Service, doubts which arise from the difficulties concerning the
appropriate classification of some occupations within the public service. For
example, employees of the National Health Service are not technically
employees of the Crown – and therefore not civil servants – although
responsibility for the Health Service lies with the Secretary of State. 
One further difficulty in evaluating the operation of the Civil Service arises
from the disparity in size between government departments, with some
departments having a staff of over 100,000, while others may have less than
10,000. The size of a department has a practical bearing on the extent to which
ministers can realistically be said to be making decisions. Added to that
difficulty is the preference of some governments for large departments of
state. Moreover, recent changes to the structure of the Civil Service to enhance
its efficiency have led to a proliferation of government agencies (see below). 
By way of example of the disparity in size of departments, in 1951, the
Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, appointed Lord Leathers as Secretary of
State with responsibility for the co-ordination of transport, fuel and power
and Lord Woolton as Lord President of the council with special responsibility
for the co-ordination of food and agriculture. These two ministers became
known as the ‘Overlords’ and the appointments were much criticised by the
Opposition as weakening the responsibility of ministers running the
Departments and also on the basis that both ‘Overlords’ were Members of the
House of Lords and not the Commons.
In debate,62 the Prime Minister defended the appointments, emphasising
the close links between collective and individual responsibility, and asserting
that the co-ordinating minister’s role could best be viewed as an aspect of
collective responsibility. In 1970, the Prime Minister, Mr Edward Heath,
regarded the merging of departments as a means of achieving greater
efficiency in both management and in the implementation of government
policy.63 As a result, the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Ministry
of Transport, Ministry of Public Building and Works were amalgamated to
form the Department of the Environment with some 72,000 civil servants.64
When considering responsibility for the Civil Service and accountability to
parliament, a further feature of political life must be borne in mind: that of
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ministerial mobility. The average tenure of responsibility for a department is
two years. The Department of Education and Science, between 1944 and 1986,
had 21 ministerial heads. During the Thatcher administration (1979–90),
Cabinet reshuffles were frequent with several ministers holding a number of
portfolios during that government. 
A final practical preliminary point to consider is the sheer volume of work
entailed in government. An estimated65 two-thirds of a minister’s working
week is taken up by non-departmental business: Cabinet meetings, Cabinet
committees, parliamentary party meetings, debates and questions in the
House, official visits, and constituency duties. The task of heading a major
department of state in addition to all the other duties is a major one, and the
practical impact of regular government ‘re-shuffles’, the size of departments
and non-departmental duties is great. Such considerations lead the observer to
wonder whether ministers, rather than senior civil servants, can truly be said
to be in charge of their Departments. 
Not too much must be made of this matter, but it can be noted that senior
politicians such as Tony Benn, Richard Crossman, Michael Meacher and
Barbara Castle (each of whom has held Cabinet office) have all given some
credence to what may be dubbed the ‘conspiracy theory of government’. Tony
Benn advances this criticism of the Civil Service:
The Civil Service sees itself as being above party battle, with a political position
of its own to defend against all-comers, including incoming governments
armed with their philosophy and programme. 
However, Peter Hennessy warns that:
It is easy but wrong to take away the impression from reading the literature on
Whitehall that officials do behave rather like keepers at the zoo watching the
antics of their charges – Ministers – with a mixture of familiarity, superiority
and detachment.66
THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
Improving efficiency in the Civil Service
From November 1986 to March 1987, the Efficiency Unit, under the
supervision of Sir Robin Ibbs, inquired into the future of the Civil Service.67
A principal interest of the Unit was expressed to be not so much the
detailed working of the Civil Service or its efficiency, but rather the
relationship between the Civil Service and ministerial responsibility, and the
impact which any recommendations as to the improvement of efficiency
within the Civil Service might have on this constitutional relationship.
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On the management and efficiency front, the Unit reported several
difficulties, inter alia: that there was a lack of clear and accountable
management responsibility within departments; that there was a lack of
clarity as to what was expected of individuals; that the size and diversity of
the Civil Service made it difficult to impose a uniform system; that there was a
need to reorganise the Civil Service in such a way that efficiency would
improve so as to ensure ‘value for money’.
The report recommended that agencies be established – either within or
outside of the departments – charged with the responsibility of overall
management of the Department. By 1996, 130 agencies had been created.
The main controls would continue to lie with ministers or the Permanent
Secretary but, once policy objectives and budgets had been established, the
Agency should have as much independence as possible in deciding how
objectives should be met. The crucial question was that of the line of
responsibility. The Head of the Agency should be given personal
responsibility to achieve the best results.
As to the future role of ministers, the report recommended that ministers
continue to be wholly responsible for policy but that it was unrealistic to
suppose that they could have in-depth knowledge about every operational
question:
... the convention that they do is part of the cause of the overload which we
observed. We believe it is possible for Parliament, through Ministers, to regard
managers as directly responsible for operational matters.
The (Social Security) Benefits Agency is the largest. Others include the Child
Support Agency,68 the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency, the Stationery
Office, the Land Registry, Ordnance Survey, Patent Office and United
Kingdom Passport Agency. Issues of responsibility of ministers are also raised
in respect of non-departmental public bodies – ‘quangos’ – whereby state
enterprises are privatised.69 A non-departmental public body is defined as a
body ‘which has a role in the processes of national government but is not a
government department’.70 The movement towards increased government
involvement in commerce and industry stems from 1945, although public
corporations had been earlier established.71 Today, the movement is towards
privatisation, with, among others, British Rail, British Gas, British Telecom,
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, and the Naval Dockyards being sold into
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private ownership. Accountability for such organisations, when publicly
owned, was weak. Today the question is to what extent these organisations
are truly private; to what extent ministers exert control over them, whether via
financial power or the power to issue policy guidance; and, more importantly,
the extent to which parliament assures that ministers are accountable for the
implementation of policies. 
The Labour government and the civil service
When the government entered into office in May 1997, it arrived with not only
a radical mandate to reform the constitution, but also one to improve
efficiency in the civil service. In March 1999, the government published its
White Paper, Modernising Government, described by Cabinet Secretary Sir
Richard Wilson as ‘a key document which signals a change of course for the
Civil Service for the next ten years as important as Next Steps ten years ago’.72
The aim, he said, was ‘modernisation with a purpose: better policy making,
better responsiveness to what people want, and more effective public
services’. The White Paper introduced a range of reforms, including the
commitment to make public services available on a 24 hour a day, seven day a
week basis; removing unnecessary regulation and requiring departments
which are preparing policies involving new regulations to submit Regulatory
Impact Assessments following consultation with the Cabinet Office; creating
greater incentives for civil servants, which includes considering financial
rewards for staff who identify financial savings or service improvements. In
Whitehall, all Permanent Secretaries are required to ‘ensure that their
Department has the capacity to drive through achievement of the key
government targets and to take a personal responsibility for ensuring that this
happens’. To facilitate this, the government calls for the introduction of more
people from outside the civil service. While the focus is on improved
management and the delivery of service to the consumer, sight has not been
lost of the core civil service values. Selection and promotion will remain based
on merit; political impartiality and the giving of best independent advice to
government will be maintained. 
Five key commitments were presented in the White Paper. The first relates
to policy making which is designed to ‘deliver outcomes that matter’, rather
than simply reacting to short term pressures. A new Centre for Management
and Policy Studies is introduced to identify and spread best practice
throughout the service. There is to be a refocus on the delivery of public
services to ensure that services meet the needs of citizens, rather than the
service providers – ‘joined-up working’ of departments to ensure that the
citizen is not faced with bureaucratic barriers to responsibility for services. To
eliminate ‘mediocrity’ in government, all central and local government
department services are to reviewed over a five year period to identify the
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best suppliers of services. All public bodies will be set new targets for
improving quality and effectiveness, and there will be closer monitoring to
ensure the maintenance of quality. The government’s information technology
systems will be geared to meeting the needs of citizens and business. A
People’s Panel, 5,000 randomly selected individuals, will be appointed to
advise government on all aspects of the provision and delivery of services.
Equality, on the basis of gender, race and physical disabilities, within the
service has been highlighted. In 1999, only 18 per cent of senior civil servants
were women, and 1.6 per cent from ethnic minority backgrounds. By 2004–05,
the target is to have 35 per cent women and 3.2 per cent ethnic minorities, and
targets are to be set for people with disabilities.
In January 2000, the Prime Minister’s Performance and Innovation Unit’s
report, Wiring It Up, reinforced the White Paper’s aims on modernisation
while focusing on the need for departments to engage in closer co-operation
over issues which cross departmental boundaries, and the introduction of
bonuses and promotion for those who work on multi-faceted problems such
as social deprivation, crime reduction, young people at risk and rural issues. 
PERMANENCE, POLITICAL 
NEUTRALITY AND ANONYMITY
The role of the Civil Service must be considered against the constitutional
features of permanence, political neutrality and anonymity.
Permanence
In many countries, such as the United States of America, the Civil Service is a
semi-permanent body, the most senior posts of which change hands with a
change in government. A variation on this model, which is employed in
Germany and France, involves incoming ministers bringing into the
department with them a small body of hand picked professional advisers.
Under the constitution of the United Kingdom, Civil Servants hold permanent
posts, in law ‘holding office at the pleasure of the Crown’. Many aspects of
employment protection legislation73 apply to the Civil Service, but such rights
as, for example, the right of appeal against unfair dismissal and the right to
belong to a trades union, may be revoked, under the royal prerogative.74
Moreover, at common law, the position of civil servants is precarious. Being a
servant of the Crown, they may be dismissed with no common law action for
wrongful dismissal.75 However, while the formal position is insecure, in
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practical terms civil servants enjoy a high degree of security. Terms and
conditions of employment are regulated under the prerogative, and the
Minister for the Civil Service has power to make regulations relating to the
conditions of service of all civil servants.76
The constitutional significance of permanency lies in the development of
expertise and the natural growth of a Civil Service ‘ethos’. Most importantly,
permanency ensures the availability of such expertise to governments of
differing political persuasions. The Private Secretary is a minister’s closest
contact with a department, and his adviser. Of his Private Secretary, Richard
Crossman wrote:
I have got to face it that his main job is to get across to me what the department
wants. The Private Office is the department’s way of keeping a watch on me, of
making sure that I run along the lines they want me to run on, of dividing my
time and getting the department’s policies and attitudes brought to my notice.
[1977, Vol 2, p 385]
Political neutrality
The Civil Service owes its loyalty to the government of the day, irrespective of
political party, and it is imperative that the Civil Service avoids creating the
impression of political bias. While the writings of leading Labour Party
politicians referred to above reveal scepticism as to this, its theoretical
importance cannot be underestimated.
Following the trial of senior civil servant Clive Ponting for unauthorised
disclosure of information to a Member of Parliament,77 the Head of the Civil
Service issued Notes of Guidance on the Duties and Responsibilities of Civil
Servants in Relation to Ministers (1985, revised 1987) in which it was stated that:
The Civil Service has no constitutional personality or responsibility separate
from the duly elected government of the day. The rules make it clear that a
civil servant who cannot conscientiously comply with his or her official duties
because of personal opinions or convictions should take the matter up with his
or her superiors, but if unable to carry out instructions should resign from the
Service.
The anonymity and political neutrality of civil servants is reinforced by the
rules restricting political activity. If the Civil Service is to serve governments
of all political persuasions, it is imperative that civil servants, whatever their
private political views, should not be seen to be politically active in a manner
which would inevitably compromise their neutrality under one political party
or another. 
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The Civil Service is divided, for the purpose of control over political
activity, into three groups:
(a) the ‘politically free’ category which comprises industrial staff and non-
officer grades, which may freely engage in either national and local
politics; 
(b) the ‘politically restricted’ category, comprising higher staff grades who are
debarred from participating in national political activities, but may be
permitted to engage in local politics;
(c) an intermediate group which comprises those who are neither employed
in the highest or lowest grades. 
Political activities which are subject to restriction are divided into activities at
both national and local level. Those activities subject to restriction at national
level include standing as a candidate for election to the European Parliament;
holding office in party political organisations which relate to party politics in
relation to the United Kingdom or the European Parliament; and speaking on
matters of national political controversy, or expressing such views to the press
or in books, articles or leaflets. Canvassing on behalf of a candidate for
election to the United Kingdom Parliament or the European Parliament, or on
behalf of a political party in respect of such elections, is also prohibited. At
local level, civil servants in the restricted category may not stand as candidates
for local elections; hold office in party political organisations relating to local
government; speak on local politically controversial matters or express such
views in the media or other publications; and may not canvass on behalf of
either a candidate or a political party in the course of local elections.78
Anonymity
In order that the minister be seen to be responsible and accountable for the
working of his Department, the Civil Service has traditionally been shielded
from the public gaze and protected from public inquiry. By protecting the
Civil Service, its impartiality and integrity is enhanced. Further, if civil
servants become public figures scrutinised in parliament or the media, their
capacity for maintaining the appearance of political impartiality, so important
to the concept of permanence, would be damaged.
It has been seen that the minister in charge of a particular government
department is absolutely responsible to parliament for the conduct of civil
servants, and that this responsibility in turn involves two aspects. The first of
these is that the minister has an obligation to explain and answer for the work
of his department to parliament; the second is that the minister is responsible
in constitutional terms for any failure of departmental policy and
administration. As a corollary to ministerial responsibility, the Civil Service is
not accountable to parliament and is protected by the concept of anonymity.
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While, in theoretical constitutional terms, the anonymity of civil servants is
important in buttressing the responsibility of ministers of the Crown, it is
becoming, as will be seen below, an increasingly less notable feature of the
Civil Service. The explanations for the decrease in anonymity are manifold:
the vagaries of individual ministerial responsibility, the increasing strength of
departmental select committees and the televising of those proceedings and
recent developments in the management of government departments.
The official Guidance for Officials Appearing before Select Committees79
stressed that civil servants should be ‘as helpful as possible’ to parliamentary
committees, but that advice given to ministers should never be disclosed (in
order to protect collective ministerial responsibility), nor should advice given
by a Law Officer be revealed. Further, officials should not give evidence about
matters of political controversy, or ‘sensitive information’ relating to
commercial or economic matters or related to inter-governmental
negotiations. The rules make it clear that civil servants give evidence to
committees on behalf of their ministers, and that they are subject to
instructions given by ministers.
THE CIVIL SERVICE MANAGEMENT CODE
In 1994, the Treasury and Civil Service Committee reviewed the position of
civil servants.80 In its report, The Role of the Civil Service, it concluded that a
new Civil Service Code should be drafted to clarify the position of civil
servants. The Nolan Committee also recommended clarification in the
constitutional framework within which civil servants work and ‘the values
they are expected to uphold’.81 The new Code was introduced under the royal
prerogative,82 and came into force in 1996, replacing Sir Robert Armstrong’s
statement. The Civil Service Management Code, as amended, now states that:
... the constitutional and practical role of the Civil Service is, with integrity,
honesty, impartiality and objectivity, to assist the duly constituted
government, of whatever political complexion, in formulating policies of
government, carrying out decisions of the government and in administering
public services for which the government is responsible.
Civil servants are under a duty to give honest and impartial advice to
ministers and to:
... endeavour to deal with the affairs of the public sympathetically, effectively,
promptly and without bias or maladministration of public money.
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They are also required to conduct themselves in such a manner as to:
... deserve and retain the confidence of Ministers and to be able to establish the
same relationship with those whom they may be required to serve in some
future administration.
The Code also states that civil servants must not misuse their official position
to further their own, or another’s, personal interests.
Special advisers
The appointment of special advisers to ministers blurs the lines of
responsibility between ministers and civil servants. The Committee on
Standards in Public Life examined a whole tranche of issues in 1999, including
the role of special advisers, lobbying, sponsorship and public appointments.
On special advisers, the Committee recommended that there be introduced a
code of conduct enshrined in a Civil Service Act and for there to be a statutory
limit to the number of ministerial aides appointed.83 However, while
accepting that there was no evidence that special advisers were ‘politicising
the civil service’, the Committee expressed the concern that ‘the considerable
increase in numbers, particularly at Number 10, where influential roles are
played by special advisers, raises the question of whether their authority
outweighs that of objective advisers’ and that ‘any future growth in numbers
would raise questions about a move towards the establishment of a “cabinet
system” within departments’.84
Special advisers are servants of the Crown. As such there is no entitlement
to a period of notice before the termination of employment. However, the
Model Contract for Special Advisers (May 1997) provides that, other than where
employment is terminated by agreement or results from disciplinary
proceedings, inefficiency or grounds justifying dismissal at common law,
advisers will be given not less than three months’ notice in writing. Otherwise
employment automatically terminates at the end of the current government
administration or when the relevant Cabinet minister leaves the government
or moves to another appointment or, in the event of a general election, on the
day after polling day. Schedule 1 to the Model Contract, The Role and Duties of
Special Advisers, states that special advisers ‘must always be guided by the
basic principle that they are employed to serve the objectives of the
government and the department in which they work’. They are exempt from
the general civil service requirement that appointments must be made on
merit on the basis of fair and open competition, providing that they are
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appointed ‘for the purpose only of providing advice to any minister’.85 Their
constitutional position is ambivalent: they are ‘servants of the Crown but not a
formal part of the departmental hierarchy, do not work directly under a
permanent civil servant or have permanent civil servants working for them’.
‘Special Advisers are appointed to advise the minister in the development of
government policy and its effective presentation.’86 As Crown employees
paid out of public funds, special advisers operate to support the interests of
the government rather than the government’s political party, although they
act as a channel of communication between government and party.87
THE GOVERNMENT AND THE COURTS
The government, acting in the name of the Crown, has a historic right to
privileges and immunities.88 Before the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, two
main principles governed the question of the legal liability of the Crown. The
first principle was that ‘the King could do no wrong’ and, accordingly, could
not be held liable for any actions which would be unlawful if committed by
individuals. The second rule was that the King could not be sued in his own
courts. Designed to protect the unique constitutional position of the Crown, as
state regulation increased, Crown privilege extended to a wide range of
central government activities, thereby weakening the legal protection given to
individuals aggrieved by government action. In 1947, the Crown Proceedings
Act extended the liability of the Crown to areas of tort and contract. In relation
to tortious liability, the Crown is placed in the same legal position as any other
adult individual, and has the same liability for the tortious acts of its
employees and agents as do private persons and organisations. Two
important exceptions to liability remain: liability in respect of actions of
members of the armed forces while on duty or on premises used for the
purposes of the armed forces, and liability for tortious actions committed by
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85 Civil Service Order in Council 1995, Article 3(2), as amended by Civil Service
(Amendment) Order in Council 1997. A position affirmed by the Employment Appeal
Tribunal, which ruled in Lord Chancellor and Another v Coker and Another (2001) that the
Lord Chancellor did not discriminate against two women, one of whom was black, on
the grounds of sex or race when he appointed as special adviser a white male who was
well known to him, without advertising the post. The appointment process with regard
to special advisers was not subject to the general rules that applied to the appointment
of civil servants since special advisers were not civil servants. In appointing a special
adviser, a key quality of the applicant was a commitment to the political understanding
of the particular minister. 
86 Model Contract, Sched 1(iii).
87 The lack of clarity in responsibilities between civil servants, special advisers and
ministers have led to calls for a Civil Service Act to remove ambiguities and provide a
statutory basis for the Codes regulating civil servants and advisers. A Civil Service Act
is supported by the out-going Cabinet Secretary, Sir Richard Wilson, who gave
evidence to the Select Committee on Public Administration in 2001.
88 An aspect of the royal prerogative. See Chapter 6.
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the Post Office.89 In respect of a breach of statutory duties imposed on private
persons, the Crown is liable where the statute in question is one which binds
the Crown.90 It was originally thought that the unique position of the Crown
meant that the remedies of specific performance and injunctions were not
available against the Crown. In M v Home Office (1993), however, the Home
Secretary was held to be liable in his official, but not personal, capacity for his
failure to obey an order of the court and it was declared by the House of Lords
that injunctions could be issued against officers of the Crown. 
Public interest immunity91
The phrase ‘Crown privilege’ has been superseded by the term ‘public interest
immunity’ or more colloquially ‘gagging orders’. One aspect of the immunity
which is of contemporary and continuing concern is the extent to which
governments – and agencies of government – may be required to disclose
information to a court of law. While the immunity from disclosure of
information relates principally to the government, it extends to other persons
and organisations. Public interest immunity was raised, for example, in D v
NSPCC (1978)92 in order to protect the sources of information given to the
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. 
The need for confidentiality was also accepted in Bookbinder v Tebbit (1992)
in relation to sources of information given to the Audit Commission, which
was investigating alleged irregularities in the financial dealings of a local
authority. The court must, however, be satisfied that there is a real need to
prevent the disclosure of an informant’s identity.93
Under the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, a court may order the disclosure
of documents in the interests of justice. Section 28, however, also provides that
the power of the court in civil proceedings does not extend to disclosures
which it would not be in the public interest to make.
There are two aspects of public interest entailed within this area of the law:
the public interest in the administration of justice and the public interest in
non-disclosure of damaging information. The questions which arise are, who
it is who has the power to decide whether disclosure would or would not be
in the public interest, and on what basis the ‘public interest’ is to be
evaluated? 
In Duncan v Cammell Laird (1942), dependants of victims who died in the
submarine Thetis, which sank during trials, sued the builders of the
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90 Eg, the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957.
91 See, inter alia, Jacob, 1993; Simon Brown, 1994. See Zuckerman, 1994.
92 And see Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners
(No 2) (1974).
93 See Norwich Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners (1974).
submarine. Disclosure was sought of documents relating to contracts between
the Admiralty and the building contractors, and salvage reports on the
submarine. The Admiralty refused to disclose the information, relying on
national security, and the minister certified that disclosure was against the
public interest. The House of Lords held that the minister’s certificate was
conclusive and could not be questioned. Accordingly, the rule emerged that a
court of law could never question a claim of Crown privilege (or public
interest immunity), irrespective of the type of documents being sought. The
House of Lords ruled that public interest immunity could lie in respect of the
contents of a particular document, or to a class of documents which ought to
be withheld in the interests of the proper functioning of the public service
(pp 941–42). This decision altered the law and, in the words of Professor
Wade, gave the Crown the right to withhold information and thereby ‘to
override the rights of litigants not only in cases of genuine necessity but in any
case where a government department thought fit’.94
In 1957, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Kilmuir, issued a Statement.95 He drew
a distinction between such documents which were absolutely necessary to
protect the ‘proper functioning of the civil service’, and documents which are
relevant to litigation but which do not require ‘the highest degree of
confidentiality ... in the public interest’, and stated that privilege relating to
medical and other documents relevant to the defence in criminal proceedings
should not be routinely claimed.96 The rule in Duncan v Cammell Laird,
however, prevailed until 1967. In Conway v Rimmer (1968), the House of Lords
took a more robust attitude to a claim of public interest immunity, reversing
its own decision in Duncan v Cammell Laird. In an action for malicious
prosecution against his former Superintendent of Police, the Home Secretary
objected to the disclosure of reports made on the former police probationary
officer. The court refused to follow the broad ruling in Duncan v Cammell Laird
and ruled that it was for the court – and not the person seeking to prevent
disclosure – to rule on the competing public interests in the administration of
justice and confidential information. Accordingly, it is for the person seeking
to withhold information to assert – through the use of a public interest
immunity certificate – the right to non-disclosure, and for the court to
determine whether or not non-disclosure is in the public interest. Lord Reid,
in rejecting that the power of decision lay solely with ministers of the Crown,
stated that he did not doubt that:
There were certain classes of documents97 which ought not to be disclosed
whatever their content may be ... To my mind the most important reason is
that such disclosure would create or fan ill informed or captious public or
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political criticism. The business of government is difficult enough as it is, and
no government could contemplate with equanimity the inner workings of the
government machine being exposed to the gaze of those ready to criticise
without adequate knowledge of the background and perhaps with an axe to
grind.
In Burmah Oil Co v Bank of England (1980), the oil company sought disclosure
of information relating to the rescue of the company by the bank, in exchange
for low-priced stock in the company. The Attorney General produced a public
interest immunity certificate from the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, in
which objection was made against producing documents sought on the basis
that it related to government policy. The House of Lords inspected the
documents, but felt that their disclosure was unnecessary. 
A question relating to public interest immunity certificates (PIIs) which
assumed particular importance in the Arms to Iraq affair, was whether the
minister was under a duty to sign the certificate when advised to do so by the
Attorney General. The notion of duty arose in Air Canada v Secretary of State for
Trade (1983) in which Lord Scarman (in the minority) stated that, whilst it was
for the court to accept or deny the claim, in claiming public interest immunity,
the Crown was not ‘claiming a privilege but discharging a duty’. In the Air
Canada case, the House of Lords ruled, by a majority, that the government was
entitled to immunity. At issue were the circumstances under which, in judicial
review proceedings, the court would examine documents for which immunity
was claimed. No order for disclosure can be made unless the documents are
inspected by the court. The majority in the House of Lords ruled that the party
seeking disclosure of documents had to show that ‘the documents are very
likely to contain material which would give substantial support to his
contention on an issue which arises in the case’ (per Lord Fraser, p 917e). It
was not sufficient that the documents might reveal information relevant to the
case; it had to be established by the person seeking disclosure that it was ‘very
likely’ that the information would assist his case.
The House of Lords had the opportunity to re-examine the issue in R v
Chief Constable of West Midlands Police ex parte Wiley; Chief Constable of
Nottinghamshire Police ex parte Sunderland (1995). In that case, the defendant,
Mr Wiley, was charged with robbery, but at his trial the prosecution offered
no evidence. He subsequently made formal complaints against the police and
commenced a civil action against the Chief Constable. Mr Sunderland had
been charged with assault but, again, no evidence was offered at trial by the
prosecution. He also made a formal complaint against the police. He alleged
assault by the police and indicated that he would institute civil proceedings
against them. The problem faced by both complainants was that the police
had documents which it was thought would attract public interest immunity
on behalf of the police, thereby making them unavailable to the complainants.
The Chief Constables concerned refused to give undertakings that the
documents would not be used to the detriment of the complainants, and the
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complainants secured a declaration that the Chief Constables had acted
unlawfully in refusing to give the undertakings. The Chief Constables
appealed against the declarations to the House of Lords. In the earlier case of
Neilson v Laugharne (1981),98 the House of Lords had ruled that public interest
immunity attached to police complaints documents, on the basis that if it did
not the complaints procedure would be damaged. However, the House of
Lords ruled that, in principle, documents which are relevant to litigation
should be disclosed, unless that disclosure would cause ‘substantial harm’. In
particular, Lord Templeman stated that ‘a rubber stamp approach to public
interest immunity by the holder of a document is neither necessary nor
appropriate ...’ (p 281).
One aspect of the law as previously understood, and which was the cause
of much criticism in the Scott Inquiry, discussed below, was the issue of
whether public interest immunity was a ‘right’ or a ‘duty’. The perceived
distinction was analysed in Makanjuola v Metropolitan Police Commissioner
(1992). In that case, Bingham LJ stated that:
... where a litigant asserts that documents are immune from production or
disclosure on public interest grounds he is not (if the claim is well founded)
claiming a right but observing a duty ...
Bingham LJ went on to state that:
... it [the distinction between a right and a duty] does, I think, mean: (1) that
public interest immunity cannot in any ordinary sense be waived, since,
although one can waive rights, one cannot waive duties; (2) that, where a
litigant holds documents in a class prima facie immune, he should (save
perhaps in a very exceptional case) assert that the documents are immune and
decline to disclose them, since the ultimate judge of where the balance of
public interest lies is not him but the court; and (3) that, where a document is,
or is held to be, in an immune class, it may not be used for any purpose
whatever in the proceedings to which the immunity applies, and certainly
cannot (for instance) be used for the purpose of cross-examination.
Woolf LJ, while endorsing much of this analysis, noted that Makanjuola did
not involve a Department of State, represented by a Secretary of State. He
stated that:
If a Secretary of State on behalf of his department, as opposed to any ordinary
litigant, concludes that any public interest in the documents being withheld
from production is outweighed by the public interest in the documents being
available for purposes of litigation, it is difficult to conceive that, unless the
documents do not relate to an area for which the Secretary of State was
responsible, the court would feel it appropriate to come to any different
conclusion from that of the Secretary of State. The position would be the same
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if the Attorney General was of the opinion that the documents should be
disclosed.
However, that situation did not pertain to other bodies or persons, and it
could not be left to individuals to decide that documents should be disclosed.
The court retained the ultimate right to determine disclosure and would
‘intervene to protect the public interest’. The decision in Neilson, and those
cases in which it had been applied, was wrong and could no longer be
justified. It was not, Woolf LJ stated, that ‘there had been a change in attitudes
since the Neilson decision’ but rather that ‘establishing a class of public interest
immunity of this nature was never justified’. In Wiley, the House of Lords
ruled that in Neilson and the subsequent cases in which it had been applied,
the law was incorrectly stated. The House of Lords did not, however, go so far
as to say that material which came to light in investigations against the police
could never be entitled to class immunity. The European Court of Human
Rights has ruled that the use of Public Interest Immunity Certificates which
prevent a judge from considering whether or not evidence should be
disclosed in the court of a murder trial violates Article 6 of the Convention.99
Matrix Churchill and arms to Iraq100
Between 1987 and 1989, the Matrix Churchill company exported machine
tools to Iraq. It was alleged by Customs and Excise (which brought the
prosecution against the directors of the company) that those exports breached
the export regulations in place at the time. In defence, it was argued that the
government knew about the exports and had in fact authorised them, and that
MI6 (the Secret Intelligence Service) was aware of the exports. When the
matter came to trial, four government ministers101 signed public interest
immunity certificates, refusing disclosure of documents relating to, inter alia,
records of meetings and communications between the Department of Trade
and Industry and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The effect of the
certificates was to deny to the court the evidence which might have led to the
acquittal of the defendants, each of whom was facing a significant term of
imprisonment if convicted.The trial of the directors of Matrix Churchill
collapsed after a former government minister, Alan Clark, revealed to the
court that the government had – as the defence claimed – in fact known of the
exports. The Prime Minister established the inquiry the day after the collapse
of the trial.102
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In 1992, however, it was revealed by Alan Clark that evidence which
affected the defence was not before the court. The effect of this revelation was
the collapse of the prosecution’s case and the announcement the following
day of a judicial inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the prosecution.
The decision to establish a judicial inquiry was brought about in large
measure through the failure of select committee inquiries to unravel the full
facts surrounding the issue.103
Sir Richard Scott’s Report represented the most wide ranging judicial
inquiry into a number of important constitutional issues, including:
(a) whether the relevant government departments, agencies and responsible
ministers operated in accordance with the policies of Her Majesty’s
government;
(b) an examination of decisions taken by the prosecuting authority and those
signing public interest immunity certificates;
(c) an examination of similar cases relevant to the issues of the inquiry and to
making recommendations.104
The change in policy over exports
In 1989, government minister William Waldegrave, in response to inquiries
from Members of Parliament, advised that government policy in respect of
exports had not changed. However, in Sir Richard Scott’s view, the answers
given were not accurate and were apt to mislead. Sir Richard accepted,
however, that William Waldegrave had not in fact noticed the changed
wording in the letters which, if noticed, would have alerted him to the fact
that the policy had in fact changed, and that there was no intention ‘to be
misleading’ (para D4.12).
In relation to parliamentary questions concerning the policy being applied,
Sir Richard found that the government had deliberately failed to ‘inform
parliament of the current state of government policy on non-lethal arms sales
to Iraq’ (para D4.25).
The use of public interest immunity certificates
As discussed above, the rules regulating the disclosure of documents in civil
and criminal cases vary, but in each case there are common rules. First, a
document may or may not fall within a category of documents which prima
facie must be disclosed. Secondly, disclosure may be denied on the basis that
the contents of the documents fall within a particular category of disclosure or
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non-disclosure,105 or that the documents fall within a class of documents
which may or may not be disclosed.106 Thirdly, disclosure involves the
evaluation of the relevance of the information or documents, which in some
cases will be clear, but in other cases less clear until disclosed and evaluated
by counsel and the court. Over and above these rules is the public interest
immunity certificate. The public interest immunity certificate may be used to
claim that it is contrary to the public interest for information or documents to
be disclosed irrespective of the first two rules, and may be claimed on the
basis of either contents or class.
Where the government would prefer not to disclose information, and the
information falls into a ‘grey area’, there is a temptation to claim public
interest immunity to protect the information, whereby its actual relevance to
the case in hand may go undetected.
In the case of criminal trials, it has been well established that it is the judge
who has the final say as to whether the documents in question should be
produced.107 Where, in a criminal trial, disclosure might risk the identity of a
police informant, for example, the judge must weigh in the balance the public
interest of non-disclosure and the public interest in a fair trial for the
defendant. To come down on the side of non-disclosure where there is a risk
of a miscarriage of justice for the defendant has been ruled unacceptable.108
However, the approach taken in civil cases has differed, with the court
holding in Duncan v Cammell Laird (1942) that a minister’s certificate to the
effect that disclosure would be contrary to the public interest was conclusive.
In the Matrix Churchill trial, the government claimed that it had the
absolute right, in the name of the public interest, to withhold information
which was central to the defendants’ case. Accordingly, there was a confusion
of the test to be applied to civil and criminal cases, to the detriment of the
defendants. Furthermore, by relying on immunity from disclosure on the
basis of a ‘class claim’, the government strengthened its case against the duty
to disclose.
It has been argued that class claims are unnecessary, in so far as all the
material concerned could equally be protected under a contents claim. In the
government’s view, however, class claims were essential to maintain
‘candour’ between ministers and civil servants in the development of policy,
and that it would be ‘wrong and inimical to the proper functioning of the
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public service if the public were to learn of these high level
communications’.109
Class claims, therefore, are supposedly to do with matters of ‘high policy’
and yet it was a class claim which the government relied on in the Matrix
Churchill case although, in the view of Sir Richard Scott, many of these
documents ‘could not possibly have been described as relating to “high
policy”’.110
In Sir Richard Scott’s view, ‘it had become the practice in the Treasury
Solicitor’s Department that PII class protection for all documents relating
directly or indirectly to advice to ministers should be sought, whether in a
civil case or in a criminal trial’. Moreover, he found that the documents which
the government was so keen to protect caused no damage to the Intelligence
and Security Agencies, and that, in any event, if sensitive material was
contained within the documents this could have been ‘blacked out’ on the
basis of a contents claim. Moreover:
It is, I suggest, unacceptable for PII class claims to be made covering such rel-
atively routine and, in terms of ‘high policy’, unimportant documents as
many of those for which protection was sought in the Matrix Churchill
case.111
In 1996, the Attorney General announced that, having reviewed the operation
of public interest immunity certificates, the government would no longer
utilise the distinction between ‘class’ and ‘contents’ claims but rather, in
future, it would only claim public interest immunity when the government
‘believed that disclosure of a document would cause real harm to the public
interest’. The certificate will explain the nature of the harm, and the manner in
which disclosure would harm the public interest,112 thereby allowing for
‘even closer scrutiny of claims by the court, which is always the final arbiter’.
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CHAPTER 11
MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY
The convention of ministerial responsibility is central to the constitution, and
plays a fundamental role in the relationship between the executive and
parliament. For the doctrine of government under the law to be observed, it is
essential that government be both accountable to parliament and to the
electorate, and that government be conducted in a manner sufficiently open,
subject to the requirements of the national interest, to inspire public
confidence. The origins of ministerial responsibility are traced by FW
Maitland to the principle that ‘for every exercise of royal power some minister
is answerable’ (1908, p 203). Marshall and Moodie describe ministerial
responsibility as follows:
Ministers are responsible for the general conduct of government, including the
exercise of many powers legally vested in the Monarch; and ultimately,
through Parliament and parties, to the electorate. [1971, Chapter 4]
The doctrine thus has two limbs – individual and collective responsibility. As
with so much of the constitution, there is vagueness on occasion as to the
distinction between the two limbs which are both closely related and also
complementary of one another. In order to facilitate analysis, the topic may be
broken down into three aspects:
(a) the collective responsibility of the Cabinet to parliament, and ultimately
the electorate, for policy and administration; 
(b) the individual responsibility of ministers for the policy and administration
of his or her Department;
(c) the individual responsibility of ministers for their personal conduct.
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY1
The convention of collective Cabinet responsibility emphasises the unanimity
of government and its accountability to parliament. The classic expression of
collective responsibility remains that of Lord Salisbury:
For all that passes in Cabinet every member of it who does not resign is
absolutely and irretrievably responsible and has no right afterwards to say that
he agreed in one case to a compromise, while in another he was persuaded by
his colleagues ... It is only on the principle that absolute responsibility is
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undertaken by every member of the Cabinet, who, after a decision is arrived at,
remains a member of it, that the joint responsibility of Ministers to Parliament
can be upheld and one of the essential principles of parliamentary
responsibility established. [Official Report, HC Cols 833–34, 8 April 1878.]
The rationale for the convention lies in the need for government to present a
united front to parliament and the public in order to maintain confidence. A
government which exhibits public disagreements over policy matters is one
which will be regarded as weak, and will be subjected to challenges to its
authority to continue in office.
Two principal sub-rules underlie collective responsibility. The first rule is
that, once an agreement is reached in Cabinet, all members of Cabinet – and
many outside Cabinet – are bound to speak in support of the decision. There
should be no criticism or dissent from the decision in public – irrespective of
whether or not the particular member of Cabinet was party to the discussion.
Equally, if a decision is reached by the Prime Minister in Cabinet Committee
or the Inner Cabinet when only a small handful of members are present, the
decision binds all. The second supporting rule is that records of Cabinet
discussions are absolutely secret. The knowledge that Cabinet records are
protected by confidentiality enhances the opportunity for members of Cabinet
to discuss matters freely, secure in the knowledge that their personal point of
view, whatever the decision, will be protected from the public gaze. 
These principles are expressed in Questions of Procedure for Ministers in the
following manner:
Collective responsibility requires that ministers should be able to express their
views frankly in the expectation that they can argue freely in private while
maintaining a united front when decisions have been reached. This in turn
requires that the privacy of opinions expressed in Cabinet and Ministerial
Committees should be maintained. Moreover, Cabinet and Committee
documents will often contain information which needs to be protected in the
national interest. It is therefore essential that ministers take the necessary steps
to ensure that they and their staff preserve the privacy of Cabinet business and
protect the security of government documents. [Cabinet Office, 1992, revised
2001, paragraph 17]
As with the convention of individual responsibility, there is dispute about the
status and scope of collective responsibility. So many exceptions to the classic
doctrine can be discerned that it is possible to question whether it is a
convention at all within the classical definition, or whether the term
convention should be discarded and replaced by the words practice or usage. 
Alternatively, it may be argued that the variations which can be observed
in the working of the convention merely illustrate one of the greatest strengths
of conventional rules – their flexibility.
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Agreements to differ
It is possible for the convention of collective responsibility to be waived when
the circumstances are such that the political disagreements within Cabinet are
of such magnitude that the Prime Minister finds it more expedient to set aside
the convention than to have the convention broken by members of Cabinet.
Two illustrations of waiver can be given. In 1931–32, the National (coalition)
government contained bitterly opposing views over economic policy; in
particular, over the levy of tariff duties. Four members of Cabinet handed in
their resignations, and withdrew them only after the Prime Minister, Mr
Ramsey MacDonald, decided to waive the convention and allow the dissident
members to express their views publicly.
In 1975, the Labour government of Mr Harold Wilson was faced with an
equally intransigent faction in Cabinet on the matter of the United Kingdom’s
continued membership of the European Community. The government had
decided to put the question to the people in a referendum, although, in
advance of the referendum, the government announced that it would not be
bound by the result.
Rather than face a public display of disunity in contravention of collective
responsibility, Mr Wilson announced a limited waiver of the convention, in
the guise of an ‘agreement to differ’:2
... those ministers who do not agree with the government’s recommendation in
favour of continued membership of the European Community are, in the
unique circumstances of the referendum, now free to advocate a different view
during the referendum campaign.
This freedom does not extend to parliamentary proceedings and official
business ... At meetings of the Council of Ministers of the European
Community and at other Community meetings, the United Kingdom position
in all fields will continue to reflect government policy.
I have asked all ministers ... not to allow themselves to appear in direct
confrontation, on the same platform or programme, with another minister who
takes a different view on the government recommendation.
In the event, one minister (Eric Heffer) flouted the limited waiver, and two
senior Cabinet members, Mr Roy Jenkins and Mr Tony Benn, opposed each
other in a public televised debate shortly before the referendum took place.
Cabinet papers3
The confidentiality of Cabinet discussion is protected by the prohibition
against disclosure by members of Cabinet. In addition, the rules regarding the
confidentiality of Cabinet papers include the rule that the government of the
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day may not release the papers of a previous government without the consent
of the former Prime Minister.4 Furthermore, the papers of the previous
government may not be disclosed to a government of a different political
persuasion. It may at first sight appear curious that an incoming government
cannot gain access to the papers of the previous government, and it may be
wondered how the government is supposed to act effectively in any policy
area if denied so much data. Nevertheless, the rule is justified on the basis that
an outgoing government might be tempted to remove politically sensitive
documentation if it feared that a new government would make political
capital out of it. Three categories of papers are excepted from the convention:5
(a) papers which, even if not publicly available, can be deemed to be in the
public domain, for example, letters sent by former ministers to trade
associations, trade unions, etc, or to Members of Parliament about
constituency cases, or to members of the public;
(b) papers, other than genuinely personal messages, dealing with matters
which are known to foreign governments, for example, messages about
inter-governmental negotiations;
(c) written opinions of the Law Officers, which are essentially legal rather
than political documents.
Ministerial memoirs
The publication of a former minister’s memoirs of his political life poses
problems for the rules relating to Cabinet secrecy. In 1976, the Radcliffe
Committee Report6 stated that:
The author should be free to use his ministerial experience for the purpose of
giving an account of his own work, subject to restrictions on three separate
categories of information:
(a) he must not reveal anything that contravenes the requirements of national
security operative at the time of his proposed publication;
(b) he must not make disclosures injurious to this country’s relations with
other nations;
(c) he must refrain from publishing information destructive of the confidential
relationships on which our system of government is based.
The final restriction relates to opinions or attitudes of Cabinet colleagues,
advice given to him by colleagues and criticism of those working for him in
office.
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In Attorney General v Jonathan Cape Ltd (1976), the issue of the publication of
the diaries of Richard Crossman, a former Labour Cabinet member, was
considered. Executors of the estate of Richard Crossman sought to publish his
Diaries; the government sought an injunction restraining publication.
Recognising the convention of collective responsibility, Lord Widgery CJ
stated that:
I find overwhelming evidence that the doctrine of joint responsibility is
generally understood and practised, and equally strong evidence that it is on
occasion ignored. 
Having given such ambivalent recognition to the convention, which in any
event was not court-enforceable, the injunction was denied.
INDIVIDUAL MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY7
In Questions of Procedure for Ministers,8 individual responsibility is defined as:
The minister in charge of a Department is alone answerable to Parliament for
the exercise of the powers on which the administration of the Department
depends. 
Ministerial responsibility for the department
The classic doctrine of this limb of ministerial responsibility states that a
minister is responsible for every action of his department. As AV Dicey
expressed it (1898), the responsibility of ministers means, where used in its
strict sense, the legal responsibility of every minister for every act of the
Crown in which he takes part.
Lord Morrison viewed the doctrine equally strictly:
... a minister is accountable to Parliament for anything he or his department
does or for anything he has powers to do, whether he does it or not. That is to
say, if the action or possible action is within the field of ministerial power or
competence, the minister is answerable to Parliament [1964, p 265].
It is the minister who represents the public face of the department and who
speaks for the department in parliament. The doctrine is underpinned by
Parliamentary Question Time and in debates in parliament and in committees.
During the passage of legislation relating to a particular department’s
responsibilities, it is the minister who will introduce the Bill and who will
defend the Bill throughout its passage through the House of Commons. The
minister thus stands as the link between the Civil Service and parliament,
assuming full responsibility for the department. As seen in Chapter 10, the
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conventionally-recognised characteristics of the Civil Service are permanence,
political neutrality and anonymity. The civil servant owes his or her duty to
the government of the day, and is directly accountable to his or her Secretary
of State. The principle of ministerial responsibility to parliament not only
underpins the doctrine of democratic responsibility of ministers to the people
through parliament, but also facilitates the distinction between the
responsibility of elected representatives and the civil servants who are
responsible for the practical implementation of policy. 
In practical terms nowadays, several factors diminish the extent to which a
minister can assume responsibility for every action of the department. The
size of departments, the usually short ministerial tenure of office in any one
department and the complexity of modern government have long made the
pure doctrine unworkable. As the Home Secretary, Mr Reginald Maudling,
stated in 1973, the classic doctrine of responsibility must be viewed in the light
of modern conditions, with large departments of state. Furthermore, the
complexity of defining the scope of ministerial responsibility must also be
seen in light of the rapid and extensive administrative framework under the
system of Next Steps agencies which are designed to increase efficiency in
administration by establishing specialist agencies, each with its own executive. 
Crichel Down
The classic doctrine was seen to operate most clearly in the Crichel Down
affair in 1954.9 Crichel Down, an area of some 725 acres in Dorset, had been
compulsorily acquired by the Air Ministry in 1937 for use as a bombing range.
After the Second World War, the land was no longer needed and it was
transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture and administered by the
Agriculture Land Commission. In 1950, the Commission decided that the best
way of disposing of the land was to equip it as a single farm unit and lease it.
Three hundred and twenty eight acres of Crichel Down had been part of
the Crichel Estates owned by a Mrs Marten. Her husband wanted to reclaim
the land. In both 1950 and 1952 he asked the Commission whether he could
buy back the land. The Commission wrongly thought that they had no power
of sale and declined to investigate his request. Mr Marten raised the matter
with his Member of Parliament who referred the matter to the Parliamentary
Secretary to the Minister of Agriculture who requested a report from the Land
Commission. The official in charge of making the report was instructed not to
approach the previous owners or to inspect the land, and to treat the matter as
one of great confidentiality. The resulting report was full of inaccuracies, and
went unchecked by the Ministry which decided to adhere to its original plan
for the land.
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Mr Marten was informed of the decision in 1953, and advised the Ministry
that he would rent the whole of the land. Meanwhile, the Ministry had
committed itself to another course of action. Mr Marten’s letters to the
authorities went unanswered and he pressed for a public inquiry. The inquiry
found that there had been inaccuracies in the report on the land, muddle and
inefficiency in handling the matter and hostility to Mr Marten. In July 1954,
the Minister Thomas Dugdale accepted responsibility and resigned.10
Ministerial responsibility after Crichel Down
It is notable that, between 1954 and 1982, there were no instances of
ministerial resignation following allegations of and inquiries into serious
defects in departmental administration. In 1959, 52 people were killed by
security forces in Nyasaland but the Colonial Secretary Mr Lennox-Boyd did
not resign. In 1964, due to a lack of co-ordination within the Ministry of
Aviation, an overpayment of some £4 million was made to the Ferranti
company, but the minister did not resign. In 1968, the Foreign Secretary, Mr
George Brown, did not resign over the Sachsenhausen affair in which 12
former detainees in a Nazi prison camp were wrongly denied compensation
under a scheme set up to compensate victims of Nazi persecution.11
In 1971, the Vehicle and General Insurance Company collapsed leaving
over a million policy holders uninsured. The Department of Trade and
Industry had supervisory responsibility for insurance companies. An inquiry
report placed the blame on a civil servant, Mr Jardine, an Under Secretary in
the Department, and the minister did not resign.12 In 1982, the Home
Secretary, Mr William Whitelaw, did not resign over a breach of security at
Buckingham Palace which resulted in an intruder entering the Queen’s
bedroom, nor did Mr James Prior (as he then was), the Northern Ireland
Minister, resign in 1984, following the escape of terrorists from the Maze
Prison. The exchange in parliament revealed divergent views about
accountability. In debate, Mr Prior distinguished carefully between
responsibility for policy – for which he accepted responsibility – and the
failure of officials to follow the correct orders and procedures – for which he
denied responsibility:
However, I do not accept – and I do not think it right for the House to accept –
that there is any constitutional or other principle that requires ministerial
resignations in the face of failure, either by others to carry out orders or
procedures or by their supervisors to ensure that staff carried out those orders
...
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Mr Enoch Powell MP was of a different view:
What happened was an immense administrative disaster. It was not a disaster
in a peripheral area of the responsibilities of the Northern Ireland Department.
It was a disaster that occurred in an area which was quite clearly central to the
department’s responsibilities. If the responsibility for administration so central
to a department can be abjured by a minister, a great deal of our proceedings
in the House is a beating of the air because we are talking to people who, in the
last resort, disclaim the responsibility for the administration.13
The Falklands War provided the scenario for three ministerial resignations.
Lord Carrington, the Foreign Secretary, resigned following allegations, which
he denied, over the lack of preparation of the British forces when the
Argentinians attacked; Mr Luce and Mr Atkins also resigned from the Foreign
Office.14
In 1986 came the Westland Helicopter saga.15 Westland, a helicopter
manufacturing company, was threatened with closure. The government
sought to promote a rescue bid for the company. Two alternative plans were
put forward; one from an American consortium, the other from Europe. Mr
Heseltine, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, wanted the European
option to be taken up. Mrs Thatcher, however, favoured the American plan.
Mr Heseltine had been informed that he would be able to put his preferred
plan to a Cabinet meeting. In the event, however, Mrs Thatcher cancelled that
meeting. The conduct of the affair resulted in the resignations of Mr Michael
Heseltine, more on the basis of a breakdown in collective responsibility than
of individual responsibility, and of Mr Leon Brittan for the breach of
convention in the leak of the Solicitor General’s letter.
In 1989, Mrs Edwina Currie resigned over the furore caused by her claim
that the majority of eggs in the United Kingdom were infected by the
salmonella virus and, in 1990, Mr Nicholas Ridley resigned from the
Department of Trade and Industry, having accepted responsibility for making
intemperate remarks about a fellow Member State of the European
Community.
In 1994, the Home Secretary, Michael Howard, faced several calls for his
resignation over escapes from Whitemore prison and over the finding of
escape equipment and weapons in prisons. Mr Howard refused to resign,
citing in his support the precedent set by Mr James Prior (as he then was) over
escapes from the Maze prison in Ulster, and the distinction between
responsibility for operational matters and matters of policy. In 2002, the
Secretary of State for Transport, Stephen Byers, resigned. He had inherited a
department which had ambitious plans for revitalisation of transport over a
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ten year period. However, Byers seemed unable to produce progress in any
area and was perceived by many to be less than straightforward in accounting
for the department. He also, fatally, failed to dismiss his special adviser after a
callous remark made on 11 September 2001. Increasingly his tenure became
damaging to the government and Byers left office.
Evaluating the evidence
From the above evidence, how is the working of the doctrine of individual
ministerial responsibility to be evaluated? First, it is arguable that the doctrine
represents one of the most significant conventions of the constitution,
enhancing the accountability of the government to parliament and the
electorate. However, as has been seen above, the existence and acceptance of
responsibility does not inevitably lead to the consequence of the resignation of
a minister for the failures within his department. No hard and fast rules exist
which will determine whether and when a minister should resign, and
accordingly it cannot clearly be said that resignation forms a part of the
convention itself. On the question of the circumstances under which a minister
will resign as a result of departmental mismanagement, Professor SE Finer
(1956) considered that:
... whether a minister is forced to resign depends on three factors: on himself,
his Prime Minister and his party. 
For a resignation to occur, all three factors have to be just so: the minister
compliant, the Prime Minister firm, the party clamorous. This conjuncture is
rare, and is in fact fortuitous. Above all, it is indiscriminate – which ministers
escape and which do not is decided neither by the circumstances of the offence
nor by its gravity.
Professor Finer went on to question whether in fact there is a ‘convention’ of
resignation at all, and concluded that the convention is so haphazard in
operation that it cannot amount to a rule.16
THE MORALITY OF PUBLIC OFFICE
Qualification for ministerial office
Given the fundamental importance of ministerial responsibility, it is perhaps
surprising that there are neither formal qualifications for office nor formal
means by which the suitability for office is scrutinised in advance. Sir Ivor
Jennings states that:
... the most elementary qualification demanded of a Minister is honesty and
incorruptibility. It is, however, necessary not only that he should possess this
qualification but also that he should appear to possess it. [1959a, Chapter V,
p 106]
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Lord Hailsham expresses the same sentiment as follows:
A politician must be trustworthy, and if he is found out telling a lie or if he is
discovered in even a small financial dishonesty, he can only bow himself out of
public life [1975, p 199].
If a minister of the Crown or Member of Parliament conducts his personal or
financial affairs in such a manner that falls below an ‘acceptable standard’, the
minister may be required to resign. Finer (1956) describes such conduct as
being:
... a personal misadventure of the minister which raises such doubt about his
personal prudence or integrity as to cause him to resign.
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL CONDUCT
Personal conduct
While responsibility for the implementation and execution of policy of course
entails ‘personal conduct’, one aspect of ministerial responsibility which has
also given rise to particular concern is the conduct of ministers in relation to
their private lives. The personal relationships of ministers are also matters
which fall under intense public scrutiny. In 1963, the Minister of Defence, Mr
John Profumo, was found to have been having a sexual relationship with a
prostitute, Christine Keeler. Ms Keeler, it was found, also enjoyed a close
personal relationship with a Russian Naval Attaché at the Soviet Embassy.
When questioned in the House of Commons about the affair, Mr Profumo lied
to the House. When the truth emerged, Mr Profumo resigned office. The cause
of his resignation was not so much the sexual affair, but the contempt of the
House committed through lying. The potential security aspects of the affair
led to a judicial inquiry headed by Lord Denning MR.17
In 1973, Lords Lambton and Jellicoe resigned office. Earl Jellicoe, Lord
Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Lords, resigned after it had been
revealed that he had been associating with prostitutes. Lord Lambton,
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force,
resigned over allegations of involvement with illegal drugs. The government
requested an inquiry by the Security Commission into any security aspects of
the affairs, which resulted in the finding that no classified information had in
fact been revealed either directly or indirectly to ‘any potentially hostile
power’.18
In 1983, Cecil Parkinson MP, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
and Conservative Party Chairman, resigned following revelations about a
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long standing relationship with his secretary, Sarah Keays, who became
pregnant. For some time, the Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, and the Party
maintained their support for Mr Parkinson,19 as did his wife throughout the
public attention focused on the affair. When Sarah Keays published a series of
articles in the national press about the matter, and alleged that Mr Parkinson
had said that he wanted to marry her, public and political support began to
wane, and Mr Parkinson resigned.
In 1992, Alan Amos MP resigned after allegations of indecency with
another man. Also in 1992, the Heritage Secretary David Mellor was forced to
resign following revelations of a sexual relationship with an actress (and the
receipt of gifts). The majority of the revelations had been brought about
through the illicit bugging of an apartment used by Mr Mellor. While this
affair alone may not have caused his downfall, the revelation that Mr Mellor
and his family had enjoyed the hospitality, while on holiday, of the wife of a
Palestinian Liberation Organisation official, sealed his fate. Despite being
regarded as an excellent Heritage Secretary, the intense and hostile coverage
by the media ensured his resignation.20 In January 1994, Tim Yeo MP,
Minister of State for the Environment, resigned after admitting fathering a
child out of wedlock, as did Alan Duncan MP after allegations that he had
used the ‘right to buy’ legislation to make money in property deals with a
neighbour. In February 1994, Hartley Booth MP resigned after a ‘close
relationship’ with a research assistant; in May 1994, Michael Brown MP
resigned following newspaper reports of a ‘friendship’ with a male civil
servant. In 1998, Ron Davies, the Welsh Secretary, resigned immediately after
being discovered in still unexplained but curious circumstances on Clapham
Common. The message is, if you are caught out resign sooner rather than later
in order to spare the government embarrassment and loss of public
confidence.
Financial probity
The personal financial probity of ministers, their Parliamentary Private
Secretaries and other Members of Parliament is regarded with seriousness.
Under the law and custom of parliament, Members must declare their
financial interests in the Register of Members’ Interests and make public
declarations in debate or committee proceedings of any interests they hold
which may affect their impartiality.21 The holding of directorships, ownership
of shares, consultancy positions and receipt of gifts all raise issues concerning
integrity and fitness for office. Ministers of the Crown must give up any
public appointments or directorships on assuming office. Further, they must
351
19 Thatcher, 1993, pp 310–11; Tebbitt, 1988, pp 205, 208–11.
20 Statement of Resignation 212 HC Deb 139, 25 September 1992.
21 On alleged payments for parliamentary questions, see Chapter 18.
divest themselves of any financial interests on assuming office where that
interest might give rise to conflict with his or her ministerial responsibilities.22
The Ministerial Code23 states that ‘Ministers must ensure that no conflict
arises, or appears to arise, between their public duties and their private
interests, financial or otherwise’. There is an inherent vagueness in such
criteria, yet relatively few ministers and other Members of Parliament have
fallen from grace as a result of imprudent (or dishonest) financial dealings. In
1913, the issue of ministers holding shares was raised in debate following
allegations of improper ministerial involvement in the Marconi Company.24 It
was rumoured that ministers25 had used information received as ministers for
their own personal advantage. All three ministers involved denied any share
dealings. A select committee inquiry exonerated the ministers of all charges of
corruption and from charges that they had used their ministerial positions for
personal gain. 
In 1949, a Tribunal of Inquiry26 was established to inquire into allegations
of payments and other benefits being made to John Belcher MP, Parliamentary
Secretary to the Board of Trade. Mr Belcher had received gifts offered with a
view to securing favourable treatment in relation to licences granted by the
Board of Trade. He resigned office and his parliamentary seat as a result.27
Recent ministerial resignations involving allegations of financial
imprudence – although in each case there were additional factors involved in
the resignations – include, as noted above, p 351, David Mellor, the Heritage
Secretary, who resigned following a mixture of allegations, one of which
involved the receipt of a free holiday from a woman with Palestinian
Liberation Organisation associations.28 In 1992, it was revealed that the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Norman Lamont, had received £4,700 of public
money for legal fees involved in the eviction of a tenant from his apartment.29
In June 1993, the Minister for Northern Ireland, Michael Mates MP, resigned
office after it had been revealed that Mr Mates gave to the fugitive
businessman Asil Nadir, who faces prosecution on charges of theft and fraud,
an inexpensive watch, shortly before Mr Nadir fled the United Kingdom. The
Prime Minister described the gift as ‘an error of judgment’ and ‘not a hanging
matter’. The matter might have been allowed to rest if it were not for the
subsequent allegation that Mr Mates accepted the loan of a car from Mr Nadir
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for his ex-wife’s use, and that Mr Mates had dined with Mr Nadir shortly
before he left the country. Mr Mates30 claimed to have the full support of the
Prime Minister and said that he would not resign over the matter:
nevertheless, he ultimately resigned. Further embarrassment was caused to
the government in 1994, when it was alleged that Jeffrey Archer, former
Conservative Party Chairman, had been involved in share-dealing in Anglia
Television, on whose Board of Directors his wife held a directorship. In 1994,
allegations were made that Members of Parliament had accepted payment for
asking parliamentary questions. This affair escalated into a full-scale judicial
inquiry into ‘standards in public life’, and to a tightening of the rules
regulating the financial interests of all members of the House of Commons.
Premature disclosure of confidential information
In 1936, the Colonial Secretary, JH Thomas, resigned after revealing
information relating to Budget proposals before they had been announced in
parliament. As a consequence, two friends, Alfred Bates and Sir Alfred Butt
MP, made financial gains. A ‘leak’ of information was suspected and a
Tribunal of Inquiry was established. The Prime Minister described Thomas’s
conduct as ‘letting his tongue wag when he was in his cups’.31 The Attorney
General refused to prosecute under the Official Secrets Act, and the minister
resigned. In 1947, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Hugh Dalton, resigned
after revealing Budget proposals to a journalist.
Nowadays, the contents of the Budget are regarded as being far less secret,
and it is not uncommon for the Chancellor to discuss proposals publicly prior
to revealing the precise details to parliament. Nevertheless, the convention of
secrecy of the Budget is such that the exact proposals need not be, and are not,
revealed even to the Cabinet before being disclosed in parliament.
The Nolan Committee
The result of continued and intensive media interest in ministerial conduct
has caused a loss of public confidence in Members of Parliament as a whole,
and in the conduct and probity of ministers. The Nolan Committee, appointed
to inquire into standards in public life, examined in general the standards of
conduct expected of ministers. More specifically, the Committee has
investigated the question of the rules relating to ministers who retire from
office and subsequently take up employment with organisations with whom
they had dealings whilst in ministerial office. In addition, the Committee
considered the organisation, regulation and personnel employed in non-
departmental public bodies (NDPBs or ‘quangos’).32
353
30 Interview, BBC News, 22 June 1993.
31 That is to say ‘drunk’.
32 Quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations, on which, see, further, below and
Chapter 24.
The conduct of ministers of the Crown
The Nolan Committee endorsed the view that the ‘public is entitled to expect
very high standards of behaviour from ministers, as they have profound
influence over the daily lives of us all’.33 The Committee distinguished
between the need for clear enforceable rules regulating financial conduct and
those regulating sexual conduct. In respect of the latter, the Committee, whilst
recognising that sexual improprieties may on occasion be relevant to the
performance of a minister’s public duties, took the view that it was not
possible to lay down hard and fast rules to regulate such private conduct.
In respect to financial matters, however, the Committee took a very
different view. The Committee recommended that Questions of Procedure for
Ministers,34 the document issued by the Prime Minister for the regulation of
public conduct, should be redrafted and the rules relating to ministers more
clearly and forcefully expressed. Questions of Procedure, while having no
formal constitutional status, is nevertheless, in practice, binding on all
members of the government (Nolan Report, paragraph 9). The Committee
recommended that the Prime Minister should be given explicit power to
determine whether ministers – who are responsible for complying with the
standards of conduct – have in fact upheld the required standard (paragraph
13).
As discussed in Chapter 18, the appointment of a Commissioner for
Standards, as recommended by the Nolan Committee, the refashioning of the
Committee of Privileges as the Committee on Standards and Privileges and
the renewed emphasis on the duty to formally register interests, has resulted
in a tightening of parliamentary scrutiny of, and control over, ministerial
conduct. In 1997, the Commissioner ruled that the former Chancellor of the
Exchequer should have registered his sponsored attendance at a conference in
Greece. One early inquiry also undertaken by the Commissioner, Sir Gordon
Downey, was into allegations that the Labour Party had accepted, during the
election campaign, a donation of over £1 million from the head of Formula
One racing. Controversy heightened when, subsequent to the election, the
government exempted Formula One from the proposed ban on the tobacco
industry sponsoring sporting events. Following some delay, the money was
returned. The Commissioner has also examined allegations concerning the
Paymaster General, Geoffrey Robinson, who, it was alleged, failed to register
his substantial interests in offshore trusts. While the Commissioner was
critical of Robinson’s failure to register, Sir Gordon Downey and the
Committee on Standards and Privileges cleared him of breaking any House of
Commons rules. The Commissioner stated that in future, where there was
doubt as the requirement of registration, the advice of the Commissioner
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should be sought.35 Nineteen ninety-eight saw the culmination of the long
running inquiry into the financial affairs of the former Paymaster General,
Geoffrey Robinson, when in December both Robinson and Peter Mandelson,
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, resigned. Peter Mandelson had been
a leading architect in making the Labour Party ‘electable’ and a pivotal figure
is the general election campaign. However, it was revealed that Mandelson
had accepted a personal loan from Robinson to finance the purchase of a
London home, and that the loan had not been disclosed. While protesting that
he had done nothing ‘wrong’, Mandelson resigned. He returned to ministerial
office in 1999 as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, only to resign again
over allegations that he interfered in a passport application of a wealthy
Indian businessman who had contributed money to the Millennium Dome for
which Mandelson had responsibility at the time.
The Scott Report and ministerial responsibility
The Arms to Iraq affair, discussed in Chapter 10, resulted in the Scott Report
and to an in-depth analysis of ministerial responsibility by Sir Richard Scott,
the Inquiry chairman. On the question of giving a full and honest account of
policy matters to parliament, Sir Richard endorsed the proposals made in
Nolan LJ’s First Report,36 recommending amendments to Questions of Procedure
for Ministers to emphasise that ‘Ministers must not knowingly mislead
parliament and the public ... They must be as open as possible with
parliament and the public, withholding information only when disclosure
would not be in the public interest’. In his report, Sir Richard Scott stated that
‘the withholding of information by an accountable minister should never be
based on reasons of convenience or for the avoidance of political
embarrassment, but should always require special and carefully considered
justification’.37
In ‘Ministerial accountability’ (1996), Sir Richard Scott developed the
themes analysed by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe in his report on the Crichel Down
affair (see above, p 346), and evidence given to the Scott Inquiry by Sir Robin
Butler, the Cabinet Secretary. Referring to the distinction increasingly
frequently made in recent years between ministerial constitutional
responsibility and ministerial constitutional accountability, Sir Richard Scott
cited Sir Robin’s evidence as follows:
I am using ‘accountability’ to mean that the Minister must always answer
questions and give an account to Parliament for the action of his department,
whether he is ‘responsible’ in the sense of attracting personal criticism himself,
or not. So I am using ‘accountability’ to leave out, as it were, the blame element
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of it. The blame element is an open question. There are cases where he is
accountable in which he may be personally blameworthy, and there will be
occasions when he is not personally blameworthy.38
The ‘divorce’ between the acceptance of responsibility and the consequence of
resignation is not, in Sir Richard’s expressed view, the ‘heart of an effective
system of parliamentary accountability’ as the Treasury and Civil Service
Select Committee regarded it to be.39 In Sir Richard’s view, what does lie at
the heart of the constitutional doctrine is rather the: 
... obligation of ministers to give, or to facilitate the giving, of information
about the activities of their departments and about the actions and omission of
their civil servants.40
This obligation to provide information came into conflict in relation to defence
sales with the government’s insistence on following the practice of not
disclosing to parliament information concerning individual export licensing
matters, a practice which did not, in Sir Richard’s view, constitute any
departure from the practice adopted by all other post-War administrations.
However, in 1991, the British government supported the introduction by the
United Nations of a voluntary register identifying the movement of, and
quantities of, conventional weaponry between supplier and recipient nations.
On this basis, Sir Richard Scott called for an abandonment of the blanket
refusal to answer parliamentary questions, at least in relation to conventional
weaponry.
The refusal to answer questions at all is but part of the problem of the duty
to give information. A further cause for concern lay in the failure of ministers
to give full answers to questions and, in relation to the Scott Inquiry, in the
failure of witnesses to provide the full picture. ‘Commercial confidentiality’ is
an accepted reason for the denial of information, but that, in Sir Richard’s
view, did not excuse the refusal of information or the provision of information
about weapons supply. National security is another justified exception to the
duty to make full disclosure. Nevertheless:
... setting those rare cases aside, the proposition that it is acceptable for a
Minister to give an answer that is deliberately incomplete is one which, in my
opinion, is inconsistent with the requirements of the constitutional principle of
ministerial accountability. Half the picture can be true ... But the audience does
not know that it is seeing only half the picture. If it did know, it would
protest.41
A strong democracy can only be a legitimate label if the electors are able to
express their view on the basis of adequate knowledge of government
activities:
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A failure by Ministers to meet the obligations of ministerial accountability by
providing information about the activities of their departments engenders
cynicism about government and undermines, in my opinion, the democratic
process.42
Sir Richard Scott’s recommendations
Sir Richard called for the appointment a parliamentary officer, independent of
the executive, charged with the task of scrutinising claims by ministers that
information should not be revealed ‘in the public interest’. Such an officer
would require free access to government documents and would report to
parliament twice yearly. In addition, parliament needed to tighten up on the
rules requiring witnesses to give evidence by a more robust use of the concept
of contempt of parliament. 
Moreover, Sir Richard called for a ‘comprehensive review’ of the subjects
on which governments refuse to answer questions, and of the obligation of
ministers ‘to provide and facilitate the provision of information to select
committees’.43 This task was been undertaken by the Public Service
Committee which reported in July 1996. 
The Public Service Committee report: ministerial accountability
and responsibility44
Reviewing the doctrine of ministerial responsibility from the Crichel Down
affair in 1954 to the current time, the Committee produced 34 conclusions and
recommendations. In the Committee’s view, it was not possible to distinguish
absolutely between areas in which a minister is personally responsible (and
blameworthy) and areas in which the minister is constitutionally
accountable.45 Further, the Committee concluded that ‘proper and rigorous
scrutiny and accountability’ is the more important feature of ministerial
responsibility than is parliament’s ability to force that minister’s resignation.
The government’s response
In Government Response to the Report,46 the government accepted the
Committee’s view on the difficulty of a clear distinction between
responsibility and accountability but, nevertheless, agreed that the distinction
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46 Government Response to the Report of the Public Service Committee on Ministerial
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was one which, in some circumstances, remained useful. The government also
accepted that ministers must account to parliament for their, and their
department’s actions, and must respond to criticisms made in parliament.
Further, the government accepted that parliament had the right to determine
whether to impose and what sanctions were to be imposed on ministers.
The Public Service Committee had been critical of the fact that the
definition and scope of ministerial responsibility was formulated by the
government of the day, via Question of Procedures for Ministers, rather than by
parliament, which alone had the right to demand and enforce ministerial
responsibility. As a result, and after much inter-Party debate, the House
resolved in 1997 that:
In the opinion of the House, the following principles should govern the
conduct of ministers of the Crown in relation to Parliament:
(1) Ministers have a duty to Parliament to account, and be held to account, for
the policies, decisions and actions of their departments and next step
agencies;
(2) It is of paramount importance that ministers should give accurate and
truthful information to Parliament, correcting any inadvertent error at the
earliest opportunity. Ministers who knowingly mislead Parliament will be
expected to offer their resignation to the Prime Minister;
(3) Ministers should be as open as possible with Parliament, refusing to
provide information only when disclosure would not be in the public
interest;
(4) Ministers should require civil servants who give evidence before
parliamentary committees on their behalf and under their directions to be
as helpful as possible in providing accurate, truthful and full information;
(5) The interpretation of ‘public interest’ in paragraph (3) shall be decided in
accordance with statute and the government’s Code of Practice on Access
to Government Information ...; and compliance with the duty in
paragraph (4) shall be in accordance with the duties and responsibilities of
civil services set out in the Civil Service Code ...47
Vetting of prospective ministers?
In the United States of America, appointment to Cabinet office is undertaken
only after the ‘advice and consent’ of the Senate has been obtained.48 By this
means, it is intended to test the suitability of candidates prior to appointment
and to avoid the inevitable embarrassment which occurs when resignation is
forced through disclosure of some financial, sexual or other impropriety. In
the United Kingdom, by contrast, appointment is entirely at the discretion of
the Prime Minister and will be made on information which is publicly
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available and from the personal and political reputation of the candidate. As
has been seen above, the standard of conduct required for public life and the
reality frequently part company. It is thus at least arguable that some form of
‘vetting’ – such as occurs with prospective holders of senior Civil Service posts
– should be introduced. Professor Rodney Brazier has advocated this course of
action,49 favouring some form of pre-appointment formal inquiry into fitness
for office. Such an approach has not found favour with others who have
considered it. In the inquiry following the Profumo scandal, Lord Denning
stated that there should be no inquiry into politicians’ private lives by the
Security Service other than where state security was under threat, a view
endorsed by the Security Commission in its report following the resignations
of Lords Lambton and Jellicoe.50 Lord Hailsham has expressed the view that,
in a democracy, there should be no such invasive advance inquiries into the
private lives of public figures (1975) while recognising the real risks of
corruption in public life which ‘is hard to define ... harder to detect, and
almost as catching as smallpox’ (p 201). It must, however, be conceded that
when the standard of conduct is lowered and the esteem of a government
damaged by lack of integrity, then some action is needed. 
GOVERNMENT OPENNESS AND GOVERNMENT SECRECY
The issue of the confidentiality of Cabinet papers has been discussed above,
pp 343–44. More generally, the issue of confidentiality of government papers
gives rise to questions about the extent to which the government in the United
Kingdom operates with an unnecessary degree of secrecy. Secrecy in
government raises important questions for the individual citizen over the
right of access to personal information stored by the government and also to
the right of access of citizens more generally to documents concerning
government of the state and of access to information about the policies and
standards of service of public bodies. The issue of access to personal data held
by government is discussed later in this chapter. A further question arises as
to the disclosure of government documents to courts of law and the use of
public interest immunity certificates by the government to conceal evidence. 
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STANDARDS OF PUBLIC SERVICE AND 
THE OPENNESS OF GOVERNMENT
Access to information51
The balance to be struck between the right of authorities to maintain
confidential records and the right of individuals to access to that information
is increasingly a matter of concern. There is no general right of access to data
stored by the state, for example, records maintained by the Police, Inland
Revenue, National Health Service and Department of Social Security. Under
the Official Secrets Act 1989, categories of information can never be disclosed.
A limited right of access to personal files is granted under the Data Protection
Act 1984.52 Citizens in the United Kingdom are entitled to access to official
records in certain categories of cases.53 The information which can be
disclosed is currently confined to computerised records, and not to manually
created files, although access to these will be introduced in the future.
In any heavily regulated state, government departments will have access
to large amounts of personal data on its citizens. Tax authorities, Social
Security offices, local authorities and driving licence authorities are but four
major holders of personal information. The individual has two interests in
personal records. The first is that information held about the individual
should be accessible to him or her. The second is that the individual should be
protected against disclosure of such personal data to third parties. 
The protection of personal data
A range of statutes prohibit the unauthorised disclosure of personal data to
third parties. Local authority records (relating to, inter alia, adoption,
education, child support, housing, medical records and social security) are
protected. Equally, in the financial industry, there is protection given to
confidential information. In relation to such information, the government does
not accept that there is a need to relax the restrictions on disclosure. 
Access to personal data
The Data Protection Act 1984 provided that computer-held personal
information should be made available to individuals, in order that the person
concerned may check the accuracy of the data. The Data Protection Act 1998
replaces and repeals the 1984 Act. The Act only applies to personal data,
defined in section 1(1), and confers the right to be informed of whether data is
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being held and to have that data communicated to the subject. The data
covered by the Act is wider than under the 1984 Act and relates both to
computer held records and manual files. Disclosure may be refused where it
would, inter alia, damage national security, be in the interests of the
prevention or detection of crime or the apprehension or prosecution of
offenders (sections 28 and 29). A Data Protection Commissioner supervises
the operation of the Act, and may issue enforcement notices on any data
controller who is not acting in accordance with the principles of the Act (see
section 4 and Schedule 1). The Commissioner lays an annual report before
parliament. The Access to Personal Files Act 1987 provides that individuals
have the right to inspect records relating to social services and housing
tenancies. Medical records prepared for insurance or employment purposes
are accessible under the Access to Medical Reports Act 1988. The Access to
Health Records Act 1990 gives patients the right to see records held by general
practitioners, health authorities or NHS trusts. 
Access to public records
The Public Records Acts 1958 and 1967 provide for the inspection of public
records at the Public Records Office after 30 years, unless there is justification
for withholding them. The Lord Chancellor also has the power under the Act
to order the release of documents at an earlier period if in the public interest.
Under section 5 of the 1958 Act, records may be kept closed for a longer
period.54 The main classes of information not disclosed relate to population
census returns, Ministry of Pensions First World War war pensions awards
files and the Inland Revenue Stamps and Taxes Division registered files.
The Freedom of Information Act 2000
In 1997, the incoming Labour government promised to inject greater openness
into the machinery of government. Towards this end, a White Paper, Your
Right to Know: White Paper on Freedom of Information, was published in
December 1997.55 The government intended that, for the first time, citizens
should have a legal right to information and to the records in which that
information is contained. In addition, an independent Information
Commissioner will be appointed, who will be answerable not to parliament,
but to the courts. The new legal right applies throughout the public sector, as
well as to some private organisations carrying out duties on behalf of
government and privatised utilities. Citizens are entitled to information,
subject to ‘harm tests’. The Freedom of Information Act supersedes the Code
361
54 Only one to two per cent of records remain closed for longer periods.
55 Cm 3818, London: HMSO.
of Practice on Access to Government Information and amends the Data
Protection Act 1998 and the Public Records Act 1958. The Act will be fully
implemented by 2005, and applies to central government with effect from
November 2002. The Act is the culmination of years of attempting to open up
the processes of government. There are, however, a number of restrictions
imposed on the right to information.
The Freedom of Information Act for the first time confers on citizens a
general right of access to data held by public authorities (section 1), including
local government, National Health Service bodies, schools and colleges, the
police and others. Requests must be in writing, and the authority is under a
duty to respond to the request within 20 working days of its receipt. A fee is
payable and the duty to disclose does not arise until the fee is paid. The Act is
regulated by a Commissioner to whom the public has a right of direct access
(section 18; see, further, below). A public authority may decline to provide
information where the cost exceeds the ‘appropriate limit’ (section 11; the
limits are prescribed and may be changed). The Act also provides a list of
exempted information, which considerably weakens the general principle of a
‘right to know’.
Information which is exempt from disclosure is in two categories: that
which is absolutely exempt and other information which requires the
balancing of the public interest in maintaining the exemption and the public
interest in disclosure. The following categories of information are exempt
from the duty of disclosure (Part II of the Act):
• information which is accessible by other means or which is to be
published;
• information relating to the security services or the royal household;
• personal information or information provided to the authority in
confidence;
• information to which professional privilege applies;
• information which might prejudice:
• national security; defence or the effectiveness of the armed forces;
• international relations or relations between administrations within the
United Kingdom;
• the country’s economic interests;
• criminal investigations or proceedings;
• law enforcement;
• the effective conduct of public affairs;
• the physical or mental health of any person;
• trade secrets or commercial interests.
Chapter 11: Constitutional and Administrative Law
362
Responsible Government
The Act specifies the investigative and enforcement powers of the
Commissioner. Where the Commissioner decides that a public authority has
failed to communicate information, or to provide confirmation or denial, in a
case where it is required to do so, the Commissioner may issue a decision
notice specifying the steps which must be taken by the authority in order to
comply (section 49(4)). The Commissioner may also issue enforcement notices
requiring the authority to take, within a specified time, such steps as required
to comply. Where the Commissioner has issued a decision or enforcement
notice in respect of the disclosure of information under section 13, a certificate
may be issued by an ‘accountable person’ as defined in the Act, the effect of
this is that a public authority need not comply with the Commissioner’s notice
(section 52). If an authority fails to comply with the Commissioner’s notice,
the Commissioner may so certify to the High Court or, in Scotland, the Court
of Session, and the court may, having conducted a hearing, deal with the
authority as if it had committed a contempt of court (section 53).
Appeals
Either the complainant or the pubic authority may appeal against a decision
notice to the Tribunal under section 56. The Tribunal shall either allow the
appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the
Commissioner and, in other cases, must dismiss the appeal. Appeals from the
decision of the Tribunal on a point of law lie to the High Court or to the Court
of Session in relation to Scotland and to the High Court of Justice in Northern
Ireland.
Amendments relating to public records
Part VI of the Act provides a statutory regime for access to public records,
replacing the provisions of the Public Records Act 1958 relating to
discretionary disclosure. It also provides for increased access to information
contained in records more than 30 years old. 
Amendments to the Data Protection Act 1998 
Part VII extends the Data Protection Act 1998 in relation to subject access and
data accuracy on information held by public authorities. Schedule 6 extends
the 1998 Act to include relevant personal information processed by or on
behalf of both Houses of Parliament. Personal data is, however, exempt if the
exemption is required for the purpose of avoiding an infringement of the
privileges of either House of Parliament.56
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CHAPTER 12
PART I – REGIONAL GOVERNMENT: 
THE DEVOLUTION OF POWER
As discussed in Chapters 1 to 3, the constitution of the United Kingdom has
traditionally been characterised by the unity of its several parts, with
centralised government. Wales became united with England through being
conquered in 1262, while the Acts of Union 1706 and 1707 marked the end of
the separation of Scotland and England under two sovereign parliaments.
Despite the former attempt at devolution of power to both Wales and
Scotland in 1978, discussed in Chapter 3, the population of neither country
then expressed – according to the terms of the referendum – the desire for
greater separation from centralised government. Two decades later, however,
the political position is much changed. A disenchantment with the extent to
which the national parliament reflected the views of the people of Scotland, in
particular, and Wales, and a rising tide of nationalist regional sentiment, has
led to change and power being devolved from the centre to the nations. In
addition, settlement reached in Northern Ireland under the 1998 Good Friday
agreement facilitated the re-establishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly.
NORTHERN IRELAND
The Northern Ireland Act 1998 regulates the Northern Ireland Assembly and
Executive. The Act includes many significant distinguishing features unique
to the situation pertaining in Northern Ireland. In particular, the Act provides
for a power sharing executive, with offices allocated between differing
political parties according to their electoral support. As discussed in more
detail below, the Assembly is given statutory power to exclude a minister or
junior minister, or a political party, from holding office for a 12 month period
if the Assembly resolves that he, she or it no longer enjoys the confidence of
the Assembly on the basis that he or she is not committed to non-violence and
exclusively peaceful and democratic means. The Act also provides for the
protection of all citizens of Northern Ireland from discrimination on the
grounds of religious belief and introduces a Human Rights Commission and
Equal Opportunities Commission.1
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1 The Act repeals, inter alia, in full, the Government of Ireland Act 1920, Northern Ireland
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1972, Northern Ireland Assembly Act 1973, Northern
Ireland Constitution (Amendment) Act 1973, Northern Ireland Act 1974, and, in part,
the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 and all of the Northern Ireland Act 1982
and the Northern Ireland (Elections) Act 1998. 
The completion of the devolution of power to the new Assembly was
conditional upon the decommissioning of weaponry by the paramilitary
organisations, under the terms of the Belfast Agreement of 1998. As a result of
the failure of the IRA to decommission its arms, power reverted to the United
Kingdom Parliament under the Northern Ireland Act 2000. Following further
negotiations on the arms issue, power was once again transferred to the
Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive. During the brief period of
suspension, the Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended and no Acts could
be passed by the Assembly, nor could the Assembly or any Committee hold
meetings or conduct any business during the period of revocation. Ministers
and chairpersons of statutory committees did not hold office during the
revocation period. The functions of the North-South Ministerial Council and
the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference were not to be exercised.
Following suspension, the Secretary of State had a statutory duty to initiate a
review of the situation as required under the Belfast Agreement. The Secretary
of State ended suspension through the making of a restoration order, taking
into account the result of the review. When a restoration order is made, the
persons holding office as First Minister and Deputy First Minister, and
ministers or junior ministers and chairpersons of statutory committees, remain
eligible to hold office and resume office on the effective date. If a restoration
order is revoked by the Secretary of State, section 1 of the Northern Ireland
Act 2000 comes into force once again.2 The Secretary of State’s powers are
exercisable by statutory instrument.3 While a suspension order is in effect, the
functions of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister are exercisable by the
Secretary of State, and the functions of Northern Ireland Ministers are
exercised by a Northern Ireland Department. 
The status of Northern Ireland
Section 1 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 reiterates earlier pledges regarding
the status of Northern Ireland, stating that:
... Northern Ireland in its entirety remains part of the United Kingdom and
shall not cease to be so without the consent of a majority of the people of
Northern Ireland voting in a poll held for the purposes of this section ...
Giving recognition to long held Republican ambitions, section 1 commits the
government of the United Kingdom to give effect to the wishes of the people
should a majority express the wish to cease to be part of the United Kingdom
and form part of a united Ireland, following such agreement as may be made
between the United Kingdom government and the government of Ireland.
The executive
Part III of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 regulates the executive authorities.
Within six weeks of the date of the first meeting of the Assembly, the
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Assembly elected the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. Each candidate
for the post of First Minister and Deputy First Minister must stand for election
jointly with the other candidate, and the two candidates must be elected by a
majority of members voting in the election, requiring a majority of designated
Nationalists voting and a majority of designated Unionists voting. If either the
First Minister or Deputy First Minister resigns or otherwise ceases to hold
office, the other minister shall also cease to hold office at that time, but may
continue in office until a new election is held.4 The leader of the Ulster
Unionists, David Trimble became First Minister and Seamus Mallon, the
Social Democratic and Labour Party’s (SDLP) deputy leader became Deputy
First Minister. 
Ministerial offices
The number of ministerial offices is determined by the First Minister and
Deputy First Minister acting jointly, but may not exceed ten, or such greater
number as is approved by the Secretary of State. The allocation of ministerial
offices provided for under the Act is one designed to achieve power sharing
between the political parties, in proportion to the number of seats held in the
Assembly. The formula, the ‘d’Hondt system’ devised by the eighteenth
century Belgian political scientist, is the number of seats in the Assembly held
by members of the party on the day the Assembly first met following its
election, divided by the number of ministerial offices (if any) held by members
of the party, plus one. Where this results in the same total for two parties, the
party with the bigger number of first preference votes in the Assembly
elections has the first choice of offices.5 An Executive Committee is
established, comprising the First Minister, the Deputy First Minister and the
Northern Ireland Ministers. The First Minister and Deputy First Minister are
chairmen of the Committee.6
Ministers or Northern Ireland Departments have no power to make,
confirm or approve any subordinate legislation, or do any act, so far as the
legislation or act is incompatible with Convention rights or Community law,
or discriminates against, or aids or incites another person to discriminate
against, a person or class of person on the ground of religious belief or
political opinion.7 If any subordinate legislation made, confirmed or approved
by a minister or Northern Ireland Department contains provisions dealing
with excepted or reserved matters, the Secretary of State may revoke the
legislation.8 Section 26 provides that the Secretary of State may prohibit any
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action proposed to be taken by a minister or Northern Ireland Department
where it would be incompatible with international obligations, the interests of
defence or national security or with the protection of public safety or public
order. Equally, where the Secretary of State considers that action should be
taken to give effect to international obligations, safeguard interests of defence
or national security or protect public safety or public order, he may by order
direct that the action shall be taken. Any subordinate legislation made which
conflicts with the above interests may be revoked by the Secretary of State.9
Elections10
Assembly elections are held every four years. Provision is made for
extraordinary elections, whereby, if the Assembly passes a resolution that it
should be dissolved, the Secretary of State must propose a date for the election
of the next Assembly. Constituencies are those for parliamentary elections and
each constituency returns six members. Voting is by single transferable vote,
defined as being a vote:
(a) capable of being given so as to indicate the voter’s order of preference for
the candidates for election as members for the constituency; and
(b) capable of being transferred to the next choice when the vote is not needed
to give a prior choice the necessary quota of votes or when a prior choice is
eliminated from the list of candidates because of a deficiency in the
number of votes given for him. 
The Northern Ireland Assembly Disqualification Act 1975 regulates eligibility
for membership, and a person claiming that a person purporting to be a
member of the Assembly is disqualified may apply to the High Court of
Justice in Northern Ireland for a declaration to that effect.
The Assembly
The first task of the elected Assembly was to elect from among its members a
Presiding Officer and deputies, positions analogous to the Speaker of the
House of Commons and his or her deputy.11 Consistent also with the Scotland
Act 1998, there is established a corporate body, known as the Northern Ireland
Assembly Commission, comprising the Presiding Officer and members of the
Assembly, to perform the functions of providing property, staff and services,
and other contractual functions. 
As noted earlier, the Assembly has the power to exclude a minister or
junior minister, or a political party, from the Assembly if that minister or party
does not enjoy the confidence of the Assembly. The Assembly may resolve
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that a person or party no longer enjoys its confidence on the basis that the
person or party is not committed to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and
democratic means; or because of any failure to observe any other terms of the
pledge of office. If a resolution is passed, the Assembly may exclude that
person or party from the Assembly or members of the political party may be
excluded from holding office as ministers or junior ministers for a period of 12
months, which may be extended for a further period of 12 months. A motion
for a resolution shall not be moved unless it is supported by at least 30
members of the Assembly, the First Minister and Deputy First Minister acting
jointly, or by the Presiding Officer. If the Secretary of State is of the opinion
that the Assembly ought to consider such a resolution, he may serve a notice
on the Presiding Officer requiring him to move a motion for the resolution. In
forming an opinion, the Secretary of State must take into account whether the
minister or party:
(a) is committed to the use now and in the future of only democratic and
peaceful means to achieve his, her or its objectives;
(b) has ceased to be involved in any acts of violence or of preparation for
violence;
(c) is directing or promoting acts of violence by other persons;
(d) is co-operating fully with any Commission involved in decommissioning.
A resolution under section 30 ‘shall not be passed without cross-community
support’.
Legislation
The Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 5 provides for the making of Acts of
the Assembly, but reserves for the United Kingdom Parliament the right to
make laws for Northern Ireland, subject to the right of the Assembly to
modify provisions made by Act of Parliament in so far as it is part of the law
of Northern Ireland. The legislative competence of the Assembly is regulated
by sections 6 and 7, and section 6(1) states that a provision of an Act is not law
if it is outside the legislative competence of the Assembly. Provisions defined
as outside legislative competence include those forming part of the law of a
country or territory other than Northern Ireland, matters which are excepted
and not ancillary to other provisions dealing with reserved or transferred
matters,12 provisions incompatible with Convention rights or Community
law, matters discriminating against any person or class of person on the
ground of religious belief or political opinion. The minister in charge of the
Bill shall make a statement to the effect that the Bill is within the legislative
competence of the Assembly.13 In addition, if the Presiding Officer decides
that any provision of a Bill would not be within the legislative competence of
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the Assembly, that Bill is not to be introduced. The Presiding Officer must
consider a Bill both on its introduction and before the Assembly reaches its
final legislative stage, and if he considers that any provision is outside the
Assembly’s competence, he shall refer it to the Secretary of State and the
Assembly shall not proceed with the Bill. Under section 12, the Attorney
General for Northern Ireland may refer a Bill to the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council for a ruling as to whether a provision is within the legislative
competence of the Assembly, and the Judicial Committee may refer a question
for a preliminary ruling of the European Court of Justice. Where such a
reference is made, and the reference has not been disposed of, the Assembly
may resolve to reconsider the Bill and the Presiding Officer must notify the
Attorney General and the Attorney General request the withdrawal of the
reference. Bills shall not be submitted for the royal assent at any time when
the Attorney General is entitled to make a reference under section 11 or such a
reference has been made but not decided by the Judicial Committee, or if the
Judicial Committee has decided that any provision of a Bill is not within the
legislative competence of the Assembly or a reference made has been
withdrawn. If the Secretary of State considers that a Bill contains provisions
which are incompatible with international obligations, the interests of defence
or national security or the protection of public safety or public order, or would
have an adverse effect on the operation of the single market within the United
Kingdom, he may decide not to submit the Bill for royal assent.14
Resolving devolution issues
Schedule 10 defines and regulates proceedings in relation to devolution
issues. A devolution issue is one relating to the legislative competence of the
Assembly, whether the purported or proposed exercise of a function would be
invalid by virtue of section 24 (discussed above), failures to comply with
Convention rights or Community law or questions relating to excepted or
reserved matters. In relation to proceedings in Northern Ireland, these may be
initiated or defended by the Attorney General or the Attorney General for
Northern Ireland. The First Minister and Deputy First Minister acting jointly
may defend proceedings.15 A court, other than the House of Lords or Court of
Appeal in Northern Ireland, may refer a devolution issue to the Court of
Appeal in Northern Ireland.16 A tribunal from which there is no appeal must
refer any devolution issue to the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland, and
any other tribunal may make such a reference.17 The Court of Appeal in
Northern Ireland may refer any devolution issue to the Judicial Committee of
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the Privy Council.18 Appeals from decisions on a devolution issue by the
Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland lie to the Judicial Committee, but only
with leave of the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland or special leave of the
Judicial Committee.19 Devolution issues arising in England and Wales are
similarly regulated, with references being made in Part III of the 1998 Act to
the High Court, Court of Appeal and ultimately the Judicial Committee.
Devolution issues arising in proceedings in Scotland follow a similar process,
references being made to the Inner House of the Court of Session or, in
relation to criminal proceedings, to the High Court of Justiciary, with ultimate
determination being made by the Judicial Committee.20
Witnesses and documents
The Assembly has the power to call for witnesses and documents, and may
require any person to attend to give evidence or produce documents in
relation to transferred matters concerning Northern Ireland and matters
concerning statutory functions exercisable by ministers or Northern Ireland
Departments. Exceptions are made in relation to ministers of the Crown or
those in Crown employment and those discharging functions relating to
excepted or reserved matters, and judges or members of tribunals exercising
judicial power. A person is not obliged to answer questions or produce
documents which he or she would be entitled to refuse to answer or produce
in court proceedings in Northern Ireland, under section 44 of the 1998 Act. A
person failing or refusing to attend, or answer questions, or produce
documents or who deliberately alters, suppresses, conceals of destroys any
document is guilty of an offence carrying a fine not exceeding level five on the
standard scale or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three months.21
It is a defence to prove that he or she had a reasonable excuse for the refusal or
failure.22 Standing orders may provide that the Presiding Officer administer
an oath to a person giving evidence in proceedings, and requiring that person
to take the oath. It is an offence to refuse, carrying the same penalty as
above.23 For the purposes of the law of defamation, absolute privilege
attaches to the making of statements in Assembly proceedings and the
publication of a statement under the Assembly’s authority.24
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Members’ interests
A register of members’ interests is provided for under section 43. Members
having a financial or other interest must declare that interest before
participating in Assembly proceedings, and standing orders may include a
provision preventing or restricting participation in proceedings of a member
with a registrable interest. It is an offence to advocate or initiate any cause, or
urge another member to do so, in consideration of any payment or benefit in
kind. A person guilty of an offence is liable to a fine not exceeding level five
on the standard scale. Proceedings may only be brought with the consent of
the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland.
Privilege
For the purposes of the law of defamation, absolute privilege attaches to the
making of a statement in Assembly proceedings, and the publication of a
statement under the Assembly’s authority.25
Human rights and equal opportunities
The Act establishes a Human Rights Commission,26 consisting of a Chief
Commissioner and other Commissioners appointed by the Secretary of State,
who, in making the appointments, must ensure so far as practicable that the
Commissioners, as a group, are representative of the community in Northern
Ireland.27 The functions of the Commission include ensuring the adequacy
and effectiveness of law and practice in relation to the protection of human
rights, and reporting to the Secretary of State such recommendations as are
considered necessary to improve law and practice. The Commission has a
duty to advise the Assembly on the compatibility of Bills with human rights.
The Commission is also under a duty to promote understanding and
awareness of the importance of human rights in Northern Ireland. The
Commission may conduct such investigations as it considers necessary or
expedient. The Commission may also give assistance to individuals and bring
proceedings in relation to human rights law and practice.28 Where a person
applies for assistance, the Commission may grant the application on the
grounds that the case raises a question of principle; that it would be
unreasonable to expect the person to deal with the case without assistance, or
that there are other special circumstances warranting assistance. Assistance
includes the provision of legal advice, arrangements for legal representation
and any other assistance the Commission thinks appropriate.29 No person,
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excepting the Attorney General, Attorney General for Northern Ireland, the
Advocate General for Scotland or the Lord Advocate, may challenge the
compatibility of legislation with Convention rights, or rely on Convention
rights in legal proceedings, unless he or she is a ‘victim’ as interpreted by the
European Court of Human Rights.30
The Act also establishes an Equality Commission for Northern Ireland,
consisting of between 14 and 20 Commissioners appointed by the Secretary of
State who, so far as is practicable, shall ensure that the Commissioners as a
group are representative of the community in Northern Ireland.31 The
Equality Commission replaces bodies formerly promoting equal
opportunities.32 A statutory duty is imposed on all public authorities to ‘have
due regard to the need to promote equality of opportunity between persons of
different religious belief, political opinion, racial group, age, marital status or
sexual orientation; between men and women generally; between persons with
a disability and those without and between those with dependants and those
without. It is unlawful for a public authority to discriminate, or aid or incite
another to discriminate, against a person or class of persons on the ground of
religious belief or political opinion.33
North-South Ministerial Council and British-Irish Council
The Belfast Agreement established two new bodies, designed to facilitate and
promote co-operative relations between the United Kingdom and the
Republic of Ireland. The North-South Ministerial Council is to comprise
representatives of the Irish government and the Northern Ireland Executive
with a view to fostering cross-community participation in the Council. The
First Minister and Deputy First Minister acting jointly nominate ministers to
the Council. Agreements reached by meetings of the North-South Ministerial
Council will be given effect by the Assembly, and no agreement entered into
shall come into effect without the approval of the Assembly.34
A British-Irish Council is also established, which provides a forum for
debate on matters of mutual interest between the British and Irish
governments and representatives of the devolved institutions in Northern
Ireland, Scotland and Wales, together with representatives from the Isle of
Man and the Channel Islands.
In relation to both Councils, the First Minister and Deputy First Minister
acting jointly shall give the Executive Committee and the Assembly details of
the date and agenda of meetings, and participating ministers or junior
ministers will report to the Executive Committee and to the Assembly on the
proceedings in Council. 
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SCOTLAND
In 1989, a Scottish Constitutional Convention was set up, following the
publication of A Claim of Right for Scotland by the Campaign for a Scottish
Assembly. It was argued that the people of Scotland had the right to govern
themselves, and that the conventional doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty,
as understood south of the border, had no basis in Scottish political thought.
In Scotland, the preferred view is that the people, not parliament, are
sovereign. The final report of the Convention, Scotland’s Parliament, Scotland’s
Right was published in November 1995.
While the former Conservative government was opposed to any
devolution of power to either Scotland or Wales, the Labour government
elected in 1997 declared in its election Manifesto that it favoured the
devolution of power. In the words of the Manifesto, ‘our proposal is for
devolution not federation. A sovereign Westminster Parliament will devolve
power to Scotland and Wales. The Union will be strengthened and the threat
of separatism removed’. 
The referendum
The Referendums (Scotland and Wales) Act 1997 provided the mechanisms
for testing the wishes of the people. The Scottish people were asked to vote
both for or against a Scottish Parliament, and for or against the proposition
that the Scottish Parliament should have tax varying powers. The referendum
in Scotland took place in September 1997. In favour of the establishment of a
Scottish Parliament were 74.3 per cent of voters, and in favour of tax varying
powers, 63.5 per cent. 
Devolution and the Treaty of Union
The Union with Scotland Act 1706 and Union with England Act 1707 remain
in force and have effect subject to the provisions of the Scotland Act 1998.35
(section 37 of the 1998 Act). The government is firmly committed to
strengthening the Union, and makes it clear that Scotland continues to form
an integral part of the United Kingdom:
The government want a United Kingdom which everyone feels part of, can
contribute to, and in whose future all have a stake. The Union will be
strengthened by recognising the claims of Scotland, Wales and the regions
with strong identities of their own. The government’s devolution proposals, by
meeting these aspirations, will not only safeguard but also enhance the
Union.36
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THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT 
The meeting of parliament
The Scottish Parliament is unicameral and has a fixed four year term of office.
The first general election for parliament was held in May 1999 and subsequent
general elections will be held on the first Thursday in May in the fourth
calendar year following that in which the previous ordinary general election
was held.37
Provision is made for the holding of extraordinary general elections under
section 3. If parliament resolves that it should be dissolved, and on the vote
taken, not less than two-thirds of the total number of Members of Parliament
vote in favour, then by proclamation the Queen may dissolve parliament and
require an extraordinary general election to be held. If an ordinary general
election would otherwise take place within six months, that election shall not
take place, but subsequent ordinary general elections will not be affected.
The electoral process
In the White Paper, Scotland’s Parliament,38 the government recognised the
need both for a strong constituency link and for greater proportionality
between votes cast and seats won to be achieved through the election of
additional members. Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) are elected in
two different ways. The majority are elected from constituencies which are the
same as the constituencies of the Westminster Parliament, except that Orkney
and Shetland become two separate constituencies, thus making 73 in total. The
remaining 56 Members – ‘additional members’ – are selected from party lists
drawn up for each of the current European Parliament constituencies. There
are seven additional members from each constituency.39
The Scottish Parliament was established under section 1 of the Scotland
Act 1998. The 129 seat parliament is based in Edinburgh. The parliament’s first
task was to elect a Presiding Officer and two deputies.40 The role of Presiding
Officer is analogous to that of the Speaker of the House of Commons,
although distinctions between the two offices exist. For example, the Presiding
Officer has been given statutory functions under the Act, inter alia in relation
to the holding of general elections and by-elections, notifications of filling of
vacancies of regional seats, notice of member’s resignation, administering
oaths to witnesses, the scrutiny of Bills to ensure they fall within the
37 Scotland Act 1998, s 2(1).
38 See HC Deb Vol 298 Col 1041, 24 July 1997; Vol 299 Col 456, 31 July 1997; HL Deb Vol
581 Col 1526, 24 July 1997; Vol 582 Col 185, 31 July 1997.
39 Scotland’s Parliament, para 8.2.
40 Scotland Act 1998, s 19. Standing orders provide that persons holding office of
Presiding Officer or Deputy do not represent the same political party: Sched 3, para 5.
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parliament’s legislative competence, and making recommendations to the
Queen in respect of the choice of First Minister and any person designated to
exercise the functions of the First Minister.41
A Clerk of the Parliament, and Assistant Clerks, are appointed by the
Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body, comprising the Presiding Officer and
four members of parliament. The Parliamentary Corporation has functions
defined under the Act, including the provision of property, staff and services
required for parliament’s purposes,42 entering into contracts, and bringing or
defending proceedings against the Scottish Parliament.43
Parliamentary proceedings
Parliamentary proceedings are regulated by standing orders.44 The Act
confers on the Scottish Parliament the power to call for witnesses and
documents, and provides for criminal penalties in the event of failure to
comply with parliament’s directions. Under section 23, ‘any person’ may be
required to attend parliament to give evidence, or to produce documents ‘in
his custody or under his control’, relating to any subject for which a member
of the Executive has general responsibility. Section 23(3), (4), (5) and (6) limits
the requirements to give evidence by ministers of the Crown and civil
servants, in order to avoid the situation where ministers and civil servants
find themselves accountable to both the United Kingdom and Scottish
Parliament. Under sub-section (7), parliament cannot require judges or
members of tribunals to attend and give evidence. Where a person is required
to attend, the Clerk will give written notice of the time and place at which the
persons to attend, and the particular subjects concerning which he is required
to give evidence, or the documents or type of documents which are to be
produced, and the date by which they must be produced.45 A person served
with such notice, who refuses or fails to attend, or to answer questions, or who
‘alters, suppresses, conceals or destroys any document which he is required to
produce’, or fails or refuses to produce such a document is guilty of an
offence. It is a defence to prove that the person concerned had a reasonable
excuse for the refusal or failure. If found guilty, the person is liable to a fine
not exceeding level five or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three
months.46 The Presiding Officer may administer an oath to any person giving
evidence in proceedings of parliament, and require that person to take the
oath. Under section 26, a person refusing to take the oath when so required is
guilty of an offence carrying the same penalty as under section 25(4).
41 Scotland Act 1998, ss 2, 3, 9; s 10; s 14; s 26; ss 32–35; ss 45, 46, respectively.
42 Ibid, ss 19, 20, 21.
43 See ibid, s 40.
44 Ibid, s 22.
45 Ibid, s 24.
46 Ibid, s 25(3), (4),
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Legislation
The Scottish Parliament has the power to make Acts of Parliament within the
sphere of competence laid down in the Act. Any Act which is outside the
legislative competence of the parliament is not law.47 Section 28(7) makes
clear that the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament does not affect
the power of the parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for
Scotland. The member of the Scottish Executive in charge of a Bill must state,
on or before its introduction in parliament, that the provisions of the Bill are
within the legislative competence of parliament.48 Additionally, the Presiding
Officer must, on or before the introduction of a Bill in the parliament, decide
whether or not the provisions of the bill are within the legislative competence
of parliament.49 It is for the Presiding Office to submit Bills for the royal
assent, but he may not do so at any time when the Advocate General, Lord
Advocate or Attorney General is entitled to refer the Bill to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council to determine whether or not a Bill, or any of
its provisions, are within the legislative competence of the parliament.50 A
reference to the Judicial Committee may be made at any time during the four
week period beginning with the passing of the Bill.51 The Judicial Committee
may request a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice under
Article 177 (now Article 234) of the Treaty of Rome.52 To avoid excessive
delay in the enactment of Bills, parliament may resolve that it intends to
reconsider a Bill which has been referred to the Privy Council and if it does so
the person who referred it to the Privy Council must request the withdrawal
of the reference from the European Court.53 Where the Secretary of State for
Scotland has reasonable grounds to believe that a Bill would be incompatible
with international obligations or the interests of defence or national security,
or would adversely modify the law relating to reserved matters, the Secretary
of State may make an order prohibiting the Presiding Officer from submitting
the Bill for royal assent.54
Section 29 stipulates that an Act is not law if it is outside the parliament’s
legislative competence and states that a provision is outside its competence if
it relates to the law of a country or territory other than Scotland; it relates to
reserved matters; its is in breach of the restrictions in Schedule 4; it is
incompatible with Convention rights or with Community law, or would
remove the Lord Advocate from his position as head of the systems of
377
47 Scotland Act 1998, ss 28, 29.
48 Ibid, s 31(1).
49 Ibid, s 31(2).
50 Ibid, ss 32, 33.
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52 Ibid, s 34.
53 Ibid, s 34(2),
54 Ibid, s 35.
criminal prosecution and investigation of deaths in Scotland. The most
complex provisions relate to reserved matters and incompatibility with the
restrictions in Schedule 4 of the Act, and these in turn must be read in
conjunction with Schedule 5 which lists the matters reserved to the United
Kingdom Parliament.
Schedule 4: enactments protected from modification
Paragraphs 4 to 6 prohibit the Scottish Parliament from amending or
modifying the Scotland Act 1998. In addition, the Acts of Union are immune
from amendment, as is the European Communities Act 1972 and assorted
other specified Acts. Further there is a prohibition on modification of reserved
matters. 
Schedule 5: reserved matters
Part I of Schedule 5 lays down five general categories of matters reserved to
the United Kingdom Parliament: the constitution; the registration of political
parties; foreign affairs; Civil Service, defence and treason. Part II lists specific
reservations under 11 broad heads, namely: financial and economic matters;
home affairs, trade and industry; energy; transport; social security; regulation
of the professions; employment; health and medicines; media and culture and
miscellaneous. Matters reserved facilitate United Kingdom-wide uniformity,
while devolving to the Scottish Parliament the power to regulate non-reserved
matters according to national requirements. Schedule 5 also provides for
certain exceptions to apply to particular reserved matters. For example under
Head A: Financial and Economic Matters, which in turn has five sections
covering fiscal, economic and monetary policy, the currency, financial
services, financial markets and money laundering, an exception to fiscal,
economic and monetary policy is provided for local taxes to fund local
authority expenditure in Scotland, and in relation to financial services, an
exception is made in relation to the dates of bank holidays. Accordingly, the
scope of the legislative power devolved is defined within the Act, to the extent
that precision and foreseeability allow. Inevitably, however, these detailed
and complex provisions give rise to questions as to the power devolved.
It was seen above that section 29 of the Act states that an Act of the
Scottish Parliament is not law so far as it is outside the legislative competence
of the parliament, and that provision is made for references to be made to the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council before a Bill receives the royal
assent.55 Challenges may arise by virtue of judicial review proceedings, or in
the course of civil or criminal proceedings. 
Part II of Schedule 6 details the procedures relating to proceedings in
Scotland. Either the Advocate General or the Lord Advocate may institute
proceedings, and the Lord Advocate may defend proceedings instituted by
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the Advocate General. This power is without prejudice to any power to
institute or defend proceedings exercisable by any person (paragraph 4).
Where a devolution issue is intimated in any legal proceedings, notice must be
given to the Advocate General and the Lord Advocate; for the case law in
relation to this, see Chapter 19.
The European Convention rights became enforceable in Scotland on 1 July
1999, 15 months before coming into force in England, and it is in Scotland that
the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 was first experienced. The Scotland
Act 1998, section 57(2), provides that a member of the Scottish Executive ‘has
no power to make any subordinate legislation, or to do any other act, so far as
the legislation or act is incompatible with any of the Convention rights or with
Community law’. In Starrs v Ruxton (2000)56 the Lord Advocate was held to
have acted ultra vires section 57(2), through the prosecution by his
representative the procurator fiscal, of an offence heard by a temporary
sheriff. A temporary sheriff – being dependent upon the Lord Advocate for
reappointment – was held not to constitute an ‘independent and impartial
tribunal’ as required by Article 6(1) of the Convention.
Judicial impartiality came under scrutiny in Hoekstra v HM Advocate (No 3)
(2000), in which it was held that an article written by Lord McClusky
criticising the Convention disqualified him from sitting in that his article
could give rise to a ‘legitimate apprehension of bias’ against the Convention.
The problem of reading primary legislation so as to make its compatible
with the Convention was confronted by the High Court of Justiciary in Brown
v Stott (2000). Section 172(2)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 requires the driver
of a motor vehicle to identify him or herself. The accused was convicted of
driving while drunk and appealed against conviction, arguing that the Road
Traffic Act violated her right to silence and right against self-incrimination
contrary to Article 6(1) of the Convention. The Court allowed her appeal.
Members’ interests
Section 39 of the Scotland Act regulates Members’ interests. It provides for a
Register of interests and requires Members to register financial interests,
including benefits in kind, and for Members to declare interests before taking
part in any proceedings in parliament relating to that matter. Members of
Parliament are prohibited from ‘advocating or initiating any cause or matter ...
in consideration of any payment or benefit in kind ...’ or from ‘urging, in
consideration of any such payment or benefit in kind, any other Member of
the Parliament to advocate or initiate any cause or matter ...’. A Member of
Parliament failing to comply with, or in contravention of the prohibition, is
guilty of an offence, and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding
level five on the standard scale.
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Parliamentary committees
A Parliamentary Bureau is established with the task of proposing the
establishment, membership, remit and duration of committees. The Bureau
also proposes the political party whose members are eligible to be the
convenor (chairperson) and deputy convenor of the committee. The Bureau’s
proposals are subject to parliamentary approval. A number of mandatory
committees have been established, which sit for the duration of a
parliamentary session. A number of additional committees have been
established, including Education Culture and Sport, Enterprise and Lifelong
Learning, Finance, Health and Community Care, Justice and Home Affairs,
Local Government, Procedures, Rural Affairs, Social Inclusion, Housing and
Voluntary Sector, Standards, Subordinate Legislation and Transport and the
Environment.
Parliamentary privilege57
Section 41 provides that for the purposes of the law of defamation any
statement made in proceedings of the parliament and the publication of any
statement under the authority of parliament is absolutely privileged.
Maladministration
Section 91 of the Scotland Act makes provision for the investigation of
complaints made to Members in respect of the exercise of functions by the
Scottish Executive.
THE EXECUTIVE
Under section 44 of the Scotland Act 1998, there is established a Scottish
Executive, whose members are the First Minister, and such ministers as the
First Minister appoints, and the Lord Advocate and the Solicitor General for
Scotland. The First Minister is appointed by Her Majesty from among
members of the parliament, and holds office at Her Majesty’s pleasure (section
45). Members of the Executive are responsible to the Scottish Parliament.
The continuing role of the Secretary of State for Scotland
The Secretary of State for Scotland is responsible for focusing on promoting
communication between the Scottish Parliament and Executive and between
the United Kingdom Parliament and government on matters of mutual
interests, and on representing Scottish interests in reserved matters.58 The
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Secretary of State and the Scottish Executive meet in order to monitor
progress.
Law Officers
The Law Officers of the Scottish Executive are the Lord Advocate and the
Solicitor General for Scotland. The United Kingdom government also needs
advice on Scottish law, and a new office of Scottish Law Officer to the United
Kingdom government has been created.59
Scottish representation at Westminster
The problematic issue of continued Scottish representation at Westminster
after devolution, particularly in relation to matters exclusively English (the
‘West Lothian question’), was addressed by initially continuing the same level
of Scottish representation as hitherto. However, section 86 of the Scotland Act
1998 amends Schedule 2 to the Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986 by
omitting rule 1(2) requiring Scotland to have not less than 71 constituencies,
and providing for Scottish representation in the future to be based on the
same electoral quota as for England. The effect is that representation will be
reduced to 59 seats.
The West Lothian question
The government avoided the complexities of the West Lothian question which
bedevilled the debate about devolution in previous times. The term derives
from the Member of Parliament for West Lothian, Tam Dalyell, although the
problem posed had been equally difficult in the nineteenth century in relation
to Irish Home Rule (on which, see Chapter 3), and later in relation to the
devolution of legislative power to Northern Ireland between 1921 and 1972. In
essence, the West Lothian question concerns over- or under-representation in
the Westminster Parliament once legislative power is devolved to a regional
parliament.
The difficulty stems from continued regional representation in the
Westminster Parliament. The first problem is that of regional representative
participation in the legislative process as it relates exclusively to England. In
simple terms, the argument made is that, if the Scottish Parliament has
exclusive competence in relation to health matters, on what legitimate basis
should Scottish Members of the Westminster Parliament have the right to
influence health matters which relate exclusively to English people? On the
other side of that particular coin, lies the fact that, whereas the Scottish
Members of the Westminster Parliament may exert influence on purely
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English health issues, the Westminster Parliament and its Members, by
contrast, have no equal right to influence the decisions of the Scottish
Parliament in relation to the same matters. 
When a government has a large majority, as the current government
enjoys – or even a workable majority – the issue is less problematic. However,
in a situation where a government has no clear and workable majority within
the Westminster Parliament, the difficulty is more pronounced. In the latter
situation, it may well be that the government of the day becomes dependent
on Scottish representatives at Westminster in order to enact legislation. The
question of legitimacy becomes more acute when the proposed legislation
relates exclusively to an English matter and the correlative legislative power
over that matter in relation to Scotland has been devolved to the Scottish
Parliament. 
This position was precisely that which faced the Labour government in the
1960s. In 1964, the Labour government was returned to parliament with a
majority of three. At that time, Northern Ireland enjoyed a degree of
legislative autonomy from the rest of the United Kingdom, and Northern Irish
representation at Westminster included 12 Ulster Unionist Members. In 1965,
parliament was considering the Manchester Corporation Bill and Rent Bill,
which did not relate to Northern Ireland. The Ulster Unionist Members
opposed the Bill and aligned themselves with the Conservative Opposition.
The same position arose in relation to the Labour government’s proposals to
nationalise the steel industry. The Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson,
addressed the issue directly when he stated that he:
... would hope that Northern Ireland Members who are here, and who are
welcomed here, for the duties they have to perform on behalf of the United
Kingdom in many matters affecting Northern Ireland, would consider their
position in matters where we have no equivalent right in Northern Ireland.60
Possible solutions to the West Lothian question
A number of solutions have been proposed to the West Lothian question, each
of which must be considered. First, it would be theoretically possible to
exclude Scottish representation at Westminster. Secondly, it would be possible
to reduce the strength of Scottish representation at Westminster in order to
reduce the possibility of Scottish representatives alone having real power in a
situation of a small majority, or minority, government. Thirdly, it would be
possible to legislate to ensure that Scottish representatives only have a
legislative role in relation to legislation concerning Scotland, and none in
relation to legislation which has a purely English dimension (the ‘in and out’
approach).
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Exclusion of Scottish representation
Short of devolution taking the form of a dismantling of the Union, which has
endured for nearly 300 years, and conferring complete legal and political
independence upon Scotland, this solution is not viable. The devolution of
power falls far short of complete legislative independence. The Scottish
Parliament enjoys legislative competence in relation to matters which are not
reserved to the Westminster Parliament. Accordingly, in matters reserved to
the Westminster Parliament, it is not tenable to argue that there should be no
Scottish representation at Westminster and, a fortiori, that there should be no
representation in relation to matters relating to Scotland which have been
reserved to the Westminster Parliament. To adopt such a policy would ensure
not the strengthening of the Union, but its rapid and ultimate demise and the
break up of the United Kingdom. 
The ‘in and out’ solution
This possible solution was one ruled out under the present government’s
insistence that the Union with Scotland be strengthened rather than
weakened, and that Scottish Members of Parliament should continue to play a
full role in the proceedings of the House of Commons. However, it is a
solution which has long been considered in relation to solving the difficulties
inherent in devolving legislative power to one region alone.
The ‘in and out’ solution was mooted in relation to Irish Home Rule, but
rejected by Gladstone as unworkable. The ‘in and out’ solution requires a
mechanism whereby legislation is classified as applying to either the United
Kingdom as a whole, or to Scotland in matters reserved to the United
Kingdom Parliament, or solely to England. Where legislative proposals relate
to either the United Kingdom as a whole, or to Scotland in reserved matters,
the ‘in and out’ solution would enable Scottish representatives to vote.
However, if a matter related solely to England or England and Wales,
(legislative competence over that matter in relation to Scotland having been
devolved) Scottish representatives would be ineligible to vote on the matter.
In relation to Irish Home Rule, it was suggested that it should be the Speaker
of the House of Commons who classifies Bills for this purpose. If ‘in and out’
was not viable in the nineteenth century, it is likely not to be viable in the
twenty-first century. 
There also exists a different objection to this solution, which is less based
on practicality, and is more principled. The problem involves governments
with a small majority in parliament and minority governments. In both cases
the government may find itself dependent upon Scottish representation
(and/or on other minority groups). Were the government to find itself in a
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position of dependence on Scottish representation, and the ‘in and out’
solution had been adopted, the Scottish representation on which the
government was dependent would be absent in relation to legislation on a
matter solely relating to England. Thus, the ‘in and out’ solution could lead to
an otherwise, albeit barely, viable government being defeated. Moreover, in a
situation where a government had no electoral support in Scotland, and the
government has a weak majority, as occurred under the last Conservative
government, that government could be held to ransom by Scottish
representatives who support alternative policies.
Financial arrangements61
The Scottish Parliament has the power to increase or decrease the basic rate of
income tax set by the United Kingdom Parliament by up to three pence in the
pound. The Inland Revenue will continue to administer tax variations.
Since the 1970s, there has existed a ‘block formula’ system of funding
Scotland’s public expenditure programmes. There have been adjustments
made to this arrangement, and the Scottish Parliament also has tax varying
powers which enable it to raise revenue independently. The parliament is
entitled to determine its own expenditure priorities. The parliament has
powers to control Scottish local government expenditure and to finance local
government. The parliament also has control over the form of local taxation,
both domestic and non-domestic. There is a statutory duty to maintain
effective scrutiny and audit arrangements.
Debating powers
The Scottish Parliament is able to examine devolved matters, and debate all
matters irrespective of whether they are devolved or reserved.62
Scotland and the European Union and Community
While relations with Europe are the responsibility of the United Kingdom
Parliament and government, the Scottish Parliament and Executive plays an
important role in relation to those aspects of European Union affairs which
affect devolved areas. The government has promised to ensure that Scottish
Office ministers play a full role in European Union Councils. Scottish Office
officials will participate in discussion with the relevant Whitehall department.
The Scottish Executive and officials will be directly involved in the
government’s decision making and formulation of policy in relation to
European Union matters.
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The Scottish Parliament scrutinises European Union legislative proposals
‘to ensure that Scotland’s interests are properly reflected’. Responsibility for
ensuring the implementation of European Union obligations lies with the
Scottish Executive. The overall approach to be pursued is as follows:
The guiding principle which the United Kingdom government sets out to
establish in the relationship with the Scottish Executive on European Union
matters is that there should be the closest possible working relationship and
involvement. Provided the Scottish Executive is willing to work in that spirit of
collaboration and trust, there will be an integrated process which will build
upon the benefits of the current role of the Scottish Office within government.
Taken together, these arrangements will allow Scotland, within the United
Kingdom, to develop its role in the European Union. [para 5.12]
The Scottish Parliament and local government and other bodies
Relations with local government and other public bodies are based on the
following principles:
(a) the Scottish Parliament should set the national framework within which
other Scottish public bodies operate;
(b) local authorities, non-departmental public bodies and other Scottish public
bodies should be open and accountable to the Scottish people through the
Scottish Parliament and its Executive or, in the case of local authorities,
directly through local elections. [para 6.3]
General responsibility for legislation and policy relating to local government
lie with the Scottish Parliament. The Scottish Parliament has responsibility for
all Scottish public bodies whose functions and services are devolved.
WALES
The previous attempt to devolve power to Wales has been discussed in
Chapter 3. Consistent with the 1997 Labour government’s commitment to
devolution, an Assembly for Wales has been established. However, whereas
the Scottish Parliament has full legislative powers in relation to devolved
matters, the Welsh Assembly’s role and functions are more limited.
Rather than devolve legislative power to a Welsh Parliament, the
Government of Wales Act 1998 provides for a directly elected Assembly
which has the responsibilities currently exercised by the Secretary of State for
Wales. The devolution is thus conferring administrative rather than legislative
competence. The government’s White Paper, A Voice for Wales: The
Government’s Proposals for a Welsh Assembly,63 perceived a ‘democratic deficit’
in the administrative arrangements for Wales. Until devolution, the majority
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of administrative matters were the responsibility of the Welsh Office. Other
bodies, such as health authorities and National Health Service Trusts, and
unelected bodies, such as the Welsh Development Agency and Further and
Higher Education Funding Councils and Tai Cymru, were not accountable to
the Welsh people. The only directly accountable bodies were local authorities.
The devolution of administrative competence to the Welsh Assembly to
redresses this lack of local accountability.
The referendum 
The result of the referendum held to determine the people’s wishes in respect
of devolved powers was less clear-cut than that of the Scottish referendum.
Only 50 per cent of the electorate voted, as compared with 60 per cent in the
Scottish referendum, and 50.3 per cent voted in favour of the establishment of
an Assembly. A majority of voters in 11 of the 22 local government areas
voted in favour.
THE WELSH ASSEMBLY
Meetings of the Assembly
Section 1 of the Government of Wales Act 1998 established the Welsh
Assembly. As with the Scottish Parliament, the Assembly sits for a fixed four
year term of office. The Assembly has 60 Members. Unlike the Scottish
Parliament, however, the Assembly has no power to dissolve itself before the
end of the four year term of office. The Assembly is staffed by existing Welsh
Office staff. The first Assembly met in 1999. Initial Standing Orders for the
Assembly have been drawn up by an all-Party Commission. The Assembly
runs under a committee system. An Executive Committee provides the overall
direction for the Assembly and comprises members of the majority party
alone. Regional Committees have been established to ensure that the needs of
each area of Wales are properly considered. The Regional Committees are
advisory bodies only and do not have specific functions or decision making
powers. 
Members of the Assembly are salaried, and allowances are payable.64
The electoral system
The additional member electoral system is employed for elections.65 There are
40 constituency Members, elected on the simple majority system, and 20
additional members elected from the party list. Each voter has two votes – one
for the constituency Member and one for the additional member. The first
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elections took place in the spring of 1999. Thereafter, elections take place every
four years, on the first Thursday in May.66
THE LEADER AND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
The overall political direction of the Assembly is provided by a Leader of the
Assembly, elected by the Assembly, and an Executive Committee (section 56).
The Executive Committee, headed by the Leader, comprises leaders of
differing subject committees. The Act allows for the Executive Committee to
be made up of members of a single political party, and to sit in private. The
Committee is thus envisaged to be the equivalent of the British Cabinet. The
Leader of the Committee faces questions in the Assembly concerning all
issues.
Welsh representation at Westminster
Because the Assembly does not have devolved legislative powers, the West
Lothian question does not arise. The Secretary of State for Wales and Welsh
Members of Parliament continue to play a full role at Westminster, but one
which also involves a new partnership with the Assembly.67 The number of
Welsh Members remains unchanged.
The relationship between Westminster and the Assembly
The United Kingdom Parliament at Westminster continues to legislate for
Wales. Members of the Assembly need to develop a close partnership with
Welsh Members of Parliament. The White Paper stated that the government
intended that the Assembly should be able to ‘seek to influence legislation
which is being considered at Westminster’.68 The Secretary of State for Wales
is under a statutory duty to consult the Assembly about the government’s
legislative programme, after it has been announced in the Queen’s Speech,
and the Assembly, following debate, may draft its response. The Secretary of
State is able to attend Assembly debates, but not entitled to vote.
In relation to subordinate legislation, however, the Executive Committee
and subject committees have power to prepare secondary legislation for
submission to the Assembly for debate and approval. Such pieces of
secondary legislation are known as Assembly Orders. A subordinate
legislation scrutiny committee has been established to consider draft statutory
instruments and to report to the Assembly (section 58 of the 1998 Act). The
Assembly has the power to revoke, replace or amend such legislation in the
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same manner as the Secretary of State had formerly been able to do. Proposed
Orders relating to Wales are scrutinised by the Assembly’s subject
committees.69
The powers of the Welsh Assembly
As stated above, the Assembly takes over many of the responsibilities which
formerly lay with the Secretary of State for Wales. Part II of the Government of
Wales Act 1998 defines the functions of the Assembly. Section 22 provides for
the transfer of ministerial functions to the Assembly, by the means of Orders
in Council. Any ministerial function exercisable by a minister of the Crown in
relation to Wales may be transferred. The Order in Council may also direct
that any function transferred may be exercisable by the Assembly
concurrently with the minister of the Crown, or alternatively direct that a
function exercisable by a minister of the Crown in relation to Wales shall be
exercisable by the minister only with the agreement of, or after consultation
with, the Assembly.70
The Committee structure
In addition to the Executive Committee, the Assembly is required to establish
Committees required under the Act, and other such Committees and sub-
committees as the Assembly considers appropriate.71
Subject committees are established with responsibilities to the fields in
which the Assembly has functions. A member of the Executive Committee
who has responsibility for a particular matter is a member of the Subject
Committee. In addition, a Subordinate Legislation Committee is established to
consider ‘relevant Welsh subordinate legislation’ and ‘Assembly general
subordinate legislation’. Members of the Committee are elected by the
Assembly from its members and so far as practicable shall ensure the balance
of the parties in the Assembly is reflected in the Committee.72 An Audit
Committee is established,73 its members elected from Assembly members,
again reflecting, so far as practicable, party political representation in the
Assembly. Section 61 provides for the establishment of regional committees. A
Committee for North Wales is established, and the Assembly may also
establish a committee for each of the other regions of Wales.
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Members’ interests
A register of interest is established, requiring any Assembly member who has
financial interest or other interest in any matter to be registered and for
declarations of interest to be made before participating in Assembly
proceedings. Under section 72, members are prohibited from advocating any
cause on behalf of any person in consideration of payments or benefits in
kind, or to urge another Assembly member to advocate or initiate any cause in
consideration of any payment or benefit in kind. It is an offence to act in
violation of the section 72 procedures, and a person found guilty of an offence
is liable on summary conviction to a fine. Prosecutions may only be instituted
by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions. Similar
provisions to those in the Scotland Act relate to the attendance of witnesses,
giving of evidence and production of documents.74
Privilege
Section 77 provides that any statement made for the purposes of, or for
purposes incidental to proceedings of the Assembly (including committee
proceedings), and the publication of reports of such proceedings, are
absolutely qualified for the purposes of the law of defamation. 
The continuing role of the Secretary of State for Wales
While many of the powers exercised by the Secretary of State are transferred
to the Assembly, the Executive Committee and its Subject Committees, the
Secretary of State continues to play a pivotal role. The Secretary of State
continues to represent Wales in Cabinet, having listened to the views of the
Assembly, although he or she is not bound by the Assembly’s views. The
Secretary of State also meets regularly with the Executive Committee to
exchange views about government policy. The Secretary of State is entitled to
attend and participate in proceedings of the Assembly, but not to vote or to
attend committee proceedings.
The Assembly and the Welsh economy
A principal thrust behind the government’s devolution of power is economic.
The economy of Wales was formerly dominated by heavy industry – coal and
steel – but has now diversified into more modern manufacturing industries.
Nevertheless, as the White Paper made clear, economic prosperity is not
evenly spread in Wales and there remain areas with high unemployment,
poor health, poor housing and social deprivation. As a result, Welsh gross
74 Government of Wales Act 1998, ss 74, 75.
domestic product per head remains fixed at around 84 per cent of the UK
average.75
The government considered that the Assembly would provide the driving
force in relation to economic growth and recovery. The government
summarised the role of the Assembly in relation to economic affairs as
follows:
The Assembly will:
(a) provide leadership in setting a new economic agenda for Wales attuned to
the needs of Wales;
(b) deliver its programmes through a new economic powerhouse – the
expanded Welsh Development Agency, which will take on the functions of
the Development Board for Rural Wales and the Land Authority for Wales;
(c) develop its policies in partnership with local authorities, industry, further
and higher education, Training and Enterprise Councils and the voluntary
sector;
(d) seek further inward investment, widening the Welsh industrial and
commercial base;
(e) forge close and dynamic international links with other regions in
Europe.76
Financial matters77
Wales had been managed under a block formula, with the Secretary of State
for Wales responsible for over half of government expenditure in Wales. The
1997–98 provision for the block, including central government support for
local authorities, was £6,636 billion. Now that the Assembly is established,
these arrangements will continue, save that the Secretary of State determines
how much of the block should be reserved for his office’s costs, and the
remainder is available to the Assembly. The Assembly manages its own
spending priorities, and reports annually on expenditure. Wales continues to
receive an agriculture allocation under the European Union’s Common
Agriculture Policy.
Resolving disputes about devolution issues
The White Paper stated that if the Assembly exceeded its powers, the
government would be able to challenge the ultra vires use of power in the
courts. In addition, where devolution issues arise in civil or criminal
proceedings before either courts or tribunal, the Act stipulates the procedure
to be followed. Section 109 and Schedule 7 to the Act regulate such challenges.
A devolution issue is defined as:
Chapter 12: Constitutional and Administrative Law
390
75 A Voice for Wales: The Government’s Proposals for a Welsh Assembly, Cm 3718, 1997,
London: HMSO, para 1.26.
76 Ibid, Chapter 2.
77 See Government of Wales Act 1998, Pt IV.
Regional and Local Government
(a) a question whether a purported or proposed exercise of any function by
the Assembly is, or would be, within the powers of the Assembly
(including a question whether a purported or proposed exercise of a
function by the Assembly is, or would be, incompatible with Community
law or any of the Convention rights); or
(b) a question whether the Assembly has failed to comply with any
Community obligation which is an obligation of the Assembly.
Under paragraph 2, a devolution issue shall not be taken to arise:
... in any proceedings merely because of any contention of a party to the
proceedings which appears to the court or tribunal before which the
proceedings take place to be frivolous or vexatious.
Proceedings to determine a devolution issue may be instigated by the
Attorney General, but that right does not preclude the right of any other
person to institute proceedings. Where a devolution issue arises in judicial
proceedings, a court or tribunal shall order notice of the issue to be given to
the Attorney General and the Assembly, unless the Assembly is party to the
proceedings. A magistrates’ court may refer any devolution issue which arises
before it in civil proceedings to the High Court. A court may refer a
devolution issue which arises in civil proceedings to the Court of Appeal,78
although this does not apply to a magistrates’ court, the Court of Appeal or
the House of Lords, or to the High Court if the devolution issue arises in
proceedings on a reference under paragraph 6 (which provides for references
from the magistrates’ court as above).79 A tribunal from which there is no
appeal must refer any devolution issue to the Court of Appeal, and any other
tribunal may so refer a devolution issue.
Where a devolution issue arises in criminal proceedings, a court, other
than the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords, may refer any devolution
issue which arises before it to the High Court, if the proceedings are summary
proceedings, or to the Court of Appeal if the proceedings are proceedings on
indictment.80
Where a devolution issue in any proceedings arises before the Court of
Appeal, the issue may be referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council.81 An appeal against a determination of a devolution issue by the
High Court or the Court of Appeal on a reference under paragraphs 6, 7, 8 or 9
shall lie to the Judicial Committee, but only with the leave of the High Court
or the Court of Appeal or, failing such leave, with special leave of the Judicial
Committee.82
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The Welsh Assembly and the European Union and Community
While the United Kingdom government remains responsible for issues arising
out of membership of the European Union, it is recognised that Wales needs a
strong voice in Europe.83 The Assembly is able to scrutinise legislative
proposals and other European documents. The Assembly also has the
responsibility for ensuring that European Union obligations are implemented
and enforced, and to meet any financial penalties which may arise out of
failure to implement or enforce Union obligations. Within the framework of
the Council of Ministers, the Secretary of State for Wales participates in
meetings of the Council. The Wales European Centre in Brussels continues to
act as a facilitator and source of advice on European matters. Members of the
Assembly represent Wales on the Committee of the Regions. European
Structural Funds are an important source of funding for the regeneration of
the Welsh economy. It is estimated that payments under these funds amount
to £1,280 million in the five years to 1995 to 2000. The Welsh Office had
formerly been responsible for negotiations over the funds, and for their
implementation and management. The role of the Welsh Office in these
matters has been transferred to the Assembly.84
The Assembly and local authorities and other public bodies85
The Assembly works in partnership with local authorities, other public bodies
and voluntary bodies, in order to ensure greater local democracy and
accountability. The funding of local authorities has been taken over by the
Assembly from the Welsh Office.86
The Assembly has been given significant powers in relation to
appointments to Welsh public bodies, taking over responsibility from the
Secretary of State for Wales. The Assembly also has power to issue directions
to various bodies (quangos) and to monitor their performance. In relation to
unelected bodies in Wales, such as the Welsh Tourist Board, the Assembly has
power to restructure bodies in order to ensure improved economic
effectiveness and efficient working.87 In a major rationalisation of public
bodies, the Welsh Development Agency, which plays a pivotal role in
economic matters, has been reformed and takes over the responsibilities of the
Development Board for Rural Wales, which has been abolished.88 The Agency
also assumes the powers and functions formerly vested in the Land Authority
for Wales.89
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LONDON: THE GREATER LONDON 
AUTHORITY AND MAYOR
In addition to the government’s firm commitment to devolution to Scotland
and Wales, and the future consideration of devolution to the English regions,
the government intended to introduce an elected ‘strategic authority’ for
London. As noted below, the Greater London Council (GLC), which formerly
represented a centralising focus for the capital city, was abolished in 1985.
Many of the GLC’s functions reverted to the individual London councils.
London was unique in being a capital city without an elected Mayor and
centralised area government. This perceived deficiency has been redressed.
The government’s White Paper, A Mayor and Assembly for London, proposed an
elected Mayor and 25 seat Greater London Authority. The Authority does not
have direct tax raising powers, but revenue will be raised from road tolls and
parking fees. In addition, the Authority is funded by central government. A
referendum held in the spring of 1998 established popular support for the
proposal.90 The Greater London Authority Act 1999 regulates the Authority.
Elections
The first election was held in May 2000, electing an Assembly and Mayor for a
four-year term of office.91 Every eligible elector has one vote for the mayoral
candidate, one vote for an Assembly member and one vote – a ‘London vote’ –
for a registered political party.
The simple majority voting system is used for the mayoral election unless
there are three or more candidates. Where three or more candidates stand, the
Mayor is elected under the supplementary vote system, a vote which indicates
the voter’s first and second preferences from among the candidates.92 The
Assembly members are elected under the simple majority system.93 The
London vote, for a registered political party which has submitted a list of
candidates to be London members, or an individual who is a candidate to be a
London member, is calculated according to Part II of Schedule 2 to the Act.
The qualifications for election to be Mayor or an Assembly member are that
the person must be a Commonwealth citizen; citizen of the Republic of Ireland
or citizen of the European Union and be 21 years of age.94 In addition, the
candidate must have demonstrable links with Greater London, either by being
a local government elector for Greater London, or through residency or
through principal employment in Greater London throughout the preceding
12 months. 
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The Greater London Authority
The general power of the Assembly, as defined in Part II of the Act, is to ‘do
anything which it considers will further any one or more of its principal
purposes, which are defined as being:
(a) promoting economic development and wealth creation in Greater London;
(b) promoting social development in Greater London; and
(c) promoting the improvement of the environment in Greater London.
In deciding whether or how to exercise these powers, the Authority must
comply with the general principles of exercising power so as to also further
the remaining principal purpose(s) and securing, over a period of time, a
reasonable balance between furthering each of its principal purposes, and
have regard to the effect of its exercise of power on the health of persons in
Greater London and the achievement of sustainable development in the
United Kingdom, and shall act in such a way as to promote these objectives,
unless such action would ‘not reasonably practicable in all the circumstances
of the case’. The Secretary of State may issue guidance to the Authority in
relation to the above general power.95 The requirements of consultation with
London councils and representative voluntary bodies and interest groups are
defined in section 32. Functions conferred on the Authority are exercisable by
the Mayor acting on behalf of the Authority. All functions conferred on the
Mayor acting on behalf of the Authority, or on the Authority alone, or on the
Mayor and Authority jointly are exercisable only by the Mayor acting on
behalf of the Authority, subject to any express provision to the contrary in the
Act. Section 38 makes provision for the delegation of functions exercisable by
the Mayor to designated bodies.
The Authority is regulated by Standing Orders defining its procedures,
which are made in consultation with the Mayor. The office of Chair and
Deputy Chair of the London Assembly is created. The Local Government Act
1972, Part VA, regulating access to meetings and documents, applies to the
Assembly and its committees, with the exception of confidential information
and exempt information which may be withheld from the press and the
public. 
The Assembly is under a statutory duty to keep under review the Mayor’s
exercise of statutory functions, and has the power to investigate and report on
any actions and decision of the Mayor, actions and decisions of any member
of staff of the Authority, matters relating to the principal purposes of the
Authority and any other matters which the Assembly considers to be of
importance to Greater London. The Assembly may submit proposals to the
Mayor, but this function cannot be delegated to a committee or sub-
committee.96
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Witnesses and documents
The Assembly has the power to call for witnesses and documents. Consistent
with section 23 of the Scotland Act 1998 and sections 74 and 75 of the
Government of Wales Act 1998, the Assembly may require certain categories
of person to attend, and the power may also be exercised by Assembly
committees, but not by an individual committee member or member of staff
of the Authority. Certain categories of information, and documents, which a
person required to attend may refuse to disclose may be prescribed by the
Secretary of State. Refusal or failure to attend proceedings as required, or
failure to answer questions, or produce required documents, or the alteration,
suppression, concealment or destruction of documents required to be
produced is an office. On conviction a person is liable to a fine not exceeding
level 5 on the standard scale, or a term of imprisonment not exceeding three
months. A person is not obliged to answer questions or produce documents
which he would be entitled to refuse to answer or produce before court
proceedings in England and Wales.97
Ethical standards
Under section 66, the Secretary of State may issue guidance to the Authority
regarding the ethical standards for the Mayor, Assembly members and
member of the Authority’s staff, and other persons who are members of
advisory committees or sub-committees of the Assembly. Such guidance may
include the disclosure and registration of interests, the exercise of functions in
relation to which the relevant person has an interest in the matter in question,
and voting. The Secretary of State may also issue guidance on the
establishment and functions of committees concerned with ethical standards
and the prescription of model codes of conduct.
Bills in parliament
The Authority may promote a local Bill in parliament, or oppose any local Bill
which affects inhabitants of Greater London. The Mayor acts on behalf of the
Authority, having consulted the Assembly. In addition, the Mayor on behalf
of the Assembly, and following consultation with it, may request a London
local authority to include provisions in local Bills. A local Bill promoted in
parliament by a London local authority may include provisions which affect
the exercise of statutory functions by the Authority or any of the functional
bodies, only if the Authority gives its written consent.98
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The London Mayor
The Mayor is under a duty to prepare, keep under review and revise
strategies relating to transport, the London Development Agency, spatial
development,99 the London Biodiversity Action Plan, municipal waste
management, air quality, ambient noise and culture.100 In preparing or
revising any strategy the Mayor must have regard to the principal purposes of
the Authority, the effect which the strategy would have on the health of
persons in Greater London and the achievement of sustainable development
in the United Kingdom. In addition, the strategy must be consistent with
national policies and international obligations as notified by the Secretary of
State, available resources and the desirability of promoting and encouraging
the use of the River Thames safely, in particular for the provision of passenger
transport services and freight.101
In preparing or revising strategies, the Mayor must consult the Assembly,
the functional bodies, each London borough council, the Common Council of
the City of London and any other ‘appropriate person or body’. Adequate
publicity must be given to the strategies, and copies provided to the Common
Council and each London borough council. The Secretary of State may issue
directions to the Mayor to prepare and publish any strategy which the Mayor
has not prepared and to stipulate the period in which the strategy must be
prepared.102
The appointment of staff
The Mayor may appoint not more than two persons as his political advisers,
and not more than ten other members of staff. The Assembly may also
appoint such staff as it considers necessary for the proper discharge of
functions of the Authority.103 Political restrictions and disqualifications are
regulated by section 68. Sections 1 and 2 of the Local Government and
Housing Act 1989 have effect in relation to the Authority, Transport for
London and the London Development Agency. 
Accountability
The Mayor is under a duty to report to the Assembly, not less than three clear
working days before each meeting of the Assembly, on significant decisions
taken and the reasons for them, and his response to proposals submitted by
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the Assembly under section 60. The Mayor must attend every meeting of the
Assembly and answer questions put to him about matters relating to his
statutory functions.104 Questions will be answered orally ‘so far as practicable
to do so’, or in writing before the end of the third working day following the
day on which the question was asked at the meeting. An Annual Report is to
be prepared by the Mayor as soon as practicable after the end of each financial
year, reporting on his mayoral activities during the year.
Once in each financial year the Mayor must hold and attend a ‘State of
London debate’, open to all members of the public. In addition, twice in every
financial year, a ‘People’s Question Time’ shall be held, open to all members
of the public, for the purpose of putting questions to the Mayor and Assembly
members. People’s Question Time is to be held within one month of the State
of London debate.105
Transport functions of the Authority
Part IV of the Act regulates transport. Under section 141, the Mayor is under a
duty to develop and implement policies for the ‘promotion and
encouragement of safe, integrated, efficient and economic transport facilities
and services to, from and within Greater London’. The Act stipulates the
respective powers and duties of the Secretary of State, the Mayor and London
borough councils. ‘Transport for London’ is the functional body established to
implement the Mayor’s transport strategy, and will assume the functions
previously exercised by a number of differing bodies. Transport for London
has wide-ranging responsibilities, including traffic management, maintenance
of roads, the London Underground, the regulation of bus services and rail
services, road safety and parking, including the fixing of parking and other
charges for London. The making of public-private partnership agreements
(PPP agreement) is provided for, enabling contracts between the London
Authority bodies and private companies for the provision, construction,
improvement or maintenance of railways.106
Transport for London comprises a Board of between eight and 15
members, all of whom are appointed by the Mayor. The Mayor designates one
of the members to be Chairman of Transport for London. Schedule 10 states
that the Mayor may be a member, and if he elects to be so, shall be the
chairman. The Mayor may issue guidance, general directions and specific
directions as to the exercise of its functions.107
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The London Development Agency
Part V of the Act establishes the London Development Agency and amends
the Regional Development Agencies Act 1998 in relation to London. The
Mayor is responsible for appointing the 15 members of the London
Development Agency, and must ensure that at least four members are elected
members of the Assembly, a London borough council or the Common Council
of the City of London. The Mayor must consult the London Assembly before
making appointments. The Chairman is designated by the Mayor, and must
be a ‘person who has experience of running a business’ (section 304). The
functions of the London Development Agency is to further economic
development, promote business efficiency, investment and competitiveness,
promote employment and to enhance the development and application of
skills relevant to employment and to contribute to sustainable development. 
The Mayor is responsible for preparing and publishing the London
Development Agency strategy, assisted by the Agency.
The Metropolitan Police
Section 310 of the Act inserts into section 5 of the Police Act 1996, section 5A:
‘A police force shall be maintained for the metropolitan police district’, and
section 5B: ‘There shall be a police authority for the metropolitan police
district’, known as the Metropolitan Police Authority. Formerly, the Police
Authority for the Metropolitan Police District was the Home Secretary.
Whereas other police forces in England and Wales were accountable to a local
police authority, the Home Secretary’s responsibility as police authority meant
that London lacked the degree of local accountability existing outside London.
The establishment of the Metropolitan Police Authority redresses this lack of
accountability, and also ensures that the Mayor and Assembly have a role to
play in the combating of crime in the capital. The Metropolitan Police
Authority consists of 23 members, 12 of whom are members of the London
Assembly appointed by the Mayor, one of whom must be the deputy Mayor,
one appointed by the Secretary of State, six appointed by members of the
Metropolitan Police Authority from persons on a shortlist prepared by the
Secretary of State, and four magistrates for commission areas which are
wholly or partly within the metropolitan police district. Members generally
serve a four year renewable term. The Authority shall appoint a chairman
from among its members.108
Under section 311 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 (inserting a
new sub-section (5) to section 6 of the Police Act 1996), the Authority is
responsible for ensuring the maintenance of an efficient and effective police
force. The metropolitan police force is under the direction and control of the
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Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,109 appointed by Her Majesty on the
recommendation of the Secretary of State following any recommendations
made to him by the Metropolitan Police Authority and representations made
by the Mayor.
London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority
The Fire and Emergency Planning Authority replaces the London Fire and
Civil Defence Authority as established under the Local Government Act
1985.110 The reconstituted Authority is responsible to the Mayor. The Fire and
Emergency Planning Authority consists of 17 members, of whom nine are
Assembly members appointed by the Mayor and the remainder members of
London borough councils appointed by the Mayor on the nomination of the
London borough councils acting jointly. The Mayor is under a duty to ensure,
so far as practicable, that members for whose appointment he is responsible
reflect the balance of parties for the time being prevailing among the members
of those councils taken as a whole.111 Members are appointed for a renewable
one-year term of office. The Mayor is also responsible for appointing a
chairman from among the members of the Authority.
Planning
Part VIII of the Act gives to the Mayor a role in planning, although neither the
Mayor nor Assembly is a local planning authority for the purposes of the
Town and Country Planning Act 1990, and the local planning authorities for
the Greater London area remain. The Mayor has a duty to prepare and
publish a ‘spatial development strategy’ (SDS) document for Greater
London,112 which includes his general policies in respect of the development
and use of land in Greater London. The Secretary of State has the power to
direct the Mayor to prepare and publish either such alterations of the Spatial
Development Strategy as he directs, or a new SDS to replace the existing
one.113 When preparing the SDS, the Mayor must consult the Assembly and
the functional bodies.114 Copies of the SDS must be sent to the Secretary of
State, every London borough council, councils whose area adjoins Greater
London and is affected by the proposed SDS, bodies or persons designated by
the Secretary of State under section 343 and any other body or person to
whom the Mayor considers it appropriate to send a copy. The Mayor is under
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a duty to keep the SDS under review, and if the Secretary of State so directs,
the Mayor shall review the strategy as specified in directions from the
Secretary of State.115
Environmental functions
Within three years of the first election, and within four years from the date of
the previous report, the Mayor must, in accordance with section 351 of the
1999 Act, produce and publish a Report on the environment in Greater
London, known as the ‘state of the environment report’. The Report must
contain information about: air quality and emissions to air, including in
particular emissions from road traffic; road traffic levels; water quality and
emissions to water; ground water levels; energy consumption and the
emission of substances which contribute to climate changes; land quality;
biodiversity; the production, minimisation, recycling and disposal of waste;
noise; national resources, and litter.116
The Mayor must also prepare and publish a ‘London Biodiversity Action
Plan’, containing information concerning the ecology of Greater London,
wildlife, conservation proposals and commitments made as to conservation
and promotion of biodiversity within Greater London.117
A ‘Municipal Waste Management Strategy’ must also be prepared by the
Mayor, containing proposals and policies for the recovery, treatment and
disposal of municipal waste,118 and a ‘London Air Quality Strategy’ detailing
implementation of policies on national air quality strategy and the
achievement of air quality standards provided for under the Environment Act
1995. In addition, the Mayor must prepare and publish a ‘London Ambient
Noise Strategy’, detailing information about noise and the impact of noise and
proposals to counteract the effect of noise, including aircraft noise.119
Culture, media and sport
A Cultural Strategy Group for London (CSGL) is established under section
375 of the Act, which has the function of advising the Mayor on the
implementation of culture strategy. The CSGL formulates and submits to the
Mayor a draft strategy containing proposed policies relating to culture, media
and sport. Sections 376–78 then expand on this basic framework. The policies
may relate to arts, tourism and sport; ancient monuments and sites; buildings
of historical or architectural interest; museums and galleries; library services;
archives; treasure and movable antiquities; broadcasting, film production and
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other media of communication. The Authority may provide financial or other
assistance for the purposes of any museum, gallery, library, archive or other
cultural institution in Greater London. The functions of the Authority include
the duty to promote tourism to Greater London.
The Cultural Strategy Group for London consists of not fewer than ten and
not more than 25 members, appointed by the Mayor, following consultation
with such bodies or persons as he considers appropriate, and for such term of
office as the Mayor determines.120
PART II – LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN 
ENGLAND AND WALES: AN OUTLINE121
Local government represents both a form of decentralisation of power from
central government and a basis for local democracy. Local government
predates central government by many centuries. Historically, local
government represented an early form of localised self-regulation. The
country is divided into local authorities – either county or district – each
having law making and administrative powers as delegated by parliament.
Local authorities nowadays are entirely creatures of statute: accordingly, the
only powers which they have are those conferred by the sovereign United
Kingdom Parliament. Increasingly, however, the law of the European Union
and Community also requires action at local authority level. 
THE ADVANTAGES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Central government is ill equipped to deal with many matters which require
special local knowledge and regulation on the basis of local needs. The
devolution of power to directly elected local authorities enables those with
local knowledge and expertise to regulate the provision of services, such as
public housing, public sanitation, educational and recreational facilities. Local
government, therefore, is justified on the basis of efficiency. Local government
also represents the citizen’s closest contact with a democratic institution and
enables individuals to play a role in the administration of their geographical
area. The merits of local government were summarised by the Widdicombe
Committee122 as follows:
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The value of local government stems from its three attributes of:
(a) pluralism, through which it contributes to the national political system;
(b) participation, through which it contributes to local democracy;
(c) responsiveness, through which it contributes to the provision of local
needs through the delivery of services. [p 47]
Local authority boundaries
In order to revise boundaries and to adjust them to reflect changes in
population the Local Government Act 1972 introduced the Local Government
Boundary Commissions. One Commission exists for England, Scotland and
Wales. The present structure was established following a lengthy inquiry into
the structure, role and functions of local authorities.123
In 1992, a Local Government Commission,124 appointed by the Secretary
of State for the Environment, was established under the Local Government
Act 1992 to review the structure, boundaries and electoral arrangements of all
areas except London and the metropolitan areas. The government’s intention
was to seek to increase the efficiency of local government and reduce
overlapping functions and bureaucracy. Accordingly, it was the government’s
objective to introduce unitary authorities which would replace the previous
two tier structure. The reason for the proposed reforms was cost saving in the
long term. However, cost saving was the prediction and motivation behind
the 1972 reforms, when it was expected that reduced overheads would cut
costs, and that there would be a saving in relation to salaries alone of some £9
million annually, an expectation which was not realised.
The proposed changes came about at the end of a period marked by
radical change in the functions local government. As will be seen, the thrust of
development over the period from 1979 to 1997, under the former
Conservative government, was one towards compulsory competitive
tendering for services and the privatisation of local government departments,
reducing the role of Local Education Authorities. In the view of Sir John
Boynton:125 ‘... for good or ill the whole concept of local government as a
public service is being transformed.’ The reviews, however, ended in
compromise. The Commission recommended the retention of the two tier
system in many areas, but also proposed unitary councils in some areas. In
1994, unitary councils were introduced in Scotland and Wales, with
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respectively 32 and 22 unitary councils being established.126 In England, no
uniformity was achieved.127
Before the review began in 1992, the structure of local government in Great
Britain comprised some 515 councils, made up of the following:
In England: 32 London boroughs; the Corporation of London; 36
metropolitan districts; 39 county councils; 296 district councils. In Scotland:
nine regional councils; 53 district councils; three island councils. In Wales: 37
district councils; eight county councils.
Following the review, the total number of councils in Britain was reduced
between 1994 and 1998 from 515 to 442. The number of authorities in Scotland
was reduced from 62 to 32 unitary councils; whereas in Wales, 45 councils
were reduced to 22 unitary councils. In England, in 1998, there are 238 district
councils, 34 county councils and 46 new unitary authorities.
The current structure of local government
The structure of local government was substantially revised by the Local
Government Act 1972 and, further, by the Local Government Act 1985. Under
the 1972 Act, England was divided into six metropolitan counties outside
London.128 London was governed by the Greater London Council. In addition
to the metropolitan counties, 39 non-metropolitan counties were established.
In 1983, the Conservative government abolished the Greater London Council
and the metropolitan county councils.129 As seen above, the current
government has introduced an elected Mayor and Assembly for London.
The size of local government
In comparison with other nations, local government in the United Kingdom is
represented by substantially larger units, representing a substantially greater
number of people. Before the latest reorganisation of local government,
statistics reveal the average population per local authority.130 The figures
reveal that whereas the United Kingdom had an average population per local
authority of 118,400, the corresponding figure for France is 1,580; Germany is
4,925; Norway, 9,000; Denmark 18,760 and Sweden 30,040. The population
size of authorities naturally affects the number of constituents a local
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councillor will represent. Accordingly, in France, one elected representative
represents 116 people, in Germany 250, in Denmark 783, in Sweden 667 and in
the United Kingdom, 2,605. 
THE FUNCTIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Local government has no powers other than those conferred by parliament.
The powers conferred must be exercised according to law, and judicial review
of local authority decisions may be made to ensure that the rule of law is
respected.131 Some discretion exists, however, as to the means by which local
authorities achieve the goals set by central government. 
However, the freedom of local authorities to raise finance, to undertake
expenditure and to provide services was substantially reduced under the
Conservative government which assumed office in 1979 and lasted until 1997.
During that time, as will be seen, the government altered the manner in which
local taxation was raised, set clear limits on expenditure and imposed
sanctions on local authorities who exceeded the expenditure approved by
central government. Moreover, the provision of services by local authorities
has been significantly curtailed. Intent on improving efficiency and on
privatising many aspects of government previously performed either by local
authorities or by central government, ‘market forces’ were introduced to
many local authority services. Local authorities are now required to put many
services out to tender to the private sector, and may provide services
themselves only if they can do so in a manner which is competitive with
private companies and organisations. See, further, below.
In addition to taxation and the provision of services, local authorities have
a regulatory and law making role. Local councils have wide powers to
regulate, for example, the granting of licences of taxis, market trading, the
approval of child care facilities and private welfare homes for the elderly,
disabled or sick. In relation to law making, local authorities, acting under the
authority of Acts of Parliament, have the power to make bylaws – local laws
which regulate the area. For example, footpaths, parks and recreational
facilities are controlled by local bylaws. In the exercise of all such power, the
local authority is subject to control by the courts: all local authorities must act
intra vires (within their powers), or their decisions will be declared null and
void by the courts.
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The allocation of functions between authorities in England and
Wales 
Functions are allocated between local authorities principally on the basis of
‘operational efficiency and cost-effectiveness’.131 The provision of certain
services, for example, education, is clearly a matter for regulation on a large
scale, whereas the provision of local libraries and refuse collection may be
appropriate for smaller councils to administer. However, there can be no
generalisations about the distribution of functions: there are variations
throughout. From the point of view of local democracy, and the accountability
and responsiveness of local councillors, however, the larger the local
government unit, and the more diffuse the provision of services between
differing levels of local government, the more difficult it becomes for the
individual to apportion responsibility. In Byrne’s analysis, the allocation of
responsibilities is made the more complex by the sharing of responsibilities,
which of itself takes several forms. Shared responsibilities in this analysis may
include concurrent provision, whereby all local authorities provide the same
service in their area; or joint provision, where two or more local authorities
combine to provide a common service to all within their common area; or
shared but divided provision, in which different levels of local authority provide
differing aspects of the same service; reserve powers, under which larger
authorities reserve the power to provide particular aspects of a service
otherwise provided by smaller authorities; claimed powers, through which
individual, small authorities assume responsibility for a service or function
formally allocated to a larger authority, and agency powers, whereby one
authority will act as the agent of another authority in the provision of a service
or exercise of certain functions.133
In addition to the complexity in the allocation of functions between local
authorities must be considered the movement, discussed further below,
towards compulsory competitive tendering (CCT), which obliges local
authorities to put the provision of services out to tender and, in the event that
they wish to continue to make provision for a particular service, demonstrate
that they can do so in a manner competitive with private companies. What is
evident from this movement is that local authorities nowadays are far less the
actual providers of services and more bodies which, through contract, enable
services to be provided by those in the private sector. Moreover, no picture of
local government can be complete without recognition of the increased, and
increasing, functions formerly undertaken by local authorities, which are now
undertaken by boards and trusts under provisions introduced by the
Conservative government in relation to education and housing (discussed,
further, below) which further fragments local government, accountability and
democracy.
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The Local Government Act 2000 regulates the duty of local authorities to
promote the economic, social or environmental well being of the relevant area.
Every local authority is to have power to prepare a strategy for promoting or
improving the economic, social and environmental well being of their area.
The authority must consult or seek the participation of appropriate persons
and must have regard to any guidance issued by the Secretary of State. Under
section 5 of the Act, the Secretary of State has the power to amend, repeal or
revoke enactments relating to the strategy.
THE ELECTION PROCESS
Section 10 of the Representation of the People Act 2000 makes provision for
greater flexibility in the voting arrangements for local government elections. A
local authority may submit to the Secretary of State proposals for a scheme
relating to when, where and how voting is to take place, how the votes cast
are to be counted and the sending by candidates of election communications
free of postage charges. The scheme may make provision for voting to take
place on more than one day, and at places other than polling booths. The
Secretary of State has power to approve the proposals either without
modification or with such modifications as, after consulting the authority, he
considers appropriate, and may by order make provision for and in
connection with the implementation of the scheme in relation to those
elections he considers appropriate. Once elections under the scheme have
taken place, the authority concerned must prepare a report on the scheme,
detailing its provisions and assessing the scheme’s success or otherwise in
facilitating voting at the elections in question and, if relevant, the counting of
votes, or in encouraging voting at the elections in question or enabling voters
to make informed decisions at those elections. 
A copy of the report must be sent to the Secretary of State, and published
in the relevant area, by the end of the period of three months beginning with
the date of the declaration of the result. If it appears to the Secretary of State
that it would be desirable for provision to be made to apply generally and on
a permanent basis to local government elections in England and Wales, he
may by order make such provision as he considers appropriate, which power
includes the power to modify or disapply any provision of an Act of
Parliament including the 2000 Act. Such an order must be made by statutory
instrument, and laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of
Parliament.134
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THE ELECTION OF COUNCILLORS
Councillors are elected for a four year term of office and represent ‘wards’
within the local government area. In metropolitan districts, one third of
councillors retire each year, other than in a year in which there will be county
council elections. In other, non-metropolitan districts, councillors retire every
four years, or may choose to adopt the metropolitan model. The electoral
system reflects that used for general elections, being the simple majority or
‘first past the post’ system.
Detailed rules regulate election expenditure and, as with general elections,
a number of corrupt and illegal practices are proscribed. An election challenge
may be presented by way of a petition to the Queen’s Bench Division of the
High Court.135 The petition is heard by the election courts which consists of a
commissioner appointed by the judges who are nominated to try election
petitions.
Qualification and disqualification for election
A candidate must – unlike candidates for parliament – be able to demonstrate
a close connection with the locality. Accordingly, he or she must either be on
the local register of electors, or have been resident or occupied property or
have his place of employment within the local authority area for a 12 month
period preceding ‘nomination day’.136 Bankruptcy, conviction for corrupt or
illegal practices, a conviction and sentence of three months’ imprisonment
within five years of the election or the imposition of a surcharge by the Audit
Commission for unlawful local government expenditure137 will all disqualify
a person from standing for election. 
The fact of regular local elections during the life of a parliament enables
the people not only to express their preferences for those who will govern
them until the next set of local elections, but also to express their approval or
disapproval of central government policies. In the May 1995, local elections, in
which the Conservative Party lost control of a large number of local councils,
the Conservative government was given a clear indication of the people’s
judgment on its stewardship of power. 
Standards of conduct
The Prevention of Corruption Acts 1906 and 1916138 made it a criminal
offence for a member of the council to accept payments, in money or kind, for
407
135 Representation of the People Act 1983, ss 127–63, as amended.
136 Local Government Act 1972, s 79.
137 Audit of local authority accounts is undertaken under the Local Government Finance
Act 1982.
138 And, previously, the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889.
services. Under sections 94–98 of the Local Government Act 1972, Councillors
must disclose the existence of any direct or indirect financial interest in council
business. In 1974, following a scandal involving councillors in the North of
England concerning contracts for a private architect, John Poulson, official
inquiries were launched into the standard of conduct in public life.139 While it
was found that, in general, local government members’ conduct was ‘honest’,
a number of reforms have been introduced. A statutory Register of Members’
Interests has been established140 and a Code of Conduct introduced relating
to non-pecuniary interests.
The conduct of local government came under review from the Committee
of Standards in Public Life, chaired by Lord Nolan.141 The inquiry examined
the ‘seven principles of public life’ – selflessness, integrity, objectivity,
accountability, openness, honesty and leadership – identified by the
Committee in its inquiries to parliamentary standards. Lord Nolan’s frame of
reference included the issue of the manner in which, and extent to which, local
government operates these principles. Moreover, the Committee examined
codes of conduct, including the declaration of financial and non-pecuniary
interests; the role of councillors and officers of local authorities; the role of
auditors and ombudsmen; the relationships between councils and contractors
and/or consultants; the management of planning permissions; local authority
allowances and access to information by the public into local authority work.
Part III of the Local Government Act 2000 relates to standards of conduct
in local government, and empowers the Secretary of State to specify the
principles which are to govern the conduct of members of relevant authorities
in England in a model code. In relation to Wales, the National Assembly may
specify standards. Local authorities will be under a duty to adopt a code of
conduct, and incorporate such mandatory provisions of a model code as
apply to that authority. Every local authority, other than a parish council or
community council, must establish a standards committee,142 the functions of
which are to promote and maintain high standards of conduct and assist
members of the authority to observe the code of conduct. The standards
committee also has power to advise the authority on the adoption or revision
of a code, monitoring the operation of the code, and advising, training or
arranging to train members of the authority in relation to the code of conduct.
Adjudication tribunals are to be established to consider allegations of non-
compliance with the code, and to report to the standards committee. Every
local authority must establish and maintain a register of members’ interests.143
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THE MANAGEMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT144
Unlike central government, there is no ‘cabinet’ which formulates policy. All
councils employ officers, some of which are required to be appointed under
statute.145 Officials hold office on ‘such reasonable terms and conditions,
including conditions as to remuneration’ at the discretion of the council.146
Local authorities appoint a salaried chief officer or executive and employ
senior administrators, clerical officers and secretarial and office staff. In
addition, a local authority will employ teachers, police and firemen and
personnel related to their specific services.147
Local authorities have some discretion to decide on their management
arrangements.148 For the most part, committees undertake the majority of
decision making, with their decisions being ratified by a meeting of the full
council which may meet as frequently as the council thinks fit. By law,
councils are required to have at least one annual meeting, but in practice these
are usually far more frequent. 
Meetings of the council must be publicised149 and council meetings150 are
open to the public, unless the council rules that the meeting should be
conducted in private because of the confidential nature of the business.151
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT 2000
The Local Government Act 2000 provides for new executive arrangements to
be introduced into local government, and empowers a local authority to
decide whether to introduce the executive arrangements.152 The
arrangements consist of an elected mayor and two or more councillors of the
authority appointed by the elected mayor to the executive. The Executive is to
be referred to as the Mayor and Cabinet Executive. Part II of the Act
introduces a further layer of management to local government, and is subject
to the approval of electors expressed at a referendum. Where a local authority,
with referendum approval, introduces an executive, the Secretary of State may
by regulations provide for any functions of a local authority to be the
responsibility of the Executive. Every local authority must draw up proposals
for the operation of executive arrangements and send a copy of the proposals
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to the Secretary of State. The proposals must indicate the form the executive is
to take, having consulted local government electors and other interested
persons. Where the executive arrangement include a mayor and cabinet
executive a referendum is required. In other cases, where a referendum is not
required, the authority must implement the proposals in accordance with a
timetable included in the proposals. The Secretary of State may direct a local
authority to hold a referendum in relation to the election of a mayor and
executive cabinet.
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT153
Parliament is supreme and can control both the structure of local government,
and the extent of local government powers and functions. The major forms of
control are through general legislation and through delegated legislation.
Local authorities have statutory power to make bylaws but these are subject to
confirmation by the minister. Central government policy and standard-setting
control the manner in which local authorities may exercise their powers.
Schemes for town planning, transport and education must have central
approval and, in town planning, appeals will ultimately lie to the Secretary of
State, and his approval will be needed in relation to compulsory purchase
orders. In relation to fire, education and the police, regular inspections are
made by central government inspectors.
The Department of State most closely associated with local government is
the Department of the Environment, created in 1970. There are also other
departments such as the Department of Education and Employment, the
Home Office,154 and the Social Security Department which have powers over
local government. 
Financial controls over local government
In order to understand the current status of local government and its
relationship with central government, it is necessary to understand the recent
history of local government finance, which is one characterised by increasing
controls being imposed by central government. The Royal Commission on
Local Government, 1966–69, discussed finance but made no proposals for
change in financial arrangements. The genesis of increased control on local
government spending by central government generally can be seen in the
1970s under the Labour government. The oil crisis of 1973 increased
government alarm over public spending in general. In 1976–77, the
government fixed grants at a level of projected price levels for the financial
year without any adjustment for inflation. 
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Throughout the 1979 general election campaign, ministers criticised local
government as wasteful, irresponsible and unaccountable. The Conservative
Party came into government promising reform of the rating system and added
to its promises the commitment to introduce a fairer and more simple grant
system.
Local government revenue155
Some 60 per cent of local government revenue comes from central
government grants. These are either specific grants – for example, for
particular services such as fire or police (50 per cent), or general grants – a
central government contribution to local authority funds. In addition, local
authorities may borrow money, subject to strict control by the Treasury, and
raise money from the imposition of charges, for example, for services
(swimming pools and recreational facilities) and the sale of council houses, for
transport services.
The financial needs of local government are thus met by a mixture of local
and central revenues. In terms of local revenue, from around 1600 until 1988,
local domestic rates had been in existence. The rates, calculated according to
the value of the property, were cheap and easy to collect, and the public were
used to them. Rates applied to a property irrespective of the number of
persons living in it. During the 1960s and 1970s, high spending councils led to
pressure for reform of the rating system. As the position stood then, a local
authority raised the annual local rates and central government, through the
Rate Support Grant – a ‘top-up’ grant – provided the short-fall between
revenue and expenditure. 
By 1974, the Conservative Party was committed to abolishing local rates.
The community charge, or Poll Tax, found favour with the government and
was introduced – amidst widespread public disorder – under the Local
Government Finance Act 1988. The same rate within a local authority area
would apply to every person: it was a person based rather than property
based tax. Accordingly, each resident in a local area would contribute to the
costs of services which were enjoyed by all. Equally, such a tax would ensure
that each voter in the area felt the impact of local authority spending and,
accordingly, the local authority would be more accountable to the voters. In
addition to that personal tax, the government was keen to reform business
rates, and introduced the National Non-Domestic Rate, to be set by
government and outside local authority control.
The conflict and disquiet over the introduction of the community charge
led to rapid reform.156 Whilst in principle the tax would serve the needs of
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fairness and accountability, in practice, the tax was rapidly regarded as
iniquitous and, as a result, uncollectable. The backtrack once again centred on
property values. From 1993, the council tax payable is based on values of
property within differing price bands and is payable irrespective of the
numbers of people living within the house although, to mitigate the perceived
unfairness of the old rating system, a 25 per cent discount is allowable for
single person households. 
Local authority expenditure
Before 1980, the Rate Support Grant was designed to top up the needs of a
local authority where the income from domestic rates fell short of their
expenditure requirements. The sum payable by central government annually
was fixed by the Secretary of State for the Environment following discussion
with local authority associations. Prior to the Local Government Planning and
Land Act 1980, the majority of the grant was based on what was needed: and
what was needed was dependent upon the local authorities’ perception of
need. By the 1970s, the Conservative Party had come to the view that local
government was ‘profligate, wasteful and out of control’. The result was the
introduction157 of a new Block Grant, distributed according to grant related
expenditure assessments (GREAs) and those were to be determined by
central, and not local, government. Overspending councils were to be
penalised by a grant taper. Simply expressed, the taper represented a
reduction in the central government grant where the Secretary of State
considered that a local authority was spending too much. By 1981, it was
realised by the government that this initiative was ineffective. Accordingly,
the government introduced the grant holdback.158 Henceforth, overspending
local authorities were to have their grant withheld. In order to prevent the
local authority from simply levying a mid term supplementary rate to make
up the short fall, the right to impose a supplementary rate was removed.
However, these controls also proved ineffective. In order to circumvent the
consequences of grant being withheld, some local authorities increased the
amount of the annual rate levied to make up the short fall. The Rates Act 1984
introduced further central government powers: those of rate capping. Rate
capping sought to prevent rate increases above a target set by central
government, and conferred a broad discretion on the Secretary of State for the
Environment to impose sanctions. Those opposed to rate capping claimed that
it represented an interference in local government affairs and an erosion of
local democracy. For each one per cent of overspend, the offending local
authority would lose a proportion of its allowable rate figure. 
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An illustration of the political conflict which ensued involved Liverpool
City Council. The City Council, a Labour Party controlled council, decided to
take illegal action to safeguard vital services, and set their own rate outside
the limits set by government. Between 1985 and 1986, unemployment was
running at 27 per cent; the City Council had enough money for only nine
months’ administration. The government refused to come to the City
Council’s assistance. The City Council resolved to close down for three
months and to make employees redundant, while the Council was moving
towards bankruptcy. Eventually, the City Council set a legal rate financed,
ironically, by Swiss banks. One response to such restraints by local authorities
was the attempt to raise money through the financial markets in interest
swaps. The House of Lords, however, ruled such transactions to be ultra
vires.159
With the demise of the Poll Tax and introduction of the council tax in
1993,160 came a change in the manner in which central government calculated
and allocated the Revenue Support Grant.161 In an attempt to ensure standard
levels of service throughout the country, the Grant Related Expenditure
Allocation gave way to the Standard Spending Assessment (SSA). In brief, the
Department of the Environment (DoE) calculates the level of resource which
each local authority needs in order to achieve the ‘standard level of service’
across the range of services which a local authority is statutorily required to
provide. In part, this figure is determined by the previous expenditure of the
local authority. In calculating the resource needs, the DoE operates a formula
based on statistical data on each authority, comprising a number of variables,
such as population, property prices, demographic factors, level of social
deprivation and so on. Based on this, the DoE calculated the resource needs in
relation to particular services – education, social services, etc. The DoE
combines this calculation with the amount which it deems it appropriate for a
local authority to raise through the imposition of the council tax, and the
amount which the local authority will be given from government from the
National Non-Domestic (Business) Rate (NNDR). The combination of the
amount to be levied via the council tax plus the receipts from the NNDR,
subtracted from the DoE’s assessment of resource need, equals the
government’s Revenue Support Grant for a particular authority. Over and
above that final calculation, and based on former expenditure, the
government set for each authority the percentage level at which the authority
is ‘capped’ – that is to say, the absolute maximum budget which that authority
was permitted to spend in the financial year. If a local authority decided that it
needs to spend more than the cap figure, the revenue needed could only come
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from an increase in local council tax. The government would not provide
monies over the cap, and local authorities exceeding the cap are liable to the
full range of penalties available under statute. 
The Local Government Act 1999
The Labour government entered power in 1997 with a pledge to reform local
government. The Local Government Act 1999 represented the first stage of
reform, removing the requirement of compulsory competitive tendering
imposed by the 1988 Local Government Act, and introducing the concept of
best value (on which, see below), and amending the scheme of rate capping in
place under the 1992 Local Government Finance Act. The 1999 Act introduced
greater flexibility into the rate-capping mechanisms. Under the 1992 Act, local
authorities were classified according to type and the same principles applied
to all local authorities within a particular class, which prevented the particular
circumstances of individual authorities from being taken into consideration
when making the decision in relation to capping. Section 30 and Schedule 1 to
the 1999 Act enable the Secretary of State to apply different capping principles
to individual authorities. The Act also introduces the power of the Secretary of
State to ‘nominate’ a local authority. The nomination power is one enabling
the Secretary of State to warn a local authority that its spending is becoming
excessive.162 Where an authority’s spending is becoming excessive, the
Secretary of State may either designate the authority or nominate the
authority.163 Where an authority is designated, the Secretary of State notifies
the authority of the amount which he proposes should be the maximum for
the amount calculated by the authority as its budget requirement for the year,
and the target amount for the year which the Secretary of State proposes the
authority could calculate as its budget requirement for the year without the
amount calculated being excessive.164 Where an authority is nominated, the
Secretary of State may decide to designate the authority for the following
financial year, or to set a notional sum for its budget requirement, against
which the authority’s budget requirement for the following year will be
compared.165
Audit
The government controls local authorities by way of audit. The Audit
Commission Act 1998 consolidates the former provisions relating to audit. The
Audit Commission166 of Local Authorities and the National Health Service in
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England and Wales is the principle body responsible for supervising local
government and heal service audits. The Commission consists of not less than
15 and not more than 20 members appointed by the Secretary of State.167 The
accounts of bodies subject to the Act are required to be compiled at the end of
March annually and audited by auditors appointed by the Commission.168
The Commission is responsible for preparing and keeping under review a
Code of Audit Practice. Auditors have a right of access to every document
relating to a body which appears to him necessary for the purposes of his
functions under the Act. It is an offence to fail to comply, without reasonable
excuse, with any requirement of the auditor.169
If in the course of an audit of a local government body, other than a health
service body, that an item of account is contrary to law and has not been
sanctioned by the Secretary of State, the auditor may apply to High Court for
a declaration that the item is contrary to law.170 If the High Court makes such
a declaration, it may also require the responsible person to repay the unlawful
expenditure in whole or in part. If the unlawful expenditure exceeds £2,000,
and at the time the person responsible was a member of a local authority, the
Court may order him to be disqualified from being a member of a local
authority for a specified period and may order rectification of the accounts.
The High Court must not make an order if it is satisfied that the responsible
person ‘acted reasonably or in the belief that the expenditure was authorised
by law’, and in any other case shall ‘have regard to all the circumstances,
including that person’s means and ability to repay the expenditure or any part
of it.171 If a person has failed to bring into account a sum, and that failure has
not been sanctioned by the Secretary of State and a ‘loss has been incurred or
deficiency caused by the wilful misconduct of any person’ the auditor must
certify that the sum, or the amount of the loss or deficiency, is due from that
person.172 Wilful misconduct has been held to include the failure to collect
fees which were due,173 and a delay in setting the rate resulting in the
authority losing interest on money which would otherwise have been
collected.174 A person aggrieved by the auditor’s decision to certify a sum or
amount due may appeal to the High Court.175 In relation to health service
bodies, section 19 of the Audit Commission Act 1998 provides that if the
auditor has reason to believe that the body or an officer of the body, has made
or is about to make a decision which involves incurring unlawful expenditure,
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170 As in Hazell v Hammersmith LBC (1992), discussed above.
171 Audit Commission Act 1998, s 17.
172 Ibid, s 18(1).
173 R v Roberts (1901).
174 Lloyd v McMahon (1987).
175 Audit Commission Act 1998, s 18(10).
or undertake a course of action which would be unlawful and likely to cause a
loss or deficiency, the auditor must refer the matter to the Secretary of State. 
In relation to authorities, other than a health service body, the auditor may
issue a prohibition notice if he has reason to believe that the body is about to
make or has made a decision which involves incurring unlawful expenditure,
or has taken, or is about to take, action which is unlawful and likely to cause a
loss or deficiency, or is about to enter in the accounts an item of unlawful
expenditure.176 If the authority’s chief finance officer has already made a
report on unlawful expenditure,177 no prohibition order may be made in
relation to the period covered by the report. Where a prohibition order is
issued, it is not lawful for the body concerned to make or implement the
relevant decision or undertake the course of action to which the prohibition
order relates. The body concerned may appeal against the prohibition order to
the High Court.178 The auditor has power to apply for judicial review of local
authority, but not health service bodies, decision or failure to act.179
The Commission has the power to direct an auditor to undertake an
extraordinary audit, and the Secretary of State may require the Commission to
direct such an audit.180
Under Part III of the Act, the Commission has responsibility for
undertaking or promoting comparative or other studies for the improving
economy, efficiency and effectiveness of local authority services, and of other
bodies covered by the Act, and for improving the financial or other
management of bodies subject to audit. Bodies subject to the Act may require
the Commission to undertake such studies. The right to make studies and
receive requests for studies extends to higher education funding councils, the
governing bodies of institutions within the higher education sector and
further education sector, the Funding Agency for Schools and the governing
body of a grant-maintained school. The Secretary of State may request the
Commission’s assistance in studies designed to improve the economy,
efficiency, effectiveness and quality of performance in relation to social
services functions of local authorities.181
The abolition of compulsory competitive tendering and the 
best value concept
The 1999 Local Government Act abolished compulsory competitive tendering
for the provision of services, which forced local authorities to compete with
the private sector. Tendering, however, while no longer compulsory continues
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180 Ibid, s 25.
181 Ibid, ss 33–37.
Regional and Local Government
to form one part of the government’s quest for value and efficiency in the
provision of local authority services. Section 1 defines the local authorities to
which the best value duty will apply, which extends beyond local authorities
proper and includes such bodies as the police authorities, Transport for
London and other metropolitan transport authorities, waste disposal
authorities, fire authorities and the London Development Agency.
The general duty imposed on best value authorities is to ‘make
arrangements to secure continuous improvement in the way in which its
functions are exercised, having regard to a combination of economy, efficiency
and effectiveness’. In deciding how to fulfil its duty under section 3,
authorities must consult local tax payers, service users and representatives of
persons appearing to have an interest in any area in which the authority
carries out functions. The Secretary of State may by order specify factors
‘performance indicators’ by reference to which best value authority’s
performance can be measured and standards ‘performance standards’ to be
met in relation to the performance indicators. Differing performance
indicators or standards may be set for different functions and different
functions and may apply at different times.182 A best value authority must
conduct reviews of its functions with the aim to improving the way its
functions are exercised, and the Secretary of State may by order specify
matters which an authority must include in a review of functions. In
particular an order may require an authority to consider whether it should
carry out a particular function, the level at which it should be exercising the
function, and its objectives in relation to the exercise of the function. It should
also assess its performance, and the competitiveness of its performance by
reference to other best value authorities and by commercial or other
businesses, and consult other authorities and commercial operations about the
exercise of the function. It must also assess its progress towards meeting
performance standards, which have been specified.183
Each authority must prepare a best value performance plan for each
financial year, and the Secretary of State may by order specify matters which
an authority must include in its plan.184 The performance plan published for a
financial year is to be audited by the authority’s auditor.185 The authority
must respond to the auditor’s report, and where recommendations have been
made, must make a statement of action it intends to take as a result of the
report and its proposed timetable, within 30 days of receiving the report or
earlier if the report so specifies.186 The Audit Commission may carry out
inspections of an authority’s compliance with the requirements, and
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inspectors have a right of access and may require responsible persons to give
such information, explanation or documentation as is required.187 Where an
inspection has been carried out, the Audit Commission must issue a report
stipulating areas in which the Commission believes the authority is failing to
comply with requirements and may recommend that the Secretary of State
give directions to the authority. Where the Commission issues a report stating
failure to comply with requirements, the authority must, in its next
performance plan, record that fact and any action taken by the authority as a
result of the report.188 Under section 15, the Secretary of State has the power
to intervene where he or she is satisfied that an authority is failing to meet the
requirements relating to best value. The Secretary of State may require an
authority to amend a performance plan, to follow specified procedures in
relation to the plan and to carry out a review of its exercise of specified
functions. The Secretary of State may also direct a local inquiry to be held in
relation to the exercise of functions.
Section 15 also gives to the Secretary of State the power to direct an
authority to take any action which he considers necessary or expedient to
secure compliance with best value requirements. The Secretary of State may
direct that a specified function of an authority shall be exercised by the
Secretary of State or a person nominated by him, thereby removing that
function, for the period specified, from the authority.189 Where the Secretary
of State takes over the function of an authority, regulations may be made to
avoid the situation where, for example, planning functions have been taken
over. The Secretary of State is also the final arbiter of an appeal against that
planning decision.190
COMPLAINTS ABOUT LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Complaints against local government may be made to the authority itself and,
if such a complaint does not receive satisfactory treatment, a complaint may
be made to the Commissioner for Local Administration. The jurisdiction, role
and powers of Commissioners for Administration are considered in Chapter
26.
The reforms introduced after 1980 radically altered the role of local
government. It is no longer assumed that local authorities have the democratic
right to set local taxation at a level unrestrained by parliament, or that local
authorities are the most efficient providers of local services. The spirit of
privatisation and market forces, so prevalent throughout the former
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Conservative government’s tenure of office, severely reduced the traditional
role of local authorities and altered the balance of power between central and
local government. 
While the role and function of local government is defined, controlled and
restrained by central government, local government must also be seen within
the wider context of the European Union and Community. Since the United
Kingdom acceded to the European Community in 1973, and the formation of
the European Union under the Treaty on European Union 1992, an increasing
volume of European law affects not only the legislative sphere of competence
of parliament in relation to matters within the competence of the Union, but
also affects both national and local policies and standards. The Community
was founded on the four freedoms – of persons, goods, capital and services –
which affect all levels of government. In addition, the community and Union
has expanded its sphere of competence over the years to include such diverse
matters as environmental protection, health and hygiene standards and
weights and measures. Many of the Community laws on these areas fall on
local authorities to implement. The freedom of movement and right of
establishment of European citizens191 has implications for local authority
housing, as does the European Court of Justice’s development of the law of
gender equality in the workplace.
The European Union’s relationship to local government is not limited to
the imposition of regulations and directives imposing duties on local
authorities, but extends to the provision of regional aid. The Committee of the
Regions of the European Union192 provides the means by which the views
and interests of local authorities may be taken into account. Furthermore, the
provision of financial aids and grants through the Social Fund, European
Investment Bank and Regional Development Fund provides an additional
source of finance for local authorities.
Local government and the courts
Local authorities, being bodies to whom powers are delegated by parliament,
may exercise their powers and spend money only for the purposes authorised
by statute. In order to ensure that bodies with delegated law making,
administrative and/or judicial powers act within those powers (intra vires),
the courts are seized with jurisdiction to review any action challenged by a
person or body aggrieved by that action. Applications for judicial review
proceed by way of an application for leave to apply for judicial review.
Applicants must have sufficient interest (locus standi) in the matter to apply,
and the matter challenged must be one falling under public law as opposed to
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192 Formerly, the Consultative Council of Regional and Local Authorities.
private law. Furthermore, the matter must be one which is justiciable, that is
to say, a matter which the courts deem themselves to be the appropriate body
to adjudicate on the matter.193
Local government is a regular participant in judicial review proceedings.
As seen earlier, all the powers which they exercise are powers delegated by
statute; local authorities have no inherent jurisdiction. Accordingly, the courts
may rule on the ‘vires’ of their activities. Judicial review is considered in
Chapters 24 and 25 and those chapters should be consulted for discussion of
the case law. In relation to control over the exercise of local government
powers, the courts employ the concept of fiduciary duty. Local government is
in a fiduciary position of trustee of resources to be exercised for the benefit of
the consumers of those resources, council tax payers.194
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PART V
PARLIAMENT

CHAPTER 13
The first variety of democracy is that which is so called because it is based
chiefly on the principle of equality. In such a democracy, the law interprets
equality as meaning that the poor shall not enjoy any more advantage than the
rich, that neither shall be sovereign, but both shall be exactly similar. For if, as
is held by some, freedom is especially to be found in democracy, and also
equality, this condition is most fully realised when all alike share most fully in
the constitution. But, since the people are a majority, and the decision of the
majority is sovereign, this must be a democracy.1
INTRODUCTION
In a democratic state, the electoral process exercises determining power over
those who hold political office. It is the electorate which confers the power to
govern and calls government to account. If the electorate is to enjoy true
equality in constitutional participation, it is of fundamental constitutional
importance that the electoral system ensures four principles:
(a) that there is a full franchise, subject to limited restrictions; 
(b) that the value of each vote cast is equal to that of every other vote; 
(c) that the conduct of election campaigns is regulated to ensure legality and
fairness; 
(d) that the voting system is such as to produce both a legislative body
representative of the electorate and a government with sufficient
democratic support to be able to govern effectively. 
It is against these four principal objectives that the law must be evaluated.
However, it must be recognised that these elements are in large measure
inseparable from each other. Each aspect of the electoral process combines to
form a system:
Any code of electoral law includes a number of essential sections of almost
equal importance ... Each of these sections is meaningless in isolation from the
others. A wide and equal suffrage loses its value if political bosses are able to
gerrymander constituencies so as to suit their own interests; there is no point in
having an elaborate system of proportional representation if the electors are all
driven in one direction by a preponderance of bribes and threats; legal
provisions mean nothing if enforcement is left wholly in the hands of those
who profit by breaking it.
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1 Aristotle, The Politics, Bk iv, 1291b30.
That is why it is right to speak of the ‘electoral system’. Procedure for elections
is systematic in that its parts are interdependent; it is impossible to advance on
one ‘front’ without regard to others.2
THE FRANCHISE3
Evolution of the franchise
Prior to the Reform Acts of 1832 and 1867, the right to vote was limited and
based on rights in property. The 1832 Act – the Representation of the People
Act – increased the franchise by 50 per cent, which represented only seven per
cent of the population. The Reform Act of 1867 doubled the number of people
entitled to vote. The debate as to who should participate in the franchise goes
back to ancient Greece. Aristotle argued for maximum involvement of all
citizens in the decision making processes of the City State, arguing inter alia
that, while the individual citizen acting alone may be of unsound judgment,
decisions reached collectively will be better – or at any rate no worse – than
those made by ‘experts’.4
In Great Britain, the right to vote – by the nineteenth century – was based
on property holdings. Men without property, and all women, were excluded
from the franchise. The extension of the franchise in 1867 to skilled and
unskilled male labourers was not a matter greeted with universal approval.
Walter Bagehot retorted that:
... no one will contend that the ordinary working man who has no special skill,
and who is only rated because he has a house, can judge much of intellectual
matters. [(1867) 1993, p 273]
Bagehot feared the potential power of the working class: should they combine
as a class, the ‘higher orders’ might have to consider whether to concede to
their demands or ‘risk the effect of the working men’s combination’ (p 278).
Women and the right to vote
Women were to remain disenfranchised until 1928, but the movement for
women’s right to vote predates the 1867 Act.5 In 1851, Harriet Taylor Mill had
published Enfranchisement of Women in the Westminster Review. In 1886, John
Stuart Mill6 presented a petition to parliament calling for the enfranchisement
of women. The following year, the Manchester Women’s Suffrage Committee
was formed, soon to be united in a National Committee based in London.
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3 For a full history of the franchise, see, inter alia, Anson, 1933; Maitland, 1908, pp 352–64.
4 Aristotle, The Politics, Bk III xi, pp 204–05.
5 See Kent, 1987.
6 A Member of Parliament and radical reformer. See, inter alia, Representative Government
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When the Reform Bill was before parliament, John Stuart Mill introduced an
amendment – changing the word ‘man’ to ‘person’ – thereby entitling women
to vote. The amendment was defeated. 
A legal challenge to disenfranchisement came in Chorlton v Lings (1868). It
was argued before the Court of Common Pleas that the Representation of the
People Act 1867 had conferred on women a right to vote. The argument
centred on the use of the word ‘man’ in the Act. It was contended that Lord
Brougham’s Act which stipulated that the word ‘man’ included ‘women’
applied to an interpretation of the Representation of the People Act. Bovill CJ
rejected such a view:
The conclusion at which I have arrived is, that the legislature used the word
‘man’ in the Act of 1867 in the same sense as ‘male person’ in the former Act;
that this word was intentionally used, in order to designate expressly the male
sex; and that it amounts to an express enactment and provision that every
man, as distinguished from women, possessing the qualification, is to have the
franchise. In that view, Lord Brougham’s Act does not apply to the present
case, and does not extend the meaning of the word ‘man’ so as to include
women. [p 387]
Mr Justice Willis, Byles J and Keating J agreed. In accepting Bovill CJ’s
interpretation, Willis J turned to comment on the wider issue. In declaring
himself opposed to any view that women were excluded from the franchise
on the basis of ‘fickleness of judgment and liability to influence’, which would
be quite inconsistent ‘with one of the glories of our civilisation – the respect
and honour in which women are held’, Willis J declared, concerning the
prohibition against voting – and the prohibition against peeresses in the
House of Lords – that ‘out of respect to women, and a sense of decorum, and
not from their want of intellect, or their being for any other reason unfit to
take part in the government of the country, they have been excused from
taking any share in this department of public affairs’ (p 392).
In 1869, Mill published The Subjection of Women. The right to vote was but
one campaign. Women were also seeking equal rights in education, in politics
and in the medical profession. In 1897, the differing suffrage movements were
to be united under the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies. By
1913, the number of affiliated societies had reached 400. The leadership of
Emmeline and Christabel Pankhurst injected new energy into the campaign
and the age of militancy in support of the right to vote began. The tide of
public opinion started to turn in women’s favour in 1909, when the authorities
started to force feed hunger striking suffragettes imprisoned as a result of
their campaign. A Bill to give women the right to vote passed second reading
in 1910, but was defeated by the Prime Minister, Asquith, acting in concert
with Lloyd George, the Opposition Leader. The failure of a second Bill in 1911
sparked violent protest all over London: 217 women were arrested. A Bill of
1913 met with a similar fate and reaction. Fearful of the consequences of
imprisonment and hunger strikes, the government passed the ‘Cat and
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Mouse’ Act,7 which enabled the authorities to release hunger striking
prisoners who were in medical danger and re-arrest them on their physical
recovery.
The persistence of the suffragettes, combined with the involvement of
women in industry during the 1914–18 World War, acted as catalysts for
winning the right to vote. In 1916, an all-party conference on electoral reform
was established under the chairmanship of the Speaker of the House of
Commons. 
The Representation of the People Act 1918, which implemented the
conference’s proposals, introduced a full franchise of all men in parliamentary
elections and conferred the right to vote in parliament on all women over the
age of 30 who were either local government electors or the wives of local
government electors.8 Full equality with men was delayed until 1928. A full
franchise, on the basis of equality, and respecting the principle of ‘one person,
one vote’, was finally achieved under the Representation of the People Act
1948.
The current franchise
The right to vote is defined in the Representation of the People Act 1983, as
amended. Prior to enactment of the Representation of the People Act 2000,
eligibility was based solely on residency in a constituency at a ‘qualifying
date’.9 The 2000 Act introduces greater flexibility, allowing registration once
resident in a constituency at any date. The Representation of the People Act
2000 extends the right to vote in both parliamentary elections and local
government elections by supplementing the residency requirement with
registration on the register of parliamentary electors for that constituency
(sections 1 and 2, substituting the same sections of the 1983 Act). In addition, a
person’s eligibility depends on citizenship,10 voting age (now 18 years and
over),11 and not being subject to any legal incapacity — including minors
(those under the age of 18), aliens, peers other than Irish peers, mental patients
who are compulsorily detained,12 convicted persons in detention13 and, for a
period of five years, anyone found guilty of election offences.14 Section 2 of
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8 In addition, the Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act 1918 provided that: ‘A
woman shall not be disqualified by sex or marriage from being elected to or sitting or
voting as a Member of the Commons House of Parliament.’
9 Representation of the People Act 1983, ss 1, 2.
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qualifying Commonwealth citizen, or a citizen of the Republic of Ireland. In relation to
local government elections, relevant citizens of the European Union are also eligible to
vote: Representation of the People Act 1984, ss 1, 2 and 4; as amended by the
Representation of the People Act 2000, ss 1, 2 and 4. 
11 Representation of the People Act 1983, s 1.
12 Ibid, s 7, as substituted by s 4 of the 2000 Act.
13 Ibid, s 3, as amended by the Representation of the People Act 1985, Sched 4.
14 Ibid, s 60.
The Electoral System
the 2000 Act inserts into section 3 of the 1983 Act provisions relating to the
disenfranchisement of offenders detained in mental hospitals.
Section 5 of the 1983 Act defined ‘residence’ for the purposes of inclusion
on the electoral register. Section 3 of the 2000 Act extends those requirements.
Section 6 of the 2000 Act15 extends eligibility to vote in parliamentary or local
elections, other than for those disenfranchised by virtue of mental incapacity
or detention pursuant to criminal conviction, to those who have no fixed
residence, through ‘declarations of local connection’. A declaration of local
connection must state the name of the declarant and either an address to
which election correspondence can be delivered, or that he or she is willing to
collect such correspondence periodically from the registration officer’s office.
The declaration must state the required address and also be dated, and, on the
date of declaration, the declarant must also be otherwise qualified to vote by
virtue of relevant citizenship and age. A declaration of local connection may
be cancelled at any time by the declarant. The declaration is of no effect unless
it is received by the relevant registration officer within the period of three
months beginning with the date of the declaration.16
Constituencies
The United Kingdom is divided for electoral purposes into 659 constituencies,
or voting areas. Each constituency is represented in parliament by just one
member, who has secured a majority of votes in a general election or by-
election.17
The Boundary Commissions (now Committees)
The principle of ‘one man, one vote, one value’ is given formal recognition in
the rules regulating the work of the Boundary Commissions18 contained in
the Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986,19 which consolidates the House of
Commons (Redistribution of Seats) Acts 1949–79. Equality is not, however, as
will be seen below, the sole, or even dominant, criterion. By way of
comparison, in the United States of America, the principle was judicially
considered by the Supreme Court in Baker v Carr, in 1962. In that case, the
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provides that persons with service qualifications may only be registered in pursuance of
a service declaration, even where they would otherwise be entitled to vote by virtue of
residence in the United Kingdom, shall cease to have effect. The Representation of the
People Act 2000, Sched 2 extends the parliamentary franchise in relation to overseas
voters, amending the Representation of the People Act 1985. On the right to vote and
the European Convention of Human Rights, see Matthews v United Kingdom (1999). 
17 An election in a single constituency, conducted as a result of the seat falling vacant
during the life of a parliament.
18 Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986, Sched 2.
19 As amended by the Boundary Commissions Act 1992.
principle was regarded as of such constitutional importance that the Supreme
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution – the ‘equal
protection’ clause – required that electoral districts had to have an
approximately equal number of electors to prevent over or under-
representation and inequality in voting power.
The rules regulating the work of the Commissions are contained in
Schedule 2 of the Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986, from which it can be
seen that the principle of ‘one man, one vote, one value’ is, under the United
Kingdom’s constitution, but one of several considerations. Schedule 2
provides, in part, that:
1 (i) The number of constituencies in Great Britain shall not be substantially
greater or less than 613;
(ii) the number of constituencies in Scotland shall not be less than 71;20
(iii) the number of constituencies in Wales shall not be less than 35;
(iv) the number of constituencies in Northern Ireland shall not be greater
than 18 or less than 16 ...
2 Every constituency shall return a single member.
... 
4 So far as is practicable, having regard to rules 1–3: 
(a) in England and Wales, 
(i) no county or part of a county shall be included in a constituency
which includes the whole or part of any other county or the whole
or part of a London borough;
(ii) no London borough or any part of a London borough shall be
included in a constituency which includes the whole or part of any
other London borough.
5 The electorate of any constituency shall be as near the electoral quota as is
practicable having regard to rules 1–4; and a Boundary Commission may
depart from the strict application of rule 4 if it appears to them that a
departure is desirable to avoid an excessive disparity between the
electorate of any constituency and the electoral quota, or between the
electorate of any constituency and that of neighbouring constituencies in
the part of the United Kingdom with which they are concerned.
6 A Boundary Commission may depart from the strict application of rules 4
and 5 if special geographical considerations, including in particular the
size, shape and accessibility of a constituency, appear to them to render a
departure desirable.
The target figure for constituency electorates is based on the simple division of
the eligible voting population in the country divided by the number of
constituencies. The Commission aims to achieve a result which brings the
majority of constituencies within a narrow band of this target figure, bearing
in mind the other criteria contained within the rules.
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Legal challenges to Boundary Commission reports
The political difficulties – generally the loss of a number of ‘safe’ seats by one
party – which arise from boundary changes have given rise to challenges in
the courts. In R v Home Secretary ex parte McWhirter (1969), the Labour Party
feared the loss of up to ten constituencies as a result of the Commission’s
recommendations. The Home Secretary laid the report before parliament,
without the draft Orders in Council which were necessary to implement the
changes. The reason given for failure to produce the draft Orders was that it
made little sense to implement changes, given that local government
boundaries were under review at the time.
The Home Secretary introduced the House of Commons Redistribution of
Seats Bill, implementing some of the recommendations regarding large urban
areas, but not the remaining recommendations. The House of Lords
introduced amendments, which the Home Secretary rejected. The Home
Secretary then suggested compromise amendments, which the House of
Lords rejected. Subsequently, the Home Secretary introduced the draft Orders
in Council, leaving the Lords’ amendments intact, but inviting the House of
Commons to reject the Orders. The application for mandamus was
withdrawn. In 1970, however, the incoming Conservative government
reintroduced and passed the Orders.
In R v Boundary Commission for England ex parte Foot (1983), the Labour
Party, having been aggrieved by the Boundary Commission’s
recommendations, instituted legal proceedings. The Rt Hon Michael Foot MP
sought an order of prohibition and injunctions to restrain the Commission
from putting the recommendations to the Home Secretary, alleging that the
Commission had misinterpreted the rules.21 The court rejected the argument,
relying on the considerable discretion built into the rules by the Parliamentary
Constituencies Act. Sir John Donaldson MR, having referred to the
constitutional role of judicial review, and accepted that jurisdiction lay to
review the decision of the Boundary Commission stated that unless there was
sufficient evidence that:
... the commission is intent upon making recommendations which go beyond,
or differ from, what any reasonable body of men in their position could
properly make, exercising the best of their skill and judgment in the light of the
instructions given to them by Parliament ... the court’s duty to leave the
commission to get on with the process entrusted to them, that being their
business and not that of the courts.
On the relationship between the different rules within Schedule 2 of the Act,
the Master of the Rolls stated that:
... the guidelines designed to achieve the broad equality of electorates, which
are to be found in the opening limb of rule 5, have been deliberately expressed
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by the legislature in such a manner as to render them subordinate to the
guidelines given by rule 4, designed to prevent the crossing of boundaries and
not vice versa ... Even if a strict adherence to the principles of rule 4 will
produce what is a prima facie excessive disparity between the electorate of any
constituency and the electoral quota, the wording of the second limb of rule 5
implicitly makes it clear that the commission are to be left with a discretion not
to depart from the strict application of rule 4 if, in all the particular
circumstances of the case, they consider such departure undesirable ... From a
bare reference to the statistics in the present case, we see no reason to assume
that the commission did not, consciously and on sufficient grounds, conclude
that departure from the strict application of rule 4 was not desirable in any of
the particular cases where ‘excessive disparity’ is alleged.
Secondly, and quite apart from this first reason, rule 6 expressly confers on the
commission a discretion to depart from the strict application of either rule 4 or
rule 5 itself, if special geographical considerations, including in particular the
size, shape and accessibility of a constituency, appear to them to render a
departure desirable. 
The reluctant attitude of the courts towards controlling the Boundary
Commissions’ exercise of power is understandable, given the politically
charged nature of the subject matter. Judicial inquiry in this matter comes
very close to questioning a matter which is more appropriately dealt with in
parliament, and to thereby infringing the privileges of parliament.22
Nevertheless, such an attitude is thrown into sharp relief when compared
with the position in the United States of America, where the constitutional
guarantee of ‘the equal protection of the law’23 has been utilised to ensure real
equality in voting power. As noted above, in Baker v Carr (1962), the Supreme
Court held that such inequality (as is permitted under United Kingdom law)
was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees the equal
protection of the law. 
In Australia, a system of determining boundary sizes exists for each of the
state parliaments and for the Commonwealth Parliament. Under the
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth), the Electoral Commission is under a
duty to undertake a reassessment of the allocation of seats between the states
between 11 and 12 months after the opening of the House of Representatives
following a general election, in order that the review may be completed and
recommendations implemented and ‘available for use at the next election’. In
relation to the House of Representatives, section 24 of the Commonwealth
Constitution states: 
... that the number of members chosen in the several states shall be in
proportion to the respective numbers of their people. It has been held that this
question of proportionality is to exist on each occasion when the members are
chosen, that is, at each time an election is held.24
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Any legislation which impedes the review or implementation of its
recommendations is invalid.25 Despite these requirements, it has been held
that total equality was not the objective. Rather, equality was to be measured
on a scale of deviation from absolute equality: a ten per cent variance would
not contravene the requirements of section 24, whereas one of over 100 per
cent clearly would.26 The Constitutional Commission reviewing electoral law
in 1988, while acknowledging the fundamental importance of ‘one vote, one
value’, nevertheless conceded that such variation was acceptable.27
Reform of the Boundary Commissions
A number of criticisms were levelled at the arrangements concerning the
number and size of constituencies. The first related to the inherent conflict in
principles enshrined in the legislation. The principle of equality in
constituency size and hence voting power is too often sacrificed to the
requirement to respect local government boundaries and to have regard to
special geographical considerations. The second criticism related to the time-
lag between the enumeration date for the Commissions’ reviews and the
ultimate report and recommendations. Were the Commissions required to
complete their reviews on a fixed date and within a prescribed period from
that date this problem could be alleviated. Professor Robert Blackburn
addressed this issue in The Electoral System in Britain (1995), calling for reforms
which would require the Commissions to complete their work within a two
year period from the fixed date of report. Not only would this reform
diminish the problem of population changes within the time taken to
complete the review, but the fixed term for submission of the report would
also avoid much of the uncertainty which surrounds the implementation of
boundary changes, and encourages party political controversy. 
The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000
The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 establishes an
Electoral Commission, comprising not less than five but not more than nine
Electoral Commissioners, appointed by Her Majesty. The Commission is not
to be regarded as the servant or agent of the Crown, or as enjoying any status,
immunity or privilege of the Crown. Schedule 1 makes detailed provision for
the terms of office. The Commission regulates its own procedure, and may
appoint a chief executive and such other staff as the Commission considers
necessary.
The Commission’s functions are set out in the 2000 Act. They include
preparing and publishing reports relating to parliamentary general elections
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and elections to the European Parliament, Scottish Parliament, National
Assembly for Wales and Northern Ireland Assembly.28 The Commission must
keep under review such matters relating to elections and referendums as the
Commission determines, the redistribution of seats at parliamentary elections,
the registration of political parties and the regulation of their income and
expenditure and political advertising.29 The Commission assumes
responsibility for the registration of political parties.30 No nomination may be
made in relation to an election in the name of a party unless that party is
registered, or the candidate is a person who does not propose to represent any
party.31
The Commission may provide advice and assistance in relation to
elections.32 The Commission is also to be under a duty to promote public
awareness about electoral and democratic systems, including the institutions
of the European Union.33 The Act also provides that the functions of the
Boundary Committees, as they are labelled in the Act, are transferred to the
Electoral Commission.34 Under Part II of the Act, the registration of political
parties falls under the Commission’s terms of reference, and Part III provides
for accounting requirements for registered parties, and provides for annual
audits for parties whose gross income or total expenditure exceeds £250,000 in
any financial year, and in relation to those with less income or total
expenditure, where the Commission requires an audit to be carried out.
Failure to submit a proper statement of accounts incurs criminal liability.
There is established a Speaker’s Committee, consisting of the Speaker and
the Chairman of the Home Affairs Select Committee of the House of
Commons, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether or not a
Member of the Commons, a member of the Commons who is the minister
with responsibilities in relation to local government and five Members of the
Commons who are not ministers.35 The Speaker’s Committee scrutinises the
annual estimates of the Commission, and decides whether the estimated level
of income and expenditure is consistent with the economical, efficient and
effective discharge by the Commission of their functions. If the Committee is
not satisfied, it may modify the estimates. Having concluded examination of
the estimate, the estimate is laid before the House of Commons. The
Commission is also to submit to the Speaker’s Committee a five year plan,
setting out the aims and objectives for the period and estimated requirements
for resources during that five year period. The Speaker’s Committee examines
the plan, and may make modifications. The Speaker’s Committee is assisted
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by the Comptroller and Auditor General, who under Schedule I, each year, is
to carry out an examination into the economy, efficiency and effectiveness
with which the Commission has used its resources in discharging its
functions, and report to the Speaker’s Committee, including such
recommendations as he considers appropriate.
INITIATING THE ELECTION PROCESS
General elections
General elections must be held every five years, the maximum life of any
parliament.36 Section 7 of the Septennial Act 1715, as amended by the
Parliament Act 1911, provides that a parliament shall ‘have continuance for
five years, and no longer ...’. A royal proclamation dissolves parliament and
orders the issue of writs for the election of a new parliament. 
The Prime Minister controls the timing of general elections although, in
theory, the dissolution of parliament lies within the prerogative of the Crown.
For detailed discussion of the dissolution of parliament, see Chapter 6. The
Crown’s powers in relation to the dissolution of parliament are discussed in
Chapter 6. Within the context of electoral law, what is of significance is the
inexactitude relating to the actual date of a general election, and the extent to
which Prime Ministers control the timing of elections. While a parliament may
run for a full five year term, there are often political reasons against this,
which result in Prime Ministers choosing a politically convenient date for his
or her own party. While there is a maximum time limit on the life of a
parliament, there is no minimum period which a government must serve
before calling an election.37 In 1974, for example, the parliament lasted less
than one year, whereas parliament’s life extended to four years and nine
months between 1987 and 1992. In the absence of firm rules, Prime Ministers
also have latitude over the amount of notice which is given before the election
is held. 
By-elections
By-elections take place following the death or retirement of a Member of
Parliament. Any Member of Parliament may put down a motion to the House,
which if successful, orders the Speaker to make a warrant for the issue of a
writ commencing the election procedure. In practice, the Chief Whip of the
party which held the seat of the Member moves the motion for a writ. There is
a limit laid down by law as to the time period in which a by-election must be
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held. In 1973, a Speaker’s Conference recommended that the motion initiating
the by-election process should be moved within three months of the vacancy
arising.
Eligibility of candidates
There is no statutory or other authority defining the qualifications for
membership of the House of Commons. In order to promote a greater gender
balance in parliament, the Sex Discrimination (Election Candidates) Act 2002
provides that the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and Sex Discrimination
(Northern Ireland) Order 1976 do not apply to the selection of candidates by
political parties. Under the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975,
certain categories of persons are eligible for election and others are
disqualified under the Act. 
Under section 1 of the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975, the
following classes of persons are disqualified from membership of the
Commons:
(a) holders of judicial office;38
(b) civil servants;
(c) members of the armed forces;
(d) members of the police;
(e) members of non-Commonwealth legislatures;
(f) members of Boards of Nationalised Industries, Commissions, Tribunals
and other bodies whose members are appointed by the Crown.39
In addition, a number of general restrictions on eligibility apply. 
Persons under the age of 21
While the age of majority was reduced in 1969 by the Family Law Reform Act,
eligibility for election to parliament does not arise until the age of 21.40
Persons suffering from mental illness
Mental illness is a common law disqualification. If an already elected Member
of Parliament is authorised to be detained on grounds of mental illness, the
Speaker of the House is notified and, following confirmation of the illness, the
Member’s seat is declared vacant.41
Peers
Members of the House of Lords, or persons succeeding to a peerage, are not
eligible for office. Under the Peerage Act 1963, a person succeeding to a
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peerage has a limited right to disclaim his peerage. If a member of the House
of Commons succeeds to a peerage, he has one month in which to disclaim his
peerage or resign from the House of Commons. 
Members of the clergy
Formerly, no person who had been ordained ‘to the office of priest or deacon’
or who is a Minister of the Church of Scotland could stand for election,42
although a clergyman could relinquish his office and thereby become eligible
to stand for election.43 The House of Commons (Removal of Clergy
Disqualification) Act 2001 removes the disqualification, other than for those
who hold office as Lords Spiritual in the House of Lords.
Bankrupts
Persons declared bankrupt are ineligible for election to the House of
Commons and, if already a Member, may not either sit or vote in parliament
until the bankruptcy is discharged by a court or the adjudication annulled.44
Treason
Persons convicted of treason are disqualified for election to the House and, if
already a Member of the House, may not sit or vote until a pardon has been
received or the sentence of the court has expired.45
Corrupt practices at elections
Any person found guilty of corrupt practices in the course of an election may
be disqualified from membership of the House of Commons. If the corrupt
practices come to light only after the election, the Member may be disqualified
from sitting in parliament.46 The disqualification commences from the date of
the report of the Election Court on the practices and will last, in relation to any
constituency, for a period of five years and, in relation to the constituency in
which the practices occurred, for a ten year period. 
The conduct of election campaigns
The Representation of the People Act 1983 governs the law relating to election
campaigns, controlling both the amounts of expenditure and the manner in
which it can lawfully be spent, proscribing certain unlawful practices and
providing for challenges to the legality of a campaign. Corrupt practices
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include exceeding the lawful expenditure limits, bribery, treating, and undue
influence which includes making threats or attempts to intimidate electors.47
A bribe is defined as ‘any money, gift, loan or valuable consideration, office,
place or employment, in order to influence how an elector will cast his or her
vote’.48 ‘Treating’ occurs where a candidate offers or gives food, drink or
entertainment with a view to influencing how the elector will vote.49 A
corrupt practice may be committed by any person, not just the candidate or
his or her election agent. While minor infringement of the strict rules may be
excused by a court,50 a finding of corrupt practices may cause the election of
the candidate to be invalidated.51
It may be noted that, before the Political Parties, Elections and
Referendums Act 2000, while the law closely regulated the conduct of
constituency campaigns, it virtually ignored regulation of the national
political party campaigns. In an age of mass communication, and ever
increasing personality politics in terms of political party leaders, the absence
of regulation at national level – other than via broadcasting controls – was a
matter for concern. On the 2000 Act, see below.
The 2000 Act makes special provision for assistance with voting for
persons with disabilities, whether by virtue of partial sight, blindness or other
physical incapacity or inability to read.52
Expenditure
Section 75 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 provides that no
expenditure shall be made other than by the candidate or through his or her
election agent. Each candidate is obliged to appoint an election agent.53 The
rationale for this rule lies in establishing and maintaining fairness between
candidates and providing a mechanism for accountability as to election
expenses. All accounts relating to election expenses must be reported, within
21 days of the election result, to the Returning Officer. Section 76 of the Act54
permits the Secretary of State to set and raise the permitted amounts of
expenditure, in line with inflation, by way of statutory instrument. The
allowable amounts are £5,483 per candidate per borough (urban)
constituency, plus 4.6 pence for each voter in the constituency and £5,483 plus
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6.2 pence for each voter in a county (country) constituency. Any expenditure
exceeding the prescribed limits amounts to a corrupt practice under section
75(1). Expenditure on national party election broadcasts is met by central
party funds. Broadcasting is controlled by sections 92 and 93 of the Act, and is
confined to broadcasts made by the British Broadcasting Corporation and
Independent Broadcasting Authority. No broadcast may be made without the
consent of the participating candidate.55
Several challenges to expenditure have been presented to the courts. In R v
Tronoh Mines Ltd (1952), Tronoh Mines placed an advertisement in The Times
newspaper urging voters not to vote socialist. The company and The Times
were charged under the Act. The court held that the expenditure had been
incurred with a view to promoting the interests of a Party generally, rather
than an individual candidate; that any advantage incurred was incidental and
not direct; and that accordingly the expenditure did not fall within section 75.
Conversely, in DPP v Luft (1977), an anti-fascist group had distributed
pamphlets in three constituencies urging voters not to vote for National Front
(extreme right wing) candidates. The group was prosecuted under section 75
of the 1983 Act for incurring expenditure with a view to promoting the
election of a candidate without the authority of an election agent. It was held
that an offence had been committed, even though the promoters were seeking
to prevent election of a candidate, rather than directly promote the election of
a preferred candidate. In Walker v Unison (1995), the court ruled that section
75(1) of the Representation of the People Act 1983 had not been breached.
During local elections in Scotland, Unison, a trade union, placed
advertisements in national newspapers and on billboards, urging voters not to
vote Conservative. The advertisements were placed without the authorisation
of an election agent. Two Conservative candidates argued that there had been
an illegal expenditure. The court ruled that the advertisements were a
generalised attack on a political party, and not a direct attack on the
candidates and, accordingly, the advertisements did not contravene the Act.56
In Grieve v Douglas-Home (1965), Alec Douglas-Home’s election was
alleged to be void on the basis that he had participated in a national Party
Political Broadcast on behalf of the Conservative Party and had not declared
the cost of this expenditure within his election expenses. The court held that
no offence had been committed either by the candidate, the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) or the Independent Broadcasting Authority
(IBA). The court accepted the contention that the intention behind the
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broadcast was not to promote the candidature of Douglas-Home in his own
constituency but to provide general information about the Party to the general
public.
Broadcasting and elections 
No broadcast may be made other than through the BBC or the ITC. The role of
these two organisations is unregulated by statute. There exists a non-statutory
body, the Committee on Party Political Broadcasts, which comprises
representatives from the broadcasting authorities and from the main political
parties. Broadcasting time is allocated on the basis of the number of votes cast
for each party at the last general election, and at by-elections between general
elections. This arrangement disadvantages the Liberal Democrats, who have
wide popular support throughout the country, and other smaller parties, such
as the Scottish National Party and the Green Party, which enjoy much popular
support nationwide which rarely – because of the voting system employed –
translates into electoral success.
The ITC is under a statutory duty57 to ensure that news is accurate and
impartial, and that political parties are given a fair allocation of time for party
political broadcasts and news coverage of their campaigns. The BBC is not
controlled by statute, but by Charter, and is under a duty to preserve
impartiality. Judicial review will lie if either body infringes the rules. This
general duty of fairness was raised by the Rt Hon David Owen MP (now Lord
Owen), in R v Broadcasting Complaints Commission ex parte Owen (1985). David
Owen had complained to the Commission that the allocation of time to
various parties, principally the Social Democratic Party, was unjust or unfair
under section 54 of the Broadcasting Act 1981. On an appeal to the court, it
was held that the Commission had jurisdiction to consider complaints about
general fairness, rather than just the unfairness, or otherwise, of particular
programmes, but that the Commission had acted lawfully in allocating time
on the basis of the number of seats won rather than votes cast. A further
challenge to the allocation of broadcasting time came in R v British
Broadcasting Corporation ex parte Referendum Party (1997). The Referendum
Party was founded in 1994 and contested 547 seats at the general election. The
broadcasting authorities allocated the party one five minute broadcast on each
network. The Conservative and Labour Parties each were allocated four
broadcasts. The Referendum Party sought judicial review, claiming that it had
three per cent support in public opinion polls and that, given that it was a new
party, the broadcasting authorities should not have relied on past electoral
support. The Divisional Court held that former electoral support must not be
determinative, but that the authorities were allowed to include it as a criterion.
The decision was not irrational.
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In R (Pearson and Another) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and
Others; Hirst v Attorney General (2001), the Queen’s Bench Divisional Court
ruled that domestic law disqualifying prisoners from voting at a
parliamentary or local government election was not incompatible with the
right to vote under the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 3 of
the first Protocol to the Convention provides for the holding of free elections
under conditions ensuring ‘the free expression of the opinion of the people in
the choice of the legislature’. Registration officers had refused to enter the
applicants’ names on the electoral register in light of their imprisonment. The
applicants sought judicial review of that decision. A further application was
made (by Mr Hirst) for a declaration under section 4(2) of the Human Rights
Act 1998 that section 3(1) of the Representation Act 1983 (which provides that
a convicted person detained in a penal institution is legally incapable of
voting) was incompatible with the Convention. The right to vote was not
absolute, and states had a margin of appreciation as to restrictions. 
The impact on Convention rights was also seen in R (Quintavalle) v British
Broadcasting Corporation (2002), in which the Court of Appeal elevated itself to
the status of ‘the constitutional guardian of the freedom of political debate’
and ‘the trustees of democracy’s framework’.58 At issue was the right of a
registered political party, the ProLife Alliance, to insist that the BBC and other
terrestrial broadcasters transmit its party election broadcast which
contravened, in the BBC’s opinion, the obligation to ensure that nothing in its
programmes, inter alia, offended against good taste or decency.59 Laws LJ
asserted that the court’s constitutional responsibility to protect political speech
was overarching. The ProLife film was ‘graphic and disturbing’. Nevertheless,
those characteristics could not justify any restriction on freedom of political
speech. 
It has been noted above that the law60 requires the consent of participants
in broadcasts. In addition to that requirement, if a candidate participates in a
broadcast with a view to promoting his own election, every other candidate in
the constituency must consent to the broadcast. This rule was tested in
Marshall v BBC (1979). The candidate, having refused to participate in a
debate, was filmed while canvassing in the streets. On a challenge to the
legality of the broadcast, it was held that no offence had been committed. To
‘take part’ in a constituency item, means to take active part in.
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Disputed elections
Any challenge to an election campaign must be made within three weeks of
the result being declared. The complaint may be made by a registered elector,
by unsuccessful candidates or by their nominees. Since 1868, such challenges
go to the Election Court, a Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division of
the High Court. The court has the power to order a recount; declare corrupt or
illegal practices; disqualify a candidate from membership of the House of
Commons and declare the runner-up duly elected; or to order a fresh election.
Two cases illustrate this aspect of the law. In Re Parliamentary Election for
Bristol South East (1964), Tony Benn MP, who had recently succeeded to a
peerage as Viscount Stansgate, stood for re-election. The election was declared
void and awarded to the runner-up. In Ruffle v Rogers (1982), the election
papers were incorrectly counted and affected the outcome of the election. The
election was declared void, but the court made clear that had the miscount not
affected the result, the election would have been upheld. A fresh election was
ordered in 1997, following allegations concerning the accuracy of the count of
the vote which returned a Member of Parliament with a majority of just two
votes.
The Registration of Political Parties Act 1998
The Act introduces for the first time a register of political parties. A political
party is entitled to be entered on the Register of Political Parties if that party
intends to have one or more candidates at parliamentary elections, elections to
the European Parliament, Scottish Parliament, National Assembly for Wales,
the Northern Ireland Assembly or local government elections. Registration is
intended to clarify the identity of bona fide political parties and thereby make
regulation more certain. Under section 14, no party political broadcast may be
made by broadcasters other than on behalf of a registered political party.
Political party funding61
In the United Kingdom, there is no provision for state aid for political parties
for the conduct of election campaigns. Political parties do, however, receive
public funds for their parliamentary work. Under the system, generally
known as ‘Short Money’,62 the money allocated is to be spent exclusively in
relation to the party’s parliamentary business, and not for election expenses.
The amounts allocated are indicated below. A similar scheme operates in the
House of Lords. Introduced in 1996 by the then Leader of the House of Lords,
Viscount Cranborne, ‘Cranborne Money’ is paid to the first two opposition
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parties. The Committee on Standards in Public Life has recommended that
both the Commons and the Lords consider considerable increases of the
amounts paid to opposition parties. In addition to financial support for
parliamentary business, candidates at parliamentary elections or elections to
the European Parliament are entitled to free postage for one election
communication to every elector within the constituency. Candidates are also
entitled to the free use of publicly funded premises for an election meeting.
Indirect state assistance is provided through political broadcasts during
election campaigns. 
For election purposes, parties are dependent upon the support of the
membership and, more importantly, from companies and trades unions.
Approximately 30 per cent of Conservative Party funds come from
companies, whereas almost 55 per cent of Labour Party funds have
traditionally come from trades union donations, although this pattern has
recently changed. In 1976, the Houghton Committee recommended that state
aid be given to parties in proportion to the success at the previous election. In
1982, the Commission recommended state funding equivalent to individual
contributions to local constituency parties. Neither proposal has been
adopted. Payments are, however, made to opposition parties in parliament on
the basis of a fixed sum for every seat won, plus an amount for every 100
votes cast, up to a fixed maximum for any one party.
State funding of political parties?63
Any limitation on the rights of parties to accept funds, disclosed or
undisclosed, increases the arguments in favour of state funding of political
parties. State funding in Europe is an accepted commonplace. Austria,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain all have
publicly funded political parties. This issue is, however, contentious in the
United Kingdom on a number of grounds. First, it is argued by the
Conservative Party that state funding potentially undermines the
cohesiveness of the party, and introduces the possibility of politically inspired
changes to the bases of funding. Moreover, it is argued that state funding
would encourage the formation and growth of extremist parties. Opposition is
also voiced on the constitutional basis that, to compel citizens to finance
political parties, through taxation, especially those with which they have no
sympathy, would cause dissent. Set against these objections, however, are the
benefits which would accrue from public funding. First, depending on the
method used to calculate entitlement, greater equality and fairness would be
achieved among the political parties. Secondly, party political finances would
become most clearly a matter of open public record. Thirdly, the elimination
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of contributions from individuals and organisations would eradicate the
public’s suspicions about the integrity of party political finance and thus
enhance confidence in the political process. Fourthly, the ability of parties to
conduct their official duties would be enhanced by improving the level of
contributions made. The Houghton Committee commented, in its 1976 report,
that, at a local level, party organisation was weak and ‘generally exists on a
pitifully inadequate scale of accommodation, equipment, trained staff and
resources’. Thus, improved funding would facilitate an enhanced level of
efficiency at the grass roots level of democracy. 
In November 1997, the Labour Government extended the terms of
reference of the Committee on Standards in Public Life to include political
party funding. Recognising that ‘political parties are essential to democracy’,
the Committee identified three of the seven ‘principles of public life’, namely,
integrity, accountability and openness, as particularly relevant to the funding
of political parties. Increasing election spending by the two main parties, who
between them spent some £54 million on the 1997 general election, and the
issue of large donations to political parties by persons known or unknown,
gave rise to the public perception that election results can be affected by
spending and that wealthy organisations or individuals could effectively
influence public policy. Undisclosed foreign donations to the Conservative
Party also caused concern. Whereas the Conservative Party accepted 47
overseas donations worth a total of £16.2 million between 1992 and 1997, the
Labour Party received none. In the same period, the Conservative Party
received over 1,300 donations of over £5,000 while the Labour Party received
almost 300.
In the Committee’s view, it was ‘undesirable that a political party should
be dependent for its financial survival on funds provided by a few well
endowed individuals, corporations or organisations’, irrespective of ‘whether
or not the suspicion [that he who pays the piper calls the tune] is justified’.
The problem of public confidence in the political system was compounded
when such donations came from undisclosed sources. 
On the issue of state funding for political parties, the Committee
considered the arguments for and against increasing aid. The principal
argument in favour was that public funding would ‘purify’ the political
process by eliminating the need for parties to be reliant on donations. State aid
would also enable the parties to fulfil their functions more effectively, both
ensuring that sufficient funds were available to cover costs and that parties
were not reliant on individuals or organisations for finance. On the other
hand, it was argued, inter alia, that individual taxpayers should not be obliged
to contribute to financing political parties with whose views they disagreed.
There was also the problem of the criteria for state aid, which, if dependent
upon success at elections, could deter new parties from access to funding. The
Committee found the arguments for and against state funding ‘finely
balanced’, but the arguments in favour were not conclusive. The Committee
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considered that its proposals for limits on campaign expenditure coupled with
the requirements of disclosure and registration would meet the concerns
expressed about the current system of party funding.
DONATIONS TO POLITICAL PARTIES: THE 2000 ACT
Part IV of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 provides
for the control of donations to registered parties and their members, defining
permissible donors and providing rules regulating the acceptance or return of
donations, and providing for forfeiture of donations by impermissible or
unidentifiable donors, under a court order, on an application of the
Commission. A person commits an offence if he or she knowingly enters into,
or does any act in furtherance of, any arrangement which facilitates or is likely
to facilitate the making of donations by any person or donor other than a
permissible donor. The Act provides for quarterly donation reports to be
made, and, in the period of general elections, for weekly reports.64 Under
section 69, the Commission is to maintain a register of donations.
Part V of the Act relates to campaign expenditure. No expenditure may be
incurred by or on behalf of the registered party unless it is incurred with the
authority of the treasurer or deputy treasurer of the party, or a person
authorised by the treasurer or deputy treasurer. No campaign expenditure
may be incurred unless it is made by the above.65 Section 74 and Schedule 8
impose limits on campaign expenditure in relation to parliamentary general
elections and general elections to the European Parliament, Scottish
Parliament, National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Assembly.
In relation to a parliamentary general elections, the limit applying to
campaign expenditure in England, Scotland and Wales is £30,000 multiplied
by the number of constituencies contested by the party in that part of the
United Kingdom, of, if greater, in relation to England, £810,000, Scotland,
£120,000 and Wales, £60,000. In relation to Northern Ireland, the limit is
£30,000 multiplied by the number of constituencies contested by the party
there. In relation to general elections to the European Parliament, the limit is
£45,000 multiplied by the number of MEPs to be returned for that part of the
United Kingdom at the election. In relation to general elections to the Scottish
Parliament, the limits on campaign expenditure incurred by or on behalf of a
registered party in the relevant period are £12,000 for each constituency
contested by the party, plus £80,000 for each region contested by the party. In
relation to elections to the Welsh Assembly, the limits are £10,000 for each
constituency and £40,000 for each region contested by the party. In relation to
Northern Ireland, the limit is £17,000 for each constituency. Special provision
is made where there is a combination of elections to the European Parliament
and a devolved legislature.
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Part VII and Schedule 13 regulate expenditure at referendums. The
amount persons or bodies designated by the Commission under section 103
and registered parties within section 100(1)(a) but not designated under
section 103 may expend is related to the percentage of votes cast for a party’s
candidates at the last parliamentary general election, and ranges between
£500,000 and £5 million.
Schedule 18 of the Act makes new provision for the control of political
donations by companies and amends the Companies Act 1985, inserting a
new Part XA. Inter alia, a company is prohibited from making any donation to
any registered party to any other EU political organisation, or incurring any
EU political expenditure unless the donation or expenditure is authorised by
virtue of an approval resolution passed by the company in general meeting
before the relevant time. An approval resolution is a resolution passed by
special resolution procedure or a resolution passed by any percentage of the
members greater than that required for an ordinary resolution.
The Act provides for 69 offences, with liability ranging from a fine at level
5 or six months’ imprisonment on summary conviction to a fine or one year’s
imprisonment on conviction on indictment.66
VOTING SYSTEMS67
The first and foremost object of reforming zeal ought, in my opinion, to be the
system of parliamentary representation, or rather misrepresentation.68
The Labour Government came to power in 1997 committed to major electoral
reform, and to holding a referendum to ascertain the people’s view.
Substantial reform has taken place. The 1999 elections to the new Scottish
Parliament employed the additional member system, as did election to the
new National Assembly for Wales. The 1999 elections to the new Northern
Ireland Assembly employed the single transferable vote system, one already
utilised for elections in Northern Ireland to the European Parliament and for
local elections. The 1999 elections for the European Parliament in the rest of
the United Kingdom saw the introduction of a new system of proportional
representation based on party lists. Despite these reforms, no move has yet
been made to reform the simple majority system employed for elections to the
United Kingdom Parliament. In this section, the merits and demerits of
differing systems are considered.
Chapter 13: Constitutional and Administrative Law
444
66 The chairman of the new Electoral Commission is Sam Younger: the Commission
started work on 19 January 2001. The rules relating to disclosure of large donations
came into force in February 2001 and will be kept under review by the Commission.
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67 See Finer, 1975; Bogdanor, 1981 and 1983; Bogdanor and Butler, 1983; Chandler, 1982;
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Vernon Bogdanor categorises voting systems under three heads: plurality
systems; majority systems; and proportional systems. Under the heading of
proportional systems, there exists a range of differing systems: 
Proportional representation’ is in fact a generic term denoting a number of
different systems sharing only the common aim of proportionality between
seats and votes. This common aim, however, does not prevent the various
proportional systems diverging considerably, one from another; and their
political consequences, therefore, can be quite different. [Bogdanor and Butler,
1983, p 2]
Despite recent reforms, the United Kingdom is out of step with much of the
rest of the world in terms of systems employed for electing its national
parliament. As a generalisation, it can be said that those countries influenced
by English common law are the countries which retain the majority system of
voting. The majority of states on the continent of Europe employ a list system;
France by contrast employs a system which involves two ballots. In France,
when no candidate wins an absolute majority of the vote in the first ballot, a
second ballot is held to determine which of those candidates who have gained
12.5 per cent of the registered electorate in the first ballot are to be elected. In
Australia, two electoral systems are employed. For election to the House of
Representatives, a system of compulsory preferential voting is used. For
election to the Senate, a proportional representation system is employed. 
The simple majority system
If it is accepted that a democratic Parliament ought to represent so far as
possible the preferences of the voters, this system is probably the worst that
could be devised.69
For elections to the United Kingdom Parliament, the system of election
remains the simple majority (colloquially, ‘first past the post’) system. The
origins of the voting system lie in tradition, and it should be noted that the
voting system is not a matter of law, but of past political practice. One
principal merit of the system lies in its simplicity. The candidate who gains the
largest number of votes in the election wins the seat – irrespective of the
proportion of votes cast for himself or his opponents. Thus, to illustrate, if the
votes cast for individual candidates at an election are: 
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CANDIDATE NUMBER OF VOTES
Smith 3,200
Jones 2,700
Brown 2,500
TOTAL 7,400
Smith wins the election, even though 5,200, or 70 per cent, voters have voted
for the other candidates. This lack of representativeness – when viewed from
the perspective of proportionality of votes cast to seats won – is reflected in
the results nationwide.
The 1997 and 2001 general elections
The general election of 1 May 1997 resulted in a landslide victory for the
Labour Party.70 Tony Blair MP became the youngest Prime Minister, at the
age of 43, since 1812, and only the fifth Labour Prime Minister in this
century.71 The electoral turnout was 71.3 per cent in 1997, but only 59 per cent
in 2001. The 2001 election results were as follows:
Party Number of seats Percentage of vote Percentage of seats
Labour 413 42.0% 62.7%
Conservative 166 32.7% 25.2%
Liberal Democrat 52 18.8% 7.9%
Other 28 6.5% 4.2%
TOTAL 659 100.0% 100.0%
The Electoral Reform Society calculated that had there been a system of
proportional representation in place for the 1997 election, the results would
have been much different, namely:
Party Number of seats Percentage of vote Percentage of seats
Labour 286 44.4% 43.4%
Conservative 199 31.4% 30.2%
Liberal Democrat 109 17.2% 16.5%
Other 65 7.0% 9.9% 
TOTAL 659 100.0% 100.0%
Far from having a commanding majority in the House of Commons, the
Labour government would have had 286 seats, the opposition parties 308.
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It is figures such as these which explain the demands for reform of the
electoral system. Several alternatives present themselves, some of which offer
proportional representation, others of which do not, but do represent an
improvement of the representativeness of parliament when compared with
the simple majority system. The alternative vote, the supplementary vote, the
additional member system and the single transferable vote are all alternative
systems. The alternative vote and supplementary vote are both majoritarian
systems. The latter two – the additional member system and the single
transferable vote, along with the party list system – are proportional
representation systems. Simply stated, proportional representation means that
Members should be elected to parliament on a party basis which reflects the
proportion of votes cast for a party in the election: thus, if 40 per cent of the
population vote Liberal Democrat, then 40 per cent of the parliamentary seats
should be held by that party; not as under the present system, where the 1987
election revealed that 15 per cent of the population voted Liberal Democrat
but, in terms of seats in parliament, the party only won three per cent of seats. 
Alternative voting systems
The alternative vote
This system retains individual constituencies, but introduces the notion of
multiple votes in order of preference. As noted above, it is a majoritarian
system, not a proportional representation system. The voter marks his ballot
paper with preferences expressed in numerical order. The candidate who
wins 50 per cent of the first preference vote is declared elected. Should no
candidate achieve 50 per cent, the votes of the candidate who achieves the
lowest number of first preference votes are redistributed in accordance with
that candidate’s supporters’ second preferences. The process is continued
until one candidate achieves an overall majority of votes compared with all
other candidates. Where the system fails is from the point of view of
proportional representation, since the overall result will bear little or no
resemblance to proportionality. It would also potentially have the effect of
returning to parliament candidates who have achieved no clear support (or
mandate) from the people. The system does, however, ensure that, within
each constituency, the candidate with most support overall is returned to
parliament.
The advantages of the alternative vote are, first, that the traditional one
member, one constituency principle is retained and, secondly, that the elected
candidate has a majority of votes, as compared with other candidates.
The supplementary vote
This system is very similar to the alternative vote system, and is the system
recommended by the working party on electoral systems set up by the Labour
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Party, under the chairmanship of Lord Plant, which reported in 1993.72 The
system allows voters to express a preference through voting for two
candidates. If no candidate secures 50 per cent of the vote, the second
preferences cast for all candidates other than the top two are redistributed
between the two leading candidates until a clear winner emerges. Where there
are only three candidates, this system would work smoothly. However, the
system becomes more complex in constituencies where a greater number of
candidates is standing for election, for the electorate would not be clear as to
who the leading two candidates will be, and may therefore vote tactically in
order to ensure, as far as possible, that a candidate who they did not want
elected, would not be in either of the two top positions. 
The additional member system (AMS)73
This is the system adopted for the 1999 elections to the Scottish Parliament
and Welsh Assembly. The additional member system seeks to combine the
advantages of the single member constituency, with overall proportionality
between votes and seats. The system has been used in West Germany since
1945. Under AMS, three quarters of the United Kingdom’s Members of
Parliament (487 seats) would be elected in single member constituencies,
using the first past the post system. The remaining one quarter (163 seats)
would be ‘additional members’, elected from party lists on a regional party
basis, employing a formula based on the largest average of votes cast between
the parties. The additional Members thus top up the total for each party in
order to give overall proportionality. 
Under AMS, each voter would thus have two votes: one for the candidate
of his choice in the constituency, one for the party of his choice on a regional
basis. The additional member system has the advantage of remaining close to
the system which is currently in place, while departing from it sufficiently to
ensure proportionality. The system would necessitate a reduction of the
number of constituency Members of Parliament in order to accommodate the
regionally elected Members. If the division between constituency and regional
Members is to be equal, this would necessitate doubling the size of current
constituencies. However, the additional member system also confers wide
powers on political parties who would control who is to be included on the
regional list, and in what order of priority. For this reason, the Hansard
Society Commission on Electoral Reform, chaired by Lord Blake, concluded
that the German model of AMS was not suitable for Britain.74
There is a variant of this system which is employed in local elections in
Germany which avoids the problem of party control. Under this variant of
AMS, all candidates stand directly as constituency candidates, but only three
quarters, or some other percentage, are elected in single member
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constituencies. The remaining one quarter of seats would be allocated to those
who had been runners up in the election contest, who would sit as additional
members.
Single transferable vote (STV)75
Employed in Northern Ireland for the European Parliament elections and
elections to the new Northern Ireland Assembly, the single transferable vote
offers both proportionality between votes and seats and a constituency based,
but multi-member, system of election. The STV was recommended for
introduction in urban constituencies as long ago as 1917. The STV would
involve a rearrangement of the current single member constituencies into far
larger regional units, each returning several Members of Parliament. The
method of calculation varies, but is based on a quota of the votes cast that is
achieved either by first preference voting producing the required quota or the
redistribution of votes cast for losing candidates. The STV offers both
proportionality and the greatest range of choice to electors. The system used
for local elections and elections to the European Parliament in Northern
Ireland76 requires that the total number of votes be divided by one more than
the number of vacant seats, plus one. The current constituencies would
require alteration in order to increase their size to accommodate three
Members (or four or five, as favoured by the Liberal Democrats),77 which
would require a fresh look at the criteria for constituency boundaries. The
current requirement to respect local authority boundaries is the most obvious
criteria which would be compromised if such a system were to be adopted.
This is the most complex of alternative systems and, for that reason alone,
is not favoured by many, although, despite the complexity, the system works
well in Northern Ireland. The voter expresses his or her preferences for
candidates in numerical order. A quota is predetermined. Thus, in a five
member constituency, the quota would be approximate to one sixth of the
votes cast. Successful candidates are those reaching the quota, and those who
on a redistribution of second, third and more remote preferences reach the
quota. If less than the required number of candidates reach the quota figure,
then redistribution of second preferences will take place until the required
number of elected Members is reached. If, on the other hand, the required
number of elected Members is not achieved by the redistribution of second
preferences, then a third stage comes into play. The candidate who polled the
lowest number of votes is then eliminated, and the votes for that candidate
distributed among the other remaining candidates in order of preferences
expressed. This process of elimination continues until the quota is reached for
all five required elected Members. 
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The party list system78
This system requires that a list of candidates be nominated by each political
party. The votes for each party’s list are calculated on a nationwide basis –
rather than a constituency basis – and the parties obtain the number of seats in
the legislature in direct proportion to the votes in the country. The party list
system is not a serious contender for adoption in the United Kingdom. Two
principal defects are perceived with the system: first, that it destroys election
on the basis of constituencies, and secondly, that too much patronage is placed
in the hands of party leaders. Within the two principal political parties in the
United Kingdom – Conservative and Labour – there exists a broad spectrum
of political opinion: from the political left to the political right in each party.
To leave the power of nomination, and the positioning of candidates on the
‘list’, to political leaders would potentially exclude some of the best candidates
– most likely, those whose views are incompatible with, or troublesome to, the
leadership.
THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST 
REFORMING THE SIMPLE MAJORITY SYSTEM
Most of the arguments for reform of the electoral system centre on the alleged
defects of the present system. Reformers argue that the status quo results in a
government which does not represent the majority of the voters’ wishes. Since
the Second World War, no government has been elected with a majority of
votes overall. The Liberal Democrats have been arguing for reform for many
years, and they are not alone in this. Lord Hailsham, former Conservative
Lord Chancellor and Cabinet minister, and Angus Maude have both
questioned the democratic basis of the current system. Professor SE Finer,
Vernon Bogdanor and Professor HWR Wade79 have all questioned the status
quo. 
The case for reform therefore centres on the principle of democracy and
equality in voting power. For democracy to have real meaning, it is argued
that the government of the day, and the composition of the legislature as a
whole, must reflect the wishes of the electors. Under such a system, it can be
argued that the government would have enhanced authority to pursue its
electoral mandate. In answer to the charge that proportional representation
can result in weak government, reformers argue that less extreme, rather than
weak, government would be the result. Such an outcome would force a
‘rethink’ in radical politics, with governments being keenly aware that with a
slim majority in parliament, and possibly the balance of power being held by a
third party (both outcomes which are common to proportional representation
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systems), certain radical policies would have to be modified. Thus many of the
more politically contentious subjects, such as education and health, might be
largely removed from party political conflict: consensus would become the
only way in which to make legislative progress.
Reformers also point to the inequity of the distribution of the vote between
the parties under the current system. The simple majority system invariable
favours a two party system, and leaves little room for the adequate
representation of smaller parties. The Liberal Democrat Party regularly
achieves approximately 25 per cent of the popular vote at general elections
(and has a high success rate at by-elections), but that overall popularity does
not translate itself into a proportionally related number of parliamentary
seats. One explanation for this result is that votes for the Liberal Democrats
are spread fairly evenly over the United Kingdom, and not concentrated in
one geographic area (although the south west of England is becoming a
Liberal stronghold). It is otherwise with the Conservative and Labour Parties.
For the most part, the United Kingdom is subject to an electoral north-south
divide, with the Labour Party holding a majority of seats in the north, the
Conservatives dominating the southern seats (and being unrepresented in
Scotland). 
The case for the status quo is linked to the point made above. The simple
majority system generally, although not invariably, produces a government
with a strong parliamentary majority which is able to implement its electoral
programme without undue hindrance. This argument requires careful
evaluation. One of the often experienced effects of proportional representation
based systems is that governments are returned with either a very small
majority of seats or with a minority of seats overall in the legislature. One of
the most significant effects of this result is that minority parties with few seats
and relatively small electoral support may hold a disproportionate amount of
power, making governments dependent upon their wishes in order to
implement their legislative programme. As a result of such dependence,
governments are also subject to the risk of defeats on motions of no
confidence,80 thus producing general political insecurity and the potential for
frequent elections. 
A further, related effect is that a government may be required to
compromise substantially upon its electoral promises in order to govern.
Under the current system, it is generally the case that the elected government
– always depending upon its majority in parliament – is relatively free to
implement its electoral programme. In other words, the voter knows what he
is getting in terms of policies and proposals for legislation. Under
proportional representation, where less strong government is the frequent
result, voters can be far less certain either that the policies for which they are
voting will be implemented or of the policies which will be pursued after the
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election. In countries where politics are less polarised than has traditionally
been the case in the United Kingdom, this consequence may be of little
practical significance: in the United Kingdom, the political spectrum is still
sufficiently diverse and conflicting as to cause disquiet and to compromise
government.
There also exist doubts as to the effects of a reformed system on the
convention of collective ministerial responsibility; see Chapter 11. Under
current constitutional arrangements, the convention of collective
responsibility requires that the Cabinet ‘speaks with one voice’ in order to
maintain parliamentary, and electoral, confidence. The rule accordingly
requires that, where a decision has been made by the Cabinet, each member of
Cabinet and non-Cabinet ministers and all their Parliamentary Private
Secretaries, adhere to the decision and do not speak out against it. Such a
show of unity would prove difficult to sustain in governments which were
either coalition or minority governments. The sister doctrine of individual
ministerial responsibility might also prove more difficult to adhere to,
particularly where a minister felt unable to support and pursue a policy with
which he or she disagreed on political principle. One consequence, therefore,
which could flow from the introduction of some form of proportional
representation could be that governments become less cohesive and, as a
result, less commanding of the confidence of the people.
A further argument is put for the status quo: that of the close links
currently established between the constituency Member and his or her
electorate. Irrespective of the proportion of votes won in an election, the
Member of Parliament, once duly elected, and irrespective of political party,
represents each and every one of his or her constituents in parliament.
Constituencies are relatively small and Members of Parliament are accessible –
through surgeries and other contact – to the voters. A Member is thus able to
gain a detailed knowledge of his or her constituency, its geography, industry
and economy, environment and populace. With large constituencies, such a
detailed working knowledge of an area becomes more difficult, with the
attendant possibility that a Member is less effective in his representation of
that constituency in parliament.
As can be seen, the issue of electoral reform is by no means clear-cut, and
real potential constitutional problems could be encountered as a result of its
introduction. At the end of the day, the quest for an alternative system is
rooted in the paramountcy of the principle of real democracy and equality of
representation of the people in parliament. Against that ideal must be set the
constitutional implications of introducing reform.
As noted above, one of the manifesto pledges of the Labour Party before
the 1997 election was a review of the electoral system for the Westminster
Parliament and, once in office, the government appointed Liberal peer Lord
Jenkins to review the system. The Jenkins Commission reported in October
1998, and recommended a novel, if complex, solution. The Commission,
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wanting to retain single member constituencies but also inject a greater degree
of proportionality into the system, opted for a ‘mixed system’ made up of the
alternative vote and regional list systems. Constituency members would be
elected on the alternative vote system, and comprise 80–85 per cent of
members, with additional members, 15–20 per cent elected on the regional list
basis. Greater proportionality would be achieved, while the traditional strong
link between a member and his or her constituency would be retained. The
system would also, the Commission claimed, avoid coalition governments
and in its estimation would have produced a single party majority
government in three out of the four last general elections.81
The current position is that the United Kingdom now employs a number
of differing systems: a new system of proportional representation was used in
May 1999 for elections to the European Parliament, for elections to the Scottish
Parliament and National Assembly for Wales the additional member system
was used, and for elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly, the single
transferable vote system. The issue which remains unresolved is the voting
system for elections to the United Kingdom Parliament. The government had
promised to hold a referendum on that matter and as seen above, the Jenkins
Commission recommended a mixed system of voting. The government has
however deferred both issues. Despite the experimentation with reform, the
government appears unconvinced of wholesale reform of the system
employed for elections to the Westminster Parliament.
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CHAPTER 14
Parliament is composed of the Crown, the House of Lords and the House of
Commons. Its origins lie in the King’s Council – the assembly of advisers
summoned by the King – and the term ‘parliament’ can be traced to the
thirteenth century.1
In order to evaluate parliament, it is necessary to examine its composition
and procedure. The former task may be accomplished by looking at the actual
membership of parliament by party allegiance at a fixed point in time or by
looking at it in a more sociological manner in order to analyse the class and
educational background of Members and their employment status. The
undertaking is complicated by the bicameral nature of parliament and the fact
that the House of Commons is elected and the House of Lords unelected. The
importance of procedure, particularly in the House of Commons, cannot be
overemphasised. Only by acquiring an understanding of the procedural rules
can sense be made of the functions of parliament and its importance, or
otherwise, in the process of government. In the absence of a written
constitution which clearly defines and allocates powers and functions, the
manner in which the legislative proposals of government are examined, and
the administration of the state scrutinised, assumes central importance to the
notion of democratic control of the executive. The doctrine of
constitutionalism can only be effective if the procedures adopted by
parliament are effective in controlling the government. 
THE FUNCTIONS OF PARLIAMENT
In Representative Government (1861), John Stuart Mill wrote of parliament:
Instead of the function of governing, for which it is radically unfit, the proper
office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government; to
throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and
justification of all of them which anyone considers questionable; to censure
them if found condemnable; and if the men who compose the government
abuse their trust, or fulfil it in a manner which conflicts with the deliberate
sense of the nation, to expel them from office, and either expressly or virtually
appoint their successors.
The House of Commons is the sounding board of the nation – an arena in
which not only the general opinion of the nation, but that of every section of it
can produce itself in full light and challenge discussion. 
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1 The role of the sovereign is discussed in Chapter 6. The House of Lords is discussed in
Chapter 17.
Very little has changed. Parliament is not there to govern: that is for the
executive. Parliament exists to represent the views and opinions of the people
and to influence, constrain and demand justification for the actions of
government and to give them legitimacy.
Accordingly, the functions of parliament may be summarised as being:2
(a) to provide the personnel of government;
(b) to legitimise government actions; and
(c) to subject matters of public policy to scrutiny and influence.
As discussed in Chapters 7 and 12, the devolution of legislative power to the
Northern Ireland Assembly and Scottish Parliament and, to a lesser extent, the
Welsh Assembly affects the scope of the United Kingdom Parliament’s role
and functions. In terms of debating and scrutinising government policy and
administration and the passage of legislation, while the United Kingdom
Parliament (Westminster) remains the sovereign legislature in the United
Kingdom, there is now a diffusion of power – differing in nature and scope –
between Westminster and the devolved institutions.
THE LIFE OF A PARLIAMENT
A parliament is summoned to meet by the sovereign following a general
election, and the life of the parliament will run until the subsequent general
election. Under section 7 of the Parliament Act 1911, the life of a parliament is
restricted to five years from the day on which first appointed to meet, unless
previously dissolved. Parliaments are summoned and dissolved by
Proclamation of the Crown on the advice of the Privy Council; see Chapter 6.
The average life of a parliament is three years, one month. The parliament
elected in June 1983 lasted for three years 11 months; that of June 1987 for four
years ten months. By contrast, the previous parliament elected in 1992 existed
for just under the maximum five year term. The 1997 parliament existed for
four years and one month.
The parliamentary session
A parliamentary session is the parliamentary year, which commences in
November. There is no legal requirement as to the length of a session. At the
end of the session, parliament is formally closed by the Queen and stands
‘prorogued’ until the new session begins. The significance of prorogation lies
in the fact that all business is suspended until the new session. 
The number of sitting days per session varies from year to year. In 1991–92
(a short session terminated by the dissolution of parliament), 83. The figure for
the 1992–93 session was 240 days. The average session length is 168 days. In
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the 1998–99 session, there were 149 sitting days, the daily average sitting being
nine hours and 15 minutes, and in 2000–2001, 83 sitting days, averaging eight
hours and 19 minutes.
Parliamentary sittings
The term ‘parliamentary sitting’ relates to the daily business of the House.
Under Standing Orders, the rules of the House, parliament meets at 2.30 pm
from Monday to Thursday, and from 9.30 am on Fridays. The House is
adjourned for three weeks at Christmas, one week at Easter, for the whole of
August and for most of September. In emergency situations, the House may
be recalled for urgent debate during a recess or at a weekend, as occurred in
1982 for debate on the invasion of the Falkland Islands.3 The daily
proceedings of the House generally cease at 10.00 pm but frequently will
extend beyond this time. The average duration of a sitting is eight and three
quarter hours, Monday to Thursday, and on Fridays, five and a half hours.
The length of parliamentary sittings varies according to the pressure of
time on the House. In the 1980s, for example, seven sittings lasted over 24
hours, the longest recorded in that decade, being 32 hours and 12 minutes.4
Where the House sits beyond the normal time of the commencement of
business the following day, the business of that day (with the exception of
Questions put down for written answer for that day) will be lost. It is a matter
of constant concern that parliament sits unsocial hours and, for this reason,
reforms have been introduced, in 1995, to limit the number of occasions on
which parliament sits after 10.00 pm. Under Standing Orders, the normal
business of parliament should end at 10.00 pm. However, certain business is
exempted from that rule, which results in lengthy sittings. The House
resolved not to sit on eight Fridays, in order to facilitate the constituency work
of Members of Parliament which is traditionally undertaken on Fridays and at
weekends. Further, the House resolved to meet on Wednesdays at 10.00 am
and to hold debates until 2.30 pm, when the normal business of the House
will commence. 
SUMMONING, ADJOURNMENT, PROROGATION,5
AND DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT
Summoning
It is within the Crown’s prerogative to determine when parliament should be
summoned. However, under statute, the Queen is bound to issue writs within
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three years of the ending of a parliament.6 In practice, a parliament must be
summoned to meet every year in order that approval can be given for monies
to be provided for public services. Parliament is summoned to meet by
proclamation of the Queen. The proclamation dissolves the previous
parliament, orders the issue of writs by the Lord Chancellor and appoints the
day and place for the meeting of the new parliament.
Adjournment
During a parliamentary session, parliament will be adjourned on many
occasions. The adjournment is no more than an ‘interruption in the course of
one and the same session’.7 Up to a quarter of the time in the House of
Commons is spent debating the question: ‘... that this House do now
adjourn.’8 The effect of adjournment is to suspend the sitting of the House for
a period, but to leave unaffected the business of the House. Adjournments
take place for a number of reasons and to effect a number of consequences. 
A motion for adjournment can be used in debate to interrupt proceedings.
The motion will take the form ‘that the debate be now adjourned’. The device
may be used as an alternative to moving an amendment to the question before
the House, and will be used to determine consideration of the matter under
consideration. The Speaker has a discretion whether to decline to put the
matter to the House. The business which has been interrupted can be brought
before the House at the next sitting day, provided that notice is given.
Daily adjournment debates
There is a daily motion for adjournment which suspends the day’s sitting.
Once the motion for adjournment has been moved, the daily adjournment
debate takes place.9 The adjournment debate enables one Member to speak on
a topic, previously notified, for 15 minutes, and to receive a ministerial reply.
Topics may include any matter other than a request for legislation. There is a
weekly ballot held at which successful Members are chosen for the
adjournment debate, other than for the debate on Thursdays when the choice
of Member is made by the Speaker.
Adjournment debates before holidays
Adjournment debates also take place before the House adjourns for
holidays.10 No ballot is held for participation: five backbenchers speak for half
an hour each and the Leader of the House replies to the debate.
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9 See, further, Chapter 16.
10 Four times a year.
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Adjournment debates following consideration of Consolidated Fund Bills
In any session, there will be three Consolidated Fund Bills before parliament.
Second reading consideration is purely formal, with no debate. When
proceedings are finished, any Member of the government may move a motion
‘that this House do now adjourn’. The ensuing debate may last until 9.00 am
the following day, 8.00 am on Fridays. Private Members can raise any matter,
but their names are balloted. One and a half or three hours may be allocated to
any topic, at the discretion of the speaker. 
Adjournments for emergency debates
Provision is made under Standing Orders for urgent matters to be brought to
the attention of the House for early debate. A Member may, at the start of
business of the day, propose that the House be adjourned for consideration of
an urgent matter. It is within the discretion of the Speaker as to whether the
matter should be discussed. If satisfied, it is then for the House to give leave
for the debate. If refused, the support of not more than 40 Members of the
House is required in order for leave to be granted.11 The debate will take
place at the start of business the following day.
Prorogation
Prorogation is effected under the prerogative, by the announcement of the
Queen’s command. The effect of prorogation is that all business before
parliament is suspended. Any Bill which has not concluded its parliamentary
stages must be brought anew to the future parliament. Parliament will be
prorogued until a specified date. The prorogation of parliament has not been
effected in person by the Crown since 1854: the normal procedure is for
parliament to be prorogued by a commission under the Great Seal. The period
between prorogation and the summoning of a new parliament is known as
the ‘recess’. 
Dissolution12
For detailed discussion of dissolution, see Chapter 6. Parliament is dissolved
prior to a general election. Under the Parliament Act 1911, the maximum
duration of the life of a parliament is five years. Dissolution is therefore
required before the expiry of this period. For the most part, the Prime Minister
will seek a dissolution – effected by the Crown under the royal prerogative –
at a date which is politically favourable to his or her party. It is entirely within
the Prime Minister’s personal discretion when to seek a dissolution.
Alternatively, dissolution may be sought when the government loses the
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support of the House of Commons. Governments may suffer defeats in the
Commons on a range of issues which will not force a dissolution. However, if
the government is defeated on a motion of confidence on a matter central to
its administration a dissolution will be forced.
When a dissolution is granted, the government does not resign until after a
defeat in the general election. It was seen in Chapter 6 that, in 1974, the Prime
Minister, Edward Heath, did not resign until it was clear that he could not
form a pact with the Liberal Party which would secure a working majority in
the Commons.
THE ORGANISATION OF BUSINESS
The business in a typical parliamentary session is as follows. The session
opens with the State Opening of parliament and the Queen’s Speech, which
outlines the government’s proposals for legislation in the session. The
following five days are spent in Debate on the Address, including two days on
which the Opposition proposes – ‘moves’ – amendments to specific areas of
policy. The government then introduces the most important Bills and, until
Christmas, most of the time of the House will be spent on second reading
debates on these Bills. Between Christmas and Easter, the majority of the time
of the House will be spent in second reading debates and the committee stage
of Bills. Before the end of July, the remaining legislative stages of Bills take
place.
Allocation of time in the House of Commons: Session 2000–01 (a short session)
Type of business Hours : minutes
Addresses, other than Prayers 36 : 18
Adjournment Debates 81 : 56
Finance 35 : 00
Government Bills 241 : 15
Government Motions 32 : 19
Opposition Day Motions 48 : 28
Oral Questions and Private Notice Questions 69 : 28
Prayers 6 : 55
Private Members’ Bills 42 : 21
Statements 43 : 00
Affirmative Statutory Instruments 21 : 58
Prayers against Statutory Instruments 5 : 24
Miscellaneous 18 : 16
Westminster Hall business 185 : 49
TOTAL 866 : 27
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PERSONNEL OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
The office of Speaker
The office of Speaker is traceable to 1377 and the appointment of Sir Thomas
Hungerford although, from 1258, parliaments had similar officers.13 The
Speaker of the House featured in the constitutional struggles between King
and parliament in the seventeenth century. When Charles I arrived in the
Commons to arrest the Five Knights, the Speaker declared:
May it please Your Majesty, I have neither eyes to see, nor tongue to speak in
this place, but as the House is pleased to direct me, whose servant I am here,
and I humbly beg Your Majesty’s pardon that I cannot give any other answer
than this to what Your Majesty is pleased to demand of me.
Henceforth, the independence of the Speaker from the Crown was
established.
The Speaker regulates the proceedings of the House. The Speaker is a
senior Member appointed by common agreement of all Members and is
generally a Member of the Opposition Party. The election of the Speaker is the
first task undertaken by parliament following a general election. The Speaker
acts with political impartiality and controls the business of the House. 
The Speaker is the presiding officer of the House and ensures that the rules
of conduct and order are observed. The Speaker is also the representative of
the Commons in relations with the Crown – it is through the Speaker that the
privilege of access to the Sovereign is effected – and the House of Lords and
other bodies outside parliament. When the House of Lords amends
Commons’ Bills, the Speaker checks the amendments to ensure that they do
not infringe the financial privileges of the lower House. It is also the function
of the Speaker to certify Bills under the Parliament Act 1911. 
The Speaker has a discretion in relation to the granting of an application
for an emergency debate, whether to allow private notice questions or grant
requests for emergency debates, and whether a prima facie case of a breach of
the privileges of the House has been established. It is also for the Speaker to
rule on matters of procedure. Furthermore, the Speaker will decide whether a
proposed amendment to a motion will be accepted.
Disciplinary powers of the Speaker
The control of debate lies in the Speaker, who chooses who is allowed to
speak. Advance notice of the wish to participate in debate is given and the
Speaker calls each side (government and Opposition) alternately, and respects
the rights of minority parties to participate. The Speaker has powers under
Standing Orders to control the following:
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(a) irrelevance or tedious repetition;
(b) minor breaches of order;
(c) the use of disorderly or unparliamentary expressions;
(d) grossly disorderly conduct;
(e) grave disorder;
(f) obstruction of the business of the House by other means.
Disorderly conduct – such as damaging the Mace14 – may result in the
Member, if a suitable apology is not given to the House, being suspended
from the House for a period determined by the House on a motion.15
Suspension from the House in the first instance will be for five sitting days, on
a second occasion for 20 days and in the event of a further repetition, for the
remainder of the session. Any Member refusing to withdraw from the
chamber of the House may be forcibly removed by the Serjeant at Arms.16 In
such an event, the Member will be suspended for the remainder of the
parliamentary session.
If a Member persists in a speech after being ordered to discontinue on the
basis of irrelevance or tedious repetition, the Speaker may direct him to
withdraw from the House for the remainder of the sitting, or ‘name’ him for
disregarding the authority of the Speaker’s Chair. The same penalty may
befall a Member who uses unparliamentary language. Unparliamentary
language includes:
(a) the imputation of false or unavowed motives;
(b) the misrepresentation of the language of another and the accusation of
misrepresentation;
(c) charges of uttering a deliberate falsehood;
(d) abusive and insulting language likely to create disorder.
The Leader of the House
The Leader of the House is responsible to the Prime Minister for the
organisation of business in the Commons. It is the function of the Leader of
the House to announce the parliamentary business for the following week.
The Leader of the House is a minister of the Crown.17 When the Prime
Minister is unavailable, it is the Leader of the House who represents the
House of Commons. 
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The party whips
The party political control of Members of Parliament is in the hands of the
party whips. On the government side, all whips receive salaries18 and are
ministers of the Crown. The Chief Whip19 is assisted by up to 12 other
Members. The Chief Whip organises the details of business of the House. The
Opposition has a Chief Whip, two salaried assistants and eight to ten non-
salaried assistants. The task of the government Chief Whip is to act as contact
between the Prime Minister, the Leader of the House (to both of whom he is
responsible) and Members. The whips (of all parties) keep Members informed
about the House’s business, and inform Members when they are obliged to
attend the House. The degree of coercion of Members will depend on the
importance of the matter in hand. When attendance is required – and when
political consequences will flow from non-attendance – a ‘three line whip’ is
announced. Where attendance is necessary, but not essential, a ‘two line whip’
is applied. In order that Members are not unduly pressured by the need for
attendance in parliament, the whips arrange ‘pairing’. Pairing is the
arrangement whereby Members of government and opposition parties will be
linked together: if one is absent the other may abstain from voting. Thus, the
non-attendance of one Member will be off-set – in the counting of votes – by
the absence of the other. It is this arrangement which is most frequently
threatened when relationships between the government and Opposition break
down. 
Much of the organisation of the business of the House is in the hands of
the whips, including planning the parliamentary timetable and advising on
practice and procedure. Whips of all parties are also responsible for
recommending candidates for membership of parliamentary committees. 
Members of Parliament
Front- and backbenchers
Business in the House is conducted on adversarial lines. The adversarial
nature of the Commons is reflected in the layout of the House. The House is
divided into two sections which face each other, separated by the Table of the
House, behind which the Speaker sits. Each side has a front-bench and several
rows of backbenches. On the side to the right of the Speaker sit Members of
the government party, ministers of the government occupying the front-
bench. Opposite, on the front-bench, will sit the shadow ministers of the
Opposition party. All other Members of both the government and Opposition
will sit on the backbenches: hence the term ‘backbenchers’. 
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The representation of women in the Commons
The Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act 1918 made women eligible to
stand as Members of Parliament. Of 1,613 candidates at the 1918 election, only
17 were women. The first female candidate to take her seat in the House of
Commons was Lady Astor, elected in 1919 in a by-election. The representation
of women has always been poor in the Commons, as a sampling of the figures
shows. In 1918, there was just one woman Member; in 1929, this figure had
risen to 14; and, in 1945, 24 women were elected to parliament. The figures
remain between 17 and 29 until 1987, when 41 women were elected. All the
major political parties are committed to increasing the representation of
women in the Commons. The 1997 general election resulted in a significantly
improved proportion of women Members of Parliament. The total number
elected was 120 (18 per cent of 659 seats), with 101 Labour, 14 Conservative,
three Liberal Democrat and two Scottish National Party Members, plus the
Speaker of the House of Commons. The 2001 general election returned 118
women members.
The first woman to hold ministerial office was Margaret Bondfield. She
became the first female Member of Cabinet in 1929. Two women have held the
office of Speaker: the Rt Hon Betty Harview in 1970, and Betty Boothroyd
from 1987. The first female Prime Minister was the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher
MP (as she then was), who held office from 1979–90, the longest premiership
in the twentieth century.
Salaries and allowances of Members of Parliament
As far back as the thirteenth century, representatives attending parliament
were paid – either in cash or kind – and, in addition, had travelling expenses.
Payment by electors had ceased by the end of the seventeenth century. In the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, though unpaid, a seat in the House of
Commons was valuable, and could attract large sums of money for its
purchase. Members of Parliament remained formally unpaid until 1911,
despite numerous previous attempts to introduce payment. In 1911, the salary
amounted to £400 per annum. In 1996, the Review Body on Senior Salaries,
successor to the Top Salaries Review Board, recommended that Member’s pay
should be increased by 26 per cent to £43,000 per annum. The government,
however, proposed an increase of a mere three per cent. The House rejected
the government’s proposal and agreed to the Review Body’s
recommendation. The House also agreed that, from 1997, the yearly rate
would be increased by the average percentage of Senior Civil Service pay
bands. 
Members also receive allowances for secretarial and research assistance,
car mileage allowance, and for limited travel between the constituency and
parliament. In addition, Members whose constituencies are within inner
London are entitled to claim a London Supplement payment.
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Members’ Code of conduct
Members of Parliament are governed by a Code of Conduct setting out
general principles to guide members on the standards of conduct that the
House and the public have a right to expect.20
The size of the House of Commons
Prior to the 1997 general election, the number of seats in parliament was
increased from 651 to 659, as a result of constituency boundary changes. Over
the past 40 years, the number of parliamentary seats has increased by ten per
cent. If the number of parliamentary representatives is compared with the
total population of the country, it can be seen that there is a wide discrepancy
in the representativeness of differing legislatures. In Ireland, for example,
there are 166 Members of Parliament, each representing 24,000 citizens. By
contrast, in Australia, there are 147 Members, each representing 122,000
citizens. In the United Kingdom, there are 659 Members of Parliament, each
representing approximately 89,000 citizens.
Resignation of Members of Parliament
A Member, once duly elected, cannot relinquish his seat.21 However,
provision is made whereby a Member may retire under differing
procedures,22 each of which involves accepting office under the Crown, which
obliges the Member to relinquish his seat on the basis of disqualification from
membership23 and a writ to be issued for a by-election. Application for the
office is normally granted,24 although power remains for the application to be
refused. The offices are nowadays purely nominal and retained as a device to
avoid the absence of any resignation procedure.
The political parties
The major political parties have a similar organisational structure in
parliament. The Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat Parties have a
system of election for the party leader, and are organised into front and
backbench Members. Looking at the Commons as a whole, we see that it
comprises the government, elected on the basis of the simple majority vote,
20 As recommended by the Committee on Standards and Privileges: Third Report of the
Committee on Standards and Privileges, HC 604 (1995–96), London: HMSO; HC Deb Vol
282 Col 392, 24 July 1996. See, further, Chapter 16.
21 Commons’ Journal (1547–1628) 724.
22 Most usually accepting the office of steward or bailiff of Her Majesty’s Three Chiltern
Hundreds of Stoke, Desborough and Burnham or steward of the Manor of Northstead.
23 Under the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975, s 4.
24 By the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition, being the second largest party in the House,
and minority parties – Liberal Democrat, Ulster Unionist, Scottish Nationalist,
Plaid Cymru.
Composition of the House of Commons by political party
The 2001 general election resulted in the House of Commons being made up
of 413 Labour Members, 166 Conservative Members, 52 Liberal Democrat
Members, and 28 Members from other minority parties.
GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
It is the government which controls the majority of parliament’s time. On 75
per cent of sitting days, government business takes priority and it is the
government which determines the business to be undertaken (subject to
established practices as to Opposition Days, days set aside for Private
Members’ Bills, etc). From scrutinising the work of parliament, it may be
tempting to underplay the importance of parliament as a whole, and the
Opposition in particular, in comparison with the power of the government.
Such a view is implicit in the pejorative labelling of government as an ‘elective
dictatorship’.25 Such charges need to be viewed with some caution. In 1947,
Sir Ivor Jennings described the role of the Opposition as ‘at once the
alternative to the government and a focus for the discontent of the people. Its
function is almost as important as that of the government’.26
In its constitutional role, the Opposition must constantly be questioning,
probing and calling government to account. Viewed in this light,
notwithstanding the government’s control over the timetable and business of
the House, it can be said that all parliamentary time is as much ‘Opposition
time’ as ‘government time’.
The constitutional importance of the official Opposition is reflected in the
fact that the Leader of the Opposition draws a substantial salary in both the
House of Commons and Lords, which is drawn on the Consolidated Fund.27
In addition, since 1975, financial assistance has been provided to all opposition
parties to enable them to carry out their role effectively. Each party is entitled
to a fixed sum per annum per seat won by the party, plus an amount for every
200 votes cast in the previous election. 
The Opposition is allocated 20 days per session in which it can determine
the business of the day, representing in an average session 11.6 per cent of
parliamentary time. Following the Queen’s Speech at the opening of a new
parliamentary session, the Opposition has the right to determine the subjects
for debate on the second of the six days set aside for debate on the speech. 
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In addition to normal parliamentary procedure for debate, questions, etc,
and opposition time, the Opposition has the weapon of the motion of censure
– or vote of no confidence. The motion takes the form of ‘the House has no
confidence in Her Majesty’s Government’. By convention, the government
always makes time for debate on the motion, a three line whip will be
employed, and a division (a formal vote – see below) invariably takes place.
While fairly infrequent and confined to serious matters of policy, the loss of a
motion of confidence can, as in 1979, lead to the resignation of the
government, and such motions are always regarded as important
parliamentary occasions. 
* Liberal Democrat motions
VOTING IN THE COMMONS
A ‘division’ is the name for the counting of votes on important issues where
conflict is apparent. Not every debate will result in a division: divisions are
reserved for instances when it is important to register formally the number of
votes for and against a particularly important issue. In the 1992–93 session,
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2000–2001 was a very short session, hence the reduced number of Opposition Days.
Opposition days 2000–2001: subject matter28
DATE DAY NO SUBJECT OF DEBATE
18.1.01 1 (a) Teacher supply
(b) Police numbers
24.1.01 2 (a) Manufacturing industry
(b) Public health
1.2.01 3 (a) The asylum system
(b) The crisis in agriculture
5.2.01 4 (a) Social exclusion, poverty and job losses in Wales
(Plaid Cymru)
(b) Personal care for the elderly (LD)*
12.2.01 5 (a) Prison conditions
(b) Liaison Committee’s First Report of 1999/2000
28.2.01 6 Foot and mouth disease
23.3.01 7 Foot and mouth disease
25.4.01 8 (a) Rural economy (LD)
(b) Foreign and security policy (LD)
401 divisions were ordered; in 2000–01 (a short session), 209 divisions were
ordered. For the observer, there is something archaic and humourous about
the procedure. The Speaker orders ‘Division: clear the lobbies’. Division bells
sound throughout parliament and in the division district immediately
surrounding parliament. Members will interrupt whatever they are doing in
response to the bell and return to parliament for the vote. Members crowd
into the ‘Aye’ or ‘Noe’ lobby, and as they exit the lobby their attendance is
checked. The Speaker then announces the result of the division. Votes are
recorded by name in the Official Journal of the House of Commons.
Pairing
Not every Member must be present for every division. Provided that the
Member has agreed with a Member of an opposing party not to participate in
the division, he or she is excused since the absence of both Members will not
affect the overall result. Pairing arrangements must be registered with the
Party Whips. Pairing is not permitted in relation to divisions on the most
important matters.
PARLIAMENTARY PUBLICATIONS AND PAPERS
The House of Commons
The Commons’ Journal
The Commons’ Journal contains the official record of the proceedings of the
House. The Journal dates back to 1547 and is published annually. The Journal
contains rulings from the Speaker on procedural matters.
The Commons’ Official Report
The Report contains the records of speeches made in the House and written
answers to Parliamentary Questions. It is a substantially verbatim report of
the proceedings. 
The Vote
The Vote is the collective name of a bundle of papers delivered to Members
daily during a parliamentary session. It contains the record of the previous
day’s proceedings together with the Order Paper for the day which lists the
business of the House. 
The Order Book
A daily publication setting out the future business of the House.
Chapter 14: Constitutional and Administrative Law
468
Introduction to the House of Commons
The House of Lords
Minutes of proceedings
The record of the proceedings in the House of Lords together with details of
forthcoming business. 
The Lords’ Journal
Since 1461, the Journals have been kept, providing details of attendance and
voting.
Televised proceedings in parliament
Radio broadcasting of Ministerial Question Time (see Chapter 16) began in
1978. Televised broadcasts of the House of Lords have been transmitted since
1985. In 1988, the House of Commons resolved that:
... this House approves in principle the holding of an experiment in the public
broadcasting of its proceedings by television.29
The Select Committee on Televising of Proceedings was established to make
recommendations as to the rules of coverage.30 Broadcasting commenced in
1989. The Journals of the House of Commons and Lords remain the official
record of proceedings in parliament.
PROPOSED REFORMS
In 2001, the Leader of the House of Commons proposed several reforms to the
workings of the House. Among proposals being considered is that
appointments to Select Committees should no longer be controlled by the
party whips but determined by a panel of senior MPs. Also on the agenda are
plans for shorter debates, morning sittings, moving Prime Minister’s
Questions from 3 pm on Wednesdays to midday, an end to the long summer
recess and the introduction of electronic voting. On Question Time it is
proposed that the two week period of notice of questions should be reduced.
Also proposed is that Select Committees should consider more Bills and that
they should also have powers to monitor the operation of legislation. On the
legislative process, it has been proposed that Bills should be allowed to carry
over from one parliament to the next, with a maximum period of 12 months,
during which they must pass through both Houses. With more morning
sittings designed to minimise the need for late night sittings, the total number
of hours worked would be longer than at present. The plans were submitted
to the Commons’ Modernisation Committee.
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THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
Approximately two-thirds of the time of the House of Commons is devoted to
the consideration of proposals for legislation.2 In order to effect changes in the
law, any proposal must receive the authority of parliament. Parliament
legitimises policy objectives. A mere decision of parliament, in the form of a
Resolution of the Commons, cannot change the law of the land.3 In order to
become law, a legislative proposal must receive the consent of the three
component parts of parliament: the Commons, the Lords4 and the Crown
through the giving of the royal assent. In this chapter the process of scrutiny
in the House of Commons is considered. Discussion of the legislative role of
the House of Lords is to be found in Chapter 17. 
Before examining the process of scrutiny in the Commons, the various
types of legislation must be considered. Legislative proposals fall under two
main categories: primary and delegated (or secondary) legislation. Primary
legislation refers to Acts of Parliament. Delegated or secondary legislation
refers to legislation drafted by authorised persons or bodies under the
authority of a ‘parent’ statute.
WESTMINSTER AND DEVOLUTION
As seen in Chapter 12, devolution to the Northern Ireland Assembly, Scottish
Parliament and, to a lesser extent, the Welsh Assembly (which has no power
to enact primary legislation), represents a diminution in Westminster’s
legislative role. Under devolution, in practical terms, the United Kingdom
Parliament retains power to enact primary legislation only to the extent to
which this power has not passed to the regional legislature.
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1 See Norton, 1985b, Chapter 5; Miers and Page, 1990; Ryle and Richards, 1988, Chapter 7;
Silk and Walters, 1987, Chapter 6; Norton, 1993, Chapter 5; Griffith and Ryle, 1989,
Chapter 8.
2 For details of allocation of time in the Commons, see Chapter 14.
3 Stockdale v Hansard (1839).
4 Other than where the Parliament Act procedure is employed. See Chapter 17.
PRIMARY LEGISLATION5
The classification of Bills
The majority of Bills will be those put forward by the government to
implement its policy. Bills fall into four categories: Public Bills, Private Bills,
Hybrid Bills and Money Bills. The procedure for passing the Bill differs
according to the classification of a Bill. Most attention is here devoted to the
legislative procedure for Public Bills. 
A Public Bill is one which has general application to all members of
society, for example, Road Traffic Acts, Environmental Protection Acts,
National Health Service Acts. A Private Bill is one which affects only an
individual or bodies in society, such as local authorities. 
A Hybrid Bill is one of general application, that is to say a Public Bill,
which also affects particular private interests in a manner different from the
private interests of other persons or bodies of the same category or class. The
Bill regulating the development of the Channel Tunnel is an example of a
Hybrid Bill, since it affected the private rights of landowners whose land
would be compulsorily purchased.6
A Money Bill is one which is certified by the Speaker as such, and is one
which contains nothing other than financial measures. 
A Private Members’ Bill is one promoted by an individual Member of
Parliament, as opposed to the government7 or, alternatively, a matter which
the government has been unable to fit into its legislative programme but will
subsequently adopt and provide time – and support – for the passage of the
Bill. Most often, such Bills involve sensitive issues of particular interest to their
promoters. The Abortion Act 1967, for example, originated from a Private
Members’ Bill. Private Members’ Bills follow the same legislative process as
government Bills, but the time available for their consideration is restricted.
Normally, ten (although, occasionally more) Fridays each session will be set
aside for Private Members’ Bills, and it is rare for a Bill to succeed unless the
government is prepared to provide additional time for its consideration. 
Consolidation Bills represent a re-enactment of legislation in a
comprehensive manner and they enable previous legislation – which will
generally exist in several statutes – to be repealed. Consolidation Bills do not,
for the most part, represent any change in the law; rather, they represent the
chance to ‘consolidate’ all the law on a particular matter within one statute.
Consolidation Bills are normally introduced in the House of Lords and then
scrutinised by a Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills, comprised of
Members of both the House of Commons and the House of Lords. Since there
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is no change being made in the substantive law, parliamentary time devoted
to Consolidation Bills is short and it is rare for a Consolidation Bill to be
debated more than briefly on the floor of the Commons. In 1994, the House of
Commons agreed that, in order to save further time, Consolidated Bills would
no longer require a committee stage. Finally, there are Consolidated Fund and
Appropriation Bills which provide statutory authority for government
expenditure and which are not debated in parliament. 
The legislative picture cannot be complete without consideration of
delegated or subordinate legislation. In the decade 1980–90, an average of 62
Bills were enacted each session, and the average number of statutory
instruments (see, further, below) amounted to 2,000 per session. In addition,
administrative rules drafted by government departments must be considered.
These include Codes of Practice, Circulars and Guidances and, while they do
not have the force of law, they nevertheless have an impact on the manner in
which laws are implemented.8
The origins of legislation
The majority of Bills considered by parliament will be introduced by the
government of the day. This does not mean that the source of the proposal is
one emanating from government policy, still less from the party manifesto on
which the election was fought. Between 1970–74, only eight per cent of Bills
were attributable to the Conservative Party Manifesto, and between 1974–79,
only 13 per cent of Bills were attributable to the Labour Party Manifesto.9 In
1981, 75 per cent of Bills originated within government departments, and the
remainder were responses to particular events. Illustrations of reactive
legislative proposals include the War Damage Bill 1964–65, introduced rapidly
to nullify the effect of the House of Lords’ decision in Burmah Oil v Lord
Advocate (1964) (see, further, Chapter 7); the Prevention of Terrorism
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1974, passed in response to the Birmingham pub
bombing by the Irish Republican Army; the Dangerous Dogs Act 1990, a
response to the increased numbers of dogs causing serious injury, particularly
to children. 
Consideration of the origins of legislative proposals is important in
evaluating the extent to which government and the House of Commons
interacts with the society it is elected to serve. As John Stuart Mill said in
Representative Government (1861), parliament is ‘the sounding board of the
nation’. JAG Griffith and M Ryle express the same idea when they observe
that parliament is ‘the recipient of a wide range of external pressures and
proposals’:
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It is a central feature of Parliament, however, that it performs a responsive
rather than initiating function within the constitution. The government – at
different levels – initiates policy, formulates its policy on legislation and other
proposals, exercises powers under the prerogative or granted by statute and, in
all these aspects, performs the governing role in the State. Both Houses of
Parliament spend most of their time responding, in a variety of ways, to these
initiatives, proposals or executive actions. [1989, p 5]
The government, however, is not the only source of input of business for
parliament. Much business originates from the Opposition front-bench, and
from backbenchers on either side of the two Houses. The inspiration for their
input is largely found in general public opinion, outside pressures or interest
groups, newspapers, radio and television, and in the minds and attitudes of
millions of citizens represented in the Commons by Members.
Parliament, therefore, finds itself the recipient of a wide range of external
pressures and proposals, broadly divided in origin between the government
of the day on the one hand and the outside world – the public – on the other.10
Professor Finer (1958) labels the forces external to parliament which have
an impact on its working as the ‘anonymous empire’. Finer is here referring to
all those individuals and organisations, lobby groups and interest groups
whose aim is to influence the content of legislation. Finer claims that the
detailed programme of government legislation ‘owes a great deal to sectional
groups’. Amongst these groups, we can include such organisations as the
Confederation of British Industry, Trades Union Congress, National Farmers’
Unions, National Union of Teachers, the British Medical Association, and the
Law Society, each of which is engaged in promoting its own sectional
interests. Other pressure groups pursue particular causes: for example, the
Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, JUSTICE (the
International Commission of Jurists), Howard League for Penal Reform,
Friends of the Earth (environmental issues), Shelter (housing). 
In addition to these and many other groups, the law reform bodies
provide a source of legislation. The Law Commission, established under the
Law Commissions Act 1965, is under a duty to keep the law under review
with a view to its systematic development and reform, including codification
of law, and simplification and modernisation of law (section 3). If we take, by
way of example, the Law Commission’s work on family law, the Commission
has reviewed the law of legitimacy, custody, wardship, divorce, domestic
violence and occupation of the matrimonial home. In conjunction with inter-
departmental committees, the Law Commission has been engaged in a
comprehensive review of adoption law. Between 1965–88 the Law
Commission had published 111 reports, 71 of which were given legal effect in
full or in part. 
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Commissions of inquiry may be established by the government to examine
and report on particular issues, often culminating in a change in the law. For
example, the Committee of Inquiry into Child Abuse in Cleveland (in part)
resulted in changes implemented in the Children Act 1989 which represented
a major overhaul of the law relating to children. The Criminal Law Revision
Committee, has examined the law relating, inter alia, to conspiracy, contempt,
arrest and detention, and criminal deception.
Each of these sources may result in proposals for changes in the law. The
success of these proposals in terms of becoming law is largely dependent
upon the government of the day and its willingness to provide parliamentary
time for the consideration of Bills. In any parliamentary session,
approximately 50–60 Bills will be introduced, the vast majority of which will
reach the statute book.
The preparation of a Bill
Once the government has decided to implement a particular measure, the
aims of government must be translated effectively into language which will
achieve those objectives. That task is entrusted to parliamentary draftsmen, or
parliamentary counsel, attached to the Management and Personnel Office of
the Treasury.11 Drafting involves five stages: understanding, analysis, design,
composition and revision.12 Once a draft Bill is in being, it is examined by the
Cabinet Home Affairs Committee before being formally submitted to
parliament for scrutiny and enactment.
The structure of a Bill
Each Bill has a short title, for example, the Transport Bill, which indicates the
general area of policy involved, together with a long title which summarises
the main objectives of the Bill. The Bill is made up of Chapters or Parts which
encompass groups of related clauses, and Schedules which contain details
supplementary to the primary clauses. The Bill may grant powers to make
delegated legislation to ministers or other specified bodies, such as local
authorities. There is, necessarily, no uniformity as to the length of Bills, which
may range from one clause (Abortion Amendment Bill 1988–89), to 27 Parts,
747 clauses and 25 Schedules (Companies Bill 1985). 
The legislative stages: Public Bills
First reading
A Bill which is to be introduced will appear on the Order Paper of the relevant
day. The Bill will be presented in ‘dummy form’ and is deemed to be read a
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‘first time’. Alternatively, a Bill may be introduced on order of the House, or
after having been sent to the Commons following its passage by the House of
Lords. Following the purely formal introduction into parliament, a date will
be set for second reading and the Bill will be printed and published.
Second reading
It is at the second reading that a Bill will receive the first in depth scrutiny.
The scrutiny occurs in the form of a debate, generally on the floor of the
House, and is confined to matters of principle rather than detail.
Exceptionally, the second reading debate may be referred to a committee for
consideration, but may only be so referred if 20 or more Members of
Parliament do not object and, accordingly, the procedure is reserved for non-
controversial matters and not measures ‘involving large questions of policy
nor likely to give rise to differences on party lines’.13 Where a Bill has been
committed to a second reading committee, the committee considers the
principles of the Bill, but the vote on the Bill is taken on the floor of the
House.14 It is at second reading stage that the minister in charge of the Bill
must explain and defend the contents of the Bill. The Opposition’s task is to
probe and question and set out reasons for opposing the Bill. It should not be
assumed that the Opposition invariably opposes Bills. In many instances, the
proposed legislation is uncontroversial and may even be welcomed by the
Opposition. The Dangerous Dogs Bill and the Child Support Bill 1990 are
illustrations of this phenomena. If the Bill is opposed, a vote will take place
which determines the fate of the Bill. If the vote is lost, the Bill is rejected and
the proposed legislation must either be abandoned or the Bill must be
reintroduced at a later date. 
Once a Bill has successfully completed the second reading stage, it ‘stands
committed’ to a standing committee, unless, exceptionally, the House orders
otherwise.15 Bills of constitutional importance may ‘stand committed’ to a
Committee of the Whole House, or the Bill may be divided and part
considered by a Committee of the Whole House and part in standing
committee. A Bill may also be referred to a special standing committee or to a
select committee, although, as seen below, this is rare.
Public Bills which are to give effect to proposals contained in a report by
either of the Law Commissions, other than a Private Members’ Bill or a
Consolidation Bill, when set down for second reading will be committed to a
second reading committee, unless the House orders otherwise, or the Bill is
referred to the Northern Ireland, Scottish or Welsh Grand Committee. If a
minister of the Crown moves a motion that a Bill not be referred to a second
reading committee, the House will vote on the motion.
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Committee stage 
Standing committees are designed to scrutinise Bills in detail. The name is in
fact a misnomer, for it implies that these are permanent committees, whereas
in fact they are not. The committee will be established for the purpose of
examining a particular Bill and will then stand down, a feature which, as will
be seen, may have implications for the adequacy of scrutiny.
At any one time, there will be eight to ten standing committees in
operation. Committees may comprise between 16 and 50 Members of
Parliament, and normally between 18 and 25.16 Membership is drawn from
Members of Parliament from all political parties and is proportionate to the
overall strength of the party in the House, thus, the larger the government’s
majority in the House, the larger its majority in the standing committee.
Appointments are made by a Committee of Selection who will take advice
from party whips as to appropriate Members. The Speaker of the House
appoints the Chairman of the standing committee, who may be a Member of
either side of the House (government or Opposition). Once selected, the
Chairman is impartial and enjoys the same powers as the Speaker of the
House in relation to selection of amendments for discussion and imposition of
the Closure Motion (see further, below, p 482). 
The function of the standing committee is to examine the Bill clause by
clause. The minister in charge of the Bill has the task of steering it successfully
through committee, aided by his Parliamentary Private Secretary and civil
servants. Amendments may be proposed by Members giving notice to the
Public Bill Office of the House of Commons. These amendments may take the
form of linguistic details, adding or subtracting a word here or there;
alternatively, amendments may be of major substance. Once the clauses of the
Bill have been considered, the committee moves to consider any proposed
new clauses. Proposals for amendment may be ruled out of order if they are
irrelevant, beyond the scope of the Bill, conflict with other proposed
amendments, conflict with the principle of the Bill or are unintelligible,
ineffective, vague or spurious.17
The proceedings in standing committee are formal and ritualistic. A
Member moves an amendment, the minister responds, the Opposition speaks,
other Members comment, and debate continues until a decision on a clause –
‘that the clause do stand part of the Bill’ – is reached. The minister’s task is to
ensure a smooth passage for the Bill in the fastest possible time. Richard
Crossman,18 Minister of Housing and Local Government in the Labour
government of 1974, commented that committee stage is tedious with the
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minister ‘being pinned to the wall’ throughout the process. For the most part,
deliberations will follow party political lines, and it follows that, provided the
government has a majority on the committee, the chances of successfully
moving amendments is slight. 
The low success rate of backbench proposals for amendment should not be
given disproportionate weight. It has been seen above that Standing Orders
set out a number of ‘inadmissible’ categories of proposed amendments. It
must also be noted that Members may put forward amendments solely with a
view to gaining a clearer picture of the Bill, or for more spurious reasons, such
as delaying a Bill or embarrassing the government. Equally, it should be
remembered that the composition of the committee reflects that of the House
overall: governments with a firm majority will inevitably suffer fewer defeats
in committee. Finally, recognition must be given to the fact that the
government has gained a mandate in a general election and, whether or not a
specific legislative proposal stems from that mandate, the government has a
legitimate expectation of getting its legislative programme on the statute book.
Equally, the principle of the Bill has been approved on second reading by the
House. While parliament as a whole, through its representative committee,
has the equally legitimate expectation of being able to give adequate scrutiny
to government proposals, that should not necessarily be understood to mean
that standing committees should expect to be able to force their views on
government. 
That said, there have long been criticisms of the effectiveness of standing
committees. It has been noted above that the minister in charge of the Bill,
together with his civil service advisers, steers the Bill through committee. Any
minister not totally in charge of his subject matter will have a short ministerial
career, and it is essential that the minister should have a command of his
subject and the necessary advice to hand to fend off Opposition attacks. It is
inevitable, therefore, that there will be a disparity of information and expertise
between the minister and other members of the committee, and that this will
affect the adequacy of scrutiny. Further, the shortcomings of standing
committees may be exacerbated by their non-specialist composition. 
At first sight, it appears anomalous that there is no standing committee
system organised on specialist lines. There is a prima facie case for committees
to be geared to particular subjects, or groups of subjects. On this reasoning, a
standing committee could be devised with the remit to consider transport
matters, another to consider science and technology Bills, another to consider
environmental issues and so on. If such committees were appointed for the
life of the parliament, or for a parliamentary session with Members appointed
on the basis of their expertise and interests, the potential for improved
scrutiny would be enhanced. However, there is a counter-argument to this. A
specialist semi-permanent committee, while having the benefit of expertise,
would lose the quality of the assortment of interests which is currently
brought to bear on proposals. Members of the committee might become too
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familiar with each others’ attitudes, and ministers and the committee could
suffer from becoming inward looking and overly concerned with one subject
to the neglect of others. Committees are open to the public and their
proceedings are recorded in the Official Report of the House, Hansard. For
debate to become too narrow and technical might disadvantage other
Members and the public in their capacity to understand proceedings.
One recognised shortcoming in standing committee procedure is the lack
of power to send for ‘persons and papers’, in other words, witnesses and
documents. For Members who are not specialists in the subject matter or in
statutory drafting and interpretation, the task of understanding the content of
a complex Bill, its implications for other aspects of the law and the
relationship between various Parts and Clauses can be daunting. This was a
procedural aspect examined by Professor Griffith, who recommended
reform.19 The Procedure Committee20 examined this perceived difficulty and
recommended that a hybrid committee displaying the normal features of a
standing committee but adopting some of the procedures and powers of select
committees be introduced. A Standing Order, passed by the House in 1986,
provides that within the first 28 days of a Bill being committed to the Special
Standing Committee, written and oral evidence may be taken. A further
committee sitting can be devoted to debate on the evidence given to the
committee. At this preliminary stage, the committee is acting as a Committee
of Inquiry, attempting to see the Bill in its entirety and to evaluate its
substance and implications. Following the inquiry period, the committee
reverts to ordinary standing committee procedure. In the experimental period
from 1980–85, only five Bills were committed to Special Standing Committees.
In 1985 in debate, the Leader of the House, Mr John Biffen, reported that the
views of ministers on the new procedure were mixed, some finding it helpful,
others considering it irksome. In light of the pressure on parliamentary time
and the reluctance of ministers to be ‘tied up’ in committee proceedings, it is
unlikely that Special Standing Committees will become the standard form of
procedure for the scrutiny of Bills.
Other Bills may be referred to Second Reading Committees, under the
procedure outlined above. Neither major nor controversial Bills are referred to
Second Reading Committees. Many of these Bills will already have passed
through the House of Lords. 
Report stage21
Once the Bill has been considered in standing committee, the Bill is reported
back to the House of Commons as a whole. If amendments have been made in
committee, the Bill will be reprinted. Further amendments may be introduced
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at this stage, but the Speaker will be careful to avoid repetition of the debate in
standing committee, so any proposed amendments previously considered will
be rejected. The Speaker will accept amendments proposed by the
government, proposals representing a compromise and amendments relating
to new developments. Generally, the debate at this stage will be brief but,
again, this will depend on the importance of the Bill. The Police and Criminal
Evidence Bill, for example, was debated for eighteen and a half hours at report
stage. Approximately nine per cent of time on the floor of the House is taken
up with report.
Third reading
Third reading represents the last chance for the House of Commons to
examine a Bill before it is passed to the House of Lords. At this stage, the Bill
cannot be amended, other than to correct small mistakes such as grammatical
or printing errors. A Bill may pass through the report and third reading stages
at the same time.
Time spent on government Bills on the floor of the House of Commons, 
1995–96 and 1998–99 (hours : minutes)
Second Committee of Third Lords’ 
Session reading Whole House Report reading amendments TOTAL
(Standing
Committee)
1995–96 101 : 17 19 : 56 98 : 04 12 : 58 16 : 37 248 : 52
1998–99 88 : 19 101 : 69 120 : 53 17 : 10 48 : 37 375 : 88
PRIVATE MEMBERS’ BILLS22
Introducing a Private Members’ Bill
In addition to Public (and Private and Hybrid) Bills, a number of legislative
proposals will be introduced by individual Members of Parliament. In any
one session, dozens of Private Members Bills will be introduced, a minority of
which will reach the statute book. A Private Members’ Bill may be introduced
in one of four ways. The first procedure is that of the ballot.
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Introduction by ballot
The House will agree, early in the session, for days to be appointed for the
purpose of the Ballot. Members of Parliament may put their names on the
Ballot Paper on that day. Over 400 Members normally enter the Ballot,
although many will have no specific proposed legislation in mind. Twenty
Members will be successful at the Ballot. If successful, the Member must then,
within nine days, table the subject matter for his or her Bill. Six Fridays per
session are allocated to Private Members’ Bills, on which days the Bills take
precedence over other parliamentary business.
Introduction under Standing Order procedure
Any Member may present a Bill under this procedure by placing the long and
short title of the Bill on the Order Paper of the House. The Bill will not be
considered, but simply be deemed to have received a first reading and a date
set for second reading. 
Introduction under the ‘Ten Minute Rule’
A Member may give notice of a motion for leave to introduce a Bill. The
motions will be considered at specific times allotted by the House, which
permits the Member to raise an issue after Question Time on Tuesdays and
Wednesdays, thus guaranteeing media attention.23 Several rules apply. The
Member may give one notice at any one time. No notice may be given for
leave to bring in a Bill which relates to taxation or expenditure, or to bring in a
Bill which covers matters which are substantially the same as those contained
in Bills on which the House has already reached a decision in that session. 
‘Ordinary presentation’ of a Bill
Every Member is permitted to introduce a Bill after having given notice. These
Bills, however, are not presented until after the Ballot Bills have been
presented and put down for second reading. They therefore have little chance
of success. Nor do they enjoy the publicity given to Bills introduced under the
Ten Minute Rule. 
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Introduction of a Bill after consideration in the House of Lords
Most Private Members’ Bills are introduced in the House of Commons, but a
small number each session may have started their parliamentary life in the
Lords. If the Bill passes the Lords, it then comes to the Commons. However,
Bills introduced in the Lords are considered only after Bills introduced in the
Commons and, accordingly, given the severe time constraints, few are likely
even to receive a second reading in the Commons. 
The enactment of Private Members’ Bills
The success, or otherwise, of a Private Members’ Bill is largely dependent
upon it receiving government support. As has been seen in Chapter 14, the
government controls the parliamentary timetable, and dominates
parliamentary business. Since only six Fridays per session are allocated for
consideration of Private Members’ Bills, it will be necessary for the
government to make additional time for the completion of its parliamentary
stages. Whether or not the government is willing to do this will depend upon
the political support which the Bill acquires. However, even if a Bill does not
successfully pass all its legislative stages, it may have served the useful
purpose of heightening parliamentary and public awareness of a particular
issue. For example, the Rt Hon Tony Benn MP has introduced Private
Members’ Bills, inter alia, on placing the royal prerogative on a statutory
basis,24 and for enacting a written constitution.25 Neither of these has
succeeded, but represent matters in which there is widespread interest. 
Curtailing debate on legislative proposals
As a result of the pressure on parliamentary time, and the need for a Bill to
pass through all its legislative stages in a single session, procedures exist to
limit consideration of a Bill. 
Closure Motions
The Closure Motion, introduced in 1881, is a means of stopping debate,
usually by agreement between government and Opposition, in order to
ensure that debates end at times agreed by the parties. The closure can be
used in debate on the floor of the House or in standing committee. It is an
instrument of control, and one which is used sparingly: rarely will it be used
without agreement. In the 1987–88 session, however (a long session), it was
used 20 times without inter-party agreement. 
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In terms of procedure, the motion for closure is put to the Speaker who has
discretion whether or not to accept the motion. In addition, at least 100
Members of Parliament must vote in favour of closure. 
Selection of amendments
This device is confined to legislative proposals and enables the procedure to
be streamlined by the selection of amendments for discussion.
The Allocation of Time Motion
The most extreme form of control is the Allocation of Time Motion,
colloquially called the Guillotine Motion, introduced in its present form in
1887. Erskine May (1997) describes Guillotine Motions as representing:
... the extreme limit to which procedure goes in affirming the rights of the
majority at the expense of the minorities of the House, and it cannot be denied
that they are capable of being used in such a way as to upset the balance,
generally so carefully preserved, between the claims of business, and the rights
of debate.
The device, if approved by the House, enables the government to set a date by
which a Bill is to be reported from standing committee to the House, or a date
for third reading. If the government puts forward a motion for an Allocation
of Time, Standing Orders provide that a debate of up to three hours may take
place (which may be extended), unless otherwise proposed in the motion or
decided by the Business Committee of the House. Once agreed, the Business
Committee of the House, or a business sub-committee of the Standing
Committee will determine how many scrutiny sessions are to be held and the
date by which the next procedural stage must be accomplished.
Between 1881–1921, 36 Bills were guillotined, between 1921–45, 30. The
highest number of Bills guillotined in any one session, ten, was in the 1988–89
session. In respect of many Bills, the guillotine will be applied more than once,
and can apply to any stage of the legislative process. The Dangerous Dogs Bill
1990–91, for example, regarded by the government as an urgent matter, was
guillotined twice with the effect that the second reading debate, the committee
stage, report and third reading and the consideration of amendments from the
House of Lords were all subject to strict time limits. 
In the 1998–99 session, 12 Bills were subject to the Allocation of Time
Motion. In the 2000–2001 session, Orders of the House provided that
Programme Motions should be employed to facilitate efficiency in the
legislative process. The Modernisation Committee stated that the basic
requirements of the reformed system were to ensure that the government gets
its legislation through in a reasonable time while allowing the opposition and
Members to have a full opportunity to debate and propose amendments.
Further, it was essential that all parts of the Bill be properly considered, and
that there should be an improvement in the preparation of Bills so as to reduce
the need for amendments. The statistics for the 2000–01 session combine the
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use of the Allocation of Time Motion and the Programme Motion. Guillotine
or Programme Motions were used 34 times on 22 Bills during the session.26
For the most part, the Guillotine Motion is used sparingly and will,
generally, be applied only after a considerable amount of time has been spent
on the Bill in committee and the government is at risk of losing the Bill
altogether.27 For example, the Housing Bill of 1979–80 and the Social Security
Bill of 1985–86 had both spent over 100 hours in committee before the
Allocation of Time Motion was moved. Moreover, the Police and Criminal
Evidence Bill 1983–84 had no guillotine applied despite having 59 sittings in
standing committee. 
If the government chooses to move an Allocation of Time Motion, it is a
rare occurrence for it to lose the vote. In 1977, the Labour government moved
an Allocation of Time Motion on the Scotland and Wales Bill 1976–77 but,
following a six hour debate, the vote was lost by 312 votes to 283 and the
government withdrew the Bill.
The use of the guillotine procedure undeniably limits the effectiveness of
parliamentary scrutiny of Bills and may result in Bills leaving the House of
Commons with significant portions unexamined. This point must be borne in
mind when assessing the role and value of the House of Lords in the
legislative process. 
DELEGATED LEGISLATION
The picture of the law making process would be incomplete without a
consideration of delegated, or subordinate, legislation. 
In 1972, Parliament’s Joint Committee on Delegated Legislation described
subordinate legislation as covering ‘every exercise of power to legislate
conferred by or under an Act of Parliament’.28 Some examples will make the
scope of delegated legislation clearer.
Delegated legislation may be made by:
(a) ministers, in the form of rules and regulations which supplement the
provisions of an Act of Parliament;
(b) local authorities, in the form of bylaws to regulate their locality according to
particular localised needs;
(c) public bodies, in the form of rules and regulations. Such bodies include the
British Airways Authority (section 9 of the Airport Authorities Act 1975);
British Railways Board (section 67 of the Transport Act 1962); and the
Nature Conservancy Council (section 37 of the Wildlife and Countryside
Act 1981);
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(d) judges, in the form of rules of court made under the authority of section 75
of the Supreme Court Act 1981;
(e) government departments, in the form of codes of practice, circulars and
guidance. These do not contain legal rules, but have a substantive effect on
the manner in which the legal rules operate;
(f) House of Commons, in the form of Resolutions of the House. The
Provisional Collection of Taxes Act 1968 makes possible the lawful
imposition and collection of taxation between the Budget speech and the
enactment of the Finance Bill in July/August. Whereas normal Resolutions
of the House do not have the force of law, Resolutions enabling the
impositions and collections of taxation – being authorised by statute –
have legal effect.
The volume of delegated legislation also reveals its importance as a source of
law. In any parliamentary year, between 1,500 and 3,000 pieces of delegated
legislation will be approved.
The use of delegated law making power is not a purely modern
phenomenon, arising from increasing legal regulation of all aspects of life. The
power to make subordinate legislation was exercised as early as the sixteenth
century.29 The increase in the volume of delegated legislation derives from the
early nineteenth century. AV Dicey approved of delegated legislation. In
Dicey’s view:
The cumbersomeness and prolixity of English statute is due in no small
measure to futile endeavours of Parliament to work out the details of large
legislative changes ... the substance no less than the form of law would, it is
probable, be a good deal improved if the executive government of England
could, like that of France, by means of decrees, ordinances, or proclamations
having the force of law, work out the detailed application of the general
principles embodied in the Acts of the legislature. [(1898), 1959, pp 52–53]
If satisfaction and approval of delegated legislation was widespread at the
time of Dicey’s writing, strongly opposing views were being expressed before
long. Chief Justice Hewart, in The New Despotism (1929), argued that the
increased use of delegated legislation, particularly during the First World War
under the Defence of the Realm Act 1914, amounted to an effective usurpation
of the sovereign law making powers of parliament. Such criticisms led to the
appointment, in 1929, of a committee30 of inquiry to consider the powers
exercised by ministers by way of delegated legislation and to report what
safeguards are desirable or necessary to secure the constitutional principles of
the sovereignty of parliament and the supremacy of the law.
The committee’s report,31 while recognising the need for improved
parliamentary scrutiny of delegated legislation, nevertheless, emphasised the
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necessity of it in terms of legislative efficiency. It is efficiency which is the
principal justification for the delegation of law making power. Put simply,
parliament, as currently constituted, struggles to give adequate scrutiny to
primary legislation. To burden parliament with the task of scrutinising every
detail of legislation would overload the parliamentary timetable to the extent
that the system would break under the strain. A related justification for
delegated power lies in the need to supplement or amend the primary rules in
light of new developments. Delegated legislation enables the fine tuning of
the primary rules to take place, without encumbering parliament as a whole.
Further, it may be that the government is clear as to the broad policy to be
pursued under an Act, and as to the primary legal rules necessary to achieve a
particular goal. There may be less certainty as to the technical, detailed rules
necessary: the delegation of law making power enables such rules to be
worked out, often in consultation with specialist interest groups outside
parliament.
The justifications for subordinate legislation can hold good only if the
powers granted are sufficiently clear and precise as to be adjudicated upon by
the courts by way of judicial review32 and if the parliamentary scrutiny
accorded to it is adequate. 
Under the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, the validity of Acts of
Parliament cannot be questioned.33 Subordinate legislation, however, can be
reviewed, provided that the jurisdiction of the courts has not been excluded –
or ‘ousted’ – in order to determine its compatibility with the enabling Act.
Such exclusion of review is rare and, to ensure immunity from review, the
exclusion clause would have to be unambiguous on the face of the parent Act.
Of equal importance to the possibility of successful challenge in the courts is
the breadth of discretion conferred on the delegate by the Act. If a statute
conferred powers on a minister to make regulations ‘whenever the minister
thinks fit’ or (say) to award compensation for injury ‘under circumstances to
be determined by the minister’, the grant of discretion is so wide as to be
virtually unreviewable by the courts. Also important is that delegated
legislation should not impose retrospective liability on citizens, or be so vague
as to be unintelligible. Further, it is necessary that the power granted is
conferred on an identifiable delegate in order that the exercise of power be
challengeable. On this latter point, the Emergency Powers Act 1939 provided
for differing levels of delegation. The Act provided that regulations might
empower any authority on persons to make orders, rules and bylaws, for any
of the purposes for which the Defence Regulations might themselves be
made. Ministerial orders were issued under the regulations, directions issued
under the regulations and licences issued under the directions. Such
subdelegation breaches the rule that a person or body to whom powers are
entrusted may not delegate them to another, ‘delegatus non potest delegare’.
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The Statutory Instruments Act 1946 
The vast majority of delegated legislation is in the form of statutory
instruments governed by the Statutory Instruments Act 1946. Section 1
provides that where any Act confers power on His Majesty in Council or on
any minister of the Crown, where that power is expressed as a power
exercisable by Order in Council or by statutory instrument, the provisions of
this Act apply thereto. 
Parliamentary scrutiny of delegated legislation34
The Statutory Instruments Act 1946 lays down the means by which an
instrument may come into effect, but the method adopted will depend on that
which is stipulated in the particular enabling Act. First, the parent Act may
provide that the instrument be laid before parliament35 but that no
parliamentary action is needed. Secondly, the parent Act may provide that the
instrument is subject to the ‘negative resolution procedure’.36 Under this
procedure, the instrument can be laid before parliament in its final form and
come into immediate effect subject only to there being a successful move to
annul the instrument. This move takes the form of a motion, known here as a
‘prayer’ for annulment of the instrument, which can be made within 40 days
of the instrument being laid. Thirdly, the enabling Act may stipulate that the
instrument be laid in draft form and that it will come into effect only if a
prayer for annulment is not moved successfully. The Statutory Instruments
Act also provides for an ‘affirmative resolution procedure’. If this is adopted,
the instrument may either come into immediate effect, subject to subsequent
approval by parliament, or be laid in draft form to come into effect if
approved by parliament.
The choice of the procedure to be adopted lies with the government. The
problem posed for parliament is again one of time and opportunity. The
affirmative resolution procedure is rarely adopted by government; the
negative resolution procedure requires that Members of Parliament must be
vigilant and astute if they (usually the Opposition) are to be aware that a
particular instrument has been laid and are to be able to move a prayer for
annulment within the 40 day period. Instruments made under the European
Communities Act 1972 to give effect to Community law may be subject to
either the affirmative or negative procedure.
Since 1994–95, instruments subject to affirmative resolution are
automatically referred to a standing committee, unless the House orders
otherwise. Instruments subject to the negative resolution procedure, to which
a prayer has been tabled, may be referred to a standing committee on a
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Motion by a minister of the Crown. 
Supplementing the above scrutiny methods is the Joint Select Committee
on Delegated Legislation The Joint Committee comprises seven Members of
the House of Commons and seven Members of the House of Lords, and is
chaired by a member of the House of Commons. The committee is charged
with examining all instruments laid before parliament and those instruments
for which there is no laying requirement. The grounds on which the
committee will report to parliament are:
(a) that the instrument imposes a tax or charge;
(b) that the parent Act excludes review by the courts;
(c) that the instrument is to operate retrospectively;
(d) that there has been unjustifiable delay in publication or laying;
(e) that the instrument has come into effect in contravention of the rules of
notice to the House;
(f) that there is doubt as to whether the instrument is intra vires;
(g) that the instrument requires clarification;
(h) that the instrument’s drafting is defective.
The committee examines over 1,000 instruments per session. Less than one per
cent are reported to parliament and few are debated. The strength of the
committee’s work lies not in its reports to parliament and any consequent
action but rather in its scrutiny of instruments and drawing attention to
defects in instruments to the relevant government department. 
The Report of the Committee on Ministers’ Powers, in 1932,37 emphasised the
importance of distinguishing between ‘normal’ delegation of powers, matters
of technical detail, and ‘exceptional’ delegation of powers, which entailed the
delegation of power to make laws on matters of policy and principle. With
regard to the latter category, concern was expressed as to ‘whether parliament
was surrendering its own function in the process’. Research conducted by JD
Hayhurst and P Wallington (1988) suggests that, while the volume of
statutory instruments per session remains fairly stable, there has been a
change in emphasis in the content of delegated legislation, an increasing
volume of which entail the ‘exceptional’ delegation of powers. Statutes are
becoming less detailed and granting broad enabling powers to delegates. The
Education Reform Act 1988, Legal Aid Act 1988, Children Act 1989 and Child
Support Act 1991 may all be cited in support of this proposition.
The Child Support Act 1991, which aims to ensure that absent parents,
rather than the state, make financial provision for their natural children, by
way of example, grants to the Secretary of State the power to prescribe, inter
alia, those persons under a duty to disclose information, the purposes for
which such disclosure shall be made and the mathematical formula to be
employed in making maintenance assessments. Section 51(1) of the Act
confers a further and more general power, namely that: 
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The Secretary of State may by regulations make such incidental,
supplementary and transitional provision as he considers appropriate in
connection with any provision made by or under this Act.
At committee stage in the House of Lords, the Child Support Bill was
criticised for its ‘skeletal’ nature and at second reading in the House of
Commons the volume of proposed delegated legislation, estimated to amount
to over 100 regulations, was described as a ‘major flaw’ in the Bill.38 Given the
constitutional importance that delegated legislation be capable of being
scrutinised by the courts in order to ensure that it is intra vires, it is extremely
difficult to envisage a successful challenge being made in the courts against
such wide delegated powers as those granted under the Child Support Act
1991.
Standing Orders provide that, from the 1996–97 session, one or more
standing committees are appointed for consideration of delegated legislation.
Where a member gives notice of intention to pray for the annulment of a
statutory instrument, or draft thereof, the instrument may be referred to the
standing committee.39 In addition, a Joint Select Committee of both Houses
scrutinises and reports if necessary on technical issues such as drafting or
unexpected use of powers granted in the parent Act. If an instrument concerns
finance, these may be considered by the House of Commons Select Committee
on Statutory Instruments. The House of Lords’ Scrutiny Committee for
delegated legislation is discussed in Chapter 17. On delegated legislation and
the Human Rights Act 1998, see Chapter 19.
FINANCIAL PROCEDURES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
Any evaluation of parliament’s role and the legislative process must
incorporate discussion of the extent to which, and means by which,
parliament controls national finance, both in terms of taxation and
expenditure. In part, this topic requires consideration both under the heading
of the legislative process and the scrutiny of the executive.
From a constitutional standpoint, the control over expenditure may be
viewed as control over the government of the day and its policies. As WE
Gladstone40 remarked, ‘expenditure flows from policy – to control
expenditure one must control policy’. Constitutionally, therefore, parliament’s
role in relation to spending is but one part of its wider role of scrutinising and
calling the government to account. Hence, general debates, Question Time,
and Select Committees are all germane to this matter.
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Expenditure (supply)
Historically, the need to summon parliament arose from the financial needs of
the Crown.41 The authority of the House of Commons sprang from, and is
based on, its power to approve both the raising of taxation and approve
expenditure. The governing maxim was, and remains, that ‘the Crown
demands, the Commons grant and the Lords assent to the grant of monies’.42
Nowadays, for the ‘Crown’, must be inserted ‘Ministers of the Crown’.
Two propositions flow from this situation. First, that all charges – that is,
proposals for the expenditure of monies – must be demanded by the Crown
before they can be considered by parliament. The demand for approval of
monies comes today from ministers, not backbenchers. Secondly, all charges
must be considered by the House of Commons before they are approved. The
proposals for charges come before the House in the form of resolutions which,
once approved, must be embodied in legislation originating in the House of
Commons but approved by both Houses.43
National revenue to cover the cost of government is derived from three
main sources: taxation, borrowing and revenue from Crown lands. All
revenue, of whatever kind, is credited to the Exchequer Account at the Bank
of England in the form of the Consolidated Fund. All withdrawals must be
authorised by statute. Under the Consolidated Fund Acts, approximately one-
third of expenditure is authorised in permanent form and does not require
annual parliamentary approval. Charges which are immune from this
scrutiny are those payments for service which it is deemed should not be
constantly drawn into the political arena for debate. For example, payment of
interest on the national debt, salaries of judges of superior courts, the Speaker
of the House of Commons, Leader of the Opposition, Comptroller and
Auditor General, Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, payments
to meet European Community and Union obligations and the Queen’s Civil
List all fall under Consolidated Fund Services.
In contrast to Consolidated Fund Services are Supply Services. These cover
the bulk of annual public expenditure and cover the needs of all government
departments and the cost of the armed forces. Provision for Supply Services
require annual approval. The following requirements must be satisfied. The
government must lay before the House of Commons each year its estimates
for the forthcoming financial year, in the form of resolutions. Once approved,
these are translated into Bills – the Consolidated Fund Bills and Appropriation
Bills. Money must be appropriated for specific purposes in the same session as
that in which it is required by the government: thus, monies voted for one
financial year cannot be applied to a subsequent year.
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The Voting of Supply is announced in the Queen’s Speech at the autumn
opening of the parliamentary session: ‘Members of the House of Commons,
estimates for the Public Service will be laid before you.’ The financial year for
the purposes of national expenditure runs from 1 April to 31 March.
The Chancellor’s Autumn Statement is made to parliament, preceded by
preparation of estimates by each government department for the forthcoming
financial year, and the Budget announced in the Spring. The timing of the
Budget is not, however, fixed and may be timetabled for Spring or Autumn. 
Estimates
There exist six classes of estimates. 
Ordinary annual estimates
Ordinary annual estimates are the principal estimates. They set out the
specific grants of money which will be required to fund the civil service,
defence services, the cost of House of Commons administration and the
National Audit Office. Control over the form in which estimates are presented
is in the hands of the Treasury.44 Before any change in the form of the
estimates is made, approval must be obtained from the Treasury and Civil
Service Committee. 
Prior to estimates being settled, the Public Expenditure Survey Committee,
under the responsibility of the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, will have
reported on anticipated needs of departments, and settled any disagreements
between departments. Its confidential report is sent to the Cabinet, which
formalises expenditure plans.
Votes on account
Votes on account are designed to cover the problem caused by the lapse in
time between the end of one financial year and the enactment of legislation
authorising expenditure for the forthcoming year. A vote on account
authorises up to 45 per cent of projected annual expenditure.
Supplementary estimates
Supplementary estimates may be presented to parliament for approval in
relation to increased sums needed for a particular service, or to meet a new
situation. 
Excess votes
Where a department has exceeded its budget, its administration and
expenditure will be audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General who
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reports to the House. The Committee of Public Accounts will consider the
Comptroller’s report on the matter, which states its approval or objection to
the proposed excess vote. If the Public Accounts Committee approves the
additional expenditure, the matter is put to parliament without debate.
Votes of credit 
An emergency situation – or unexpected need for supply – may give rise to an
application for a vote of credit. Situations of war will give rise to such votes.45
Exceptional grants
An exceptional grant is one authorised by parliament for expenditure for
some particular objective, such as State funeral expenses or the erection of
memorial statues.
Following parliamentary debate and approval, the Appropriation Bill will
be drafted authorising withdrawal from the Exchequer Fund. In most
parliamentary sessions, three regular Consolidated Fund and Appropriation
Bills (and, where necessary, extra Consolidated Fund Bills) are put to
parliament for approval.
It will have been noticed that parliamentary approval for these financial
Bills is ‘without amendment or debate’. Thus far, it appears as if there is a
virtual abandonment of parliament’s role in assenting to the ‘demands of the
Crown’.
Limited time for the scrutiny of expenditure estimates is provided under
Standing Orders, which provide for three days per session to be allocated for
the consideration of estimates. The estimates to be considered are selected by
the Liaison Committee. The estimates selected for debate will generally be
those into which the select committee has inquired and reported.
Amendments may be tabled, including the reduction in the estimates.
Aside from this limited opportunity, any control which parliament
exercises is through the control of policy and the normal parliamentary
mechanisms for the scrutiny of government policy and administration.
Griffith and Ryle sum up the supply procedure as follows:
The House has largely abandoned all opportunities for direct control of public
expenditure by means of debate and vote on the estimates presented to the
House. Except on the three Estimates Days, there is no opportunity to amend
or negative any of the individual estimates, and the government secures
formal approval for its expenditure, without debate, in three or four block
votes each year. In place of formal direct control by Voting Supply, which for
many years has become theoretical, the House has increasingly relied on
informal indirect control through the exercise of its influence on policy,
through scrutiny of policy, administration and expenditure by departmentally
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related select committees and by ex post facto scrutiny of actual spending by the
Public Accounts Committee. [1989, p 251]
As the Public Accounts Committee Report to the House in 1987 admits,
‘Parliament’s consideration of annual estimates – the key constitutional
control – remains largely a formality’.46 The Public Accounts Committee was
established in 1861, for the purpose of examining accounts of departments
following the submission of reports from the National Audit Office. The work
of the Audit Office and the Committee and recent reforms are considered in
Chapter 16. 
Taxation (ways and means)
In relation to taxation – ways and means – the role of parliamentary scrutiny
is rather different. The initiative in tax policies lies with the Treasury, under
the political direction of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.47
The starting point for the annual cycle is the Chancellor’s Budget in the
Spring or Autumn wherein, as Erskine May points out, ‘the Chancellor
develops his views of the resources of the country, communicates his
calculations of probable income and expenditure and declares whether the
burdens upon the people are to be increased or diminished’.
The Budget48
The Budget is the annual statement of tax proposals for the forthcoming year,
together with the government’s expenditure plans for the following three
years. At the end of the Budget speech, the ways and means resolutions are
tabled. These resolutions form the basis for the main debate on the Budget,
which lasts for between three and five days. The Finance Bill is then
introduced and, within three to four weeks, will receive its second reading.
The Bill then stands committed, in part, to a Committee of the Whole House
and to a standing committee. The size of the standing committee for
consideration of the Finance Bill is larger than the normal composition, and
will have about 30 to 40 Members. Hundreds of amendments are generally
proposed to Finance Bills, although not all of these will be debated. 
Income tax rates are effective only until the end of the tax year and require
annual renewal under the Finance Act. The authority to collect taxes expires
on 5 April each year. The Finance Act becomes law in July. In Bowles v Bank of
England (1913), the legality of taxation was considered. On 2 April 1912, the
House of Commons passed a resolution approving the income tax rate for the
year beginning 6 April 1912. The plaintiff had purchased stocks. The Bank
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deducted income tax from dividends due on 1 July at the new tax rate before
the Consolidated Fund Act authorising the new rate had been passed by
parliament. The plaintiff sought a declaration that the Bank was not entitled to
deduct the tax until approved by parliament. Parker J stated that:
The question for decision is, does a resolution of the House of Commons
authorise the Crown to levy on the subject an income tax assented to by such
resolution but not yet imposed by Act of Parliament?
By the Statute of 1 William and Mary, usually known as the Bill of Rights, it
was finally settled that there could be no taxation in this country except under
the authority of Act of Parliament. The Bill of Rights remains unrepealed and
no practice or custom can be relied on by the Crown as justifying any
infringement of its provisions.
It follows, therefore, that no resolution ... has any legal effect whatsoever ...
Such resolutions are necessitated by parliamentary procedure and adopted
with a view to the protection of the subject against the hasty imposition of
taxes, and it would be strange to find them relied on as justifying the Crown in
levying a tax before such tax is actually imposed by Act of Parliament.
Bowles v Bank of England led to the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act 1913,49
which gives statutory authority to resolutions, as if imposed by Act of
Parliament. In Attorney General v Wilts United Dairies Ltd (1921), the Food
Controller had, under a regulation of 1919, established a pricing structure for
the issue of licences for milk purchase. The company claimed that the Food
Controller had no power to impose conditions of payment in granting licences
and that the condition amounted to a tax, which could not be imposed
without clear and distinct legal authority. Lord Justice Atkin declared that:
... in view of the historic struggle of the Legislature to secure to itself the sole
power to levy money on its subjects, its complete success in that struggle, the
elaborate means adopted by the representative House to control the amount,
the conditions and purposes of the levy, the circumstances would be
remarkable indeed which would induce the court to believe that the
Legislature had sacrificed all the well known checks and precautions and not
in express words but, by mere implication, had entrusted a Minister of the
Crown with undefined and unlimited powers of imposing charges upon the
subject for purposes connected with his department.
The Provisional Collection of Taxes Act 1968 requires that the resolutions
passed be confirmed by the second reading of the Bill relating to the tax
within 25 days of the House approving the resolution. It also provides that
their statutory effect shall continue only until 5 August if passed in April or
March, or for four months if passed at any other time. It is this, then, that sets
the deadline for the passage of the Finance Act.
Note that the Finance Act is not usually a Money Bill for the purposes of
the Parliament Act 1911, since it deals with wider matters than those listed in
section 1(2) of the Act. Accordingly, unless certified by the Speaker to be a
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Money Bill, the Finance Bill will pass through the Lords in the usual manner.
By convention, however, in relation to a Finance Bill, the House of Lords has
relinquished any effective role in relation to taxation or expenditure. 
SCRUTINY OF LEGISLATION BY THE HOUSE OF LORDS
Some Bills will start their life in the House of Lords and, once successfully
passed in the Lords, will pass to the Commons for debate and scrutiny. Law
Reform Bills, in particular, are regularly introduced in the House of Lords,
under the aegis of the Lord Chancellor. The majority of Bills, however, start
their parliamentary life in the Commons. Detailed consideration will be given
to the House of Lords’ role in legislation in Chapter 17. Note, however, that,
unless the Parliament Act procedure is used (which limits the role of the
House of Lords in relation to legislation), Bills which have completed their
passage in the Commons are passed to the House of Lords which employs,
with some notable differences, the same legislative stages as the House of
Commons. The House of Lords may propose amendments to Bills, the
acceptance or rejection of which will be a matter for negotiation between the
two Houses.
THE ROYAL ASSENT
Receiving the royal assent represents the final stage in the enactment of
legislation. The royal assent is a prerogative act; for further discussion of this,
see Chapter 6. The giving of the royal assent is not a matter which involves the
Monarch personally. No monarch since 1854 has given the royal assent,
although the power to do so still remains. When royal assent is required, the
Lord Chancellor submits a list of Bills ready for the Assent. In the House of
Lords, attended by the Commons with the Speaker, the Clerk of the
Parliaments reads the title of the Bills for assent and pronounces the assent in
Norman French. Once assent has been given, it is notified to each House of
Parliament by the Speaker of the House.50
PARLIAMENT AND EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY LEGISLATION
The manner in which Community law is enacted and takes effect within the
United Kingdom is considered in Chapters 8 and 9. Note here that some
Community legislation becomes directly applicable within the United
Kingdom without any enactment by parliament. Accordingly, it is of
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particular importance that parliament has the opportunity to scrutinise both
proposals for Community legislation and legislation which has been enacted.
In addition to periodic debates on Europe, parliament sets aside time at
Question Time for European Community matters to be considered.
Furthermore, ministers make regular statements to parliament concerning
decisions reached in the Council of Ministers. 
The House of Commons has established a Select Committee on European
Legislation. The House of Lords also has a Select Committee on the European
Community. Both committees consider delegated legislation which is being
introduced to give effect to Community law and also scrutinise legislative
proposals for future European Community law.
In addition to the select committees, the Commons has established two
standing committees for the consideration of European matters. The select
committee may refer such documentation to the standing committees as it
thinks fit. The standing committees, comprising 13 Members, report to the
House on matters referred to them.
Finally, successive governments have undertaken not to agree to
important European legislative proposals until these have been considered by
the committees. However, the effectiveness of these undertakings must be put
in doubt by the increasing use of majority voting in the Council of Ministers,
which makes it difficult for individual Member States to ‘block’ any proposed
legislation.
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CHAPTER 16
The concept of responsible government and the fundamental principle of
ministerial responsibility were considered in Chapter 11. The structure of
central government was considered in Chapter 10. In Chapter 14, the
composition of the House of Commons was introduced. It will be recalled that
the Commons comprises Her Majesty’s government, which is drawn from the
political party winning the largest number of seats at a general election,
government backbenchers, Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition, comprising the
Leader of the Opposition and Opposition spokesmen, who comprise the
shadow Cabinet, and Opposition backbenchers, and Members of other
minority political parties. 
With the composition of the House of Commons in mind – and, to a lesser
extent, that of the House of Lords – and the functions which parliament is
designed to fulfil, the issue which must now be addressed is the procedures
by which the House of Commons scrutinises government action in order that
an evaluation may be made as to the quality of that scrutiny. Consistent with
the doctrine of responsible government, the accountability of government
towards the democratic legislature is of fundamental importance in ensuring
that the government acts under the law and in accordance with the principles
of constitutionalism and democracy. In order to evaluate the role of
parliament in ensuring compliance with these constitutional doctrines, the
procedural mechanisms of the House must be examined. 
QUESTION TIME1
Question Time in the House of Commons is one of the most publicised
features of parliament and represents one of the principal means by which
information is obtained from ministers by Members of Parliament and the
public, and of underpinning individual ministerial responsibility. See Chapter
11. 
Standing Orders provide that, from Monday to Thursday, the period from
2.35 pm to 3.30 pm is set aside for Question Time.2 On Mondays, Tuesdays
and Thursdays, ministers from several departments may answer Questions,
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appearing on a rota, determined by the government,3 which ensures that most
departments feature in Question Time at least once every three to four weeks. 
The Speaker calls the first Member listed on the Order of Business. The
minister then answers the question, and the Member is able to ask a
supplementary question. When that has been answered, the Speaker may then
call on other Members to ask their supplementary questions. The time
allocated to supplementary questions is within the Speaker’s discretion.
Currently, about 15 to 20 questions are answered orally on each day. The
effect of the supplementary is that a Member is able to pose a question for
which no notice has been given.
Questions may be put to ministers for either oral or written answers.
Questions requiring written answers, which are to be printed in the Official
Journal, are marked with a ‘W’. Those questions tabled for oral answer are
randomly ordered by the Table Office of the House and printed on the Order
Paper of the day. Between 100 and 150 questions may be put to a minister on a
single day. As a result, only a few will receive an oral reply. However, those
which do not receive an oral reply will receive a written reply published in the
Official Report of the House. The number of questions which an individual
Member of Parliament may have pending at any one time is eight during a
period of ten sitting days, and not more than two on any one day, of which
not more than one may be addressed to any one minister.4 Questions put
down for written answer – which may be for either a priority or non-priority
answer – are less subject to restrictions and there is no limit on the number of
questions which may be put down.
Prime Ministerial Question Time
Prime Minister’s Question Time has been moved from the conventional 15
minute sessions on Tuesdays and Thursdays, to Wednesdays, when the Prime
Minister answers questions for 30 minutes.5 It is felt that more meaningful
and in-depth scrutiny is facilitated by the reform. 
Questions put to the Prime Minister simply request that the Prime
Minister list his engagements for the day. Over 100 such questions may
appear on the Order Papers; on occasions, this number has risen to over 200.
The purpose of this form of open question, which has been adopted since the
1970s, is to avoid the possibility that the Prime Minister will simply refer the
questioner to the minister having responsibility for a particular matter. The
open question also avoids the possibility – given the rules of notice for
questions – that a question put to the Prime Minister will be politically stale.
The open question, therefore, provides a neutral peg on which to hang a
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Scrutiny of the Executive
supplementary, and real, question. Only two supplementary questions per
Member are allowed. Supplementary questions may concern any matter for
which the Prime Minister carries responsibility or matters which do not fall
within any individual minister’s responsibility. For example, if a question is
addressed to the Prime Minister which should be addressed to the Secretary
of State for Social Security, the Prime Minister will decline to answer and
suggest that the matter be referred to the responsible minister. Generally,
however, the issue raised will be one of general government policy in relation
to matters such as the economy, unemployment, European or other
international affairs. The strength of Prime Ministerial Question Time lies in
the lack of notice given and the need for the Prime Minister to demonstrate his
competence across the full range of government policy. 
The Leader of the Opposition does not table questions for oral answer to
the Prime Minister. Instead, by convention, the Leader of the Opposition is
given the opportunity to put one or more supplementary questions to the
Prime Minister and, because of the open ended nature of the primary
question, it is possible for the Opposition Leader to raise virtually any aspect
of government policy. For the observer, this is frequently parliament at its
best, providing the opportunity – for Question Time is televised – to witness
the leaders of the two main political parties in oral combat. As Griffith and
Ryle observe:
Here is experienced the direct confrontation of the Prime Minister and the
Leader of the Opposition in its most concentrated and highly charged form. It
is an opportunity no Leader of the Opposition can afford to neglect. It is also
the occasion when the Prime Minister can be most critically tested, and various
commentators or experienced observers have testified to how carefully the
Prime Minister has to prepare for this ordeal. Success or failure on these
occasions can greatly strengthen or seriously weaken the political standing of
the two protagonists. [1989, pp 356–57]
A selection of questions put to the Prime Minister on 20 March 2001 included
the following matters:
• the level of strikes;
• workers’ rights;
• the European Union;
• troops in Afghanistan;
• the proposed ban on hunting;
• street crime;
• Gibraltar and sovereignty;
• government support for sport;
• the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth;
• House of Lords reform;
• funding and health care provision.
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The role of the Speaker
The rules concerning questions have been developed over time by the Speaker
of the House, who is responsible for enforcing them. Only questions on
matters which are directly within a minister’s responsibility may be put and in
addition, by convention, there exists a range of issues which may not form the
subject of questions in the House. The following matters are not subject to
Question Time:
(a) questions bringing the Sovereign directly before parliament, or questions
reflecting on the Sovereign;
(b) questions concerning issues on which the Prime Minister has given advice
to the Crown in relation to the royal prerogative: the grant of honours,
ecclesiastical patronage, appointment and dismissal of Privy Councillors
or the dissolution of parliament;
(c) questions not relating to the individual responsibility of the relevant
minister. Accordingly, questions relating to organisations under the
control of authorities other than parliament (for example, the Stock
Exchange, trade unions and nationalised industries) are not permitted.6
The following subjects are also excluded:
• local authorities and nationalised industries;
• personal powers of the Monarch;
• internal affairs of other countries;
• questions which have previously been put, or on which a minister has
previously refused to answer, or to which the answer is a matter of public
record;
• defence and national security;
• Cabinet business, and advice given to ministers by civil servants;
• questions seeking legal advice;
• questions which raise issues so broad as to be incapable of reply within the
time constraints;
• trivial or irrelevant questions;
• questions aiming to criticise judges;
• questions on matters which are sub judice;
• questions posed in unparliamentary language.7
The volume of parliamentary questions
The volume of questions put down for oral or written answer on average
amount to some 40,000 per parliamentary session. In 1998–99, 5,008 questions
were put down for oral answer and 32,149 were put down for a written
answer, giving a total of 37,157 questions. In the short 2000–01 session, 2,780
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questions were put down for oral answer and 16,417 put down for written
answer. Figures such as these emphasise one of the most important functions
of Question Time: the accountability of government. A superficial observation
of Question Time may prompt scepticism as to its value. The charge is
frequently made that Question Time is no more than a theatrical occasion,
with ministers fully briefed by the Civil Service giving prepared answers to
questions posed within the rules as to notice and substance. Questions are not
limited to the Opposition parties and may, accordingly, come from the
government’s own supporters. This feature leads to the comment that
questions are planted by government supporters in order to give a minister
the opportunity to promote the government’s view or boast about its
achievements. To exaggerate such claims would be to miss a point of prime
importance about Question Time, that of the provision of information. Every
answer given, oral or written, becomes a matter of public record, thus
providing a wealth of data about the workings of government.
Question Time is not a spontaneous affair, and it should not necessarily be
criticised for not being so. Members wishing to ask questions are required to
give a minimum of three sitting days’ notice, and a maximum of ten days’
notice. This time span for notice is designed to ensure both that there is
adequate opportunity for ministers to prepare answers and that the issue
being raised is still fresh and relevant.
Private notice questions
A private notice question8 is an oral question put to a minister without the
need to observe the normal rules as to notice. Standing Orders define private
notice questions as raising matters which are: ‘... in the Speaker’s opinion, of
an urgent character, and relate either to matters of public importance or to the
arrangement of business.’ 
Private notice questions enable a matter of urgency to be raised for
immediate discussion in the period following Question Time. Because private
notice questions take priority over other parliamentary business, rules provide
that a Member who wishes to put such a question must give notice to the
Speaker before noon on the day he seeks to put the question, and the Speaker
has absolute discretion as to whether to allow or disallow the question to be
put.9 Many applications for a private notice question are made, but few are
granted.
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APPLICATIONS FOR EMERGENCY 
ADJOURNMENT DEBATES
Under Standing Orders,10 any Member of Parliament may apply to the
Speaker to raise an urgent matter for debate.11 If granted, the matter will be
raised immediately after Question Time and private notice questions, if any.
At that time, the matter is briefly introduced and a substantive three hour
debate will be arranged for the following day. Because emergency debates
disrupt the parliamentary timetable, they are confined to matters deemed to
be of urgent national importance, and applications are sparingly granted
(normally only one or two per session). In the 1991–93 session, there were 19
unsuccessful applications for an emergency debate and one successful
application,12 whereas in 1998–99, there were a mere three unsuccessful
applications, and in 2000–01 only seven.
DAILY ADJOURNMENT DEBATES
At the close of the parliamentary day, under Standing Orders, the opportunity
is provided for backbenchers to initiate a short debate on a matter of their
choosing. Competition for a debate is keen and Members take part in a ballot
held in the Speaker’s Office for the opportunity. If successful, the Member
may speak for 15 minutes on the chosen subject and the relevant minister is
given 15 minutes for reply. The subject matter for debate is as varied as are
Members’ interests. The matter raised may be one of relevance solely to the
Member’s constituency or the matter may be related to a particular source of
general concern. 
EARLY DAY MOTIONS
Behind this curious colloquial term, lies one of the least well known or
evaluated parliamentary processes. An Early Day Motion (EDM) is a written
motion tabled in parliament requesting a debate ‘at an early day’. Any
Member of Parliament may table an EDM, on any subject matter, subject to a
few procedural rules.13
EDMs originated in the mid-nineteenth century. Before that time, the
parliamentary timetable was relaxed and Members had adequate opportunity
to raise matters for subsequent debate in the House. As pressure for time in
the House increased, the practice developed of Members giving notice that
they intended to raise a particular matter for debate at some future,
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unspecified, date. These notices were formally recorded from 1865 in the daily
papers of the House and today appear on the Motions Notice Paper, which
forms part of the daily ‘Vote Bundle’ – the working papers of the House.
The purpose of tabling an EDM is not only to express a view and request a
debate, but also to test the strength of feeling in the House over the matter
involved. An EDM may be tabled by one Member or by several, and other
Members may add their names in support. Some EDMs are tabled by the
Leader of the Opposition: for example, EDM No 351 of 1978–79, supported by
five other senior Conservative Members led to a debate on 28 March 1979,
which resulted in the resignation of the government and the subsequent
general election. The Opposition may also table motions giving notice of a
prayer to annul a statutory instrument; see Chapter 15.
Many EDMs are tabled by Members of all parties on a particular issue.
These ‘all-party’ EDMs are increasing, as is the volume of EDMs generally,
and provide an important outlet for the expression of views across party lines. 
Once tabled, an EDM remains current for the duration of the
parliamentary session and may or may not attract considerable support
within the House. Between 1948–49 and 1990–91, 29 EDMs have attracted over
300 signatures.
The rules and restrictions on EDMs are few, and are consistent with the
general rules concerning motions. Thus, the motion must be worded in
parliamentary language, must not relate to a matter which is sub judice and is
limited to 250 words. Within these limits, a Member may table an EDM on
any subject. 
The volume of EDMs tabled per parliamentary session reveals their
increasing popularity as a means of expression of, primarily, backbench
opinion.
Number of early day motions tabled in selected sessions
1945–46  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
1965–66  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .164
1974–75  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .759
1983–84  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,058
1987–88  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,601
1992–93  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,595
1995–96  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,246
2000–01  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .659
In terms of the number of debates which flow from EDMs, their success rate
must be regarded as low. The EDM censuring the government tabled by the
Rt Hon Mrs Thatcher in 1979 is a rarity, both in terms of securing a debate and
in the dramatic effect of signalling the fall of a government. The occasional
success of the EDM was again seen in 1988 in relation to the Education Reform
Bill 1988. There, two senior Conservative front-bench Members, Norman
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Tebbit and Michael Heseltine, tabled a motion calling for the abolition of the
Inner London Education Authority: a matter which was contrary to the then
policy of the Secretary of State for Education, Kenneth Baker. The EDM was
supported by 120 other Conservative backbenchers and caused the Secretary
of State to amend the Bill.14
Notwithstanding such rare examples of EDMs having important political
and legal effects, the overall significance of the EDM should not be
underestimated. Depending on the volume of support a particular EDM
attracts, it represents an expression of the mood of the House across a whole
spectrum of issues which places pressure on the government to respond. For
example, the all-party ‘Parliament First’ group of MPs in 2001 put down an
EDM calling for the strengthening of parliament in terms of scrutiny of the
executive. Over 150 MPs put their names to it. The dramatic rise in the
number of EDMs per session since the early 1980s to the current day attests to
their popularity as a vehicle for the expression of views and concerns. The
EDM has been described as the ‘graffiti board’ of parliament, signalling to
government the issues and concerns of Members. Where the rules of the
House prevent a Member from expressing a view in Debate, perhaps because
he cannot catch the Speaker’s eye, or by means of a question, perhaps because
of ministerial responsibility or because the subject matter falls within one of
the excluded categories, the EDM may represent the only vehicle for
expression.
SELECT COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
Select committees in the House of Commons are of some antiquity, although
the current structure of committees dates back only to 1979. Select committees
take several forms. Domestic committees include Accommodation and Works,
Administration, Catering and Information. Administration committees
include Broadcasting, Standards and Privileges, Procedure, Selection,
Standing Orders and the Modernisation Committee. There are also
committees to deal with the scrutiny of proposed legislation, including the
Deregulation Committee, European Legislation Committee, Statutory
Instruments (Joint Committee and Consolidation of Bills (Joint Committee). In
addition there is the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which considers
human rights issues and proposals for remedial orders made under the
Human Rights Act 1998. The majority of these committees are established
under Standing Orders of the House.
The current system of departmentally-related select committees was
established in 1979 as a result of dissatisfaction with the then current
arrangements for the monitoring of government departments.15 The report of
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the Select Committee on Procedure16 recommended that 12 new committees
be established, seeing their role as being one of enabling the House as a whole
to exercise effective control and stewardship over ministers and the
expanding bureaucracy of the modern state for which they are answerable.17
Following debate in the House,18 the proposals were approved and
implemented. In debate, the Leader of the House,19 described the proposals as:
... a necessary preliminary to the more effective scrutiny of government ... and
opportunity for closer examination of departmental policy ... an important
contribution to greater openness in government, of a kind that is in accord
with our parliamentary arrangements and our constitutional tradition.
Functions of select committees
The functions of departmentally-related committees are defined as being:
(a) to send for persons, papers and records, to sit notwithstanding any
adjournments of the House, to adjourn from place to place and to report
from time to time;
(b) to appoint specialist advisers, either to supply information which is not
readily available or to elucidate matters of complexity within the
committee’s order of reference;
(c) to report from time to time the minutes of evidence taken before sub-
committees; and
(d) to report to the House their opinion and observations upon any matters
referred to them for their consideration, together with minutes of evidence
taken before them, and also to make a special report of any matters which
they may think fit to bring to the notice of the House.
The scope of power granted to select committees is very broad. It is for the
committee to determine, within the confines of the work of the department,
what subject matter to examine and to determine what evidence the
committee needs to assist in its examination. To facilitate the working of select
committees, each has a permanent staff of some three to four, and some
committees have the power, under Standing Orders, to establish sub-
committees.
The committee structure
The departmental select committees and their related departments are as
follows:
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Departmental Select Committees
SELECT COMMITTEE GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS NUMBER 
OF MEMBERS
Agriculture Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries 11
and Food
Culture, Media and Sport Heritage Department 11
Defence Ministry of Defence 11
Education and Employment Department of Education and 17
Employment
Environment, Transport Department of Environment, 17
and Regional Affairs Transport and Regional Affairs
Foreign Affairs Foreign and Commonwealth Office 12
Health Department of Health 11
Home Affairs Home Office, Lord Chancellor’s 11
Department, Attorney General’s 
Office, Crown Prosecution Service, 
Serious Fraud Office
International Development Department for International Development 11
Northern Ireland Affairs Northern Ireland Office 13
Science and Technology Office of Science and Technology 11
Scottish Affairs Scottish Office, Lord Advocate’s 
Department 11
Social Security Department of Social Security 11
Trade and Industry Department of Trade and Industry 11
Treasury Treasury Office, Office of Public 
Service and Science, Board of 
Customs and Excise, 
Inland Revenue 12
Welsh Affairs Welsh Office 11
The Liaison Committee
The task of co-ordinating the work of select committees falls to the Liaison
Committee, first established in 1967, the membership of which comprises all
the Chairmen of the departmentally-related select committees, and the
Chairmen of the Public Accounts Committee and the European Legislation
Select Committee. Its role is defined as being:
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(a) to consider general matters relating to the work of select committees; and
(b) to give such advice relating to the work of select committees as may be
sought by the House of Commons Commission.20
Membership of select committees
Membership of select committees, unlike that of standing committees,21 lasts
for the life of a parliament, thus providing stability of membership22 and the
opportunity for Members to develop a degree of expertise in the subject matter.
Membership is largely limited, by convention, to backbenchers. The only
ministers who are members are the Leader of the House,23 the government
Deputy Chief Whip24 and the Financial Secretary to the Treasury.25 Opposition
front-bench spokesmen are not appointed to select committees.
Competition for membership of select committees is keen, particularly for
the high profile committees. The political party whips have great influence, if
not total control, over membership. The Committee of Selection, itself a select
committee, is made up of senior Members of the House drawn from all
political parties. The party whips make nominations to the committee which in
turn reports to the House for approval. The strength of each political party
overall in the House is reflected, largely but not totally accurately, in the
membership of select committees, thus giving to the committee an legitimacy
approximate to that of the House as a whole. In July 2000, the Liaison
Committee recommended that control over membership of select committees
by the whips should be ended and appointments be placed in the hands of a
panel of Members of Parliament. The government rejected the proposal.
Committee chairmanship
It might reasonably be assumed that the chairmanship of the committees always
fell to Members of the government’s own party, but this is not the case, and
select committees may be chaired by a Member of any political party. The
decision as to which party should chair a particular committee is a matter for
negotiation between government and Opposition. Once that decision has been
reached, it is for the committee members, under the ‘advice’ of the whips,
formally to elect the chairman.
The significance of the sharing of chairs between government and
opposition parties lies in the attempt to minimise party political conflict, in
order to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the scrutiny to be brought
to bear on government departments. Once appointed, the chairman acts with
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complete impartiality. Select committees are designed to operate on the basis
of broad consensus as to aims and objectives, and to produce a single
authoritative report to parliament as a whole. It is not usual for the committee
to vote on party lines although, in highly controversial matters, this may
occasionally be inevitable. If the committee intends to be critical of the
government in its report, it is necessary for at least one Member of the
government party to agree with the criticism(s). 
The work of select committees illustrated
The inquiries undertaken by select committees are both broad ranging and in
depth. It is entirely a matter for the committee to determine what subject to
investigate and, accordingly, every aspect of government administration is
potentially susceptible to inquiry. In the past, for example, select committees
have inquired into the conduct of the Falklands War26 and the banning of
trade union membership at the Government’s Communication Headquarters
(GCHQ).27 The committees have investigated such matters as the Westland
Helicopter affair; arms to Iraq; salmonella in eggs; and the loss of the Maxwell
pension funds, on which, see, further, below. The wide ranging nature of
inquiries undertaken is illustrated in the subject matter chosen by just two of
the committees in the 1998–99 session:
Reports of the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
December 2001 to February 200228
• Human Rights Annual Report;
• Zimbabwe;
• Laeken European Council;
• Appointment of Parliamentary Representatives to the Convention on the
Future of Europe;
• British-US Relations.
Inquiries undertaken by the Home Affairs Committee 2000–0129
• Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill 2001;
• Criminal Records Bureau;
• Border Controls;
• Drugs and the Law.
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The co-operation of government
It has been seen above that committees have the power to send for ‘persons
and papers’. The work of select committees would be much impaired if the
committee was obstructed in its attempt to gain access to evidence. The Select
Committee on Procedure had suggested, inter alia, that there should be power
to compel ministers to attend and to give evidence. That recommendation was
rejected by the government, on the basis that select committees should not
have power to issue orders to ministers – such a power lay with the House
alone. Accordingly, there is no formal requirement that the government co-
operate with select committees. However, the Leader of the House has
undertaken that:
... every Minister, from the most senior Cabinet Minister to the most junior
Under Secretary, will do all in his or her power to co-operate with the new
system of committees and to make it a success.30
For the most part, governments do co-operate with the committees, but limits
to this co-operation can be perceived through an examination of four
instances. 
The Westland affair
In the aftermath of the Westland Helicopter affair, during which both the
Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Heseltine, and the Secretary of State for
Trade and Industry, Leon Brittan, resigned,31 three select committees inquired
into the matter.32 When the Select Committee on Defence announced its
intention to inquire into the matter, the government refused to allow
witnesses from the Department of Trade and Industry, in particular the
Director of Information, to whom a leak of the Solicitor General’s letter had
been attributed, to give evidence to the committee. The government’s
justification for this refusal was that the giving of evidence by a senior civil
servant to a parliamentary committee would have major implications for the
conduct of government and for relations between ministers and their civil
servants. This refusal had two implications. First, it meant that parliament was
unable to check the accuracy of statements made by the Prime Minister in the
House, or those made by Leon Brittan in relation to the leaked letter. The
second implication was that the civil servants concerned were neither able to
explain nor to defend their actions. 
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Salmonella in eggs
In 1988, a junior Health Minister, Edwina Currie, resigned office, subsequent
to public comments made about alleged contamination of eggs. Her remarks
that ‘most eggs produced in the country’ were infected with salmonella had
an immediate impact on the sale and consumption of eggs, causing financial
damage to egg producers. The Select Committee on Agriculture invited Mrs
Currie to give evidence to the committee, but Mrs Currie declined. Following
an exchange of letters which involved the select committee chairman insisting
that it was for the committee, and not Mrs Currie, to decide whether or not
she should give evidence, Mrs Currie grudgingly agreed to appear. In the
event, her evidence proved, as she had indicated that it would, unhelpful.
The Maxwell pension fund
During the 1991–92 session, the Social Services Select Committee was
enquiring into the mismanagement of pension funds by the Mirror
Newspaper Group’s recently deceased Chairman, Mr Robert Maxwell. Mr
Maxwell’s sons, both holding prominent positions in the Group before their
father’s death, and subsequently assuming control of the companies, were
summoned to give evidence. The Maxwells refused, relying on a claimed right
to silence in the light of imminent criminal charges and the risk of jeopardising
their own fair trial. The committee chairman wanted the Maxwells to be
charged with contempt of parliament (see Chapter 18), but no action was
taken.
Arms to Iraq
In February 1992, the Select Committee on Trade and Industry examined the
sale of equipment to Iraq during the conflict in the Gulf.33 The equipment
involved was piping which allegedly could be used to manufacture a missile
launcher – a ‘supergun’. That inquiry was frustrated by the alleged refusal of
the Attorney General and others to give details of the information known to
the Department of Trade and Industry when the export licence was granted.
Subsequently, three directors of the company Matrix Churchill were
prosecuted by Customs and Excise for breach of the restrictions on the export
of military equipment contrary to the Import, Exports and Customs Powers
(Defence) Act 1939 by obtaining export licences by deception. The prosecution
was halted when Alan Clark34 revealed in court that there had been no
deception, since the government was fully aware of the exports and their
intended usage. The trial collapsed and prompted a judicial inquiry headed
by Sir Richard Scott. The affair has involved allegations of a cover up on the
part of the government and has given rise to serious questions concerning the
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role and use of public interest immunity certificates, by the use of which,
information may be withheld from the courts ‘in the public interest’.35
The power of select committees to compel witnesses to give
evidence
The extent to which ministers and civil servants can be made to give evidence
detracts from the effectiveness of select committee inquiries and from effective
parliamentary scrutiny of the administration of government. The Select
Committee on Procedure had examined its powers to call for ‘persons and
papers’ in 1977–78.36 The committee accepted that Members of the House
Commons could be invited, but not compelled, to attend. Compulsory
attendance could only be effected by an Order of the House.37 In light of the
limitations, the committee recommended that their powers be increased to
include the right to order the attendance of ministers to give evidence, and to
order the production of papers and records by all ministers, including
Secretaries of State.38 Were the minister not to co-operate, the committee
proposed that it should make a special report to the House and to table a
motion for an address for parliamentary debate on the minister’s conduct. The
recommendation was not, however, implemented. 
Reform of parliamentary evidence rules
The problem of witnesses who attend but who give evidence which is either
untruthful or which paints only half the picture – a problem faced by
parliament in its committee inquiries into the Arms to Iraq affair, about which
Sir Richard Scott was particularly critical – was considered in Chapter 10. In a
further attempt to strengthen parliament’s powers over its Members, and
witnesses giving evidence to its committees, since January 1997, new rules
have applied. Persons giving evidence are now required to take a formal oath.
Anyone found to have lied to parliament may be reported to the Crown
Prosecution Service with a view to prosecution for perjury, which, in the event
of conviction, could lead to a maximum prison sentence of seven years. Where
the person is a Member of Parliament, the committee will ask the Commons to
vote to remove the Member’s immunity from prosecution.
The move was in part presaged by the David Willett’s affair, in which the
former Paymaster General was accused by the Committee on Standards and
Privileges of having ‘dissembled’ in his evidence over whether he had tried to
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influence a parliamentary inquiry into the cash for questions affair.39 As
discussed in Chapter 18, the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privileges
recommended in 1999 that a new Parliamentary Privileges Act be introduced
and that the failure to answer questions or produce necessary evidence to
committees should be made a criminal offence.
Select committee reports
At the conclusion of a select committee inquiry, a report will be drawn up.
The committee aims to produce an authoritative, unanimous report which is
presented to parliament. The degree of consensus over a particular issue
within the committee membership will dictate the extent to which unanimity
can be achieved. Griffith and Ryle comment that ‘the committees have
managed to achieve a high degree of unanimity in their finding and
recommendations’ (1989, pp 520–21). This ‘high degree’ is recognised by
Griffith and Ryle to be one achieved where the matter is not politically
controversial between the parties, and that the need for unanimity may result
in committees avoiding ‘some of the big issues of the day’. Two illustrations
are offered by Griffith and Ryle. The first relates to the Foreign Affairs
Committee investigation40 into the sinking of the General Belgrano during the
Falklands War in May 1982.41 In the inquiry, the membership of the
committee had divided cleanly along party lines and the end result was a
‘dissenting’ report by four Opposition Members. On the other hand, the
Defence Committee investigation into the Westland affair, despite political
disagreement during the investigation, nonetheless resulted in a unanimous
report.
Approximately one-third of all reports published will be debated on the
floor of the House. This fact is one which also gives rise to criticism of select
committee effectiveness, although it must be conceded that the time given for
debate on reports has increased in recent years. Parliamentary procedure does
not make specific provision for debate on reports. The Procedure Committee
has suggested that eight days per session should be devoted to such debates
but this proposal has not been acted upon. Sufficient, but not too much,
weight should be attached to this alleged defect, and four arguments may be
advanced which limit its impact. The first relates to the commitment
undertaken by successive governments to respond to select committee
reports. Such an undertaking does not, of itself, ensure that the
recommendations of the committee will be implemented but it does ensure
that the government will react to any criticisms made and proposals put
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forward. Members of the committee and other interested Members of
Parliament, particularly the Opposition, will be slow to let an opportunity to
criticise government pass. The second argument centres on the information
gained through the process of the inquiry. It has been seen that ministers may
decline or refuse to answer questions fully, and that they can restrict the
extent to which civil servants may give evidence. Where a minister refuses to
co-operate with a select committee he will inevitably find media attention
focused upon him and some cogent justification for his reticence will have to
be forthcoming. For the most part, evidence suggests that there is a high
degree of ministerial co-operation with committees; this need not be seen as
being necessarily willing participation but, rather, a matter of political
prudence. 
Thirdly, it must be recognised that the reports emanating from select
committee inquiries are matters of public record, available both to Members of
Parliament and to the interested press and public. The information gathered
in the course of an inquiry becomes public information, information which,
before the introduction of the new committee structure, was often hidden
from the public gaze. Finally, the absence of debate on the floor of the House
in many cases will be justified by the pressure on the parliamentary timetable.
It may well be the case that debate on all reports is desirable in principle, but,
since 1979, over 900 reports have been published by select committees, of
varying significance and on a plethora of matters. On many matters, opening
debate to all Members of the House may involve a duplication of effort, with
non-specialist Members of Parliament inexpertly attempting to re-analyse the
information examined by the more specialised select committee Members. 
Evaluation
An evaluation of the work of select committees in relation to the
fundamentally important question concerning the accountability of
government must be approached with caution. The outcome of an appraisal is
inevitably related to the expectations which the appraiser holds and, as a
consequence, the evaluation of one commentator may not be the same as
another’s. Caution is also urged against the making of sweeping
generalisations as to the effectiveness of select committees which are diverse
in nature and operation. Many factors are involved in the analysis: the extent
to which media, and hence public, attention is focused on a particular enquiry;
the sensitivity of the subject matter; the degree of political consensus within
the committee; the extent to which governments are prepared to make time on
the floor of the House to debate select committee reports; the extent to which
select committee inquiries result in improved efficiency in government; and
the extent to which government and other witnesses co-operate with the
committees in the provision of information. All of these factors, and more,
must be put in the balance before any reasoned conclusions can be reached.
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Griffith and Ryle state that:
If we compare these committees with their predecessors, there is little doubt
that the new committees present a more formidable critical presence to
Ministers and departments. [1989, p 520]
Philip Norton comments that:
Committees are thus able to ensure that Ministers and civil servants are
subjected to scrutiny in a public authoritative forum, eking out explanations
and data that otherwise may not be forthcoming. In so doing, they have
ensured ... a greater transparency of departments, ensuring that their actions
are more visible to Parliament and to the public and outside groups. Through
issuing reports and recommendations, they also serve to have some impact on
departmental thinking. [1993, p 100]
At the heart of any evaluation must lie the recognition of the inherent tension
– already stressed in Chapter 15 in relation to the scrutiny of legislation –
between the legitimate right of the government to govern and the equally
legitimate right of parliament as a whole to ensure the collective
accountability of government and the individual responsibility of ministers. 
SCRUTINY OF NATIONAL FINANCE
In Chapter 15, the means by which the House of Commons scrutinises
proposals for taxation and expenditure was examined. In this section, the
manner in which parliament scrutinises the manner in which public money
has been spent is discussed. The responsibility for, and control over,
expenditure lies with the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The manner in which
parliament scrutinises public expenditure is through the Public Accounts
Select Committee which examines reports of audits conducted by the
Comptroller and Auditor General, who is head of the National Audit Office.42
The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) 
The committee was first established in 1861. The committee has the power to
examine the accounts ‘showing the appropriation of the sums granted by
parliament to meet the public expenditure, and of such other accounts laid
before parliament, as the committee may think fit’.43 The committee consists
of not more than 15 Members, of whom four represents a quorum. While the
composition of the committee represents (as does that of all select committees)
the party-political strength of the House, the PAC functions in a non-partisan
manner. By convention, the PAC’s Chairman is a Member of the Opposition.
The committee has the power to ‘send for persons, papers and records’ and to
Chapter 16: Constitutional and Administrative Law
514
42 National Audit Act 1983.
43 Standing Order No 122.
Scrutiny of the Executive
report from time to time.44 The PAC issues approximately 30 to 40 reports per
session.45
The principal function of the committee is to ensure that money is spent
for the purposes intended by parliament, and that money is spent effectively
and economically. The committee holds many meetings in public. One day
per session is set aside for debate of its reports. By critically examining the
expenditure of departments and assessing the extent to which expenditure
produces value for money, the PAC exerts considerable influence on
government. 
The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) 
The CAG is an officer of the House of Commons, appointed by the Crown,
and can be removed from office for misbehaviour only on the successful
moving of an address to both Houses of Parliament. As head of the National
Audit Office, the CAG’s function is to examine the economy, efficiency and
effectiveness with which bodies have used their resources in the pursuit of
policy.46 The CAG appoints his own staff, who are not civil servants. The
reports of the National Audit Office47 are recorded in the Weekly Information
Bulletin of the House of Commons and are available to the public. 
The CAG audits and certifies the accounts of over 450 departments and
bodies. Three significant areas of administration lie outside his jurisdiction:
nationalised industries, local authorities and private bodies. 
During the 1992–93 parliamentary session, the National Audit Office and
the Northern Ireland Audit Office published 67 reports, of which 21 formed
the basis of Public Accounts Committee reports in that session. Matters on
which the Public Accounts Committee reported in that session included the
sale of regional electricity companies, National Power, PowerGen and
Girobank plc; health service facilities for physically disabled persons; the
administration of legal aid in England and Wales, coastal defences in England;
overseas aid; and water and the environment. 
The independence of the CAG from government, backed by the non-
partisan Public Accounts Committee, provides powerful watchdog over the
administration of government and the expenditure of public money. It must,
however, be conceded that where serious overspending or the misuse of
public monies has already taken place, the scrutiny and report can only be
made ex post facto.
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46 National Audit Act 1983, ss 6 and 7.
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The Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000
Modernisation of the system of controlling the management of public finance
was effected with the Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000.48 In
brief, the Act provides for resource accounting and resources budgeting and
introduces a system whereby there are consolidated accounts for the whole of
the public sector (Whole of Government Accounts). The Act also provides for
the Treasury to establish Partnerships UK, a private sector body responsible
for the Private Finance Initiative, the system designed to facilitate the injection
of private money into government expenditure programmes. 
The Act sets out the criteria for the examination of accounts by the
Comptroller and Auditor General, who must be satisfied that:
(a) the accounts present a true and fair view;
(b) any money provided has been expended for the purposes intended by
parliament;
(c) any resources authorised by parliament have been used for the purposes
so authorised; and
(d) the department’s financial transactions are in accordance with any
relevant authority.
Chapter 16: Constitutional and Administrative Law
516
48 The Act is complex and its detailed provisions beyond the scope of this book. For
analysis, see White and Hollingsworth, 2001.
CHAPTER 17
INTRODUCTION
The majority of liberal democracies have bicameral legislatures, or legislatures
with two ‘chambers’ or ‘houses’.1 In the United Kingdom, the second
chamber, the Upper House – or House of Lords – is currently an unelected
chamber which has judicial, legislative, scrutinising and debating functions.2
The justifications for, and advantages of, a second chamber, irrespective of the
merits of the actual second chamber, are twofold. First, a second chamber
provides a forum for reflection, and for ‘second thoughts’ on policies and
legislative proposals. A second chamber provides for a diffusion rather than
concentration of power within parliament. Secondly, depending on the
allocation of power between the two chambers, the Upper House plays a
valuable role in the revision of legislation which has passed through the
Lower House. Such revision is of particular significance where the Lower
House is dominated by a government with a strong majority and also when –
irrespective of the political make up of the Lower House – procedures for
curtailing debate have been employed (see Chapter 15). The scrutiny, and
amendment, of Bills is equally important in improving the quality of the
statute book. As will be seen below, the House of Lords plays a major role in
statute revision. On occasion, such revision is contrary to the wish of the
Commons, which may choose to acquiesce in the Lords’ amendments rather
than employ the Parliament Act procedure which regulates the respective
powers of the two Houses of Parliament. On other occasions, however, the
revision undertaken in the Lords is either at the instance of the government
itself, which may choose to introduce amendments to Bills in the Lords, or by
Members of the House of Lords in order to improve the drafting of the Act. 
Until 1999, when the first stage of a major reform to the composition of the
House of Lords was implemented, the House of Lords was unique among
second legislative chambers. A majority of parliamentary democracies have
elected second chambers, or a second chamber which is part elected and part
nominated. By contrast, until 1999, the House of Lords was comprised of a
majority of unelected hereditary members and a minority of nominated
members. In 1999, the right of most hereditary peers to sit and vote in the
Lords was abolished, leaving the Lords with a majority of nominated and no
democratically elected members. Only Canada and Ireland have a
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1 Denmark, Sweden and New Zealand have unicameral parliaments.
2 See Bromhead, 1958; Morgan, 1975; Shell, 1992.
predominantly nominated second chamber. Before the 1997 general election,
the Labour Party had pledged to reform the House of Lords, regarding the
role of the unelected House as incompatible with modern democracy. Rather
than introduce wholesale reform immediately, however, the government
decided on a two stage reform. The first, which is largely but not wholly
accomplished, was to remove the right of the hereditaries to participate in
parliament. The second, which remains for the future, was to decide precisely
what form of composition was needed – whether fully elected or partly
elected and partly nominated – and the powers which the reformed second
chamber should have. In order to reach this decision, the government
established a Royal Commission, chaired by Lord Wakeham, to consider the
issue and make recommendations. While this second stage of reform was
expected to be implemented during the Labour government’s first parliament,
it was decided to postpone the second stage. Details of the reforms, achieved
and proposed, are discussed below.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW3
The origins of the House of Lords lie in the councils summoned by English
Kings in the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries, in order to give advice,
decide on appeal cases and, under certain circumstances, to make financial
grants to the King. These ‘King’s Councils’ had developed into a form which
is recognisable today by 1295, then being an assembly of the ‘three estates of
the realm’, the clergy, barons and commons – ‘those who pray, those who
fight, those who work’. From the earliest times, both spiritual and secular
hereditary peers formed the membership of the House of Lords, by which
name it became known in the sixteenth century. Maitland (1908) asserts that
the separation into two Houses occurred around the middle of the fourteenth
century, although Stubbs (1880) contends that the two bodies were separate
from the earliest time. The functions of the two Houses also differed: it was for
the Lords to advise the King, and it was for the Commons to consent to the
King’s proposals. By 1330, parliament was to meet annually,4 at least once but
more times as summonsed. Nevertheless, as seen in Chapter 6, the sitting of
parliament was a matter for the King to determine and, between 1364 and
1689, there were many years in which no parliament met, the longest period
being 11 years, during which time Charles I ruled under the prerogative.
The House of Lords, until 1999, comprised a majority of hereditary non-
spiritual (secular or temporal) peers,5 along with life peers (nominated
members) and 26 Archbishops and Bishops. Before the seventeenth century,
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5 The Lords Temporal (secular peers) comprise in order of precedence after the Prince of
Wales (from 1302), Dukes (from 1337), Marquesses (from 1385), Earls, Viscounts and
Barons. Other members of the Royal Family entitled to sit are the Duke of Edinburgh,
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the power of the Lords Spiritual was great. In the 1453–54 parliamentary
session, to take but one typical example of historical membership, the
membership of the House of Lords was two Archbishops, 18 Bishops, 27
abbots and priors, five dukes, 11 earls, three viscounts and 44 barons: a total of
111. With the suppression of the monasteries, spiritual peers were excluded
from parliament and, from this time, the Upper House became a
predominantly secular body. The growth in the number of secular, or
temporal, peers stems from the reign of James I (1603–25), with 96 sitting in
his last parliament. By 1685, in the reign of James II, the number had increased
to 145. The Lords Spiritual were totally excluded from parliament between
1642 and 1661.
An early conflict between the House of Commons and House of Lords and
the King occurred in 1649, when by a vote of the Commons it was declared
that neither the consent of the House of Lords, nor that of the King, was
necessary to enact valid law:
The commons of England in Parliament assembled do declare that the People
are under God the original of all just power, and that whatsoever is enacted or
declared for law by the commons in Parliament assembled, hath the force of
law ... although the consent and concurrence of the King or the House of Peers
be not had thereunto.
In March 1649, the Commons – under the leadership of Oliver Cromwell –
abolished both the Monarchy and the House of Lords – an Act which was
regarded as of no effect once the Restoration of the Monarchy took place in
1660. In 1661, Bishops were restored to the House of Lords.6 The Acts of
Union, with Scotland in 1707, and Ireland in 1800, provided for Scottish and
Irish representation in the House of Lords.7
THE COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS
The House of Lords – almost uniquely amongst democratic legislatures – is
unelected. While this situation is anomalous, undemocratic and anachronistic
in an otherwise democratic society, there are some advantages in the
arrangement which are too often overlooked. In essence, the theoretical value
of an unelected chamber paradoxically lies in its lack of accountability to
either the government of the day or the electorate, giving it an independence
without which the value of its work would be diminished. However, whether
such advantages actually flow from the House of Lords can only be evaluated
through examining the impact which the House has, in its revising role, on
government legislation. Prior to the removal of the majority of hereditary
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peers from the House, they represented a majority of peers and, being
dominated by Conservative Members, had the ability to act in a party political
preferential manner – both to support a Conservative government’s
legislation and to frustrate that of a Labour government. It was perceptions
such as this which caused, in part, the current Labour government to act
swiftly to remove the hereditary element as a first stage of reform. In the
event, some 92 hereditary peers remained in the Lords, and will so remain
until the second stage of reform takes place. Historically, there has also been a
political imbalance in the allegiance of life peers, with the Conservative peers
outnumbering Labour peers. This imbalance is also being redressed, with the
government increasing the number of appointed Labour life peers. However,
the uncompleted reform has led to the criticism that the government holds,
through its selection of appointees, excessive powers of patronage, capable of
undermining the independence of the Lords. A further factor in the
composition of the House, which renders evaluation of its work more
complex, is the considerable proportion of independent peers, or ‘cross
benchers’, who owe no political allegiance to any party.
The House of Lords also has, under the Parliament Act 1911, the power to
block any Bill attempting to extend the life of a parliament.8 This may be seen
as no more than a constitutional ‘backstop’ against a potential abuse of power
by government, and the life of a parliament has indeed been extended in
recent history in times of national emergency.9 Such extensions, however,
have been with the consent of the Lords. Any attempt by a government to
suspend elections in order to protect its own political power would be blocked
by the Lords without whose consent such a Bill could not become law. On the
other hand, any advantages which flow from the current composition of the
Lords must be weighed in the balance against the demands of democracy.
While an unelected second chamber having no role in the passage of
legislation might be acceptable to some, an unelected second chamber with
real – although ultimately limited – legislative power represents an affront to
the idea of democratic government. It is for this reason that the issue of reform
of the House of Lords has been for so long on the political agenda.10
Hereditary peers
Hereditary peers are created under the prerogative of the Crown on the
advice on the Prime Minister. A peerage is created either by a Writ of
Summons to the House or, more recently, under Letters Patent from the
Sovereign which will define the line of succession, which invariably falls to
the male heirs. A peerage created by a Writ of Summons will devolve to all
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9 Eg, during the two World Wars.
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heirs, thus enabling female successors to the title. Disputes concerning
succession to a title are resolved by the House of Lords, through the
Committee for Privileges. The evidence of blood tests is admissible in
evidence.11 A peerage cannot be surrendered other than under the disclaimer
for life under the Peerage Act 1963,12 on which, see below. The disclaimer
does not prevent the conferment of a life peerage: see below.
In January 1998, there were 759 hereditary peers, out of a total
membership of 1,272, comprising just under 60 per cent of the total.13 All this
changed, however, in 1999. Under the House of Lords Act 1999, the rights of
most hereditary peers were removed. While it had been intended to remove
the rights of all hereditary peers to sit and vote, threats of opposition to the
House of Lords Bill from the majority of Conservative hereditary peers
persuaded the government to allow 92 peers to remain. In the deal brokered
by Viscount Cranborne, the then Conservative Leader in the Lords, the
remaining hereditaries would be elected by the hereditary peers themselves.
A further seven former hereditary peers were returned to the House of Lords
as life peers appointed by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in March 2000.
Life peers
Non-judicial life peers were not introduced until the Life Peerages Act 1958. In
1998, there were 461 peers appointed under the 1958 Act: 81 female life peers
and 380 male life peers. The award of a peerage is one of the highest honours
conferred in the United Kingdom. Approximately one third of former
government ministers will receive life peerages. Some former Prime Ministers
– such as Sir Winston Churchill and Sir Edward Heath – refused the award of
a peerage in order to remain in the House of Commons. Others will decline on
point of political principle. Peerages are conferred by the Crown on the advice
of the Prime Minister. Twice a year – at New Year and on the Queen’s
birthday – honours are awarded. There are, occasionally, honours lists
announced to mark special occasions. Honours are also awarded on the
dissolution of parliament and, if there is a change of government, the
outgoing Prime Minister will draw up a special honours list. However, there
is much evidence to suggest that the system of appointment is used politically
by governments, a factor which further undermines the legitimacy of the
House of Lords, and there currently exists no formal mechanism by which a
balance between the parties can be established and maintained against the
wishes of a Prime Minister. If the Prime Minister insists that the working life
peers should reflect party-political strength in the House of Commons, as did
Margaret Thatcher, and if, as was the case with the Conservative government,
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not applied for Writs of Summons.
that government is in power for a continuous period of 18 years, there is an
inbuilt bias in appointments. 
This was the legacy inherited by the Labour Government in 1997. In order
to redress the political imbalance, the Prime Minister appointed an
unprecedented number of life peers, intended to be ‘working peers’, actively
participating in the work of the upper House. Of the 33 appointed in March
2000, 20 are Labour, nine Liberal Democrat and four Conservative. Whereas
Mrs Thatcher appointed 203 peers in her 11 years of office, Tony Blair
appointed 209 peers in under three years.
Once appointed, life peers tend to be more active in the House of Lords –
both in terms of attendance in the House and of participation in debate – than
hereditary peers.
Indeed, the Prime Minister made it clear that the appointment of new
Labour life peers carried with it the responsibility to attend the House at least
three nights a week for late night votes which carry ‘three line whips’ in order
to ensure that the government gets its key legislation through parliament.
Under current reform proposals, the conferment of a life peerage is to be
separated from entitlement to sit in the Lords.14
Judicial peers
In 1856, for the first time, a life peerage was granted to a retired judge,
although he was allowed neither to sit nor to vote in parliament. In 1876, the
Appellate Jurisdiction Act provided that two Lords of Appeal in Ordinary
could be appointed as life peers, with both sitting and voting rights.
The Lords of Appeal in Ordinary were originally appointed to add legal
expertise to the House. In their judicial capacity, the Judicial Committee of the
House of Lords represents the highest domestic court15 for civil appeals in the
United Kingdom and for criminal appeals from England, Wales and Northern
Ireland.16 The Law Lords also sit as Members of the judicial Privy Council
which has jurisdiction to hear appeals from a limited number of
Commonwealth countries. Consideration of the judicial work of the Law
Lords should be kept distinct from consideration of their role in the other
functions of the House of Lords.
The Law Lords play a role in the legislative and other functions but, by
convention, do not participate in purely political debate. To do so would
detract from the judicial impartiality which must be evident when acting in a
judicial capacity, and would have implications for the delicate balance
maintained in the separation of powers.
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In relation to legislation, the Law Lords’ role is at times both significant
and valuable, although it cannot be assumed that they act in a united
manner.17 Their contributions express personal – not official judicial –
opinions. It is notable that Bills on family law matters – divorce,18 domestic
violence, the law relating to children – are introduced in the House of Lords
under the auspices of the Lord Chancellor. Other Law Lords make significant
contributions on controversial matters, some of which can bring them into
conflict with the government. D Shell, for example, instances the influence
exerted by Lord Chief Justice Parker on the issue of abolition of the death
penalty (the Homicide Act 1957), and over the War Damage Bill 1965.19
Lords Spiritual
In addition to the hereditary and life peers, 26 Archbishops and Bishops of the
Church of England sit in the Lords, and up to 12 Lords of Appeal in Ordinary
(Law Lords). The explanation for the presence of Anglican Archbishops and
Bishops is historical. As seen above, until the dissolution of the monasteries,
spiritual peers represented a majority in the House of Lords. Today, their
presence is explained both on the basis of tradition and on the basis of the
close links between the established Church of England and the state. There are
arguments for reform in this regard (see, further, below), but it should be
recognised that the Spiritual Peers owe no allegiance to any political party
and, while by convention not speaking or voting on purely political issues,
make a significant contribution to debate on many, often sensitive, moral and
social issues, such as housing, divorce, abortion, homosexuality, embryology
and human fertilisation.
The oath of allegiance
Before becoming a full Member of the House, the new peer is formally
introduced and takes the oath of allegiance to the Crown.20
Government members in the Lords
In 1998, 23 peers were members of the government. The government is
represented in the House by the Lord Chancellor, Leader of the House (Lord
Privy Seal), Lord Advocate, five Ministers of State, seven Under Secretaries of
State, the Chief Whip and Deputy Chief Whip and seven whips.
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Disqualification from membership of the Lords
Aliens
Aliens are disqualified from membership of the Lords under section 3 of the
Act of Settlement 1700, which provides that membership of the House
excludes:
... person[s] born out of the Kingdoms of England, Scotland or Ireland, or the
Dominions thereunto belonging ... (except such as are born of English parents).
The British Nationality Act 1981, Schedule 7, amends the Act of Settlement to
the effect that Commonwealth citizens or citizens of the Republic of Ireland
are excluded from its provisions.
Persons under the age of 21
While the age of majority has been reduced from the age of 21 to the age of 18
years by section 1 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969, no person succeeding
to a peerage below the age of 21 may take his or her seat in the House.21
Technically, persons under the age of 21 are not disqualified, but merely
ineligible to take their seats until they reach the age of 21.
Bankrupts
Under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Acts,22 no peer may sit whilst
adjudicated bankrupt. The disqualification ceases in accordance with the
Acts.23 It is a breach of privilege to sit whilst disqualified. 
Treason
Any peer convicted of treason is disqualified from sitting or voting as a
Member of the House unless and until he has either completed his term of
imprisonment or received a pardon. 
The disclaimer of hereditary peerages24
Under the Peerage Act 1963, it became possible to disclaim a peerage. A peer
who disclaims his or her title does so irrevocably, but the disclaimer will not
affect the succession of the title to the next generation. Under the Act, a peer
succeeding to a title before the passing of the Act had 12 months in which to
disclaim the title. Peers succeeding to titles subsequently have one year within
which to disclaim succession, or, in the case of a person under the age of 21, a
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year from the date of attaining the age of 21. One exception exists to this rule.
If the successor is a Member of the House of Commons, or a candidate for
election to the House of Commons, at the date on which he inherits the title,
the period for disclaimer is one month (section 2 of the Peerage Act 1963). A
total of 11 peers (including Viscount Stansgate, now Tony Benn, Lord Hume
and Lord Hailsham) have disclaimed titles under the Act. 
Leave of absence
Leave of absence from the House of Lords may be granted at any time during
a parliament by applying to the Clerk of the Parliaments. At the start of each
new parliament, peers who have previously obtained leave of absence will be
asked whether they wish it to continue. Where leave of absence is granted, it is
expected that the peer will not attend the House. Should he or she wish to do
so, he may give one month’s notice of his intention to attend. However, there
is no mechanism by which the House can exclude a peer who has leave of
absence but nevertheless attends the House. 
Attendance in the House
All peers are entitled to attend and vote in the House. Before becoming
eligible to sit in the Lords, it is necessary to apply for and receive a Writ of
Summons. It is expected that Lords who have not taken leave of absence will
attend as regularly as possible.
Membership of the House of Lords: April 1998
Archbishops and Bishops 26
Peers by succession 750 (16 women)
Hereditary peers of first creation 9
Life peers under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 26
Life peers under the Life Peerages Act 1958 462 (80 women)
TOTAL 1,273*
* This figure includes 68 Lords without Writs of Summons and 60 peers on leave
of absence. 
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Membership of the House of Lords: 31 July 2000
Archbishops and Bishops 26
Peers under House of Lords Act 1999 92
Life peers under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 28
Life peers under the Life Peerages Act 1958 562
TOTAL 708
It can be seen from the table overleaf that the hereditary peers outnumbered
the life peers by two to one. One of the vehement arguments of some
reformers was that the House of Lords was dominated by hereditary peers
who were, by virtue of their background and upbringing, innately
conservative and hence supported the Conservative Party. If this was true,
then the natural implication which followed was that the House of Lords was
naturally sympathetic towards a Conservative government and naturally
hostile towards a Labour government. The bare statistics of membership,
however, leave out an important dimension – that of the political allegiance of
those who actually attended the House regularly and played a significant role
in the law making process.
Analysis reveals that prior to the removal of most of the hereditary
peers,25 although the Conservative peers formed a majority overall (in 1998
having 495 Members), when the opposition parties’ membership was totalled,
that was greater than the number of Conservative Party supporters. Looking
at those Members who attended over fifty per cent of all sittings, the
Conservative Members comprised 49 per cent of the total, with opposition
parties comprising 51 per cent.
From the above, it can be seen that the Conservative Party peers, whilst
numerically the largest group, did not, when compared with the number of
peers of other parties (or none), command a majority. 
Lords’ expenses
No salary is payable to Members of the House of Lords. They are entitled to
expenses to cover the cost of travel, overnight accommodation, subsistence
and secretarial and other expenses pertaining to their parliamentary duties.
One question which remains for future decision is whether, when the final
stage of reform takes place, there should be more substantial remuneration for
parliamentary work.
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Salaried Members of the House of Lords
The Lord Chancellor receives part of his annual salary for acting as Speaker of
the House. The Chairman and Principal Deputy Chairman of Committees,
government ministers and whips and Lords of Appeal in Ordinary are
salaried. The Leader of the Opposition and the Chief Opposition Whip also
receive salaries.
Functions of the House of Lords
Until 1911, the powers of the Lords were equal to those of the Commons, with
the exception that the Lords recognised – by convention – the supremacy of
the Commons in relation to financial matters and accepted that they had no
right to initiate or amend Bills relating to finance. The Lords nevertheless
claimed the power to reject outright financial legislation, a power which,
when exercised, led to a curtailment of their powers.
In the White Paper of 1968,26 which formed the basis for the Labour
government’s attempt further to reform the House of Lords, the following
functions of the House of Lords were recorded:
(a) the provision of a forum for debate on matters of public interest;
(b) the revision of Bills brought from the House of Commons;
(c) the initiation of Public Bills and Private Members’ Bills;
(d) the consideration of delegated legislation;
(e) the scrutiny of the executive;
(f) the scrutiny of private legislation;
(g) select committee work;
(h) the Supreme Court of Appeal.
Before considering the manner in which the House of Lords allocates its time,
it is useful to look at the overall time available to the House in a parliamentary
session.
Time available in the House of Lords
SESSION 1982–83 1991–92 2000–01
Total sitting days 123 194 169
Total sitting hours 798 765 1,261
The House of Lords contains a wealth of specialism and experience which is
unmatched by the House of Commons. It is in part the introduction of life
peers which explains the revival of the House of Lords. Perhaps the major
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factor explaining the resurgence of activity in the Upper House lies in the
sheer volume of legislative work introduced by governments in recent years.
The majority of time in the Lords is devoted to the scrutiny of legislation,
both primary and secondary, which in the 2000–01 session occupied 61.1 per
cent of time. In the 1999–2000 session a record number of amendments to
legislation were tabled, 11,020, with 4,761 of these being agreed by the
Commons.27
Procedure in the House of Lords
To some extent, the procedure in the House of Lords mirrors that of the Lower
House, although significant differences must be noted. The control of
procedure lies within the Privileges of the House (see Chapter 18), and is
regulated by the Leader of the House, the government Chief Whip and by the
House as a whole. The Speaker of the House, the Lord Chancellor,28 has no
formal powers to control the House, but is under a duty to attend the House
and to sit on the Woolsack. The duty to attend derives from a Standing Order
of the House made on 9 June 1660: ‘... that it is the duty of the Lord Chancellor
or the Lord keeper of the great Seale of England ordinarily to attend the Lords
house of Parlyament.’ That Standing Order, slightly amended, is still in force,
and the Lord Chancellor attends all sittings of the House unless absent by
reason of illness. His role, as Speaker of the House, however, has been
described as ‘ornamental and symbolic’,29 for the Lord Chancellor does not
have the same powers as the Speaker of the House of Commons. In the
passage of legislation, for example, there is no power to select amendments
for debate or to curtail debate. Whereas the Speaker in the Commons may rule
that certain proposed amendments cannot be debated – perhaps because they
are not strictly relevant to the content of the Bill – the House of Lords may
decide to debate any and all amendments.
The Leader of the House is a political appointment in the hands of the
Prime Minister, and the Leader of the House is a Member of Cabinet. It is his
or her principal duty to advise on matters of procedure and order. The
government Chief Whip is responsible for the arrangement of government
business and consultation with other parties as to its arrangement. As with the
Whip in the Commons, the Chief Whip sends out a weekly indication of the
need for Member’s attendance at particular items of business.
Having examined the composition of the House, the allocation of time and
the principal officials of the House, we can now turn our attention to
examining the actual business of the House. 
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But see the discussion of the role of the Lord Chancellor in Chapter 5.
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GENERAL DEBATES
The importance of debates in the House of Lords, although occupying a
decreasing percentage of the time of the House, should not be
underestimated. Wednesdays are generally devoted to debates on matters of
general public importance. One Wednesday per month is set aside for two
short debates limited to two and a half hours, when the subject matter is
chosen by backbench peers selected by ballot. Other debates take place as a
result of consultation between the political parties, and will be generally
timetabled to last for a maximum of either five hours or two and a half hours.
In 2000, debates occupied 14 per cent of available time in the Lords. 
The subject matter for debate is wide ranging, and it is often commented
that the quality of debate in the House of Lords attains a higher standard than
that in the House of Commons. In part, this is due to the less partisan nature
of the House of Lords and, paradoxically, their very lack of accountability
enhances their capacity for independence and openness. Since the
introduction of life peers in 1958, the quality of debate is enriched by the
diverse backgrounds and experience of Members.
Questions in the House of Lords
Four types of questions are provided for under Standing Orders: starred,
unstarred, written and private notice questions.
The daily business of the House commences with up to four starred
questions addressed to the government on four days per week. Notice must
be given of the question to be asked, and each peer is restricted to two
questions per day. The purpose of the question is not to initiate debate but to
secure information from the government. Unstarred questions are asked at the
end of the day’s business and may initiate debate. They may be likened to
daily adjournment debates in the Lower House. These are popular with
Members, providing an opportunity to initiate debate on a matter of public
interest. Questions for written answer are printed on the Order Paper of the
day and a government minister will reply within 14 days. The questions and
replies are printed in Hansard, the official journal of the House. There is no
limit on the number of questions which may be asked.
Private notice questions fulfil the same function as in the Lower House,
that is, to raise matters for urgent debate without the need to observe the strict
rules of notice for other questions. Notice must be given to the Leader of the
House by noon on the day on which the question is to be put, and the Leader
has absolute discretion as to whether to allow the question to be put.
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THE SCRUTINY OF LEGISLATION
As has been seen above, the scrutiny of legislation occupies the largest, and an
increasing, proportion of the time of the House, and it is to this aspect of the
work of the House that most attention must be paid. In 2000, 61.1 per cent of
the time of the House was taken up with the consideration of government
Bills. 
Bills, other than financial Bills, which fall within the exclusive powers of
the House of Commons, can be introduced in either the Commons or the
Lords. The majority of government Bills will be introduced in the Commons
and, having passed the Commons’ stages of scrutiny, will be passed to the
House of Lords, although many Bills are introduced in the Lords. The process
of scrutiny in the Lords in many respects mirrors that in the Commons, and
Bills receive a formal first reading, followed by the second reading debate and
then ‘stand committed’ for the committee stage, after which the Bill is
reported back to the House and then receives its third reading.
Legislative committees in the House of Lords
There are significant differences between the two Houses in the scrutiny of
legislation. First, in the House of Lords, there is no regular use of standing
committees, and Bills will be considered in the Chamber by a Committee of
the Whole House. In the 1991–92 session, a Select Committee of the House of
Lords reviewed the role of committees in the House.30 The committee
considered extending the use of Public Bill Committees – the equivalent of
standing committees in the House of Commons – but rejected the proposal. A
majority of witnesses to the committee opposed their introduction. In the
words of the committee, such committees were:
... unrepresentative of a non-partisan House; they increased the time required
on report; and breadth of experience and participation at committee stage was
considered desirable.31
However, the House of Lords did make provision for Bills to be read off the
floor of the House in ‘Grand Committees’. All peers are entitled to attend and
participate. The measure facilitates greater efficiency by freeing time in the
chamber itself. The introduction of Special Public Bill Committees was, also,
favourably considered in relation to a limited number of Bills and first used in
the 1994–95 session.32 The procedure reflects that of the special standing
committees in the Commons, with a limited period of time set aside for
30 Report from the Select Committee on the Committee Work of the House, HL 35-1 (1991–92),
London: HMSO.
31 Ibid, para 48. Public Bill Committees had been established to consider the Pilotage Bill of
1986 and the Charities Bill 1991. The Select Committee felt that consideration of the
former Bill had been less than satisfactory.
32 For the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill.
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consideration of the Bill, where the committee takes written and oral evidence
on the provisions of the Bill. The committee then reverts to standard standing
committee procedure and examines the Bill clause by clause. The committees
are used to scrutinise Law Commission Bills which are introduced by the Lord
Chancellor in the House of Lords. Note that select committees may also be
used for the committee stage.33
Curtailment of debate
A further difference between procedure in the Commons and the Lords lies in
the absence of procedures in the Lords for the curtailment of debate. The
absence of the Closure Motion or the Allocation of Time Motion (Guillotine) in
the Lords ensures that the contents of Bills are fully debated; for details, see
Chapter 15.
Party discipline in the House of Lords
There exists a system of ‘whipping’ which ensures some party political control
over Members, although the extent of that control is far less than the control
exerted by the whips in the Commons. The House of Lords is generally a far
less party-political forum than the elected House of Commons. It must also be
remembered that the House of Lords contains some 322 cross benchers, or
independents, who do not owe allegiance to any particular political party.
This group represents a potentially significant force in so far as the way in
which cross benchers will vote cannot necessarily be foreseen in advance, let
alone guaranteed. These factors, together with the independence the House
and not being accountable to an electorate, results in a scrutinising body
which can review legislation in depth and largely free from the political and
procedural controls which are prevalent in the House of Commons.
THE AMENDMENT OF LEGISLATION
The House of Lords has the power to delay enactment of a Bill under the
Parliament Acts 1911–49, but not to veto a Bill. As will be seen, the
democratically elected Lower House has the ultimate right to enact legislation
in the face of opposition from the Upper House. The House of Lords does,
however, have the power to propose amendments to Bills and it is their
success or otherwise in this regard which requires examination. At the outset,
it must be recognised that amendments proposed are of differing types and
are put forward in response to a variety of circumstances. Not all amendments
proposed in the Lords and accepted by the House of Commons stem from
principled opposition in the House of Lords.
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Some amendments are purely technical, amounting to tidying up of
statutory language. Others will be the result of government undertakings to
implement a proposed Commons’ amendment in the Lords. Amendments
also arise out of the government’s willingness to rethink an aspect of a Bill in
light of consideration in the Commons or within the department concerned
with the legislation. The Lords here acts as a convenient forum for proposing
the relevant amendments. 
It may be the case that there has been opposition in the Commons to a
particular proposal which the government has resisted, and has used its
majority to that effect. If the government is prepared to concede a point,
particularly where it foresees opposition in the Lords, it may prefer to give
way than to risk losing part of the Bill on a vote in the Lords. Negotiations will
frequently take place between the government department and those
intending to oppose the measure in order to secure a satisfactory compromise
which will ensure the smooth passage of the Bill into law.
Some amendments arise purely as a result of objections voiced in the
House of Lords. One recent example of principled opposition in the Lords, not
apparent in the Lower House, is offered by the Child Support Bill 1991.34 In
that Bill, unmarried separated mothers on state benefit were to be placed
under a statutory duty to reveal the identity of the fathers of their children in
order that the Child Support Agency could enforce the financial duty of
fathers to support their children. When the Bill arrived in the Lords, clause 46,
which offered no defence to the mother who declined to give the information,
was rejected by the Lords. The Bill returned to the Commons and the
government reinstated the clause but made a concession to the Lords and
inserted a defence of reasonably withholding information. On recent, post
House of Lords Act 1999 activity, see below.
House of Lords’ amendments have a substantive impact on legislation. For
example, the House of Lords put forward amendments to the Education (No
2) Bill 1980 which resulted in the government abandoning a proposal to
impose charges for school transport; amendments to the Local Government
(Interim Provisions) Bill 1984 resulted in the government revising plans
governing local government prior to the abolition of the Greater London
Council and amendments to the 1992 Education (Schools) Bill resulted in
changes made to inspections of schools.35
It can be seen that the House of Lords is both very active in relation to
legislation and makes a substantial impact on many legislative proposals.
Most often, the House of Commons will give way to the Lords and accept
their amendments, rather than risk losing a Bill for lack of parliamentary time.
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The House of Lords
It must be remembered that, if a Bill fails to pass all of its stages within a
session, the Bill will be lost and the government must make time to
reintroduce it in the next session. Accordingly, the later in a session a Bill is
considered by the Lords, the greater will be the inclination of the House of
Commons to accept Lords’ amendments. 
In the run-up to the reform of the Lords, the House exercised its revising
powers robustly, opposing government measures, inter alia, relating to the
closed list system of proportional representation for the 1999 European
parliamentary elections, welfare and pensions reform, immigration and
asylum, and the establishment of a London Authority and Mayor.36 The
House also threatened to exercise its powers to the full in relation to the
House of Lords Bill, in defiance of the Salisbury convention that peers would
not block a government measure which had formed part of its manifesto
programme. As noted above, negotiations between the then Conservative
Leader of the Lords, Viscount Cranborne, and the Prime Minister resulted in a
compromise measure in which 92 hereditary peers would remain in the Lords
following the removal of the majority of hereditaries.
The House of Lords following the 1999 Act
When parliamentary business resumed in January 2000, the majority of
hereditary peers had been ousted. It soon became clear, however, that the
‘new’ House of Lords was not prepared to be more acquiescent towards
government legislative proposals. Even before the new year started, the Lords
were proclaiming their renewed ‘legitimacy’ as a revising chamber, and soon
made an impact on the government’s legislative programme. The Criminal
Justice (Mode of Trial) Bill, which in part removed the right of defendants
charged with ‘either way offences’, such as theft and burglary, to choose their
mode of trial, was introduced in the Lords. The effect of this is that the
Parliament Act procedures do not apply, thus making it easier for the Lords to
press home its objections to the Bill successfully. The Lords rejected the Bill,
forcing the government to reintroduce the Bill in the Commons where at
second reading the government secured a substantial majority. The House of
Lords again rejected the Bill and it was withdrawn. The Lords also opposed
the government’s proposal to repeal ‘Section 28’, which prohibits the
promotion of homosexuality in education. Difficulty was also caused by the
Lords over the government’s proposal to lower the age of consent for
homosexual sex to 16 years, opposing the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Bill,
and forcing the government to employ the Parliament Act procedure. The
Care Standards Bill, which would introduce regulation of private hospitals
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and establish two bodies to inspect and impose standards, one for National
Health Service hospitals, one for private hospitals, was also opposed by the
Lords, which inflicted its tenth defeat on government legislative proposals
since the removal of the hereditary peers in 1999.
The House of Lords and delegated legislation
The House of Lords’ Delegated Powers Scrutiny Committee’s principal
concern is to scrutinise Bills with a view to establishing the extent of
legislative powers which parliament intends to delegate to government
ministers. Prior to the establishment of the committee, Bills with potentially or
actually contentious delegated powers took up a large amount of time in the
House of Lords’ legislative debates. The committee’s prior scrutiny of Bills
presaging delegated powers, and its approval thereof, means that this issue no
longer occupies legislative time in the consideration of the Bill by the House.
The role of the Committee is ‘to report whether the provision of any Bill
inappropriately delegates legislative power, or whether they subject the
exercise of legislative power to an inappropriate degree of parliamentary
scrutiny’. The committee reports to the House, which decides whether or not
to accept the committee’s recommendations. The committee has eight
members and meets as needs require. The committee hears oral evidence in
public, and takes evidence in writing on each public Bill from the relevant
government department. 
The committee, in the examination of a Bill, considers four principal
matters. First, the committee considers whether the power to make delegated,
or secondary, legislation is appropriate, or whether the grant of power is so
important that it should only be granted in primary legislation. Secondly, the
committee pays special attention to Henry VIII powers. A Henry VIII power is a
power to change the law without parliamentary action, that is to say, the
primary legislation may be amended or repealed by subordinate legislation
with or without further parliamentary scrutiny. Thirdly, the committee
considers which form of parliamentary scrutiny of delegated legislation is
appropriate, and in particular whether the power specifies the use of the
affirmative or negative resolution procedure.37 Fourthly, the committee
considers whether the legislation should provide for consultation in draft
form before the regulation is laid before parliament, and whether its operation
should be governed by a Code of Conduct. 
The Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 introduced a new form of
delegated legislation. Under the Act, a minister may issue a deregulation
order to amend or repeal any enactment of primary legislation with a view to
removing or reducing any administrative or bureaucratic element. The aim is
towards greater efficiency in administration. The power is exercisable
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provided that no necessary protection is removed from the law. The 1994 Act
provides for parliamentary scrutiny. The two stage process involves, first, the
proposal being laid before parliament as a draft order. The Lords’ committee,
and the House of Commons equivalent committee have 60 days in which to
report. Secondly, the government then lays a draft order before parliament,
either in its original form or amended to take account of the two committees’
opinions, for approval by a resolution of each House. The House of Lords can
only approve the draft order after the committee has made a second report on
the order.
The committee is concerned with four principal matters. First, whether the
measure is intra vires; secondly, that the measure removes the relevant
administrative burden; thirdly, whether the order removes any required
‘necessary protection’; and, fourthly, whether the consultation required under
the Act has been adequate. The committee takes oral and written evidence. In
1995, the committee rejected a proposed draft deregulation order in relation to
charges being permitted for public dances held on Sundays. The Sunday
Observance Act 1780 prohibits charging for public dances. The deregulation
proposal aimed to exempt dances from the 1780 Act and allow premises to be
licensed for Sunday dancing, and to extend the permitted hours for the sale of
alcohol at dances on Sunday nights. Having heard oral evidence and
considered written evidence, the committee rejected the proposal. In the
committee’s opinion, the subject matter was unsuitable for such an expedited
procedure and, further, the prior consultation had been inadequate. In the
2000–01 session, the Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee made 43
reports and reported on 53 Bills.
THE BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE 
HOUSE OF LORDS AND THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
The Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949
Where the House of Commons is not prepared to accept Lords’ amendments,
or where the House of Lords rejects a Bill outright, the role of the Parliament
Acts must be considered. The Parliament Act 1911 altered the balance of
power between the House of Commons and the House of Lords, restricting
the powers of the Upper House. Until that Act, the House of Lords enjoyed
equal power with the Commons over legislation, with the exception of
financial measures which, by convention, the Lords recognised as falling
under the authority of the elected Lower House. However, in 1909, the
Finance Bill containing Lloyd George’s Budget was rejected, in breach of
convention, by the House of Lords. As a consequence, the House of Commons
passed a Resolution declaring that there had been a breach of the constitution
and a usurpation of the rights of the Commons and calling for the power of
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the House of Lords to be restricted. King Edward VII was called upon to
create sufficient new peers to guarantee the passage of the Finance Bill but
refused to do so until the Budget was approved by the electorate. Parliament
was dissolved and, in the election in January 1910, the government secured a
majority of seats only with the help of minor parties. The House of Lords then
passed the Finance Bill.
This conflict between the House of Commons and House of Lords resulted
in the Parliament Act 1911, passed by both Houses of Parliament but with the
House of Lords being threatened with the creation of more peers to ensure the
Bill’s safe passage. The Act abolished the Lords’ right to reject Money Bills,38
and imposed a one month time limit during which the Lords may consider
such Bills and suggest amendments. If the Bill has not been approved without
amendment within one month, provided it has been sent to the Lords within
one month before the end of the session, the Bill will proceed to receive the
royal assent without the approval of the Lords. Not all financial bills are
Money Bills. Where a Bill contains provision dealing with other subjects it will
not be a Money Bill. The Finance Bill is not automatically a Money Bill, and
over half of the Finance Bills sent to the Lords since the 1911 Act have not
been certified as Money Bills. Similarly, the Local Government Finance Bill
1988, which introduced the Poll Tax, was not certified as a Money Bill and,
accordingly, was considered by the House of Lords. While the purpose of the
1911 Act is to prevent amendment or delay in Money Bills, should the Lords
propose amendments, these can be either accepted or rejected by the
Commons. By way of example, the Commons accepted Lords’ amendments to
the following certified Bills: the China Indemnity Bill 1925; the
Unemployment Assistance (Temporary Provisions) Extension Bill 1935–36; the
Inshore Fishing Industry Bill 1947; and the Industrial Development (Ships) Bill
1969–70.
Regarding non-Money Bills, the power of the House of Lords was
curtailed, their right to reject legislation replaced by a power to delay Bills for
a two year period spread over three parliamentary sessions.
Conflict between the two Houses resurfaced over the Labour
government’s nationalisation programme following the Second World War.
The Labour government, fearful that the Lords would reject the Iron and Steel
Bill, introduced the Parliament Bill in 1947. In 1948, a conference between
party leaders from both Houses met to attempt to reach agreement on the
terms of the Parliament Bill. In the event, the conference broke down and the
Parliament Bill was rejected by the House of Lords at second reading, only to
be passed by the Commons under the Parliament Act 1911. The 1949 Act
reduced the House of Lords’ power of delay over non-Money Bills from two
years over three sessions to one year over two sessions. No amendment was
made to the provisions of the Parliament Act 1911 regarding Money Bills. 
38 Bills certified by the Speaker as Money Bills, defined by the Parliament Act 1911, s 1(2).
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Exclusions from the Parliament Acts
The Parliament Acts do not apply to private Bills, Bills originating in the
House of Lords, Bills containing financial measures but not certified as Money
Bills (because they contain other non-money provisions), statutory
instruments or Bills purporting to extend the life of a parliament beyond the
five years laid down in the Septennial Act 1715, as amended by section 7 of
the Parliament Act 1911. 
The use of the Parliament Acts
It is notable that the Parliament Acts have been used infrequently. Aside from
the Parliament Act 1949, which was passed under the 1911 Act, the
Government of Ireland Act 1914, the Welsh Church Act 1914 and the War
Crimes Act 1991 were passed under this procedure. More recently, the
European Parliamentary Elections Bill 1998 attracted the procedure, the Lords
objecting to the chosen method of voting which enhanced party political
control over the election of candidates at the expense of voter choice. The
explanation for the low use of the procedure largely lies in conventional
practices regulating the relationship between the two Houses. First, as has
been seen above, the House of Commons accepts a great many Lords’
amendments, for a variety of reasons. Secondly, the House of Lords exercises
its delaying powers with some caution. In debate on the War Damage Bill
1965, Lord Salisbury stated that the House of Lords should insist on
amendments under two circumstances:
(a) if a matter raises issues important enough to justify such ‘drastic’ action;
(b) if the issue is such that the electorate can understand it and express
approval for the House of Lord’s position. In this regard, the House of
Lords acts as a ‘watchdog of the people’.
In 1975, in debate, Lord Carrington39 stated that:
(a) the House of Lords should not insist on opposing a government Bill for
which there is a mandate from the people (the ‘Salisbury doctrine’);40
(b) but that the House of Lords may impose delay if the constitution otherwise
would be at risk; or
(c) if public opinion was against the government.
Lord Carrington asserted that, in rare cases, the Lords could legitimately
enforce a delay so as to cause a reassessment by the government and the
people. Thirdly, if the House of Lords strongly disapproves of a measure but
does not wish to defeat the Bill, it may move a resolution deploring parts of
the Bill, as occurred in relation to the Immigration Bill 1971 and the British
Nationality Act 1981. Fourthly, many disagreements between the House of
Commons and the House of Lords will be resolved by negotiations between
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the two Houses which generally will result in the avoidance of ultimate
deadlock. Finally, the Parliament Act procedure may be avoided under the
amendment procedure laid down in section 2(4) of the Parliament Act 1911.
Under that section, the Acts may only be used if the House of Lords, over two
successive sessions, rejects the same Bill. A Bill will be deemed to be the same
Bill if it is identical with the former Bill ‘or contains only such alterations as
are certified by the Speaker to be necessary owing to the time which has
elapsed since the date of the former Bill, or to represent any amendments
which have been made by the House of Lords in the former Bill in the
preceding session’.41 If amendments have been made which are not agreed to
by the Commons, the Bill is deemed to be rejected. This formulation facilitates
agreements between the two Houses, yet preserves the ultimate possible use
of the Parliament Act procedure. Three Bills over which conflict was
ultimately avoided by this process were the Temperance (Scotland) Bill 1913;
the Trades Union and Labour Relations Bill 1975–76; and the Shipbuilding
Industry Bill 1976–77.
A more recent illustration of the working of the amendment procedure is
provided by the Teaching and Higher Education Bill 1997, which was
introduced into the House of Lords and was thus not susceptible to the
Parliament Act procedure. The government intended to introduce tuition fees
for students at Scottish universities which would have the effect of penalising
students attending those universities from England, Wales and Northern
Ireland, but not Scottish students. The House of Lords, objecting on principle
to this discriminatory treatment between Scottish and other students,
amended the offending section. The House of Commons rejected the
amendment. On the Bill’s return to the House of Lords, on two further
occasions, the House of Lords introduced a newly worded amendment – an
amendment in lieu – which had the same substantive effect of removing the
alleged discrimination.42 The House of Lords had thus rejected the
government’s proposal three times, risking the loss of the Bill in the 1997–98
session. The Secretary of State for Education rejected the House of Lords’ view
and claimed that, while ‘it is right that the Lords should scrutinise it [the Bill]’,
having had ‘its advice rejected three times by the elected House – on a matter
with financial consequences – it cannot be right for the unelected House, yet
again, to refuse to accept that decision’.43 Compromise was, however,
reached. The House of Lords finally agreed to accept the will of the Commons,
but only after securing the government’s agreement to ‘consider the
recommendations ... very seriously’ made by a newly established independent
review body to examine fee arrangements.
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Suspension Motions
The Suspension Motion is a device currently available in relation to Private
Bills which facilitates their passage through parliament. Where the Suspension
Motion is agreed by the House of Commons, a Private Bill may be carried
over form one session to another, without the loss of that Bill.
The House of Commons Procedure Committee and the House of Lords
Procedure Committee have recently agreed to extend the procedure to Public
Bills. Where a Bill is in the Commons at the end of one session, and a
Suspension Motion is agreed, that Bill will be able to continue its life into the
next session. However, the procedure is not designed to ‘rescue’ contentious
Bills over which the two Houses disagree.44 Rather, the procedure will apply
to those Bills which the government notifies to the House of Commons as
candidates for the ‘carry over’ procedure. It will be for the Commons to agree
the motion to suspend the Bill, should the need arise.
SELECT COMMITTEES IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS
The House of Lords has no structured system of select committees as exists in
the House of Commons. However, three types of select committees exist in the
Lords. The House may establish ad hoc committees to consider a matter of
public importance: such committees have considered Sport and Leisure
(1971–72), Unemployment (1979–82), Overseas Trade (1984–85), Murder and
Life Imprisonment (1988–89). Domestic select committees exist to consider
matters of procedure and privileges of the House. In addition, as has been
seen, Bills may be committed to select committee for in depth consideration
and report.
Twenty sessional committees exist.45 Significant among these are the
European Community Select Committee and the Science and Technology
Committee. The former was established in 1974 to consider Commission
proposals for European legislation. The committee has acquired a reputation
for authoritative scrutiny of the proposals. The committee has a salaried
chairman and 24 permanent Members, a considerable staff of clerks and legal
advisers and has the right to appoint expert advisers as and when needed.
The committee also has the power to appoint sub-committees.46 Each year, the
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select committee produces some 20 reports, all of which (unlike those of the
House of Commons) are debated in the Chamber. The government
undertakes to respond to the reports within two months, and not later than
three months, of a report’s publication. The European Community Select
Committee’s terms of reference are:
To consider Community proposals whether in draft or otherwise, to obtain all
necessary information about them, and to make reports on those which, in the
opinion of the committee, raise important questions to which the committee
considers that the special attention of the House should be drawn.
The committee has seven sub-committees: Economic and Financial Affairs,
Trade and External Relations; Energy, Industry and Transport; Environment,
Public Health and Consumer Protection; Agriculture, Fisheries and Food; Law
and Institutions; Social Affairs, Education and Home Affairs. In addition, ad
hoc committees are established to deal with specific proposals. 
With the establishment of the European Union in 1992, the House of
Lords’ European Communities Committee took the view that aspects of the
Union’s work should be scrutinised by the national parliament.47 The
Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar of the Union, and the Judicial and
Police Co-operation in Criminal Matters pillar do not involve legislation, but
inter-governmental co-operation. The committee took the view that
documents should be provided to parliament if they qualify under one of
three tests, namely: significance; eventual need for United Kingdom
legislation or the imposition of legal commitments on the United Kingdom.48
The Science and Technology Select Committee of the House of Lords was
set up in 1980. The committee is unique in that it provides a forum for inquiry,
examination, debate and recommendation over an important subject which is
not represented in any one House of Commons committee. Subjects which
have been given in depth examination include Hazardous Waste Disposal
(1980–81), Civil Research and Development (1986–87) and Priorities in
Medical Research (1987–88). The government undertakes to respond to
reports of the committee in writing. Reports are debated in the Chamber of the
House of Lords. 
In the 2000–01 session, three new sessional committees were established.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights, with six members drawn from each
House, considers matters relating to the implementation of the Human Rights
Act 1998 and human rights aspects of legislation. The Constitution Committee
was first appointed in 2001 to examine the constitutional implications of all
public Bills before the House, and to review the working of the constitution.
The new Economic Affairs Committee was also appointed in 2001.
Chapter 17: Constitutional and Administrative Law
540
47 House of Lords, Twenty-Eighth Report, 1992–93.
48 The government agreed: see Cm 2471, 1994, London: HMSO. 
The House of Lords
The Steering Committee
In order to co-ordinate better the work of committees in the Lords, there is a
Steering Committee which serves functions similar to those of the Liaison
Committee in the Commons – namely, deciding on subjects for investigation
by ad hoc select committees, allocating resources between differing select
committees and monitoring the work of the committees.
Members’ interests in the Lords 
In November 1995, a Register of Members’ Interests was established, in which
a number of interests must be recorded. The requirements are that three
categories of interests must be registered, namely:
(a) consultancies or other similar arrangements involving payment or other
incentive or reward for providing parliamentary advice or services.
Registration under this category is mandatory;
(b) financial interests in businesses involved in parliamentary lobbying on
behalf of clients. This requirement is also mandatory;
(c) other particulars relating to matters which the Lords consider may affect
the public perception of the way in which they discharge their
parliamentary duties. Registration under this category is discretionary.
Interests should be declared in debate whenever Lords have a direct financial
interest in a subject, along with any other interest which might affect the
judgment of the House. The Committee on Lords’ Interests has power to
investigate allegations of failure to comply with the requirements. The register
is published annually.
REFORM OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS
With a perfect Lower House it is certain that an Upper House would be
scarcely of any value ... But though beside an ideal House of Commons the
Lords would be unnecessary, and therefore pernicious, beside the actual
House a revising and leisured legislature is extremely useful ...49
Both the Labour and Liberal Democrat Parties have long had proposals to
reform the House of Lords. As seen above, the current Labour government is
translating its commitment into reality, as a first step removing the right of the
majority of hereditary peers to sit and vote. In the past, the Labour Party has
advocated total abolition of the Upper House. Much of the antagonism to the
Lords stems from basic principles of democracy, its opponents centering on
the fundamental paradox of a sophisticated democratic state having, as part of
its legislative body, an unelected and democratically unaccountable
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institution. Before the issue of principle and its implications for reform can be
addressed, it is essential to understand the actual working of the House. A
note of caution regarding these important matters should be observed at this
early stage. SA de Smith and R Brazier make the pertinent observation that:
Agreement in principle amongst the sophisticated tends to be less than whole
hearted and to beget new disagreements when principle is translated into
detail. Real enthusiasm for Lords’ reform is too often to be found among the
eccentric and the naive, who may have little idea of the mediocre performance
of second chambers in so many other countries or of the limited expectations
that can reasonably be reposed in a reconstituted British second chamber.
[1989, p 311]
As noted above, the preamble to the Parliament Act 1911 envisaged replacing
the House of Lords with an elected House:
And whereas it is intended to substitute for the House of Lords as it at present
exists a Second Chamber constituted on a popular instead of hereditary basis,
but such substitution cannot be immediately brought into operation ...
This did not represent the first proposal to reform the House of Lords. As
early as 1886 and 1888, debate took place in the House of Commons on the
desirability or otherwise of an hereditary element in the legislature. As has
been seen above, the constitutional conflict between the House of Lords and
Commons in 1908–10 resulted in the restriction on the Lords’ powers and the
intent to replace the House of Lords.
In 1917, a conference comprising 15 Members of each House was
established, under the chairmanship of Viscount Bryce, to consider the
composition and powers of the Upper House. Reporting in 1918, the
conference recommended that the Upper House should consist of 246
Members indirectly elected by Members of Parliament grouped into regional
units, plus 81 Members chosen by a joint standing committee of both Houses
of Parliament. The conference regarded the appropriate functions of this
revised chamber to be the examination and revision of Commons Bills, the
initiation of non-controversial Bills, the discussion of policy, and the
‘interposition of so much delay (and no more) in the passing of a Bill into law
as may be needed to enable the opinion of the nation to be adequately
expressed upon it’. No action was taken on the recommendations.
Following the First World War, reform of the House of Lords remained on
the political agenda. A Cabinet committee established to consider the matter
rejected the Bryce conference proposals as unacceptable. In 1922, the
government put forward proposals for a House of Lords made up of 350
Members. The majority of these were to be either directly or indirectly elected
‘from the outside’, with the remainder comprising some hereditary peers
elected by peers, plus Members nominated by the Crown. The precise
numbers of these latter categories were to be laid down in statute. No action
resulted from these proposals. Between 1924 and 1935 one further set of
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Cabinet committee proposals was rejected, as were three Private Members’
Bills introduced by Conservative peers in 1929, 1933 and 1935. The Parliament
Act 1949, discussed above, was passed by the Labour government and
remains the basis for the relationship between the Houses of Commons and
Lords today.
Reform remained on the agenda in the 1950s, the Conservative Party
Manifesto of 1951 promising a further all-party conference on reform. The
Labour Party in 1953 declined to co-operate and no further action was taken.
In 1958, two significant reforms were introduced by the Conservative
government. The first of these related to the problem of the ‘backwoodsmen’:
those peers who make no contribution to the work of the House but
nevertheless retain the right to sit and vote when called upon to do so by the
government. The report of a House of Lords select committee recommended
that Standing Orders be amended to enable those peers who did not regularly
attend the House to take leave of absence. This recommendation was adopted
but it did not produce an effective solution to the problem posed by the
‘backwoodsmen’. The remaining defect lay in the fact that, even where leave
of absence is obtained, there is no mechanism existing whereby a peer can be
denied the right to enter the House, even if he has not complied with the
requirement to give once month’s notice of his intention to return to the
House.
The Life Peerage Act 1958
The second reform of 1958 was the introduction of the Life Peerage Act. This
Act enables the Crown, on the advice of the Prime Minister, to confer peerages
for life on men and women who have reached prominence in public life. This
single reform has effectively revitalised the Upper House, providing an
increased resource of specialisation and experience. By convention, life
peerages are conferred on Members of any political party, and on those who
have no particular political affiliation. Towards this end, the leaders of the
major political parties put forward nominations to the Prime Minister on an
annual basis. The Labour Party in the 1980s refused to make any nominations
at all, basing their refusal on principled objection to the elitist nature of the
House of Lords. This stance has proven to be something of an ‘own goal’ for
the Labour Party, whose membership of the House of Lords is now smaller
than it might otherwise have been.
The Peerage Act 1963
In 1963, a more limited, but nonetheless important, reform was implemented.
The Peerage Act 1963 has its origins in the succession to a peerage by Anthony
Wedgwood-Benn (as he then was), a Member of the House of Commons. As a
result of succeeding to the title of Viscount Stansgate, Tony Benn, the Member
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for Bristol South East50 was barred from taking his seat in the Commons. A
joint committee of the Houses of Commons and Lords reported on this matter
in 1962 and recommended reform. As noted earlier, the Peerage Act 1963
provides that a person succeeding to a peerage may disclaim his peerage
within one year of his succession,51 and that a Member of the House of
Commons may disclaim within a one month period from succession. The
disclaimer is irrevocable, but operates only for the lifetime of the peer
disclaiming the title: the title will devolve to his heir upon his death. Section 6
of the the Peerage Act 1963 provides for the first time that peeresses in their
own right are entitled to sit and vote in the House of Lords.
The 1968 reform proposals
The Labour government of 1967–69 again turned its attention to reform of the
composition of the House of Lords. The party Manifesto of 1966 declared the
intention to introduce reforms to safeguard measures approved by the House
of Commons against delay or defeat in the House of Lords. An all-party
conference took place in 1967–68, at which substantial cross-party agreement
was reached on the proposals for reform. The resultant government White
Paper of 196852 proposed that there should be a two tier House. The first tier
would consist of 230 voting peers who satisfied a test of attendance on a
regular basis. The second tier would consist of peers who remained entitled to
attend and to participate in debate, but would not be entitled to vote. The
right to a seat in the House of Lords by virtue of succession to a peerage
would be removed but existing peers (who did not satisfy the attendance
criteria) would either become non-voting peers or might be conferred a life
peerage with entitlement to vote. It was recommended that the government of
the day should have a small, but not overall, majority of voting peers in the
House. The White Paper also recommended that the power of delay by the
House of Lords be reduced to a six month period. The White Paper was
approved by the House of Lords by 251 votes to 56. An alliance of the far right
of the Conservative Party and the left wing of the Labour Party in the House
of Commons caused the White Paper to be rejected by 270 votes to 159.
The government proceeded to introduce the Parliament (No 2) Bill 1968 to
give effect to the White Paper. The Bill received a Second Reading by 285
votes to 185, but the committee stage, taken as a committee of the Whole
House, became protracted and, after over 80 hours of consideration, the Prime
Minister announced the withdrawal of the Bill.
50 See Re Parliamentary Election for Bristol South-East (1964).
51 Or on attaining the age of majority.
52 Cmnd 3799, 1968, London: HMSO. 
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The Labour government’s reform agenda 
The first commitment made in relation to the House of Lords by the Labour
Party before its election to office in 1997 was to abolish, as a first measure, the
voting rights of hereditary peers. Consistent with this proposal is the removal
of the right of members of the Royal Family to vote in the House of Lords. The
government’s ultimate objective, as stated in its election Manifesto, was to
replace the current House of Lords with a new elected second chamber,
elected under a system of proportional representation. The elected House,
according to the Manifesto, would have the power to delay, for the lifetime of
a parliament, changes to ‘designated legislation reducing individual or
constitutional rights’. However, as will be seen below, the Labour Party’s
plans for reforming the Lords changed significantly once elected to
government.
Once in office, the Labour government moved cautiously. A Royal
Commission was established to consider the next phase in reform and to make
recommendations. All reform of the House of Lords is problematic. The 1968
reforms failed to be implemented, not because of opposition in the House of
Lords, but through opposition in the House of Commons, which crossed party
lines. The opposition arose from the Commons’ perception that removing the
right of hereditary peers to vote would enhance the authority of the House of
Lords, and would risk the Lords becoming more bold in its dealing with the
House of Commons. One key question for the Royal Commission and the
government, therefore, was how to move forward to the second reform stage
in order to produce an effective and valuable second chamber without
threatening the supremacy of the democratically elected House of Commons.
The problem of legitimacy remained after the removal of the hereditary
peers’ right to vote. Given the fact of political patronage, for services rendered
to the Party or country, the life peers have no more constitutional legitimacy
than do hereditary peers. Thus, removing the hereditary peers from the House
of Lords did not effect any constitutional change of real value, and certainly
did not mark a move towards greater democratic legitimacy, but represented
no more than a starting point for further, largely undefined, future reform, the
consequences of which, in terms of the distribution of power between the two
Houses, will depend on both the nature and scope of the reform. 
The Royal Commission Report: a House for the future
The Royal Commission Report was published in January 2000. To the
disappointment of those advocating radical reform, the Commission
recommended that the Upper House, having around 550 members, comprise
a majority of nominated members and a minority of selected or elected
members representing regional interests. However, despite widespread
consultation, the Commission reached no consensus on the most difficult
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issue: the number of selected or elected members and the method by which
members would be selected. 
The powers of the second chamber would remain broadly as they are at
present, with the second chamber being able to delay, but ultimately not to
defeat, primary legislation. The Salisbury convention should continue to be
respected. The report recommends that there be greater use of pre-legislative
scrutiny of Bills. In relation to secondary legislation, the second chamber
should be given power to delay their implementation and to voice its
concerns. The power to defeat secondary legislation – in practice, never used –
would be removed. 
In relation to composition, three options were put forward. Model A
provided for 65 members selected by dividing up a regional allocation of seats
according to each party’s share of the vote in that region at general elections,
with one third of the regions selecting regional members at each general
election. Model B, supported by a majority of the Commission, proposed 87
members, directly elected at the same time as the European Parliament
elections under a system of proportional representation. Model C provides for
195 regional members directly elected at the same time as the European
Parliament elections. 
On the system of nominations for the House, the Commission
recommended that an independent Appointments Commission be
established. Establishing the Commission severs the link between the granting
of honours and the political patronage of the Prime Minister and government.
Members of the House of Lords – the new name for which the Commission
did not decide – would not be known as ‘peers’. The current system of
granting of honours would remain, but would not result in membership of the
House of Lords. The granting of a peerage is therefore no longer to be a
precondition for membership of the second chamber. The remaining
hereditary peers will cease to be entitled to sit and vote once the regional
members join the second chamber. Hereditary peers will, however, be eligible
to seek nomination as regional members or apply for appointment by the
Appointments Commission. The Commission will be under a duty to
maintain balance in the composition of the House of Lords. The Commission
should ensure that at least 20 per cent of the members are not affiliated to one
of the major parties; it should be under a statutory duty to ensure that a
minimum of 30 per cent of new members are female, with the aim of
gradually achieving gender balance within the House. It will also be required
to attempt to ensure a representative level of membership from ethnic
minority groups and appropriate representation for all religious faiths (but see
below). Regional members would serve for the equivalent of ‘three electoral
cycles’ and appointed members should serve for a fixed 15 year term. The
earliest the new system for regional members would operate would be 2004.
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The Commission recommended that existing life peers, appointed before
the publication of the report, who wish to remain in the second chamber
should be deemed to have been appointed for life, whereas life peers
appointed between the publication of the report and the necessary legislation
implementing the report’s recommendations should be deemed to be
appointed for a 15 year term from the date of the award of the life peerage.
On remuneration, the Commission recommended that the financial
arrangements be adequate to make regular attendance economically viable,
and that remuneration should be linked to attendance in parliament.
Payments made, however, for time and lost income should be less than the
basic salary of a Member of Parliament over an average session. 
The report’s recommendations were removed from the aspirations of
those seeking a democratically elected second chamber. That radical option
foundered on the problem of the constitutional balance of power between two
elected chambers, and the fear – which has always dogged reform of the
House of Lords – that the Commons might lose its supremacy. But the
Wakeham Report did foresee a second chamber with at least the same powers
as the current House of Lords, and one which is broadly representative of
British society. In breaking the link between peerages and membership of the
second chamber, the Commission has removed one of the most contentious
aspects of the political honours system in which membership of the second
chamber is seen to be conferred for political services to the governing party.
Instead, the Commission seeks a second chamber which ‘should be
authoritative, confident, and broadly representative of the whole of British
society’, and its members should have a breadth of experience outside the
world of politics, skills and knowledge relevant to the careful assessment of
constitutional matters. The Commission stated that its intention was to
recommend proposals which were not only ‘persuasive and intellectually
coherent but also workable, durable and politically realistic’.53
In 2000, the House of Lords Appointments Commission was established,
which has the function of nominating all cross-bench (independent) peers to
the House of Lords.54 The Commission takes over the role formerly played by
the Prime Minister.55
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53 In 2000 a Private Members’ Bill, the Life Peerages (Appointments Commission) Bill, was
introduced, detailing the procedure and criteria for appointment to the House of Lords.
That Bill failed. On the current arrangements, see below.
54 HL Deb Vol 60 Col WA179, 25 January 2000.
55 The Commission contacted 10,000 organisations, urging them to inform their members
and staff, but no public advertisements were placed. The first 15 Members appointed all
nominated themselves. 
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The government’s response to the Royal Commission Report
The government signalled its acceptance in principle of the Report. However,
the White Paper published in November 2001 made clear that only a minority
of peers would be elected.56 The stated aim is to reduce the size of the House
from 700 to 600 members over ten years, with 120 Members directly elected;
up to 332 Members nominated by party leaders and 120 non-party
(independent) Members being chosen by the independent Appointments
Commission. The number of bishops will be reduced to 16 from 26 and there
will remain at least 12 law lords. The rights of the remaining hereditary peers
to sit will be removed. The government rejected the call for more diverse
religious representation and the proposal that Members should be salaried. 
It was expected that a Draft Bill would be presented in Spring 2002,
following the government’s consideration of responses to its White Paper.
However, that expectation was dashed when disputes arose over the
proportion of Members who would be directly elected, with members of the
government and the Labour Party opposing the 20 per cent proposal.
Meanwhile the Commons Public Administration Committee proposed that 60
per cent of Members should be elected. This is opposed by members of the
government who fear that such a substantial proportion of elected Members
would threaten the supremacy of the House of Commons. The government
has delayed any legislation until the 2002–03 session of parliament.
56 The House of Lords: Completing the Reform, Cmd 5291, London: HMSO.
CHAPTER 18
DEFINITION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
SIGNIFICANCE OF PRIVILEGE
The privileges of parliament are those rules of both Houses of Parliament
which offer protection from outside interference – from whatever source – to
the Houses collectively, and to individual members. Erskine May defines
privilege as being: 
... the sum of the peculiar rights enjoyed by each House collectively as a
constituent part of the High Court of Parliament, and by Members of each
House individually, without which they could not discharge their functions,
and which exceed those possessed by other bodies or individuals. Thus,
privilege, though part of the law of the land, is to a certain extent an exemption
from the general law. [1997, p 69]
Parliamentary privilege provides protection for Members of Parliament
against accusations of defamation from outside parliament and also protects
the individual member – in the exercise of his or her freedom of speech – from
the executive. 
Parliamentary privilege presents some intriguing constitutional issues. In
some respects, privilege may be compared with the royal prerogative, in so far
as both privilege and the prerogative represent a unique aspect of legal power
reserved exclusively for a special class of persons. Moreover, parliamentary
privilege is a legal power in respect of which the courts – mindful of the
doctrine of separation of powers – will be cautious in accepting jurisdiction to
regulate. By asserting special powers and immunities for parliament as a
whole, and for its members individually, parliament throws around itself a
cloak of protection which provides rights and immunities not accorded to
individual citizens. The balance which is – and ought to be – struck between
legitimate and necessary safeguards for parliament and its members in the
exercise of parliamentary duties and the rights of individuals to the protection
of the general law is not always satisfactorily achieved. 
The law and practice of privilege reveals the extent to which individual
members and parliament as a body are free from outside pressure – whether
from interest groups, sponsoring bodies and institutions or the media – a
freedom which is central to ensure an independent parliament. However, as
Marshall and Moodie point out, ‘the boundary lines between free comment,
legitimate pressure, and improper interference are obviously not easy to
formulate in principle’ (1971, p 112). 
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The law and custom of parliament
The privileges enjoyed form part of the ‘law and custom of parliament’ – lex et
consuetudo parliamenti – and, as such, it is for parliament to adjudicate on
matters of privilege, not the courts.1 Privileges are embodied in rules of the
Houses of Parliament. The United Kingdom Parliament, however, is not free
to extend existing privileges by a mere resolution of the House: only statute
can create new privileges.2 Privileges derive from practice and tradition; they
are thus customary in origin. Nevertheless, they are recognised as having the
status of law, being the ‘law and custom of parliament’. Parliament itself can –
in the exercise of its sovereign power – place privileges on a statutory basis.
For example, in 1770, the Parliamentary Privilege Act withdrew the privilege
of freedom from arrest from servants of Members of Parliament. Further, in
1689, Article IX of the Bill of Rights gave statutory recognition to the freedom
of speech in parliament. In 1868, parliament ended its own jurisdiction to
determine disputed elections, conferring jurisdiction on the courts by way of
the Administration of Justice Act. 
The role of the courts
The role of the courts in matters of privilege is confined to determining
whether a privilege exists, and its scope. If the court rules that a disputed
matter falls within parliamentary privilege the court will decline jurisdiction.
This relationship between parliament and the courts may be viewed in two
ways. First, it could be viewed as the courts giving recognition to the
supremacy – or sovereignty – of parliament. Historically, parliament was
established as the High Court of Parliament, having legislative and judicial
powers.3 Accordingly, it was appropriate for the ordinary courts of law to
defer to the highest court in the land. Nowadays, this justification is less well
founded. It is unconvincing to portray parliament, except when exercising its
judicial function in enforcing and upholding privilege, as a judicial body.4 The
relationship between parliament and the courts may also be explained by
reference to the doctrine of the separation of powers. For the judiciary to rule
on the legality of actions of Members of Parliament acting in their
parliamentary capacity or on the actions of the House as a whole would,
under current constitutional arrangements, place judges in a potentially
dangerous position, exercising a controlling power over both the legislature
and the executive within it.
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2 Stockdale v Hansard (1839).
3 See McIlwain, 1910.
4 See below for a discussion of recent criticism of the Committee of Privileges and the
decision making process of the House of Commons in disciplining members.
Parliamentary Privilege
THE PRINCIPAL PRIVILEGES
The principal individual privileges are freedom of speech in parliament and
freedom of members from arrest in civil matters. The collective privileges of
parliament include the exclusive right to regulate composition and procedure,
right of access to the Sovereign, the right to the ‘favourable construction’ by
the Sovereign in relation to its actions. These are formally claimed by the
Speaker, in the form of a Speaker’s Petition to Her Majesty, at the opening of
each new parliamentary session.
The privileges are substantially the same for both Houses of Parliament
(though see below on the ‘privilege of peerage’). Each House has the sole right
to regulate the privileges it enjoys – although neither House is free to extend
its own privileges other than by statute – and, as a result, some minor
differences may be discerned between the two Houses.
Historical overview
Originally designed to protect the right of the King to the services of his
advisers, the right to freedom from molestation and arrest was established
early. By the sixteenth century, parliament itself was assuming jurisdiction to
regulate privilege, and privilege was increasingly being used to protect the
fledgling parliament from the power of the Crown. Nowadays, while a few
privileges are principally of historical interest, the majority remain central to
the working of parliament.
Freedom from arrest
The first recorded statement of the right to freedom from arrest dates from
1340.5 In 1404, the Commons formally claimed that members were privileged
against arrest ‘for debt, contract, or trespass of any kind according to the
custom of the realm’.6 The King, however, paid little heed and the matter was
not finally resolved. In 1512, Strode, a member of the Commons, was
imprisoned under a court order for proposing certain Bills in parliament.
Parliament reacted by passing an Act declaring the proceedings against him
void, and also that any future proceedings against its members would be
void.7 In 1627, when King Charles I arrested and detained five knights, his
action was challenged by an application for habeas corpus. The application
failed, the court accepting the certificate of the Crown stating that they had
been detained by special order of the King: per speciale mandatum regis.8 In
551
5 Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 1970, Vol 43, pp 214–15, cited in Erskine
May, 1997, p 74.
6 Ibid. 
7 Strode’s Case; see Maitland, 1908.
8 Darnel’s Case (the Five Knights’ Case) (1627).
1629, three members were charged with uttering seditious words in debate
and violence against the Speaker of the House. The Crown contended, and the
court accepted, that privilege did not attach to seditious words or assault.9
The Petition of Right 1628 declared the arbitrary power of detention unlawful.
In 1640, the Habeas Corpus Act placed protection by writ of habeas corpus
from the Crown on a statutory basis and, in 1641, the House declared that
arrests of its members were contrary to the law and privilege of parliament.10
Freedom of speech 
An early example of the Commons protecting its own against the King is that
of Thomas Haxey,11 who, in 1397, laid a Bill before parliament criticising
Richard II. The House of Lords condemned Haxey to die as a traitor, but an
Archbishop claimed he was a clerk, thereby giving him the protection of the
clergy. He was later pardoned. The Commons subsequently declared that the
action against him was contrary to their privileges. 
Erskine May reports that the first recorded claim of privilege of speech
was contained in the petition of Sir Thomas More in 1523, asking Henry VIII: 
... to take all in good part, interpreting every man’s words, how uncunningly
soever they may be couched, to proceed yeat of a good zeale towards the profit
of your Realme. [1997, p 72]
This bold assertion met with no recorded reply, but it is thought that Henry
was generally tolerant of the Commons since he had little to fear from it.
Nevertheless, between that time and 1689, freedom of speech in parliament
remained a contended matter. In 1571, Elizabeth I warned the Commons that
they would ‘do well to meddle with no matters of state but such as should be
propounded unto them, and to occupy themselves in other matters
concerning the Commonwealth’.12 Elizabeth maintained her grudging
attitude to free speech, reminding the Speaker in 1593 that it was her
prerogative not only to summon and dissolve parliament but also to dictate
what members could discuss.13 James I reasserted the supremacy of the
Monarchy, stating in 1621 that the privileges of the Commons were derived
from the ‘grace and permission of our ancestors and us’, and that privileges
would be respected only to the extent that members acted ‘within their duty’ –
as the King saw it. Parliament’s response was to draw up a protestation
formally asserting, inter alia, that:
Every Member of the House of Parliament hath, and of right ought to have,
freedom of speech, to propound, treat, reason and bring to conclusion the
same. [Lockyer, 1985, p 226]
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10 CJ (1640–42) 203, 3 St Tr 235; 1 Hatsell 250–80, cited in Erskine May, 1997, p 73.
11 (1397) Rot Parl, iii 434. 
12 Cited in Lockyer, 1985.
13 The penalty for flouting the Queen’s will was either to be barred from the House or to
be imprisoned: Lockyer, 1985, p 190.
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The King’s reaction was to remove the protestation from the Commons’
Journal and dissolve parliament.
The reign of Charles I (1625–49) was dominated by the struggle between
the King and parliament, culminating in the Civil Wars of 1642–48 and the
execution of Charles I in 1646. The Petition of Right asserted parliament’s
power over the King in matters of taxation, imprisonment without good cause
and the imposition of martial law. Charles I dissolved parliament in 1629 and
ruled for 11 years without a parliament.14
The Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the Declaration of Right was finally
to settle the conflicts between parliament and the Crown. The issue of free
speech in parliament was to be resolved by Article IX of the Bill of Rights 1689
(see, further, below), which conferred absolute protection – or legal immunity
– for words spoken by Members of Parliament during the course of
proceedings in parliament.
THE CURRENT SCOPE AND ROLE OF PRIVILEGE
Freedom from arrest
For Members of the House of Commons, the freedom extends for 40 days
before the start of and 40 days after the end of the session. For peers, the
privilege protects from arrest in civil matters at all times. The freedom from
arrest does not extend to criminal charges or convictions.15
Where the criminal law is concerned, there is no immunity, and the re-
arrest of a Member of the House of Commons who had escaped from prison,
in the Chamber of the House, was not contrary to privilege.16 In 1939, a
Member of Parliament – Captain Ramsay – was detained under defence
regulations. His detention did not amount to a breach of privilege, although it
would have done so had he been detained for words spoken in parliament.17
Where a member is arrested on a criminal charge, the Speaker of the
House is notified and in turn will report to the House either orally or in
writing. If a member is detained on grounds of mental illness under the
Mental Health Act 1983 then – following specialists’ reports to the Speaker
confirming the member’s illness and detention – his seat will be declared
vacant. 
Nowadays, the freedom relates only to civil matters and is generally of
little significance, given that, with one important exception, imprisonment for
debt has been abolished. The exception concerns the availability of
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imprisonment as a penalty for the non-payment of financial provision during
marriage, upon divorce, and for children born outside marriage. In 1963, in
the case of Stourton v Stourton (1963), a Member of the House of Lords was
able to escape the sanction of prison for maintenance default by pleading
privilege. It is anomalous that Members of Parliament should be immune
from the law in even this limited manner. The Committee on Parliamentary
Privilege recommended, in 1967, that the freedom be abolished,18 but no
action was taken. 
Freedom of speech and ‘proceedings in parliament’
At the present day, it is more important to notice that this freedom of speech
holds good not only against the Crown, but against private individuals also. A
member speaking in either House is quite outside the law of defamation: 
He may accuse any person of the basest crimes, may do so knowing that his
words are false, and yet that person will be unable to take any action against
him.19
The most important privilege claimed by parliament is freedom of speech.
Article IX raises a question which has caused much difficulty for the courts.20
It has been seen above that, if a matter falls within the privileges of
parliament, the courts will have no jurisdiction over the matter, other than to
determine whether or not a matter of alleged privilege falls within the ambit
of privilege. If a positive determination is made, jurisdiction to rule on the
matter falls to parliament and not the courts. In order to make such a
determination in relation to freedom of speech, the courts are obliged to
interpret Article IX of the Bill of Rights, and the phrase ‘proceedings in
parliament’.
Some matters are settled. The Bill of Rights makes clear that freedom of
speech in debate is protected from legal action and redress under the law of
defamation. Debates and questions on the floor of the House and in standing
and select committees are therefore clearly protected. Other situations are, or
have been, less straightforward. For example, what is the situation where a
Member of Parliament is discussing parliamentary matters outside the
precincts of parliament, or where a Member of Parliament writes to a minister
on such a matter? Moreover, what is the position where a member writes to
the minister or another member with regard to a matter which he wishes to
raise in parliament, or which involves allegations made against bodies or
persons outside parliament, on which he requires further information before
raising the issue in parliament? Despite numerous suggestions for reform to
inject greater clarity into the law, many matters remain unclear. The most
recent consideration of the scope of proceedings in parliament is discussed
below.
Chapter 18: Constitutional and Administrative Law
554
18 HC 34 (1967–68), London: HMSO, p xxix. 
19 Maitland, 1908, p 375. On the Defamation Act 1996, see, further, p 561 ff below.
20 See Leopold, 1991.
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The case law is instructive. In Rivlin v Bilainkin (1953), the plaintiff in an
action for defamation had been granted an interim injunction to restrain the
defendant from repeating the alleged defamation. The defendant repeated the
defamatory remarks in letters and took them to the House of Commons,
giving one to a messenger to deliver to a Member of Parliament and posting
the other four, addressed to other members, in the House of Commons’ post
office. In an action for an order committing the defendant for a breach of the
injunction, the defendant argued that publication of the repetition of the libel
was committed within the precincts of the House of Commons and was
accordingly not actionable in a court of law. Mr Justice McNair declared
himself: 
... satisfied that no question of privilege arises, for a variety of reasons, and
particularly I rely on the fact that the publication was not connected in any
way with any proceedings in that House ... 
In Duncan Sandys’ case, in 1938, Mr Duncan Sandys had sent to the Secretary
of State for War the draft of a parliamentary question in which he drew
attention to a shortage of military equipment. Within the draft, Mr Sandys
quoted figures which, in the view of the War Office, could have been obtained
only as a result of a breach of the Official Secrets Acts 1911–20. The Attorney
General interviewed Mr Sandys, who later complained that he was being
threatened with prosecution – in breach of privilege – for failing to disclose
the source of his information. A select committee was established to consider
the relevance of the Official Secrets Acts to members acting in their
parliamentary capacity. The Committee Report considered Article IX of the
Bill of Rights, and it observed that:
... the privilege is not confined to words spoken in debate or to spoken words,
but extends to all proceedings in Parliament. While the term ‘proceedings in
Parliament’ has never been construed by the courts, it covers both the asking of
a question and the giving written notice of such question, and includes
everything said or done by a Member in the exercise of his functions as a
Member in a committee of either House, as well as everything said or done in
either House in the transaction of parliamentary business.
The Committee went on to assert that:
... words spoken or things done by a Member beyond the walls of Parliament
will generally not be protected. Cases may, however, easily be imagined of
communications between one Member and another, or between a Member and
a Minister, so closely related to some matter pending in, or expected to be
brought before, the House, that though they do not take place in the chamber
or a committee room they form part of the business of the House, as, for
example, where a Member sends to the Minister the draft of the Question he is
thinking of putting down or shows it to another Member with a view to
obtaining advice as to the propriety of putting it down or as to the manner in
which it should be framed ... 
... on the other hand, a casual conversation in the House cannot be said to be a
proceeding in Parliament, and a Member who discloses information in the
course of such a conversation would not, in their view, be protected by
privilege ...
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The Committee ruled that if it were necessary, in order to prove the charge
alleged, to produce evidence of what the defendant had said in the House:
... it would be in the power of the House to protect him by withholding
permission for the evidence to be given.21
The response of the House differed markedly in the case of Strauss and the
London Electricity Board in 1958.22 At issue was whether or not communication
in written form between an MP and a minister was protected by privilege.
George Strauss MP had forwarded a letter from a constituent to the relevant
minister, in which criticism was made of the manner in which the Board
disposed of scrap metal. The minister passed the letter to the Board for
comment, whereupon the Board threatened to sue Mr Strauss for libel. The
member believed that this was a matter concerned with his parliamentary
duties and that he should be covered by privilege. The Committee of
Privileges concluded that the letter written was a proceeding in parliament
and that, accordingly, the Board had committed a breach of the privilege of
the House. The committee was undecided as to whether the Parliamentary
Privilege Act 1770 (which provides that legal action taken against members is
in itself a breach of the privilege of the House) applied. It was recommended
that the House seek a ruling from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
on the matter. The Judicial Committee ruled that the Act referred only to legal
action taken against a member in his private capacity, and not as a result of his
conduct as a Member of Parliament.23 The committee so reported to the
House which, following debate, surprisingly rejected the finding of the
committee. The London Electricity Board subsequently withdrew its action for
libel, and an independent inquiry set up by the minister exonerated the
Board.24
The case raises two important questions for consideration. First, a great
many important negotiations and communications take place through
informal discussion between members outside the precincts of the House.
Much of this business is as important as matters raised for formal debate in
the House, yet they are not covered by parliamentary privilege unless so
closely associated to actual or pending proceedings in parliament as to be
brought within that phrase.
Secondly, many of the matters dealt with by Members of Parliament
involve, as did the Strauss case, alleged grievances reported by constituents
against government departments and associated public bodies. Inevitably,
such grievances may entail actual or potentially libellous statements, but they
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are not protected by privilege. Where such a matter falls within the
jurisdiction of the Parliamentary Commissioner, protection is now afforded by
section 10(5) of the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, which provides
that such communications are absolutely privileged.25 Uncertainty remains,
however, where it is unclear as to whether or not the matter falls within his
jurisdiction. It is unsatisfactory that neither members of the public, nor of
parliament, are clear as to the potential scope of liability under the law of
defamation.
Two further cases illustrate the scope of the privilege. R v Rule (1937)
entailed a letter written by a constituent to his Member of Parliament
complaining about the conduct of a police officer and a magistrate. In an
action for libel, the court held that, where a communication was one made
under a duty or common interest, the matter would attract qualified privilege:
that is to say, it would be protected from liability unless malice were proven.
A similar conclusion was reached in Beach v Freeson (1972), where a Member
of Parliament was sued by a firm of solicitors, concerning whom the member
had received complaints from a constituent and forwarded the letter, with a
covering letter, to the Lord Chancellor and the Law Society. That the letters
were defamatory was not contested, but the court nevertheless held that
publication of the letters (to the Lord Chancellor and Law Society) was
protected by qualified privilege on the basis of public interest.
Freedom of speech: its use and misuse
In the Committee of Privileges report of 1986–87,26 the Committee had
endorsed the view expressed by the Speaker27 that:
We should use our freedom of speech ... with the greatest care, particularly if
we impute any motives or dishonourable conduct to those outside the House
who have no right of reply.
The Committee recognised that there is ‘no clear dividing line between
statements which represent a legitimate exercise of freedom of speech, on the
one hand, and those which constitute an abuse, on the other’ and called on
members to exercise self-restraint.
In 1955, Kim Philby was named in the House as a Soviet spy, an allegation
which surely would not have been made without the protection of privilege.
In the 1960s, the Minister of War’s association with Christine Keeler, who also
had a relationship with a Soviet Attaché was revealed under the cloak of
privilege. Also, in the 1960s, a London property racketeer, Peter Rachmann,
was identified in the House. In 1980, Jeff Rooker MP made a number of false
accusations against a Director of Rolls Royce: the allegations were withdrawn
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only after the lapse of five weeks. In the 1985–86 session, ministers were
accused in parliament of improper involvement with the Johnson Matthey
Bank following its collapse. In 1986, Geoffrey Dickins MP accused an Essex
doctor of the sexual abuse of children, following a decision of the Director of
Public Prosecutions not to prosecute the doctor on the basis that there was
insufficient evidence to secure a conviction. Which of these exercises of
freedom of speech represented a legitimate exercise of the freedom and which
represented an abuse is a matter for individual judgment.
The House relies heavily on the notion of the self-restraint of its members,
and is slow to use its disciplinary powers against offending members. The
Committee on Procedure in its First Report urged members to exercise
caution, and to avoid misusing their freedom. Where members insist on using
privilege as a protective device and cause damage to the reputations and
livelihoods of citizens, the advice of the Procedure Committee will give little
comfort.28 Individuals may try to rebut any allegations, may petition
parliament and may try to persuade a Member of Parliament to retract a
damaging allegation, but such forms of redress are wholly unsatisfactory in
comparison with the right to legal redress.
A Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege issued its First Report in
1999. In relation to members of the public, the Committee considered whether
a ‘right of reply’ should be introduced but decided against it. A right of reply
would do nothing to prove the truth or falsity of any allegation and no
financial redress could be made, nor would a statement published in Hansard
attract the same degree of publicity as the offending allegation.29
The courts and privilege
More recent case law further illustrates the meaning of Article IX and the role
of the courts in relation to matters of privilege. In Rost v Edwards (1990), a
Member of Parliament sued The Guardian newspaper for alleged libel.30 The
Guardian article had stated that the member, who was a member of the Energy
Select Committee and a nominee for selection to the standing committee,
considering an Energy Bill, had not registered his interests – as a consultant
with two organisations concerned with energy. Subsequent to publication of
the article, the member was informed that he was no longer being considered
for membership of the standing committee and, further, that he had not been
given the chair of the Energy Select Committee. The member instituted libel
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proceedings, which were adjourned by the court in order to determine the
issue of parliamentary privilege. The member wished to adduce evidence
before the court which comprised correspondence between himself and a
clerk of the House and the Register of Members’ Interests.
Mr Justice Popplewell ruled that the correspondence could not be
submitted in evidence: that clearly fell within the exclusive domain of
parliament and not the court. As to the Register, the judge took the view that
it was a public document and, accordingly, could be put in evidence. Mr
Justice Popplewell, recognising the respective jurisdictions of parliament and
the courts, declared that the courts should nevertheless be slow to refuse to
admit in evidence documents which could affect the outcome of legal
proceedings and hence individual rights. Rost v Edwards was doubted by the
Privy Council in Prebble v Television New Zealand Ltd (1994). In Prebble, a
member of the New Zealand House of Representatives sued the television
company for libel for publishing an article alleging that state assets had been
sold off, contrary to stated policy, and that the member had been involved in a
conspiracy to effect the sale. In its defence, the company wished to introduce
in evidence parliamentary papers which substantiated its claim. The member
pleaded privilege. The House of Representatives ruled that it had no power to
waive its own privileges and thereby allow the papers to be considered in
court. The Privy Council ruled that to adduce such evidence – without the
House’s waiver of privilege – contravened privilege and the protection given
to parliamentary proceedings under Article IX of the Bill of Rights 1689. 
In Pepper v Hart (1993),31 the question considered by the House of Lords
was whether judges may refer to Hansard as an aid to the interpretation of
statutes. This issue has long been one of some controversy, and the orthodox
view has hitherto been that judges may not under any circumstances refer to
Hansard. In Davis v Johnson (1979), Lord Denning MR stated openly that he
privately referred to Hansard as an aid to interpretation, only to be criticised
for so doing by the House of Lords. However, in Black-Clawson International
Ltd v Papierwerke AG (1975), all five judges in the House of Lords had agreed
that official reports could be consulted to discern the ‘mischief’ with which the
legislation was intended to deal, although their Lordships differed over the
extent to which they could be used. Further, in Pickstone v Freeman (1988),
three members of the House of Lords made reference to a parliamentary
speech of the Secretary of State (the other two judges were silent on this
matter). 
In Pepper v Hart (1993), six of the seven judges hearing the case ruled in
favour of admitting parliamentary debates before the court in some
circumstances (the Lord Chancellor dissented on this point). Arguments were
advanced by the Attorney General against such a decision – not least that, by
consulting parliamentary debates, the courts would be acting contrary to
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Article IX of the Bill of Rights 1689, which prohibits the courts from
questioning proceedings in parliament. The court rejected those views,
concluding that there were no constitutional reasons which outweighed the
merits of a ‘limited modification’ of the rule. Lord Browne-Wilkinson, giving
the leading judgment of the court, stated that the rule should be relaxed
where: 
(a) legislation is ambiguous or obscure, or leads to an absurdity;
(b) the material relied on consists of one or more statements by a minister or
other promoter of the Bill together, if necessary, with such other
parliamentary material as is necessary to understand such statements and
their effect; and
(c) the statements relied on are clear.
The House of Lords in Pepper v Hart revealed a marked change in attitude,
although the right to refer to Hansard is not an unqualified right. The
significance of this judgment from the point of view of parliamentary
privilege lies in the court’s consideration of the scope of Article IX of the Bill of
Rights 1689. The Attorney General had argued strongly before the court that
for judges to refer to Hansard infringed Article IX, amounting to an inquiry
into the proceedings in parliament. This submission was rejected by the court,
Lord Templeman declaring that reference to Hansard, under limited
circumstances, involved no questioning of parliament, but merely clarification
as to parliament’s intention.32
In R v Deegan (1998), however, the Court of Appeal ruled that recourse to
Hansard was not justified. The court below had referred to Hansard in order to
clarify parliament’s intentions as to the meaning of the phrase ‘folding
pocketknife’, the possession of which had led to the appellant’s conviction.
The Court of Appeal, however, ruled that the conditions laid down in Pepper v
Hart had not been satisfied, and that for the court to rely on parliamentary
records of debate, on a term which was inherently open to interpretation, was
unjustified. The appeal was dismissed.
The case of Prebble v Television New Zealand Ltd (1995) was reconsidered by
the Queen’s Bench Division in Allason v Haines (1995). Joe Haines, a political
journalist, and Mr Richard Stott, editor of Today, applied to have a libel action
brought against them by the plaintiff, Mr Rupert Allason, MP, stayed. The
court held that where, in order to defend a libel action, it was necessary to
bring evidence of a Member of Parliament’s behaviour in the House of
Commons, and such a defence would be in breach of parliamentary privilege,
the action would be stayed, for it would be unjust to deprive the defendants of
their defence. The defendants had sought to show that Early Day Motions
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were inspired to improper motives or were activated upon a failure to take
proper care. Such evidence would be in contravention of Article IX of the Bill
of Rights 1689. To enforce parliamentary privilege in this case would be to
cause injustice to the defendants. A stay was granted.
Rost v Edwards was also critically considered by the Joint Committee on
Parliamentary Privilege which reported in 1999. The report stated baldly that
‘we are in no doubt that if this decision is correct, the law should be
changed’.33 In the Committee’s opinion, it is quite wrong for a court of law to
be free to investigate and adjudicate upon matters relating to the Register. If
there are allegations of wrongful failure to register, that matter should be ‘a
matter for parliament alone’. The Committee recommended that legislation be
introduced to make clear that the Register and matters relating thereto are
‘proceedings in parliament’.
The Defamation Act 1996 and Article IX of the Bill of Rights
The Defamation Act 1996 came into being as a result of the Rupert Allason
case and Neil Hamilton’s intended libel suit against The Guardian newspaper
over its allegations that he had accepted rewards in relation to his
parliamentary duties.34 Section 13 of the Defamation Act provides that a
person may waive, for the purpose of defamation proceedings in which his
conduct in relation to proceedings in parliament is in issue, the protection of
any enactment or rule of law which prevents proceedings in parliament being
impeached or questioned in any court or place outside parliament. As a result,
a Member of Parliament may bring an action for defamation to defend his or
her actions, provided that he or she waives the Article IX protection and
thereby enables the defence to adduce evidence which otherwise would be
excluded on the basis of privilege. If, however, the Member of Parliament is
not willing to waive the Article IX privilege, then, on the authority of Prebble v
Television New Zealand Ltd, the defamation action may be stayed in order to
enable the newspaper to adduce evidence which proves the truth of its
allegation. 
The Hamilton saga continued with Mr Hamilton suing Mohamed Al
Fayed for defamation. Mr Al Fayed sought to have the action struck out on
the basis that, since the Committee on Standards and Privileges and the
Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards had already investigated the
allegation, the trial would breach parliamentary privilege. It was argued that
section 13 of the Defamation Act 1996 was addressed at the individual
privilege of the member concerned and did not apply to parliament’s
collective privilege of exclusive jurisdiction over its internal regulation. The
judge at first instance refused to strike out the action, as did the Court of
561
33 First Report of the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, 1999, para 123.
34 Hamilton v Hencke; Greer v Hencke (1995), on which see, further, below.
Appeal. On appeal to the House of Lords, the decision of the Court of Appeal
was affirmed. Section 13 applied. Its effect was that the defendant’s waiver of
his parliamentary protection in relation to the parliamentary inquiry into his
conduct overrode any privilege belonging to parliament as a whole and thus
allowed the parties in the libel proceedings to challenge the veracity of
evidence given to the parliamentary committee.35
First Report of the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege
(1999)
The 1999 report offered an in depth analysis of the contemporary law and
practice relating to privilege. On the issues raised in Pepper v Hart (1993)36 and
related cases, the report endorses the decision, stating that this ‘use of
parliamentary proceedings is benign’.37 The Committee did, however, also
stress that, where the courts depart from accepted practice, that departure
‘must be scrutinised thoroughly to see whether as a matter of principle and
practice, it is justified’,38 and that there should be no ‘general weakening of the
prohibition contained in Article IX’.
In similar vein, the Committee considered the use of parliamentary
proceedings made in judicial review proceedings. Accepting the legitimacy of
reference to Hansard in judicial review proceedings, the Committee accepted
that both parliamentary scrutiny and judicial review have an important role to
play in ensuring both democratic and legal control over the executive.
Whereas parliament had the sole right to ensure ministerial accountability to
parliament, ‘only the courts can set aside an unlawful ministerial decision’.39
On the circumstances surrounding the Hamilton case, and section 13 of the
Defamation Act 1996 enacted to remedy the defect which flowed from Article
IX – namely, a plaintiff being unable to pursue his action for defamation
because the defendant newspaper was prevented, by Article IX, from
justifying what it had written – the Committee was extremely critical and
recommended reform of the law. Section 13, allowing a Member of Parliament
to waive Article IX, but preventing non-members from doing so, which had
the effect of making newspapers (and others) unable to establish the truth of
their allegations, had ‘created indefensible anomalies of its own which should
not be allowed to continue’.40 Having reviewed alternatives for reform, the
Committee recommended that the individual member should no longer have
the right to waive the protection of Article IX, and that this right should be
given to the House as a whole, subject to the overriding consideration that
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such waiver was in the interests of justice and would not result in a member
attracting legal liability in a court of law. In considering the mechanism for
reaching such a decision, the Committee recommended that, in the House of
Lords, the Committee of Privileges always contained four Law Lords and was
therefore the appropriate forum for decision, whereas, in the Commons, it
would be appropriate for such decisions to be reached by the Speaker, assisted
with advice from a small committee of members to include the Leader and
Shadow Leader of the House with the Attorney General and representatives
of the political parties.41
The composition and procedure of parliament
The Houses of Parliament have an inherent right to regulate their own
composition and procedure. For example, in Ashby v White (1703), the plaintiff
– a qualified voter – had been denied the right to exercise his vote by the
Mayor of Aylesbury. The House of Lords awarded Ashby damages. The case
gave rise to a significant constitutional conflict between parliament and the
courts. The House of Commons – which at the time had jurisdiction to hear
matters on disputed elections – regarded the decision of the House of Lords as
interfering with the exclusive right of the House of Commons to adjudicate on
disputed elections. Other voters, similarly denied the right to vote, instigated
legal proceedings and were committed to prison by the House of Commons.
They brought an application for habeas corpus to test the legality of their
detention. In Paty’s Case (1704), in 1704, the court refused the writ of habeas
corpus. Counsel for the applicants, intending to appeal to the House of Lords,
was committed to prison. The majority of the court refused to grant the
application, deferring to the Commons. The dissenting judge, Lord Holt,
declared that the courts had the power to decide that a writ of habeas corpus
could effect the release of those detained for contempt by the House of
Commons. In judgment, Lord Holt stated that:
I will suppose, that the bringing of such actions was declared by the House of
Commons to be a breach of their privilege; that that declaration will not make
that a breach of privilege that was not so before. But if they have any such
privilege, they ought to shew precedent of it. The privileges of the House of
Commons are well known, and are founded upon the law of the land, and are
nothing but the law ... And if they declare themselves to have privileges, which
they have no legal claim to, the people of England will not be estopped by that
declaration. This privilege of theirs concerns the liberty of the people in a high
degree, by subjecting them to imprisonment for the infringement of them,
which is what the people cannot be subjected to without an Act of Parliament.
In Bradlaugh v Gosset (1884), Bradlaugh had been duly elected as a Member of
Parliament. On arriving to take his seat, Bradlaugh refused to swear the
563
41 For other recommendations for reform, see below.
requisite oath on the Bible, offering instead to swear an oath of allegiance to
the Crown. The House of Commons resolved to exclude Bradlaugh from the
House. The plaintiff sought a declaration from the court that the resolution
was invalid and an injunction to prevent the House of Commons from
excluding him. The Court of Queen’s Bench declared that it had no
jurisdiction to interfere with a matter concerning the internal regulation of
parliament’s procedures. 
The right of the House to regulate its own procedures is further
demonstrated in the case of the British Railways Board v Pickin (1974). There the
court declined to inquire into the manner of the passage of a Bill even though
the plaintiff alleged that he had been denied his right to make representations
on a matter adversely affecting his rights in breach of convention. The Court
of Appeal held that the procedure used in relation to a Private – but not Public
– Bill could be examined. Lord Denning MR took a bold approach, arguing
that it was for the court to ensure that ‘the procedure of parliament itself is not
abused, and that undue advantage is not taken of it. In so doing, the court is
not trespassing on the jurisdiction of parliament itself. It is acting in aid of
parliament and, I might add, in aid of justice.’ The House of Lords disagreed
and adopted its traditional stance: the court will not look ‘behind the
Parliamentary Roll’.42 See, also, the case of Re Parliamentary Election for Bristol
South East (1964), discussed in Chapter 17. There Mr Tony Benn was refused
the right to enter and sit in the Commons, despite being duly elected, because
he had succeeded to a peerage on the death of his father, Viscount Stansgate.
Only by the passage of the Peerage Act 1963 was Tony Benn able to renounce
his peerage and take his seat in the Commons.
On a lighter note, the exclusive rights of the Commons were tested in R v
Campbell ex parte Herbert (1935). Three members of the Kitchen Committee of
the House of Commons were accused of breaching the licensing laws. The
action failed, the court holding that the House was not governed by the
ordinary laws relating to licensing, which would only apply if it could be
shown that they were expressly intended to apply to Westminster. It is for this
reason that the House remains free to open its bars at any time of day or night.
Sir AP Herbert once speculated whether the immunity conceded in R v
Campbell ex parte Herbert could be extended by analogy to permit other
licentious behaviour in the Commons. 
An early conflict between parliament and the courts
In Stockdale v Hansard (1839), a prison inspector made a written report to the
Secretary of State alleging that ‘improper books’ were being circulated in
Newgate prison. The report was subsequently published by Hansard, on order
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of the House of Commons. Stockdale, the publisher of the ‘improper book’,
sued Hansard as publishers of the report, which he regarded to be libellous. In
defence, Hansard argued that the publication had been by an order of the
House of Commons and was, accordingly, covered by the privilege of the
House. The Court of Queen’s Bench ruled that such publication was not
covered by privilege and, moreover, that the House of Commons could not by
a resolution deprive the courts of jurisdiction to protect the rights of
individuals. Stockdale was awarded damages. The Sheriff of Middlesex levied
execution on Hansard’s property to satisfy the award of damages to Stockdale
and the House of Commons responded by passing a resolution to commit the
Sheriff for breach of privilege and contempt of parliament. The Sheriff applied
for a writ of habeas corpus to test the legality of his detention.43 The Sergeant
at Arms produced a certificate from the Speaker stating simply that the Sheriff
was ‘guilty of a contempt and a breach of the privileges of this House’. The
court refused to examine the lawfulness of the Sheriff’s detention, stating that,
since the Speaker’s warrant did not specify the facts justifying the detention, it
was not for the court to inquire into parliament’s business. Mr Justice
Littledale stated that: 
If the warrant returned be good on the face of it, we can inquire no further. The
principal objection is, that it does not sufficiently express the cause of
commitment ... If the warrant declares the grounds of adjudication, this Court,
in many instances, will examine into their validity; but, if it does not, we
cannot get into such an inquiry.
Accordingly, the court conceded jurisdiction to the House of Commons and
rendered itself powerless to provide a remedy for a individual who, acting as
an agent for the courts in enforcing the court’s order for damages, found
himself incarcerated on the order of the Commons. While such an outcome
hardly inspires confidence in the judicial system, it nevertheless illustrates
clearly the judges’ reluctance to cross the boundary into matters of privilege. 
Breach of privilege and contempt of parliament 
A breach of privilege is conduct offending against one of the known privileges
of parliament. Contempt is a far wider concept than this and has been defined
as:
... any act or omission which obstructs or impedes either House of Parliament
in the performance of its functions, or which obstructs or impedes any Member
or Officer of the House in the discharge of his duty or which has a tendency,
directly or indirectly, to produce such results. [Erskine May, 1997, Chapter 9]
The main types of contempts dealt with by the House of Commons, with
illustrations, are listed by Erskine May as being:
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(a) Misconduct in the presence of the House or its committees:
• interrupting the proceedings of a committee;
• a witness persistently misleading a committee.
(b) Disobedience to rules or orders of the House or its committees:
• refusal to attend as a witness;
• refusing an order to withdraw from the House.
(c) Presenting a forged or falsified document to the House or its committees:
• forging signatures to petitions.
(d) Misconduct by Members or officers as such:
• deliberately misleading the House;
• corruption by acceptance of bribes.
(e) Constructive contempts:
• speeches or writing reflecting on the House;
• wilful misrepresentation of debates;
• premature disclosure of committee proceedings of evidence;
• other indignities offered to the House, such as fighting in the lobbies,
using the badge and the name of the House in connection with an
unofficial publication; and serving a writ on a Member in the precincts,
while the House was sitting, without leave of the House.
(f) Obstructing Members in the discharge of their duty:
• molesting or insulting Members attending, coming to, or going from
the House;
• attempted intimidation of Members, including publishing threatening
posters regarding Members voting in a forthcoming debate and
threatening to stop public investment in a Member’s constituency if
that Member persisted in making speeches of the kind he had made in
a recent debate;
• molesting Members on account of their conduct in parliament, for
example, by inciting newspaper readers to telephone a Member to
complain of a question he had tabled;
• speeches or writings reflecting on Members’ conduct in the House, for
example, accusing the Speaker of partiality in the Chair.
(g) Obstructing officers of the House while in the execution of their duty:
• resisting the Serjeant at Arms when enforcing an order of the House.
(h) Obstructing witnesses:
• calling a person to account or censuring him for evidence given by him
to a committee of the House.
The 1999 Report of the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege
recommended that contempt of parliament be defined in statute as part of its
proposal for a new Parliamentary Privileges Act and an accompanying
code.44
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MEMBERS’ INTERESTS AND MEMBERS’ INDEPENDENCE
Freedom from interference in parliament’s work is a foundational principle of
privilege. Accordingly, it is essential that all Members of Parliament are under
no external pressure which could pose an actual or potential threat to their
independence. However, from a constitutional standpoint, this issue
represents one of the most troublesome aspects of privilege. This remains a
topic of much contemporary significance and is one which raises difficult
questions. In 1994, this issue came to the fore and, as a result of a number of
allegations concerning members’ interests – on which, see further below – an
inquiry headed by Lord Justice Nolan was established by the Prime Minister
to examine the issue.45 The findings of the inquiry are discussed below. 
A majority of members of the House of Commons are in paid employment
in addition to being salaried members of the House.46 Many members are also
sponsored by outside bodies who contribute to their election expenses and
may contribute towards the cost of secretarial and/or research staff employed
by a member.47 It may be argued as a point of principle that members of
Parliament should not receive any financial or other assistance from any
outside party, whether a company or a trades union, since the very fact of
receipt of such support potentially undermines the independence and
integrity of the recipient.48 This is not, however, the view adopted by the
House of Commons itself although, from time to time, the House is troubled
by such issues. The traditionally accepted view is that such sponsorship or
remuneration is perfectly proper, provided that it does not impede the
member’s independence in the actual exercise of his parliamentary duties. 
However, there is a fine line to be drawn between legitimate payments to
members and payments designed to impede a member’s independence,
which may amount to bribery and corruption. 
Rules regulating members’ interests
In 1695, by a resolution of the House, the ‘offer of money or other advantage’
to a Member of Parliament for the purpose of persuading him or her to
promote any matter in parliament was ruled to be ‘a high crime and
misdemeanour’. Further, in 1858, a resolution declared it to be ‘improper for
any member to promote any matter’ in relation to which he or she had
received a financial reward.49 Specifically in relation to the asking of
parliamentary questions, the Committee of Privileges in 1945 ruled that it was
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a breach of the privileges of the House to ‘offer money or other advantage’ to
induce members to take up questions with ministers.50 Members of
Parliament found guilty of corruption may be expelled from the House.51
When speaking in debate or in any proceedings in the House or its
committees, or when communicating with other members or ministers, a
resolution of 1974 requires that members shall disclose ‘any relevant
pecuniary interest or benefit ... whether direct or indirect, that he may have
had, may have or may be expecting to have’.52
In 1947, the Committee of Privileges had the opportunity to examine the
issue of contracts made between members and outside bodies. Mr WJ Brown
was elected the Member for Rugby in 1942. He had previously held the post of
General Secretary of the Civil Service Clerical Association and, following his
election, agreed to become its Parliamentary General Secretary. Following
disagreements between Mr Brown and the Association, it was resolved that
Mr Brown’s appointment should be terminated. The matter was raised in the
Commons, the argument being advanced that the Association’s threat to
terminate Mr Brown’s contract was calculated to influence the member in the
exercise of his parliamentary duties and, accordingly, amounted to a breach of
privilege. The committee reported that:
It is a breach of privilege to take or threaten action which is not merely
calculated to affect the Member’s course of action in Parliament, but is of a
kind against which it is absolutely necessary that Members should be
protected if they are to discharge their duties as such independently and
without fear of punishment or hope of reward.
On the facts of the case, the Committee ruled that the making of such
payments in itself did not involve any breach of privilege, and that:
On the other hand, your committee regard it as an inevitable corollary that if
an outside body may properly enter into contractual relationships with and
make payments to a Member as such, it must in general be entitled to
terminate that relationship if it lawfully can where it considers it necessary for
the protection of its own interest so to do. What, on the other hand, an outside
body is certainly not entitled to do is to use the agreement or the payment as
an instrument by which it controls, or seeks to control the conduct of a
Member or to punish him for what he has done as a Member.53
A further instance of alleged improper pressure being brought to bear on
Members of Parliament occurred in 1975. The Yorkshire Area Council of the
National Union of Mineworkers who sponsored a number of Labour
Members of Parliament, resolved that it would withdraw its sponsorship from
any member who voted in the House in a manner which conflicted with
Union policy. The Committee of Privileges found this threat to be a serious
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contempt of the House, amounting as it did to an attempt to force a member
to vote in a particular way thus threatening a member’s freedom of speech.54
In the event, the National Executive of the Union nullified the resolution and
no action was taken against the Union.
In June 2002 it was reported that the Rail Maritime and Transport Union
(RMT), which sponsors 13 Labour Members, had proposed an oath of loyalty
to be signed by its sponsored MPs or face the loss of sponsorship, which is
worth more than £40,000 a year to the constituency parties. John Prescott,
Deputy Prime Minister, Robin Cook, Leader of the House of Commons and
Tam Dalyell, the longest serving MP in the Commons, are among those who
will lose the support of the Union. The matter is being referred to the Speaker
requesting that the matter be referred to the Commons Standards and
Privileges Committee on charges of attempting to influence MPs and showing
contempt for the independence of parliament.
The Register of Members’ Interests
On the wider question of the financial interests of Members of Parliament,
under the rules of the House, all members are required to declare their
interests, these being recorded in the Register of Members’ Interests. A
resolution of the House of Commons provided that:
... in any debate or proceeding of the House or its committees or transactions or
communications which a Member may have with other Members or with
Ministers or servants of the Crown, he shall disclose any relevant pecuniary
interest or benefit of whatever nature, whether direct or indirect, that he may
have had, may have or may be expecting to have. [22 May 1974]
The practice was considered by the Select Committee on Members’ Interests in
1968–69 and 1969–70. On the relevance of interests, the Committee reported
that:
The judgment on whether an interest is relevant and should be declared is in
the first instance a matter for the Member concerned ... The main criterion for
declaration should be relevant to debate or other activity in which a Member is
taking part. An interest should be declared whenever a specific and relevant
financial connection exists which might reasonably be thought to affect the
expression of a Member’s views on the matter under debate or other activity ...
If the interest is not relevant there is no need to declare it. Nor need an interest
be declared which does not entail an actual or potential benefit.55
The Register of Members’ Interests is published annually.56 The following
classes of interests are required to be registered:57
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(a) remunerated directorships of companies, public or private;
(b) remunerated employments, trades, professions, offices or vocations;
(c) the names and details of clients of a lobbying company in relation to which
a Member plays a parliamentary role;
(d) gifts, benefits or hospitality received. Sums in excess of £125 cash or
material benefit must be registered, as must hospitality over £160;
(e) financial sponsorships either as a parliamentary candidate where, to the
knowledge of the Member, the sponsorship in any case exceeds 25 per cent
of the candidate’s election expenses; or as a Member of Parliament, by any
person or organisation, stating whether any such sponsorship includes any
payment to the Member or any material benefit or advantage, direct or
indirect, such as the services of a research assistant;
(f) overseas visits, relating to or arising out of membership of the House,
where the cost of any such visit has not been borne wholly by the Member
or by public funds;
(g) any payments or any material benefits or advantages received from or on
behalf of foreign governments, organisations or persons;
(h) land or property of substantial value (excluding a Member’s home) or
from which a substantial income is derived;
(i) names of companies or other bodies in which a Member has, to his
knowledge, either himself or with or on behalf of his spouse or infant
children, a beneficial interest in share holdings of a nominal value greater
than one hundredth of the issued share capital;
(j) miscellaneous and unremunerated interests. Registration of such interests
is voluntary.58
The rules relating to ministers are more strict than those relating to ordinary
Members of Parliament.59 Ministers are required to resign directorships in all
companies other than those dealing with family estates, to divest themselves
of any investments which might involve a conflict of interest with their
ministerial position and to avoid speculative investments which might be seen
to be made with the benefit of information acquired as a result of their
ministerial office. A minister may only continue to act as a Member of Lloyd’s
with Prime Ministerial permission.60
Failure to register an interest may be regarded as a contempt of the House.
The only member who consistently refused to enter any interests on the
Register was Mr Enoch Powell. Mr Powell adopted the constitutional stance
that, since only statute could impose legal duties on individuals, the House
could not – through the use of resolutions – lawfully require him to register.
The select committee, having tried persuasion and inviting the House to take
action to enforce the duty to register, took no further action. 
The seriousness with which the House regards matters of interests which
come to its attention may be seen in the case of Mr Michael Mates, a senior
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Conservative Party member. Mr Mates was chairman of the Select Committee
on Defence, which was considering low flying exercises by the airforce, which
entailed consideration of the use of flight simulation equipment. Mr Dale
Campbell-Savours MP complained to the select committee that Mr Mates had
failed properly to register and declare certain financial interests in the defence
industry. Mr Mates had financial interests in a defence consultancy business,
and in a manufacturer of flight simulation equipment, for whom Mr Mates
acted as general adviser. It was not disputed that Mr Mates had never spoken
on behalf of either company in the House or in committee, and there was no
allegation that Mr Mates had used his parliamentary position to further the
interests of either company.
Mr Mates’s defence was that his interests had no relevance to the
deliberations of the committee and that, in any event, the interests appearance
on the Register of Members’ Interests ensured that members of the select
committee were fully aware of his interests. The select committee was highly
critical of Mr Mates’s conduct, asserting that ‘we do not believe that Mr
Mates’s judgement was sound on this point’.61
The committee took the view that Mr Mates was in error in not declaring
his interests when asking, as Chairman of the Defence Select Committee,
questions relating to flight simulators. It was accepted that Mr Mates had
made no personal gain nor had he made any effort to conceal his interests.
Nevertheless, his conduct fell below the high standard of disclosure expected
by the select committee. In the event, the committee decided not to ask the
House to take any action, but recommended that all members of Parliament
take serious note of the findings in the report.
Cash for questions62
The cash for questions affair began in 1993, when political lobbyist Ian Greer
advised Mohamed Al Fayed to bribe Members of Parliament to pursue his
interests in parliament. In 1994, Al Fayed publicly claimed that Tory MPs
were paid to plant questions. The Guardian newspaper pursued the story,
leading to a libel action by Mr Hamilton and Mr Greer. That action was
dropped when it became apparent that The Guardian had damning evidence
which would cause the action to fail.63
In 1994, a number of allegations were made against Members of
Parliament in relation to accepting money for the tabling of parliamentary
questions to ministers. Allegations were also made in relation to improper
payments being accepted by members from outsiders, in the form of payment
for hotel bills. Further, allegations were made in respect of the failure of a
number of Members of Parliament who allegedly failed to record benefits
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received and other relationships in which members received financial reward
for services in the Register of Members’ Interests. 
In 1994, two Parliamentary Private Secretaries resigned (from the
government but not from parliament) following allegations into the receipt of
money in exchange for tabling parliamentary questions. Furthermore, in 1994,
two Junior Ministers faced allegations that they received payments and/or
gifts in exchange for tabling parliamentary questions. On 20 October 1994, The
Guardian alleged that Tim Smith MP and Neil Hamilton MP had each received
£2,000 for tabling questions in parliament concerning the takeover of Harrods
by the Al Fayed brothers. Tim Smith resigned on the day of the report. Neil
Hamilton remained in office, claiming that he enjoyed the continued support
of the Prime Minister. On 21 October, however, The Guardian newspaper
published details of a bill from the Ritz Hotel in Paris, totalling an estimated
£4,000, paid for by Mr Al Fayed. The then Prime Minister subsequently
demanded Mr Hamilton’s resignation.
The matter was referred to the Committee of Privileges. The rapidly
accelerating and intensifying atmosphere of suspected corruption – or ‘sleaze’
– in public life caused the Prime Minister to appoint a judicial inquiry into
standards of conduct in public life.64
The cash for questions affair also raises issues concerning the press.
Journalists from The Sunday Times, working undercover, offered payment of
£1,000 to two Conservative Parliamentary Private Secretaries, Graham
Riddick and David Tredinnick. The offers were made by telephone and the
conversations recorded by the journalists. The Committee of Privileges
inquired into the allegations in July 1994 and, in April 1995, recommended
that the two members be suspended from parliament for 20 days and ten days
respectively for conduct which ‘fell below the standards of the House’. In
April 1995, the House, following debate, adopted the committee’s
recommendation. The members also lost their parliamentary salaries for the
periods of suspension. Concerning the role of The Sunday Times, the committee
was highly critical of the manner in which their investigation was conducted,
but no action has been taken against the newspaper. 
The Committee on Standards in Public Life: the Nolan Inquiry
The Committee on Standards in Public Life, chaired by Lord Nolan, was
established as a standing body, with membership being held for three years.
The Committee’s terms of reference are:
To examine current concerns about standards of conduct of all holders of
public office, including arrangements relating to financial and commercial
activities, and to make recommendations as to any changes in present
arrangements which might be required to ensure the highest standards of
probity in public life.
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For these purposes, public life should include Ministers, civil servants and
advisers, Members of Parliament and United Kingdom Members of the
European Parliament, members and senior officers of all non-departmental
public bodies and of national health service bodies, non-ministerial office
holders, members and other senior officers of other bodies discharging
publicly funded function, and elected members and senior officers of local
authorities.
Individual allegations of impropriety do not fall within the committee’s terms
of reference.
The Committee has investigated and reported on three matters: issues
relating to Members of Parliament; issues relating to ministers and civil
servants; and issues relating to non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs or
quangos).65 In this chapter, the findings relating to Members of Parliament are
discussed. The conduct of ministers and civil servants is considered in
Chapter 11.
In May 1995, the committee published its First Report.66 While finding
that, in general, ‘there is no evidence ... of a growth in actual corruption’
(paragraph 6), the committee records a widespread loss of public confidence
in the probity of Members of Parliament. Evidence to the committee revealed
that 64 per cent of the public believed that Members of Parliament made
money by using their office improperly, a figure which had risen from 46 per
cent in 1984.67
The committee set out the general principles of conduct which apply to
public life as being selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness,
honesty and leadership. 
Members of Parliament
The Nolan Report recorded that the 1995 Register of Members’ Interests
suggest that 26 members had entered into agreements with public relations or
lobbying firms. A further 142 members had consultancies ‘with other types of
company or with trade associations’. The 168 members between them held a
total of 356 consultancies. When ministers and the Speaker are excluded from
the analysis, almost 30 per cent of Members of Parliament held some form of
consultancy agreement. In relation to associations with trades unions, a total
of 184 members had sponsorship agreements, 27 had paid consultancies, and
a further ten received some form of financial assistance from trade unions.
Accordingly, the committee concluded that almost 70 per cent of Members of
Parliament (excluding ministers and the Speaker) had some form of financial
relationship with outside bodies. 
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Despite the evidence of witnesses and persons writing to the committee,
the committee did not conclude from this evidence that such arrangements
should be banned. Indeed, the involvement of Members of Parliament in
outside work was regarded by the committee as a benefit to parliament as a
whole. As the committee viewed the matter: 
... a Parliament composed entirely of full time professional politicians would
not serve the best interests of democracy. The House needs if possible to
contain people with a wide range of current experience which can contribute
to its expertise. [paragraph 19]
The committee was also concerned that a ban on outside financial interests
would act as a deterrent to people who would otherwise stand for election to
parliament. The committee recommended, therefore, that Members of
Parliament should continue to have the right to engage in outside
employment. The matter which remained was how best to protect the
integrity of members and the House as a whole in light of such continuing
outside employment. 
Having reviewed the early resolutions of the House, and the later
resolution of 1947,68 and the rules regulating the registration of members’
interests, the committee found that the Register had worked unsatisfactorily.
The committee invited the House of Commons to review the statement of
principle which governed the registration of interests.
Paid consultancies
Three fifths of all members of the House have arrangements with clients or
sponsors. While appreciating that paid consultancies enable ‘many entirely
respectable, and in some cases highly deserving, organisations’ to ‘gain a
voice in the nation’s affairs’,69 the Committee recognised that there was a fine
– and difficult – line to be drawn between paid advice and paid advocacy, the
latter of which is a matter of concern. To remove the right to engage in such
arrangements would be ‘impracticable’ and was, accordingly, not
recommended. There was, however, one area – the issue of ‘general
consultancies’ – in which the committee wanted to see firm and immediate
action.
General consultancies
Public relations and lobbying firms are engaged in acting as advisers and
advocates to a wide range of clients, each of which is pursuing its own
objective in terms of exerting pressure on parliament. The problem posed by
such companies is that registration of an agreement with the company does
not necessarily disclose the actual client for whom, in fact, the member is
acting in a parliamentary capacity. The committee recommended that there be
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an immediate ban introduced on such relationships, but parliament did not
act specifically on this proposal but, rather, tightened the rules relating to
registration and the declaration of interests.
Clarifying the Register of Members’ Interests
The committee acknowledged that the 1995 Register was an improvement on
previous Registers. However, there still remained areas of doubt and
uncertainty as to the precise requirements of disclosure of interests, and an
unacceptable degree of laxity in the enforcement of registration. The
committee recommended that the entry requirements be clarified. Since the
beginning of the 1995 session, members have been required to deposit in full
any contracts which involve the member acting in a parliamentary capacity on
behalf of any organisation, and these contracts are available for public
inspection. In addition, members are required to reveal their annual
remuneration, and also estimated monetary benefits received of any kind.
Furthermore, all agreements which do not involve the member acting in a
parliamentary capacity for an organisation and, therefore, do not need to be
deposited, should contain clear terms stating that the agreement does not
involve the member acting for the organisation in a parliamentary capacity.70
The committee also emphasised the requirement that members of
Parliament disclose their interests on ‘each and every occasion when a
member approaches other members or ministers on a subject where a
financial interest exists’.71 The onus is on the members to disclose the interest,
and he or she should not assume that the interest is one known about by the
other party.72
The rules on conflicts of interest should be further developed, and
clarification provided on the circumstances under which a member of
Parliament should withdraw from, or refrain from taking part in, proceedings
in parliament.
Gifts and hospitality
In relation to gifts and hospitality, the committee found that the rules set out
in Questions of Procedure for Ministers73 are sufficiently detailed and that no
further elaboration is required. The committee endorsed the important
principle set out in Questions of Procedure:
It is a well established and recognised rule that no Minister or public servant
should accept gifts, hospitality or services from anyone which would, or might
appear to, place him or her under an obligation.74
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Enforcing members’ obligations
The Nolan Committee considered that Members of Parliament are
insufficiently aware of the binding nature of resolutions of the House, and
that this climate of laxity is one of the contributory factors to poor compliance.
Furthermore, the committee regarded the respective roles of the Select
Committee on Members’ Interests and the Committee of Privileges of the
House as unclear. The committee proposed the appointment of an
independent Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, responsible for
maintaining the Register of Members’ Interests and for providing guidance on
standards of ‘conduct, propriety and ethics’. The Commissioner fulfils a
similar function to that of the Comptroller and Auditor General and the
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration.75 The Commissioner has
power to receive and investigate complaints concerning members’ conduct. 
Political reaction to the Nolan Report was mixed. In a six hour debate on
the Nolan Report in May 1995, some curious alliances between right wing and
left wing politicians of both the Conservative Party and Labour Party were
formed to oppose the recommendations. Many Conservative Members
opposed, in particular, the introduction of a Commissioner. The former Prime
Minister, Edward Heath, attacked the proposal on the basis that a
Commissioner would be a parliamentary ‘outsider’ unable to detect poor
standards of conduct in the House. A former senior Conservative Member of
Parliament, Enoch Powell,76 warned that questions of members’ conduct
cannot be legislated for.
The First Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (the ‘Nolan
Report’) was published in July 1995.77 The Report recommended the
following:
(a) that all new Members of Parliament should undertake a training course in
ethics;
(b) that there should be established the office of Commissioner for Standards –
an ethics ombudsman – to investigate allegations of breaches of the rules.
The Commissioner for Standards would be responsible solely to the House
of Commons, and should not enjoy independent legal status – as
recommended by the Nolan Inquiry – similar to that enjoyed by the
Comptroller and Auditor General and the Parliamentary Commissioner
for Administration. The Commissioner will investigate allegations and
recommend whether the matter should be heard by the Select Committee
on Standards and Privileges;
(c) the Committee on Standards and Privileges will replace the current
Privileges Committee of the House;
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(d) Members of Parliament against whom allegations have been made should
be entitled to legal representation;
(e) Members of Parliament are to be required to declare financial interests
when tabling parliamentary questions.
The proposal that Members of Parliament should be forbidden from working
for multi-client lobbying companies is also subject to further consideration.
Members of the House of Commons were given a free vote (a vote free
from any party-political pressure) on the recommendations. Following an
acrimonious Commons’ debate, the proposal that Members of Parliament
should declare the size of their outside earnings was rejected by 282 votes to
248 votes.78
In relation to ministers, the Nolan Report was critical of the present
position, whereby ministers may leave government office and assume senior
positions with – in particular – companies which have recently been
privatised by the government.
In response to aspects of the Nolan Report, the House approved a Code of
Conduct, incorporating the key principles of conduct in public life.79 Ministers
leaving office will no longer be permitted to take employment in the private
sector without the appointment being vetted by an independent committee.
From the parliamentary session 1995–96, all Cabinet Ministers have to wait at
least three months before taking outside paid employment. In addition, a two
year waiting period may be imposed. In relation to appointments to non-
governmental public bodies, a Commissioner for Public Appointments has
been established to ensure that there is no political bias in such appointments.
The House of Commons, in response to the Nolan Report, passed
resolutions which (a) introduce a rule against paid advocacy and (b) require
members entering into agreements for the provision of services in their
capacity of members to deposit the terms of their agreements with the
Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards at the same time as they are
registered in the Register of Members’ Interests. Furthermore, the House
resolved to revise the 1947 resolution by inserting the requirement that no
Member of Parliament (nor member of his or her family) shall receive
remuneration of any kind in relation to raising an issue in parliament by
means of any speech, question, motion, introduction of a Bill or amendment to
a motion or Bill. In addition, the House resolved that the rules on declaration
of interests be amended to make it clear that members are required to declare
any relevant interest when tabling questions for oral or written answer or
when preparing amendments to a Bill. Further, a Committee on Standards
and Privileges was established; and the office of Parliamentary Commissioner
for Standards.
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The Committee on Standards and Privileges’ first investigation concerned
allegations that David Willetts, the Paymaster General, attempted to influence
a 1994 investigation into whether Neil Hamilton had broken House of
Commons rules. A finding that he had tried improperly to influence an
inquiry could have lead to a reprimand or suspension or expulsion from the
House of Commons. Any recommendation for action made by the committee
must be approved by the House of Commons. In December 1996, it was
reported that Mr Willetts was to be rebuked by the committee and that he
would apologise, but that no further action would be taken. As a result of the
committee’s report, Mr Willetts resigned from office.80
The Report of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards (the ‘Downey
Report’) was published in July 1997. The 898 page report, which had taken ten
months to complete, made it clear that the five former ministers and Members
of Parliament involved in accusations of accepting financial rewards, which
were not recorded as required in the Register of Members’ Interests, and were
denied by the MPs, were guilty of breaking the parliamentary rules.81 The
Downey Report found the evidence against Neil Hamilton, who continues to
declare his innocence, ‘compelling’:
The evidence that Mr Hamilton received cash payments from Mr Al Fayed in
return for lobbying services is compelling: and I so conclude.
The insistence that parliament remain a self-regulatory body has come under
question in light of the Downey Report. While early analyses of the Downey
Report all praised the painstakingly detailed approach of the Commissioner,
there were suggestions that such allegations should perhaps be investigated
by a statutory tribunal, headed by a judge, and holding public, rather than
private, hearings.82 The ability of parliament to remain a self-regulatory body
was thrown into further doubt by the circumstances surrounding the
departure of the Commissioner for Standards, Elizabeth Filkin, who – having
been told that she would not be automatically reappointed for a further term
of office and would need to reapply through open competition – announced
her decision to depart. Her investigations into allegations, inter alia, against a
former trade secretary, former Foreign Office minister, Northern Ireland
Secretary and the Deputy Prime Minister provoked a storm of protest among
Members of Parliament, and her findings failed to be upheld fully by the
Committee for Standards and Privileges. At root, the problem appeared to be
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that the Commissioner was too rigorous in her enquiries. The Commissioner
accused ministers, MPs and civil servants of undermining her position.83
Penalties for breach of privilege and contempt
Historically, the most important power available to the House was to commit
the offender to prison. Erskine May describes this power as the ‘keystone of
parliamentary privilege’, but it is little used and has not been used since
Bradlaugh’s Case in 1880. The House can vote to allow the offender to be
prosecuted by the police, as happened in 1970, when a stranger threw a CS
gas canister into the Chamber.84 The most regularly employed sanction is the
reprimand. The reprimand was used against Mr Tam Dalyell in 1968.85 The
House may order that a member be suspended from the House or expelled. In
1948, Garry Allighan MP was found to have lied to a committee, falsely
accusing other members of taking money. The House ordered his expulsion
from parliament.86 In 1988, Ron Brown MP was suspended from the House
for the contempt of damaging the Mace. In 1994, the House suspended two
members, with loss of salary, for 20 days and ten days respectively, for
accepting payment for putting down parliamentary questions (see, further,
below). Following a report from the Standards and Privileges Committee,87 a
Member of Parliament, the Member for Liverpool (Mr Wareing) was also
suspended for failing to register a shareholding interest in the Register of
Members’ Interests. The House of Commons has also considered the reports
of the Standards and Privileges Committee88 in relation to 25 investigations of
allegations of breach of the rules. The committee had upheld findings on
allegations in relation to 25 members and former members made by the
Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards. Allegations were proved against
five members, but all had failed to be re-elected in the 1997 general election.
Each would, but for their failure to be re-elected to parliament, have faced
suspension. 
The House of Lords has the power to impose fines on offenders but,
curiously, the House of Commons does not have that power although,
historically, it did. The last occasion on which a fine was imposed was in
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HC Deb Vol 299 Col 1051, 30 October 1997.
88 HC 240 and 261 (1997–98), London: HMSO.
1666.89 The power to impose fines was denied in R v Mead (1762).
Recommendations of the Select Committee on Parliamentary Privilege in 1967
and 1977 that such a power be introduced by statute have not been
implemented. Where newspapers breach the rules of privilege or commit
contempt of parliament, the editor may be called to the bar of the House to
explain and apologise, and journalists may be excluded from the precincts of
the House for a specified period.
With regard to maintaining order in the House, the Speaker has a range of
available disciplinary powers. The Speaker will firstly warn a member about
his conduct. If this does not ensure order, the Speaker may request the
member to leave the Chamber. If the member refuses to leave, the Speaker
may direct him to withdraw90 immediately, and the member must leave the
precincts of parliament for the remainder of the day. In the rare event that a
member refuses to comply with the order to withdraw, the Speaker may
formally ‘name’ the member91 and put down a motion that the member be
suspended from the service of the House. The suspension on a first offence
will last for five sitting days, on a second occasion, for 20 sitting days and on
any subsequent occasion, for as long as the House shall determine.
The Select Committee on Procedure,92 which in 1988 considered the
standard of conduct of members, found a sharp increase in the use of the
Speaker’s formal disciplinary powers, in particular the number of namings.
The parliament of 1979–83 saw 12 cases, of which five involved naming, the
1983–87 parliament saw nine cases, including five namings, but, in the
1988–89 session, nine cases occurred, eight of which led to namings. The
committee recommended that everything possible should be done to maintain
order in the House. The House of Commons is, however, powerless in relation
to the punishment of former Members of Parliament in respect of breaches of
privilege while Members. 
The Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege Report of 1999 had
considered in depth the issue of bribery of a Member of Parliament,
subsequent to the Law Commission’s investigation into the law relating to
bribery and corruption.93 Four options exist. The first is to rely solely on
parliamentary privilege to deal with allegations of bribery; the second, to
subject Members of Parliament to the same corruption laws as other people;
the third, to distinguish between conduct to be dealt with by parliament and
that to be dealt with under the criminal law; and the fourth, to make criminal
proceedings against members subject to the approval of the relevant House of
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Parliament. Each of these, in the Committee’s view, was attended by
difficulties in relation to parliamentary privilege and Article IX. Nevertheless,
the Committee favoured the second option – namely, bringing members of
both Houses of Parliament within the ambit of the criminal law of bribery. The
necessary legislation would need to be drafted to make clear that evidence
relating to an alleged offence would be admissible in a court of law
notwithstanding Article IX. 
In 2000, the Committee on Standards in Public Life made
recommendations designed to improve discipline over Members of
Parliament. In Reinforcing Standards, Lord Neill of Bladen recommended that
legislation be introduced to bring Members of Parliament, and those who
offered bribes to members, within the reach of bribery laws. The report also
recommended that there should be an appeal mechanism against findings of
misconduct by the Committee on Standards and Privileges. Serious
allegations of misconduct would be heard by a new tribunal, chaired by an
independent legal expert and senior backbenchers, rather than the Standards
and Privileges Committee. Before a case is referred to the tribunal, it would be
considered by the Committee on Standards and Privileges and the accused
member would be able to make representations to the Committee. Financial
assistance would be made available to fund legal representation before the
tribunal. The tribunal’s findings would be reported back to the Committee
which would decide what penalty should be recommended to the House of
Commons. The Neill Committee also recommended that an appeals
procedure should be introduced to enable a member to appeal against the
decision to refer his or her case to the tribunal, and against the tribunal ruling.
The appeal would be heard by a retired senior judge. Proceedings before the
Committee should be held in public. 
The Code of Conduct for Members of Parliament
The Code of Conduct sets out the general principles to guide members on
standards of conduct that the House and the public have a right to expect,
together with a Guide to the Rules relating to the Conduct of Members.94 These
include matters relating to the registration of interests and their declaration
and the advocacy rule (see, further, below). In relation to registration, interests
to be registered are directorships; remunerated employment; sponsorships
which amount to 25 per cent or more of election expenses, or other funds
related to a candidate’s election campaign; free or subsidised research
assistance; gifts, benefits or hospitality; overseas visits; overseas gifts and
benefits; land and property; shareholdings; and miscellaneous interests.
Where members have entered into agreements which are relevant to their
parliamentary duties, these are to be deposited with the Parliamentary
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Commissioner for Standards in addition to being registered. Where an
informal, unwritten agreement, has been entered into, it must also be
deposited with the Commissioner in written form. In relation to paid
advocacy, this is banned in relation to a number of important matters. In
particular, paid advocacy is banned in relation to initiating parliamentary
proceedings, including the presentation of Bills, presentation of petitions, the
asking of parliamentary questions, tabling or moving motions, or moving
amendments to Bills. Any Member of Parliament, or member of the public,
may lay a complaint, alleging breach of the Code, with the Commissioner for
investigation. The Commissioner has a discretion whether or not to
investigate. It is this tightening of the rules which has led to recent
investigations into allegations including the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime
Minister, Paymaster General and Leader of the Liberal Democrat Party,
discussed in Chapter 11. The Commissioner reports his findings to the Select
Committee on Standards and Privileges, which examines the findings. If no
prima facie case is disclosed, this is reported to the Commons. If there is a prima
facie case disclosed, the committee, following its examination, will report to
the Commons, detailing its findings. The final decision on the matter lies with
the House of Commons. 
Subsequent to the cash for questions affair, the House of Commons re-stated
the resolution of 194795 and added the following:
... in particular, no Member shall, in consideration of any remuneration, fee,
payment, reward or benefit in kind, direct or indirect ...
(a) advocate or initiate any cause or matter on behalf of any outside body or
individual; or
(b) urge any other Member of either House ... including Ministers, to do so, by
means of any speech, question, motion, introduction of a Bill or
amendment to a motion or Bill.96
PUBLICATION OF PARLIAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS
The publication of proceedings in parliament is covered by the same rules as
the reporting of proceedings in court. The underlying principle is that
publication is in the public interest and generally outweighs any disadvantage
to individuals.
On the extent to which the reporting and publication of parliamentary
proceedings is protected, section 1 of the Parliamentary Papers Act 1840
provides that, where civil or criminal proceedings are commenced, the
defendant may present to the court a certificate stating that the publication in
question was made under the authority of the House of Lords or House of
Commons, and that the ‘judge or court shall thereupon immediately stay such
civil or criminal proceeding’.
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Section 2 provides that similar protection exists for correct copies of official
reports and authorised papers. Section 3 provides that extracts or abstracts
from such reports or papers, for example, in newspapers, are protected
provided that such extracts are published bona fide and without malice. Thus
papers of the House, or papers ordered to be published by the House, plus
fair and accurate, but unauthorised, reports of proceedings are covered by
qualified privilege, and an action for damages for injury allegedly caused by
their publication would only lie if malice could be proven.
The Parliamentary Papers Act was passed as a direct result of two cases in
which the courts and parliament came into conflict, namely Stockdale v
Hansard (1839) and the Sheriff of Middlesex’s Case. While the passing of the
Parliamentary Papers Act 1840 gives statutory authority to publication of
official papers and authorised reports, uncertainty still remains as to the scope
of the protection. 
Privilege and the media
Publications which reflect on the dignity of the House as a whole are classified
as ‘constructive contempts’, as are reflections on individual members.97
Illustrations of adverse comments published in the press include that of The
Sunday Express which, in 1953, commented that two members were asleep
during an all night sitting of the House. Further, in 1956, The Sunday Express
criticised Members of Parliament for exempting themselves from the petrol
rationing which had been imposed as a result of the Suez crises. The report of
the Committee of Privileges held that the editor had been:
... guilty of a serious contempt in reflecting upon all Members of the House and
so upon the House itself by alleging that Members of the House had been
guilty of contemptible conduct in failing, owing to self interest, to protest at an
unfair discrimination in their favour. Such an attack on Members is calculated
to diminish the respect due to the House and so to lessen its authority.98
The issue of media pressure again fell for consideration by the Committee of
Privileges in 1956. A Member of Parliament, Mr Arthur Lewis, gave notice of a
forthcoming Prime Ministerial parliamentary question, which asked:
... whether he will arrange for part of the money contributed by the
government for relief in Hungary to be allocated to the relief of the several
thousand Egyptian people who have been rendered homeless and destitute by
British shelling and rocket fire in Egypt.
In a scathing editorial in The Sunday Graphic, readers were invited to telephone
Mr Lewis and give him their views. To assist this task, the newspaper
published the member’s telephone number. As a consequence, the member
received thousands of irate telephone calls before the Post Office was able to
change his number. The committee ruled that:
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... the principle that to molest a Member of Parliament on account of his
conduct in Parliament is a breach of privilege is well established ... In our view,
the principle clearly applies to the circumstances of this case and, in our
opinion, the Editor of The Sunday Graphic was guilty of a breach of privilege in
that he instigated the molestation to which Mr Lewis was subjected.99
In both cases, the editors were called to the Bar of the House and apologised. 
Unauthorised disclosure of parliamentary proceedings
The unauthorised disclosure of proceedings conducted in private and of draft
reports of committees which have not been reported to the House is governed
by a resolution of the House of 1837, as amended in 1980. The resolution
makes such disclosure a contempt of the House.100 The House resolved in
1978 that its penal jurisdiction should only be used where the action
complained of was likely to cause a ‘substantial interference’ with a
committee’s work.101 The Committee of Privileges recommended in its 1985
report that ‘substantial interference’ with regard to leaked documents should
be confined to confidential or classified information or deliberate attempts to
undermine the work of the committee.102
Between 1971 and 1988, six incidents of unauthorised disclosure were
recorded.103 In no case was the source of the leak – presumed to be a member
of the select committee – identifiable and, in each case, the journalists
concerned had refused to reveal their sources. The House has shown itself to
be unwilling to punish publishers when it cannot identify and punish the
source of the leak.
In 1985, The Times newspaper published a leaked draft report of the Home
Affairs Select Committee and a draft report on the Environment Select
Committee on the disposal of radioactive waste. The Committee of Privileges
recommended that both the member responsible for the leak and the
journalist should be punished but, when the matter was put to the House, it
declined to follow the committee’s recommendation.104
A fresh issue arose in 1999 with the leak of select committee reports to
ministers. In July 1999, a senior Labour Member of Parliament, Earnest Ross,
was forced to resign from the Foreign Affairs Select Committee after he had
been found responsible for leaking a critical report over the Foreign Office’s
role in allegedly breaching a United Nations’ arms embargo in Sierra Leone to
the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook. The leak had the potential, if used by the
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Foreign Secretary, of interfering with the work of the Select Committee. After
criticism by the Standards and Privileges Committee, Mr Ross apologised to
the House and was suspended for ten days. Subsequently, two Labour
Members, one who had leaked a Social Security Select Committee Report and
one who had received the report, were suspended from the Commons for
three and five days, respectively. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet
Secretary then issued directions to ministers and senior civil servants that any
leaked documents were to be returned immediately and without use having
been made of them, and that the Ministerial Code of Practice would be
amended to cover the leaking of such reports which potentially undermine
the authority of Select Committees.
The procedure for determining issues of privilege and contempt
If an allegation of breach of privilege or contempt is made, the complaint is
communicated to the Speaker. The member will be given written notice of the
complaint. The Speaker must be satisfied, first, that the matter is one involving
privilege and, secondly, that the complaint is substantial. If he or she so finds,
the Speaker advises the complainant that he may put down a Motion which
will be debated the following day. For the most part, the matter will then be
referred by the House to the Committee on Standards and Privileges
(formerly the Committee of Privileges). The committee is made up of 17 senior
members of the House from all political parties, chaired by the Leader of the
House. Although acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, the committee is not
bound to follow strict rules of procedure. The legal rules of evidence do not
apply and there is normally no legal representation. The Committee sits in
private.105 If the Committee finds that there has been a breach, it will make
recommendations as to punishment, but has no power to apply the sanction:
that is for the House as a whole, who will vote on the matter following a
debate. The House is not bound by the Committee’s recommendations and
may, as happened in the case of Strauss (1985), reject them.
Members’ interests in the House of Lords
Privilege in the House of Lords
The House of Lords enjoys the same privilege of freedom from arrest106 and
freedom of speech as the Commons. Freedom of access to the Sovereign is
enjoyed by the House collectively and by each peer individually. This
privilege of peerage extends to all peers, irrespective of whether they sit in the
House of Lords. The House of Lords has the same right as the Commons to
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determine its own procedure. In the event of a disputed peerage, the House of
Lords has jurisdiction to determine the matter.107 The House of Lords has the
power to commit persons for breach of privilege or contempt and also the
power to impose fines. The House of Lords may also summon judges to
attend in order to give advice on points of law. 
Members’ interests in the House of Lords
In July 1995, Lord Griffiths published his report on outside interests of peers.
The report was submitted to the Lords’ Procedure Committee. The
recommendations included the introduction of a Register of Members’
Interests on which all remunerated positions are to be declared. Peers will no
longer be permitted to act as advocates for companies or organisations from
whom they receive remuneration. They will, however, continue to be allowed
to act as advisers to outside groups. Peers will no longer be free to ask
questions or to table amendments where their sponsoring organisation stands
to gain benefit. 
In 1996, in response to increased concerns over Members’ interests, a
Register of Members’ Interests was established in the House of Lords. In
addition, the House has approved a motion that Lords should always act on
their personal honour and should never accept any financial inducement as an
incentive or reward for exercising parliamentary influence.
Further reform of parliamentary privilege
In addition to the reforms considered above, there remains a need to clarify
the definition given to the phrase ‘proceedings in parliament’ in Article IX of
the Bill of Rights in order that both members and other individuals may better
understand the scope of the protection given by privilege.
The Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege considered the question
of the definition of parliamentary proceedings in its 1999 report. The
Committee recommended that there should be enacted a Parliamentary
Privileges Act to cover this and a number of other reforms. 
Defining ‘proceedings in parliament’
Rejecting earlier suggested definitions of parliamentary proceedings as too
wide, the Committee proposed the following statutory definition:
(1) For the purposes of Article IX of the Bill of Rights 1689 ‘proceedings in
Parliament’ means all words spoken and acts done in the course of, or for
the purposes of, or necessarily incidental to, transacting the business of
either House of Parliament or of a committee.
Chapter 18: Constitutional and Administrative Law
586
107 See Stourton v Stourton (1963).
Parliamentary Privilege
(2) Without limiting (1), this includes:
(a) the giving of evidence before a House or a committee or an officer
appointed by a House to receive such evidence;
(b) the presentation or submission of a document to a House or a
committee or an officer appointed by a House to receive it, once the
document is accepted;
(c) the preparation of a document for the purposes of transacting the
business of a House or a committee, provided any drafts, notes, advice
or the like are not circulated more widely than is reasonable for the
purposes of preparation;
(d) the formulation, making or publication of a document by a House or a
committee;
(e) the maintenance of any register of the interests of the members of a
House and any other register of interests prescribed by resolution of a
House.
(3) A ‘committee’ means a committee appointed by either House or a joint
committee appointed by both Houses of Parliament and includes a sub-
committee.
(4) A document includes any disc, tape or device in which data are embodied
so as to be capable of being reproduced therefrom. 
In addition, there should be a statutory definition of ‘place out of parliament’,
and the scope of the prohibition on ‘questioning’. Article IX should not apply
to court proceedings in so far as they relate to interpretation of Acts of
Parliament or subordinate legislation (the Pepper v Hart principle), or to
judicial review. Tribunals appointed under the Tribunals of Inquiry
(Evidence) Act 1921 could also be excluded from Article IX. The legislation
should make it clear that the application of Article IX extends to Scotland and
Northern Ireland. Disputes as to the meaning of ‘proceedings in parliament’
arising in court proceedings should continue to be resolved by the trial judge,
whereas those arising in the House should be dealt with there.
In relation to the question of bribery and corruption of Members in
Parliament, which was the subject of enquiry by the Committee on Standards
on Public Life108 and the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege,109 the
Government has published its proposals to reform the law and has stated that
it intends to introduce legislation when parliamentary time allows.110 The
government’s proposals are based on the recommendations of the Law
Commission.111 The government accepts the need to modernise the law112
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and to provide a statutory definition clarifying the meaning of ‘acting in a
corrupt manner’. The Act will apply to both the public and private sectors.
Liability would extend to extraterritorial offences committed by British
nationals. The Act will make it clear that the changes in the law apply to
members of both Houses of Parliament.
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PART VI
THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE

CHAPTER 19
INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 4, the rule of law, a concept which portrays the idea of
governmental power limited by law and the democratic process, was
discussed. It was seen that from early times the sovereignty of law over man
was proclaimed in order to safeguard citizens from the abuse of power by
Monarchs and governments. The protection of individual rights and freedoms
by the state is an essential feature of the rule of law. 
THE ORIGINS OF THE IDEA OF RIGHTS:
EARLY CONCEPTIONS OF 
LIMITED GOVERNMENTAL POWER
John Locke
In Two Treatises of Government, John Locke claimed that sovereign power was
limited and that the people had the right to resort to revolution against the
sovereign if power was abused. Such writing was both revolutionary and
seditious – challenging the very basis of state authority. Locke went into exile
in 1683.1 With the accession of William of Orange to the throne in 1689, Locke
returned to England and his work – previously unpublished – reached the
light of day, albeit anonymously. The timing of publication could not have
been more forceful. An historic settlement between parliament and Crown
had finally and recently been reached, resulting in the Bill of Rights 1689, thus
ending centuries of conflict. However, Locke’s writing presented a theory
which challenged the basis of sovereign power by asserting the rights of man
against the sovereign. Much of the first Treatise is an argument directed
against absolute monarchical power and the use of the prerogative. By
insisting that government held its power on trust, Locke was indirectly
claiming the sovereignty of the people over the sovereignty of government.
Government had a legitimate right to rule, and to use the law for the good of
the people; but that right was conditional and limited by the ultimate power
of the people to overthrow a government which violated its trust. As Locke
observed:
... acting for the preservation of the community, there can be but one supreme
power, which is the legislative, to which all the rest are and must be
subordinate, yet the legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain
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1 The Treatises were assumed to have been in manuscript form by 1683. Whilst in exile,
Locke wrote Essay Concerning Human Understanding and Letter on Toleration.
ends, there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the
legislative, when they find the legislative acts contrary to the trust reposed in
them. For all power given with trust for the attaining an end being limited by
that end, whenever that end is manifestly neglected or opposed, the trust must
necessarily be forfeited, and the power devolve into the hands of those that
gave it, who may place it anew where they shall think best for their safety and
security. And thus the community perpetually retains a supreme power of
saving themselves from the attempts and designs of anybody, even of their
legislators, whenever they shall be so foolish or so wicked as to lay and carry
on designs against the liberties and properties of the subject. For no man or
society of men having a power to deliver up their preservation, or
consequently the means of it, to the absolute will and arbitrary dominion of
another, whenever any one shall go about to bring them into such slavish
condition, they will always have a right to preserve what they have not a
power to part with, and to rid themselves of those who invade this
fundamental, sacred, and unalterable law of self-preservation for which they
entered into society. And thus the community may be said in this respect to be
always the supreme power, but not as considered under any form of
government, because this power of the people can never take place till the
government be dissolved. [Two Treatises of Government (1690), 1977, Bk II,
Chapter XIII, para 149]
Thomas Paine
Thomas Paine (1737–1809), who claimed not to have read Locke’s works, was
to echo many of Locke’s radical and revolutionary sentiments. Paine was
involved in two revolutions: that of the United States of America, in 1775, and
that of France, in 1789 – an involvement which he claimed made his life ‘truly
useful’. The background of the two men could not have been more different.
Whereas John Locke had a privileged upbringing, being educated at
Westminster School, and Christ Church, Oxford, where he remained for some
15 years, before entering into service with the Earl of Shaftsbury,2 Thomas
Paine was largely self-educated. In 1773, he issued a pamphlet,3 the radical
nature of which caused him to be discharged from his position as an
exciseman (customs officer). In the course of his political lobbying for higher
pay for fellow excise officers, he met Benjamin Franklin.4 With Franklin’s
support, Paine emigrated to North America. 
While John Locke had been writing against the background of the
constitutional struggles in the United Kingdom, which were to culminate in
the assertion of parliament’s sovereignty over the King, Paine was writing in
the midst of the struggle for independence in America against the sovereign
English King George III. In 1775, Paine, working as a journalist on the
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Pennsylvania Journal, was supporting the right of colonists to control their own
affairs. In criticising England for her treatment of, among others, American
Indians and black slaves, Paine predicted the eventual separation of America
from Britain. In 1776, he published Common Sense, which not only attacked the
policy of the King towards the colony, but also attacked the institution of
monarchy itself. Common Sense exerted a profound influence on the course of
political events, and the Declaration of Independence (4 July 1776) echoed
Paine’s sentiments. In both Common Sense and Rights of Man, arbitrary power
is decried and the freedom of the individual declared to be sovereign. Paine
distinguished between the natural and civil rights of individuals:
Natural rights are those which appertain to man in right of his existence. Of
this kind are all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind, and also those
rights of acting as an individual for his own comfort and happiness, which are
not injurious to the natural rights of others. Civil rights are those which
appertain to man in right of his being a member of society. Every civil right has
for its foundation, some natural right pre-existing in the individual, but to the
enjoyment of which his individual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently
competent. [Rights of Man (1791–92), Part II, p 90]
Civil rights, for Paine, are entailed in, and grow out of, individual natural
rights and are, accordingly, antecedent to any form of government. When
man entered into society:
... the individuals themselves, each in his own personal and sovereign right,
entered into a compact with each other to produce a government: and this is
the only mode in which governments have a right to arise, and the only
principle on which they have a right to exist. [p 92]
Furthermore:
The rights of men in society, are neither devisable, nor transferable, nor
annihilable, but are descendable only; and it is not in the power of any
generation to intercept finally, and cut off the descent. 
The American constitution reflected these views, the preamble declaring that:
We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, ensure Domestic Tranquillity, provide for the Common
Defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION for
the United States of America. 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF RIGHTS
These early expressions of an emergent notion of individual rights can be seen
today in most written constitutions in the world, whether or not the
constitution is ‘autochthonous’.5
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The attempt to protect human rights on an international level began with
the founding of the League of Nations after World War I and the imposition of
certain safeguards of human rights in peace treaties negotiated after the war
for the protection of minorities. It was not to be, however, until after the
Second World War that the international community became convinced of the
real and pressing need to protect and promote human rights as an integral
and essential element for the preservation of world peace and co-operation.
The United Nations6 provided the appropriate forum for international quasi-
legislative activity. In 1948, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights was
adopted, supplemented by two implementing international covenants in 1966:
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Taken together, these
documents represent an international Bill of Human Rights. Inspired by the
United Nations Declaration and Covenants, many other regional conventions
were drafted, for example, the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms 1950, the American Convention of Human Rights
1969 and the African Charter of 1987.7
Natural law and positive law8
The ancient concept of natural law, as discussed in Chapter 4, concerns an
evaluation of the validity of human law against some higher source of
authority, whether theological or secular, which is both eternal and universal.
The demands of natural law challenge the law of human rulers – demanding
that law conform to higher principles. One such principle is the respect for
individual rights and freedoms, and it may therefore be argued that the
protection of human rights is a natural law concept. It should not be assumed,
however, that the assertions that the rights of man derive from natural law has
been completely or unequivocally accepted.
In the nineteenth century, for example, the rise of nationalism in the West
challenged doctrines of natural law. The same century also witnessed the rise
in positivism – the legal-theoretical schools of thought concerned solely to
identify and define the concept of valid human law. These two developments
– nationalism and positivism – shifted the focus of attention away from
individual rights towards an analysis of state power. By way of illustration,
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1821) portrayed the picture of the state as
absolutely sovereign, its form and content being determined by history, but its
existence and power being unrestricted by any form of natural law. 
In the United Kingdom, the Scottish philosopher David Hume laid the
foundations for positivism.9 Positivism, in its many forms, concerns the
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endeavour of isolating the law laid down by human superior (the sovereign
power) to human inferior (the subject).10 In essence, Hume’s thesis was that,
in logic, it is not possible to derive a statement of fact (an existential statement)
from a statement of what ought to be (a normative statement). By this
reasoning, only by keeping statements of fact and statements of ‘ought’ – or
moral statements – separate can there be a true understanding of reality, and
law. The implication of such a distinction for law and legal theory is that no
moral statement as to what ‘ought to be’ can be inferred from a purely factual
statement. This essential logical separation of the factual from the normative
underlies the positivist endeavour: the attempt to provide a coherent logical
structure of legal rules, and legal rules alone, unaffected by morality. For the
positivist, whatever is enacted according to the accepted constitutional
procedure employed within the state is valid law and entails an absolute
obligation of obedience. As such, there can be no claim to freedoms or human
rights which are capable of overriding the positive law. According to
positivist theories of law, while in a perfect world the positive law may – and
ideally should – conform to moral precepts, should it fail so to do, the
individual is powerless to confront the law. 
The nineteenth century rise in positivism represented both an attack on the
claims of natural law and an attempt to analyse scientifically the law as it
exists in fact. The doctrine of natural law for which so much had been claimed
in relation to human rights and freedoms was placed on the defensive. The
protection of rights based on natural law was further damaged by the
utilitarians. Having rejected natural law as providing the lodestar for
enactment of positive law, the utilitarians adopted the principle of utility. By
utility is meant that the proper guidance in the formation of laws is the overall
effect of a legislative proposal on society as a whole. A proposal for legislation
will be in conformity with the doctrine of utility if it increases the sum of
happiness in society overall. The leading exponent of the utilitarian school
was Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) whose An Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation was to exert enduring influence. Bentham dismissed the
idea of natural law and natural rights: natural rights were ‘nonsense’ – and,
worse – ‘nonsense on stilts’. 
Despite the attacks from nationalists, positivists and utilitarians, the quest
for the protection of rights – from wheresoever derived – continued; a quest
which became reinvigorated by the horrors of the Second World War.
Rights and freedoms in Britain
It has long been a paradox that the United Kingdom – viewed as a liberal
democratic state – should have no comprehensive written Bill of Rights.11
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This is especially so, given that the United Kingdom has been responsible for
restoring independence to many former colonies and dominions and, in so
doing, has conferred upon those states both a written constitution and a Bill of
Rights. However, the Human Rights Act 1998, discussed below, now provides
a yardstick against which to measure current law and proposals for new
legislation, and marks a significant conceptual change in the manner in which
rights are regarded in the United Kingdom. 
In the Labour Party’s 1996 general election Manifesto, the Party undertook
to incorporate Convention rights.12 The Human Rights Act 1998 marks a
significant constitutional change in relation to citizens’ awareness about rights,
and their protection by judges in the domestic courts. The Act and its
implications are considered later in this chapter. Prior to incorporation of
Convention rights, the judges used the Convention as an aid to interpretation
to assist in resolving ambiguities in domestic law. However, given the
supremacy of parliament, the judges previously had no jurisdictional basis on
which directly to employ the Convention to protect rights. The Human Rights
Act confers this jurisdiction, requiring the courts not only to protect
Convention rights, but to make ‘declarations of incompatibility’ wherever
domestic law is judicially seen to conflict with Convention rights. By this
means, parliament preserves its supremacy over changes in the law which may
be required by judicial evaluation of domestic law against the provisions of the
Convention. Before considering the Human Rights Act, however, it is
necessary to understand the status and working of the European Convention
and the scope and application of the Convention rights which the Act
incorporates. 
PART A: THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS13
Introduction
Europe was one of the principal theatres of the Second World War, following
which there was felt to be a great need for European political, social and
economic unity. Those objectives were perceived to be promoted, in part, by
the adoption a uniform Convention designed to protect human rights and
fundamental freedoms.14 In 1949, the Council of Europe was established and
the Convention on Human Rights ratified by Member States in 1951, coming
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into force in 1953.15 Despite having been instrumental in the drafting of the
text of the Convention, the British government had strong reservations about
the Convention and its impact on British constitutional law. As a result of
such reservations, it was not until 1965 that the government gave individuals
the right to petition under the Convention.
The status of the Convention under English law prior to the
Human Rights Act 199816
The attitude of the United Kingdom courts towards the Convention has, in the
past, been the traditional one adopted in relation to treaties. Treaties form part
of international law and have no place within the domestic legal order unless
and until incorporated into law.17 The courts regarded the Convention as an
aid to interpretation but had no jurisdiction directly to enforce the rights and
freedoms under the Convention.18 This could, however, of itself be significant.
For example, in Waddington v Miah (1974), Lord Reid stated – having referred
to Article 7 of the Convention which prohibits retrospective legislation – that
‘it is hardly credible that any government department would promote, or that
parliament would pass, retrospective criminal legislation’.19
The influence of the Convention before the Human Rights Act
1998
While previously lacking the jurisdiction to enforce Convention rights. the
English courts were nevertheless influenced by Convention provisions. By
way of example of the influence of the Convention, in R v Secretary of State for
the Home Department ex parte Brind (1991), the Home Secretary had exercised
his discretionary power under section 19(3) of the Broadcasting Act 1981 to
issue a notice requiring the Independent Broadcasting Authority ‘to refrain
from broadcasting any matter or classes of matter specified in the notice’. In
1988, with the aim of depriving those connected directly or indirectly with
terrorist activity related to Northern Ireland of the ‘oxygen of publicity’, the
Home Secretary issued a notice prohibiting the broadcasting on television or
radio of the voices of any person speaking on behalf of a ‘proscribed
organisation’. The words used could be reported through the medium of an
actor, provided that the voice of the spokesperson was not broadcast. The
challenge to this prohibition was, in the House of Lords, based primarily on
the argument that it was contrary to the United Kingdom’s obligations under
Article 10 of the Convention, guaranteeing freedom of expression. It was
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argued that the Home Secretary should have had regard to the Convention in
exercising his discretion under the Broadcasting Act. 
The House of Lords was prepared to accept that there was a presumption
that parliament would enact laws that were in conformity with the
Convention. Accordingly, it was accepted that, where a statute permits two
interpretations, one in line with the Convention, the other contrary to it, the
interpretation which fitted with the Convention should be preferred. The
House of Lords, however, was not prepared to accept that where a discretion
could be exercised, the presumption that parliament intended that it should
be exercised having regard to the Convention must be applied. Lord Bridge
stated that to do so would go beyond the resolution of ambiguity and would,
in effect, compel the courts to enforce conformity with the Convention.20 In
Brind, the court could find no ambiguity in section 29(3) of the Broadcasting
Act. The only basis for challenge therefore was that the Home Secretary’s
decision was unreasonable in the Wednesbury21 sense, that is to say, that the
decision was so irrational or unreasonable that no rational or reasonable
person could have reached the same decision.
A rather different approach to the Convention was adopted in Derbyshire
County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd, concerning the question of whether a
local council could bring an action in libel against newspapers (see, further,
below). In the Court of Appeal, Butler-Sloss LJ was forthright in declaring that
‘where there is ambiguity, or the law is otherwise unclear as so far undeclared
by an appellate court, the English court is not only entitled but ... obliged to
consider the implications of Article 10’. The House of Lords, however, while
arriving at the result achieved in the Court of Appeal – namely that local
authorities enjoyed no standing to sue in defamation – did so without relying
on Article 10 of the Convention, but relying on the common law. 
Accordingly, there existed (before the Human Rights Act 1998 came into
force) no obligation for courts to rely on the Convention if a source of
authority can be found within domestic law. Increasingly, however, it
appeared that – within certain limits – the judiciary expressed willingness to
protect individual liberties and, where a statute was ambiguous, or silent, to
construe the statute strictly and in favour of the liberty of the citizen.
However, there were limits to the extent to which judges were able to
protect rights, as the case of R v Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte
Rossminster Ltd (1980) revealed.22 In Rossminster, the House of Lords ruled
that, where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court
possessed no jurisdiction to go against its unambiguous words, and was
under a duty to uphold the will of parliament by giving effect to its words. In
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both Attorney General v BBC (1981) and Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers
(No 2) (1990), however, the House of Lords confirmed that it was the duty of
the courts to have regard to the international obligations assumed under the
Convention, and to interpret the law in accordance with those obligations.
The application of Convention provisions in the interim period between
the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998 and its coming into effect in
England and Wales was considered by the House of Lords in R v DPP ex parte
Kebeline and Others (1999). The House of Lords ruled, on an appeal by the
Director of Public Prosecutions from a decision of the Divisional Court, that
the decision of the Director of Public Prosecutions to proceed with a
prosecution under section 16A of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) Act 1989, which reverses the burden of proof in relation to the
possession of articles for purposes connected with terrorist activities and
which is, arguably, contrary to Article 6 of the Convention, was not unlawful.
INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURE 
UNDER THE CONVENTION
The Council of Europe, under which the Convention operates, is
constitutionally distinct from the European Community. The Council was
founded in 1949, inspired by the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948. The Committee of Ministers is the political body,
consisting of one representative from each state government (usually Foreign
Ministers). The Commission, comprising one member from each country, is
elected by the Committee of Ministers, but acts independently, ‘serving in
their individual capacity’.23 The Court of Human Rights – elected by the
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe – represents the judicial
body.24 Judges are elected for a renewable nine year term of office,25 and need
not be drawn exclusively from the judiciary in Member States. The
qualifications for appointment are defined as being persons ‘of high moral
character’ who must either possess the qualifications required for
appointment of high judicial office or be jurisconsults of recognised
competence.26
Prior to 1998, the role of the Commission was to act as a filter for
applications. By employing the rules on admissibility in Articles 26 and 27 of
the Convention, the Commission exercised a quasi-judicial function. The effect
of an application being declared inadmissible was that the matter would
never reach the Court of Human Rights. If declared admissible, the
Commission investigated the case fully and attempted to reach a friendly
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settlement between the parties,27 namely, the state and the aggrieved
individual.28 If negotiations for the friendly settlement failed, a report was
sent by the Commission to the state concerned and to the Council of
Ministers.29 The matter could then be determined by the Council of Ministers
– deciding by a two-thirds majority – thus conferring on the political
institution a judicial function. Alternatively, the case could be referred to the
Court by the Commission or by the state concerned.30 Originally, the
complainant had no involvement in the proceedings, let alone the right to
insist that the matter be referred to the Court. Since 1983, the complainant has
a right to be represented before the Court and, by an amendment to Article 48,
a limited right to refer the case to the Court.31 The decision of the Court is
final and binding on states.32 Between 1955 and 1991, 11 inter-state cases, but
17,116 complaints from individuals, had been considered by the Commission.
From November 1998, under Protocol 11 of the Convention on Human
Rights, the Commission and Court are merged into a single Court performing
the tasks of both the Commission and the Court. The objectives sought are
greater clarity for the citizen in terms of organisation and better control of
cases. By this means, the Court is able to scrutinise applications and determine
the admissibility of a complaint. Speed and cost are also factors in the
reformed procedures. On average, when cases go to the Court, it takes some
four to five years before a final decision is reached.
Further, in October 1993, the 32 European nations agreed to strengthen the
powers of the Council of Europe. It was reported that nine nations had joined
since 1989 and that, by the end of 1992, the number of cases before the Courts
was 1,861, compared with only 404 in 1981. Most recently joined as candidate
members are Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia, Latvia, Albania and
Croatia. The summit recorded disquiet over resurging nationalism –
especially in the Balkans. Full membership of the Council for these countries
will depend upon their record in the protection of minorities.
The right of application
Inter-state applications33
By 1994, only 18 inter-state complaints had been recorded, and many of these
involved the same factual situation. In relation to the United Kingdom,
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Republic of Ireland v United Kingdom (1976), discussed above, is the most
significant.
Complaints from individuals34
The right of individual petition to a body outside the jurisdiction of states was
a constitutional innovation. As noted above, the British government was
exceedingly cautious about conceding such a right and only in 1965 did the
right of individual application become available to citizens of the United
Kingdom. Applications may be from individuals, groups of individuals or
non-governmental organisations. The applicant(s) must be personally affected
by the issue: complaints involving alleged conduct which does not personally
affect the individual complainant are not admissible.35
The procedure
Exhaustion of domestic remedies
Any domestic remedies which are available must be exhausted.36 Thus, if a
remedy is available within domestic law, it must first be sought. Only where
there exists no remedy in law, or where the pursuit of a remedy would be
unequivocally certain to fail,37 may an individual lodge a petition.
The time limit
The application must be made within six months of the final decision of the
highest court having jurisdiction within the domestic legal system.38
Admissibility
A number of hurdles face the applicant in having his application declared
admissible:
(a) a complaint must not constitute an ‘abuse of right of complaint’. In
essence, this means that the complainant should not be pursuing a remedy
out of improper motives – such as political advantage. In short, the
complaint must be brought for genuine reasons;
(b) a complaint must not be anonymous;
(c) a complaint must not relate to a matter which has been investigated and
ruled upon previously;
(d) a complaint must not relate to a right which is not protected under the
Convention;
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(e) a complaint is inadmissible if, although the application relates to a
protected right, the State against which the complaint is made has
derogated from that provision, or lodged a reservation (see below for
further discussion of derogations and reservations);
(f) the application must relate to violation of the Convention by a State which
is bound by the Convention, or to an organisation for which the State has
responsibility;
(g) the application must not be such that it represents an attack on another
right protected by the Convention. Article 17 provides that there is no
right to ‘engage in any activity or perform any act’ which is aimed at the
destruction of protected rights;
(h) a complaint must not be ‘manifestly ill founded’. By this is meant that the
application must be plausible – there must be prima facie evidence of a
violation.
Once an application is declared admissible, the examination of the merits will
commence. The complainant has a limited right to appear where the Court
requires further evidence. The Court’s decision must be reasoned and, if not
unanimous, there is a right for individual judges to give a separate opinion.
Under Article 43(1) of the Convention, any party to the case may, within three
months from the date of the judgment of a Chamber (effectively the ‘court of
first instance’ hearing the case), request that the case be referred to the Grand
Chamber. If it is not so referred, the judgment becomes final. Alternatively, if
referred, the judgment of the Grand Chamber is final and Member States
undertake to abide by the decision of the Court. Compensation can be
awarded by the Court.
Enforcing the judgment
The task of ensuring that the judgment is complied with is for the Committee
of Ministers: the matter is thus returned to the political arena. If a state refuses
to comply with the judgment, its membership of the Council of Europe can be
suspended or, ultimately, it may be expelled from the Council. Where
exercised, this ultimate power has regrettable implications and would remove
the protection of the Convention from individuals within the state and thus
further damage the protection of rights. Greece withdrew from the Council of
Europe following five allegations of persecution against it between 1967 and
1970. In 1974, a new Greek government ratified the Convention once more.
However, failure to comply with a judgment will cause adverse publicity for
the state and there is thus great political pressure to conform. Following the
judgment in Brogan v United Kingdom (1988), concerning the seven day
detention provisions in the Prevention of Terrorism Acts, however, the British
government announced its intention to derogate from the protection given in
Article 5 to the right to liberty and freedom and access to a court of law for the
determination of the legality of detention.
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THE ‘MARGIN OF APPRECIATION’
In respect of almost all Articles of the Convention, there is an area of
discretion as to the means by which they protect the substantive rights. This
margin of appreciation is necessary in order that the Convention can apply in
a workable fashion in very differing societies. It also means, however, that
application to the Convention will not be uniform throughout the legal
systems and that states may be able to deviate from the protection given.
Whether the state has a margin of appreciation – and the scope of it – is a
matter to be determined under the Convention. The doctrine is unpredictable
in operation and has become, over the years, applicable to all Articles.
Accordingly, it is a concept which is capable of significantly undermining the
protection given by the Convention, and has been criticised for so doing.39
DEROGATION AND RESERVATION
Where a state finds it impossible or undesirable to comply with specific
Articles, it is possible for the state to derogate, or enter a reservation as to the
matter.40 No derogation is permitted in relation to Article 2 (the right to life),
other than in war situations. Derogation is not allowed in respect of Articles 3
(freedom from torture), 4(1) (slavery or servitude), and 7 (freedom from
retrospective criminal liability).41 The right of derogation is limited. Article 15
provides that:
1 In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation
any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its
obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.
2 No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from
lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made
under this provision.
3 Any High Contracting Party availing himself of this right of derogation
shall keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of
the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also
inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe when such
measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the Convention are
again being fully executed.
A challenge can be made to the lawfulness of derogation. Following the
United Kingdom’s derogation after the decision in Brogan v United Kingdom
(1988), a challenge was lodged, but failed when it was held that the situation
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in Northern Ireland did amount to a public emergency42 and was thus within
the terms of Article 15.43
Cases against the United Kingdom44
By 1997, a total of 50 successful applications had been made, alleging
violations under the Convention, against the United Kingdom. The
significance of the figures should not be exaggerated. In all other European
countries,45 either the Convention is enshrined in law or the constitution of
the state provides a Bill of Rights. The United Kingdom was thus in the
minority of states of the Council of Europe in not previously having such
protective legislation.
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: 
THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
ARTICLE 1
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within jurisdiction the
rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Convention.
ARTICLE 2
1 Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived
of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court
following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by
law.
2 Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of
this Article when it results from the use of force which is not more than
absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person
lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or
insurrection.
The scope of this Article is broad but vague. It is clear that imposition of the
death penalty is not per se contrary to the Convention, although there may be
situations where the circumstances leading up to imposition of the death
penalty amount to a violation of Article 3, which prohibits torture or inhuman
or degrading punishment or treatment. However, it is much less clear as to
the duty, if any, which is imposed on states to sustain life by providing, for
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example, the economic and social conditions under which the right to life is
meaningfully upheld. In Simon-Herald v Austria (1971), for example,
allegations that the state had failed to provide adequate medical care to
prisoners was ruled admissible, although a friendly settlement was reached
thus avoiding the need for a judicial analysis. 
Issues are also raised under Article 2 as to the legality of euthanasia and
abortion. Under domestic law, euthanasia – the act of facilitating a person’s
death when suffering from an incurable illness – amounts to murder and
would also appear to be a violation of Article 2, if sanctioned by the state. In
relation to abortion, under United Kingdom law, there is a restricted right to
abortion under the Abortion Act 1967 (as amended). Whether such provisions
violate Article 2 depends on the interpretation given to the word ‘everyone’ in
Article 1. Domestic law has consistently ruled that legal protection of the
person commences at birth, and not before, a view supported in Paton v United
Kingdom (1980), although whether the right to unrestricted abortion would
violate the Article was mooted in Open Door Counselling and Dublin Well
Woman Centre v Ireland (1992).
The allowable exceptions to the protection of Article 2 are designed to
excuse unintentional causes of death in violent situations. Thus the use of
plastic bullets in a riot will not violate Article 2,46 nor will measures taken to
prevent possible future terrorist activities.47 There are, however, limits to the
lawful use of force. In Kelly v United Kingdom (1993), an application under
Article 2 was rejected as manifestly ill founded. Soldiers had shot dead a
joyrider who had attempted to avoid an army checkpoint, and the use of force
was held to be justifiable. The killing of three Irish Republican Army members
by members of the SAS in Gibraltar48 was challenged under the European
Convention on Human Rights. In McGann, Farrell and Savage v United Kingdom
(1995), the Court ruled that, given the information which the security forces
had received regarding the movements of the suspected terrorists, their
shooting did not violate Article 2 of the Convention. Nevertheless, the Court
ruled that there had been inadequate control over the security forces operation
and that, as a result, the killing of the suspected terrorists was ‘more than
absolutely necessary’ as provided within Article 2. Thus the action taken, to be
lawful, must be proportionate to the circumstances of the case. A violation of
Article 2 was also found in Andronicus and Constantinou v Cyprus (1996), a case
arising when the police, in a siege operation, fired at the hostage taker but
killed the hostage. It was held that the number of bullets fired reflected a lack
of caution in the operation.
In Jordan v United Kingdom; McKerr v United Kingdom; Kelly and Others v
UK; Shanaghan v UK (2001), the families of men shot dead by the SAS and
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Royal Ulster Constabulary in three incidents between 1982 and 1992 were
each awarded £10,000 compensation by the Court. It ruled that the authorities
had failed to conduct a proper investigation into the circumstances of the
persons killed in the fight against terrorism. The required investigation had to
be independent and effective in the sense that it was capable of leading to a
determination of whether the force used was or was not justified in the
circumstances and to the identification and punishment of those
responsible.49 See also Edwards v United Kingdom (2002), in which the United
Kingdom was found to have violated Article 2 through its failure to protect
the life of a prisoner who was killed in his cell. 
ARTICLE 3
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.
In Ireland v United Kingdom (1978), the Republic of Ireland50 alleged that the
United Kingdom had, inter alia, violated Article 3 of the Convention, which
proscribes ‘inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. In 1966, the
United Kingdom had declared that there was a state of emergency in
Northern Ireland. In 1971, acting under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers)
Act 1922,51 the government introduced new powers of detention and
internment of suspected Irish Republican Army terrorists. Fourteen suspects
were subjected to such techniques as hooding, wall-standing for between 23
and 29 hours, noise intrusions and deprivation of sleep, food and water were
employed. There was evidence that the men subjected to these practices
suffered a loss of weight and pain. Between August and November 1971, a
total of some 980 suspects were arrested52 and further allegations of ill
treatment made. The Compton Committee of Inquiry,53 ruled that the
interrogation techniques amounted to ill treatment. The government of the
Republic of Ireland alleged violations of Articles 3, 5 and 14. 
The Court ruled that the techniques, applied in combination and with
premeditation for hours at a time caused, if not actual bodily injury, at least
intense physical and mental suffering and led to acute psychiatric
disturbances. The treatment fell within the meaning of inhuman treatment; it
was also degrading, arousing feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable
of humiliating and debasing them and breaking their physical or moral
resistance. To amount to torture, however, comparison must be made with
inhuman and degrading treatment. The distinction, ruled the Court, derives
from the difference in the intensity of suffering inflicted. In this case it did not
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occasion suffering of a particular intensity and cruelty implied by the word
torture as understood by the Court.54
In Tyrer v United Kingdom (1978), the Court ruled on the compatibility of
birching as a judicial punishment in the Isle of Man with the requirements of
Article 3. Tyrer, then aged 15, was given three strokes of the birch as
punishment for an assault on a school prefect. The question raised was
whether the punishment amounted to a violation of Article 3. The Court held
that, while a conviction for a criminal offence itself could humiliate, for a
finding to be sustained under Article 3, there needed to be found a
humiliation deriving from the execution of punishment imposed. The
treatment must attain a particular level and the assessment was relative: the
assessment turns on the nature and context of the punishment and the
method of its execution. Corporal punishment, the Court stated in Tyrer, may
be undesirable without necessarily being degrading. When inflicted with
proper safeguards and when traditionally sanctioned for offences in the
society to which the offender belongs, it may not be degrading. The mere fact
that the punishment being inflicted was distasteful was not enough. Under
the circumstances, with the victim having to undress, the treatment reached a
level of degrading punishment.
Corporal punishment of children may also violate Article 3.55 In Costello-
Roberts v United Kingdom (1993), the Court indicated that there is a distinction
to be drawn between ordinary physical punishment, which may not violate
the Convention, and corporal punishment, which is degrading. The
determination as to whether or not the requirements of the Convention have
been breached will depend upon the conditions under which the punishment
is inflicted. In A v United Kingdom (1998), the stepfather of a child had beaten
him with a stick, resulting in bruising which a paediatrician considered to
indicate that he had been beaten with considerable force on more than one
occasion. The Court of Human Rights held that domestic law did not provide
adequate protection for children in relation to treatment or punishment
contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. 
The law relating to immigration, race and citizenship has also been tested
under Article 3. In East African Asians v United Kingdom (1973), the
immigration legislation (the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968) restricted
immigration of British passport holders in East Africa, preventing those who
had neither a parent or grandparent born or naturalised in the United
Kingdom from entering the country. The Commission ruled that racial
discrimination of this type constituted a form of affront to human dignity and
amounted to degrading treatment.
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Issues are also raised as to the lawfulness of the conditions under which a
prisoner is detained.56 In Price v United Kingdom (2001), the Court of Human
Rights ruled that the detention of a severely disabled person in unsuitable
conditions at a police station and subsequently detention in prison in similar
conditions amounted to degrading treatment contrary to Article 3.57
In Z and Others v United Kingdom (2001), the Court of Human Rights ruled
that the United Kingdom authorities had failed to provide children with
appropriate protection against serious, long term neglect and abuse which
amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of Article 3. The
Court also ruled that there was a violation of Article 13 due to the lack of
appropriate means to determine the local authority’s responsibility for the
damage suffered as well as the impossibility of obtaining an enforceable
award of compensation. Proceedings against the local authority claiming
damages for negligence had been struck out by the House of Lords, which
ruled that local authorities should not be held liable in negligence in respect of
the exercise of their statutory duties (those under the Children Act 1989) as a
matter of public policy.58
The rights of persons to remain in the United Kingdom may also be raised
under Article 3. If an individual is returned to his homeland in the knowledge
that he will there suffer certain imprisonment or death, a state may violate
Article 3 by refusing to allow him to remain. Two illustrative cases may be
cited. In Soering v United Kingdom (1989), the applicant successfully alleged
that his extradition to the United States on a charge of capital murder, which
would result in his detention on Death Row prior to execution, would amount
to a breach of Article 3. Conversely, in Vilvarajah and Four Others v United
Kingdom (1991), the applicants had applied for political asylum in the United
Kingdom, fearing persecution if they returned to Sri Lanka. Following
deportation four of them were arrested and ill treated. No breach of Article 3
was established, since the court held that there was no clear risk of ill
treatment proven, only a possibility of ill treatment.
The issue was tested in Chahal v United Kingdom (1997), in which the Court
of Human Rights ruled, by twelve votes to seven, that the United Kingdom
violated Article 3 of the Convention and – unanimously – that there had been
a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3, in that effective remedies
did not exist before the courts in England. In addition, there was also a
violation of Article 5(4), in that Mr Chahal had been denied the opportunity to
have the lawfulness of his detention decided by a national court.
Mr Chahal, a Sikh, had been politically active in Sikh affairs. In 1990, the
Home Secretary decided to deport him from the United Kingdom on the
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ground of national security and the international fight against terrorism. He
was arrested in 1990 and detained. Mr Chahal applied for political asylum,
claiming he would be a victim of torture if deported to India. Mr Chahal had
been subject to torture in India on a visit in 1984. The Court was appraised of
substantiated allegations of torture by the authorities in India. By refusing Mr
Chahal asylum and threatening to deport him, the United Kingdom
authorities violated Article 3. Mr Chahal’s detention on the basis of national
security was not a violation of Article 5(1), since there was prima facie evidence
that national security would be threatened by his release. 
The threat to remove was retested in D v United Kingdom (1997). D had
arrived in the United Kingdom in 1993 from his country of origin, St Kitts. On
arrival, he was found to have in his possession a substantial quantity of
cocaine. Rather than being deported, he was arrested and charged with
illegally importing a controlled drug. He was convicted and sentenced to six
years imprisonment. In 1994, the applicant was diagnosed as HIV positive
and suffering from AIDS. A medical report of 1996 indicated that his life
expectancy was limited to eight to 12 months. In January 1996, shortly before
the applicant was due to be released from prison on licence, the immigration
authorities ordered his removal to St Kitts. D applied unsuccessfully for
judicial review. His appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal. An
application was lodged under the Convention.
The Court of Human Rights ruled that Article 3 prohibited in absolute
terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and its
guarantees applied, irrespective of the reprehensible nature of the conduct of
the person in question. The Court was not limited to considering Article 3
within the context of anticipated torture or inhuman treatment on the part of
the public authorities of the recipient country. The applicant’s condition was
deteriorating. To remove him to St Kitts, where he had no family willing to
care for him or home of his own, and no guarantee of adequate medical
treatment, would expose him to ‘a real risk of dying in the most distressing
circumstances and thus to inhuman treatment contrary to Article 3’.
ARTICLE 4
1 No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.
2 No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.
3 For the purpose of this Article the term ‘forced or compulsory labour’ shall
not include:
(a) any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention
imposed according to the provisions of Article 5 of this Convention or
during conditional release from such detention;
(b) any service of a military character or, in the case of conscientious
objectors in countries where they are recognised, service exacted
instead of compulsory military service;
(c) any service exacted in case of any emergency or calamity threatening
the life or well being of the community;
(d) any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations.
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This provision has little relevance in the majority of Western democracies and
has given rise to little case law. Challenges have been made relating to the
requirement that German lawyers undertake compulsory legal aid work, but
these have failed.59
ARTICLE 5
1 Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent
court;60
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the
lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any
obligation prescribed by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of
bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable
suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably
considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing
after having done so;61
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational
supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him
before the competent legal authority;62
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of
infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug
addicts, or vagrants;63
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an
unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom
action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.
2 Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which
he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against
him.64
3 Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 1(c) of this article shall be brought promptly before a judge65or
other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be
entitled to trial within a reasonable time66 or to release pending trial.
Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.67
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4 Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be
entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall
be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is
not lawful.68
5 Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention
of the provisions of this article shall have an enforceable right to
compensation.69
This long and intricate Article has provided the platform for many challenges
on behalf of persons detained and is in many cases linked to Article 6. The
first requirement to be met in relation to Article 5 is that, where a person is
deprived of his liberty, the deprivation must be in consequence of a lawful
detention.
In Weeks v United Kingdom (1987),70 the issue raised, under Article 5(1)(a),
was whether the revocation of a life licence deprives a person of his liberty
without the conviction of a court of law. In that case, the applicant had been
sentenced to life imprisonment but, after ten years, was released on licence.
The Home Secretary revoked the licence after Weeks had failed to stay out of
trouble. The Court held, however, that the original sentence was passed in the
knowledge that the Home Secretary enjoyed a discretion as to the liberty of
prisoners under sentence and that, accordingly, there was a sufficient link
between the original sentence passed, the granting of a licence, and the
revocation of the licence.
The lawfulness of arrest was also tested in Steel and Others v United
Kingdom (1998). In a case involving five applicants, allegations of breaches of
Articles 5, 6, 10, 11 and 13 were made. The applicants had been involved in
animal rights and other protests, and had been arrested and charged with
breach of the peace. In relation to Article 5(1), while the concept of breach of
the peace was sufficiently clear and formulated ‘with the degree of precision
required by the Convention’, where, as in the case of three of the applicants,
the protest had been entirely peaceful and there had been no obstruction of
others or any provocation of others to violence, the Court ruled that their
arrest and subsequent detention was not lawful within the meaning of Article
5(1).
Article 5(1) was also violated in the case of Johnson v United Kingdom
(1996). In this case, the applicant had been convicted of a number of assaults
and, having been found to be suffering from mental illness within the Mental
Health Act 1983, was in 1984 ordered to be detained indefinitely. In 1989, the
Mental Health Review Tribunal decided that the applicant was no longer
suffering from mental illness. However, since no suitable accommodation for
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the applicant could be found, he was detained until 1993. That detention
violated the requirements of lawful detention.
The second group of requirements is that, where a person is arrested, that
person must be informed of the grounds for the arrest (paragraph 2), be
brought ‘promptly’ before a court of law and, moreover, is entitled to a trial
within a reasonable time, or to be released on bail (paragraph 3).71 In Oldham v
United Kingdom (2001), the Court of Human Rights ruled that a two year delay
between Parole Board reviews was not reasonable, and that made continued
detention unlawful. There was a violation of Article 5(4) of the Convention.
See also Hirst v United Kingdom (2001), in which the Court of Human Rights
ruled that where undue delays existed between reviews carried out by the
Parole Board, the lawfulness of the continued detention of a prisoner serving a
sentence of discretionary life imprisonment was not decided speedily as
required by Article 5(4) of the Convention. The 21 and 24 month delays
violated Article 5(4).
Article 5 was tested in Murray v United Kingdom (1995). The applicant
alleged a breach of Article 5 and a breach of Article 8, on the basis that she had
been detained by soldiers in Northern Ireland who suspected that they had
grounds for arrest. Despite there being a period of a few hours between the
time of arrest and informing the applicant of the reason for arrest, this was
insufficient to amount to a violation of Article 5.72 In Brogan v United Kingdom
(1989),73 a challenge was lodged to the lawfulness of detention for up to seven
days, at the Home Secretary’s discretion, under the Prevention of Terrorism
(Temporary Provisions) Act. The Court ruled that such detention represented
a violation of the requirements of Article 5.74
There was no contravention of Article 5 of the Convention in respect of a
person who had been arrested on reasonable suspicion of having committed a
crime. The Court of Human Rights so held in O’Hara v United Kingdom (2001).
There was, however, a violation of Article 5(3), which guarantees the right to
be brought promptly before a judge, and a violation through the failure to
award compensation for the breach. 
In Benham v United Kingdom (1996), the Court of Human Rights ruled, by a
majority of seventeen votes to four, that there was no violation of Article 5(1)
of the Convention. Magistrates had committed Benham to prison for thirty
days pursuant to his failure to pay his community charge, the reason for
which the magistrates found to be his culpable neglect. Benham had not been
legally represented before the magistrates. On an application under the
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Convention alleging breaches of Articles 5 and 6, the Court ruled that, under
national law, the order was valid; that the detention was not arbitrary as the
magistrates had not acted in bad faith or failed to apply the relevant
legislation. There was, however, a violation of Article 6 since, given the
complexity of the legal issues and the fact that these were criminal
proceedings, Benham should have been entitled to legal representation.
In Hussain v United Kingdom; Singh v United Kingdom (1996), the European
Court of Human Rights ruled that the United Kingdom had violated Article
5(4) of the Convention. The applicants, who had been sentenced to be
detained during Her Majesty’s pleasure, were unable to have the lawfulness
of their continued detention reviewed by a court.75
Articles 5 and 6 have also provided the basis for recent challenges in
relation to military proceedings in Hood v United Kingdom (1999) and Jordan v
United Kingdom (2000).76 In Hood’s case, the applicant had been tried and
convicted of criminal charges under the Army Act 1955. The applicant’s
commanding officer had decided on pre-trial detention, and had subsequently
played a role in hearing the case against the applicant. Accordingly, he could
not be impartial, and the proceedings did not meet the requirements of
independence and impartiality required by Article 6(1). In Jordan’s case,77 the
applicant had completed a sentence of imprisonment, but continued to be
detained, under close arrest, on the basis of further suspected offences under
investigation by military police. Jordan had been released following habeas
corpus proceedings and had brought proceedings against the Ministry of
Defence, claiming unlawful detention. The commanding officer, who had
been involved in Jordan’s case since 1995, could not be considered impartial,
and there was a violation of Article 5(3) and (5).78
Provisions relating to the prosecution of juveniles for criminal offences
have also been subject to the scrutiny of the Court of Human Rights. In T and
V v United Kingdom (1999), the Court ruled that there were violations of Article
5(4) and one violation of Article 6(1). Two boys, aged ten when they killed a
two year old child, were convicted of murder. Following their conviction, the
Home Secretary had set the tariff period to be served for retribution and
deterrence. Accordingly, there was no opportunity for the lawfulness of their
detention to be assessed by a judicial body and, thereby, Article 5(4) was
violated. In addition, the adult trial process, although specially adapted in
light of the defendants’ young age to reduce its formality, caused the
defendants stress and, thereby, violated the right to fair trial guaranteed by
Article 6.
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ARTICLE 6
1 In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within
a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by
law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may
be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public
order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of
juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to
the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special
circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
2 Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law.
3 Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum
rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in
detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own
choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to
be given it free when the interests of justice so require;
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same
conditions as witnesses against him;
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or
speak the language used in court.
Article 6 is the most frequently cited Article. Up to the end of 1989, 63
violations had been found. The protection given relates to the ‘determination
of ... civil rights and obligations’ and ‘of any criminal charge’. The Court has
had to determine the meaning and scope of these phrases. A ‘criminal charge’
has been interpreted to mean ‘the official notification given to an individual
by the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal
offence’.79
The phrase – ‘civil rights and obligations’ – has given rise to extensive
interpretation. The Article has been held to apply to proceedings before an
administrative tribunal – the Regional Land Commission – in Austria.80 As a
general principle, where the consequence of an administrative decision is one
which affects the civil rights of individuals, then Article 6 may be held to
apply.81 For example, in Konig (1980), Dr Konig’s licence to practise as a
doctor in his own clinic was withdrawn. The Court ruled that the decision
affected Dr Konig’s civil rights and that, therefore, the protection of Article 6
applied.
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Article 6 was held to have been violated by the Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland in relation to appointment to the Civil Service in Devlin v
United Kingdom (2001). The Secretary of State had issued a national security
certificate certifying that a refusal of employment was for the purpose of
safeguarding national security and public safety, which restricted
disproportionately the applicant’s right of access to a court. There was no
evidence as to why the applicant was considered a security risk, nor was there
any independent scrutiny of the facts.82
Particular difficulties arise in disciplinary proceedings for criminal
offences in the armed services. The consequence of trying the matter under
disciplinary regulations is to remove the normal application of Article 6. The
Court has ruled that whether an offence is classified as criminal or
disciplinary is less important than the nature of the offence. In Campbell and
Fell v United Kingdom (1984), following involvement in a prison riot, the
applicants had been punished by the Board of Prison Visitors with loss of
remission of sentence. The Court held that Article 6 applied to the decision
making process of the Board of Visitors.83
A ‘fair and public hearing’ has been interpreted to include the right to
legal advice before the judicial hearing. In Golder v United Kingdom (1975),
Golder, serving a prison sentence, wanted to sue a prison officer for
defamation. His request to the Home Secretary to consult a solicitor was
denied. The Court held that Article 6 had been violated. The Court has further
ruled that not only must access to law not be impeded (by the denial of legal
advice or other means), but that the state has a duty to ensure effective access
to law.84 The right of access to law is not absolute, but any restrictions which
are imposed must not be such as to impair ‘the very essence of the right’.
Limitations will be incompatible with the Convention, if they do not pursue a
legitimate aim and are not proportional to the objective being sought.85
Article 6(1) also requires that the hearing take place ‘within a reasonable
time’. The reasonableness of the length of the proceedings will depend upon
their complexity. 
The Court of Human Rights ruled that the United Kingdom authorities
had violated Article 6(1) in the case of Saunders v United Kingdom (1996). The
case concerned the prosecution of Ernest Saunders, formerly chief executive
officer of Guinness plc, for corporate fraud. The investigating authorities
(inspectors appointed by the Department of Trade and Industry) interviewed
Mr Saunders on nine occasions in 1987, using their powers under sections
532(2) and 436(3) of the Companies Act 1985. By law, Mr Saunders was
compelled to answer questions put by the inspectors, under threat of
contempt of court and the imposition of a fine or a prison sentence. In 1990,
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the applicant was convicted on 12 counts of conspiracy, false accounting and
theft. The Court ruled by a majority of 16 votes to four that there had been a
violation of the fundamental right not to incriminate oneself, as guaranteed by
Article 6(1). The public interest in combating fraud could not be allowed to
override the defendant’s right not to incriminate himself.86
In B and P v United Kingdom (1997), the Court of Human Rights ruled that
there was no violation of Article 6 through the denial of a hearing and
pronouncement of judgment in public in child custody proceedings. The
hearings took place in chambers; the judge ordered that no documents used in
the proceedings should be disclosed outside the court. The right to a public
trial was not absolute, and could be overridden by the interests of children or
the need for privacy where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 
The right to legal advice was considered by the Court of Human Rights in
Magee v United Kingdom (2000). The applicant had been arrested in 1988 under
the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 and held for
more than 48 hours without access to legal advice. He signed a confession
statement at his seventh interview, and was only subsequently allowed to
consult his solicitor. The Court of Human Rights considered that the central
issue raised by the applicant’s complaint was that: ‘... he had been prevailed
upon in a coercive environment to incriminate himself without the benefit of
legal advice.’ Although the right to legal advice is not expressly stated in
Article 6 and may be subject to restriction for ‘good cause’, the Court ruled
that there had been a violation of Article 6, stating that ‘to deny access to a
lawyer for such a long period and in a situation where the rights of the
defence were irretrievably prejudiced is – whatever the justification for such
denial – incompatible with the rights of the accused under Article 6’.
However, in the earlier case of Murray (John) v United Kingdom (1996),87 where
the applicant refused to give evidence at trial and adverse inferences were
drawn as a result, the Court ruled that there was no violation of Article 6.
Unlike Magee’s case, where the only evidence against him was the confession,
in Murray’s case there existed a formidable body of other evidence against
him.
The right to silence was also considered in Condron v United Kingdom
(2000). In Condron, the applicants had been under police surveillance and were
charged with drug offences. When interviewed by the police, the applicants,
acting on the advice of their solicitor who was concerned that their state of
withdrawal from drugs made them unfit to answer questions, had remained
silent, only offering ‘no comment’ to questions. The applicants were cautioned
that the jury could draw adverse inferences from their silence. At trial, the
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judge failed to give a proper direction to the jury on the correct approach to be
taken to the drawing of inferences. Nevertheless, on appeal the Court of
Appeal ruled that the convictions were safe. However, what the Court of
Appeal did not consider – which was of the essence of consideration before
the Court of Human Rights – was whether the trial of the defendants was fair
in accordance with the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention. The Court
ruled that there was a violation of Article 6. The right to silence, according to
the Court, ‘lies at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure guaranteed by
Article 6’. Accordingly, the applicants did not receive a fair trial.
The Court ruled that there was a violation of Article 6. The defendants had
given evidence at their trial, and had explained that they had declined to
answer questions at interview on the advice of their solicitor. It was the
function of the jury, properly directed, to decide whether or not to draw an
adverse inference from the applicants’ silence.88 They therefore had a
discretion. However, the judge in his direction did not restrict that discretion,
since he failed to advise the jury that it should only draw an adverse inference
if it concluded that their silence was attributed to their having no answer to
the charges or none that would stand up to cross-examination. The right to
silence, according to the Court, ‘lies at the heart of the notion of a fair
procedure guaranteed by Article 6’. Accordingly, the applicants did not
receive a fair trial.
The presence of police officers within hearing during an accused’s
interview with his solicitor violated Article 6. The Court of Human Rights so
ruled in Brennan v United Kingdom (2001). However, Article 6 was not violated
by the deferral of access to the solicitor or in respect of police interviews. The
right to consult a solicitor had to be practical and effective. If it was not, that
could undermine the right to fair trial: the presence of the police officer would
have prevented the applicant from speaking frankly.
The availability of free legal representation is essential to the fairness of a
trial, and denial of legal aid, where the interest of justice demand that it
should be made available, violates the Convention. In Granger v United
Kingdom (1990), for example, Granger was refused legal aid for his appeal
against conviction on a charge of perjury. The Crown was represented by the
Solicitor General for Scotland and junior counsel, whereas Granger was
obliged to represent himself. The Court held that there was a violation of
Article 6. Granger had no available remedy, and no right to make a fresh
application for legal aid once his original application had been rejected, and
he had no means to pay for representation.The denial of legal aid also resulted
in a violation of the Convention in Benham v United Kingdom (1996). 
In addition to those cases alleging breaches of Articles 5 and 6
simultaneously, Article 6 has been subject to further scrutiny. The requirement
of judicial impartiality was recently tested before the European Court of
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Human Rights, in a judgment which has implications for the role of Lord
Chancellor. In McGonnell v United Kingdom (2000), a case relating to the
position of the Deputy Bailiff of Guernsey as President of the States of
Deliberation, Guernsey’s legislative body, and subsequently as the sole judge
of law in proceedings relating to the applicant’s planning application which
had been refused, the Court of Human Rights held that the Deputy Bailiff’s
position was ‘capable of casting doubt’ as to his ‘impartiality’ and, as a result,
was in violation of Article 6(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights,
which guarantees ‘a fair and public hearing ... by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law’. On impartiality, the Court restated the
proposition that:
... [the tribunal] must be subjectively free of personal prejudice or bias.
Secondly, it must also be impartial from an objective viewpoint, that is, it must
offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect ...
In the instant case, there was no question of actual bias on the part of the
Bailiff; nevertheless, the Court considered that:
... any direct involvement in the passage of legislation, or of executive rules,
was likely to be sufficient to cast doubt on the judicial impartiality of a person
subsequently called on to determine a dispute over whether reasons exist to
permit a variation from the wording of the legislation or rules at issue.
Accordingly, ‘the mere fact that the Deputy Bailiff presided over the court ...
was capable of casting doubt on his impartiality...’. There was, therefore, a
violation of the requirements of fair trial before an independent and impartial
tribunal.89
In Rowe and Others v United Kingdom (2000), the failure by the prosecution
to lay Public Interest Immunity Certificates before the judge in a trial for
murder deprived the applicants of a fair trial, as required by Article 6. The
withholding of evidence from the court breached the fundamental principle
that there should be ‘equality of arms’ between prosecution and defence.
While there was no absolute right to disclosure, and the rights of the accused
must be weighed against the interests of, inter alia, national security, it was for
the judge to control the release or otherwise of material.90
Article 6 has been held not to be violated where state immunity had
prevented the applicants from pursuing cases in domestic court
proceedings.91 The three applicants each sought redress for the actions of
British, Kuwaiti and United States authorities for, respectively, an alleged
assault, wrongful imprisonment and torture, and discrimination. The
respondent governments pleaded state immunity. The Court ruled that in
each case the doctrine of state immunity, designed to promote comity
between nations, applied. 
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ARTICLE 7
1 No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or
international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the
criminal offence was committed.
2 The article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for
any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was
criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised
nations.
It is an accepted presumption of statutory interpretation under English law
that parliament does not intend – in the absence of clear words – to legislate
with retrospective effect. Lord Reid’s observation in Waddington v Miah (1974),
to the effect that ‘it is hardly credible’ that parliament would pass
retrospective criminal legislation must now be seen in light of the War Crimes
Act 1991 which does, however, have retrospective effect, making it a criminal
offence to have participated in war crimes during the Second World War.
However, this Act would appear not to violate Article 7 of the Convention,
given that such activities fall within paragraph 2 of Article 7, being crimes
against the ‘general principles of law recognised by civilised nations’.
A challenge lodged under the Convention, claiming a violation of Article
7, for a penalty imposed which could not have been foreseen occurred in
Harman and Hewitt v United Kingdom (1989). Ms Harman showed confidential
documents to a journalist after these had been read out in court, as a result of
which she was found guilty of contempt. Previously, no liability had been
imposed in such situations – the information had been regarded as having
entered the ‘public domain’ through disclosure in court. Ms Harman’s
application was ruled admissible, but a friendly settlement was reached with
the government.
The European Court of Human Rights has ruled on the compatibility of a
conviction for marital rape with Article 7 of the Convention: SW v United
Kingdom; CR v United Kingdom. In R v R (1992), the House of Lords ruled that
the exemption of husbands from the law of rape against their wives was
obsolete. Two men were convicted of rape or attempted rape of their wives in
1989 and 1990, following the decision in R v R. The applicants alleged that
their conviction amounted to a violation of Article 7 which prohibits a
retrospective change in the criminal law. The Court ruled that the convictions
did not violate the Convention: the judicial decisions had done no more than
continue a line of reasoning which diminished a husband’s immunity; the
decisions had become a reasonably foreseeable development of the law and
the decisions were not in contravention of the aims of Article 7. A different
conclusion was reached in Welch v United Kingdom (1995). In Welch, the
applicant was awaiting trial for drug offences. Before the trial, the Drug
Trafficking Offences Act 1996 came into force, under which there was
provision made for confiscation orders. A confiscation order was made, even
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though the provision was not in force at the time the applicant committed the
offences.
ARTICLE 8
1 Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence.
2 There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.
Article 8 has provided the legal means by which to challenge domestic law
and practice in two principal areas – the respect for privacy and non-
intervention by the state (including the keeping of personal records), and the
respect for the individual’s private life in terms of his or her own personal
relationships.
Respect for individual privacy
As can be seen from the text of Article 8, the right to privacy is subject to
several exceptions, and the protection which can in fact be accorded to privacy
is limited.
The interception of communications has given rise to challenges under the
Convention. For example, in Klass v Federal Republic of Germany (1978), lawyers
challenged German legislation which authorised the interception of mail and
telecommunications. The Court held that, whilst the right to privacy was
undoubtedly infringed, the interceptions were justified under paragraph 2 of
Article 8. The Court ruled that any surveillance of citizens could be legitimate
only to the extent that it was necessary for ‘safeguarding the democratic
institutions’ of the state. Provided that there exist adequate guarantees against
abuse, Article 8 was not violated. 
In Foxley v United Kingdom (2001),92 the Court of Human Rights ruled that
Article 8 was violated by the interception of correspondence which included
correspondence between the applicant and his solicitors. The legal basis for
the interception was the Insolvency Act 1986, under which a court ordered the
redirection of the applicant’s mail to a trustee in bankruptcy. However, the
intercepts continued after the expiry of the court order and involved
communications between the applicant and his lawyer. That was unjustified
and violated Article 8.
In Malone v United Kingdom (1984), a different conclusion was reached by
the Court. The Court found that the law was unclear, and that, accordingly,
‘the minimum degree of legal protection to which citizens are entitled under
the rule of law in a democratic society is lacking’ (paragraph 79). The
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government’s response to the judgment was to introduce the Interception of
Communications Act 1985 (see Chapter 23), which places the granting of
warrants for interception of communications on a statutory basis. In Kruslin v
France (1990) and Huvig v France (1990), the Court also ruled that insufficient
safeguards existed in law, and that the Convention was, accordingly,
violated.93
In X, Y and Z v United Kingdom (1997),94 a female to male transsexual
applied to have his name registered on ‘his’ child’s birth certificate. The child
had been conceived after artificial insemination by donor. His application was
refused, on the basis that a female to male transsexual was not a ‘man’ within
the meaning of that term under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act
1990. The Commission of Human Rights expressed the view that this position
violates Article 8. See, now, Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002), at page 627 for
recent developments in the law.
In Halford v United Kingdom (1997), Alison Halford, a former Assistant
Chief Constable, won a significant victory in the European Court of Human
Rights. Whilst in her post in Merseyside, Ms Halford’s telephone calls were
intercepted by senior police officers. Ms Halford applied under the European
Convention, alleging a breach of her right to privacy, as guaranteed under
Article 8. Nine judges of the Court of Human Rights on 25 June 1997 ruled
unanimously that there had been a violation of the Convention. The Court
also ruled that domestic law provided no avenue for a complaint such as this
to be determined. Ms Halford was awarded £10,000 compensation. This case
raised, for the first time, the issue of the right to privacy of employees at work.
Government lawyers had argued, unsuccessfully, that there was no protection
under the Convention on the basis that the telephones which had been tapped
were government property. 
Covert surveillance by the police prior to the enactment of the Police Act
1997, which provided for statutory authority for such surveillance, violated
the right to respect for private and family life, as guaranteed by Article 8. The
Court of Human Rights so held in Khan v United Kingdom (2000). The applicant
had been convicted for drug dealing, on the basis of evidence improperly
obtained by a secret listening device installed by the police. The evidence so
gained was the sole evidence against the accused. 
The applicant alleged that his trial was unfair and in breach of Article 6,
that his right to respect for private life under Article 8 had been breached and
that his right to an effective remedy under Article 13 had also been breached.
On Article 6, the Court of Human Rights ruled that the applicant had had
ample opportunity to challenge the use of the evidence and had done so
before the trial court, the Court of Appeal and House of Lords, and that the
domestic courts had considered the question of admissibility. Accordingly,
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there was no violation of Article 6. There was, however, a violation of Article
8. Since there was an absence of statutory authority for the intercept, the
interference could not be considered to be in accordance with law. 
On Article 13, the Court considered the avenues open to the applicant,
principally the police complaints mechanism. Having considered the
respective roles of Chief Constables, the Police Complaints Authority and that
of the Home Secretary in relation to the appointment, remuneration and
dismissal of members of the Police Complaints Authority, the Court ruled that
the system of investigation of complaints did not meet the requisite standards
of independence needed ‘to constitute sufficient protection against the abuse
of authority and thus provide an effective remedy’. Accordingly, there was a
violation of Article 13.95
Privacy of the family
In Hoffman v Austria (1994), the Court ruled that Ms Hoffman had been
discriminated against (contrary to Article 14) and her respect for family life
violated (Article 8) by the Supreme Court of Austria, which had denied her
the custody of her children on divorce, principally because she had become a
Jehovah’s Witness. In Marckx v Belgium (1979), a complaint was lodged on the
basis that Articles 12 and 14 had been violated by discriminatory inheritance
rules for illegitimate children.96 English law relating to care proceedings and
the powers of local authorities to control access of parents to children in local
authority care have also been successfully challenged under the Convention,
leading to changes to the rights of parents to access to a court of law in order
to challenge a local authority’s decision to terminate contact between children
and their parents.97
The rights of Gypsies to live on their own land without planning
permissions was considered by the Court of Human Rights in Buckley v United
Kingdom (1997).98 The Court ruled that the United Kingdom authorities had
not violated Article 8 or Article 14 (enjoyment of substantive rights without
discrimination) of the Convention. Mrs Buckley had purchased land, and had
sought and been refused planning permission. 
The Court ruled, by a majority, that the protected right to a home may be
limited ‘in accordance with law’ as ‘necessary in a democratic society.’
However, the Court ruled that the measures taken by national authorities
must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Two dissenting judges
ruled that there was a violation of Article 8 and one dissenting judge, that
there had also been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention. There are a
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number of Gypsy cases pending under the Convention and it is likely that the
Court will re-examine this issue in the foreseeable future. See also Chapman v
United Kingdom (2001), which followed Buckley in holding that there was no
violation of Article 8, but by a narrower majority of ten votes to seven.
In Hatton and Others v United Kingdom (2001), the Court of Human Rights
held that there had been a violation of Articles 8 and 13. The applicants all
lived in properties in the area surrounding Heathrow Airport and complained
that the increase in night-time noise interfered with their right to respect for
their private and family lives and their homes, guaranteed by Article 8. They
also claimed that judicial review was not an effective remedy in that it failed
to examine the merits of decisions by public authorities and was prohibitively
expensive for individuals. The state had failed to strike a fair balance between
the UK’s economic well being and the applicants’ effective enjoyment of their
rights. The Court also ruled that there was a violation of Article 13. Judicial
review, limited to concepts such as irrationality, unlawfulness and patent
unreasonableness, did not allow consideration of whether the increase in
night flights under the scheme represented a justifiable limitation on the right
to respect for private and family life. 
Issues relating to the relationship between parents and children are
increasingly coming under scrutiny. In G v United Kingdom (Minors: Right of
Contact) (2000), there was no violation of Article 8 with regard to the alleged
failure of the English and Scottish courts to enforce access arrangements
between the applicant and his children, following his wife’s refusal to comply
with court orders. Compare TP and KM v United Kingdom (2001), in which a
violation of Articles 8 and 13 was held to have been committed by the
authorities. A mother and daughter had been separated for nearly a year by
the local authority as a result of allegations that the child had been sexually
abused by the mother’s partner. The local authority had withheld evidence
from the mother and failed to submit the issue to court, and had thereby
excluded the mother from the decision-making process.99
Respect for private sexual life
In Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1982), the right to respect for privacy was
examined against the claim that legislation in force in Northern Ireland
prohibited homosexual conduct between adult males. As a result, the
Homosexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 1982 was passed to bring
domestic law into line with the requirements of the Convention. See, also,
Lustig-Praen and Beckett v United Kingdom and Smith and Grady v United
Kingdom (2000), in which the Court of Human Rights ruled that the ban on
homosexuals in the armed forces violated Article 8 of the Convention.
The prosecution and conviction of a man, for engaging in non-violent
homosexual acts in private with up to four other men, was a violation of
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Article 8. The Court of Human Rights so held in ADT v United Kingdom (2000).
The Court ruled that the applicant was a victim of an interference with his
right to respect for his private life, both as to the existence of legislation
prohibiting consensual sexual acts between more than two men in private,
and as to the conviction for gross indecency. The interference was not justified
as being ‘necessary in a democratic society’ in the protection of morals and
rights and freedoms of others. 
ARTICLE 9
1 Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2 Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order,
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion have founded the basis for few
cases under the Convention. Applications which have been made under this
Article relate primarily to the conditions under which an individual may
exercise his rights. In the case of prisoners detained following a criminal
conviction, the prison authorities are entitled to prescribe limits to the exercise
of religious and other rights, simply because such restrictions represent ‘an
inherent feature of lawful imprisonment’. In X v Austria (1965), refusal by
prison authorities to allow a Buddhist prisoner to grow a beard was held not
to violate the Convention.
ARTICLE 10
1 Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This
article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises.
2 The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions
or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
In a significant case relating to the responsibility of the state towards citizens
affected by industrial and manufacturing hazards, the Court of Human Rights
ruled in Guerra v Italy (1998) that the failure of state authorities to advise
citizens of the threat posed by environmental pollution violated their right of
enjoyment of their homes in such a way as to affect their private and family
life adversely. 
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Freedom of expression has given rise to several cases under the
Convention. In The Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979), the English law of
contempt was considered in the light of Article 10. In 1972, The Sunday Times
published an article concerning children born deformed as a result of their
mothers taking the drug Thalidomide during pregnancy. The manufacturers,
Distillers, were involved in pending court proceedings between the claimants
for compensation. In October 1972, Distillers made representations to the
Attorney General, claiming The Sunday Times article would prejudice
negotiations and would amount to contempt of court. The Attorney General
sought and was granted an injunction. The Court of Appeal reversed the
decision but, in July 1973, the House of Lords confirmed the injunction. As a
result, The Sunday Times turned to Article 10.
At issue was whether Article 10, paragraph 2, justified the restriction of the
injunction. The Court held that Article 10(2) – since it limited freedom of
expression – should be strictly construed and that no implied limits should be
read into it. The English law of contempt, imposing a restriction of over three
years, was ruled to be uncertain and unsatisfactory. The Court was required to
decide whether the restriction imposed by the injunction was really necessary
in the circumstances and, moreover, whether the restriction was proportionate
to the objective being sought. The government claimed that the law of
contempt was a necessary device whereby the authority and impartiality of
the judiciary was upheld. However, given that the trial was not in sight in
1972 (when the injunction was granted) and that the authority of the judiciary
was unlikely to be at risk from journalistic articles, the restriction imposed
violated Article 10. As a result, the Contempt of Court Act 1981 was enacted,
clarifying the law on pre-trial publicity.100
The Court of Human Rights reached a different conclusion in Handyside v
United Kingdom (1976),101 in which a publication entitled The Little Red
Schoolbook had been seized under the Obscene Publications Act 1959. The
publishers claimed that the Obscene Publications Act represented a violation
of Article 10 in several respects. The Court ruled there was no breach of the
Convention. The ‘protection of morals’ clause in Article 10(2) entitled the
government to impose restrictions on freedom of expression, provided that
the restrictions were proportional to the aim pursued. It was for the Court to
decide whether the restrictions were necessary and sufficient. In this case, the
book was aimed at under 18 year olds and encouraged promiscuity.
Accordingly, there was no violation of Article 10.102
In Open Door Counselling and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland (1992), the Court
ruled that restrictions – an injunction – placed on the dissemination of any
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information regarding the availability of abortion advice and treatment
represented an unlawful restriction and was therefore contrary to Article 10.
ARTICLE 11
1 Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of
association with others, including the right to form and to join trades union
for the protection of his interests.
2 No restriction shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder
or crime, or the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition
of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the
armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.
The right to a peaceful assembly is more limited than a right to assemble.
Where a state seeks to regulate assemblies which are not peaceful – or unlikely
to be peaceful – no violation of the right occurs.
The right to join a trade union has been interpreted to incorporate the right
not to join a trades union. In Young, James and Webster (1981), the Court
interpreted Article 11 to mean that there is a measure of choice left to
individual workers whether or not to join a trade union.
Deprivation of the right to be a member of a trade union was considered
by the Court in Council of Civil Service Unions v United Kingdom (the GCHQ
case) (1985).103 It will be recalled that the Minister for the Civil Service, the
Prime Minister, had, following industrial unrest, by Order in Council ruled
that workers at Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) would
no longer be entitled to membership of a trade union. The ban was challenged
by judicial review proceedings, which were ultimately unsuccessful in the
House of Lords. The applicants argued that rights under Article 11 had been
infringed, and also rights under Article 13, which provides for an effective
domestic remedy. In answer, the government argued that the order was
justified, inter alia, under Article 11(2) on the basis of the protection of national
security. The Commission found a clear violation of Article 11. However, the
ban on union membership was justifiable under Article 11(2) and therefore
there was no violation of the Convention.
In Wilson v United Kingdom (2002), the Court of Human Rights held that
financial incentives offered by employers to employees in exchange for
employees giving up trade union protection for collective bargaining
purposes violated Article 11. The applicants had applied to industrial
tribunals, arguing that the requirement to sign contracts giving up their rights
was contrary to the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, section
23(1)(a). Those proceedings culminated in the House of Lords, which ruled
against them. The Court of Human Rights ruled that while the state was not
directly involved, the responsibility of the state was engaged where it failed to
secure to the applicants the rights conferred under Article 11.
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ARTICLE 12
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a
family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.
The right of transsexuals to marry has hitherto been denied by the Court of
Human Rights; see Rees v United Kingdom (1987) and Cossey v United Kingdom
(1992). In July 2002, however, in Goodwin v United Kingdom, the Court found
that English law, which prohibits transsexuals from marrying on the basis that
a person’s sex determines gender identity for marriage purposes and cannot
be changed, violated both Articles 8 (the right to privacy) and 12. The Court
ruled that the law placed transsexuals in a position where they could
‘experience feelings of vulnerability, humiliation and anxiety’ and that the
‘very essence of the Convention was respect for human dignity and human
freedom’. On the right to marry, the Court held that the matter could not be
left entirely within the state’s margin of appreciation and there was no
justification for barring transsexuals from the right to marry. In the earlier case
of B v France (1992), the Court had ruled that French law violated Article 8, in
that official documentation could not be altered, thereby causing the applicant
distress and humiliation.
The right to marry and found a family does not entail a right to a
termination of marriage by divorce. In Johnston v Ireland (1987), the applicant
claimed that his right under Article 12 was violated by the government
through its failure to provide for divorce in Ireland which would enable him
to marry and found a family with the woman with whom he was now living.
Challenges have been lodged by prisoners denied the right to marry by
virtue of their imprisonment. In Hamer v United Kingdom (1981) and Draper v
United Kingdom (1978), the Commission ruled that it was for the individual –
and not governments – to determine whether he or she would enter into
marriage. However, the right of prisoners to marry does not entail a right to
conjugal relations whilst in prison.104
ARTICLE 13
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity.
Article 13 imposes a duty on Member States to provide effective remedies for
any violation of the substantive rights protected by the Convention. Article 13
has been interpreted to mean that an effective remedy before a national
authority is guaranteed to ‘everyone who claims that his rights and freedoms
under the Convention have been violated’.105
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Judicial review106 provides an effective means by which to ensure that
government complies with the requirements of the law.107 In Klass v Federal
Republic of Germany (1978), the applicant argued, in relation to telephone
tapping, that there was no effective way in which to challenge the decision to
intercept communications and that the only method of control was through a
parliamentary committee. The Court adopted the doctrine of margin of
appreciation and ruled that under the circumstances – where national security
was involved – no better remedy could be given.
ARTICLE 14
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
Article 14 provides for non-discrimination in the enjoyment of the substantive
rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. There is not, therefore, a
right to non-discrimination per se but, rather, a right not to be discriminated
against in relation to any of the other rights and freedoms. Thus, Article 14
enjoys no independent existence; it is tied to other Articles in the
Convention.108 However, it is possible that a violation of Article 14 is found,
even where a claim that a breach of another Article has occurred fails. For
example, in Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali (1985), three foreign wives
residing in England complained that their husbands were not allowed to enter
into the country. The applicants alleged a violation of Articles 8 and 14. The
Court rejected the complaint concerning Article 8, adopting the view that the
right to family life does not entail the right to establish a home wheresoever
people choose. However, there was a violation of Article 14, in so far as the
rules provided easier conditions under which men could bring in their wives
than those which existed for wives trying to bring their husbands into the
country.109
ARTICLE 16
Nothing in Articles 10, 11 and 14 shall be regarded as preventing the High
Contracting Parties from imposing restrictions on the political activity of
aliens.
Article 16 affects all Articles in the Convention in so far as they relate to the
political activities of aliens. Article 16 does not mean that there can be no
violation of other substantive Articles in respect of aliens.
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ARTICLE 17
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State,
group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed
at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their
limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.
According to the Commission, the purpose of Article 17 is to:
... prevent totalitarian groups from exploiting in their own interests the
principle enunciated by the Convention ... Article 17 covers essentially those
rights which, if invoked, will facilitate the attempt to derive therefrom a right
to engage personally in activities aimed at the destruction of any of the rights
and freedoms set forth in the Convention.110
Accordingly, convictions before a domestic court – as in the case of
Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v Netherlands (1982) – for possessing racially
discriminatory literature was not a violation of Article 10. The conviction was
justified both by Article 10(2) and by Article 17 of the Convention.
The Convention protocols
In addition to the substantive Articles of the Convention, there exists a series
of nine Protocols on matters ranging from the right to peaceful enjoyment of
possessions (First Protocol, Article 1), education (First Protocol, Article 2), the
holding of regular free elections (First Protocol, Article 3), freedom of
movement (Fourth Protocol), abolition of the death penalty (Sixth Protocol),
the rights of aliens and sexual equality (Seventh Protocol), procedural matters
under the Convention (Ninth Protocol) and minority rights (Tenth Protocol).
The United Kingdom is not a party to the Fourth, Sixth or Seventh Protocols.
In relation to Article 2 of the First Protocol, the government has entered a
reservation to the effect that the rights of parents to determine the education
of their children are respected in the United Kingdom only to the extent that
such respect is compatible with the requirements of the Education Acts.111
PART B: THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998
The incorporation of Convention rights into domestic law under the 1998 Act
puts an end, finally, to the debate over whether or not to incorporate, which
had endured for decades. That long-running debate focused on three principal
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concerns, namely the criticism that the Convention is outdated and not
tailored specifically to British conditions; that the judiciary was ill equipped to
assume the mantle of guardian of individual rights in the face of executive
power and the concept of parliamentary sovereignty;112 and concerns over
the manner in which ‘incorporation’ would affect the conventional balance of
power between judges and parliament. There was also the (unconvincing and
political) argument that the House of Commons, as the democratically-elected
representative of the people, was best equipped to respond to the better
protection of rights.
The Act provides a charter of rights now enforceable before the domestic
courts. The effect of the Act is such that three avenues for challenging public
bodies arise. First, a failure to comply with Convention rights now forms the
basis for legal action; secondly, a new ground for judicial review has been
introduced, namely the failure to comply with the Convention; and, thirdly,
Convention rights may be used as a defence against actions brought by public
bodies against private bodies or individuals.
However, the manner in which the Act is drafted raises a number of issues
which give rise to some difficulties. These may be summarised as being:
• the meaning of ‘public authorities’ for the purposes of the Act;
• whether the Act has solely ‘vertical’ effect – binding only those bodies for
which the state is accountable to Strasbourg – or is capable of also having
‘horizontal’ effect, and being enforceable against bodies for which the state
is not accountable to Strasbourg;
• the extent to which judicial interpretative techniques relating to statutes
will change, and the extent to which the judges will develop the common
law to give effect to Convention rights.
As discussed in Chapter 7, under the constitution of the United Kingdom, and
consistent with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, legislation cannot
be entrenched. That is to say, it cannot be given a ‘special’ or ‘higher’ status
than other Acts of Parliament. This traditional doctrine has been preserved in
relation to the Human Rights Act. In its White Paper, the government
announced that it did not intend to permit the courts to strike down Acts of
Parliament, whether that legislation preceded the Act or was introduced
subsequently. Thereby, parliament’s sovereignty and, to the extent possible,
the separation of powers, is preserved. The Convention, in the government’s
view, is ‘intended to provide a new basis for judicial interpretation of all
legislation, not a basis for striking down any part of it’.113 However, the courts
are given power over delegated, or secondary, legislation. Unless the parent
Act stipulates that the courts do not have power to invalidate a piece of
secondary legislation, its validity will depend on the court’s interpretation of
its compatibility with the Convention. 
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Accordingly, section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires that
primary and secondary legislation, whenever enacted, must be interpreted
and applied in a manner consistent with Convention rights. However, section
3(2) makes it clear that this requirement does not affect the validity,
continuing operation or enforcement of any incompatible primary legislation,
and does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of
incompatible subordinate legislation, if the primary legislation prevents
removal of the incompatibility.
Declarations of incompatibility are regulated under section 4, which
provides that, if a court is satisfied that a provision of primary or subordinate
legislation is incompatible with one or more Convention rights, it may make a
declaration of incompatibility. The courts with the jurisdiction to make
declarations of incompatibility are the House of Lords, the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council, the Courts-Martial Appeal Court; in Scotland, the High
Court of Justiciary, sitting as a court of criminal appeal, or the Court of
Session; and, in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the High Court or
Court of Appeal. Section 4(6), however, contains a vital limitation, in that a
declaration of incompatibility does not affect the validity, continuing
operation or enforcement of the provision in question, and is not binding on
the parties to the proceedings in which it is made. 
As is evident from section 4, it is only the superior courts which have
jurisdiction to make declarations of incompatibility and, further, a declaration
of incompatibility, as emphasised in sub-section (6)(a) and (b), the declaration
will have no effect on the validity of the primary legislation in question, nor
will the declaration affect the legal position of the parties to the litigation.
However, where the court finds a violation of a Convention right, it has the
power under section 8 to grant a remedy to the victim. See further below. The
power to amend the law has thereby been preserved for parliament, although
a fast track legislative procedure, discussed below, will be employed to
facilitate rapid parliamentary action in relation to the declaration.114
The definition of primary legislation is provided in section 21 of the
Human Rights Act 1998, which in part provides that primary legislation
includes any ‘public general Act, local and personal Act, private Act ... and
Order in Council made in exercise of Her Majesty’s Royal Prerogative’. It was
seen in Chapter 6 that Acts of Parliament have always been deemed to have
superior force to acts of the prerogative,115 and that where a claimed
prerogative power is held to exist, if it is not expressly overruled by statute, it
will be held to be ‘in abeyance’ and the statute will prevail. The Human Rights
Act 1998, however, appears to elevate Orders in Council to the same status as
Acts of Parliament, thereby making them immune from invalidation by the
courts. Accordingly, whereas the courts may set aside secondary legislation
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which is incompatible with the Convention – unless the parent Act makes this
impossible – Orders in Council regulating the exercise of the prerogative may
not be so set aside.116
The meaning of public authorities
The Human Rights Act 1998 provides that public authorities exercising
executive powers must comply with the requirements of the Convention. As
the White Paper stated:
Although the United Kingdom has an international obligation to comply with
the Convention, there at present is no requirement in our domestic law on
central or local government, or others exercising similar executive powers, to
exercise those powers in a way which is compatible with the Convention. This
Bill will change that by making it unlawful for public authorities to act in a
way which is incompatible with the Convention rights. [Rights Brought Home,
paragraph 2.2]
The European Convention imposes responsibilities on signatory states to
protect rights, and as such it is the state which is the defendant in allegations
of Convention violations before the Court of Human Rights. The state bears
liability for the failure of its agencies to protect rights. The emphasis on public
bodies/authorities under the Human Rights Act reflects this now traditional
form of state liability.117
Section 6(3)(b) of the Act provides that a public authority includes ‘any
person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature’. The test,
therefore is not state ownership, funding or control per se but rather the
functions which a body performs. The position is complicated by section 6(5)
which provides that a person is not a public authority (applying the functions
test) ‘if the nature of the act is private’. Accordingly, the Act recognises that
some authorities may, notwithstanding their ownership or control or funding
by the state, be public on the functions test, but will not be treated as public
bodies in relation to some actions which are deemed to be private. An
example given in debate was that of Railtrack, which is a public authority
when exercising its function as a safety regulator, but acts privately in its role
as property developer.118 The Home Secretary in debate stated that the British
Broadcasting Corporation is a public authority but that independent television
companies are not, whilst the Independent Television Commission is.119
The definition of a ‘public body’ was considered by the Court of Appeal in
R (Heather and Another) v Leonard Cheshire Foundation (2002). The Foundation is
a private charity which provides accommodation for the disabled, some of
which is funded by the local authority pursuant to its statutory duty under the
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National Assistance Act 1948, as amended. The court made it clear that
residents of the home funded by the local authority could rely on their
Convention rights against the authority but not against the charity, since it
was not exercising public functions. Aside from the funding being provided
by the state, there was no other evidence ‘of there being a public flavour to the
functions of the foundation or the foundation itself. The foundation was not
standing in the shoes of the local authorities’.120 Compare Aston Cantlow and
Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank (2001), in which the
Court of Appeal ruled that a Parochial Church Council which had statutory
duties to enforce parish church repairs was a public authority for the purposes
of the Human Rights Act. The Court ruled that its enforcement powers
amounted, inter alia, to a distinctive form of taxation and did not meet the
requirements of Article 1 of the First Protocol. 
However, the classification of bodies (public or private) does not exhaust
the potential for the Act to develop the protection of Human Rights, because
the courts themselves are public authorities and are under a statutory duty to
give effect to Convention rights, and this raises the question of whether the
Act has solely ‘vertical effect’ or is capable of having ‘horizontal effect’. Section 6
of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides that a public authority includes a
court or tribunal,121 and proceedings against a ‘judicial act’ may be brought
by way of appeal or by an application for judicial review. Section 6
accordingly requires that the courts act compatibility with Convention rights,
and does not limit that duty to either the interpretation of statutes or to the
actions of public bodies. In respect of the common law the Lord Chancellor in
debate stated that:
... it is right as a matter of principle for the courts to have the duty of acting
compatibly with the Convention not only in cases involving other public
authorities but also in developing the common law in deciding cases between
individuals. Why should they not?122
In Professor HWR Wade’s view, which is controversial, this is ‘a clear
statement in favour of horizontal effect’. Arguing for horizontality, Wade
continues that it ‘... will eliminate such problems [as to the definition of public
authorities] altogether, since Convention rights will take effect against public
bodies and private persons equally, thus saving a great deal of litigation’
(2000, p 223). In Murray Hunt’s analysis (1998), the issue is not so clear-cut,
nor a choice between a purely vertical or purely horizontal approach, but
rather that there is a spectrum of positions between the two extremes, the
essential question being where along this line of possible positions the courts
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will set the standard. It is clear from section 6 that the Act does not intend
directly to confer enforceable Convention rights between two private parties:
direct horizontal effect is thereby precluded. However, the duty on the courts,
under section 6(3)(a), tends to the conclusion that indirect horizontal effect is
possible.123 The manner in which the courts are dealing with this issue is
illustrated by recent case law. 
The interpretative duty: section 3
In the exercise of the interpretative duty under section 3 of the Human Rights
Act 1998, the courts have rapidly adapted to the approach of the Court of
Human Rights in employing the concepts of proportionality and necessity,
which give greater scope for the protection of rights than the conventional
concepts employed in judicial review under the umbrella of the Wednesbury124
unreasonableness test, which spans ‘illegality, impropriety and procedural
irregularity’. Even before the Human Rights Act 1998 came into effect, the
courts were developing a more vigorous approach to the protection of rights.
In R v Ministry of Defence ex parte Smith (1996), it was recognised that in judicial
review proceedings, where human rights were in issue, the courts should
‘anxiously scrutinise’ executive decisions. That approach, however, did not
satisfy the interpretative duty according to Lord Steyn in R (Daly) v Secretary of
State for the Home Department (2001), in which he stated that while there was an
overlap between the traditional Wednesbury grounds for review and the
proportionality approach, there was nevertheless ‘a material difference
between the Wednesbury and Smith grounds of review and the approach of
proportionality applicable in respect of review where Convention rights are at
stake’.
Convention rights, section 3 and statute125
Section 3 of the Human Rights Act requires the courts to interpret primary
and subordinate legislation in a way which is compatible with Convention
rights, ‘so far as it is possible to do so’.126 The House of Lords in R v A
(Complainant’s Sexual History) (2001)127 gave guidance as to the correct
approach. At issue was whether the statutory restrictions on the admissibility
of evidence prejudiced the right to fair trial.128 The Court ruled that it first had
to consider whether a legislative provision interfered with a Convention right.
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If there was an interference, then the court had to look at the legislative
purpose of the provision and employ the concept of proportionality. Three
issues had to be considered:
• First, was the legislative objective sufficiently important to justify limiting
a fundamental right?
• Secondly, were the measures adopted to meet that objective rationally
connected to it?
• Thirdly, the court must be satisfied that the means used to impair the right
or freedom were no more than necessary to accomplish the objective (the
proportionality test). 
Section 3 of the Human Rights Act ‘went further than requiring the court to
take the Convention into account: the court had a duty to strive to find a
possible interpretation compatible with Convention rights’. Lord Steyn stated
that this might even require the courts ‘to adopt an interpretation which may
appear linguistically strained’.129
Moreover, the courts could imply a right to appeal where Convention
rights demanded such a course of action. For example, in R v Lichnial; R v
Pyrah (2001), the Court of Appeal ruled that although there was no right to
appeal against a sentence that was fixed by law, the court nevertheless had
jurisdiction under section 3(1) of the 1998 Act to hear such an appeal if the
statutory provision which required the imposition of such a sentence was
incompatible with the Convention. A mandatory life sentence imposed on
conviction of murder in accordance with section 1(1) of the Murder (Abolition
of Death Penalty) Act 1965 was not incompatible with Articles 3 and 5 of the
Convention.
The limits of interpretation
Strive as the judges may to interpret statutes compatibly, there are limits. First,
it is clear that the 1998 Act is not retrospective. For example, in R v Kensal (No
2) (2001), the House of Lords ruled that it should follow its previous decision
notwithstanding that a majority of the House now believed the precedent case
to have been wrongly decided. Note, however, that this case involved a pre-
Human Rights Act precedent. The respondent had answered questions under
compulsion, and was convicted under the Theft Act 1968 and Insolvency Act
1986. The case was referred back to the Court of Appeal by the Criminal Cases
Review Commission on the basis that, following the passing of the 1998 Act,
there was a real possibility that the admission of evidence acquired under
compulsion was a breach of Article 6. Lord Slynn was not ‘persuaded’ that the
precedent relied on in Lambert (2001) was wrong. If parliament had intended
convictions valid before the Act came into force to be re-opened on the basis
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of rights conferred by the 1998 Act, it would have said so clearly. By section
22(4) of the Act, section 7 applies to proceedings ‘brought by or at the
instigation of a public authority whenever the act in question took place; but
otherwise that subsection does not apply to an act taking place before the
coming into force of that section’. Lord Lloyd stated that there was no doubt
that Lambert decided that the 1998 Act was retrospective in respect of
proceedings brought by or at the instigation of a public authority, but not in
respect of appeals in those proceedings. The House of Lords (sitting as a panel
of five judges) in Kensal was divided on whether Lambert was correctly
decided. However, the reasons advanced for departing from Lambert ‘fell
short of the sort of compelling considerations necessary to justify their
Lordships departing from so recent a decision’. Lord Hutton stated that ‘there
were strong reasons of policy, grounded in the need for certainty in the law
and finality in litigation, why a conviction which was valid and lawful at the
time it took place should not be set aside because of a change in the
substantive law brought about by legislation’.
In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Mahmood (Amjad)
(2001), the Court of Appeal also considered the question of the effect of the
Human Rights Act 1998 on decisions taken before the date of its
implementation which came into effect after its implementation. The Court
ruled that while it was not required to judge the decision by reference to its
conformity with the affected individual’s fundamental rights by regarding
them as incorporated into domestic law, nevertheless, the court, in reaching a
decision in public law involving a fundamental right before the date of
implementation of the 1998 Act, should require the decision maker to
demonstrate that his proposed action did not interfere with the right, or if it
did, that ‘considerations existed which might reasonably be accepted as
amounting to a substantial objective justification for the interference’.130
In Pearce v Governing Body of Mayfield School (2001), the Court of Appeal
considered the issue of gender orientation in relation to discrimination under
the Human Rights Act 1998. Disruptive pupils abused a lesbian teacher at the
school in the early 1990s. Such conduct was not discriminatory under the Sex
Discrimination Act 1975. Since the Human Rights Act was not in force at the
time of the conduct in question, the applicant could not seek compensation
under that Act.
In Secretary of State for the Home Department v Wainwright and Another
(2002), the Court of Appeal affirmed that there was no tort of invasion of
privacy at common law, and that because the conduct complained of occurred
in 1997, before the Human Rights Act came into force, section 3(1) of the Act
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did not apply to introduce a right to privacy retrospectively. Mrs Wainwright
and her son had been strip-searched by prison officers,131 having been told
that they were under suspicion of bringing drugs into the prison when
visiting an inmate. They consented to the searches. The county court judge
ruled that the tort of trespass to the person had been committed and awarded
damages. The claimants relied on section 3 of the 1998 Act, arguing that once
the Act was in force the court had the duty to comply with it even though the
matters complained of took place before the Act came into force.132 The Lord
Chief Justice stated that the 1998 Act could not change substantive law by
introducing a retrospective right to privacy which did not exist at common
law. 
The second limitation lies in the distinction between legitimate
interpretation and the ‘redrafting’ of statutes. For example, in In re W and B
(Children: Care Plan) (2002), the Court of Appeal considered the interpretive
duty and held that the duties of local authorities under the Children Act 1989
should be subject to a system of ‘starred milestones’ which required
authorities to implement care plans within time limits. No such provision had
been made by parliament in the Children Act. Lord Nicholls ruled that section
3 of the 1998 Act maintained the constitutional boundary between
interpretation by the courts and the enactment and amendment of statutes by
parliament, and that an interpretation of an Act which departed from an
essential feature of an Act of Parliament was likely to have crossed the
boundary. Here, parliament had entrusted local authorities with responsibility
for looking after children in care. The House of Lords ruled that the Court of
Appeal’s interpretation went beyond the boundary of interpretation and
exceeded its judicial jurisdiction.
In R v Saunders, Parnes, Ronson and Lyons (2002), the Court of Human
Rights had ruled that there had been a violation of Article 6.133 Article 46 of
the Convention provides that states undertake to abide by the final judgment
of the Court of Human Rights. On a reference from the Criminal Cases
Review Commission, the Court of Appeal ruled that it could not set aside the
convictions as being unsafe because the procedures were expressly permitted
by parliament (under section 434 of the Companies Act 1985). Section 3, per
Lord Woolf CJ, does not authorise the judges to legislate, but only to interpret
in order to render a statutory provision consistent with Convention rights.134
However, although the line between legislating and interpreting may appear
to be fine, it is nevertheless understood by the judges. 
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Convention rights, interpretation and common law
While section 3 does not refer to common law, as seen above, the Act requires
that the common law be developed consistently with Convention rights, and
section 6, which includes courts and tribunals as public bodies, underpins the
jurisdiction. Development of the common law has been seen most clearly in
relation to privacy, which engages three issues. First, there is no common law
right to privacy: as Glidewell LJ stated in Kaye v Robertson (1991), ‘It is well-
known that in English law there is no right to privacy’. Secondly, privacy
rights under common law derive from a relationship of confidence and breach
of that confidentiality. Thirdly, Article 8 protects privacy rights in relation to
family life, the home and correspondence. In Venables v News Group
Newspapers Ltd (2001), an injunction was granted which prevents, indefinitely,
the media from revealing the identity and whereabouts of the applicant.
Butler-Sloss LJ recognised that the defendant newspapers were not within the
definition of public authorities, but nevertheless asserted that the court – as a
public authority – must itself act compatibly with the Convention. Article 8 of
the Convention thus prevailed over Article 10 (freedom of expression) and
was applied against a private body. Similarly, in Campbell v MGN Ltd (2002),
the High Court developed the law of breach of confidence in a manner which
restricted the press from unauthorised disclosure of details of treatment
undertaken by the model Naomi Campbell and awarded her damages,
thereby in all but name recognising a right to privacy which is enforceable
against non-public bodies. On this, see further Chapter 20.
It is already clear from the early case law that the doctrines of
proportionality and necessity have been accepted as judicial tools for the
enforcement of Convention rights. In R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department (2001), for example, in the House of Lords, in declaring the prison
policy of requiring prisoners to leave their cells for the purpose of searches,
including the search of privileged legal correspondence, unlawful, Lord
Bingham of Cornhill stated that his conclusions had been reached ‘on an
orthodox application of common law principles’ but stated that the same
result would yield by reliance on the Convention. However, he recognised
that this coincidence between common law and Convention might not always
occur. Lord Steyn was more explicit regarding the requirements of
proportionality. Citing Lord Clyde in de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing (1999), Lord Steyn declared
that the criteria to be applied are ‘more precise and more sophisticated than
the traditional grounds of review’, and that under the proportionality
approach, ‘... the intensity of review is somewhat greater’. Where there has
been an infringement of a right, it must be established that the limitation of
the right ‘was necessary in a democratic society, in the sense of meeting a
pressing social need, and the question whether the interference was really
proportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued’.
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Section 5 of the Human Rights Act
Section 5 of the Human Rights Act 1998 confers the right on a minister to be
heard. The purpose of section 5(2) was to ensure that the appropriate minister
had an opportunity to address the court on the objects and purposes of the
legislation in question and any other matters which might be relevant. In R v
A (Joinder of Appropriate Minister) (2001), the House of Lords ruled that where
an issue was raised in criminal proceedings which might lead to the House of
Lords considering making a declaration of compatibility, it was appropriate to
join the Crown in advance of the appeal hearing. Where the Crown was
already represented by the Director of Public Prosecutions, his role as
prosecutor was different from that of a government minister in the discharge
of executive responsibilities. The House granted the application for joinder
made by the Home Secretary, who bore responsibility for promotion of the
legislation in question. 
Declarations of incompatibility
As has been noted above, where the superior courts135 are unable to interpret
statutes in a manner which makes them compatible with Convention rights, a
declaration of incompatibility may be issued. This puts the government and
parliament ‘on notice’ that the statute requires amendment. 
A declaration of incompatibility was made by the Court of Appeal in R (H)
v Mental Health Review Tribunal, North and East London Region and Another
(2001). At issue was Article 5 of the Convention, which guarantees the right to
liberty and the right to take proceedings to determine the lawfulness of
detention. The applicant was detained under the Mental Health Act 1983,
section 73 of which provides, inter alia, that in order to satisfy a mental health
review tribunal that he was entitled to discharge, the burden of proof fell on
the restricted person to show that he was no longer suffering from a mental
disorder warranting detention. Section 73 could not be given an interpretation
which was compatible with the Convention.
In Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) (2001), the Court of Appeal made a
declaration of incompatibility under section 4(2) in relation to section 127(3) of
the Consumer Credit Act 1974. Section 127(3) of the 1974 Act contained an
inflexible prohibition against the making of an enforcement order in a case
where a loan agreement signed by the debtor did not include the prescribed
terms. That prohibition meant that there could be no fair and public hearing
by an independent and impartial tribunal and excluded a judicial remedy. The
exclusion of any remedy engaged not only Article 6 but also Article 1 of the
First Protocol, which requires a balance to be struck between the rights of an
individual to enjoy possessions and the public and general interest. The
inflexible prohibition was unnecessary and disproportionate. 
639
135 The High Court and above.
In Matthews v Ministry of Defence (2002), the Queen’s Bench Division ruled
that the Crown’s immunity from action in respect of claims by members of the
Armed Forces under section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 was
incompatible with Article 6 of the Convention.136 The ‘all-embracing nature of
section 10 meant that it was not rationally connected to the limited objective it
was intended to achieve, and the limitation placed on the right of access to the
courts was more than reasonably necessary to accomplish that objective’.
Section 10 did not satisfy the test of proportionality. It could not be interpreted
in such a way as to make it compatible with Convention rights. 
Compare R (Alconbury Developments Ltd and Others) v Secretary of State for
Environment, Transport and Regions (2001), where the House of Lords ruled that
the Secretary of State’s power to make decisions on planning applications was
not incompatible with Article 6. Such decisions were subject to judicial review
which ensured compatibility of the overall procedures. The decision overturns
that of the High Court, which had ruled that the processes by which the
Secretary of State made decisions relating to planning matters137 were
incompatible with Article 6(1) of the Convention.138 The minister’s powers,
the High Court ruled, conflicted with the requirements of an independent and
impartial tribunal because the minister was also responsible for the formation
of planning policy.
Making an application under the Act
Section 7(3) of the Act provides that an individual may make an application to
the courts if, and only if, he or she ‘is, or would be, a victim of an unlawful
act’. A person claiming that a public authority has acted, or proposes to act, in
a way made unlawful by section 6(1) may bring proceedings against the
authority, or may rely on the Convention right concerned in any legal
proceedings. In relation to judicial review proceedings, the victim test is also
applied, giving a narrower meaning to ‘sufficient interest’ (or ‘standing’) than
that applied under other judicial review proceedings. 
The definition of standing follows the approach of the Court of Human
Rights. A victim or potential victim has standing, as does a person who, while
not the immediate victim of an alleged violation, is nevertheless affected. An
example is a family member of a person deported or threatened with
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deportation where this violates the Article 8 right to family life. The position
of third parties who are not directly affect is more complex and gives rise to
differing tests to be applied depending on the type of proceedings being
brought. The sufficient interest – or standing – requirements in judicial review
proceedings allow ‘public interest’ organisations to bring proceedings. Help
the Aged, the Child Poverty Action Group and the Joint Council for the
Welfare of Immigrants have all been taken to have standing.139 Standing for
the purposes of the Human Rights Act, however, excludes interest groups
unless they can establish that their members are actual or potential victims.
Interest groups whose members are not victims, but who have special
expertise in an area (for example, environmental groups such as Greenpeace
or Friends of the Earth), will not have standing. They will, however, be
permitted to make submissions to the court on matters within their expertise.
In debate, the Lord Chancellor, referring the practice before the Court of
Human Rights, stated that ‘... our courts will be ready to permit amicus written
briefs from non-governmental organisation; that is to say briefs, but not to
treat them as full parties’, and further that ‘... I dare say that the courts will be
equally hospitable to oral interventions, provided that they are brief’.140
Proceedings must be brought within one year of the date on which the act
complained of took place, but this limit may be extended by the court if it
considers it ‘equitable’, having regard to any stricter time limit imposed on the
proceedings in question (section 7(5) of the Act). ‘Legal proceedings’ is
defined to mean proceedings brought by a public authority and appeals
against the decision of a court or tribunal (section 7(6)).
Remedies 
Article 13 of the Convention, which provides that everyone shall have an
effective remedy before a national authority, has not been incorporated.
Instead, section 8 of the Human Rights Act regulates remedies. Section 8
provides that, where a court finds that a public authority has acted
unlawfully, it may grant ‘such relief or remedy, or make such order within its
jurisdiction as it considers just and appropriate’. Accordingly, courts and
tribunals may only award a remedy which is within their statutory powers.
Damages may only be awarded by a court which has power to award
damages or to order the payment of compensation in civil proceedings, and
no award of damages is to be made unless, taking into account all the
circumstances of the case and any other relief or remedy available, the court is
satisfied that the award is necessary to afford just satisfaction to the
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complainant. The court must take into account the principles applied by the
Court of Human Rights in relation to the award of compensation under
Article 41. However, the full range of remedies – declarations, injunctions and
the prerogative orders of certiorari (quashing orders), mandamus (mandatory
orders) and prohibition (prohibitory orders) – are also available to those courts
and tribunals with the power to grant them. 
One question which arises is the issue whether or not section 8 provides an
adequate remedy according to the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights.141 The courts are under a duty, under section 2, to take into
account the case law developed in Strasbourg. Accordingly, there is the
potential for considerable case law on the relationship between section 8 of the
Human Rights Act 1998 and Article 13 of the Convention.
The adequacy of judicial review as a remedy was considered by the Court
of Human Rights in Kingsley v United Kingdom (2002). There, the Gaming
Board had revoked the applicant’s licence. Seeking leave to apply for judicial
review, the applicant claimed that the Board was biased against him. The
High Court ruled, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, that even if there had
been some form of bias, the decision on the licence had to be taken by the
Board because there was no other body with jurisdiction to make the decision,
and that as efforts had been made to minimise the effect of any potential bias,
the decision could not be impugned for bias. The Court of Human Rights
ruled that the Gaming Board did not present the ‘necessary appearance of
impartiality’ and that ‘the subsequent judicial review was not sufficiently
broad to remedy that defect’. The clear implication of this decision is that since
judicial review is concerned with the procedural correctness of decision
making, rather than the merits of the decision itself, where there is no
alternative decision maker which satisfies the requirements of impartiality
and independence under Article 6, judicial review cannot be regarded as an
adequate remedy. As discussed in Chapter 25, however, it should be noted
that the courts are developing judicial review in a manner which appears to
extend its scope beyond the traditional pre-Human Rights Act limitations. 
Ensuring legislative conformity with Convention rights 
Ensuring that domestic legislation conforms to Convention requirements
involves two procedures. The first relates to the enactment of legislation
generally, and the second relates to legislative action taken after a declaration
of incompatibility has been issued by the courts. 
In relation to non-remedial legislation, the Act provides for declarations to
be made to parliament that the proposed legislation conforms to Convention
requirements. Section 19 requires that a minister in charge of a Bill in either
House of Parliament must, before second reading, make a statement either to
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the effect that a Bill does comply with Convention rights or that, although
such a statement cannot be made, the government nevertheless wishes to
proceed with the Bill.
In relation to remedial legislation, the courts are not given the power
under the Act to invalidate or set aside primary legislation which is
incompatible with Convention rights. Instead, the power to reform the law is
preserved for the executive and parliament. The Act introduces a special
legislative procedure for reform. While this mechanism preserves the
principle that it is parliament, as the democratically elected legislature, which
is sovereign in making and reforming law, it also opens the door to the
possibility that governments of differing political persuasions may react with
greater or lesser enthusiasm to declarations of incompatibility. The extent to
which successive governments respond to the ruling of the courts thus lies in
the moral rather than legal authority of the Convention. 
The fast track legislative procedure
Where a higher court142 makes a declaration of incompatibility, or where the
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg declares that the Convention has been
violated, the relevant government minister will have power to enact
amending legislation by Order in Council (a ‘remedial order’). Other than
where it is necessary for the Order to have immediate effect, the Order will be
subject to the approval of both Houses of Parliament, and will only come into
effect once approval has been secured. Section 10 and Schedule 2 regulate
remedial action and remedial orders. 
Section 10, which was considerably amended in Standing Committee in
the House of Commons, provides for the amendment of legislation to make it
compatible with Convention rights. The remedial procedure can be used
either following a declaration of incompatibility or in response to a decision of
the European Court of Human Rights, whether or not the decision in question
related to United Kingdom law. Two procedures are provided for. Under the
standard procedure,143 a draft of the order must be laid before parliament for
a 60 day period before it is approved by resolution of each House. When
laying the draft instrument, the minister must also provide the ‘required
information’, which entails an explanation of:
... the incompatibility which the proposed order seeks to remove, including
particulars of the court declaration, finding or order which caused the minister
to propose a remedial order; and a statement of the reasons for proceeding
under section 10 and for making an order in the terms proposed.144
During the period in which the draft is laid before parliament, representations
may be made to the minister, either by parliament or by any other person. If
142 As interpreted by the Human Rights Act 1998, s 6.
143 Ibid, Sched 2.
144 Ibid, Sched 2, para 3.
representations are made, the draft must be accompanied by a statement
containing a summary of the representations and details of any changes
introduced into the proposed order as a result of the representations.145
Section 10 and Schedule 2 also provide that, if a minister considers that there
are compelling reasons, he may make such amendments to legislation as he
considers necessary to remove the incompatibility, by means of a statutory
instrument. The power applies to both primary and subordinate legislation. In
debate on the Bill, the Lord Chancellor stated that, ‘if legislation has been
declared to be incompatible, a prompt parliamentary remedy should be
available’.146
Derogations and reservations
The Human Rights Act 1998 makes provision for derogations and
reservations. Sections 14 to 17 regulate designations and reservations. Section
14, in part, provides that the Secretary of State has the power to make
‘designation orders’ in anticipation of a proposed derogation from
Convention Articles.147 Following the terrorist attacks in the United States of
America in September 2001, the Home Secretary made an Order148 regarding
derogation from Article 5(1) of the Convention, which guarantees the right to
liberty. The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 provides for an
extended power of arrest and detention in relation to foreign nationals who
have been certified by the Secretary of State as a risk to national security and a
suspected international terrorist.149 This measure is regarded as one which is
‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’. The measure is initially in
force for a 15 month period, after which it expires unless renewed by
parliament. Thereafter it will be subject to annual renewal by parliament. The
derogation was necessitated by the Court of Human Rights’ ruling that
detention with a view to deportation is not permissible save where
deportation proceedings are conducted with ‘due diligence’ and without
undue delay.150 Considering that the extended powers are incompatible with
obligations under Article 5(1), the government decided to derogate until
further notice.
In relation to reservations, section 15 provides in part that:
(1) In this Act, ‘designated reservation’ means:
(a) the United Kingdom’s reservation to Article 2 of the first protocol to
the Convention [the right to education in conformity with parents’
religious and philosophical convictions]; and
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(b) any other reservation by the United Kingdom to an Article of the
Convention or of any protocol to the Convention, which is designated
for the purposes of this Act in an order made by the Secretary of State.
Case law under the Human Rights Act 1998
While there have been few declarations of incompatibility, there have been
numerous challenges under the 1998 Act, both successful and unsuccessful.
‘Catalogues’ of cases briefly digested are inherently unsatisfactory. It is,
however, important to appreciate the scope of the Act as applied in its early
years.
Article 2: the right to life
A court making a declaration of lawful withdrawal of treatment in a case
where a patient was in a permanent vegetative state does not infringe the
right to life. The Court applied the principle established in Airedale National
Health Trust v Bland (1993) in NHS Trust A v M; NHS Trust B v H (2001). In the
high profile case of Diane Pretty, the victim of motor neurone disease who
was paralysed, the House of Lords ruled, inter alia, that Article 2 was directed
towards protecting the sanctity of life and did not entail a right to terminate
one’s own life.151 Where there was a serious risk to life to former soldiers
through their giving evidence before a tribunal enquiring into the shootings in
Northern Ireland on ‘Bloody Sunday’, the Court of Appeal ruled that the
evidence should be given elsewhere.152
Article 3: freedom from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment
Article 3 to date has given rise to challenges against prison conditions and the
imposition of a life sentence on a mentally ill offender. In Napier v The Scottish
Ministers (2001), the Court of Session ruled that Article 3 was violated by the
conditions in prisons. The court ordered the executive to transfer the applicant
to conditions of detention which complied with Article 3. There was no
infringement of Article 3 or 5 through the imposition of a life sentence on a
mentally ill offender rather than the making of a hospital order. The Court of
Appeal (following the approach taken in R v Offen, below) so held in R v Drew
(2002), in which the offender presented a serious and continuing danger to the
safety of the public and a hospital order would not have ensured adequate
security.
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Article 5: the right to liberty
Article 5 has been employed to test the compatibility of an automatic life
sentence imposed on a defendant who had committed two serious offences
and the Court of Appeal ruled that if the offender was a significant risk to the
public the court could impose a life sentence under section 2 without
contravening the Convention.153 In Anderson and Others v Scottish Ministers
(2001), the Privy Council ruled that the continued detention of mental patients
on grounds of public safety did not infringe Article 5 of the Convention, even
where there was no medical treatment for the condition. The House of Lords
in R v Leeds Crown Court ex parte Wardle (2001) ruled that continued detention
in custody where the accused was charged with a second offence while in
custody on the first charge did not infringe the Convention. The fresh time
limit was justified by the need to give the prosecutor sufficient time to prepare
the evidence relating to each offence.
In Regina (C) v Mental Health Review Tribunal (2001) the Court of Appeal
ruled that the listing of all hearings by the Mental Health Review Tribunal in a
uniform specified period after a request for review had been made was
unlawful in that it did not ensure that individual applications were heard as
soon as reasonably practicable. 
In In re K (A Child) (Secure Accommodation Order: Right to Liberty) (2000) the
Court of Appeal ruled that a secure accommodation order, while a
deprivation of liberty, was justified as ‘being detention of a minor by lawful
order for the purpose of educational supervision’ under Article 5(1)(d). 
Article 6: the right to fair trial
As expected, Article 6 has generated a wealth of case law. It is clear that the
courts are following the approach of the Court of Human Rights in looking
less at detailed irregularities in trial procedures and more to the overall
fairness of the criminal process. Where there are alleged defects in the process,
the courts will only rule that a violation of Article 6 has occurred where the
cumulative effect is to render the trial unfair. Furthermore, where there are
defects identified, if these are remedied by the appeal process, or through
judicial review proceedings, then the courts will be slow to find a violation of
Convention rights. On a general point of principle, the Court of Appeal stated
that the law had ‘moved on and had received a decisive impetus towards a
more case-specific approach with the advent of human rights’.154 Article 6
comprises a number of rights relating to differing aspects of judicial decision
making. Issues considered under the Human Rights Act include the
following.
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Disclosure of informants’ identity
When considering whether to disclose whether a person was a police
informer, the court had to balance the need to protect the informer and the
requirements of fair trial. The court would not be constrained by precedent
which identified possible exceptions to the rule of non-disclosure.155
Substantive issues and Article 6 protection
Article 6 does not apply where a prisoner serving a mandatory life sentence is
accused of breaching prison rules. That is not a criminal charge and therefore
the guarantees of Article 6 do not apply.156 Also, Article 6 does not apply to
proceedings relating to an accused’s fitness to plead.157 The applicants had
argued that Article 6 applied because it was unfair to try someone under a
disability which prevented him from participating in proceedings because of a
mental handicap. The Court of Appeal stated that the proceedings could not
result in a conviction and therefore the argument failed. 
Child law and the powers and duties of local authorities in relation to
housing law have also given rise to challenges. The Court of Appeal has held
that secure accommodation orders against children, although not criminal
proceedings, attracted rights to fair trial.158
Temporary judges
Article 6 was also invoked in Millar v Dickson, Payne v Heywood, Stewart v Same
and Tracey v Same (2001). There, the defendants were tried by temporary
sheriffs. The decision follows that of Starrs v Ruxton (2000), where it was held
that temporary sheriffs were not an independent and impartial tribunal
within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. The right to fair trial was of
the utmost importance to citizens. By continuing prosecution of the accused
before temporary sheriffs, the Lord Advocate had violated the right of the
accused to the protection of Article 6. 
The position of the Lord Chancellor has again come under question, most
particularly in relation to the judicial appointments system. In Starrs v
Procurator Fiscal, Linlithgow (1999), the issue of an impartial tribunal was
tested. It should be noted that this case arose in Scotland, where the Human
Rights Act 1998 was already in force at the time. The challenge arose over the
position of temporary sheriffs, appointed by the Lord Advocate, who hold
office for one year renewable terms ‘at pleasure’ and who enjoy no security of
tenure. The High Court of Justiciary ruled that the appointment system and
lack of security created a situation of ‘dependence’, which was ‘objectionable’
and contrary to the fundamental requirement of judicial independence from
the executive, of which the Lord Advocate is a member. Accordingly, the
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appointment system was contrary to Article 6 of the European Convention,
which requires a fair hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal. 
The case raises questions about both the Lord Chancellor’s powers of
appointment over magistrates and part time recorders in England and Wales
and his disciplinary powers. The system of appointment to the judiciary is
also under question. While defending the current system, Lord Irvine of Lairg
has also indicated that a judicial appointments commission, involving
laypersons, may be needed to ensure greater openness in the system.
Article 6 was also examined by the High Court of Justiciary in Hoekstra v
Her Majesty’s Advocate (2000). In that case, the right to an impartial tribunal
was violated by a judge sitting in a case of criminal appeal, who wrote a
newspaper article strongly critical of the Convention. The article, which inter
alia suggested that persons suspected of drug dealing should not have the
right to privacy (under Article 8) against covert surveillance, would create in
the mind of an informed observer ‘an apprehension of bias’ on the part of its
author against the Convention and its rights. The court ordered that fresh
appeal proceedings should be heard by three different judges. 
In Scanfuture UK Ltd v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry; Link v Same
(2001), the Employment Appeal Tribunal ruled that new procedures for
appointing lay members of employment tribunals meant that they were now
compliant with the Convention. Previously, they had contravened provisions
guaranteeing the right to fair trial where the Secretary of State had an interest.
The role of the Secretary of State in the appointment of members of the
tribunal gave rise to concerns other than their independence and impartiality.
That defect had now been cured.159
Evidence
The question of admitting evidence of previous sexual relations at trial came
before the Court of Appeal in R v A (No 2) (2001). The giving of such evidence
is prohibited except with the leave of the court.160 It was argued that this
restriction was incompatible with Article 6. The House of Lords ruled, inter
alia, that the relevant section could be construed as permitting evidence where
to exclude it would endanger the fairness of the trial.161
In R v Botmeh, R v Alami (2001), the Court of Appeal ruled that there was
nothing ‘unlawful or unfair’ in the court considering an ex parte application to
withhold evidence on the ground of public interest immunity where that
evidence had not been subject to a public interest immunity application to the
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trial judge. The court ruled that the defence had no absolute right to disclosure
of relevant evidence and that ‘strictly necessary measures restricting the rights
of the defence were permissible, provided they were counterbalanced by
procedures followed by the judicial authority’. In Atlan v UK (2001), the Court
of Human Rights had ruled that the Court of Appeal’s review of evidence not
available to the trial judge was insufficient to remedy the unfairness at trial
where the judge had not scrutinised the evidence. However, the Court of
Appeal ruled that this did not apply to an ex parte examination of material. 
The Court of Appeal in R v Looseley (2001) ruled that an accused’s right to a
fair trial was not prejudiced by admitting evidence obtained through the use
of undercover police officers. At the start of his trial, the accused alleged that
the police officers had incited him to commit the offence. The correct test was:
... whether the officers did no more, whether than by active or passive means,
than to afford the accused the opportunity to offend of which he freely took
advantage in circumstances where it appeared that he would have behaved in
a similar way if offered the opportunity by someone else; or whether, on the
other hand, by means on unworthy or shameful conduct, they had persuaded
him to commit an offence of a kind which otherwise he would not have
committed. 
That approach was consistent with Article 6.
Remedial proceedings
In Taylor v Lawrence (2002), the Court of Appeal ruled that if it was established
that a significant injustice had occurred, the court could re-open an appeal
after its final judgment had been delivered and there was no alternative
remedy. When the alternative remedy would be an appeal to the House of
Lords, the Court of Appeal could only re-open a case where it was satisfied
that no leave to appeal would be given by the House of Lords. 
In R (Beeson) v Dorset CC (2001), the Queen’s Bench Division ruled that a
decision taken by a panel comprising one independent member and two
county councillors was not an independent tribunal for the purpose of
determining a claim to financial assistance for care arrangements. That defect
could be remedied by the appointment of a totally independent panel.
Although disciplinary procedures of the General Dental Council and General
Medical Council did not meet the requirements of impartiality and
independence, any defect is cured by the right to appeal to the Privy
Council.162
Similarly, defects at trial which were capable of being reviewed by the
Court of Appeal did not violate Article 6.163 The Court of Appeal has also
considered the procedures under the Housing Act 1996 in relation to decisions
as to the suitability of accommodation for the homeless and declared that the
649
162 Preiss v General Dental Council (2001); Ghosh v General Medical Council (2001).
163 R v Smith (Joe) (2000); R v Craven (2001).
right to appeal to the county court, which granted full jurisdiction to that
court, satisfied the requirements of the ‘developing domestic law of human
rights’.164 Article 6 was considered in tandem with Article 8 (right to respect
for private and family life) by the Court of Appeal in St Brice v Southwark
London BC (2001). The court ruled that where a local authority, acting on a
possession order granted by a county court, evicted a tenant without notice, it
did not infringe the tenant’s rights under the Convention. Those rights had
already been protected by the hearing in the county court. 
Time lapses in proceedings
On the reasonableness of time lapses between charge and trial, the Court of
Appeal in Dyer v Watson; HM Advocate v K (2002) ruled that it would be a
breach of Article 6 for a boy charged with serious sexual offences when aged
13 to be tried some 28 months later, when he would be a youth of 16.
However, a delay of 20 months between charging police officers with perjury
and the date of trial was not such a delay as to violate Article 6. 
The fixing of a penalty by tax commissioners in relation to a defaulting
taxpayer amounted to the determination of a criminal offence and Article 6 of
the Convention applied. The Chancery Division of the High Court so ruled in
King v Walden (Inspector of Taxes) (2001). Accordingly, the taxpayer was
entitled to have his case determined ‘within a reasonable time’. Here there
was a delay of five years, which the court stated was ‘marginally, but only
just’ acceptable. Such matters should in future be dealt with more speedily.
Article 6 applies to the determination of civil penalties pursuant to criminal
charges brought under the Value Added Tax Act 1994 and the Finance Act
1994.165
In Attorney General’s Reference (No 2 of 2001) (2001), the Court of Appeal
ruled that, in considering whether a criminal charge had been determined
within a reasonable time for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention, the
relevant time normally started to run when the defendant was charged by the
police or served with a summons, rather than when he was first interviewed
by the police. 
A violation of Article 6 also arose in R v Her Majesty’s Advocate (2000),
where a nine month delay between an original interview of a suspect and the
suspect being charged rendered a prosecution unlawful. The delay had been
unreasonable and contrary to Article 6(3). 
Equality between defence and prosecution
The Court of Appeal has ruled that the equality of arms between prosecution
and defence in criminal proceedings did not require representation of the
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defendant by Queen’s Counsel merely because the Crown was so
represented.166 In R v Weir (2001), the House of Lords ruled that it had no
power to extend the time allowed for a prosecutor to apply for leave to appeal
from the Court of Appeal. The right to fair trial guaranteed under Article 6 did
not require that the prosecution be given an equal right to the defence: that
‘would stand the Convention on its head’. 
The presumption of innocence
Making the assumption that property or expenditure by a person convicted of
a drug trafficking offence was the proceeds of drug trafficking was not
incompatible with the presumption of innocence: HM Advocate v McIntosh
(2001). Admitting, under statutory compulsion, to being the driver of a motor
vehicle did not violate the right not to incriminate oneself, provided the
overall fairness of trial was not compromised: Brown v Stott (2001). The
reversal of the burden of proof in the Drug Trafficking Act 1994 did not
contravene Article 6, given the powers of review held by the Court of Appeal:
R v Benjafield, Leaf, Rezvi and Milford (2000). 
Compatibility with Article 6 requirements also fell for consideration in
Brown v Procurator Fiscal, Dunfermline (2000), in relation to self-incrimination.
There, a police officer who suspected a person of driving while drunk
required him to say whether he had been driving his car. The response ‘it was
me’, and evidence of that reply, was given to the court by the prosecution on a
charge of driving whilst drunk. That evidence violated the driver’s right to
silence and rights against self-incrimination under Article 6. The relevant
statutory provision, section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1972, had to be
interpreted subject to the requirements of Article 6. 
Miscellaneous issues relating to fair trial
In R v Stone (2001), the Court of Appeal ruled that the right to fair trial was not
inevitably denied by publicity. See also R v Williams (2001) and R v Francom
(2000), in which defective summing up to a jury did not violate the right to fair
trial unless that defect would have had the effect of altering the jury’s
decision. 
Article 6, in conjunction with Article 8, does not impose a general and
unqualified obligation on local authorities to remedy housing defects.167
The Home Secretary’s role in the fixing of the tariff period necessary for
retribution and deterrence, before which a mandatory life sentence prisoner
could be considered for release on licence, was considered by the Court of
Appeal in R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R (Taylor) v
Same (2001). The court recognised the distinction drawn between the setting of
tariffs for prisoners serving discretionary life sentences, detention during Her
Majesty’s pleasure and mandatory life sentences. In relation to the two former
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cases, the Home Secretary’s role had breached Article 6(1) of the
Convention,168 and the House of Lords ruled that the distinction between the
different categories was one embedded in primary legislation. However, the
case of Stafford had founded an application to the Court of Human Rights.
While the Court of Appeal in Anderson and Taylor did not expect the
distinction to survive the Court of Human Rights’ decision in Stafford, it
declined to act in advance of such a ruling. The Court of Human Rights ruled
on Stafford v United Kingdom in May 2002: the Home Secretary had no power
to keep murderers in prison once the Parole Board had decided that they
could be safely released. The Parole Board had ruled that Mr Stafford could be
released, a decision which the Home Secretary had overruled. The decision
paves the way for the reconsideration of a number of cases where the Home
Secretary has insisted that murderers be kept in jail for life. The Court of
Human Rights considered that the Home Secretary’s powers were
incompatible with the doctrine of separation of powers.169
Article 7: the prohibition against retrospectivity
In Gough and Another v Chief Constable of Derbyshire and Others (2001), the
Queen’s Bench Division ruled that banning orders which prevented UK
nationals from leaving the country in order to attend regulated international
football matches were lawful and a proportionate restriction on freedom of
movement under EC law. Further, such an order imposed after a conviction of
a public order offence was not a penalty and there was no violation of Article
7 of the Convention.
Article 8: the right to privacy
The Convention right to privacy, discussed here, must also be considered in
relation to freedom of expression, with which it may conflict. It will be seen
from the case law on Article 10, discussed in Chapter 20, that the restrictions
imposed on freedom of expression are having the effect of substantially
promoting privacy, at least when considered within the context of protection
from intrusion by the media. As can be seen from the following, Article 8 has
been invoked in relation to mental patients, prisoners, the evidence of
defendants in criminal proceedings, planning law and the making of
possession orders over a home. It has also been raised in matters relating to
deportation orders and electoral law.
168 V v United Kingdom (1999). In relation to mandatory life sentences, see R v Secretary of
State for the Home Department ex parte Stafford (1999).
169 Practice Statement: Life Sentences, 4 June 2002 replaces the term ‘tariff’ with ‘minimum
term’. The sentencing judge should indicate the appropriate determinate sentence
suitable for punishment and retribution. He should then calculate the minimum term to
be served before the prisoner’s case should be referred to the Parole Board. Differing
considerations apply to adult and juvenile cases.
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Mental patients
In R v Ashworth Special Hospital Authority and Another ex parte N (2001), the
High Court ruled that the right to privacy was not violated through the
random monitoring of telephone calls of mental patients classified as having
dangerous, violent or criminal propensities. Provision had been made to
gather information on escape plans, disturbances and arrangements to bring
in illicit substances, threats to others and behaviour presenting security
implications. There was evidence that patients were likely to abuse the use of
telephones unless prevented from doing so. Random monitoring interfered
with Article 8 no more than was necessary to achieve the permitted purpose. 
Prisoners
The House of Lords considered both common law and Article 8 of the
Convention in R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2001). It
was Home Office policy that prisoners should be required to leave their cells
during searches conducted by prison officers. The search included the
scrutiny of privileged legal correspondence. The House of Lords ruled that the
policy infringed the common law right to legal professional privilege in
communications with legal advisers. On Article 8, the Court ruled that the
policy interfered with Article 8. Lord Bingham stated that:
... the policy interfered with Mr Daly’s exercise of his right under Article 8(1) to
an extent much greater than necessity requires. In this instance, therefore, the
common law and the Convention yield the same result ...
Article 8 was invoked alongside Article 12 (the right to marry and found a
family) in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Mellor (2001). A
prisoner, who was sentenced to life imprisonment, claimed that he was
entitled to facilities to enable him and his wife to have a child, through the use
of artificial insemination. The Court of Appeal ruled that imprisonment was
incompatible with the exercise of conjugal rights and that the restrictions in
Article 8(2) applied. The restrictions were necessary for the maintenance of
security in prison. Prisoners inevitably forfeited aspects of their rights. It did
not follow, however, that prisoners would always be prevented from
inseminating their wives artificially, or naturally. The interference with the
fundamental human rights in question involved an exercise in
proportionality. Exceptional circumstances could require the restriction to
yield. In this case however, they did not. 
Evidence
The question of the admission of illegally obtained evidence into court was
considered in R v Loveridge and Others (2001). In that case, contrary to section
41 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925, the police had filmed defendants at a
magistrates’ court in order to compare the pictures with pictures previously
taken by closed circuit television cameras, in order to link the defendants to a
robbery. The Court of Appeal ruled that the filming had been unlawful and in
breach of Article 8. However, their Lordships were satisfied that the breach of
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Article 8 did not interfere with the fairness of the hearing. The appeals against
conviction were dismissed. In R v (1) X (2) Y (3) Z (2000), the Court of Appeal
ruled that there was no violation of Article 8 through the admission of
evidence resulting from telephone intercepts lawfully made according to the
country in question. Although such evidence of the result of intercepts made
in the United Kingdom would not be admissible by virtue of the Interception
of Communications Act 1985, that did not preclude the admission of evidence
from outside the United Kingdom.
In R (P) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and R (Q) v Same (2001),
the Queen’s Bench Divisional Court upheld the policy of the Prison Service
that children should cease to live with their mothers in prison at 18 months
old as lawful. 
Article 8 was held by the Queen’s Bench Division not to be violated
through the retention by the police of fingerprints and DNA samples of
suspects after they had fulfilled the purpose for which they had been taken: R
(S) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire (2002).
Planning law and possession orders
In South Buckinghamshire District Council v Porter, Chichester District Council v
Searle, Wrexham Borough Council v Berry and Hertsmere Borough Council v Harty
and Others (2001), the power to issue injunctions to restrain the breach of
planning control was in issue in relation to Gypsies and the right to respect for
their home and family life. In an unusually sympathetic decision in relation to
Gypsies, the Court of Appeal ruled that the power to grant the injunction
should not be used to evict Gypsies from their mobile homes unless the need
for such a remedy to protect the environment outweighed the Gypsies’ rights
under Article 8. The precedents, Mole Valley DC v Smith (1992), Guildford BC v
Smith (1994) and Hambleton DC v Bird (1995), could not be considered
consistent with the court’s duty under section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act
1998 to act compatibly with Convention rights. Proportionality required not
only that the injunction be appropriate and necessary for the attainment of the
public interest objective sought, but also that it did not impose an excessive
burden on the individual whose private interests – here the Gypsy’s private
life and home and the retention of his ethnic identity – were at stake. Gypsy
rights were also at issue in Clarke v Secretary of State for the Environment,
Transport and the Regions (2001). In this case, the Queen’s Bench Division ruled
that in deciding whether to grant planning permission to a Gypsy to station a
caravan on land for his residential use it could be a breach of Articles 8 and 14
(the right to enjoyment of Convention rights without discrimination) to take
into account the fact that he had refused the offer of alternative, conventional,
housing accommodation as being contrary to his culture as a Gypsy. The
making of a possession order of a dwelling house, which a court was obliged
to make if the statutory criteria were satisfied, did not contravene the tenant’s
right to family life and home. The Court of Appeal so ruled in Poplar Housing
and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v Donoghue (2001).
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Electoral law
Article 8 of the Convention was violated by the refusal of an electoral
registration officer to allow an elector to have his name removed from an
electoral register before that register was sold to a commercial firm for
marketing purposes. The Queen’s Bench Division so held in R (Robertson) v
Wakefield Metropolitan District Council and Another (2001). No provision had
been made in the Representation of the People (England and Wales)
Regulations for the editing of the register following requests to be excluded
and this breached the EC Directive. Article 8 was violated, since the sale of the
register to marketing organisations raised the foreseeable infringement of a
person’s privacy.170
Deportation
In R (Samaroo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2001), the Court of
Appeal ruled that where the decision had to be made whether to deport a
person on the grounds of the prevention of crime and disorder (in this case
conviction for importing Class A drugs), a fair balance had to be struck
between the legitimate aim and the affected person’s fundamental rights. The
Secretary of State was entitled to regard drug trafficking as very serious and
there was no violation of Article 8. In R v Secretary of State for the Home
Department ex parte R (2000), the Queen’s Bench Division ruled that it would
be a breach of an unsuccessful asylum seeker’s right to family life to remove
him from the United Kingdom while his wife and children remained, and that
it would be disproportionate to do so on the ground that he had criminal
convictions in the United Kingdom. The court accepted the Home Secretary’s
undertaking not to take any steps to remove the claimant until his wife’s
application had been determined.
Article 9: freedom of religion, etc
Article 9 was not violated by the prohibition in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971
in relation to the supply of cannabis which it was claimed was for use in acts
of religious worship (Rastafarianism). The Court of Appeal so held in R v
Taylor (Paul Simon) (2001). In R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and
Employment, the Queen’s Bench Division ruled that a genuine belief in
corporal punishment in schools was not a manifestation in practice or
observance of a religion or belief. Nor was it a religious or philosophical
conviction for the purposes of the right to education in Article 2 of the First
Protocol.
170 In addition, there was a failure by domestic law to comply with EC Directive 95/96/EC
of October 24 1995, OJ 1995 L281/3l which required that an individual could object to
the processing of personal data which the data controller anticipated would be
processed for the purposes of direct marketing.
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Special considerations apply to the position of religion and the churches.
Section 13 of the Act provides for freedom of thought, conscience and religion,
and states that:
13(1) If a court’s determination of any question arising under this Act might
affect the exercise by a religious organisation (itself or its members
collectively) of the Convention right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion, it must have a particular regard to the importance of that right.
The section was included to protect the churches from liability under the
Convention. Thus, for example, if a person alleges that he or she is the victim
of a breach of the Convention right to marry (Article 12) or the right to respect
for private and family life (Article 8) by the beliefs, rules and practices of a
religious faith, the court, in determining the issue, must have special regard to
the importance of those beliefs and practices.
Article 10: freedom of expression
Freedom of expression is subject to the limitations set out in Article 10(2).
Those restrictions prevailed in R (Farrakhan) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department (2002), which justified the exclusion of the Islamic leader on
grounds of public policy.
The House of Lords upheld the right of prisoners to freedom of expression
in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Simms; Same v Same ex parte
O’Brien (1999). The court ruled that an indiscriminate ban on all visits to
prisoners by journalists or authors in their professional capacity was unlawful.
A prisoner had a right to seek, through oral interviews, to persuade a
journalist to investigate his allegations of miscarriage of justice in the hope
that his case might be re-opened. The Court of Appeal had allowed an appeal
by the Secretary of State from the decision of the High Court, granting judicial
review of the Home Secretary’s decision that the applicant could receive visits
in prison from journalists only if the journalists signed written undertakings
not to publish any part of the interviews, as laid down in the Prison Rules
issued by the Home Secretary. The applicants were serving life sentences for
murder and, having had their renewed applications for leave to appeal
against conviction turned down, continued to protest their innocence. The
Home Office had adopted a blanket policy that no prisoners had a right to oral
interviews with journalists. Lord Steyn stated that the applicants wished to
challenge the safety of their convictions, and that, ‘in principle, it was not easy
to conceive of a more important function which free speech might fulfil’. His
Lordship was satisfied that it was administratively workable, and consistent
with prison order and discipline, to allow prisoners to be interviewed for the
purpose here at stake. The Home Secretary’s policy and the governor’s
administrative decisions pursuant to that policy were unlawful.
The Protection of Human Rights
Freedom of expression and the right to privacy (Article 8) are capable of
colliding with one another. Developments in the law relating to privacy are
significant, with the courts extending the common law of confidence in line
with Article 10 to provide, in all but name, a right to privacy, the existence of
which has always been denied under common law.171 Freedom of expression
is also inextricably linked to freedom of association, discussed below.
Article 11: freedom of association
Article 11 was considered in Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals v Attorney General and Others (2001). The Chancery Division ruled that
the RSPCA had the right to exclude applicants whom the Society thought in
good faith were likely to damage its objectives. In question was the right of the
Society to exclude current members and deny membership to applicants who
sought to reverse the Society’s policy against hunting with dogs. However,
fairness dictated that a large charity such as this could not adopt an arbitrary
procedure which gave no right of reply to a potential applicant. The RSPCA
had sought a declaration that its Council be permitted to adopt a new policy
on membership which would enable it to remove and/or exclude from
membership those who opposed its policy, and the introduction of an
administratively convenient scheme for the implementation of that policy. The
court ruled that the Society should adopt a procedure through which any
potentially excluded person should have the opportunity to make
representations.
Protocol 1: the right to enjoyment of possessions
The Court of Appeal in Lindsay v Commissioners of Customs and Excise (2002)
ruled that the policy of seizing motor vehicles of those who evaded duty on
tobacco and alcohol, and refused to restore the vehicle save in exceptional
circumstances, fettered the discretion of officers. It failed to distinguish
between commercial smuggling and importation for distribution among
family and friends. Under Article 1 of Protocol 1, deprivation of possessions
could only be justified if it was in the public interest. There had to be a
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and
the aim pursued. Here there was not.
A child’s right to education under Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the Convention
was not violated by enforcement of immigration control which involved the
removal of a child settled in a school in England after her parents’ application
to remain in the United Kingdom had been rejected. The Court of Appeal so
held in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Holub and Another
(2001). Article 2 did not confer a right to education in any particular country
and was accordingly limited in scope.
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CONCLUSION
The European Convention on Human Rights has provided vital protection for
citizens against the power of the state. As has been seen, the case law against
the United Kingdom is substantial and, in many instances, has led to
considerable reform of the law. Nevertheless, the right of individual petition,
conferred in 1965, meant long delays and high costs for litigants. The
Convention has for the most part, and despite its limitations in scope, served
individuals well in the protection of fundamental rights. The incorporation of
Convention rights into domestic law was a logical step forward for a
government seriously committed to individual rights and freedoms.
Incorporation may also change the traditional public conception of individual
freedoms in favour of rights, and bring a greater clarity to the law relating to
both civil liberties and human rights. It may be argued that the manner of the
Convention rights’ incorporation is deficient: that it represents ‘half a loaf’ by
allowing for express repeal and for the retention of legislative control by the
executive and parliament. Perhaps, however, to state the obvious, half a loaf is
better than none. 
In the third edition of this text, it was noted that the effectiveness of the
Human Rights Act 1998 rests on three foundations: the willingness of the
judges robustly to defend rights and to interpret Convention rights in a
manner favouring individual protection against governmental encroachment;
parliament’s willingness to amend the law to ensure compliance with
declarations of incompatibility with Convention rights; and, finally, the
energy with which individual citizens are prepared to assert their rights in
courts of law. Within two years of the Human Rights Act coming into effect, it
can be seen that its impact is reaching swiftly into numerous areas of law.
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CHAPTER 20
The common law proved inadequate to protect individuals against
discrimination on the basis of either race or sex. Parliament intervened,
passing originally the Race Relations Act 1965 (now the Race Relations Act
1976) and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (as subsequently amended). The
two Acts employ similar concepts and are enforced by similar machinery. 
The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates Article 14 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, which provides for non-discrimination on the
grounds of sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth
or other status. However, Article 14 protects against discrimination only in
respect of ‘the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the]
Convention’: it is not, therefore, a blanket prohibition on discrimination in all
circumstances.
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Race Relations Acts1
In 1965, parliament, for the first time, considered legal protection against
racial discrimination to be necessary. The Race Relations Act 1965, however,
proved to provide only limited value in protection.2 The Act provided not for
access to the courts for protection from discrimination, but for an application
to be made to the Race Relations Board established under the 1965 Act. The
Race Relations Act 1968 strengthened the powers of the Board, but protection
from discrimination remained limited. The law is now found in the Race
Relations Act 1976. 
Racial discrimination is defined under the Act as being discrimination
based on the grounds of colour, race, nationality, ethnic or national origins.
Discrimination may be direct or indirect (see, further, below). The Act did not,
however, prohibit all forms of racial discrimination, and confined protection
to discrimination in the field of employment, including service of the Crown,
such as the armed forces,3 the police and local authorities, and to education,
housing and the provision of goods and services.
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1 See Lustgarten, 1980 and 1981.
2 The Race Relations Act 1968 extended the 1965 Act, but effectiveness remained
unsatisfactory.
3 See R v Army Board of Defence Council ex parte Anderson (1992).
The problem of the scope of the 1976 Act was exacerbated by the decision
in Re Amin (1983), in which the House of Lords ruled that the functions of
many authorities could not be construed as offering a ‘service’ (such as
education, employment, housing or the provision of goods and services) and
were therefore excluded from the prohibition. The effect of Amin was to
exclude from protection such bodies as the Immigration Service, customs, the
prison service and law enforcement by the police. These deficiencies have now
been remedied by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000.
The 2000 Act4 imposes a statutory duty on public authorities5 to eliminate
discrimination and to promote equality of opportunity and good relations
between racial groups.6 The Act also provides for codes of practice. The duties
may be enforced by compliance notices issued by the Commission for Racial
Equality, and where necessary enforced by a court order.7 The Act also makes
the police subject to the Race Relations Act 1976.8 Excluded from the Act are
immigration authorities, the security services, Parliament and the Scottish
Parliament and Welsh Assembly, and acts of the judiciary.
The definition of racial discrimination
The courts have encountered problems with the definition of racial
discrimination which is linked to discrimination of the grounds of colour,
race, nationality, ethnic or national origins. In Seide v Gillette Industries (1980),
for example, it was held that people of Jewish origin and culture fell within
the definition. In Mandla v Dowell Lee (1983), the House of Lords ruled that
Sikhs fell within the definition of a racial group and were thus protected
under the Act.9 Gypsies have also been held to be within the definition
(Commission for Racial Equality v Dutton (1989)), although Rastafarians have
not. The tests propounded by the court in Dawkins v Department of the
Environment (1993), in relation to whether a group constitutes a racial group
for the purposes of the Act, is whether there is a long shared history and a
cultural tradition and customs. In Mandla v Dowell Lee (1983), the House of
Lords ruled that the characteristics of an ethnic group included a long shared
distinctive history and a distinctive cultural tradition. Further common
characteristics included a common geographical origin, common language
and religion, common literature, and being a minority within a larger society. 
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4 Amending the Race Relations Act 1976, s 71(1).
5 Specified in Sched 1A, which lists 60 authorities including ministers, government
departments, the armed forces, health authorities, local authorities, police authorities,
probation and magistrates’ committees.
6 See O’Cinneide, 2001.
7 Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, ss 71C–71E.
8 In response to the findings of the Macpherson Inquiry into the death of black teenager
Stephen Lawrence. See Report of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, Cm 4262-I, February 1999,
and Chapter 21.
9 Race Relations Act 1976, s 3(1).
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In Commission for Racial Equality v Dutton (1989), the Court of Appeal had
to decide whether Gypsies constituted a racial group. The court reviewed the
variety of meanings given to ‘Gypsies’. Applying the tests propounded by the
House of Lords in Mandla v Dowell Lee, Nicholls LJ stated that:
... Gypsies are a minority, with a long shared history and a common
geographical origin ... having certain, albeit limited, customs of their own ... a
distinctive style of dressing, ... a language or dialect, ... a repertoire of folktales
and music passed on from one generation to the next.
The court accepted that many Gypsies no longer derive from a ‘common
stock’, but that of itself did not prevent them from being a racial group within
the wide definition in the Act.10 By distinction, the court ruled, in Dawkins v
Department of Environment, that Rastafarians, while enjoying distinctive
cultural features, having their own music and hair styles, do not fall within
the meaning of a racial group, for their ‘shared history’ is only of some 60
years duration (compared with that of Gypsies, whose history is of over 700
years duration).
Direct and indirect discrimination
Direct discrimination
Under section 1(1) of the Act, direct discrimination involves the treatment of a
person less favourably than another, on the basis of racial grounds. For an
offence to be proven, there is no need to establish that the person
discriminating on racial grounds intended so to do.11 Direct discrimination
includes segregation on the grounds of race, and to provide separate facilities
for differing races, irrespective of the quality of the facilities, is an offence.12
Proving direct discrimination – whether on grounds of race or sex – is
difficult: there will usually be a number of other grounds for, say, rejecting an
application for employment, other than pure racial or sexual discrimination.13
In order to minimise the difficulties of proof, it has been established that, once
the inference has been raised that discrimination has occurred, the burden of
proof shifts to the alleged discriminator to prove that the decision was not
racially or sexually discriminatory.14 In Sidhu v Aerospace Composite Technology
Ltd (2000), the Court of Appeal ruled that an employer’s policy in relation to
violence and abusive language which applied to all employees, irrespective of
race, was not direct discrimination when applied to an employee who had
suffered racial abuse and retaliated with violence.
In Nagarajan v London Regional Transport (1999), the House of Lords
considered the meaning of discrimination by way of victimisation under
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11 R v Council for Racial Equality ex parte Westminster City Council (1984).
12 Race Relations Act 1976, s 1(2).
13 See Cotterrell, 1981; Millar and Phillips, 1983.
14 Dornan v Belfast County Council (1990).
section 2 of the Race Relations Act 1976. The issue turned on whether or not it
was necessary to establish that there was conscious motivation to
discriminate, as was held by the appeal tribunal and the Court of Appeal. The
House of Lords ruled that conscious motivation was not a prerequisite for a
finding of direct discrimination under section 1 of the Act, and that section 2
had to be read in that context. If a job applicant’s previous complaint under
the Race Relations Act had a significant influence on the decision not to offer
him a job, the case fell within section 2(1), even though the interviewee did not
consciously realise that he was prejudiced by that knowledge.
In Chief Constable of the West Yorkshire Police v Khan (2001), the House of
Lords ruled that where a chief constable had refused a reference for a police
officer who had brought proceedings against him in an employment tribunal,
the refusal was not ‘by reason that’ the officer had brought proceedings but
because of the existence of the proceedings and the chief constable’s need to
preserve his legal position in relation to them. Accordingly, the officer’s
complaint of victimisation under section 2(1)(a) of the Race Relations Act 1976
failed.
Indirect discrimination
Indirect discrimination occurs when a person conducts him or herself in a
manner which is not directly discriminatory, but which has the indirect effect
of being discriminatory. Indirect discrimination may affect individuals or a
group of persons. Accordingly, if, for example, an employer attaches
conditions of employment to an advertised post which a member of a
particular racial group cannot fulfil, there will be indirect discrimination. The
proof of indirect discrimination is again a difficult one to establish. Once a
prima facie case of discrimination has been made out, it is for the defendant to
rebut the presumption that there has been discrimination. To do so, the
defendant must establish to the satisfaction of the court that any conditions of
employment are justifiable. By way of example, in Mandla v Dowell Lee (1983),
the House of Lords ruled that the rules relating to school uniform, which
prohibited the wearing of a turban, which the pupil was required to wear on
religious grounds, were discriminatory. The House of Lords ruled that the
statutory words ‘can comply’ meant ‘can in practice comply’ or ‘can
consistently with customs and cultural conditions of the racial group comply’,
not ‘can physically comply’ (pp 565–66, per Lord Fraser). Conversely, in Singh
v British Railway Engineers (1986), a condition of employment was the wearing
of protective headgear – a condition with which the applicant could not
comply by virtue of wearing a turban in accordance with the requirements of
his faith. The court here held that the condition was justifiable on the basis of
the requirements of safety. In Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Weber von Hartz (1986),
however, the European Court of Justice ruled that conditions of employment
must be justifiable, inter alia, according to the extent to which they are
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appropriate to achieving a necessary objective.15 This test has made it more
difficult for employers to argue that conditions are non-discriminatory.
Section 33(1) of the Race Relations Act 1976 provides that a person is to be
treated as a person committing an unlawful act if that person knowingly aids
another person to do an unlawful act. In Anyanwu v South Bank Students’
Union (2000), two students had been expelled from the university and
debarred from entering university premises, including the Students’ Union,
by which they were employed. The Union then dismissed the students from
their employment. The students brought proceedings alleging that they had
been discriminated against on racial grounds by the Union and that the
university had knowingly aided the Union in their unlawful dismissal. The
Court of Appeal held, by a majority, that, although the university had taken
action against the students, and that action brought about their dismissal from
employment, the university had not aided or helped the Union to dismiss the
students. In Hallan and Another v Avery and Another (2001), the House of Lords
considered the meaning of aiding another to commit an unlawful act under
the Race Relations Act 1976. Police officers told a local authority that a
reception booked at its premises was to be a Gypsy wedding with a potential
risk of disturbance. Acting on that advice, the council imposed additional
booking conditions which amounted to unlawful discrimination contrary to
sections 20 and 21 of the 1976 Act. The officers, however, who took no part in
the council’s decision, could not be shown to have aided it to do that unlawful
act.
Where there is an allegation of unfair dismissal by virtue of racial
discrimination, what had to be compared was how the employer had treated
the complainant and how that employer would have treated another
employee, not how a hypothetical reasonable employer would have treated
another employee. The House of Lords so ruled in City of Glasgow Council v
Zafar (1988), holding that it was not legitimate to infer from the
unreasonableness of the dismissal that it had been racially motivated.
Exceptions to protection
Exceptions are made to the protection of the Act. Residential accommodation
in small premises is excepted, as is foster accommodation for the care of
children.16 Businesses with less than six partners are also exempted, as are
associations with less than 25 members. Further limitations in the protection
given lie in the areas of employment. For example, it is justifiable for an
employer to insist on candidates for employment being of a particular race in
order to ensure authenticity. Accordingly, it is lawful for an Indian restaurant
to advertise for, and employ, only Indian staff.17
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17 Ibid, s 29.
A regrettable exception to the protection against racial discrimination
under the Race Relations Act 1976 was considered by the Court of Appeal in
Post Office v Adekeye (1996). The Court of Appeal ruled that racial
discrimination against an employee in the course of an appeal against
dismissal was not unlawful under section 4(2) of the Act, since that section
applied only to a person in employment. Lord Justice Peter Gibson
commented that it was unsatisfactory that the 1976 Act did not extend to give
a remedy to an ex-employee pursuing an appeal against dismissal.
An employer may be guilty of discrimination contrary to the Race
Relations Act 1976 where the employer allows a third party to abuse
employees racially in circumstances over which the employer had power to
control the third party. In Burton and Another v De Vere Hotels (1996), the
Employment Appeal Tribunal ruled that the hotel, in allowing a guest speaker
to make racially abusive remarks in the presence of its employees, acted
unlawfully. An employer is under a duty to protect its employees from the
detriment of racial abuse and harassment. If an employer had sufficient
control over an event, and it was reasonably foreseeable that offence or
harassment would occur, the employer is guilty of subjecting employees to
racial abuse or harassment, contrary to section 4 of the 1976 Act.
The Commission for Racial Equality
Under the former Race Relations Acts (1965 and 1968), the Race Relations
Board – a statutory body which had no powers of initiative to initiate
investigations – and the Community Relations Commission were established.
Under the 1976 Act, these bodies have been replaced by the Commission for
Racial Equality (CRE). The chairperson and members of the Commission are
appointed by the Home Secretary, and the Commission lays an annual report
before parliament. The Commission can assist claimants in the preparation of
their case. The Commission also has the power to initiate investigations,
provided that it has a reasonable suspicion that acts of discrimination have
occurred.18 The Home Secretary may direct the Commission to undertake
investigations. If the Commission finds that discrimination has occurred, it
has powers to issue a ‘non-discrimination notice’. A right of appeal against a
non-discrimination notice is available.19 Further, for a period of five years
from the issue of the notice, the Commission may seek an injunction from the
county court. In relation to individual complaints of racial discrimination in
employment, complaints may be made to an employment tribunal.20 The
tribunal has the power to make an order for compensation and to make orders
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as to the manner in which the discrimination should be alleviated.21
Complaints relating to other areas may be made to the county court, and the
court may award damages.22
There are perceived weaknesses in the jurisdiction of the Commission. The
House of Lords has ruled that the Commission is not entitled to investigate a
person or a company unless it has a strong reason to believe that
discrimination has occurred. Accordingly, the Commission may not
investigate on a mere suspicion that discrimination is occurring.23
SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION
Sexual equality24
Factual and legal inequalities between the sexes have bedevilled history, and
the issue is one which is firmly on the agenda for reform. Feminist legal
theory, which seeks to unmask and eradicate legal discrimination based on
gender, has moved from being a minority interest subject and become a
popular field of study. It is often assumed that the feminist movement is a
fairly recent phenomenon, dating from the liberalising 1960s. Whilst the
struggle for women’s rights dates only from the eighteenth century, the
debate concerning the position of women in society has a far longer history
than that. It is possible, for example, to trace the issue back to ancient Greece
and to the writings of Plato and Aristotle. In Plato’s Republic, Socrates argues
that children, wives and property should be owned in common. Aristotle
(384–322 BC) rejects such a notion in relation to both wives and property.
Instead, we find that Aristotle favours private ownership of the wife – by the
husband. Nothing had changed at the time William Blackstone was writing
his Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765–69). For Blackstone, in marriage,
the husband and wife are ‘one person in law: that is, the very being or legal
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is
incorporated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and
cover she performs every thing’. While Blackstone insisted on human freedom
and the protection of the individual by law; on the priority of the individual
over the community and on the protection of private property, this free,
autonomous individual was a property owning man having dominion over
his wife and children. 
The ‘feminist campaign’ began in the eighteenth century. Mary
Wollstonecraft (1759–97) argued for equality in treatment between men and
women. In The Vindication of the Rights of Women, Wollstonecraft argued for
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24 See, inter alia, Atkins and Hoggett, 1984; Pannick, 1985; Fredman, 1997; Barnett, 1998.
educational and political equality. Socio-economic changes in the eighteenth
century resulted in the emergence of middle class society, in which women
became a ‘leisured class’. Thus, the differences between men and women
became more, rather than less, defined. Excluded from public affairs and the
world of work, femininity became an objective and a goal. It was a dangerous
development for women, for femininity emphasised the idea of both
difference and fragility – and dependence. 
The legal disabilities under which women laboured, analysed by John
Stuart Mill over a century ago in The Subjection of Women (1869), have been
slow to pass. On marriage, a wife traditionally and effectively became the
property of the husband: the doctrine was that of ‘one flesh’ created by the
spiritual, legal and physical union within – in the United Kingdom – a
Christian marriage. Three consequences, at least, flowed from this doctrine.
First, a married woman was, until 1882, effectively incapable of owning
property. Secondly, by marriage, a woman impliedly consented to sexual
intercourse with her husband whenever he so required. It was, until the
House of Lords’ decision in R v R in 1991 (see below, p 740), impossible in law
for a married man to rape his wife. As Archbold stated: ‘It is a clear and well
settled law that a man cannot rape his wife.’25 Thirdly, the husband had sole
control, or custody, of the children of the marriage. Mothers, until 1839, had
no custody rights whatsoever – and then only to the age of seven years. The
‘right’, such as it was, would be lost through committing adultery. Equality in
parental rights was not to be achieved until 1973.26
This power of dominion of husbands over wives – unchanged from the
fourth century BC to the late nineteenth century – arose, as John Stuart Mill
observed:
... simply from the fact that from the very earliest twilight of human society,
every woman (owing to the value attached to her by men, combined with her
inferiority in muscular strength) was found in a state of bondage to some man.
Laws and systems of polity always begin by recognising the relations they find
already existing between individuals. They convert what was a mere physical
fact into a legal right, give it the sanction of society, and principally aim at the
substitution of public and organised means of asserting and protecting these
rights, instead of the irregular and lawless conflict of physical strength. [The
Subjection of Women, Chapter 1]
Furthermore:
... this dependence, as it exists at present, is not an original institution, taking a
fresh start from considerations of justice and social expediency – it is the
primitive state of slavery lasting on, through successive mitigations and
modifications occasioned by the same causes which have softened the general
manners, and brought all human relations more under the control of justice
and the influence of humanity. It has not lost the taint of its brutal origin.
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It followed from its natural origins that, in the minds of men – and probably
many women – this was the natural position and, accordingly, raised some
sort of presumption that the position was right and just. In short, the
presumption needed to be rebutted by those seeking so to do – by women
themselves, or such rare men as Mill.
General male attitudes towards the inferior status of women have been
reflected in legal judgments. By way of example, in Meacher v Meacher (1946),
Henn Collins J held that a husband was within his rights in assaulting his wife
because she refused to obey his orders to visit her relations.27 While smacking
a woman as punishment amounted to cruelty under the old law of divorce, it
would not have been cruel if the husband had punished her ‘as one would a
naughty child’.28
Marital rape 
Until 1991, it was impossible, in law, for a husband to rape his wife,29 because
the fact of marriage entailed implied consent to intercourse. This anachronism
was only removed in R v R (1991),30 when the House of Lords ruled that rape
within marriage did not constitute lawful intercourse and, accordingly, fell
within the prohibition laid down in section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956,
which provided that ‘it is a felony for a man to rape a woman’. 
The Law Commission recommended that ‘the law should continue to be
that there is no immunity for husbands in the crime of rape.31 The response
has been equivocal. Professor Glanville Williams, for example, argues, in
relation to intercourse without consent, that ‘what is wrong with this demand
is not so much the act requested but its timing, or the manner of the demand’
and that the ‘fearsome stigma of rape is too great a punishment for husbands
who use their strength in these circumstances’.32 Feminists have argued that
the criminalising of rape provides the mask of protection, but not its reality, a
view supported by evidence from Australia, where rape within marriage has
been a criminal offence for over 20 years but few prosecutions are brought.33
It is against this broad background that legal protection from overt
discrimination on the basis of sex must be evaluated.
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31 Report No 205, Rape Within Marriage, 1992. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act
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32 Williams, 1991; but see Barnett, 1998, Chapter 11.
33 See Naffine, 1992 and 1990.
Statutory protection from sexual discrimination
In 1919, parliament enacted legislation to remove some legal disabilities in the
field of property and contract, the vote and employment.34 However, in the
field of employment, many exceptions existed to a right to equal treatment.
The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 attempted to redress the factual inequalities
which remained. Much still remains to be achieved: the average pay for
women has traditionally been lower than that of men; women form the
majority of part time, low paid workers.35 Moreover, the demands of child
care continue to reduce the opportunities for women in employment, and the
state has not been robust in insisting that employers provide child care
facilities. The law of the European Community has had a significant impact on
the issue of equal pay for women, and domestic legal protection must be seen
nowadays in light of Community law.36
The Equal Pay Act 1970 and Sex Discrimination Act 197537
Employment and dismissal
Contractual employment rights are regulated under the Equal Pay Act 1970,
whilst other aspects of employment are governed by the Sex Discrimination
Act 1975. The two Acts are thus designed to provide protection in all fields of
employment. It is unlawful to discriminate on the basis of sex or marital status
in the context of employment, education and the provision of goods and
services.38 Sexual discrimination – as with racial discrimination – may be
direct or indirect. Indirect discrimination may arise through unjustified
conditions for employment, for example, through stipulating that applicants
be of a certain height or age, where height or age is irrelevant to the particular
job. On the other hand, some conditions of employment will be fully justified,
for example, particular academic qualifications. As with racial discrimination,
once an inference of discrimination has been raised, it is for the allegedly
discriminatory person to disprove that he or she has in fact discriminated on
the grounds of sex or marital status.39 The issue of justifiable qualifications
arose in Price v Civil Service Commission (1978), where a condition was applied
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the requirements of European Community law (see, further, Chapter 9).
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38 Sex Discrimination Act 1975, ss 6, 22 and 29.
39 Dornan v Belfast County Council (1990).
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that applicants be under the age of 28 years. Mrs Price, aged 35, alleged
discrimination and her claim was upheld. However, in Saunders v Richmond
upon Thames LBC (1978), a female qualified applicant was refused employment
as a golf professional, although her qualifications were higher than that of the
man who was appointed. Despite her qualifications, the Employment Appeal
Tribunal ruled that there was insufficient evidence that she had in fact been
discriminated against on the basis of her sex. 
In order to establish sexual discrimination, a women must prove that – but
for her sex – she would have been treated more favourably. In order to
establish this requirement, the 1975 Act provides that a woman’s treatment
must be evaluated against that of a ‘comparable man’.40 Accordingly, the
curious and regrettable consequence arises whereby, if an employer only
employs women – and does so at a lower rate of pay than he would have paid
to men – no discrimination can be proven, for there is no comparator.
In Glasgow City Council v Marshall (2000), the House of Lords had to
determine whether employers who paid employees different rates in respect
of their duties as teachers and instructors (the teachers being paid more) had
acted lawfully. Proceedings were brought under the Equal Pay Act 1970 by
one male and seven female instructors, claiming that they were entitled to
equal pay. The employers relied on the absence of sexual discrimination. The
House of Lords ruled that the employer had established a defence under
section 1(3) of the Act, and that the inequality of pay was due not to sexual
discrimination but to some other material fact. The House of Lords also
considered the section 1(3) defence in Strathclyde Regional Council v Wallace
(1998). In that case, female teachers did the same work as principal teachers
but were paid at a lower rate. The House of Lords ruled that, if a difference in
pay was explained by genuine factors – in the instant case, by financial
constraints and a promotion structure established by statute – and not tainted
by discrimination, that was sufficient to raise a defence. If, however, the factor
was tainted by sexual discrimination, the defence would not succeed unless
such discrimination could be objectively justified.41
The position of pregnant women in employment causes particular
difficulties and, again, the idea of the comparator is utilised.42 The Trade
Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993 provides that dismissal on
the grounds of pregnancy is unfair.43 However, in Webb v EMO Cargo (UK)
Ltd (1992), the Court of Appeal ruled, and the House of Lords affirmed, that a
woman who was dismissed from employment because of her pregnancy was
not unlawfully dismissed, since – comparing her to a man with a temporary
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Girls’ School (2001).
42 See, eg, Turley v Allders (1980); Hayes v Malleable WMC (1985).
43 Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993, ss 23–25 and Scheds 2 and 3; EC
Pregnancy Directive 92/85.
physical disability who would also have been unable to work – the man
would also have been dismissed.44 The House of Lords, referred the issue to
the European Court of Justice with the following questions:
Is it discrimination on grounds of sex, contrary to the Equal Treatment
Directive, for an employer to dismiss a female employee:
(a) whom it engaged for the specific purpose of replacing another female
employee during the latter’s forthcoming maternity leave,
(b) when, very shortly after appointment, the employer discovers that the
appellant herself will be absent on maternity leave during the maternity
period of the other employee and the employer dismisses her because it
needs the jobholder to be at work during that period, and
(c) had the employer known of the pregnancy of the appellant at the date of
appointment, she would not have been appointed, and
(d) the employer would similarly have dismissed a male employee engaged
for this purpose who required leave of absence at the relevant time for
medical or other reasons? 
Under European Community law, it has been held that a pregnant woman
whose application for employment was rejected on the basis of her pregnancy
was a victim of discrimination. The Court of Justice ruled in favour of the
appellant on two grounds. First, the Court ruled that pregnancy could not be
compared with a male illness, since pregnancy was not pathological.
Secondly, the appellant could not be dismissed, because her inability to
perform the terms of her employment was temporary, not permanent. The
dismissal of the appellant therefore constituted sex discrimination. The House
of Lords remitted the case to the Industrial Tribunal to consider the question
of compensation.45 While the ruling of the European Court is welcome, it does
not answer the question as to the lawfulness of dismissing a temporary
employee on the basis of pregnancy.
The Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993 provides that
a woman is protected from dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy and is
entitled to 14 weeks of maternity leave. Where that employee has been in
continuous employment for two years, she is entitled to return to work within
29 weeks of the birth.46 The position in relation to women with less than two
years’ continuous service remains uncertain although, in O’Neill (1996), the
court followed Webb and ruled that dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy
was unlawful. 
The right to return to work has been further protected by the Court of
Appeal in Crees v Royal London Mutual Insurance Society Ltd and Greaves v Kwik
Save Stores Ltd (1998). Both employees had taken extended maternity leave.
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45 Webb v Emo Cargo (UK) Ltd (No 2) (1995).
46 Employment Protection Consolidation Act 1978, s 39(1)(b).
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However, at the date on which they were due to return to work, the
employees were unwell. The employers took the view that they had failed to
exercise their right to return to work and that, accordingly, their contracts of
employment were terminated, and that, accordingly, there had been no
dismissal which could be construed as unfair. The employees appealed to the
Employment Appeal Tribunal on the basis of unfair dismissal. The tribunal
held that they had not been unfairly dismissed.47 On appeal to the Court of
Appeal, the court ruled that the employees had been unfairly dismissed. The
employees qualified for the right to return to work,48 and had given the
necessary notices. However, the court ruled that the right to return to work
was a right which had to be exercised. Nevertheless, section 42 of the 1978 Act
did not expressly require an actual presence at work on the notified day. The
provisions did not expressly say, either, that the right to return would be
‘terminated, divested or avoided’ by non-attendance. There were
circumstances where it would be impossible to return to work – for example,
during a period when her place of work was closed for an annual holiday.
Under section 42(1) of the 1978 Act, what was required was that the employee
gave written notice of a return to work. This the employees had done. To
require the physical presence of the employee, in order for the right to return
to work to remain, would result in absurdities. Situations such as an employee
who worked from home or who had had an accident, or where a natural
disaster had occurred, would all result in the employee being vulnerable to
dismissal. Under the circumstances the only conclusion which could be
reached was that the employees had, in effect, been unfairly dismissed.49
The right to non-discrimination applies equally to men and women.50 The
Court of Appeal so confirmed in Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough
Council v Jesuthasan (1998). In this case, a part time worker employed in the
public sector was held to be equally entitled as a female employee to claim
redundancy payments and compensation for unfair dismissal. Jesuthasan had
originally alleged that he had been the victim of racial discrimination. He
subsequently sought to amend his original application to include claims for
unfair dismissal and redundancy. The Employment Appeal Tribunal refused
to allow him to amend his application.51 The Employment Protection
(Consolidation) Act 1978 had been amended by the 1995 Employment
Protection (Part time Employees) Regulations,52 in order to conform to the
House of Lords’ decision in R v Secretary of State for Employment ex parte Equal
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48 Under the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, s 39, as substituted by the
Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993, s 23.
49 On equality of treatment in relation to redundancy payments, see Barry v Midland Bank
plc (1999). See, also, Halfpenny v IGE Medical Systems Ltd (1999).
50 Sex Discrimination Act 1975, preamble.
51 [1996] ICR 991.
52 SI 1995/31.
Opportunities Commission and Another (1995) (the EOC case is discussed in
Chapter 9). The novel point for decision was whether a male part time worker
employed in the public sector was entitled to claim a redundancy payment
and compensation for unfair dismissal, in relation to a dismissal occurring
before the 1978 Act was amended. It was common ground that, had the
employee been a female part time worker, she could have claimed
redundancy payment and compensation for unfair dismissal. In the Equal
Opportunities Commission (EOC) case, the House of Lords had ruled that the
qualifying periods for entitlement53 were incompatible with European
Community law. In the present case, the employee was in exactly the same
position as the female employee in the EOC case. It was argued for the
Council that the EOC case was distinguishable, in that the objective of
Community law was to protect women against indirect discrimination arising
out of the fact that more women than men were part time workers. Mummery
LJ was unable to accept that proposition. The general proposition of law in the
EOC case was that discriminatory provisions should be disapplied
irrespective of sex and, further, the employee did not complain of sexual
discrimination but unfair dismissal and redundancy under the 1978 Act,
subject to the disapplication of qualifying provisions declared in the EOC case
to be incompatible with European Community law. The employer was an
‘emanation of the State’ and bound by the direct effect of Article 119 (now
Article 141 of the EC Treaty) and relevant directives. The appeal was
allowed.54
Sexual harassment
Sexual harassment is defined as ‘conduct of a sexual nature or other conduct
based on sex affecting the dignity of men and women at work’.55 Section
6(6)(b) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and section 4 of the Race Relations
Act 1976 refer to conduct which has detrimental effect on the victim. In
Hereford and Worcester County Council v Clayton (1996), it was held that a sexist
comment directed against a woman firefighter was detrimental to women in
the message which it conveyed. The European Commission has drafted a
Code of Practice on sexual harassment giving guidance to employees and
employers.56 Sexual harassment, as a form of sexual discrimination, is, again,
difficult both to define and to prove. 
However, the Court of Appeal took a robust approach to the issue of
harassment in Tower Boot Company v Jones (1997), holding that employers were
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more hours a week, and five years of continuous employment for employees who
worked between eight and 16 hours a week.
54 See, also, Hill and Stapleton v Revenue Commissioners and the Department of Finance (1998)
and London Underground v Edwards (1998).
55 OJ C157/2.
56 On the Protection of the Dignity of Men and Women at Work, 35 OJ L49/3, 1992.
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under a duty to make themselves aware of any harassment in the workplace
and take steps to prevent harassment. This was the approach taken in Burton
and Another v De Vere Hotels (1996), in which the hotel management was held
liable for avoidable racial abuse on the part of hotel guests against female
staff.57
The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 provides for civil remedies for
harassment. The Act provides that a person must not pursue a course of
conduct which amounts to harassment of another, and which he knows, or
ought to know, amounts to harassment.58 Harassment is not further defined.
The Act creates a criminal offence of harassment in addition to providing for
civil remedies in the form of a restraining order.59 The Act is not designed to
inhibit journalists or photographers, but is aimed to stop ‘stalking’. However,
where an individual reporter or photographer repeatedly follows and causes
harassment, that conduct may fall within the scope of the Act. 
Formerly, the courts had found difficulty in protecting individuals from
harassment where they fell outside the scope of the domestic violence
legislation.60 The former legislation, now repealed and replaced by the Family
Law Act 1996, provided for relief only where the parties were either married
to each other, or living together as husband and wife in a cohabiting
relationship.61 In Patel v Patel (1988), for example, the courts were powerless
to grant relief in a situation where a family member (a father in law) was
being harassed by another family member (his son in law), because the
relationship fell outside the definitions of the domestic violence legislation. In
Khorasandjian v Bush (1993),62 however, the Court of Appeal controversially
extended the law of tort to provide a remedy against unwanted intrusions
into privacy through persistent telephone calls. In that case, a former
boyfriend was unable to accept that the relationship was over. There had been
no cohabitation. While it is unclear whether there existed a separate head of
tortious liability for harassment, the Court ruled that the occupier of property,
in addition to the owner of the property, had the right to relief under the law
of nuisance. The Family Law Act 1996 extends the scope of eligible applicants
to include relatives and former partners, although the circumstances in
Khorasandjian would still fall outside the scope of the Family Law Act 1996,
in the absence of a sexual relationship and cohabitation. The Protection from
Harassment Act 1997 would, on the other hand, provide a remedy.
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made by an employee once her employment was terminated. The Court of Appeal so
held in Rhys-Harper v Relaxion Group plc (2001). A complaint under s 6 of the Sex
Discrimination Act 1975 could only be made during the relevant employment.
58 Protection from Harassment Act 1997, s 1 and, in relation to Scotland, s 8(1).
59 Ibid, s 3.
60 As contained in the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 and the
Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1978. The former statute has been
repealed, the latter repealed in part in so far as it relates to domestic violence.
61 The 1978 Act covered only married couples.
62 See, however, Hunter v Canary Wharf (1997).
Effectiveness
In an area of regulation which is both complex and sensitive, the law
inevitably falls short of achieving the ideal of a racially or sexually non-
discriminatory society.63 Much remains to be achieved – in law and practice –
before claims to real equality can be made. 
Sexual equality under European Community law
In the field of employment, the law of the European Community has greatly
extended the equality of men and women. See Chapter 9.
EQUALITY AND DISABILITY
In 1995, parliament passed the Disability Discrimination Act, under which the
National Disability Council was established as an advisory body. The Council
had no investigative powers in relation to allegations of discrimination nor
did it have enforcement powers. The Disability Rights Commission Act 1999
amends the 1995 Act and provides for the establishment of the Disability
Rights Commission, modelled on the EOC and the Commission for Racial
Equality. The government has confirmed that the Act is compatible with the
European Convention on Human Rights, as required by section 19 of the
Human Rights Act 1998.
Under the 1995 Act, a person has a disability for the purposes of the Act if
he has a physical or mental impairment which has a substantial and long term
adverse effect on his ability to carry out normal day to day activities.64 The
provisions of the Act relate both to persons with current disability and to
persons who have previously suffered a disability. It is unlawful for an
employer to discriminate against a disabled person in relation to
arrangements for interviews, the terms of an offer of employment, or refusing
to offer or deliberately not offering the disabled person employment. It is
equally unlawful to discriminate against a disabled employee. The meaning of
discrimination in section 5 is modelled on the Race Relations Act 1976 and Sex
Discrimination Act 1975. However, the Court of Appeal has ruled that
discrimination in relation to disability is different from discrimination based
on race and sex, and that cases under the legislation relating to racial and
sexual discrimination are not a satisfactory guide to interpretation of the 1995
Act. If less favourable treatment of a disabled person is shown to be justified,
it is not discrimination.65 Where any arrangements made by the employer, or
any physical feature of the relevant premises place the disabled person at a
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‘substantial’ disadvantage, the employer is under a duty to make adjustments
to premises, reallocate work, transfer the employee to another post, alter
working hours, assign him or her to a different place of work, allow him or
her to be absent for the purposes of rehabilitation, assessment or treatment,
providing training, acquiring or modifying equipment or instruction or
reference manuals, modifying procedures for testing or assessment, providing
a reader or interpreter and providing supervision.66 Section 7 makes detailed
provision for matters to be taken into consideration when determining
whether an employer has complied with the duty imposed, and provides for
the making of regulations to amplify the specific requirements of the Act.
Small businesses are exempt from the provisions of the Act, and Part I does
not apply to an employer having less than 20 employees.
Complaints under the Act are made to an employment tribunal, which has
the power to make a declaration as to the rights of the complainant and the
respondent in relation to the complaint, to order the respondent to pay
compensation to the complainant and to make recommendations to the
respondent as to the actions required to be taken to obviate or reduce the
adverse effect on the complainant. Compensation is calculated by applying
the principles applicable to the calculation of damages in claims of tort or, in
Scotland, reparation for breach of statutory duty, and may include
compensation for injury to feelings.67
Part III of the Act relates to discrimination in other areas, including the
provision of goods or services, accommodation and facilities. Part V regulates
public transport and provides that the Secretary of State may make
regulations relating to the accessibility of taxis, public service vehicles and rail
vehicles.
Under Part VI, the National Disability Council was established (now the
Disability Rights Commission, see below), with advisory, but not
investigatory powers. Section 55 of the Act makes it unlawful to discriminate
against another by way of victimisation. Victimisation is interpreted as
meaning treating a disabled person less favourably than another person
whose circumstances are the same as the disabled person, and the relevant
person is treated less favourably because the relevant person has brought
proceedings under the Act, or given evidence or information or otherwise
done anything under the Act in relation to the discriminator, or alleged that
the other person has contravened the Act, or the person believes or suspects
that the disabled person has done or intends to do any of those things. It is
unlawful for a person to knowingly aid another person to do an act made
unlawful under the Act.68
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The Disability Rights Commission is a non-departmental public body. It
consists of between ten and 15 members, a majority of whom must be
disabled or be people who have had a disability. The general functions of the
Commission are to work towards the elimination of discrimination against
disabled persons; to promote the equalisation of opportunities for disabled
persons; to take such steps as it considers appropriate with a view to
encouraging good practice in the treatment of disabled persons and to keep
under review the working of the 1995 and 1999 Acts.69 The Commission may
make proposals or give advice to ministers as to any aspect of the law or a
proposed change to the law, and advise government agencies and other
public authorities as to the practical application of the law and undertake the
carrying out of research.70
The Act also imposes a number of specific duties on the Commission.
Under section 4, the Commission may issue non-discrimination notices if it is
satisfied, in the course of a formal investigation, that a person has committed
an unlawful act. In lieu of enforcement notices, agreements may be entered
into between the Commission and the relevant person, in writing and binding
on both parties, detailing the steps to be taken to ensure no unlawful act is
committed.71 The Commission may assist persons bringing or contemplating
bringing legal proceedings under the 1995 Act.72 Where such assistance is
given and the Commission incurs costs, those costs are recoverable from costs
awarded to the complainant, but not from any award of damages or
compensation.73
The Disability Rights Commission has power to issue Codes of Practice,
and when requested by the Secretary of State to do so, must prepare a Code of
Practice dealing with specified matters. Draft Codes are to be approved by the
Secretary of State.74
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Freedom of expression entails many aspects: an individual’s freedom to
express any view he or she wishes, however offensive to others, in private or
public; freedom of the press to express any view; freedom of authors to
write and publish; and freedom of film makers to record and distribute
films/videos for private and public consumption. Blackstone, in his
Commentaries, said of freedom of the press that:
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... the liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state. Every
free man has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the
public; to forbid this is to destroy the freedom the press; but if he publishes
what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequences of his
own temerity.
In the United Kingdom, there is no right to free speech but, in a negative way,
there is a freedom of expression subject to the limitations imposed by law.
Freedom of expression is regulated under Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, now incorporated into domestic law under the
Human Rights Act 1998. However, the right is limited by restrictions.
Freedom of expression under Article 10 includes the ‘freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers’.75 The right is
subject to such legal restrictions as are ‘necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others’.76 Legal restrictions on the exercise of the right by
members of the armed forces, police or of the administration of the state are
permitted. The effect of Article 10 is that all restrictions on the right must be
justified, in common with other restricted Articles, according to these criteria:
they must be both necessary and proportionate.77 The Article 10 right is also
regulated by section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which was drafted so
as to prevent claims to privacy78 restricting freedom of the press.79 Section
12(4) provides that:
The court must have particular regard to the importance of the Convention
right to freedom of expression and, where the proceedings relate to material
which the respondent claims, or which appears to the court, to be journalistic,
literary or artistic material (or to conduct connected with such material), to –
(a) the extent to which –
(i) the material is, or is about to, become available to the public;80 or
(ii) it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be published;
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75 But does not prevent state licensing of broadcasting, television or cinemas.
76 The issue of whether to order the postponement of reporting of a trial until after the
conclusion of a second related trial came before the Court of Appeal in R v Sherwood ex
parte The Telegraph Group plc and Others (2001). The court ruled that the ban was
necessary in the interests of justice.
77 On the meaning of these terms, see Chapter 19.
78 Protected under Article 8.
79 See Chapter 19.
80 In Attorney General v Times Newspapers, the government lost its appeal to restrain
publication of Richard Tomlinson’s The Big Breach: From Top Secret to Maximum Security,
which the government alleged would damage national security. The Court of Appeal
ruled that if the material was already in the public domain, whether at home or abroad
(the book had been published in Moscow), then there should be no restraint on freedom
of expression and the publishing of extracts from the book. 
(b) any relevant privacy code.81
As will be seen below, however, section 12(4) appears from the early case law
not to have deterred the courts from expanding rights to privacy when they
conflict with freedom of expression in the press. 
Restrictions on freedom of speech
Defamation82
Defamation – slander or libel – may be defined as the publication, whether
oral or written, of a falsehood which damages the reputation of the person
concerned and lowers the victim’s reputation in the eyes of ‘right thinking
members of society generally’.83 Slander is defamation in the form of the
spoken word; libel is defamation in some permanent form, such as publication
in books or newspapers. Publication via radio or television broadcasting, or in
the course of public theatre performances, is defined as libel rather than
slander.84
Defamation may attract criminal or civil liability. Criminal libel85 is rare,
and proceedings may not be brought without leave of a High Court judge,
which will be granted only where the libel is prima facie very serious and the
public interest justifies the prosecution. In 1976, a private prosecution was
brought against the publishers of Private Eye in respect of allegations that Sir
James Goldsmith was involved in a conspiracy to obstruct the course of
justice.86 The Law Commission has recommended that criminal libel should
be abolished.87
Civil liability for defamation is more frequent and poses difficult questions
concerning the extent to which freedom of expression is to be balanced against
protection of the reputation of others – whether individuals or organisations.
Relaxation of the restrictions on reporting imposed by the law of defamation
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81 See R v Advertising Standards Authority Ltd and Another ex parte Matthias Roth BV and
Another (2001), in which adjudications published by the Advertising Standards
Authority under its non-statutory code were held to be ‘prescribed by law’ within the
meaning of Article 10 of the Convention. The Codes of Advertising and Sales
Promotion had the ‘underpinning’ of subordinate legislation which gave recognition for
the statutory recognition of means of dealing with complaints. The Code of Practice was
readily accessible and therefore prescribed by law, its provisions being sufficiently clear
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the consequences of infringing the provisions.
82 For details, see textbooks on the law of tort.
83 Sim v Stretch (1936), p 671.
84 Theatres Act 1968, s 4; Broadcasting Act 1990, s 166.
85 An offence at common law but, in part, regulated by statute: see Libel Act 1843; Law of
Libel Amendment Act 1888.
86 Goldsmith v Pressdram Ltd (1977) (the prosecution was withdrawn after a settlement was
reached with the publishers). See, also, Desmond v Thorne (1982).
87 Working Paper No 84, 1982, London: HMSO. See, also, Report of the Committee on
Defamation, Cmnd 5909, 1975, London: HMSO.
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in the United Kingdom were considered, but rejected, by the Faulks
Committee.88
Freedom of expression is essential in a free and democratic society, and
restrictions which inhibit criticism of public authorities, in particular,
undermine the potential for scrutiny of official action. For this reason, in
Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers (1993), the House of Lords has
ruled that neither local nor central government had standing to sue for
defamation. Lord Keith stated that ‘it is of the highest importance that a
democratically elected governmental body ... should be open to uninhibited
public criticism’.
Defences to an action for defamation
The defence of truth
If a statement is damaging to the reputation of another but nevertheless
justified on the basis that it is true, no liability will arise. It is not essential that
every aspect of a statement must be absolutely true, but it must be true in
most material respects.89 Section 5 of the Defamation Act 1952 provides a
statutory defence of truth.90
Fair comment
Expressions of opinion on matters of public interest – even though unfair or
biased – may be protected under the defence of fair comment. The defence
will not succeed if there are factual inaccuracies in the statement or if the
statement was motivated by malice. The defence is important in giving
limited protection to the publication of comments about public figures whose
actions are matters of public interest.91
Unintentional defamation
Under section 4 of the Defamation Act 1952, the unintentional, or innocent,
publication of statements which are defamatory may be defended. It must be
shown that the publisher of the defamation has genuinely tried to make
amends either by way of an apology and by correcting the false statement. 
Absolute privilege
Some speech is absolutely privileged. That is to say, the words, however
libellous, are protected from the law of defamation. An example of such
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89 See, eg, Bookbinder v Tebbit (1989).
90 The protection is not absolute and is restricted, for example, in relation to publications
regarding records of former (spent) criminal convictions: Rehabilitation of Offenders
Act 1974, s 8.
91 See Silkin v Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd (1958); Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd (1968).
protection is parliamentary privilege; see Chapter 18 on this. As we have seen,
Article IX of the Bill of Rights 1689 gives absolute protection to words spoken
in proceedings in parliament. Statements made in the course of judicial
proceedings also attract absolute privilege; as do statements by the
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration.92
Qualified privilege
This offers a more limited protection. A statement will attract qualified
privilege provided that the defamatory statement is made without malice. The
Parliamentary Papers Act 1840 gives privilege from defamation laws to fair
and accurate reports of proceedings in parliament. Qualified privilege has
been held to attach to a communication between a Member of Parliament –
who forwarded a constituent’s complaint – and the Lord Chancellor and the
Law Society where the matter is held to be in the public interest.93
Newspapers radio and television broadcasts also attract qualified
privilege. Under the Defamation Act 1952, protection extends to fair and
accurate reports of judicial proceedings and international organisations; fair
and accurate reports of public meetings; local authority meetings; meetings of
public companies; proceedings before statutory tribunals and inquiries and
public election meetings.94
Qualified privilege was considered by the House of Lords in Reynolds v
Times Newspapers Ltd (1999). The former Prime Minister of the Republic of
Ireland brought libel proceedings against The Times newspaper in relation to
an article which, he alleged, suggested that he had lied to parliament and to
Cabinet colleagues. No account of the Prime Minister’s explanation was given.
On qualified privilege, the House of Lords ruled, inter alia, that there should
be no defence of generic qualified privilege for political information. The
article had made serious allegations without giving the former Prime
Minister’s explanation, and the defence of qualified privilege was not made
out and could not be argued by the defendants at the re-trial of the issue.
In Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Ltd (2001), the Court of Appeal
reconsidered qualified privilege, following the approach laid down in
Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd (1998). In 1999, The Times had published two
articles in which it accused Grigor Loutchansky of involvement in
international criminal activities. The public interest in a democratic society
necessitated freedom of expression and the promotion of a free and vigorous
press. However, there was a corresponding duty to act responsibly, and no
privilege arose unless the press was seen to be acting responsibly. Where that
was made out, and there was no malice, the publisher acquired an immunity
from legal liability for the publication of statements the truth of which could
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not be fully proven. Brooke LJ stated that ‘the court had to balance the
powerful interests of the media in the right to freedom of expression against
the interest of an individual who complained that he had been wrongfully
defamed’. There was, however, no unfettered right to publish whatever a
newspaper believed to be in the public interest. The publication must be
consistent with the restriction in Article 10.2 of the Convention on Human
Rights. 
SEDITION, INCITEMENT TO 
DISAFFECTION AND TREASON95
Sedition
Sedition includes words or conduct directed against the peace or authority of
the state. Sedition is a common law offence which may involve the spoken
word or written materials which are libellous. The intention which must be
proven in relation to sedition is that the accused intended to bring ‘into hatred
or contempt’, or to ‘excite disaffection’ against, the Crown or government.96
The words used must be such that they are intended to promote violence or
public disorder. Merely strong criticism, therefore, which is not intended to be
inflammatory will not result in liability. Recent use of the law of sedition is
seen in R v Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Choudhury (1991),
in which the Divisional Court,97 adopting the test laid down by the Canadian
Supreme Court,98 ruled that the correct test for seditious intention is ‘an
intention to incite to violence or to create public disturbance or disorder
against His Majesty or the institutions of government’. 
Incitement to disaffection
The Incitement to Disaffection Act 1934 provides that it is an offence
intentionally to attempt to dissuade a member of the armed forces from
complying with his duty. It is also an offence to aid, counsel or procure
commission of the principal offence. In R v Arrowsmith (1975), the defendant
was accused and convicted of distributing leaflets to soldiers urging them not
to serve in Northern Ireland, and the conviction was upheld by the Court of
Appeal.99 A similar offence exists in relation to causing disaffection within the
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against Mr Salman Rushdie, author of The Satanic Verses.
98 Boucher v R (1951).
99 An application under the European Convention on Human Rights failed: see
Arrowsmith v United Kingdom (1978).
police force.100 There also remains on the statute book the Aliens Restriction
(Amendment) Act 1919, section 3 of which prohibits aliens from causing
sedition or disaffection among the population and the armed forces, and
makes it a summary offence to cause industrial unrest in an industry in which
he has not been employed for two years. 
Treason
The Treason Act 1351 made it a capital offence to give ‘aid and comfort to the
King’s enemies’. In Joyce v Director of Public Prosecutions (1946), William Joyce
was convicted of making propaganda broadcasts on behalf of the Nazis
during the Second World War. The death penalty for treason and piracy with
violence was abolished by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, section 36.
Section 21(5) of the Human Rights Act 1998 abolishes the death penalty for
military offences.
Incitement to racial hatred
The first attempt at protecting persons from racial hatred was contained in the
Race Relations Act 1965. The justification for restricting offensive racist speech
– and hence freedom of expression – lies in the greater need to protect
individual minority groups from demeaning and discriminatory speech.
Incitement to racial hatred is now regulated under sections 17 to 23 of the
Public Order Act 1986.101 Section 17 defines racial hatred as meaning ‘hatred
against any group of persons in Great Britain defined by reference to colour,
race, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins’. 
There are two basic requirements which relate to the offences in the Act.
First, that the words used, or behaviour, must be ‘threatening, abusive or
insulting’. Secondly, the words or behaviour must either have been intended
to incite racial hatred or be likely to do so. Under the Act, it is an offence to use
words or behaviour, or display written material, which have the above
elements. Publication of or distributing such material is also an offence.102 The
performance of plays, showing of films or videos or playing of records or
broadcasts intended to or likely to incite racial hatred is an offence.103 The
Act, in section 23, also creates the offence of possession of such materials.
Prosecutions may only be commenced with the consent of the Attorney
General. 
Racial abuse at football matches is a criminal offence.104 The Crime and
Disorder Act 1998 extends the law to include racially aggravated offences,105 a
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reform prompted by the findings of the inquiry into the death of Stephen
Lawrence.106 The offences of racially aggravated assault, criminal damage,
public disorder and harassment are created. In addition, higher sentences may
be imposed in relation to any other offences where that was found to be
racially motivated.
OBSCENITY, INDECENCY, 
CENSORSHIP AND PORNOGRAPHY107
The Obscene Publications Act 1959
The Obscene Publications Act 1959 creates the offence of publication of an
obscene article, whether or not for gain. Further, it is an offence to have such
articles in ownership, possession or control for the purpose of publication for
gain or with a view to publication.108 An article109 is ‘obscene’ if ‘its effect ... is
... such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having
regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained
or embodied in it’.110
An article will be ‘published’, according to section 1(3), if a person:
(a) distributes, circulates, sells, lets on hire, gives or lends it, or who offers it
for sale or for letting on hire; or
(b) in the case of an article containing or embodying matter to be looked at or
a record, shows, plays or projects it.
The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 amends section 1(3) by adding
the words ‘or where the matter is stored electronically, transmits that data’.111
The tendency to ‘deprave and corrupt’
It is not sufficient that an article disgusts, or is ‘filthy’, ‘loathsome’ or
‘lewd’.112 What must be established is that the article will ‘deprave or
corrupt’.113 Nor is it sufficient that the article is capable of depraving or
corrupting just one person: the test is whether or not a significant proportion
of persons likely to read or see the article would be depraved or corrupted by
it.114 The fact that the persons likely to read the article regularly read such
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materials is irrelevant to whether or not the material can deprave or
corrupt,115 although the same argument may not hold if the likely audience is
to be police officers experienced with dealing with pornography.116
There exists a defence of public good117 but the defence is interpreted
narrowly.118 For example, in Director of Public Prosecutions v Jordan (1977),119
where the defendant argued the psychotherapeutic benefit of ‘soft porn’ for
the consumer, the judge rejected the defence, holding that what was for the
public good was art, literature or science. It is an offence to send or attempt to
send indecent or obscene materials through the post.120 It is also an offence to
import indecent or obscene materials. Such materials may be forfeited.121
Broadcasting, cinemas, theatres and video recordings 
Section 2 of the Theatres Act 1968 prohibits obscenity in theatrical
performances. The law relating to obscenity applies to live performances,
subject to the defence of public good. Legal regulation of live performances
also exists in the form of section 20 of the Public Order Act 1986, which
prohibits the use of threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour
intended or likely to stir up racial hatred. Section 6 of the Theatres Act
prohibits words or behaviour likely to cause a breach of the peace. Offences
which relate to gross indecency between males can also be committed under
section 13 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. In order to avoid frivolous or
censorious legal action, the consent of the Attorney General is required in
relation to prosecutions under the Theatres Act, Public Order Act and Sexual
Offences Act.
The Broadcasting Act 1990 and Video Recordings Act 1984 each prohibit
obscenity on local radio services, television and video. In relation to
broadcasting, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), established under
the royal prerogative,122 is under a duty not to adopt its own political stance
on current affairs, and may only broadcast party political programmes with
the consent of the major political parties. In relation to television companies
and radio services financed through advertising, the Broadcasting Act 1990
provides statutory regulation. An Independent Television Commission
(ITC),123 whose members are appointed by the Home Secretary, is under a
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duty to ensure effective competition in the provision of services. The
Commission licenses programme makers. Under section 6 of the Broadcasting
Act, a number of duties are imposed on the Commission. Section 6 provides,
in part, that:
(1) The Commission shall do all that they can to secure that every licensed
service compiles with the following requirements, namely:
(a) that nothing is included in its programmes which offends against good
taste or decency or is likely to encourage or incite to crime or to lead to
disorder or to be offensive to public feeling;
(b) that any news given (in whatever form) in its programmes is presented
with due accuracy and impartiality;
(c) that due impartiality is preserved on the part of the person providing
the service as respects matters of political or industrial controversy or
relating to current public policy;
(d) that due responsibility is exercised with respect to the content of any of
its programmes which are religious programmes, and that, in
particular, any such programmes do not involve:
(i) any improper exploitation of any susceptibilities of those watching
the programmes, or
(ii) any abusive treatment of the religious views and beliefs of those
belonging to a particular religion or religious denomination ...
Under section 143 of the Broadcasting Act 1990, the Broadcasting Complaints
Commission was under a duty to adjudicate upon complaints concerning:
(a) unjust or unfair treatment in programmes ...; or
(b) unwarranted infringement of privacy in, or in connection with the
obtaining of material included in, such programmes ...
The Broadcasting Act 1996 established the Broadcasting Standards
Commission, amalgamating the Broadcasting Standards Council and the
Broadcasting Complaints Commission. The Broadcasting Standards
Commission is under a statutory duty to draw up codes of guidance in
relation to the portrayal of violence in programmes, and in connection with
the portrayal of sexual conduct in programmes, and ‘standards of taste and
decency for such programmes generally’.124 In addition, the Commission is
under a duty to monitor programmes and to report of such matters as the
portrayal of violence, sexual conduct, and standards of taste and decency in
programmes and to consider complaints.125 The Commission also has the
power to make reports on standards and, in particular, may make an
assessment of the attitudes of the public at large in relation to violence or
sexual conduct in programmes, and standards of taste and decency. 
The Broadcasting Act 1990 also conferred power on the Secretary of State
to proscribe foreign satellite services, where the Independent Television
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Commission, or Radio Authority, consider that a satellite service is
‘unacceptable’ on the basis that it repeatedly contains material which ‘offends
against good taste or decency or is likely to incite to crime or to lead to
disorder or to be offensive to public feeling’.126
Section 109 of the Broadcasting Act 1996 extends the functions of the
Broadcasting Standards Commission to include monitoring:
... so far as practicable, all television and sound programmes which are
transmitted or sent from outside the United Kingdom but are capable of being
received there, with a view to ascertaining:
(a) how violence and sexual conduct are portrayed in those programmes; and
(b) the extent to which those programmes meet standards of taste and
decency.
The regulation of films falls to the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC),
and their availability for viewing by the public controlled by local authorities.
The BBFC operates a system of classification by age: ‘U’ for general
circulation, ‘PG’ (parental guidance), 12, 15, and 18 certificate films, and R18
films which are for restricted viewing only on segregated premises. The BBFC
may refuse a certificate if the film contravenes the Obscene Publications Act
1959, and may insist on cuts to a film before a certificate is granted. Local
authorities exercise control through the granting of licences for a particular
film to be shown in its area.127
The BBFC also classifies videos for private viewing. The Video Recordings
Act 1984 requires that the BBFC should have ‘special regard to the likelihood of
video works being viewed in the home’ (section 4). The BBFC must also pay
‘special regard’ to the harm caused potential viewers by the depiction of
criminal activity, illegal drugs, violence and sexual behaviour.128 The growth
in Internet availability led to the transmission of electronically stored data
being included within the Obscene Publications Act 1959 definition of
‘publication’.129 However, the likelihood of enforcement is slim, given the
nature of the Internet and the ability of anyone, worldwide, to place items on it.
Conspiracy to corrupt public morals
Under the common law, publishers may be liable for the offence of conspiracy
to corrupt public morals. In Shaw v Director of Public Prosecutions (1962), Shaw,
the publisher of a directory giving the names and details of prostitutes was
prosecuted for conspiracy to corrupt public morals.130 The House of Lords
(Lord Reid dissenting) held that the courts have a ‘residual power to enforce
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the supreme and fundamental purpose of the law, to conserve not only the
safety and order but also the moral welfare of the state’.131
Shaw v Director of Public Prosecutions was upheld in Knuller Ltd v Director of
Public Prosecutions (1973). The publishers had produced a magazine
containing advertisements for male homosexuals. The House of Lords upheld
Shaw, rejecting as a defence the fact that the Sexual Offences Act 1967
provided that homosexual acts between adult males, in private, were no
longer an offence. The use of this common law offence is rare; nevertheless, it
remains an available offence which enables the state to avoid statutory
offences which provide defences such as that of the ‘public good’.132
Blasphemy and blasphemous libel133
Blasphemy is a common law offence which prohibits words which cause
outrage to the feelings of a Christian by abusing Christ or by denying or
attacking the established church. Between 1922 and 1977, there were no
prosecutions brought and it was thought that the offence had fallen into
disuse. In 1976, however, the magazine Gay News published a poem and
illustration depicting Christ at the Crucifixion. A private prosecution against
the editor and publisher was instigated,134 alleging that the poem and
illustration ‘vilified Christ in His Life and His Crucifixion’. The resulting case
was R v Lemon (1979), in which the jury, by a majority verdict, found the
words and drawing blasphemous.135 On appeal to the House of Lords, the
question of law concerned the mental element required for a conviction of
blasphemy. By a majority, the House of Lords held that there was no need to
prove an intention to blaspheme, but rather that it was sufficient to prove that
a blasphemous libel – a publication calculated to outrage and insult a
Christian’s religious beliefs – had been published. The majority136 dismissed
the appeal against conviction, holding that the law required no more than an
intention to publish words found by the jury to be blasphemous. It was
unnecessary to hold137 that there was intention to offend, or reckless
indifference to whether or not offence was caused. 
In Lord Scarman’s opinion, the law should be extended to protect the
religious beliefs and feelings of non-Christians. Lord Scarman stated that:
... the offence belongs to a group of criminal offences designed to safeguard the
internal tranquillity of the kingdom. In an increasingly plural society such as
that of modern Britain it is necessary not only to respect the differing religious
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beliefs, feelings and practices of all but also to protect them from scurrility,
vilification, ridicule and contempt. [p 658]
This view was not to prevail, however. In R v Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary
Magistrate ex parte Choudhury (1991), it was held that blasphemy remained
confined to protection of the Christian religion as exemplified by the
established Church of England, and did not extend to the protection of the
Islamic faith. That the law should offer such limited and discriminatory
protection is both anachronistic and offensive to the principle of equality in a
pluralistic society. The Law Commission in 1985 recommended that the
offence be abolished,138 but the government has not acted on this
recommendation.139
Contempt of court
The law relating to contempt of court developed in order to protect the
judiciary and judicial proceedings from actions or words which would
impede or adversely affect the administration of justice, or ‘tends to obstruct,
prejudice or abuse the administration of justice’.140 Contempt of court, under
English but not Scottish law, may be criminal or civil. In relation to criminal
contempt, which may be dealt with in both the civil and criminal courts, the
action relates to conduct which is designed to interfere with the
administration of justice, which may of itself involve a criminal offence. The
court has the power to rule on the existence of a contempt and to punish the
guilty party. Where the judge finds the person guilty of contempt, he may
commit the person instantly to prison. Two principal forms of criminal
contempt exist.
Scandalising the court
The need to maintain public confidence in the judiciary underpins this
offence. Criticism of a judge, or a court’s decision, may be a contempt if it
suggests bias or unfairness on the part of the judge or court.141
Contempt in the face of the court
Conduct in court which impedes the judicial process may be a contempt. A
demonstration which interrupts proceedings,142 or insulting behaviour, or
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refusal of a witness to answer questions or give evidence, or comply with a
court order to disclose information may amount to contempt.143
Publications prejudicing the course of justice
The balance to be struck between freedom of expression and the protection of
judicial proceedings is a matter for debate. The Contempt of Court Act 1981,
which reformed the common law of contempt, sought to achieve the
appropriate balance. Before that Act, the law relating to contempt proved
capable of inhibiting freedom of the press for an extensive period of time,
where judicial proceedings became protracted. The leading case which
presaged reform of the law is that of The Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979)
(see, further, Chapter 19). In 1974, the House of Lords restored an
injunction144 prohibiting The Sunday Times from publishing articles relating to
the drug Thalidomide, manufactured by Distillers Ltd, which, it was alleged,
caused serious deformities in babies. The parents of the affected children
intended to sue Distillers for compensation. The company entered into
protracted negotiations with the families’ solicitors. The injunction restrained
any further publication on the matter by the newspaper. The Sunday Times
made an application under the Article 10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, which protects freedom of expression, alleging that the
common law of contempt violated Article 10. The European Court of Human
Rights held that there had been a violation of Article 10. 
The Contempt of Court Act 1981
Section 1 of the Contempt of Court Act provides for the ‘strict liability rule’.
The rule is defined as ‘the rule of law whereby conduct may be treated as a
contempt of court as tending to interfere with the course of justice in
particular legal proceedings regardless of intent to do so’ (emphasis added). In
order for the strict liability rule to be established, a number of issues need to
be satisfied. First, the test relates only to publications falling within section 2 of
the Act. Publications are defined in section 2(1) as including ‘any speech,
writing [programme included in a programme service]145 or other
communication in whatever form, which is addressed to the public at large or
any section of the public’. Secondly, the publication must be such that it
‘creates a substantial risk that the course of justice in the proceedings in
question will be seriously impeded or prejudiced’. Thirdly, the strict liability
rule applies only if the proceedings in question are ‘active’, as defined by
Schedule 2 to the Act. In relation to appellate proceedings, these are active
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from the time when they are commenced, by an application for leave to
appeal or apply for review, or by notice of appeal or of application to review
or by other originating process, ‘until disposed of or abandoned, discontinued
or withdrawn’.146 In relation to criminal proceedings, the starting point is the
issue of a warrant for arrest, arrest without warrant or the service of an
indictment.147 The end point is acquittal, sentence, any other verdict or
discontinuance of the trial. In relation to civil proceedings, the start point is
when the case is set down for a hearing in the High Court. The end point is
when the proceedings are disposed of, discontinued or withdrawn.148
It is a defence to prove that, at the time of publication, or distribution of
the publication, he or she does not know, and has no reason to suspect, that
relevant proceedings are active.149 Fair and accurate reports of legal
proceedings, held in public, and published ‘contemporaneously and in good
faith’ do not attract the strict liability rule.150 In addition, if publication is
made as, or as part of, a discussion in ‘good faith of public affairs or other
matters of general public interest’, it is not to be treated as contempt of court,
‘if the risk of impediment or prejudice to particular legal proceedings is
merely incidental to the discussion’.151
Section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act regulates the disclosure of
sources. The court may not require disclosure, and a person will not be guilty
of contempt as a result of non-disclosure, unless the court is satisfied that
‘disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice or national security or for the
prevention of disorder or crime’. The leading case is X Ltd v Morgan Grampian
(1991), in which the House of Lords ruled on the decision making process
entailed in section 10. In that case, a confidential plan was stolen from the
plaintiffs and information from the plan given to a journalist. The plaintiffs
applied for an order requiring the journalist, William Goodwin, to disclose the
source and sought discovery of his notes of the telephone conversation in
order to discover the identity of the source. The House of Lords, in balancing
the competing interests – the applicant’s right to take legal action against the
source and the journalist’s interest in maintaining confidentiality with the
source – held that the interests of the plaintiffs outweighed the interests of the
journalist. This decision led to an application under the European Convention
under Article 10 – the right to freedom of expression. In Goodwin v United
Kingdom (1996), the Court ruled that the order against the journalist violated
his right to freedom of expression which was central to a free press.152
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It is for the court to determine whether a particular decision making forum
is a ‘court’ for the purposes of the law as to contempt of court. In General
Medical Council v British Broadcasting Corporation (1998), the Court of Appeal
ruled that the Professional Conduct Committee (PCC) of the General Medical
Council was not part of the judicial process of the state and accordingly was
not subject to the Contempt of Court Act 1981. The PCC was a statutory
committee under the Medical Act 1983, with power to remove the registration
of a medical practitioner if found guilty of a criminal offence or judged to be
guilty of serious professional misconduct. The PCC sat in public and had the
assistance of a legally qualified assessor to advise on questions of law. All
parties were entitled to be heard and represented by solicitors and counsel.
Evidence was given on oath and witnesses could be summonsed and
documents called for. The PCC was therefore exercising a sort of judicial
power, but it was not the judicial power of the state. It has a recognisable
judicial function, but was not part of the judicial system of the state.
Accordingly, the PCC did not constitute a court for contempt of court
purposes.
Where the judge considers that disclosure is necessary in the interests of
justice, a discretion remains as to whether disclosure should be ordered. That
involved weighing up the competing interests of the need for disclosure and
the need for protection of sources. In John and Others v Express Newspapers and
Others (2000), the Court of Appeal ruled that the need to protect journalistic
sources overrode the need for disclosure of the source of a confidential
document which had come into the hands of a journalist by a breach of
confidentiality in relation to legal advice given by a firm of solicitors.153
However, the exercise of discretion led to a different conclusion in Camelot
Group plc v Centaur (1999). In that case, a disloyal employee of Camelot sent a
copy of draft accounts to a journalist employed by the defendant. The Court of
Appeal ruled that the public interest in enabling the plaintiffs to discover a
disloyal employee who leaked confidential information was greater than the
public interest in enabling the employee to escape detection. The order for
disclosure was upheld. 
Contempt of court and Article 10 of the European Convention
The impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 is being felt in this area of law. In
Ashworth Security Hospital v MGN Ltd, The Mirror newspaper had published
verbatim extracts from hospital medical records of information concerning a
convicted murderer who was detained at the hospital. The information had
been supplied to the newspaper, in breach of confidence and breach of
contract, by a hospital employee through an intermediary. The Contempt of
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Court Act 1981, section 10, provided for orders of disclosure of sources of
information only where it was established that ‘disclosure is necessary in the
interests of justice or national security or for the prevention of disorder or
crime’. The hospital had failed to identify the informant and sought an order
that MGN identify the intermediary as the only likely means of discovering
the source’s identity. MGN argued that such an order would contravene
Article 10 of the Convention. The Court of Appeal ruled that unless the source
was identified and dismissed, there was a significant risk that there would be
further selling of confidential information, and that such disclosures
amounted to an attack on confidentiality which should be safeguarded in any
democratic society. Where a person against whom disclosure was sought – in
this case the intermediary – had ‘become mixed-up in wrongful, albeit not
tortious, conduct that infringed a claimant’s legal rights’, the court had
jurisdiction to order disclosure. In Interbrew SA v Financial Times (2001), the
court declared itself bound by the decision in Ashworth.154 A claimant was
entitled to an order for delivery up of leaked and partly forged documents
held by publishers in order to enable him to ascertain the proper defendant to
a breach of confidence action. The ‘public interest in protecting the source of a
leak was not sufficient to withstand the countervailing public interest in
letting Interbrew seek justice in the courts against the source’.155
In Attorney General v Punch Ltd and Another (2001), the Court of Appeal
considered Article 10. The former editor of Punch, and the publishers, had
been fined for being in contempt of court. At issue was the publication by
Punch of an article by David Shayler, the former MI5 officer. The Attorney
General had been granted injunctions on the basis that revelations by David
Shayler about matters relating to his employment would be contrary to
national security. The question was, where a court ordered that specified
material was not to be published, would a third party who, with the
knowledge of the order, published the specified material automatically
commit a contempt of court, or would contempt only occur if the third party
thereby knowingly defeated the purpose for which the order was made? The
court considered Attorney General v Newspaper Publishing plc (1988), Attorney
General v Observer Ltd (No 2) (1990) and Attorney General v Times Newspapers
Ltd (1992). It ruled that intentional interference with the manner in which a
judge was conducting a trial could amount to a contempt of court, and that a
third party who, with knowledge of that purpose, intentionally acted in such a
way as to defeat that purpose could be in contempt of court. Although the
order did not bind the third party, contempt arose where the conduct of the
trial was disrupted. Allowing the appeal, the court stated that the injunction
resulted in the ‘imposition of a restriction on freedom of the press that was
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disproportionate to any public interest and thus in breach of Article 10 of the
Convention’. 
Law of confidence
Injunctions may be sought in order to restrain the publication of information.
Injunctions are orders of a court, which can be either permanent or interim.
Injunctions impose what is called a ‘prior restraint’, that is to say, they prevent
disclosure of information in advance to avoid publication. An injunction can
be granted on the basis that the proposed item is libellous (defamatory) or in
breach of the common law duty of confidence. In the case of alleged libel,
judges are reluctant to impose a ‘prior restraint’ by way of injunction and will
not grant it if the defendant swears that they can prove the truth of the
defamatory statement or can defend it on the basis of ‘fair comment’. In cases
of breach of confidence, the judges are more willing to grant the injunction.
An example of this is seen in Schering Chemical v Falkman Ltd (1981). In
Schering, a Thames Television documentary regarding a pregnancy drug was
scheduled for transmission. The programme’s producer had been engaged as
a consultant to the drug manufacturers and the programme revealed material
obtained by him during his consultancy. The court held that a duty of
confidence existed, which should be enforced by injunction. In 1987, the
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) intended to transmit a television
documentary My Country Right or Wrong in which former security officers
were interviewed. An injunction was granted on the basis that there had
occurred a breach of confidence in the course of interviews.156 The BBC was
vetted by the Attorney General, who then withdrew the action but,
nevertheless, the transmission of the programme had been delayed for six
months. 
In the Thalidomide case (which resulted in The Sunday Times v United
Kingdom) (1980), injunctions were used to restrain newspapers from
publishing material which might have been prejudicial to forthcoming judicial
proceedings. For discussion of the case, see, further, Chapter 22. The book
Spycatcher, written by a former member of the Security Services, was also
restrained by way of an injunction based on breach of confidence owed to the
Service. See Chapter 23 for a discussion of Spycatcher. One objectionable aspect
of the use of such prior restraint is that there exists no trial of the merits of the
work which is being restrained: an injunction is issued, and the trial of the
facts may occur much later, when it may transpire that there has been an
unjustified, and often lengthy, restriction on freedom of expression. 
The notion of breach of confidence, originally relevant mainly to trade
secrets and unfair competition and industrial espionage, has expanded over
two decades in no particularly logical way, proceeding on a case by case basis.
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Disclosure of information may amount to breach of confidence if the
relationship is based on marriage,157 contracts of employment, consultancies
and potentially any situation involving a ‘confidential relationship’. A duty of
confidence is owed to Cabinet by individual ministers,158 and by members of
the Security Services and civil servants to the Crown.159 Where such a
relationship is held to exist, an obligation is imposed to keep information
confidential and a proposed disclosure will found an action for breach of
confidence. Defences to an action for breach of confidence include the
following:
Staleness
In Attorney General v Jonathan Cape Ltd (1976) (the Crossman Diaries case) the
information disclosed in breach of confidence was some ten years old and no
harm would follow from its publication. Accordingly, the court held that, in
the absence of a breach of national security, further restraint was not justified.
However, in the Spycatcher case, Attorney General v Guardian (No 2) (1990),
while the injunction was eventually lifted, the government claimed that the
duty of former Security Service personnel is lifelong and that no publication of
any matter concerning their employment may be disclosed. Section 1 of the
Official Secrets Act 1989 now reflects this duty and imposes criminal sanctions
on any revelations made in relation to security matters.
The material is in the public domain
While there may be found to be a duty of confidence, this duty does not
necessarily result in an injunction being permanently imposed to restrain
publication. In addition to the material being ‘stale’, it may be that the
material has already been published elsewhere, and is thus in the ‘public
domain’. In relation to the book Spycatcher, this matter weighed with the court.
The book had been published in Australia and the United States of America
and was, in fact, freely available anywhere outside the United Kingdom. 
Revealing true information to correct falsity
Irrespective of the existence of a duty of confidence, there may be situations
where material has been published which is false and which justifies a breach
of confidence in order to rectify the falsehood. In Woodward v Hutchins (1977),
for example, a falsehood concerning a pop star had been published.
Notwithstanding a duty of confidence, there was a justified and legitimate
need for rebuttal of the untruths. 
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Iniquity: to reveal evidence crime/fraud
Breach of confidence may be excused by the court if the defence of revealing
criminal or fraudulent activities is made out.
Public interest
The defence of public interest was considered in Lion Laboratories v Evans and
Express Newspapers (1984). The Express newspaper revealed information
concerning faulty intoximeters used to measure the extent of alcohol in an
individual’s bloodstream. Deficiencies in the breathalyser equipment could
have resulted in wrongful convictions for driving under the influence of
alcohol. The disclosure of confidential information was justified. There was no
question of the manufacturer having been guilty of any ‘iniquity’ or
wrongdoing. However, the matter was one of public interest which overrode
any claim to confidentiality of the information. 
PRIVACY AND THE MEDIA
The invasion of privacy by the media has also become a matter of rising
concern. In 1953, the Press Council was established.160 This self-regulatory
body proved woefully inadequate at controlling the press, not least because it
had no powers to fine newspapers. In 1972, the Younger Committee was
established to consider reforms in relation to press freedom. The Committee
recommended that a tort of disclosure of information unlawfully acquired
and a tort and crime of unlawful surveillance by technical devices be
introduced.161 The proposed reforms were not implemented. Concern over
intrusions into individual privacy have increased with the media attention
given to the Royal Family in recent years. The case of Kaye v Robertson and
Another (1991) heightened public interest in the respective right of an
individual to privacy and the right of the public to information. In Kaye,
journalists entered a hospital room in which the well known actor, Gordon
Kaye, was being treated for severe injuries sustained in a car accident. Kaye
agreed neither to be photographed nor interviewed. An injunction was
sought, and granted, to restrain the newspaper from publishing the
‘interview’ and photographs. On appeal, the Court of Appeal ruled that there
was no right to privacy under English law which could found the basis for an
injunction. 
In 1990, the Committee on Privacy and Related Matters (the Calcutt
committee) was established, which led to the creation of another self-
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regulatory body in 1991, the Press Complaints Commission.162 A review of
the working of the Commission by Sir David Calcutt163 found the protection
accorded to individuals inadequate. It has been recommended, therefore, that
a statutory body be established. That recommendation has not been
favoured.164
Privacy, freedom of expression and the Human Rights Act 1998
While there is no common right to privacy, the law relating to breach of
confidence has been expanded to a degree which suggests that privacy claims
are being given greater protection than was the case prior to the Human
Rights Act 1998. In Douglas and Others v Hello! Ltd (2001), the Court of Appeal
ruled that individuals had a right of personal privacy which was grounded in
the equitable doctrine of breach of confidence.165 Michael Douglas and
Catherine Zeta Jones had granted OK! magazine exclusive rights to publish
photographs of their wedding. Hello! magazine had obtained photographs of
the wedding and had been subjected to an interim injunction restraining
publication before the trial of the substantive issues.166 In this case, the
claimants had lessened the degree of privacy concerning their wedding by
allowing OK! magazine to publish photographs, thereby affecting the balance
between their rights (to privacy) and the rights of others to freedom of
expression. The court discharged the injunction. However, in a strong
statement of principle, Sedley LJ said that ‘we have reached a point at which it
can be said with confidence that the law recognises and will appropriately
protect a right of personal privacy’.
In Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers (MGN) Ltd (2002), the model Naomi
Campbell was awarded damages,, albeit minimal, by the High Court for the
disclosure of information relating to her attending meetings for the treatment
of drug addiction. The claimant accepted that The Mirror was entitled to
publish the fact that she was addicted to drugs and that she was having
therapy, but argued that details of the treatment were private and confidential
matters and that there was no overriding public interest justifying their
publication. The court ruled that in order for a claim for breach of confidence
to succeed, the claimant had to establish three things:
• that the details given had the necessary quality of confidence about them;
• that the details given must have been imparted in circumstances
importing an obligation of confidence; and that
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• publication of the details must have been to the claimant’s detriment.
The Court recognised that celebrities – even ‘self-publicists – were entitled to
some space or privacy’. Unless there was an overriding public interest in
publication, the media had to respect information relating to the private lives
of celebrities which they legitimately chose to keep private. 
Campbell may be compared with A v B plc (2001). The Court of Appeal
ruled that any interference with freedom of the press had to be justified, and
could not be limited because there was no identifiable public interest in the
material being published. The court distinguished between the confidentiality
which attached to sexual relations within marriage ‘or other stable
relationships’ and the confidentiality which attached to transient
relationships. Here, a footballer, A, had had sexual relationships with C and
D. He did not want his wife to find out. C and D, however, had no interest in
maintaining confidentiality. The Lord Chief Justice recognised that the
Convention provided ‘new parameters within which the court would decide
in an action for breach of confidence whether a person was entitled to have his
privacy protected’, or ‘whether the intrusion into freedom of information
which such protection involved could not be justified’. In this case, it was not
obvious why an injunction should be granted: A’s relationships were not in
the categories of relationships which the court should be astute to protect
when other parties did not want them to remain confidential. Freedom of the
press should prevail, and regulation of reporting in the press should be a
matter for the Press Council, not the courts.
In exceptional circumstances, where individuals were at serious risk of
injury or death if their identity or whereabouts became known, the law of
confidence could be applied to protect them. The Family Division of the High
Court so held in Venables and Another v News Group Newspapers and Others
(2001). In exceptional circumstances, taking into account the Human Rights
Act 1998 and in particular the right to life under Article 2 of the Convention,
the court had jurisdiction to extent the protection of confidentiality where ‘not
to do so would be likely to lead to serious physical injury, or the death of the
person seeking that confidentiality’, and there was no other way to protect the
applicants other than seeking injunctive relief.
The issue of whether to order the postponement of reporting of a trial until
after the conclusion of a second related trial was considered in R v Sherwood ex
parte The Telegraph Group plc and Others (2001). The Court of Appeal dismissed
an appeal against an order made under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court
Act 1981 during the trial of a police constable for murder. The order prevented
reporting on that trial until after the conclusion of a second trial against three
other defendants who were originally co-defendants of the accused. The
jurisdiction to make a postponement order under the 1981 operated in light of
Articles 6 (right to fair trial) and 10 (right to freedom of expression) of the
Convention. The 1981 Act required the court to consider whether a ban was
necessary to avoid the perceived risk of prejudice. Even if such a risk was not
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demonstrated, however, it did not follow that an order had to be made. The
next question to address was whether such an order was ‘necessary’ within
the meaning of Article 10(2) of the Convention. A three stage test was
necessary. First, it should be asked whether reporting would give rise to a not
insubstantial risk of prejudice to the administration of justice. Secondly, if
there was such a risk, would a postponement order eliminate the risk?
Thirdly, even if it was considered that there was no other way of eliminating
the risk, the judge had to consider whether the degree of risk contemplated
should be regarded as ‘tolerable in the sense of being the lesser of two evils’.
At this stage it was necessary to make value judgments as to the priority
between competing public interests. Justice required that the two trials be
separated, and publicity would inevitably defeat the purpose of the severance
order.
The Employment Appeal Tribunal ruled in Lord Chancellor and Another v
Coker and Another (2001) that the Lord Chancellor did not discriminate against
two women, one of whom was black, on the grounds of sex or race when he
appointed as special adviser a white male who was well known to him,
without advertising the post. The appointment process with regard to special
advisers was not subject to the general rules that applied to the appointment
of civil servants, since special advisers were not civil servants. In appointing a
special adviser, a key quality of the applicant was a commitment to the
political understanding of the particular minister.
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CHAPTER 21
PART I – ASSOCIATION AND ASSEMBLY 
While the detection and prosecution of crime and the preservation of public
order are of first importance in any state, the extent to which police powers
reflect a legitimate interference with the liberty and security of citizens is a
problematic question which involves evaluating the balance struck between
the rights of the individual and the powers of the police.
In any society, it is essential that there be a balance effected between the
legitimate rights of individual citizens to conduct their lives in maximum
freedom and the equally important need to protect order in society, without
which no citizen would enjoy freedom. In this chapter, the organisation of the
police forces is considered. Further, the manner in which law regulates
associations and assemblies – whether meetings or processions – is examined.
In addition, it is necessary to consider the manner in which law regulates an
individual’s freedom to move around, and the conditions under which it is or
is not lawful to enter into and remain on land, both private and public. The
powers of the police in relation to these issues and public order offences are
also considered, as are the powers of the police in relation to arrest and
detention in the course of the investigation of crime.
The law of association and assembly must now be evaluated against
Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, incorporated under
the Human Rights Act 1998. Article 11 provides that ‘everyone has the right to
freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others,
including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his
interests’.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
While citizens are generally free to join any club, society or trades union, two
statutory restrictions exist. The first restriction relates to membership of
military or quasi-military organisations. The Public Order Act 1936 provides,
in part, that the wearing of uniforms in public with the intention of promoting
a political objective is unlawful, and that membership of groups organised
and trained for the purpose of displaying physical force is unlawful. To be a
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND ASSEMBLY,
PUBLIC ORDER AND POLICE POWERS1
1 See, inter alia, Robertson, 2001; Fenwick, 2001.
member of such a group, or to solicit or invite financial or other support for
the group, is an offence. 
In R v Jordan and Tyndall (1963), the defendants were members of a fascist
group, Spearhead. They exercised in military fashion and were known to be
storing chemicals capable of being used for the manufacture of bombs. They
were convicted under section 2(1)(b) of the Public Order Act 1936. In Director
of Public Prosecutions v Whelan (1975), the defendants were charged under
section 1 of the 1936 Act. Participating in a Sinn Fein march in Northern
Ireland, the defendants wore black berets, dark clothing and carried the Irish
flag. It was held that the wearing of similar clothing could amount to a
‘uniform’. Specific groups are proscribed, and Schedule 2 to the 2000 Act lists
such groups. 
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
... it can hardly be said that our constitution knows of such a thing as any
specific right of public meeting.2
Freedom of assembly is closely related to freedom of speech. An individual is
free to assemble with others to the extent that the law does not prohibit such
assemblies or the assembly does not involve unlawful actions. In 1898, Dicey
was to record that ‘the police have with us no special authority to control open
air assemblies’. Today much has changed. Under common law, a number of
restraints were placed on this freedom, and the Public Order Acts 1936 and
1986 and the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 restrict rights of
assembly. While there is a general freedom to assemble on private property or
on public land, in the case of the former, it will be a trespass to do so without
the consent of the landowner. In relation to land to which the public have the
right of access, the right of assembly is controlled by local authority bylaws,
and a criminal offence is committed if these are breached. Further, the right of
assembly may be controlled by statute. By way of example, the right to
assemble in Trafalgar Square is regulated under statute, under which
permission must be granted by the Secretary of State for the Environment.3
Hyde Park is equally regulated.4
The duty to facilitate meetings
The constitutional importance of freedom of expression and involvement in
civic life is reflected in the right to use schools and other public rooms for
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meetings in local elections, by-elections and general elections.5 In addition,
under the Education (No 2) Act 1986, the governing bodies of universities and
colleges are under a duty to ‘take such steps as are reasonably practicable to
ensure that freedom of speech within the law is secured for members,
students and employees of the establishment and for visiting speakers’.6 This
requirement gave rise to a challenge in R v University of Liverpool ex parte
Caesar-Gordon (1991). In that case, the university had refused permission for a
meeting at which two diplomats from the South African Embassy were due to
speak. The decision was based on the fear that the meeting would cause
public unrest in the surrounding area. The Divisional Court ruled that the
university had acted ultra vires its powers. The university authorities were not
entitled to take into account threats of violence outside its precincts. Only
where the risk of violence would relate to university precincts, would the
university be justified in imposing restrictions.
The meaning of ‘public meeting’ was considered by the House of Lords in
McCartan (Turkington Breen) v Times Newspapers Ltd (2000). At issue was
whether a meeting, in this case a press conference, held on private premises,
to which members of the press had been invited and others also attended,
without an invitation but without any restriction, was a ‘public meeting’.7 A
meeting was public if those who arranged it opened it to the public, or by
issuing a general invitation to the press showed an intention that the
proceedings of the meeting should be communicated to a wider public.
The right of assembly is intricately linked to the right to freedom of
expression protected under Article 10 of the European Convention.8 In R v
Secretary of State for Health ex parte Wagstaff; R v Secretary of State for Health ex
parte Associated Newspapers Ltd (2001), the High Court ruled that the holding in
private of the inquiry into the multiple murders committed by Dr Harold
Shipman contravened Article 10. It constituted unjustified governmental
interference with the reception of information that others wish or may be
willing to impart. Compare R (Persey) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food
and Rural Affairs (2002), in which the High Court distinguished Wagstaff and
ruled that Article 10 did not impose a positive obligation on government to
provide an ‘open forum’. The applications related to the Secretary of State’s
decision to hold three separate, independent inquiries into the outbreak of
foot and mouth disease with the evidence for the most part to be held in
private. The court distinguished between the right to freedom of expression
and access to information: Article 10 prohibited interference with freedom of
expression, it did not require its facilitation. Equally, the High Court ruled in
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R (Hard) v Secretary of State for Health (2002) that there was no presumption one
way or the other as to whether an inquiry should be held in public. There was
no right to access to information conferred by Article 10.
INDIRECT RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY
A number of indirect means may be employed in order to restrain public
meetings. Such means include breach of the peace, obstruction of police
officers and obstruction of the highway.
Breach of the peace
In Beatty v Gillbanks (1882), the Salvation Army met knowing that there would
be an opposing meeting. The magistrates’ court issued an order preventing
the meeting. When the meeting assembled in defiance of the order, the police
ordered the meeting to disband and arrested one of the members. On the
defendant’s appeal against conviction, the Queen’s Bench Division refused to
accept the restriction on freedom of assembly based on the threatened
unlawful acts of others. Where, however, participants in a meeting engage in
unlawful conduct which provokes others and results in a breach of the peace –
or a reasonable apprehension of a breach of the peace – the meeting may be
held to be unlawful. Further, if the meeting is conducted lawfully and yet
provokes an actual breach of the peace, the police may order the meeting to
disband. Failure to comply with an order to leave an assembly on the grounds
of an officer’s reasonable belief that it is necessary to avoid a breach of the
peace is a criminal offence.9
The Beatty v Gillbanks principle – namely, that a person acting lawfully was
not responsible for the unlawful reaction of others – has been undermined in a
number of cases. In Jordan v Burgoyne (1963), the court ruled that a person
addressing an audience would be found guilty of a breach of the peace if his
or her words were likely to inflame the audience and lead to violence.
Equally, in Percy v Director of Public Prosecutions (1995), the court ruled that
conduct which was not itself unlawful could amount to a breach of the peace
if the words spoken were likely to cause disorder among those listening, even
if member of the audience had attended with the express intent of causing
trouble. Further, in Morpeth Ward Justices ex parte Ward (1992), the issue was
not so much the conduct of the protesters but, rather, whether or not the
conduct had the effect of provoking violent behaviour, even where the
reaction to the protest was unreasonable. However, in Nicol v Director of Public
Prosecutions (1996), the court adopted a more restrictive approach. The protest
in question concerned an attempt to stop anglers from fishing. The protesters
blew horns and provoked the anglers. It was held that, although there was
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nothing unlawful in the protesters’ actions, the provocation of the anglers was
likely to cause a breach of the peace because it was unreasonable action. 
However, in Redmond-Bate v Director of Public Prosecutions (1999), three
women preachers, who were preaching on the steps of a cathedral, were
approached by a police constable and warned not to stop people. Later, he
returned to find that a crowd had gathered, some of whom were hostile to the
speakers. The constable asked the women to stop preaching, but when they
refused arrested them for a breach of the peace. They were convicted of
obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duty. On appeal, it was held
that there was no lawful basis for the arrest. Free speech, provided that it did
not tend to provoke violence, irrespective of its content (unless contrary to
law), was to be respected. There were no grounds on which the constable
could apprehend a breach of the peace, much less one for which the preachers
would be responsible.
The European Convention on Human Rights is making an impact on the
law of protest, both in terms of the right to liberty (Article 5) and the right to
freedom of expression (Article 10). See, for example, Steel and Others v United
Kingdom (1998) and Hashman and Harrup v United Kingdom (2000). In the
absence of obstruction or provocation of others to violence, their arrest and
detention was unlawful under Article 5 and also amounted to a violation of
Article 10.
In Hashman and Harrup, the issue was freedom of expression relating to
hunt saboteurs. The applicants were bound over ‘to be of good behaviour’ for
one year. The applicants claimed that the concept of behaviour contra bona
mores was so broadly defined that it did not comply with Article 10(2) of the
Convention, the requirement that any interference with freedom of expression
be ‘prescribed by law’. The Court of Human Rights ruled that the definition of
contra bona mores, as behaviour which was ‘wrong rather than right in the
judgment of the majority of contemporary fellow citizens’, was particularly
imprecise and failed to give the applicants sufficiently clear guidance as to
how they should behave in future. Accordingly, the interference with freedom
of expression was not ‘prescribed by law’ and there had been a violation of
Article 10.
Breach of the peace is a concept which traditionally has involved a degree
of proximity and immediacy between the conduct of individuals and the
anticipated breach of the peace. However, in Moss v McLachlan (1985), in the
course of the miners’ strike 1984–85, the defendants were ordered to turn back
on a journey to another colliery some four miles away. The police suspected
that they were intending to join the picket line in support of fellow miners and
that a breach of the peace might occur. When the miners refused to obey the
order to turn back, they were arrested for obstruction. The judge conceded a
wide discretion to the police and ruled that, provided a senior police officer
‘honestly and reasonably formed the opinion’ that there was a real risk of a
breach of the peace, in an area proximate to the point of arrest, they could take
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whatever measures were reasonably necessary to prevent it. This decision,
whilst understandable from the police’s point of view, is regrettable for it
introduces a dangerous breadth to the offence. Furthermore, uncertainty is
created as to the precise scope of the police’s power to interfere with freedom
of movement.
Obstructing the police
Under the Police Act 1996,10 it is a criminal offence to obstruct the police in the
execution of their duty. Section 89 provides that:
(1) Any person who assaults a constable in the execution of his duty, or a
person assisting a constable in the execution of his duty, shall be guilty of
an offence ...
(2) Any person who resists or wilfully obstructs a constable in the execution of
his duty, or a person assisting a constable in the execution of his duty, shall
be guilty of an offence ...
In Duncan v Jones (1935), the defendant had intended to hold a public meeting
at a place previously used for that purpose. The police, aware that a
disturbance had previously occurred in that place, instructed Mrs Duncan to
hold the meeting on an alternative site. Mrs Duncan refused and started the
meeting on the highway. She was arrested and charged under section 51 of
the Police Act. The defendant could have been charged with obstruction of the
highway (see below) or with inciting a breach of the peace. However, in the
alternative the police charged her with obstructing a police officer. The court
held that, once the police officer reasonably considered that a breach of the
peace could occur, any action which impeded him in the course of preventing
such an occurrence, amounted to an obstruction of the police. In Piddington v
Bates (1960), in the course of an industrial dispute, the police directed that no
more than two pickets should be allowed at each entrance to the factory. The
defendant joined the picket line in defiance of the order, regarding the
restriction as unreasonable, and was charged with obstruction. On appeal, the
Divisional Court upheld his conviction. 
Obstructing the highway
The Highways Act 1980
A citizen is free to move along the highway. It is, however, a criminal offence
to obstruct the highway. Obstructing the highway also represents a public
nuisance, which may be prosecuted on indictment under common law.11
Under section 137 of the Highways Act 1980, ‘if a person, without lawful
authority or excuse, in any way wilfully obstructs the free passage along a
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highway he is guilty of an offence’.12 In Hirst v Chief Constable for West
Yorkshire (1986), animal rights demonstrators protesting outside a store selling
animal fur products were charged with obstructing the highway. The
magistrates’ court convicted them of obstruction. However, on appeal, the
Divisional Court held that the justices should have considered the
reasonableness of the action and weighed in the balance the right to protest
and demonstrate and the need for public order. The magistrates’ court had
failed to consider this and, accordingly, failed to respect the freedom to
protest on matters of public concern.13
The Public Order Act 1986 and Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994
The Public Order Act 1986 was passed after growing concern over
demonstrations, industrial disputes, riots and football hooliganism.14 The Act
had two principal objectives. The first was to provide a comprehensive code
as to the organisation and control of processions and demonstrations. The
second was to provide a code relating to disorderly conduct, which can range
from behaviour which causes alarm or distress to riot. In addition, the Act
created offences relating to football hooliganism and to control of persons
unlawfully camping on private land. 
The law relating to public order was further reformed substantially by the
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.15 This Act made major reforms
across a wide spectrum of criminal justice matters and matters relating to
sexual offences. New sentences for young offenders were introduced; the right
to silence of defendants was curtailed; and the powers of police to take body
samples increased. In relation to public order,16 the Act increased the powers
of the police and local authorities in respect of trespass, ‘rave parties’,
squatters and campers, and marked a significant shift away from individual
liberties towards increasing state regulation in favour of maintaining public
order. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 introduces new criminal offences
where conduct contrary to public order is racially aggravated. See below.
The regulation of processions
A procession is not defined in the Public Order Act. Processions were
originally regulated under the Public Order Act 1936 and the powers were
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extended under the Public Order Act 1986. In Flockhart v Robinson (1950), a
procession was said to be ‘not a mere body of persons: it is a body of persons
moving along a route’. Accordingly, a procession must involve more than one
person. To be regulated by the Act, a procession must be public. A public
place is defined in section 16 as being:
(a) any highway ...; and
(b) any place to which at the material time the public or any section of the
public has access, on payment or otherwise, as of right or by virtue of
express or implied permission.
The requirement of notice
Under section 11, notice must be given to the police of a procession which is
designed to express or oppose the views of another, to publicise or encourage
support for a campaign, or to commemorate an event. Processions which are
regularly held within a particular area need not be notified to the police.
Where it is impracticable to give notice in advance, the requirement may be
waived. This exception enables spontaneous demonstrations to take place. 
Six clear days’ notice must be given, except where it is impracticable to do
so.17 Failure to give notice, or organising a procession different from the one
notified, is a summary offence. In Scotland, similar requirements exist. Under
the Civil Government (Scotland) Act 1982, as amended,18 the police must
receive at least seven days’ notice. Where a ban is imposed on a particular
march, a right of appeal exists.19
The power to impose conditions
Where notice has been given in accordance with section 11, then a senior
police office (Chief Constable or Commissioner) may impose conditions,
under section 12. If a procession is under way, then a senior officer on the
scene may impose conditions. The basis on which conditions may be attached
include situations where the senior police officer reasonably believes that a
procession may result in serious public disorder, serious damage to property
or serious disruption of the life of the community.20 An alternative basis for
conditions is where it is reasonably believed that the procession is taking place
for an illegitimate purpose. Intimidation, for example, would be an
‘illegitimate purpose’. Under section 14 of the Act, conditions may also – on
the same grounds as those stated in section 12 – be imposed on assemblies.
If the requirements for the imposition of conditions are met, the senior
officer has a wide discretion as to the conditions which may in fact be
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imposed. Section 12(1) merely states that he may impose conditions ‘as appear
to him necessary’. Under section 12, there is power to impose conditions as to
the route to be followed, and to prohibit entry into particular public places.
Failure to comply with the conditions, or to incite others not to comply, is an
offence.21
The power to ban processions
Under section 13, the Chief Officer of Police22 may issue a banning order,
which may only be issued if the power to impose conditions is insufficient to
prevent serious public disorder. In London, the banning order must be with
the consent of the Home Secretary, elsewhere, with the consent of the local
authority. The power to ban processions represents a power to ban all
processions, rather than to ban a particular procession, and can cover all or part
of a police area and last for up to three months.23 Organising or participating
in, or inciting participation in, a banned procession is a summary offence.24
The power to enter meetings on private premises
Where a private meeting is held, the police have power to enter and remain on
the premises under certain circumstances. A meeting is defined as a private
meeting if it is held in entirely enclosed premises. Thus, even if the meeting is
held in publicly owned and managed premises, such as a school or town hall,
it will be a private meeting. In Thomas v Sawkins (1935), a police officer entered
a private meeting which was held to protest against the Incitement to
Disaffection Bill. The organiser of the meeting brought an action based on
trespass, and argued that, as a result of trespass by the police, he had the right
to evict the officers. The meeting had not given rise to a breach of the peace.
However, the court held that notwithstanding its peaceful nature, the police
had grounds for reasonably suspecting that a breach of the peace might occur
and were therefore entitled to enter and remain on the premises.
The regulation of public assemblies25
While there is power to regulate a public assembly, there was no power to
issue a banning order under the 1986 Act. However, section 70 of the Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act 1994 inserted section 14A into the 1986 Act,
which provided a power to ban assemblies. A public assembly is defined as
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‘an assembly of 20 or more persons in a public place which is wholly or partly
open to the air’.26 However, an individual who disobeys an order, even where
he or she does not actually join the assembly, is liable under the Act.27 The
basis on which the conditions which may be attached28 are the same as those
for conditions imposed on processions. Intimidation, as a ground for
imposing a condition, has been interpreted to mean more than ‘causing
discomfort’.29
Trespassory assemblies
A Chief Officer of Police may apply for a banning order if he reasonably
believes that an assembly is likely to involve trespass or might result in
serious disruption to community life or cause damage to buildings and
structures. This power must be seen within the context of section 14(c) of the
Public Order Act 1986,30 which confers power on the police to stop persons
within a five mile radius of the assembly, if the police reasonably believe that
they are on their way to the assembly, and the assembly is subject to a section
14A order.
In Director of Public Prosecutions v Jones (1999), section 14 was considered. A
section 14A order had been issued, which prohibited the holding of a
trespassory assembly within a four mile radius of Stonehenge. The assembly
was heading for Stonehenge, and was within the four mile radius, and on the
public highway. The court held that the highway was for passing and
repassing only, and that assembling on the highway was outside the purpose
for which the implied licence to use the highway was granted. The
respondents argued that they were both peaceful and not obstructive and
were making ‘reasonable use’ of the highway. The House of Lords ruled, by a
majority of three to two, that the public had the right to use the highway for
such reasonable and usual activities, inter alia, including peaceful assembly, as
was consistent with the primary use for passage and repassage. It was a
question of fact and degree in each case whether the user was reasonable and
not inconsistent with that primary right.
The right to move freely along the highway, for a minority group such as
Gypsies, entails the need for a lawful place to stop. While local authorities had
been under a duty to provide sites under the Caravan Sites Act 1968,31 the
government has now removed that statutory duty.32 This is of particular
concern, given that Gypsies – a recognised racial group protected under the
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Race Relations Act 1976 and under international law33 – traditionally travel
with caravans from area to area, usually in search of seasonal work. 
The problems encountered in the 1970s and 1980s with groups of New
Age Travellers combining for the summer solstice at Stonehenge and the
problems caused by ‘rave parties’ resulted in the criminalisation of trespass
for the first time under English law. Section 39 of the Public Order Act 1986
provided the police with powers to direct persons to leave land where they
had entered land as trespassers, with a common purpose of remaining there,
where steps had been taken by the occupier34 to ask them to leave. A further
requirement under section 39 was that the trespasser had caused damage to
property on the land or had used threatening, abusive or insulting words or
behaviour towards the occupier and his associates, or that the trespassers had
brought 12 or more vehicles onto the land. Failure to obey the instruction of
the police to leave the land as soon ‘as reasonably practicable’35 amounted to a
criminal offence. A number of difficulties arose with the interpretation of
section 39, and that section has been repealed and replaced by section 61 of the
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. A number of significant
amendments have been made to the powers of the police.
First, whereas under the 1986 Act, persons could be directed to leave
where they had entered the land as trespassers, the 1994 Act makes it possible
to remove persons who are in fact trespassing, whether or not they entered the
land as trespassers.36 Thus, even where persons originally entered land at the
invitation of the occupier, if they have subsequently become trespassers they
can be directed to leave the land. Secondly, whereas the 1986 Act provided for
damage to property on land as a criterion for a direction to leave, the 1994 Act
has extended the concept of damage to include damage to the land itself.
Thirdly, the 1986 Act applied in relation to persons having 12 or more vehicles
on the land: the 1994 Act reduces the number of vehicles to six. This is a major
change and one of great disadvantage for the minority Gypsy population
which traditionally migrates in convoys of caravans. 
Fourthly, the Act extends the land to which the provisions apply.
Common land37 is now included, as are footpaths, bridleways, byways, public
paths and cycletracks.38 Fifthly, section 62 of the 1994 Act has given the police
new powers to remove ‘vehicles and other property’ on land. The power to
seize vehicles and property arises where the trespasser fails to comply with a
direction to leave within a reasonable time. Reasonableness is an objective test
and will depend on all the circumstances of the case, including the
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roadworthiness of vehicles.39 Where vehicles are seized, powers are given for
the safe keeping, disposal and destruction of the vehicles, the powers to be
exercised according to Regulations to be drafted by the Secretary of State.40
The power of seizure and destruction was introduced by the government,
which was aware of the limitations of fines for non-compliance, and
recommended the seizure of caravans as a sanction ‘as a last resort’.
Circumspection is appropriate here. The potential for harrowing scenes of
families being physically wrenched from their homes and removal of those
homes until ‘the offender(s) satisfied the court that he (they) either had a legal
place to camp or alternative accommodation’41 is great and chilling in its
contemplation. The cumulative effect will be that Gypsy families comply with
the request to leave, only to find themselves – in the absence of official sites –
with no lawful place to stop. As Baroness Mallalieu stated in debate, ‘we are
in very real danger of putting people in Britain in 1994 in the position of the
road sweeper in Bleak House in the last century who was forever being told to
move on but had nowhere to go’. The only alternative will be to submit to
seizure of their homes, leaving them without a roof over their heads until
rehoused under the Housing Act 1985 provisions. Failure to leave land as
directed amounts to a criminal offence, for which arrest without warrant is
provided.42
Rave parties
The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 introduces new police powers
to order persons to leave gatherings, creates a new criminal offence of failing
to leave within a reasonable time and provides for arrest without warrant. The
provisions govern open air gatherings of 100 or more persons, where
amplified music is played at night time. Failure to comply with a police
direction may result in the power to seize and remove vehicles and sound
equipment.43
The Act gives the police power to regulate the movement of persons to a
gathering. Where a direction has been made under section 63, the police may
stop persons and order them not to proceed to the gathering. The exercise of
this sweeping power is confined to an area within a five mile radius of the
gathering.
Other public order offences under the 1986 Act
The Act replaces a number of common law offences. The Law Commission
considered, for example, that the offence of breach of the peace was too vague
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a concept and that it should be replaced with more specific offences. In its
place, the concept of unlawful violence is used, which encompasses a number
of situations. Violent conduct is defined as meaning any violent conduct,
whether or not intended to cause injury or damage.44
Riot
Riot is the most serious offence created under the Act. ‘Riot’ is defined in
section 1 as being where 12 or more persons who are present together use or
threaten unlawful violence for a common purpose and the conduct of them
(taken together) is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness
present at the scene to fear for his personal safety; each of the persons using
unlawful violence for the common purpose is guilty of riot.
Under section 1, a riot may be committed in private as well as public
places. The common purpose may be inferred from the conduct, and does not
need to be articulated. The purpose itself need not be unlawful – a perfectly
legitimate demonstration may turn into a riot if the conditions for a riot are
satisfied, namely the use of unlawful violence for a common purpose which is
such as to cause persons ‘of reasonable firmness’ present to fear for their
personal safety, although it is not necessary that such persons actually be
present at the scene. The mental element required for liability, under section
6(1), is that a person ‘intends to use violence or is aware that his conduct may
be violent’. The seriousness with which the offence is viewed is reflected in
the requirement of trial on indictment (trial by jury) and the liability on
conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or a fine, or
both.45
Violent disorder
Section 2 of the Public Order Act 1986 creates a new statutory offence of
violent disorder, which replaces the common law offence of unlawful
assembly. The offence shares similarities with the offence of riot, but differs in
several respects. First, for the offence to be committed, there needs to be only
three people, rather than 12 as required for a riot, involved in the violent
conduct. Secondly, there needs to be no common purpose, as is required for
the offence of riot. It is sufficient for an offence of violent disorder to be
committed that the persons be involved in the use or threat of violent conduct.
It is necessary that the conduct be such that it causes a person ‘of reasonable
firmness’ to ‘fear for his personal safety’, although such persons need not
actually be present.46 The offence can be committed in private or public.47 The
mental element required under section 6 is that the person intends to use or to
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threaten violence, or is aware that his conduct may be violent or threaten
violence. Self-induced intoxication, other than through prescribed medication
in a course of medical treatment, is not an excuse.
The requirement of three person’s involvement in the violent disorder has
caused difficulties. In R v Fleming (1989), for example, four persons were
charged, one was acquitted and the jury failed to reach a decision on a second.
Accordingly, the conviction of the remaining two defendants was quashed.48
The Court of Appeal in Fleming noted that it was possible for less than three
persons to be convicted where, for example, there was sufficient evidence as
to the involvement of more than three persons but some of the greater number
evaded arrest or lacked the required mental element for the offence. The jury
must be correctly directed on the matter, and failure to direct appropriately
will cause a conviction to be quashed. This occurred in R v Whorton (1990),
where there was evidence that eight to ten people were involved in the
violence, but only four were charged and only two convicted. Their appeal
against conviction was successful, on the basis that the judge had not directed
the jury that they could only convict if there were either three defendants
before them, or if a lesser number, that a greater number had in fact been
involved in the violent disorder.
The offence is triable on indictment (by the Crown Court) or summarily
(by a magistrates’ court), and carries a term of imprisonment of up to five
years on indictment, a fine or both and, on summary conviction,
imprisonment of up to six months or a fine, or both.49
Affray
A person is guilty of an affray if he uses or threatens unlawful violence
towards another and his conduct is such as would cause a person of
reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety.50
Two or more persons may be involved in the offence, in which case it is
necessary that their conduct be considered together for the purpose of section
1. A verbal threat of unlawful violence is not sufficient for the offence to be
committed. The offence may take place in private or in public and, again, the
test for unlawful violence is whether a person of reasonable firmness, who
need not in fact be present, is put in fear for his personal safety. The mental
element is the same as that required for violent disorder. Police constables
may arrest without warrant, and the offence is triable on indictment or
summarily. On indictment, the offence carries a term of imprisonment not
exceeding three years or a fine or both; on summary conviction, there is
liability to imprisonment of up to six months or a fine or both.51
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The definition of affray was considered by the Court of Appeal in R v
Sanchez (1996). On the charge of affray, the trial judge directed the jury on the
requirement for a ‘person of reasonable firmness’ and said that the victim was
such a person and that he was to be believed when he said that he was
frightened. The Court of Appeal held that there was a misdirection, in that the
judge’s directions overlooked the need to direct the jury to consider not only
the victim but also the putative third person, the hypothetical bystander;
affray was a public order offence and there were other offences for the
protection of persons at whom the violence was aimed.
Fear or provocation of violence
Under section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986, a person is guilty of an offence if
he:
(a) uses towards another person threatening, abusive or insulting words or
behaviour; or
(b) distributes or displays to another person any writing, sign or other visible
representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting, with the intent to
cause that person to believe that immediate unlawful violence will be used
against him or another by any person, or to provoke the immediate use of
unlawful violence by that person or another, or whereby that person is
likely to believe that such violence will be used or it is likely that such
violence will be provoked.
The offence is one which may be committed by a single person. For a
prosecution to succeed, it is necessary to establish that threatening, abusive or
insulting words or behaviour have been directed towards a specific person.
Rude or offensive words or behaviour may not necessarily be insulting, and
swearing may not be abusive.52 It is also necessary to establish that the person
affected is caused to believe that immediate unlawful violence is about to be
used against him. In Horseferry Road Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte
Siadatan (1990), it was held that the violence feared must be both immediate
and unlawful.53 A threat of violence at some future time will not suffice for
this offence to be proven. The mental element required under section 6 is that
the person intends his words or behaviour (or signs, etc) to be threatening,
abusive or insulting or that he is aware that it may be threatening, abusive or
insulting.
Harassment, alarm or distress54
Under section 5 of the Act, a person is guilty of an offence if he:
(a) uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly
behaviour; or
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(b) displays any writing, sign or other visible representation which is
threatening, abusive or insulting, within the hearing or sight of a person
likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby.
The introduction of this offence,55 and the use to which it is put by the police,
raises controversy. The offence was designed to provide powers to deal with
relatively minor acts of antisocial, unruly or disorderly conduct which, while
of itself not serious, cause fear in others. In its White Paper, the government
illustrated the sort of behaviour which was being targeted:56
(a) hooligans on housing estates causing disturbances in the common parts of
blocks of flats ...;
(b) groups of youths persistently shouting abuse and obscenities or pestering
people waiting to catch public transport or to enter a hall or cinema;
someone turning out the lights in a crowded dance hall, in a way likely to
cause panic;
(c) rowdy behaviour in the streets late at night which alarms local residents.
For the offence to be proven, it is necessary that the words or behaviour, or
signs etc, are uttered or displayed within the sight of a person who is likely to
be harassed or alarmed or distressed – it is not necessary to prove actual
harassment, alarm or distress. However, the mental element required is that
the person using the words, behaviour or signs either intended his conduct to
be threatening, abusive or insulting or be aware that it might be. Thus, words
uttered in a public place (for example, by demonstrators or persons attending
football matches) which might in fact be threatening or abusive, and might in
fact cause alarm or distress to someone hearing the words will not be
sufficient for a prosecution to succeed.57
In Jordan v Borgoyne (1963), the accused made an inflammatory racist
speech in Trafalgar Square. He was prosecuted under the forerunner to
section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986, section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936.
It was held that the speech went beyond the limits of tolerance. The defendant
could not argue that the words used were not likely to cause ordinary persons
to commit breaches of the peace. The defendant had to ‘take his audience as
he found them’. If the words used were likely to provoke that audience, or
part thereof, to commit a breach of the peace, the defendant was guilty of an
offence. 
Insulting words were the subject of judicial scrutiny in Brutus v Cozens
(1973). In Brutus, the defendant and other anti-apartheid protesters
interrupted play at a Wimbledon tennis match. The audience resented the
interruption. Brutus was charged with insulting behaviour likely to cause a
breach of the peace. In the Divisional Court, it was held that an offence
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occurred where the behaviour affronted other people, and reflected a
contempt for their rights. The House of Lords, however, allowed Brutus’s
appeal. Not all speech or conduct fell within the meaning of the section. It
must be conduct or speech which the ordinary person would recognise as
insulting – a term which was deemed incapable of precise definition. The
mere resentment of the crowd, as opposed to violence, did not suffice to make
the actions insulting.
The issue of violent reaction to provocative words was considered in R v
Horseferry Road Magistrate ex parte Siadatan (1991). The case concerned Salman
Rushdie’s novel, The Satanic Verses. In an application laid against the
publishers and the author, it was argued that distribution of the book
offended against section 4 of the 1986 Act, in so far as it contained abusive and
insulting language which was likely to provoke violence amongst devout
Muslims. The magistrate refused to issue a summons. The issue went to the
Divisional Court for judicial review. It was there held that the violence which
was apprehended by the words must be immediate violence, not some distant
act of violence. 
In R v Stephen Miller (1999), the defendant appealed against sentence for
racially aggravated threatening words. The defendant had pleaded guilty to
two offences, first, aggravated threatening words and behaviour contrary to
section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986, as amended by section 31 of the Crime
and Disorder Act 1998, and, secondly, travelling on a railway without a ticket.
He was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, and appealed. The Court of
Appeal dismissed his appeal. His conduct towards the conductor on the train
was particularly bad. The sentence was designed to reflect public concern
about conduct which damaged good racial relations within the community.
The mental element on the part of the accused must be satisfied. KA
Ewing and CA Gearty provide illustrations of the uses to which section 5 has
been put.58 The Act has been used to curb the use of obscene T-shirts and hats;
to suppress a satirical poster of the former Prime Minister Mrs Thatcher; and
to prosecute protesters outside abortion clinics in Ireland.59 In Gearty and
Ewing’s assessment, section 5 of the Act represents a ‘mechanism for
punishing non-violent non-conformity for the crime of being itself’.60 It must
be conceded that section 5 represents a serious, and hitherto uncontemplated,
limitation of freedom of expression and an alteration of the balance between
individual liberty and the legitimate expectations of citizens to be protected
from the consequences of another person’s words and actions. The extent to
which the balance has been correctly struck is a matter for personal judgment. 
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The Crime and Disorder Act 1998
Sections 28 to 32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 extend the law to
encompass racially aggravated offences.61 It is an offence under sections 4 and
5 of the Public Order Act 1986 (fear of provocation of violence, intentional
harassment, alarm or distress) to engage in racially aggravated conduct.
Section 32 makes it an offence to act in a racially aggravated manner in
relation to sections 2 and 4 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Under
section 28(1), an offence is racially aggravated if:
(a) at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing
so, the offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility
based on the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial
group; or
(b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards members
of a racial group based on their membership of that group.
Section 28(3) provides that:
It is immaterial ... whether or not the offender’s hostility is also based, to any
extent, on –
(a) the fact of presumption that any person or group of persons belongs to any
religious group ...
Under section 82, the court may impose a higher penalty for racially
aggravated offences.
PART II – THE POLICE AND POLICE POWERS
THE ORGANISATION OF THE POLICE62
The United Kingdom has no national police force. Instead, the police are
organised on a basis which links the police to the locality. In England and
Wales, there now exist 43 police forces: the City of London Police, the
Metropolitan Police and 41 forces outside London. Scotland has six forces and
Northern Ireland one. The Police Act 1996 provides that the Home Secretary
may alter police areas ‘in the interest of efficiency or effectiveness’.63 In 1962, a
Royal Commission examined the question whether there should be a national
police force under central government control, but concluded that the status
quo should be maintained, subject to supervision by central government.64
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The regulation of the police represents a tri-partite arrangement involving the
Home Secretary, local police authorities and Chief Constables of Police. 
THE HOME SECRETARY
The Home Secretary and Metropolitan Police
Until 1999, the Home Secretary was the police authority for the Metropolitan
Police. Under the Greater London Authority Act 1999, on which see Chapter
12, there is established a Metropolitan Police Authority, which replaces the
Home Secretary as police authority.65 The 1999 Act amends the Police Act
1996, introducing a Police Authority for the Metropolitan Police District and
specifying membership of the Authority. The Authority is headed by the
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, appointed by the Crown and
holding office at Her Majesty’s pleasure.66 The Metropolitan Police Force is
under the direction and control of the Commissioner. There is established a
Deputy Commissioner who has the power to exercise any or all of the powers
and duties of the Commissioner during any absence from duty of the
Commission, any vacancy in the office of the Commissioner or at any other
time with the consent of the Commissioner.67
The Home Secretary and other police authorities
Each of the local police forces has its own police authority, the role of which is
discussed below. The Home Secretary, however, has a number of powers in
relation to local forces. The Home Secretary may, in consultation with the
police authority and Chief Constable, determine policy objectives for the
policy authority.68 The Home Secretary may issue Codes of Practice which
regulate the manner in which the police authority pursues policy objectives,69
may direct the authority to establish performance targets and may impose
conditions on police authorities.70 In addition, section 57 of the 1994 Act
extends previous powers71 of the Home Secretary to provide and maintain
‘such organisations, facilities and services’ as the Home Secretary thinks
necessary for promoting the efficiency and effectiveness of the police.72 The
Police Act 1996 also extends the powers of the Home Secretary, and provides
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that the Home Secretary may make regulations for the government,
administration and conditions of service of police forces.73
Police authorities are funded by central government. The annual grant is
determined by the Home Secretary with the approval of the Treasury.
Formerly, the grant amounted to 51 per cent of approved expenses. Now, the
Home Secretary has a wide discretion, under section 46 of the 1996 Act, as to
the amount of the grant. The efficiency of police forces is under the jurisdiction
of Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary appointed by the Home Secretary
and accountable to him.74
Codes of Practice, notes for guidance and Home Office circulars
Under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, a number of Codes of
Practice have been issued. The Codes do not have the force of law, but
represent an administrative means of regulating differing aspects of police
powers. Breach of the Codes does not give rise to civil or criminal liability.75
Under the 1984 Act, there are five Codes of Practice. Code A relates to stop
and search procedures; Code B to the search of premises; Code C relates to
interviews and conditions of detention; Code D regulates identification
procedures; and Code E regulates the tape recording of interviews. The notes
for guidance are not part of the Codes, but represent interpretative guidelines.
Home Office circulars are designed to supplement the provisions of the Police
and Criminal Evidence Act and other statutes. 
The functions of police authorities
Local police authorities are responsible for setting policy objectives for the
police, subject to the Home Secretary’s power to determine the objectives for
police authorities.76 The general function is ‘to secure the maintenance of an
efficient and effective police force for its area’.77 The police authority is
responsible for ensuring the efficiency of the local force.78 The composition of
the police authority is now regulated by the Police Act 1996. The standard
membership of the authority is 17, of which nine are local authority
councillors. Five further members are appointed from a shortlist drawn up by
the Home Secretary. The remaining three members are local magistrates and
appointed by the magistrates collectively. The police authority has control
over the police budget.
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The police authority has the power to order a Chief Constable or Assistant
Chief Constable to retire ‘in the interests of efficiency and effectiveness’,
following consultation with, and the approval of, the Home Secretary.79 The
Home Secretary also has power to require a police authority to exercise the
powers. The police authority reports annually to the Home Secretary.80
Chief Constables of Police
Outside the Metropolitan area, which is headed by the Metropolitan
Commissioner of Police, police forces are under the operational control of
Chief Constables.81 The Chief Constable is responsible for recruitment and
promotions to the ranks below that of Assistant Chief Constable, and exercises
disciplinary powers over the police. The Chief Constable makes annual
reports to the police authority,82 and the Home Secretary can require the Chief
Constable to submit reports.83
Section 88 of the Police Act 1996 makes it clear that Chief Constables are
liable for torts committed by constables under his direction and control:
The chief officer of police for a police area shall be liable in respect of torts
committed by constables under his direction and control in the performance or
purported performance of their functions in like manner as a master is liable in
respect of torts committed by his servants in the course of their employment,
and accordingly shall in respect of any such tort be treated for all purposes as a
joint tortfeasor. 
The legal status of police officers
A police officer is a servant of the state.84 He or she is not employed under a
contract of employment, but is a holder of public office.85 Police officers are
not servants of the Chief Constable.86
Prior to the enactment of section 88 of the Police Act 1996, the liability of a
police officer for wrongful actions was personal. Whilst a servant of the
Crown, the Crown was not, at common law, vicariously liable for wrongful
actions of officers because, being neither appointed nor paid by the Crown,
the officer was not ‘in the employment of the Crown’. Where damages or costs
are ordered in legal action, these are awarded against the Chief Constable and
paid out of the local police budget. 
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Police officers hold office under statute, and are subject to the police
disciplinary code. They are not allowed to belong to trade unions, or any other
association concerned with levels of pay or conditions of employment. Police
Federations represent police officers in matters relating to welfare, and have
restricted powers in relation to police discipline.87 Police officers are not
permitted to take any active part in politics, nor participate in any other
activity which could actually impede, or give the suggestion that it could
impede, the officer’s impartiality.88
Co-operation between police forces
Co-operation between police forces is facilitated by the Association of Chief
Police Officers. The Police Act 1997 established a National Intelligence Service
and National Crime Squad, the former to gather and disseminate information
concerning serious crime to local forces, the latter of which has powers in
relation to the prevention and detection of serious crime which may affect
more than one police area. The Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, section
85, created a new Central Police Training and Development Authority to
‘design, deliver and accredit’ training programmes.
Note also that the Treaty on European Union 1997 increases the powers of
Europol and provides for closer co-operation between police forces and
Customs and Excise to combat crime.
Judicial control and police policy
The exercise of police discretion is reviewable by the courts, although the
courts confer a great deal of latitude in relation to that discretion. In R v
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis ex parte Blackburn (No 1) (1968), the
Court of Appeal made it clear that an order of mandamus would lie against
the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. The Commissioner had issued a
policy statement in which he made it clear that supervision of gambling clubs
would not take place, other than where there was a suspicion that the clubs
were being frequented by criminals. The applicant, Blackburn, claimed that
illegal gambling was taking place and applied to the courts for an order of
mandamus to compel the Commissioner to reverse his policy. The court
insisted that the Commissioner had a public duty to enforce the law, and that
his discretion could be controlled by the courts. Nevertheless, since the
Commissioner had undertaken to reverse his former policy, the order would
not be granted. Neither was mandamus ordered in R v Commissioner of Police
for the Metropolis ex parte Blackburn (No 3) (1973). In that case, the applicant
sought to compel, by order of the court, enforcement of the Obscene
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Publications Act 1959. However, the Chief Office had increased the numbers
in the vice squad, and reorganised its working methods.
Police discretion returned for consideration in R v Chief Constable of Sussex
ex parte International Traders’ Ferry Ltd (1997). In that case, animal rights
protesters, concerned about the welfare of live animal exports, blockaded
ports in order to stop the exports. To assist the exporter, the police deployed
1,125 officers, a level of policing which was maintained for some ten days. In
order to maintain the operation, seven other police forces assisted.89 The cost
of the operation amounted to £1.25 million. The Home Office refused to make
a special grant to assist with the financial cost of the operation. In April, the
Chief Constable indicated that new arrangements would have to be made,
which would involve the company having to reduce its shipments. The
company sought judicial review of the Chief Constable’s decision. The Court
of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court’s refusal to interfere with the decision
of the Chief Constable. In light of the circumstances, the Chief Constable’s
decision could not be ‘regarded as so unreasonable as to enable a court to
interfere’. The Court approved the statement of Neill LJ in Harris v Sheffield
United Football Club Ltd (1987):
I see the force of the argument that the court must be very slow before it
interferes in any way with a decision of a chief constable about the disposition
of his forces.
The House of Lords affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal.
Complaints against the police
Part IV of the Police Act 1996 regulates police complaints and discipline.
Under sections 68–69, where a complaint is made against a police officer
below the rank of Chief Superintendent, these are submitted to the Chief
Officer of the force, who has powers to investigate. Where a complaint is
made regarding an officer of the rank of Chief Superintendent or above, the
complaint is submitted to the Police Complaints Authority and the Authority
supervises the investigation of the complaint, which is conducted by a police
officer from a different police force than that to which the officer who is
subject to the complaint belongs.
In relation to the powers and duties of the Chief Officer, the procedure to
be followed is dependent upon the categorisation of the complaint. If a
complaint is classified as relatively minor, the Chief Officer may decide that
the complaint may be resolved informally. No complaint can be dealt with
under the informal procedure unless the complainant agrees, and the
complaint does not involve conduct which would justify a criminal or
disciplinary charge. Where the complaint is more serious and cannot be
resolved under the informal procedure, the Chief Officer must have the
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complaint investigated, either by a member of his or her own force, or by a
member of a different force. If the investigation reveals that a criminal offence
might have been committed and the officer should be charged with that
offence, the report is sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions.90 If the
Director of Public Prosecutions decides that prosecution is justified, the matter
will go to trial. Irrespective of whether the defendant is convicted or acquitted,
no disciplinary charge can then be brought against the officer relating to
matters substantially the same as those raised in the prosecution.91
The third category of cases involves allegation of serious crime. Where
there is an allegation that an officer has caused death or serious injury, the
complaint must be referred to the police authority.92 Other allegations
involving assault occasioning serious bodily harm, corruption, or a serious
arrestable offence93 must also be referred to the authority.94 Where a matter is
referred to the authority, the authority appoints an investigating officer and
supervises the investigation. Disciplinary proceedings may result in a
reprimand, fine, reduction in rank, the requirement to resign or dismissal.
Legal liability of the police95
In addition to making complaints about police conduct, the police are liable in
law in actions for assault, wrongful arrest,96 false imprisonment, trespass,
public misfeasance, negligence or an action for the return of property which
has been wrongfully taken. An action for malicious prosecution is available
where a person believes that the police have maliciously and without
reasonable cause abused their powers in recommending prosecution to the
Crown Prosecution Service. Further, the police are liable in law for the care of
those in their custody.97
The European Convention on Human Rights and the police98
The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates Convention rights. The Convention
had already had an impact on the liability of police. The European Court of
Human Rights ruled, in Osman v United Kingdom (1998), that Article 6 had
been violated in respect of the effect of the police’s immunity from civil
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actions under the rule formulated in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire
Police (1989). The applicant alleged that there had been violations relating to
Articles 2, 6 and 8 of the Convention. The applicant’s son had become the
object of attachment on the part of a schoolteacher, and the family had
suffered criminal damage to their home; the police visited the school but took
no further action. Subsequently, the teacher was questioned by police in
relation to missing school files. Following damage to the family’s home and
other incidents, the police again questioned the teacher. In 1988, the teacher
went to the Osmans’ home, where he shot and killed the applicant’s husband
and injured her son. He then shot and injured the deputy headmaster and
shot and killed his son. 
In 1989, the applicant commenced a civil action against the police. In 1992,
the Court of Appeal upheld the request of the police that the statement of
claim be struck out, on the basis that, according to the ruling in Hill, no action
could lie for public policy reasons against the police for their negligence in the
investigation and suppression of crime. 
The Court of Human Rights ruled that, in relation to Article 2, there was
no violation of the Convention, inter alia, because of the difficulty in policing
modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational
choices which the police had to make. Any obligation to protect the right to
life of the applicant’s husband had to be interpreted in a way which did not
impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. In
respect of Article 8, which was allegedly breached by the failure of the police
to protect the family, no violation was found. The Court ruled that, given the
finding in relation to Article 2, it followed that there had been no violation of
any implied positive obligation under Article 8. In relation to Article 6,
however, the Court ruled unanimously that the application of the
exclusionary rule constituted a disproportionate restriction on the applicant’s
right of access to a court.
In Price v United Kingdom (2001), the Court of Human Rights ruled that the
detention of a severely disabled person in unsuitable conditions at a police
station and subsequent detention in prison in similar conditions amounted to
degrading treatment contrary to Article 3. The authorities admitted that they
were unable to cope with the applicant’s special needs. There was no evidence
of any positive intention to humiliate or debase the applicant. However, to
detain a seriously disabled person in such conditions which risked her health
constituted a violation of Article 3. See, also, Edwards v United Kingdom (2002),
in which the United Kingdom was found to have violated Article 2 through its
failure to protect the life of a prisoner killed in his cell by a fellow inmate who
had a history of violence and had been diagnosed schizophrenic. There had
been a failure on the part of the agencies involved to pass on information
about the victim, who had been tentatively diagnosed as schizophrenic, and
failures in the mechanisms designed to protect prisoners. A private, non-
statutory inquiry had been established to investigate and report on the death,
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the proceedings of which were defective and violated the procedural
obligation of Article 1 to hold an effective investigation into the victim’s death.
There was also a violation of Article 13, in that the victim’s parents had no
avenue through which to secure an enforceable award of compensation for
the damage suffered.99
POLICE POWERS IN RELATION TO THE 
DETECTION AND INVESTIGATION OF CRIME
Questioning by the police
It is a fundamental rule that the citizen is not obliged to answer police
questions, unless there is lawful justification for official interference with the
citizen’s liberty. The rule was endorsed in Rice v Connolly (1966). There, the
appellant was questioned by the police. He refused to answer questions and
was, accordingly, arrested for obstructing a police officer in the execution of
his duty contrary to section 51(3) of the Police Act 1964.100 On appeal, Lord
Parker CJ stated that a citizen has every right to refuse to answer questions;
generally the citizen has a ‘right to silence’. 
In Kenlin v Gardiner (1967), the issue in question concerned whether a
person could lawfully be stopped in the street by the police. Police officers
attempted to question two boys. One of the boys tried to run away,
whereupon a police constable tried physically to stop him and a scuffle broke
out. The boys were charged with assaulting a police constable in the execution
of his duty. There was no question that an assault on the police had occurred.
The question for decision was whether the assault by the boys was justified.
The Divisional Court held that the attempt to restrain the boy amounted to an
assault by the police officer, and was, accordingly, an unlawful attempt to
detain him. As such, the police officer was not acting in the course of his duty
and, as a result, the boys were not guilty of assaulting a police officer ‘in the
execution of his duty’. A distinction must be made between a refusal to
answer questions and conduct which amounts to obstruction of the police;
see, further, below.
There are, however, situations in which a citizen is under a duty to answer
questions. For example, under road traffic law,101 there is a duty to give
information as to one’s name and address, and a refusal to do so and to give
up one’s driving licence and other motoring documents is an offence. Other
than under statutory authority, however, there is a right to silence.102
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Power exists to stop motorists on any ground,103 and failure to stop is an
offence.104 A police officer is entitled to immobilise a car by removing the
ignition keys. The vehicle owner may be detained in order to allow the officer
sufficient time to determine whether an arrest is to be made, to effect arrest,
and to give reasons for the arrest. Moreover, the police have the power to
detain a motorist in order to administer a breathalyser test.105 Powers also
exist under the Official Secrets Act 1911, whereby the Home Secretary can
grant the police permission to question suspects. Refusal to answer questions
in respect of inquiries made under the Companies Act 1985 and under the
Criminal Justice Act 1987 in respect of investigations into fraud amount to a
criminal offence, as can refusal to disclose information under the Prevention
of Terrorism Acts106 and the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1984.
Stop and search powers
Under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the police have been given
the power to stop and search a person reasonably suspected of carrying
prohibited articles such as offensive weapons and/or housebreaking
equipment or stolen goods.107 The police also have the power to set up road
blocks108 if there are reasonable grounds for suspicion that a person in the
area has committed a serious arrestable offence (see further, below, p 731 ff),
or that a serious arrestable offence is about to be committed, or that a person is
unlawfully ‘at large’.109 Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order
Act 1994 provides that powers may be given to the police, by a police officer
of the rank of superintendent or above, to stop and search persons and
vehicles, where that officer reasonably believes that incidents involving
serious violence may take place in any locality in his area, and that it is
expedient so to do to prevent their occurrence. The authorisation lasts for up
to 24 hours. If no superintendent is available, a Chief Inspector or Inspector
may grant authorisation for the stop and search, if ‘he reasonably believes that
incidents involving serious violence are imminent’.110
The Police Act 1997
The Police Act 1997 places the power to interfere with property and plant
surveillance devices. Modelled on the Interception of Communications Act
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1985,111 the Act provides that authorisation for the bugging of property may
be given on the basis that it would facilitate the ‘prevention and detection of
serious crime’, which cannot ‘reasonably be achieved by other means’.112 No
exemptions from the provisions are made: thus, solicitors’ offices, doctors’
surgeries and even Roman Catholic confessionals may fall victims of bugging
by the police. Authorisation must be given by the Chief Officer of Police113 or,
if he is unavailable, by an officer of Chief Constable rank.114 Written
authorisations remain in effect for three months whereas, in cases of
emergency, oral authorisation may be made which will remain in force for 72
hours. Following opposition to the Bill, the government accepted that
independent commissioners115 should review the authorisations. Such review
does not, however, necessarily precede police action on the warrant. In cases
where private dwellings, hotel bedrooms or offices are involved, a
commissioner’s prior approval for the authorisation is required. Prior
approval is also required where the surveillance may result in the revealing of
confidential personal information, confidential journalistic material or matters
which are subject to legal privilege.116
THE PROTECTION OF SUSPECTS
Helping the police with inquiries117
In law, the police have no power to detain a person in order to make inquiries.
Section 29 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act clarifies this rule. A person
is either at will to leave a police station where he voluntarily attends to assist
the police, or the police must arrest him. If a person is detained by the police,
he must be informed immediately that he is under arrest, and given reasons
for the arrest, the absence of which may render the arrest unlawful.
The identification of suspects
One of the principal causes of wrongful conviction lies in the wrongful
identification of suspects.118 Identification may take place by witnessing, or
by fingerprinting and the taking of bodily samples. Code of Practice D
governs the procedures to be followed, although Code D does not regulate
those detained as terrorist suspects under section 14 or Schedule 5 to the
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Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, save for the
provisions relating to fingerprinting and bodily samples. 
Identification by identity parade is the most reliable means of
identification, and will be carried out if the defendant requests it or consents
to it. If it is impracticable to hold an identity parade,119 perhaps because there
is a large number of suspects or because there are insufficient people with
relevant characteristics to the suspect,120 the police may then turn to
alternative means of identification. Identification by witness may be effected
by arranging for the witness to see the suspect in a group, generally in a
public place away from the police station. The consent of the suspect is
required, but his or her failure to consent does not prohibit the use of group
identification. Alternatively, identification may be by video identification.
Face to face confrontation of the witness and accused may take place provided
identification is not possible by any other means.
Search of the person
Before 1984, there was considerable doubt about the breadth of power to
search an arrested person. The police had a common law power to search a
person if they reasonably believed that he was carrying a weapon or evidence
relevant to the crime of which he was suspected. Resisting a lawful search
would amount to obstruction of the police. In Lindley v Rutter (1980), the
police, having arrested the defendant while drunk, insisted on searching her
person and attempted to remove her bra. Ms Lindley resisted the attempt and
scratched and bit a police woman. On a charge of obstruction of the police, the
magistrates’ court convicted Ms Lindley. On appeal, however, the conviction
was quashed. While it was conceded that the police were under a duty not to
allow a person to escape, or to destroy evidence, the lawfulness of their action
depended upon the circumstances of the case. This personal search, which
was highly unlikely to yield any evidence, required strong justification. Under
the circumstances the police had exceeded their powers. In Brazil v Chief
Constable of Surrey (1983), the police also attempted to search a woman, in the
course of which she assaulted the officers. The police claimed that the search
was necessary, first, to ensure the detainee’s own safety and, secondly, to
discover whether she was carrying drugs. The search was ruled unlawful.
There was no need for the search and, in relation to the search for drugs, the
detainee had not been informed of the police’s reasons for the search. Her
conviction for assaulting a police officer in the execution of his duty was
quashed. 
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Search of an arrested person under the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act 1984
Section 32 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provides that searches
may be made of an arrested person, the premises on which he or she was
arrested and any vehicle in which the suspect was arrested. The grounds for
the search are for evidence relating to any offence, or for evidence which may
assist the escape of the suspect.121
Intimate body searches are also permitted under section 55 of the 1984 Act.
The search must be carried out by a doctor, unless a senior officer believes that
that is impracticable. The search may only be made for articles which may
cause injury or for class ‘A’ drugs. The powers to search the person, and
personal samples which may be taken, have been extended by the Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act 1994. Section 58 extends the definition of intimate
and non-intimate samples which may be taken. An intimate sample is one of
blood; semen or any other tissue fluid; urine; pubic hair; a dental impression;
or a swab taken from a person’s orifice other than the mouth.122 A non-
intimate sample means a sample of hair other than pubic hair; a sample taken
from a nail or from under the nail; a swab taken from any part of a person’s
body including the mouth but not other body orifice; saliva; or a footprint or a
similar impression of any part of a person’s body other than a part of his
hand.123
The conditions of interviews
The Code of Practice on the Detention, Treatment, and Questioning of Persons
by Police Officers (Code C) provides that a suspect should be given eight
hours in any 24 hours free of questioning. Breaks for refreshment should be
given regularly (every two hours), unless such breaks would adversely affect
the inquiries. Persons who are mentally disordered and children should be
interviewed in the presence of a competent adult. The detention must be
reviewed regularly, the first taking place after six hours from the time of
lawful detention; subsequent reviews to be conducted at intervals of no more
than nine hours. 
Tape recording of interviews124
The tape recording of police interviews acts as a protection for the person
being questioned, and as protection for the police against accusations of
oppression. Tape recording is regulated by a code of practice.125 Both the
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defence and prosecution have the right to listen to tape recordings, although
the police provide summaries of the recordings.126 The police must maintain
proper records of any interview, including the time of commencement and
ending and any breaks in questioning. The person interviewed must be
allowed to read the record. 
The caution
The caution to be administered is laid down in the Criminal Justice and Public
Order Act 1994, and reads:
You do not have to say anything. But, if you do not mention now something
which you later use in your defence, the court may decide that your failure to
mention it now strengthens the case against you. A record will be made of
anything you say and it may be given in evidence if you are brought to
trial.127
Arrest
A lawful arrest is an arrest for which there is legal authority. Three categories
of lawful arrest exist: arrest under warrant; arrest without warrant under
common law and arrest without a warrant under statute. Where a person has
been wrongly arrested and detained under statute,128 the person detained in
entitled to damages: Roberts v Chief Constable of Cheshire Constabulary (1999);
Woodward v Chief Constable, Fife Constabulary (1998).
Arrest under warrant
Section 1(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 provides that a warrant for
arrest may be made on the basis that a ‘person has, or is suspected of having,
committed an offence’. The warrant should not be issued unless the offence is
indictable129 or punishable by imprisonment.130
Arrest without warrant: common law
The only common law power to arrest without warrant is where there are
reasonable grounds for suspicion that a breach of the peace is about to occur,
or has been committed and is likely to continue or to reoccur.131 If violence
has occurred, or is about to occur to persons or property, a police officer may
reasonably believe that a breach of the peace is about to occur. If a breach of
the peace has occurred, but has ceased, the power to arrest ceases.
729
126 See Baldwin and Bedward, 1991.
127 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s 34; Code C, para 10.4.
128 PACE 1984, s 34; Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980.
129 A serious offence triable by jury in the Crown Court.
130 Criminal Justice Act 1967, s 24(1).
131 See R v Howell (1982).
In Trevor Foulkes v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police (1998), the Court of
Appeal considered the issue of reasonable grounds in law for the arrest and
subsequent detention of a person in relation to an apprehended breach of the
peace. The police officer had arrested the appellant in the course of a domestic
incident, honestly believing that arrest was necessary to prevent a breach of
the peace. The Court of Appeal ruled that, where there was no actual breach
of the peace but only an apprehended breach, the power of arrest was only to
be exercised in the clearest of circumstances where the officer was satisfied
that a breach of the peace was imminent. The arresting officer in this case
acted honestly but did not have reasonable grounds for the arrest. Arrest was
an inappropriate management of a dispute between husband and wife in the
family home.
An apprehended breach of the peace was also central to the decision in
Bibby v Chief Constable of Essex Police (2000). A bailiff had gone to a debtor’s
premises for the purpose of seizing assets due under a liability order issued by
a magistrates’ court. The debtor threatened to call his friends to prevent the
removal of goods. Fearing a breach of the peace, a police constable, who had
been called to the premises, ordered the bailiff to leave. When the bailiff
refused, he was arrested and led away to the police station in handcuffs. He
was later released without charge. The bailiff sued the police for assault and
wrongful imprisonment. The Court of Appeal considered the conditions to be
met in order to exercise the ‘now exceptional’ common law power of arrest.
These included:
• There must be the clearest of circumstances and a sufficiently real and
present threat to the peace to justify the extreme step of depriving of his
liberty a citizen who is not at the time acting unlawfully.132
• The threat must be coming from the person who is to be arrested.133
• The conduct must clearly interfere with the rights of others.
• The natural consequence of the conduct must be violence from a third
party.
• The violence from the third party must not be wholly unreasonable.
• The conduct of the person to be arrested must be unreasonable.134
In the instant case, the bailiff was acting lawfully and attempting to enforce an
order of a court. Although the constable reasonably came to the conclusion
that a breach of the peace was imminent he had failed to consider where the
threat was coming from. Accordingly, neither the arrest nor the use of
handcuffs was justified.135
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Arrest without warrant under statute
Section 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 defines the power of
arrest without warrant for serious offences. 
A person may be arrested without warrant under the following
circumstances:
(a) he or she is conspiring to commit, or attempting to commit, or inciting,
aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence
under section 24(2);
(b) he or she is in the act of committing an arrestable offence;
(c) where the arrestable offence has been committed, the person who is guilty
may be arrested;
(d) where the arrestable offence has been committed, the person is reasonably
suspected of having committed the offence;
(e) where a constable reasonably believes that an arrestable offence has been
committed, any person whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to
be guilty of the offence may be arrested;
(f) any person is about to commit an arrestable offence may be arrested;
(g) any person whom the police officer reasonably believes is about to commit
an arrestable offence.136
Arrestable offences
Section 24 applies:
(a) to offences for which the sentence is fixed by law;
(b) to offences for which a person of over 21 years of age or over (not
previously convicted) may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five
years (or might be so sentenced but for the restrictions imposed by section
33 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980); and
(c) to the offences to which section 24(2) applies and in this Act ‘arrestable
offence’ means any such offence.
Offences for which a person may be arrested under section 24 may also be
classified as ‘serious arrestable offences’ under section 116 and Schedule 5,
Part I of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act.137 Where that is the case, the
power of arrest is unaffected, but the safeguards and powers exercisable
under detention conditions are affected. Helen Fenwick analyses the
importance of the distinction between the two categories as follows:
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137 Offences include treason, murder, manslaughter, rape, kidnapping, incest with a girl
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consented, and an indecent assault which constitutes an act of gross indecency. The
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photographs of children) and an offence under the Obscene Publications Act 1959, s 2
(publication of obscene matter).
The section 24 offences which may also fall into this category fall into two
groups as defined under section 116 – first, those which are so serious (such as
murder, manslaughter, and indecent assault which amounts to gross
indecency) that they will always be serious arrestable offences and secondly,
those which will be so classified only if their commission has led to certain
specified consequences, namely, serious harm to the security of the state or
public order, serious interference with the administration of justice or
investigation of offences, death or serious injury, substantial financial gain or
serious financial loss.138
An arrestable offence is a serious offence which carries a sentence fixed by
law. Conspiracy to commit such offences, or attempts or incitement, aiding,
abetting, counselling or procuring such offences are all arrestable offences.139
Where an arrestable offence has occurred, or the police reasonably suspect
someone is committing such an offence, or about to commit such an offence,
the police may arrest without a warrant.140 In these circumstances, there is no
need for the police to establish the ‘general arrest conditions’ which apply to
arrest for less serious offences. 
The police may arrest without warrant for any non-arrestable offence –
that is to say, less serious offences – where the ‘general arrest conditions’ are
satisfied.141 The ‘general arrest conditions’ are:
(a) that the name of the relevant person is unknown, and cannot be readily
ascertained by, the constable;
(b) that the constable has reasonable grounds for doubting whether a name
furnished by the relevant person as his name is his real name;
(c) that:
(i) the relevant person has failed to furnish a satisfactory address for
service; or
(ii) the constable has reasonable grounds for doubting whether an address
furnished by the relevant person is a satisfactory address for service;
(d) that the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the arrest is
necessary to prevent the relevant person:
(i) causing physical injury to himself or any other person;
(ii) suffering physical injury;
(iii) causing loss of or damage to property;
(iv) committing an offence against public decency; or
(v) causing an unlawful obstruction of the highway;
(e) that the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the arrest is
necessary to protect a child or other vulnerable person from the relevant
person.142
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Giving reasons for the arrest
A failure to give reasons for an arrest will cause the arrest to be unlawful. In
Christie v Leachinsky (1947), the House of Lords ruled that a person must be
told of the fact of his or her arrest and the grounds for arrest, although this
need not be done if the circumstances are obvious or it is difficult to
communicate with the arrested person. Section 28 of the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act 1984 places the requirements on a statutory basis and makes
them more stringent. Subject to a person escaping before the information can
be communicated, section 28 requires that:
(a) the person making the arrest must inform the arrested person of the fact of,
and reasons for, arrest, either immediately or as soon as is reasonably
practicable afterwards;143
(b) a police officer making an arrest must inform the person arrested of these
matters even if they are obvious.144
No particular form of words need be used, but they must be in sufficient
detail to enable the arrested person to understand the issue and, if possible, to
deny the allegation and be released. Where it is not possible to state reasons
immediately, for example, because the arrestee is reacting violently, reasons
must be stated as soon as practicable. This requirement is illustrated in
Director of Public Prosecutions v Hawkins (1988). In that case, a violent struggle
prevented reasons being given immediately. However, when the arrestee was
subdued, reasons for the arrest were still not given. The arrest became
unlawful when the opportunity to give reasons arose, and reasons were not
given. A sympathetic attitude to the arresting authorities was seen in Lewis v
Chief Constable of the South Wales Constabulary (1991). There, two people were
arrested and not immediately informed of the reasons for arrest. In an action
for false imprisonment, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the circuit
judge, that the arrests were unlawful until the reasons were given but, once
the reasons were given, the arrests became lawful. However, in Ghagar v Chief
Constable of West Midlands Police (2000), the Court of Appeal took a strict view
in relation to a motoring offence, stating that a police officer must state both
the offence which a person is suspected of committing and the power to
request a name and address.
The giving of reasons for arrest is also a requirement under the European
Convention on Human Rights. In Fox, Campbell and Hartley v United Kingdom
(1990), the applicants were arrested on suspected terrorist offences, but were
not informed of the reason for the arrest, although they were told they were
being arrested under a specified statutory provision. When later interviewed,
they were asked about specific criminal offences. The Court of Human Rights
held that paragraph 5(2) of Article 5 had not been satisfied at the time of the
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arrest, but that the defect was later rectified. The case of Murray, discussed
above, also went to the European Court. The Court again found no breach of
Article 5. Although she was denied reasons for some half an hour, she was
eventually informed of the reason for arrest during interrogation.
Detention following arrest
Once a person has been arrested, he or she may be detained by the police for
questioning before a charge is laid. There exists a fine balance to be achieved
here between permitting the police to question a suspect in order to determine
whether there exist sufficient grounds on which to make a charge, and the
need to protect persons from unwarranted detention by the police. Section
41(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provides that a person
shall not be kept in police detention for more than 24 hours without being
charged. The time runs from the time of the person’s arrest or, in the case of a
person’s arrest outside the relevant police area, from the time at which he
arrives in the police station.145
The 24 hour period is extendable. The grounds on which detention beyond
24 hours may be authorised are as follows. For authorisation by a senior
officer of police, there must be reasonable grounds for believing that the
detention is necessary in order to secure or preserve evidence or obtain
evidence by questioning; that the offence in question is a ‘serious arrestable
offence’; and that the police investigation is being conducted ‘diligently and
expeditiously’.146 A review of detention must be made after 24 hours.147 On
application to the senior officer, authorisation may be given to detain him for
up to 36 hours.148 After 36 hours of detention, a person must be brought
before the magistrates’ court for a hearing. The authorised period of further
detention is at the magistrates’ discretion, but shall not be longer than 36
hours,149 but the police may apply for a further period of detention which, if
granted, may extend the period of detention to a possible maximum of 96
hours.150
Bail
Section 41(7) provides that, if a person has not been charged at the expiry of 24
hours, he shall, subject to sub-section 8, be released, either on bail or without
bail.151 The 24 hour time limit does not apply to persons whose detention for
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more than 24 hours has been authorised by a senior officer152 or where a
successful application has been made to a magistrates’ court by the police for
continued detention.153
Conditions of detention
The Codes of Practice detail the conditions under which persons may be held.
These include no more than one person in a cell, access to toilet and washing
facilities, the provision of adequate food and daily exercise. The police may
not use more than ‘reasonable force’ in relation to detainees in preventing
escape, or causing damage to property. Appropriate medical treatment must
be given where necessary. 
In R v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (1999), the House of Lords
ruled that authorities, such as the police or prison service, who were entrusted
with holding prisoners in custody, had a duty to take reasonable care to
prevent them from harming themselves or committing suicide. Where there
was a breach of that duty and a suicide occurred, the authorities were not
entitled to rely on the defences of volenti non fit injuria or novus actus
interveniens in an action for negligence brought by the estate of the
deceased.154
The right to legal advice155
Under section 58(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ‘a person
arrested and held in custody in a police station or other premises shall be
entitled, if he so requests, to consult a solicitor privately at any time’.
Delay in complying with a request to consult a lawyer is only permitted
where the person is being held in connection with a serious arrestable offence
and where a senior officer has authorised the delay. The grounds on which
delay may be authorised include reasonable grounds for believing that there
will be interference with or harm to evidence; that exercising the right would
lead to alerting other suspects who have not yet been arrested; or that
exercising the right would hinder the recovery of any property obtained as a
result of the offence.156
Legal representation may be crucial to the protection of the suspect from
oppressive questioning by the police. Where confessions are obtained by
oppression, a guilty verdict may subsequently be set aside.157 Guidelines laid
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down for solicitors who attend interviews are published by The Law Society.
The guidelines for intervening in questioning include, inter alia, the following:
... you may need to intervene if the questions are: ... oppressive, threatening or
insulting;
... you should intervene if the officer is not asking questions but only making
his/her own comments ...
... if questions are improper or improperly put, you should intervene and be
prepared to explain your objections ...
... if improprieties remain uncorrected or continue, advise the suspect of
his/her right to remain silent.158
When a person has been arrested and is being held in custody at a police
station, he or she has the right to communicate with one other person ‘as soon
as practicable’.159 A delay is only permitted, where an officer of the rank of
superintendent authorises it, on the basis that ‘he has reasonable grounds to
believe’ that the communication will lead to interference with evidence
connected with a serious arrestable offence, or physical injury to other
persons, or will lead to alerting of other suspects connected with the offence,
and will hinder the recovery of property obtained as a result of the offence.160
Section 58(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 also provides that a
person who is in police detention ‘shall be entitled, if he so requests, to consult
a solicitor privately at any time’. In addition, section 59 inserts into the Legal
Aid Act 1982 a provision which is capable of preventing a solicitor from
providing advice and legal representation under the Legal Aid scheme if ‘they
do not also provide advice and assistance ... for persons ... held in custody’.
Under Code of Practice C,161 a detainee is to be informed of the right to legal
advice,162 and given the name of a duty solicitor if he or she requires it.163 The
detainee is also entitled to have a solicitor present during questioning.164
However, where a person is arrested for a serious arrestable offence, and an
officer of the rank of superintendent or above so authorises, access to a
solicitor may be delayed for up to 36 hours. Such a delay may be authorised
where the officer is concerned that there is a risk to witnesses or to evidence
relating to the case, or where immediate access would hinder the recovery of
any property obtained as a result of the offence.165 In cases of suspected
terrorism, the right to consult a solicitor is conditioned by the requirement
that the interview is conducted within ‘the sight and hearing’ of a uniformed
officer.166 The Court of Appeal has construed section 58(8) narrowly. In R v
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Samuel (1988), it was held that delay in access to legal advice can only be
justified on specific grounds which must be substantiated to the satisfaction of
the court.
The right to have a solicitor attend during police interviews has been held
not to apply to a suspect arrested in Northern Ireland under section 14 of the
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, since section 58 of
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 was not applicable to a person
arrested or detained under the terrorism provisions.167 The House of Lords so
held in R v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary ex parte Begley (1997).
The right to legal advice must also be considered in relation to Article 6 of
the European Convention on Human Rights. See, inter alia, the discussion of
Magee v United Kingdom (2001), Condron v United Kingdom (2001) and Murray v
United Kingdom (1996) in Chapter 19.
The right to inform someone of arrest and detention
A person held in a police station is entitled to inform a relative or friend ‘or
other person concerned with his welfare’ of his arrest without delay, unless
such notification would prejudice the investigation of crime or the arrest of
other suspects.168
The right to silence169
In relation to the right to silence, the position of a person who has been
arrested is different from that of a citizen before arrest, and the Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act 1994 made substantial amendments to this right.
See, further, below.
The reforms introduced under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act
are amongst the most controversial reforms of the protection of an accused for
many years. Those who oppose a weakening of the right to silence base their
arguments on the relative vulnerability of the accused, and the need to protect
the accused from making statements which might falsely incriminate him.170
Against this concern must be set the argument that when individuals are
permitted to remain silent when questioned by the police, advantage of this
right is taken by ‘professional criminals’ who are familiar with the process.
The concern has been that such persons will conceal information under
questioning and then ‘ambush’ the prosecution by revealing the information
in court.171
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Sections 34 to 38 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 effect
the reforms. Under section 34, where an accused is being questioned under
caution and fails to mention any fact later relied on in his evidence or, where
the accused has been officially charged with an offence172 or officially
informed that he might be prosecuted for it,173 he fails to mention any fact
which in the circumstances existing at the time ‘the accused could reasonably
have been expected to mention’ when questioned, charged or informed, then
the court, in determining whether there is a case to answer,174 and the court of
jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged,175
may ‘draw such inferences from the failure as appear proper’.
Section 35 relates to the accused’s silence at trial. Other than where a
person’s guilt is not in issue, or where the court considers that the physical or
mental condition of the accused ‘makes it undesirable for him to give
evidence’, the court must satisfy itself that the accused is aware that the stage
has been reached where he or she can give evidence in defence. If the accused
then chooses not to give evidence, or without good cause refuses to answer
questions, it is permissible for the court or jury to draw such inferences ‘as
appear proper from his failure to give evidence or his refusal, without good
cause, to answer any question’.176 Section 35 relates to persons who have
attained the age of 14 years177 and, where the age of the person is ‘material’,
his age ‘shall for those purposes be taken to be that which appears to the court
to be his age’.178
Section 36 relates to the effect of an accused’s failure to account for objects,
substances or marks. Where a person has been arrested by a constable, and the
police reasonably believe that the presence of the object, substance or mark
may be attributable to the accused participating in the commission of a
specific offence, the police are entitled to ask for an explanation as to the
object, etc.179 If the person fails to account for it, then the court, when
(a) considering whether to dismiss the charge, or (b) deciding whether there is
a case to answer, or (c) whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged, is
entitled to ‘draw such inferences from the failure or refusal as appear
proper’.180
Section 37 relates to the accused’s failure to account for his or her presence
at a particular place. If a person arrested by a constable was found at a place
where the offence was committed, and the officer reasonably believes that his
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presence was attributable to participation in the offence, and the constable
requests him to account for his presence, then, if that person fails to do so, a
court, or court or jury, in circumstances (a), (b) and (c) in relation to section 36,
may draw ‘such inferences from the failure or refusal as appear proper’.181
In R v Argent (1997), the Court of Appeal ruled that six formal conditions
had to be met before the jury could draw adverse inferences under section 34
of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. The accused had been
convicted for manslaughter and sentenced to ten years in prison. The
defendant appealed against conviction. The Lord Chief Justice stated that the
formal conditions to be met were:
(1) there had to be proceedings against a person for an offence. That condition
had necessarily to be satisfied before section 34 could bite;
(2) the alleged failure had to occur before a defendant was charged;
(3) the alleged failure had to occur during questioning under caution by a
constable, or any other person within section 34(4);
(4) the questioning had to be directed to trying to discover whether or by
whom the alleged offence had been committed;
(5) the alleged failure by the defendant had to be to mention any fact relied on
in his defence to those proceedings. That raised two questions of fact:
(a) was there some fact which the defendant had relied on in his defence?;
(b) did the defendant, when he was being questioned in accordance with
section 34, fail to mention it?;
(6) the fact that the appellant failed to mention was a fact which, in the
circumstances existing at the time, he could reasonably have been expected
to mention when so questioned.
The relevant time was the time of questioning and account had to be taken of
all the relevant circumstances existing at that time.
The court should not construe the expression ‘in the circumstances’
restrictively; matters such as time of day, the defendant’s age, experience,
mental capacity, state of health, sobriety, tiredness, personality and legal
advice were all part of the relevant circumstances. Those were only examples
of the things which might be relevant.182
The ‘right to silence’ and serious fraud trials
Different provisions apply to serious fraud trials. Under the Criminal Justice
Act 1987, where the Serious Fraud Office issues a ‘section 2 notice’, the person
to whom the notice is addressed commits a criminal offence if he or she does
not attend for interview and answer questions. In addition, under section
432(2) of the Companies Act 1985, where a company is under investigation, a
person is under a legal obligation to answer questions. By these means, any
‘right to silence’ is effectively negatived.183 In Saunders v United Kingdom
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(1997), the Court of Human Rights ruled that the provisions were in violation
of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.184
The reliability of evidence185
It is central to the protection of the individual that evidence be obtained in a
lawful manner. The question arises as to how the law can secure a balance
between ensuring that the police operate within the law, and the Codes of
Practice which supplement the law, and allowing evidence to be used which
may have been obtained in a manner not strictly in accordance with the rules
but which does prove that a suspect committed a particular crime. If evidence
is made inadmissible, on the basis of a procedural irregularity, a guilty suspect
may go free. On the other hand, if the evidence – however obtained – is
admitted, and proves false, there is a danger of innocent suspects being
wrongfully convicted.
Prior to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the admissibility of
evidence was regulated under the common law. A distinction was drawn
between illegally obtained evidence which was admissible, and involuntary
confessions which were inadmissible on the basis that they might be
unreliable.186 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 places the
admissibility of evidence on a statutory basis. In relation to confessions, there
are four criteria to be employed in determining whether they should be
admissible in court. Section 76 regulates confessions.187 Confessions are
admissible into court unless the confession has been obtained by
(a) oppression,188 or (b) in consequence of anything said or done which was
likely, in the circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable any
confession which might be made by him in consequence thereof.189 In those
circumstances, the court ‘shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence
against him except in so far as the prosecution proves to the court beyond
reasonable doubt that the confession (notwithstanding that it may be true)
was not obtained as aforesaid’.190 Moreover, in any case where the
prosecution proposes to give in evidence a confession, the court may, of its
own motion, require the prosecution to prove that the confession has not been
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obtained in the circumstances above.191 However, where a confession has
been partly or wholly excluded on the grounds above, that fact does not affect
the admissibility in evidence (a) of any facts discovered as a result of the
confession, or (b) where the confession is relevant as showing that the accused
speaks, writes or expresses himself in a particular way, of so much of the
confession as is necessary to show that he does so.192
In relation to the exclusion of ‘unfair evidence’, section 78 of the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provides that:
In any proceedings, the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the
prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having
regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the
evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an
adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to
admit it.193
Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is far wider than
section 76, and may be relevant to confessions obtained which do not fall
within the requirements of section 76.194 Thus, for example, if a confession is
fabricated, the defence will argue that the accused did not make a confession
and, accordingly, that ‘confession’ could not fall under section 76. The power
to refuse to allow evidence is discretionary. Where there has been a breach of
the rules under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, and that breach is
substantiated to the satisfaction of the court, the question to be determined is
whether the breach is substantial or significant,195 other than where the police
had acted in bad faith.196 Having established whether a breach of the rules is
substantial or significant, the court will then look to the nature of the rule in
question in relation to the circumstances of the case. Thus, for example, the
right to have a legal adviser present will be deemed the more important in
relation to a vulnerable suspect who could be easily confused by police
questioning.
Habeas corpus
The ancient writ of habeas corpus is available to test the legality of a person’s
detention. The writ can be issued either by the person imprisoned or by
someone acting on his behalf. If it is established that there is a prima facie
ground for believing the detention to be unlawful, the writ will be issued.
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Originally a common law power, the right to a writ was placed on a statutory
basis under the Habeas Corpus Act 1679. The Act of 1679 relates to persons
imprisoned on a criminal charge. The Habeas Corpus Act 1816 relates to
persons detained other than on a criminal charge.197 AV Dicey instructed that:
... if, in short, any man, woman, or child is deprived of liberty, the court will
always issue a writ of habeas corpus to any one who has the aggrieved person
in his custody to have such person brought before the court, and if he is
suffering restraint without lawful cause, set him free.198
In the case of Wolfe Tone (1798), Tone was tried and found guilty of high
treason by a court-martial and sentenced to death. A writ was issued on the
basis that, since Wolfe Tone was not under commission to the English army,
but rather held a commission from the French Republic, there was no
jurisdiction for his trial by court-martial in Ireland. The Lord Chief Justice
instructed the sheriff to go immediately to the army barracks and demand that
Tone not be executed. When the officers refused to comply with the order, the
Lord Chief Justice ordered that Tone, and the detaining officers, be taken into
the custody of the sheriff. On seeking to recover Tone from detention, it was
found that he had cut his throat and could not be moved. On this case, Dicey
wrote, seemingly without irony, that ‘it will be admitted that no more
splendid assertion of the supremacy of law can be found than the protection
of Wolfe Tone by the Irish Bench’.199
The writ has also been used to test the legality of detention of slaves:
Sommersett’s Case (1771) and of students: Ex parte Daisy Hopkins (1891). In Board
of Control ex parte Rutty (1956), a writ was issued to test the legality of the
detention of a mentally defective patient who had been detained for eight
years without an order of a court. Nowadays, the writ of habeas corpus is
most often used to test the legality of the detention of immigrants. However,
in R v Home Secretary ex parte Mughal (1974) and R v Home Secretary ex parte
Zamir (1980), the court refused to allow habeas corpus to be used to question
the decision to remove an illegal immigrant from the country. Conversely, in
R v Home Secretary ex parte Khawaja (1984), the House of Lords ruled that the
question as to whether a person was an illegal immigrant was not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Home Secretary to decide. Rather it was a matter
of fact, which the courts would decide. Before Khawaja could be removed
from the country, the court had to be satisfied on the evidence that he was in
fact an illegal immigrant. Only if he was an illegal immigrant would the court
permit deportation. 
There exists an overlap between habeas corpus and judicial review which
causes uncertainty: see Chapters 24 and 25. In R v Home Secretary ex parte
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Cheblak (1991), the Court of Appeal held that habeas corpus is not a substitute
for judicial review proceedings. However, where an application for judicial
review is pending, a writ may be used to ensure that the applicant is not
prematurely removed from the country.200
PROTECTION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
In Semayne’s Case (1605), the principle was judicially declared that an
‘Englishman’s home is his castle’. Two early cases reveal judicial boldness in
the protection from unlawful entry into property. In Wilkes v Wood (1763), an
Under Secretary of State, accompanied by police, entered into Wilkes’s home,
broke open his desk and seized papers. In an action for trespass against the
Under Secretary, Lord Pratt CJ stated that the power claimed would affect ‘the
person and property of every man in this kingdom, and is totally subversive
of the liberty of the subject’. Moreover, such action, being without justification
and unlawful, was ‘contrary to the fundamental principles of the constitution’.
In the seminal case of Entick v Carrington (1765), the Secretary of State,
under a general warrant, authorised the entry into property and the seizure of
property of Entick, suspected of publishing seditious literature. In an action
for trespass against Carrington, Lord Camden CJ declared:
This power, so claimed by the Secretary of State, is not supported by a single
citation from any law book extant ...
If it is law, it will be found in our books. If it is not to be found there, it is not
law.
By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so
minute, is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without my
licence, but he is liable to an action, though the damages be nothing ... 
Every entry into the property of the citizen must be authorised by law.
However, such freedom from arbitrary intrusion is – in the absence of a
written guarantee of rights – subject always to the sovereignty of parliament.
It may also be that the royal prerogative will confer legitimacy on what might
otherwise be deemed an invasion of property. The doctrine that ‘a man’s
home is his castle’201 has many exceptions. As seen in Chapter 6, statutory
rights of entry are conferred on employees of public authorities.
In addition to rights of physical entry into property, the issue of warrants
to intercept communications202 authorises a non-physical but nevertheless
real intrusion into a person’s private property.
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Rights of entry under common law 
The courts have considered rights of entry under common law. In Thomas v
Sawkins (1935), it was held that the police are entitled to be present at a public
meeting on private premises even where organisers asked them to leave. The
officers had reasonably believed that a breach of the peace would occur and,
hence, were justified in remaining and were not trespassing.203 In R v Inland
Revenue Commissioners ex parte Rossminster Ltd (1980), however, the House of
Lords ruled that clear wording in a statute would override the individual’s
right to privacy in the home.
Police powers of entry came into conflict with Article 8 of the European
Convention in McLeod v United Kingdom (1998). The applicant was required by
a court order to surrender certain items to her former husband. The former
husband entered the premises, with members of his family and a solicitor’s
clerk, with the permission of the applicant’s mother, but in the applicant’s
absence. The police had been called because of fears of a breach of the peace
and entered the premises and checked the list of items to be removed.
Following the applicant’s return, the police insisted that the husband leave
with the property. The applicant’s action against the police was dismissed by
the Court of Appeal. The Court of Human Rights ruled that although the
police’s action was lawful and had the legitimate aim of preventing a breach
of the peace, their entry in the applicant’s absence and their failure to check
the terms of the court order rendered their conduct disproportionate and in
violation of the right to privacy.
Police powers of entry, search and seizure
The police have special powers of entry and search, recognised under
common law, but now clarified under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act
1984. For the most part, entry is authorised under a warrant authorised by a
magistrate.204 Over and above entry under warrant, however, there exists a
class of cases under which the police may enter without warrant under
sections 17 and 18 of the Act. Included in this class, are entry to arrest for an
arrestable offence or for offences under the Public Order Act 1936, or Criminal
Law Act 1977. Entry without warrant is also lawful if exercised to recover a
prison, court or mental hospital detainee and to save life or prevent serious
damage to property. The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 permits the
detention of a vehicle, small ship and small aircraft (each of which is defined
in the Act), until all charges for carrying clandestine entrants have been
paid.205
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Under sections 18 and 19 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the
police have the power to seize and retain a vehicle and not just parts of it or its
contents, although those sections relate to ‘premises’. The Court of Appeal so
held in Cowan v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (2000), in which the
court also ruled that a vehicle was ‘premises’ for the purpose of the Act and
the Act did not give power to seize premises but only contents, that rule
applied where the premises were immoveable and could not physically be
removed. Where premises were moveable there was no reason not to interpret
‘anything’ in sections 18 and 19 as including ‘everything’. When exercising a
search warrant under section 8(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act
1984, however, a police officer was not entitled to remove items from the
premises in order to sift through them for the purpose of deciding whether
they fell within the scope of the warrant.206 In Webb v Chief Constable of
Merseyside Police (2000), the Court of Appeal ruled that there was no statutory
power for the police to retain money seized by the police in the investigation
of drug trafficking, where the person entitled to possession of the money was
not convicted of a drug trafficking offence, and there was no general power to
retain the money on public interest grounds. It might be lawful for the police
to retain goods of a kind that it was unlawful to deal in them at all, but money
was not of this character. 
Where police exercise statutory powers of entry by the use of reasonable
force, unless circumstances make it impossible, impracticable or undesirable,
the police should give any occupant present the reason for his seeking to
exercise that power of entry. The police had entered premises under section 17
of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, for the purpose of arrest. In
O’Loughlin v Chief Constable of Essex (1998), the Court of Appeal, dismissing an
appeal by the Chief Constable of Essex against an order of the county court,
granted damages and costs to the defendant for, inter alia, assault by the
defendant’s officers. 
Under section 32 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, where a
person is arrested at a place other than a police station, a police constable may
search the arrested person for anything which might assist him to escape from
lawful custody or for anything which might be evidence relating to an offence,
and to enter and search any premises in which he was when arrested or
immediately before he was arrested for evidence relating to the offence for
which he has been arrested.207 The power is subject to the requirement that
the ‘constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the arrested person
may present a danger to himself or others’.208 The power to search is limited
to what is ‘reasonably required’ for the purpose of discovery.209 Search of the
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person is restricted: a person may not be required to remove any of his or her
clothing in public, other than an outer coat, jacket or gloves, and the search
may only be conducted if the constable ‘has reasonable grounds for believing’
that the person concerned has concealed on his or her person anything for
which a search is permitted.210 If the permitted search discloses anything
which might be used to cause physical injury to the person or any other
person, the officer may seize and retain anything found, other than an item
subject to legal privilege, if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
item may be used to assist escape from lawful custody, or is evidence of an
offence, or has been obtained in consequence of the commission of an
offence.211
Searching a suspect’s property
At common law, the legality of searches of a person’s property was doubtful.
In Ghani v Jones (1969), police officers investigating a woman’s disappearance
searched, without a warrant, her father-in-law’s house. At the request of the
police, passports and documents were handed over. When the return of the
passports was requested, the police refused. The court ruled that where no
one had been arrested, the police were justified in taking an article if, first,
‘there were reasonable grounds for believing that a serious offence had been
committed’; secondly, that there were reasonable grounds ‘for believing that
the article in question is either a fruit of the crime ... or is the instruments by
which the crime was committed ... or is material evidence to prove the
commission of the crime’; thirdly, the police must reasonably believe that the
person in possession of the article has ‘himself committed the crime, or is
implicated in it, or is accessory to it, or at any rate his refusal must be quite
unreasonable’; fourthly, the police must not keep the article longer than
reasonably necessary; and finally, the ‘lawfulness of the conduct of the police
must be judged at the time, and not by what happens afterwards’. This
decision tipped the balance very much in favour of the powers of the police, to
the detriment of individual citizens. However, in Jeffrey v Black (1978), where
the defendant was arrested for allegedly stealing a sandwich, and the police
subsequently searched his home and found drugs, the court ruled that,
whereas the search might have been lawful if the police were looking for
evidence connected with the theft, it was unlawful to search for evidence of
another offence. In McLorie v Oxford (1982), the court disapproved of lenient
attitudes to police searches. Lord Justice Donaldson confirmed that there was
no common law right to enter into a dwelling house to search for ‘the
instruments of crime, even of serious crime’.
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Freedom of Association and Assembly, Public Order and Police Powers
Police powers to enter into property other than after arrest
At common law, the police have no right to enter into private property
without a warrant. Accordingly, if they so enter and are asked to leave – even
where reasonable force is used to evict them – the police are not acting in the
execution of their duty and an individual cannot be convicted for assaulting a
police officer executing his duty.212 There are a number of conditions under
which a police officer might enter property, each of which is founded on the
basis of a ‘lawful excuse’. In the absence of a lawful excuse for entry, the police
committed a trespass. At common law, entry was lawful to prevent a breach
of the peace,213 or in the case of actions designed to save life or prevent injury.
Under the Criminal Law Act 1967, there was statutory power to enter
premises in order to execute an arrest. 
In Khazanchi v Faircharm Investments Ltd; McLeod v Butterwick (1998), the
Court of Appeal held that the police have no right to forcibly enter property
for lawful purposes, even where the owner had previously consented to their
entry, when the owner, not aware of the police’s intention to visit at a
particular time, locked his house on leaving.
The right to search premises under the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act 1984
Under section 18, a police officer may enter premises of a person arrested for
an arrestable offence and search for evidence of the offence for which he has
been arrested or for related offences. There must be reasonable grounds for
believing that the evidence is on the premises. Authorisation for the search
must be given by a senior officer, and a written record of the grounds for the
search and the evidence sought made.214
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND POLICE ACT 2001215
The 2001 Act provides statutory authority for giving penalty notices under a
range of legislation governing minor offences. The effect of complying with
the penalty notice is to discharge any liability to be convicted of the offence to
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the search of prisoners’ property when the claim to legal privilege arises: see R (Daly) v
Secretary of State for the Home Department (2001), in which the House of Lords ruled that
prison officers could not exclude prisoners from their cells in order to effect a search.
See Chapter 19.
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which the notice relates.216 As an alternative, the person concerned may
choose to be tried for the offences.
Problems are encountered by the police in the seizure of materials which
might be legally privileged, being correspondence between a client and his or
her lawyer. Where the police seize such material and the owner claims that it
is privileged, the position of the police has proved uncertain.217 In order to
remedy the difficulties, the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 provides
statutory authority for the removal of property for examination elsewhere and
authorises the removal of material which is intrinsically related (such as
computer disks), where it is not reasonably practicable for the property to be
separated from that which it would otherwise be unlawful to remove.218
Where property is found to be privileged, that property must be returned as
soon as is practicable.219 Any person from whom property is seized may
apply to the Crown Court for the return of the property.220
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CHAPTER 22
INTRODUCTION
The concept of citizenship is fundamental to the question of rights of
residence and freedom of movement of the individual. Historically, at
common law, any individual lawfully within the realm owed a duty of
allegiance to the Crown, in return for which the Crown owed a duty of
protection to the individual.2 This reciprocal relationship, in the eighteenth
century, came to be dubbed the social contract under which citizens conceded
power to government to rule, the government holding its powers as a trustee
of the individual’s rights and freedoms.3 The Crown had the right to control
rights of entry to the country, and the duty to protect the country’s borders.4
Being an island, from a historical point of view, the task of controlling the
external boundaries of the state was a relatively easy matter. 
Magna Carta of 1215 recognised the right of merchants, other than those
from enemy countries in time of war, to enter, leave, stay and travel in
England. The Magna Carta also expressed the right of other individuals who
owed allegiance to the King, to enter, leave and re-enter the realm.5 In times of
emergency, the King could prevent persons from leaving the realm.6 Classes
of persons could be denied entry and those already present ordered to leave
the land, where their remaining constituted a perceived threat to the ‘public
good’. In 1530, for example, a statute7 provided that Gypsies could no longer
enter the country and, in 1547, statute provided that Gypsies over the age of
14 born in England had one month in which to leave the realm.8 In the
Victorian era, immigration was legally uncontrolled. From the 1880s, large
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1 See Macdonald and Blake, 1997; Dummett and Nichol, 1990; Supperstone and
Cavanagh, 1994.
2 See Chitty, 1820.
3 See Locke (1690), 1977; Paine, 1791; Rousseau (1762), 1977.
4 On the limits of the Crown’s power to remove persons from their homeland, see R v
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Office ex parte Bancourt (2000), discussed
in Chapter 6.
5 Excepting those who had been lawfully convicted, or outlawed, or who were enemy
aliens: Chapter 42. The right to leave one’s country is an international law right under
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 12(2), which provides
that ‘everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own’. The making of
exclusion orders against suspected terrorists under the Prevention of Terrorism Acts,
which confines that person to his own country, violates that international law right. See,
further, Chapter 23.
6 Under the prerogative writ of ne exeat regno.
7 An Act concerning outlandifh People, calling themfelves Egyptians.
8 The Act of Elizabeth 1547. See Barnett, 1995.
numbers of East European Jews fleeing from persecution entered the country,
and a political campaign for restrictions to be introduced resulted in the
enactment of the Aliens Act 1905. Not all aliens were barred, and controls
were aimed at those arriving at certain ports and travelling on the cheapest
class of ticket. The Act also introduced power to curb the entry of certain
groups – powers which were on one occasion used to restrict entry of Chinese
and Gypsy people. The aliens inspectorate was the forerunner to the
immigration service, and came under the control of the Home Office. The First
World War marked a tightening of immigration control under the Aliens
Restriction Act 1914 and the Defence of the Realm Acts. From 1919, all aliens
were subject to controls on entry. The Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act
1919 confirmed the restrictions and remained in force until 1973.
With the expansion of the British Empire, the status of British subject was
conferred on all citizens within the Empire. With the growth in independence
of formerly dependent territories, the newly independent States exerted their
own right to control nationality and immigration. In 1948, the British
Nationality Act created a new classification – that of citizens of the United
Kingdom and Colonies. All such citizens, and citizens of other
Commonwealth nations, became British subjects or Commonwealth citizens,
and enjoyed the same rights of entry and residence into the United Kingdom.
These extensive rights to enter and reside were, by the 1960s, put under great
strain as increasing numbers of overseas subjects sought to enter and reside in
the United Kingdom. The Commonwealth Immigration Acts of 1962 and 1968
imposed restrictions on entry. Discrimination entered into the law.9 Under the
Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962, controls were introduced which
distinguished between the rights of entry of citizens from Commonwealth
countries who had familial and ancestral links with the United Kingdom and
those who did not. The 1968 Act10 further tightened rights of immigration,
limiting the rights of entry of those who had no parental or grandparental
links with the United Kingdom. The Immigration Act 1971 further
distinguished between subjects who were free to enter the United Kingdom
and those who needed permission to enter. The 1971 Act, which came into
force on 1 January 1973, also provided the criteria for rights of residence in the
United Kingdom. Under the Act, the distinction between aliens and
Commonwealth citizens was reduced, and the important distinction became
between those with rights of abode in the United Kingdom and others,
whether aliens or Commonwealth immigrants, who were subject to
immigration control and required permission to enter and remain. Also in
1973, the United Kingdom became a member of the European Communities,
now the European Community and Union, and distinctions arose between the
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rights of citizens of Member States of the Community and citizens from non-
EC countries. Section 1 of the Act lays down general principles. Section 1(1) of
the Immigration Act 1971 provides that:
All those who are in this Act expressed to have the right of abode in the United
Kingdom shall be free to live in, and to come and go into and from, the United
Kingdom without let or hindrance except such as may be required under and
in accordance with this Act to enable their right to be established or as may be
otherwise lawfully imposed on any person.
Section 2 of the 1971 Act stipulates who has the right of abode. A person has a
right of abode in the United Kingdom if (a) he is a British citizen; or (b) he is a
Commonwealth citizen who (i) immediately before the commencement of the
British Nationality Act 1981 was a Commonwealth citizen having the right of
abode in the United Kingdom by virtue of section 2(1)(d) or section 2(2) of this
Act as then in force, and (ii) has not ceased to be a Commonwealth citizen in
the meanwhile. 
The 1971 Act also created the status of patriality and non-patriality – non-
patrials having lesser rights of entry than patrials. The classification scheme
was complex and much criticised. One consequence of the concept was that
some Commonwealth and United Kingdom citizens were not conferred a
right of entry by virtue of patriality, notwithstanding that they had no other
country to go to. In particular, in relation to East African Asians, the rules
worked harshly, and resulted in condemnation by the Court of Human Rights
on the basis that it represented degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of
the European Convention on Human Rights.11
The need to bring the law relating to nationality and immigration law into
conformity led to the Immigration Act 1971. Immigration law was
substantially reformed by the British Nationality Act 1981, with a tightening
of the rules on rights of appeal against deportation orders and making it a
criminal offence to overstay leave to enter.12 It is also from the Immigration
Act 1971 that current citizenship status flows. The Act replaced the former
categories of citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies with three
classes of persons: British citizenship, British Dependent Territories
citizenship and British Overseas citizenship. In addition to these categories,
there exists the status of British National (Overseas) citizens, Commonwealth
citizens, and citizens of the European Union.
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12 The problems caused by refugees seeking to enter and remain in the United Kingdom
led to further reforms under the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 and the
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BRITISH CITIZENSHIP
British citizenship may be acquired by birth, adoption, descent, registration or
naturalisation.
Birth
A legitimate child born in the United Kingdom, one of whose parents is a
British citizen or is ‘settled’13 in the United Kingdom at the time of its birth
assumes British citizenship. A child born outside marriage acquires
citizenship through his or her mother, unless the child is legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of his or her parents. Prior to the 1981 Act, any person
(with minor exceptions) born in the United Kingdom became a British citizen. 
Adoption and legitimation
A child14 adopted by a British citizen becomes a British citizen from the date
of the adoption order. Where the adopters are married, the child becomes a
British citizen provided that one of the adoptive parents is a citizen. A child
born out of wedlock and subsequently legitimated by the marriage of his or
her parents shall be treated as legitimate for the purposes of the British
Nationality Act 1981.15
Descent
A child born outside the United Kingdom becomes a citizen if one of his or
her parents is a British citizen, provided that that parent has not also acquired
citizenship through descent. Where the child is born to a parent who acquired
citizenship through descent, the child will only acquire citizenship if the
parent is an employee of the Crown, or other designated services.16
In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Rahman (1997), the
Court of Appeal ruled that, where a court had to establish the truth relating to
a precedent fact on which the Secretary of State formed the opinion that a
person had entered the country by deception and was an illegal entrant, the
court was entitled to take into account all the material on which the decision
maker had relied, even though that might be hearsay. The onus was on the
Secretary of State to establish, to a level of proof appropriate to a crime in civil
proceedings, that the person was an illegal entrant. On the facts, by a majority,
the court ruled that the Secretary of State had done so.
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Registration
After a period of residence in the United Kingdom, a person may acquire
citizenship through residence. Children born in the United Kingdom, who are
not automatically entitled to citizenship through birth, have a right to be
registered as citizens at the age of ten years, provided that the child has not
been absent from the United Kingdom for more than 90 days in each of the
first ten years.17 A child is also entitled to registration if one of his or her
parents acquires citizenship or becomes settled in the United Kingdom during
his or her minority.18 British Dependent Territories citizens, British Overseas
citizens and British Protected Persons19 resident for five years in the United
Kingdom are also entitled to registration.20 The Home Secretary has a general
discretion to register any child as a British citizen.21
Naturalisation
Persons not covered by the provisions of the 1981 British Nationality Act may
acquire citizenship through naturalisation. A five year residence period is a
precondition for applying for naturalisation, which is granted at the discretion
of the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary, in deciding whether to grant
naturalisation, must be satisfied that the applicant is of ‘good character’, has a
command of the English, Welsh or Gaelic language, and intends to have his or
her principal residence in the United Kingdom, unless employed in a
designated form of employment as specified in the Act.22 Naturalisation may
also confer citizenship on the spouse of a British citizen.23 Where citizenship is
conferred through naturalisation, the Home Secretary’s decision is final and is
not subject to appeal.24
BRITISH DEPENDENT TERRITORIES CITIZENSHIP
Part II of the 1981 British Nationality Act governs Dependent Territories25
citizenship. A person may acquire citizenship through birth, adoption,
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21 Ibid, s 3(1).
22 Ibid, s 6(1) and Sched 1.
23 Ibid, s 6(2) and Sched 1.
24 Ibid, s 44(2).
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descent, registration as a minor or naturalisation, concepts which follow the
same formula as that discussed above.26
The Falkland Islands
The British Nationality (Falkland Islands) Act 1983 confers British citizenship
on persons born in the Falklands to parents who are settled there.
Hong Kong
The Hong Kong Act 1985 created the status of British Nationals (Overseas) for
Hong Kong citizens after the transfer of sovereignty from the United
Kingdom to China in 1997. Under the British Nationality (Hong Kong) Act
1990, the Home Secretary could confer citizenship on up to 50,000 Hong Kong
residents, nominated by the Governor of Hong Kong, to enable them to live in
the United Kingdom in the future if they wish to leave Hong Kong after the
transfer of power.27
British overseas citizenship
Any person who was a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies
immediately before the commencement of the Act, and who does not become
either a British citizen or British Dependent Territories citizen by virtue of the
Act, becomes a British Overseas citizen. Overseas citizenship may otherwise
be acquired through registration during a child’s minority28 and registration
through marriage.29
COMMONWEALTH CITIZENSHIP
Every person who is a British citizen, British Dependent Territories citizen, a
British Overseas citizen or a British subject, or is a subject in a country listed in
Schedule 3,30 has the status of a Commonwealth citizen.31
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31 British Nationality Act 1981, s 36.
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EUROPEAN UNION CITIZENSHIP
The Treaty on European Union 1992, as amended by the Treaty on European
Union 1997 (TEU), confers Union citizenship on the citizens of all Member
States.32 Under the 1992 Treaty, asylum policy, immigration, control over
external borders and policies relating to nationals of third countries, was one
of the designated areas of common interest between Member States, and fell
within the Justice and Home Affairs pillar.33 Member States were under a
duty to co-operate in these matters, and to act in compliance with the
European Convention on Human Rights and the 1951 Convention on the
Status of Refugees. There was common agreement that the working of third
pillar of the Union structure – Justice and Home Affairs – was unsatisfactory.
As a result, under the Treaty on European Union 1997 (the Treaty of
Amsterdam), as discussed in Chapter 8, all issues relating to the free
movement of persons within the Union, including asylum, visas and
immigration, have now been placed under Community law and its law
making processes, while issues relating to crime and the police remain in the
third pillar. 
Freedom of movement and rights of establishment are a central feature of
the European Union and Community. The elimination of border controls
between Member States – which the United Kingdom government is currently
resisting – further extends the freedom of movement for persons within the
territorial boundaries of the European Union. 
Article 4(4) of Council Directive of 1968, on the abolition of restrictions on
movement and residence within the European Community for workers of
Member States and their families34 provides that:
A member of the family who is not a national of a member state shall be issued
with a residence document which shall have the same validity as that issued to
the worker on whom he is dependent.
The Treaty on European Union 1992 introduced the concept of European
citizenship. This is reaffirmed in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union
1997 (the Amsterdam Treaty), which states that, among the objectives of the
Union, is the aim to:
... to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of national of its
Member States through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union.
Articles 17 and 18 of the EC Treaty provide that:
Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the
Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship.
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Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and shall
be subject to the duties imposed thereby.
Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within
the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid
down in this Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it effect.
In addition to rights of residence, every citizen of the Union has the right to
stand as a candidate and to vote in municipal elections in the Member State in
which he or she resides,35 and to stand as a candidate and vote in elections for
the European Parliament.36 Union citizens are entitled to protection from the
diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State.37 Citizens of the
Union have the right to petition the European Parliament under Article 194 of
the Treaty, and have the right also to apply to the European Union
Ombudsman under Article 195.38
The free movement of persons provisions under the EC Treaty founded
the basis for the development of the idea of European citizenship. The ideas of
free movement of persons and rights of establishment within the common
market were essentially linked to the economic aspects of the Community.
The concept of citizenship now adopted under the TEU is far broader than
this, and reflects the wider political and social union which is aspired to. The
Commission has the duty to develop further the concept of citizenship and to
report to the European Parliament, and the Council on developments. The
Council has the power to adopt the proposals of the Commission, following
consultation with the European Parliament, and acting unanimously, which
the Council will recommend for adoption by Member States.
Under the Schengen Agreement of 1985–95, several Member States agreed
to remove all forms of border controls between their countries. This
agreement is now formally incorporated, under the Treaty on European
Union 1997, into the EC Treaty; see, further, Chapter 8. In respect of the
United Kingdom and Ireland, however, opt outs were negotiated, in order to
allow these Member States to preserve border controls, in light of their
particular geographical characteristics.39
Although Article 8 confers citizenship, and the EC Treaty provides for the
free movement of workers and rights of establishment, this does not give an
unqualified right for residents of other Member States to enter and remain in
the United Kingdom. In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte
Vitale (1996), for example, the Court of Appeal ruled that it was clear from the
case law of the European Court of Justice that Article 48 of the EC Treaty (now
Article 39), which confers freedom of movement for work, does not confer
unlimited freedom in relation to residence. Article 39 protects those who are
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actively seeking work, and a Member State is justified in requiring the person
to leave the country where he had been unsuccessful in securing employment
for six months, unless he could demonstrate that he was actively continuing to
seek employment, and that he had a real chance of being engaged. The Treaty
on European Union had not affected that legal position. 
Further, in Sahota v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Zeghraba v
Same (1997), on appeal by the Secretary of State against decisions of the
Immigration Appeal Tribunal granting indefinite leave to remain in the
United Kingdom to Sahota and Zeghraba, the Court of Appeal ruled that a
person who was not a citizen of a Member State of the European Community
but was married to a British citizen, was not entitled under Community law to
the same rights of residence in the United Kingdom as those enjoyed by his
spouse under UK law when they returned to live and work in the United
Kingdom. 
The Court of Appeal ruled that spouses of United Kingdom citizens did
not on marriage automatically become entitled to identical rights. Their entry
into the UK was subject to immigration controls. The rights under
Community law were not to be amalgamated with those which arose under
domestic law within the territory of Member States for their own nationals
and spouses. National law continued to distinguish between British citizens
with a right of abode and citizens of the Community exercising Community
rights. The Secretary of State’s appeal was allowed.40
The distinction between entry into the United Kingdom under
Community law and national rights of residence was also considered, by the
Court of Appeal, in Boukssid v Secretary of State for the Home Department (1998).
In that case, the spouse of a British citizen had been admitted under
Community law. Whereas, under national law, she would have had a right to
indefinite leave to remain, that was not the position when she had entered the
United Kingdom under Community law. Counsel for the applicant argued
that, provided the applicant had entered the country lawfully, the basis on
which she had entered was irrelevant. Further, he argued that the length of
residency requirements which applied to the applicant, but not to a national,
were discriminatory and contrary to Article 12 of the EC Treaty. Both
arguments were rejected.41
Rights of entry and residence
Rights of entry and residence are inextricably linked to the question of
citizenship. The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, to which the United Kingdom is a signatory, provides that ‘No one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country’.42 The
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United Kingdom entered a reservation in respect of this broadly phrased right
under international law, by which it reserved the right to ‘continue to apply
such immigration legislation governing entry into, stay in and departure from
the United Kingdom’ as it deems necessary.43
Establishing the right to enter
The holding of a valid British passport identifying that person as a British
citizen or as a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies having the right of
abode in the United Kingdom, or travel document of a European Union
Member State entitles the holder to entry. Passports may be issued by the
Passport Agency for a full ten year period, or for a lesser period, or a British
visitor’s passport may be issued. Full passports are only issued once the
Passport Agency is satisfied as to the accuracy of the application and
supporting documentation. Section 3 of the Immigration Act 197144 provides
that:
(8) When any question arises under this Act whether or not a person is a
British citizen ... it shall lie on the person asserting it to prove that he is. 
(9) A person seeking to enter the United Kingdom and claiming to have the
right of abode there shall prove that he has that right by means of either:
(a) a United Kingdom passport describing him as a British citizen or as a
citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies having the right of abode
in the United Kingdom; or
(b) a certificate of entitlement issued by or on behalf of the government of
the United Kingdom certifying that he has such a right of abode.
The holding of a passport, however, is not conclusive proof of the right to
enter. Where as passport has been obtained as a result of fraud, or theft, then
an immigration officer who suspects that this is the case is entitled to require
that the passport holder substantiate his or her claim to be the legitimate
holder of the passport. In these situations, therefore, the burden of proof as to
identity rests with the passport holder. However, where the Passport Agency
has indisputably issued a passport to the holder, albeit one of a limited
duration, the issue arises – should a dispute occur over the matter – as to
where the burden of proof lies over the issue of the validity of that passport
and the right of its holder to enter. A British Visitor’s passport is
distinguishable from a full passport, albeit of limited duration. A visitor’s
passport does not qualify for section 3(9) purposes.45
The issue was tested in the Queen’s Bench Division in R v Home Secretary
ex parte Obi (1997). In Obi, the passport agency had issued a passport limited
to six month’s duration. When he applied for a renewal of the passport, he
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was arrested and served with a notice directed to him as an illegal immigrant,
on the basis that, notwithstanding the passport, the Secretary of State was not
satisfied that the applicant was Obi, and that the onus of proof of identity,
once queried, lay with the applicant to prove that he was the person whom
the passport described as a British citizen. The applicant sought judicial
review. The question which fell for answer was the question as to who was
under the duty to satisfy the burden of proof: the applicant or the Home
Secretary:
... the principal question I have to decide is, however, one of pure law: is it for
the Secretary of State to satisfy the court that the applicant is an illegal entrant
or for the applicant to satisfy the court that he is not?
Sedley J ruled that on the balance of probabilities in light of the evidence as to
identity of the applicant, and the evidence which the applicant refused to
disclose, the applicant had not proven that he was the person for whom the
passport had been issued. However, that finding was not determinative of the
issue. The Secretary of State was unable to discharge the burden of proof
which the statute placed upon him, showing that the passport issued, naming
him as Mr Obi and describing him as a British citizen, does not entitle him to a
right of abode. The application for judicial review accordingly succeeded. 
Rights of entry and abode: immigration policy and citizenship
status
Immigration, asylum and deportation law is a complex web of statutes, with
Acts of Parliament being enacted in piecemeal fashion and no attempt being
made to consolidate the law in a manageable, comprehensive form. The
Immigration Act 1971, Immigration Act 1988, Asylum and Immigration
Appeals Act 1993, the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 and the Immigration
and Asylum Act 1999 are the Immigration Acts regulating the area. In order to
determine rights of entry for other than British citizens and others referred to
above, it is necessary to consider immigration law and policy in light of
citizenship status to which the policy is linked. 
Immigration policy
The first modern statutory control over immigration was provided by the
Aliens Act 1905, which permitted the refusal of entry to persons regarded as
‘undesirable’. By the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962, more favourable
treatment was given to descendants of white immigrants than to citizens of
the New Commonwealth.46 The Immigration Act 1971, as amended,47
together with the Immigration Rules, provides the structure of immigration
law. Rights of entry are determined by citizenship status under the British
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Nationality Act 1981. As noted above, section 1 of the Immigration Act 1971
provides that those who ‘have a right of abode shall be free to live in, and to
come and go into and from, the United Kingdom without let or hindrance’
subject to restrictions enabling their status to be determined.48 Those who do
not have the right of abode, may live, work and settle in the United Kingdom
‘by permission and subject to such regulation and control of their entry into,
stay in and departure from the United Kingdom’.49
A person who has the right of abode is a person who is a British citizen, or
a Commonwealth citizen who was a Commonwealth citizen having the right
of abode immediately before the commencement of the British Nationality Act
1981, and who has not ceased meanwhile to be a Commonwealth citizen.50
Where a person is not a British citizen (or a Commonwealth citizen as defined
above), section 3 states that a person ‘shall not enter the United Kingdom
unless given leave to do so under this Act’. Leave may be given to enter the
United Kingdom either for a limited period or for an indefinite period. Where
limited leave is given for entry into the United Kingdom, the leave may be
subject to conditions restricting an individual’s right of employment or
occupation, or requirements to register with the police, or both. The leave to
enter may be varied. The leave may be restricted or enlarged, or added to by
varying or revoking conditions.
The general provision relating to regulation and control is section 3 of the
Immigration Act 1971, as amended, which provides in part that:
(1) Except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, where is person is not
[a British citizen]:
(a) he shall not enter the United Kingdom unless given leave to do so in
accordance with this Act;
(b) he may be given leave to enter the United Kingdom (or, when already
there, leave to remain in the United Kingdom) either for a limited or
for an indefinite period;
(c) if he is given limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, it
may be given subject to all or any of the following conditions, namely –
(i) a condition restricting his employment or occupation in the United
Kingdom;
(ii) a condition requiring him to maintain and accommodate himself,
and any dependants of his, without recourse to public funds; and
(iii) a condition requiring him to register with the police.
The Home Secretary has the power to lay down rules for the regulation of
entry and stay in the United Kingdom, and these must be laid before
parliament. The rules are subject to nullification by parliament within 40 days
of being laid. 
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Section 3(5) of the 1971 Act, as amended by the Immigration and Asylum
Act 1999,51 provides that a person who is not a British citizen is liable to
deportation from the United Kingdom if:
(a) the Secretary of State deems his deportation to be conducive to the public
good; or
(b) another person to whose family he belongs is or has been ordered to be
deported.
Where a person is given leave to enter and remain, that leave may be
indefinite or limited. Where it is limited, that leave may be varied, whether by
restricting, enlarging or removing the limit on its duration, or by adding,
varying or revoking conditions.52 The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999
makes further provision in relation to the giving, refusing or varying of leave
to enter the United Kingdom, and the Secretary of State may make orders by
statutory instrument which must be laid before parliament and approved by a
resolution of each House. Provision may be made for leave to be given or
refused before a person arrives in the United Kingdom, for the manner or
form in which leave may be given, refused or varied, for the imposition of
conditions, and that a person’s leave to enter not lapse on his leaving the
common travel area (as per section 3 of the 1971 Act).53 The Secretary of State
also has power to make statutory instruments, subject to parliamentary
approval, regulating leave to remain in the United Kingdom, including the
form or manner in which leave may be given, refused or varied, the
imposition of conditions and providing that a person’s leave to remain does
not lapse on his leaving the common travel area.54
The Immigration Act 1971, as amended, created a number of criminal
offences relating to immigration matters. Under the Act, it is a criminal
offence to enter the country illegally;55 to fail to observe conditions of leave; to
assist illegal immigrants; or to obtain leave to remain by deception. A person
who is not a British citizen is liable for deportation from the United Kingdom
if he or she has a limited leave to enter does and not observe conditions
attached, or remains beyond the time limited by the leave, or if the Secretary
of State deems his deportation to be conducive to the public good, or if a
member of his or her family has been ordered to be deported.56 A person may
also be deported if, when over the age of 17, he is convicted of an offence for
which he is punishable by imprisonment, and on conviction, there is a
recommendation by the court for deportation.57 The Act provides that any
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person claiming entitlement to British citizenship bears the onus of proof that
he is a citizen.58 Such proof may be established either by the production of a
British passport, or a certificate of entitlement certifying that a person has a
right of abode issued by, or on behalf of, the government of the United
Kingdom.59
The powers to control immigration are under the responsibility of the
Home Secretary, but, in practice, are entrusted to immigration officers subject
to review by the courts. Powers to give leave to remain in the United
Kingdom, or to vary conditions of leave, are exercisable by the Secretary of
State.60 Deportation orders are the responsibility of the Secretary of State for
the Home Office (the Home Secretary). The effect of a deportation order is to
invalidate any leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom.61 A
deportation order may be made against members of a deportee’s family, but
shall not be made against a family member if eight weeks have elapsed since
the deportee left the country, or if a person has ceased to be a member of the
deportee’s family.62 The making of a deportation order while a claim for
asylum is outstanding is invalid.63
Commonwealth citizens, or citizens of the Republic of Ireland who were
ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom at the time the Act came into force
are not liable to deportation, provided that they have remained ordinarily
resident in the United Kingdom or British Islands since the Act came into
force, or have for the five years previous to the Secretary of State’s decision
been resident in the United Kingdom and Islands, or upon conviction for an
offence, if they have been ordinarily resident for the previous five years.64
Appeals against immigration decisions and deportation orders
The immigration appeal structure was established by the Immigration
Appeals Act 1969, and now falls under the Immigration Act 1971.
Adjudicators are appointed by the Lord Chancellor. Above the adjudicators is
the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, whose President is a lawyer of not less than
seven years’ standing. Members of the Tribunal, which sits in two divisions,
each having three members, are also appointed by the Lord Chancellor. The
system is subject to the supervision of the Council on Tribunals. Before 1993,
there was no further right of appeal against the decision of the Immigration
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Appeal Tribunal, although judicial review proceedings were available. Section
9 of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 provides a right of appeal
on point of law, with leave to the Court of Appeal or to the Scottish Court of
Session. Additionally, the Home Secretary has the power to uphold or reverse
a decision. 
Under section 13 of the Immigration Act 1971, a person who has been
refused leave to enter has a right of appeal to an adjudicator against the
decision. No right of appeal lies against a decision regarding leave to enter
unless the person has a passport or certificate as required by section 3(9).
Under the 1971 Act, no person had a right of appeal unless he was refused
entry at a port of entry and at a time when he held a current entry clearance. A
person entering the United Kingdom as a visitor, or as a student or as a
dependent person is not entitled to appeal against a refusal of an entry
clearance or against a refusal of leave to enter unless he held a current entry
clearance at the time of the refusal.
Appeals against conditions lie to an adjudicator. A person is not entitled to
appeal against a variation of his leave which reduces its duration, or against
any refusal to enlarge or remove the limits of its duration if the Secretary of
State certifies that the person’s departure from the United Kingdom would be
‘to the public good’.65 The adjudicator also has jurisdiction to hear appeals
against deportation orders.66 No deportation order shall be made while an
appeal may be lodged, or while the appeal is pending.67 The adjudicator may
allow the appeal on the basis that a decision taken was not in accordance with
the law, or with applicable immigration rules or, where the decision involved
the exercise of discretion by the Home Secretary, the discretion has been
improperly exercised.68 Appeals against the decision of an adjudicator may be
made to an Appeal Tribunal which may affirm the determination, or vary it.69
Special provisions apply to suspected terrorists: see below.
Extradition
Extradition is the means by which a fugitive from another country is returned
to that country. The Extradition Act 198970 now governs the law. The law
applies to all persons, irrespective of citizenship and extends extradition to all
foreign countries, Commonwealth states and colonies. An exception exists in
the relation to the Republic of Ireland, which is regulated by the Backing of
Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965. Whereas deportation is at the
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instance of the Home Secretary, extradition is commenced by way of a request
from another country to the United Kingdom’s Home Secretary for the return
of the person.71 Only countries with whom a bilateral Treaty has been entered
into, may request extradition. If the Home Secretary is satisfied as to the
request, the matter is referred to a metropolitan stipendiary magistrate who
may issue an arrest warrant.72 On arrest, the person is brought before the
magistrate for committal into the custody of the Home Secretary.73
An offence for which extradition may be ordered is one which, if
committed in the United Kingdom, would carry a term of imprisonment of 12
months or more and carries the same punishment in the requesting state and
where, if committed outside the United Kingdom, would amount to an extra-
territorial offence against the United Kingdom or, in a case where the
requesting state’s jurisdiction is dependent upon the nationality of the
offender, the offence would be an offence under the law of the United
Kingdom.74 No extradition may be granted for a purely political offence, or
where the request for the return of the person is based on race, religion,
nationality or political opinions.75 The question of what amounts to a political
offence is one for the court to determine, and the categories are not closed.
However, terrorist acts will not be regarded as ‘political offences’. The
Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978 and the European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism76 aim to preclude terrorists pleading that their
actions are political and, accordingly, offences for which extradition will be
allowed include murder, kidnapping and the use of imitation firearms. 
A person detained must be notified of his right to make representations to
the Home Secretary as to why he should not be extradited. The detainee has
the right to institute judicial review proceedings to test the lawfulness of the
Home Secretary’s decision, and may apply for habeas corpus to review the
legality of his detention. If the decision is challenged unsuccessfully, the
Home Secretary may extradite the person. If there are no legal proceedings
undertaken, the person may be returned after 15 days from the date of
committal. If the requesting state is not satisfied with the Home Secretary’s
decision not to commit the person, it may apply for a review.77
Extradition arrangements between the United Kingdom and the Republic
of Ireland are governed by the Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act
1965, which in part provides for an extradition order to be made where an
offence has been committed in the Republic of Ireland which corresponds to
an offence in the United Kingdom which is an indictable offence or
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punishable on summary conviction with imprisonment for six months. In R v
Governor of Belmarsh Prison ex parte Gilligan (1999), the House of Lords, on an
application for habeas corpus, ruled that the word ‘correspond’ in relation to
relevant offences was not used in any technical sense and should be
understood in its ordinary meaning. There was, on the facts, sufficient
correspondence between charges of murder and of unlawful carnal
knowledge. The meaning of the ‘accused’ in section 1 of the Extradition Act
1989 was also held not to be a term of art in Re Ismail (1998). The applicant had
applied for habeas corpus challenging the decision to commit him on bail to
await the Secretary of State’s decision whether to extradite him to Germany.
He argued that he was not an accused within the meaning of section 1 of the
Extradition Act 1989. The House of Lords held that, given the differences
between the criminal procedures of various countries and, in particular,
between those of England and civil law countries, the word ‘accused’ should
be given a broad, general and purposive construction. A person was accused
of an extradition crime in a foreign state if the competent authorities there had
commenced prosecution.
In R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Government of
the United States of America (1999), the House of Lords considered the concept
of an extradition crime. The Extradition Act 1989 preserved Orders in Council
made under section 2 of the Extradition Act 1870, relating to giving effect to
extradition treaties and the power to amend them. The Treaty between the
United Kingdom and the United States provided, inter alia, for extradition for
offences listed in the Schedule to the Treaty or any other offence if the offence
was extraditable under the law of the United Kingdom. Section 15 of the
Computer Misuse Act 1990 provided that extraditable offences included
offences relating to computer crime, offences not listed in the Schedule to the
Treaty. The House of Lords ruled that the 1990 Act clearly intended to make
such offences extraditable for the purposes of the Order in Council giving
effect to the Treaty, even though neither the Treaty nor the Order in Council
had been amended.78
The House of Lords also considered the scope of extradition crimes under
the Extradition Act 1989 in R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex
parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) (1999). The applicant, the former president of the
government junta of Chile from 1973 to 1974, and subsequently Head of State
of the Chilean Republic until 1980, had been subject to an international
warrant for his arrest in respect of murder, genocide and terrorism, and the
stipendiary magistrates had issued arrest warrants. On an application for
judicial review, both warrants were quashed on the ground, inter alia, of
sovereign immunity. The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and the
Government of Spain appealed. Since the first hearing before the House of
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Lords, which was set aside on grounds of judicial bias (see, further, Chapters 5
and 26), the crimes alleged had been widened to include offences allegedly
committed before Pinochet became head of state. Counsel for the defence
claimed that, irrespective of the issue of sovereign immunity, a number of the
alleged offences were not extradition crimes. On that point, the House of
Lords ruled that, under section 2 of the Extradition Act 1989, the alleged
conduct had to be a crime in the United Kingdom at the time at which the
crimes took place. Extraterritorial torture did not become an offence until
September 1998 when section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 came into
force. On sovereign immunity, the House of Lords ruled that, by section 20 of
the State Immunity Act 1978, a former head of state enjoyed immunity for acts
done in his official capacity, but that torture was an international crime
against humanity for which there could be no immunity under customary
international law, or there could be no immunity after December 1988 when
the International Convention against Torture 1984 had been ratified by Chile,
Spain and the United Kingdom.
THE ASYLUM AND IMMIGRATION ACTS 1996 AND 199979
The 1996 Asylum and Immigration Act, according to the then Home Secretary
had three objectives, namely:
First, to strengthen our asylum procedures so that bogus claims and appeals
can be dealt with more quickly; secondly, to combat immigration racketeering
through stronger powers, new offences and higher penalties; and, thirdly, to
reduce economic incentives which attract people to come to this country in
breach of our immigration laws.80
The Act amended the administrative procedures for dealing with asylum and
immigration as contained in the Immigration Act 1971 and the Asylum and
Immigration Appeals Act 1993. The Act must be seen in light of developments
within the European Union, and also in light of international law obligations
under the United Nation’s Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951
and the Convention Against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
1981 and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms 1951. 
The 1996 Act is in part aimed at extending national controls, by providing
safeguards for genuine refugees, and providing for appeals for those refused
asylum before deportation, but expediting the processing of cases which
represent bogus claims and tightening up on immigration racketeering. 
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THE IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM ACT 199981
The Labour government sought to reform the law in the face of substantial
pressure imposed on the administrative system by escalating numbers of
persons seeking asylum in the United Kingdom. The Home Secretary stated
that the 1999 Act was intended to make the ‘system fairer, faster and firmer’.82
The 1999 Act makes provision covering most areas of immigration and
asylum. The Act is intended to enable genuine travellers to enter more quickly
while also combating illegal entry and strengthening powers to deal with
other persons not entitled to enter or remain in the United Kingdom.
Immigration
Section 1 of the 1999 Act amends section 3 of the Immigration Act 1971 (the
1971 Act), and is designed to make more flexible and streamlined the granting
of leave to enter. Leave to enter may now be granted, refused or varied
outside the United Kingdom, thus relieving the pressure on immigration
officers at points of entry and giving greater certainty to travellers intending
to enter the United Kingdom. Under section 2, the Secretary of State may, by
statutory instruments, make further provision in relation to the giving,
refusing or varying of leave to remain in the United Kingdom, including the
imposition of conditions. Where a person has limited leave to enter or remain
and applies to the Secretary of State, before the leave expires, for it to be
varied and no decision has been taken on the application when leave expires,
the leave is to be treated as continuing until the end of the period allowed
under the rules relating to appeals against a decision on an application.83 A
person who has overstayed their leave to enter or remain in the United
Kingdom may, during the regularisation period, which is to be not less than
three months, apply for leave to remain in the United Kingdom.84 However,
whereas previously, overstayers who were liable to deportation had a right of
appeal against deportation which could be exercised before any action was
taken to remove them from the United Kingdom, the right of appeal has been
removed by the 1999 Act, although persons removed have a right of appeal
against removal on the ground that there was no lawful basis for their
removal under section 66 (see below, p 775). Section 10 provides that a person
who is not a British citizen may be removed from the United Kingdom in
accordance with directions given by an immigration official if the person
having limited leave to enter or remain does not observe conditions attached
to the leave or remains beyond the time limit, or has obtained leave to remain
767
81 The government certified the Bill as being in conformity with the European Convention
on Human Rights.
82 Hansard, HC Vol 326, Col 37. 
83 Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, s 3.
84 Ibid, s 9.
by deception. The only protection remaining for such persons is to appeal to
an adjudicator under section 65 alleging that the Immigration Authority has
acted in breach of human rights, or to make a claim for asylum under the 1971
Act.
Section 11 of the Act reduces the possibility of challenges by judicial
review (on which see below) to decisions to remove asylum seekers to third
countries which are Member States of the European Union. Whereas in R v
Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Besnik Gashi (1999) and in R v
Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Lul Omar Adan, Sittampalan
Subaskarant and Hamid Aitesegeur (1999) the claimants argued that Germany
was not a safe third country, section 11 introduces the presumption that all
Member States are safe and are to be regarded as places where a person’s life
and liberty is not threatened by reason of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, and as places
from which a person will not be sent to another country otherwise than in
accordance with the Refugee Convention. The remaining avenue for such
persons is to appeal to an adjudicator under section 65 alleging violation of
Convention rights. Where the Secretary of State intends to remove an asylum
claimant to a third country other than a Member State of the European Union,
section 12 applies. Section 12, inter alia, provides that section 15 (restrictions on
removal of asylum claimants while the application is pending) shall not
prevent the removal of a claimant if the Secretary of State has certified that the
claimant is not a national or citizen of the country to which he is to be sent,
that his life and liberty would not be threatened there as above in relation to
section 11, and that the government of that country would not send him to
another country otherwise than in accordance with the Convention on
Refugees.85 Unless such a certificate has been issued, the claimant is not to be
removed from the United Kingdom if he has an appeal pending under section
65, or before the time for giving notice of such an appeal has expired.86
Section 22 of the 1999 Act amends section 8 of the Asylum and
Immigration Act 1996, and provides that the Secretary of State must issue a
Code of Practice for employers, advising on the measures to be taken to avoid
the commission of an offence under section 8 (employing a person subject to
immigration control), and also to avoid racial discrimination contrary to the
Race Relations Act 1976.
Sections 28 to 30 of the 1999 Act relate to criminal offences in relation to
immigration control. Section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971 provides that it is
a criminal offence to knowingly enter the United Kingdom in breach of a
deportation order or without leave, to use deception in order to obtain leave
to enter or remain, or to breach time limits or conditions of limited leave and
related offences. Section 28 amends section 24 of the 1971 Act, and relates to
deception in relation to obtaining or seeking to obtain leave to enter or remain
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in the United Kingdom, or securing or seeking to secure the avoidance,
postponement or revocation of enforcement action against him (the giving of
directions for removal under Schedule 2 to the 1971 Act or section 10 of the
1999 Act). Section 25 of the 1971 Act makes it a criminal offence to assist
unlawful entry and harbouring an unlawful entrant. Section 29 of the 1999 Act
increases the maximum penalty for facilitating illegal entry. Making false
statements to an immigration officer or obstructing an immigration officer
acting lawfully is an offence under section 26 of the 1971 Act, which is
amended by section 30 of the 1999 Act to make clear that making false
statements under any of the post-1971 Immigration Acts is an offence.
Section 31 of the 1999 Act reflects the prohibition in Article 31(1) of the 1951
Convention against penalising refugees for their method of entry to a country
to seek asylum,87 and provides that it is a defence for a refugee charged with
an offence to which this section applies to show that, having come to the
United Kingdom directly from a country where his life or freedom was
threatened, he presented himself to the authorities in the United Kingdom
without delay, showed good cause for his illegal entry or presence and made a
claim for asylum as soon as was reasonably practicable. If the refugee has
stopped in a third country in transit from a country where his life or freedom
was threatened en route to the United Kingdom, the defence in sub-section (1)
only applies if he shows that he could not reasonably have expected to be
given protection under the Refugee Convention in that other country.88
The Immigration Services Commissioner and Immigration
Services Tribunal
The 1999 Act introduces an Immigration Services Commissioner, appointed
by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Lord Chancellor and
Scottish Ministers.89 It is the general duty of the Commissioner to promote
good practice by those who provide immigration advice or immigration
services.90 The Commissioner will issue a Code of Standards and rules. The
Commissioner will have responsibility for registering those persons or bodies
qualified to provide immigration advice or services.91 The Immigration
Services Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider appeals by persons aggrieved by
decisions of the Commissioner in relation to registration,92 and to consider
disciplinary charges laid by the Commissioner in relation to registered
persons or bodies providing immigration advice or services.93
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Carriers’ liability
Part II of the Act imposes civil liability on persons responsible for the
transport of ‘clandestine entrants’ to the United Kingdom and repeals and
replaces the Immigration (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1987.94 Civil liability covers
all vehicles, trains, ships or aircraft bringing clandestine entrants to the United
Kingdom, and provides power to detain such vehicles, ships or aircraft as
security until all charges for the carriage of illegal entrants have been paid.
The definition of clandestine entrant is broad.
Section 32(1) provides that a person is a clandestine entrant if:
(a) he arrives in the United Kingdom concealed in a vehicle, ship or aircraft,
(b) he passes, or attempt to pass, through immigration control concealed in a
vehicle, or
(c) he arrives in the United Kingdom on a ship or aircraft, having embarked:
(i) concealed in a vehicle;
(ii) at a time when the ship or aircraft was outside the United Kingdom,
and claims, or indicated that he intends to seek, asylum in the United
Kingdom or evades, or attempts to evade, immigration control.
‘Immigration control’ means United Kingdom immigration control and
includes any United Kingdom immigration control operated in a prescribed
control zone outside the United Kingdom,95 with the effect that a person may
be a clandestine entrant even though he or she does not arrive in the United
Kingdom. The prescribed control zones will be defined by regulation.
The ‘responsible person’, defined in section 32(5) and (6), is liable to a
penalty for each clandestine entrant, irrespective of whether the responsible
person knew or suspected that a clandestine entrant was concealed in the
transporter, or that there were one or more other persons concealed with the
clandestine entrant in the same transporter.96 Liability is fixed at £2,000 per
clandestine entrant. It is a defence for the carrier to show that he or an
employee was acting under duress, and for the carrier to show that he did not
know and had no reasonable grounds for suspecting that a clandestine entrant
was or might be concealed in the transporters or that an effective system for
preventing the carriage of clandestine entrants was in operation and that, on
the occasion in question, the responsible person was operating that system
properly. If the Secretary of State decides that a person is liable, he must issue
a penalty notice stating the reasons for deciding that the person is liable, the
amount of the penalty or penalties, the date before which the penalty must be
paid, and include an explanation of the steps to be taken if the person objects
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to the penalty If a penalty notice has been issued, a senior officer (which
means an officer not below the rank of Chief Immigration Officer) may detain
the relevant vehicle, small ship or small aircraft, as defined in section 43, until
all penalties have been paid, but the power may only be exercised if there is a
significant risk that the penalty will not be paid in the prescribed time if the
transporter is not detained, and may not be exercised if alternative security
has been given. The detention of the transporter is lawful, even though it is
subsequently established that the penalty notice was ill founded, unless the
Secretary of State was acting unreasonably in issuing the penalty notice.
Where a transporter is detained, the owner or responsible persons or any
person with an interest in the transporter may apply to the court for its
release. The court may order its release if satisfactory security has been
tendered, there is no significant risk that the penalty will not be paid or there
is significant doubt whether the penalty is payable and the applicant has a
compelling need to have the transporter released. If the court does not order
release, the Secretary of State may sell the transporter if the penalty is not paid
before the end of a period of 84 days beginning on the date on which the
detention began. Provision is also made for the detention of ships, aircraft and
vehicles following the arrest of a person in connection with offences relating
to assisting illegal entry and harbouring an unlawful entrant.97
Where an owner of a ship, aircraft or vehicle, or train operator transports a
passenger without proper immigration documents, that carrier is liable to a
charge of £2,000 or such other sum as may be prescribed. The charge is
payable to the Secretary of State on demand. No charge is payable if the
person is shown to have produced the required documentation, or, in relation
to a train operator or owner of a road passenger vehicle, if the law applicable
to the place where the person embarked prohibits the production of
documentation or satisfactory arrangements designed to ensure that such
passengers were not carried were in place, or, where all steps were taken to
ensure that the person had the required documents, or where that person
refused to produce the documentation, that all practicable steps were taken to
prevent his or her arrival in the United Kingdom. Where payment of a charge
is pending, a senior officer may detain the transporter, the release of which
may be ordered by a court on the same grounds as under section 37.98
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Bail
Under the Immigration Acts,99 persons seeking leave to enter the United
Kingdom, persons who are illegal entrants and those subject to deportation
proceedings may be detained. Persons suspected of offences under the
Immigration Acts may also be detained, although in those cases the rules
relating to bail on criminal charges apply. Previously, decisions to detain
persons had not been attended by independent judicial supervision. The 1999
Act seeks to remedy this situation by providing for bail hearings for those
persons detained under the 1971 Act. The 1999 Act does not amend the right
to bail, but provides that the Secretary of State may do so by way of
regulations.100 The Secretary of State must arrange a reference to the court for
it to determine whether the detained person should be released on bail.101
Exceptions to the section 44(2) duty to refer apply in relation to persons
detained other than under a provision of the 1971 Act, or where a person is
liable to deportation as a result of a recommendation of a court or if the
person concerned has given written notice to the Secretary of State that he
does not wish his or her case to be referred to the court.102 Section 46 provides
that the court must release the detained person on bail, subject to exceptions.
These exceptions include where the court is satisfied that there are substantial
grounds for believing that, if released, he or she would fail to comply with bail
conditions, or commit an offence while on bail, or be likely to cause danger to
public health, or be a serious threat to the maintenance of public order.103
Also, the detained person need not be granted bail if the court is satisfied that
he or she is or has been knowingly involved in a concerted attempt to enter
the United Kingdom in breach of immigration law, or he or she is suffering
from a mental disorder and his or her detention is necessary in his or her own
interests or for the protection of others, or he or she is under the age of 18 and
no satisfactory arrangements have been made for his or her care on release, or
he or she is required to submit to an examination by immigration officers or
medical examiners,104 or there are directions in force for his or her removal
from the United Kingdom. A detained person also need not be granted bail if
the court is satisfied that he or she falls within the national security provisions
of section 3(2) of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997,
which provides that the Secretary of State has certified that his or her
detention is necessary in the interests of national security, or that he or she is
detained following a decision to refuse him or her leave to enter on the basis
of national security or that he or she is detained following a decision to make a
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deportation order on the grounds of national security. Where granted,
conditions may be attached to bail.105 Where a condition is attached and has
been broken, any recognisance or security may be forfeited.106 A power of
arrest without warrant applies where an immigration officer or constable has
reasonable grounds for believing that a released person has broken or is likely
to break a bail condition.107
Immigration and asylum appeals
Part IV and Schedules 2, 3 and 4 to the 1999 Act reform the system of
immigration and asylum appeals with a view to providing a comprehensive
right of appeal replacing the multiplicity of appeal mechanisms formerly in
place. Other than in relation to national security cases, where the person may
appeal to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission under the 1997
Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997,108 all other persons may
appeal under the 1999 Act, which repeals appeal provisions under earlier
legislation. The right of appeal extends to decisions requiring a person to seek
leave or the refusal of leave to enter the United Kingdom under the 1971
Act.109 Where, before an appeal is lodged, directions have been given for the
person’s removal from the United Kingdom, or before or after he or she
appeals, the Secretary of State or an immigration officer serves notice that
directions for his removal will be for removal to a country or one of several
countries specified in the notice, the appellant may object to the country to
which he or she would be removed and claim that he or she ought to be
removed, if at all, to a different country specified by him or her.110 Section 60
of the 1999 Act makes detailed provisions limiting rights of appeal under
section 59, largely replicating the provisions of the Immigration Act 1971.
There is the right to appeal decisions to vary, or refuse to vary any limited
leave to enter or remain if, as a result of that decision, the person may be
required to leave the United Kingdom within 28 days of being notified of the
decision.111 The right of appeal under section 61 is limited by the provisions
of section 62. Less detailed than the restrictions in section 60, section 62
provides for four situations to which the right to appeal does not apply. A
person may not appeal against a refusal to vary leave if the refusal is on the
ground that the relevant document which is required by the Immigration
Rules has not been issued, or if the person does not satisfy a requirement of
the Immigration Rules as to age or nationality or citizenship, or the variation
would result in the duration of a person’s leave exceeding that permitted by
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the Immigration Rules, or where any required fee has not been paid. The right
to appeal against a decision to deport a person under the 1971 Act, or the
refusal of the Secretary of State to revoke a deportation order, is regulated
under sections 62 and 63. A person is entitled to appeal against the making of
a deportation order by the Secretary of State under section 5(1) of the
Immigration Act 1971 as a result of his liability to deportation under section
3(5) of that Act, or the refusal to revoke a deportation order. Under the 1999
Act, deportation appeals are limited to cases where deportation is deemed by
the Secretary of State to be ‘conducive to the public good’ and cases where
‘another person to whose family he belongs is or has been ordered to be
deported’.112 Where the Secretary of State serves notice that directions will be
given for his or her removal to a country, or one of several specified countries,
the person may object to the specified country and claim that he or she ought
to be removed, if at all, to a different country specified by him or her. A
deportation order is not to be made under section 5(1) of the 1971 Act against
a person while an appeal may be brought against the decision to make it.113
Section 64 restricts the right of appeal under section 63, providing that the
right to appeal is not available where deportation is ordered as being
conducive to the public good, in the interests of national security or of
relations between the United Kingdom and any other country, or ‘for other
reasons of a political nature’. No right of appeal lies against a refusal to revoke
a deportation order if the Secretary of State has certified that the appellant’s
exclusion from the United Kingdom is conducive to the public good.
Section 65 of the 1999 Act makes provision in relation to Convention rights
under section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998. If, under the Immigration
Acts, a public authority acts in breach of a person’s human rights, by acting or
failing to act in a way made unlawful by section 6(1), the person may appeal
to an adjudicator, unless he or she has grounds for appealing against the
decision under the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997. 
Where directions are given for the removal of a person on being refused
leave to enter, or on a deportation order being made against him or her, or
that person entering the United Kingdom in breach of a deportation order, an
appeal lies to an adjudicator on the ground that he or she ought to be
removed, if at all, to a different country specified by him or her.114 Section 68
restricts the right of appeal under section 67, inter alia, providing that, where a
person has objected to a specified country and has stipulated another country
of destination, if he or she is not a national or citizen of that other country, he
or she must prove that the country will admit him or her.
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Appeals in relation to asylum claims are regulated under section 69 of the
1999 Act. A person who is refused leave to enter may appeal on the ground
that his or her removal would be contrary to the Convention on Refugees. A
decision varying or refusing to vary a person’s limited leave to enter or
remain may also be appealed against to an adjudicator, on the ground that
such a requirement would be contrary to the Convention on Refugees, if it
results in the person being required to leave the United Kingdom within 28
days. Further, a person who has been refused leave to enter or remain, but has
been granted limited leave to enter or remain, may, if that limited leave will
not expire within 28 days of notification, appeal on Convention grounds to an
adjudicator. Where the Secretary of State has decided to make a deportation
order or refused to revoke such an order, an appeal lies to an adjudicator on
Convention grounds, as it does if directions are given under section 66(1) for
the removal of the person from the United Kingdom. The right of appeal is
restricted by section 70 of the 1999 Act, and section 69 does not entitle a
person to appeal against refusal of leave to enter if the Secretary of State
certifies, personally, that the exclusion is in the interests of national security. A
person is not entitled to appeal against a variation of leave which reduces its
duration or a refusal to enlarge to remove the limit on its duration if the
Secretary of State has certified that the appellant’s departure would be in the
interests of national security, or that the decision questioned by the appeal
was taken on that ground by the Secretary of State personally. Where a person
has been refused leave to enter or remain on the basis of a claim for asylum,
but has been granted limited leave to enter or remain, no right of appeal lies if
the reason for the refusal was that he or she was a person to whom the
Convention did not apply and the Secretary of State has certified that the
disclosure of material on which the refusal was based is not in the interests of
national security. A person is not entitled to appeal against a refusal to revoke
a deportation order where the Secretary of State has certified that exclusion is
in the interests of national security, or where revocation was refused on that
ground.115
Support for asylum seekers
Part VI of the 1999 Act provides support for asylum seekers and their
dependants. Asylum seekers are taken out of the benefits system116 and
detailed provision is made for their support under the Act. Support may be
given through the provision of accommodation which is ‘adequate’, providing
for the essential living needs of the supported person, enabling the person to
meet expenses (other than legal and other prescribed expenses) in relation to
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asylum claims, enabling the asylum seeker to attend bail proceedings.117 If the
circumstances of a particular case are ‘exceptional’, the Secretary of State may
provide such support as he considers necessary to enable the supported
person to be supported.118 Local authorities may also provide support in
accordance with arrangements made by the Secretary of State.119 Where the
Secretary of State asks a local authority to assist him in providing support
under section 95, the local authority must co-operate in the provision of
accommodation.120 In order to spread the burden of providing for asylum
seekers throughout the country in an equitable manner, the Secretary of State
has power to designate reception zones in relation to the provision of support,
including accommodation.121 Where the Secretary of State decides that an
applicant for support under section 95 is not qualified for support, the
applicant may appeal to an Asylum Support Adjudicator.122 The Act
introduces a number of offences relating to support. It is an offence to make
false representations, dishonest representations, or to delay or obstruct,
without reasonable excuse, a person exercising functions relating to support,
or to refuse or neglect to undertake an obligation to maintain a supported
person, having given a written undertaking to do so.123 On the compatibility
of these provisions with the Human Rights Act 1998, see below.
Powers of arrest, search and fingerprinting
Part VII of the 1999 Act increases the powers of immigration officers in
relation to entry of premises, arrest and search of suspects, and introduces a
power to fingerprint persons suspected of immigration offences. Arrest
without warrant is regulated by section 128, amending section 28 of the 1971
Act, and provides for the arrest of a person who has committed or attempted
to commit an offence under section 24 or 24A (illegal entry and deception), or
offences under section 25(1) (assisting illegal entry) and obstruction of an
immigration officer under section 26(1)(g). Search and arrest by warrant is
governed by section 129, amending section 28 of the 1971 Act. For the purpose
of arresting a person for an offence under section 25(1) (assisting illegal entry),
an immigration officer may enter and search any premises, but the power may
be exercised only to the extent that it is reasonably required for that purpose
and only if the officer has reasonable grounds for believing that the person
whom he is seeking is on the premises. The power to enter and search
Chapter 22: Constitutional and Administrative Law
776
117 Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, s 96, specifying the types of support which may be
given to eligible persons defined in s 95.
118 Ibid, s 96(2).
119 Ibid, s 99.
120 Ibid, s 100.
121 Ibid, s 101.
122 Ibid, s 102.
123 Ibid, ss 106, 107, 108, respectively.
Citizenship, Immigration and Extradition
premises for evidence is under warrant.124 Following arrest at a place other
than a police station, an immigration officer may enter and search any
premises in which the person was when arrested, or in which he was
immediately before he was arrested for evidence relating to the offence for
which the arrest was made. The power may only be exercised if the officer has
reasonable grounds for believing that there is relevant evidence on the
premises and only to the extent that it is reasonably required for the purpose
of discovering the relevant evidence.125 Similar powers of entry and search of
premises following arrest under section 25(1) of the 1971 Act are provided by
section 133, amending section 28 of the Act. Where a person is arrested at a
place other than a police station, an immigration officer may search the
arrested person if he has reasonable grounds for believing that the arrested
person may present a danger to him or herself or others. The search may be
conducted to search for anything which might be used to escape from lawful
custody, and anything which might be evidence relating to the offence for
which he or she was arrested. The power may only be exercised on reasonable
grounds and to the extent reasonably required. The power conferred does not
authorise an officer to require a person to remove any clothing in public other
than an outer coat, jacket or gloves, but does authorise the search of a person’s
mouth. Evidence discovered may be seized.126 Where a person is arrested
under Schedule 2, an immigration officer may search the person on similar
grounds to those above, save that the immigration officer may also search for
any document which might establish his or her identity, nationality or
citizenship, or indicate the place from which he or she has travelled to the
United Kingdom or to which he or she is proposing to go.127 Similar powers
relate to the search of persons in police custody, and provide that an
immigration officer may search to see if the arrested person has anything with
him or her which might be used to cause physical injury to him or herself or
others, damage property, interfere with evidence or assist his or her escape.128
Fingerprinting is regulated by section 141 of the 1999 Act. Fingerprints may be
taken from adults arriving without proof of identity, those granted temporary
entry where there is a suspicion that they may break entry conditions, illegal
entrants subject to removal, a person who has been arrested about whom a
decision to give leave to enter has not yet been reached, asylum seekers and
dependants of the above.129 The fingerprinting of children under the age of 16
is subject to restrictions. Where there is doubt as to the age of the person,
fingerprints may be taken if a senior officer (Chief Constable, Chief
Immigration Officer, Prison Governor) reasonably believes that the person is
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aged 16 or over.130 Provision is made for requiring attendance for
fingerprinting, and for the subsequent destruction of fingerprints.131 Codes of
Practice, based on the Codes issued under the Police and Criminal Evidence
Act 1984, must be complied with by immigration officers and those authorised
to take fingerprints. An immigration officer exercising any power conferred
under the 1971 Act or the 1999 Act may, if necessary, use reasonable force.132
Detention centres for detained persons
Part VIII of the 1999 Act provides for arrangements for the management of
detention centres for the accommodation of immigration and asylum
detainess, and provides for the contracting out of the provision and running
of detention centres.
Marriage regulations
Part IX of the 1999 Act tightens up the law relating to abuse of marriage for
the purposes of immigration.133 Registrars have the power to request
evidence of name, age, marital status and nationality from couples, and to
refuse to give authority for the marriage where the Registrar is not satisfied
that a person is free, legally, to contract the marriage. The existing procedure
for authorising marriage by a certificate with a licence is abolished, and the
existing period of notice for the Superintendent Registrar to issue a certificate
without a licence reduced from 21 to 15 days. The law is amended to ensure
that notice of intent to marry is given personally by each party before the
Superintendent Registrar in the registration district where they reside, and the
notice will have to state their nationality. Under section 24, Registrars are
under a duty to report to the Home Office those marriages suspected of
having been arranged for the purpose of evading immigration controls. 
Judicial review and immigration
Immigration raises difficult questions for the courts, particularly in light of the
wide powers conferred on the Home Secretary. Exercise of the Home
Secretary’s powers which resulted in judicial criticism occurred in M v Home
Office (1992). The Home Secretary, Kenneth Baker, had ignored an order of the
court that M should not be returned to Zaire, where he feared torture.
Immigration officials put M on a plane, which the Home Secretary refused to
have turned back. The House of Lords held that an injunction could lie against
ministers of the Crown, and that they would be guilty of contempt of court –
in their official capacity – for defiance of orders of the court.
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Where the Home Secretary has rejected an application for asylum, and the
applicant submits a fresh application based on ‘new, apparently credible
evidence’, the Home Secretary has a duty to consider that application afresh:
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Boybeyi (1997). The Court
of Appeal so held, dismissing the Home Secretary’s appeal against the
judgment of the lower court in judicial review proceedings. An unsuccessful
application for asylum does not preclude the making of a second application,
based on fresh evidence.134 However, where no fresh application is
submitted, there is no right of appeal against the Home Secretary’s decision to
deny asylum: R v Special Adjudicator ex parte Secretary of State for the Home
Department (1997).135
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
In R v Home Secretary ex parte Bugdaycay and Musisi (1987), the House of Lords
took a more robust approach. In judicial review proceedings, the House of
Lords ruled that the Home Secretary had failed to take into account relevant
considerations in his decision to deport a Ugandan refugee to Kenya (in which
the applicant had lived previously). Evidence existed that Kenya had
previously returned refugees to Uganda. The court had the aid of the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1954, Article 33 of which
provides that no one should be returned to a territory where his life or
freedom would be threatened, which the court boldly held should govern the
interpretation of the Immigration Rules. 
Under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,136 which came
into force in 1954, the United Kingdom has undertaken certain obligations.
The United Nations’ Office of High Commissioner for Refugees is the
umbrella office responsible for providing advice and guidance as to the
interpretation and implementation of the Convention. A person is defined
under the Convention as a refugee if he:
(a) is outside the country of his nationality;
(b) has a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinions;
and
(c) is unable or, because of that fear, unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country.137
If a person is found to be a refugee, that person is entitled not to be expelled or
returned to the country from which he fears persecution. If, however, the
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person has come to the United Kingdom from a third country, he may be
returned to that third country, provided that that third country will not return
him to the country from which he has fled.138 In Gardi v Secretary of State for
the Home Department (2002), the Court of Appeal ruled that ethnic Kurds who
had a safe and autonomous region to return to (the Kurdish Autonomous
Region in Iraq), and an undertaking by the Home Secretary that the claimant
would not be removed from the United Kingdom until a supervised and safe
method of travel could be arranged, did not establish refugee status.
If a person is deemed to be a refugee, and has not come from a safe third
country, he is entitled to remain. However, he may be deported on the basis of
the requirements of national security or public order, although only if some
country in which he would be safe will accept him.139
A person is not a refugee for the purpose of the Convention on the sole
ground that he or she is stateless, being unable to return to the country in
which he or she is habitually resident. To bring an person within the
Convention, it must be established that there is a well founded fear of
persecution on Convention grounds.140
The test for deciding whether a person has a well founded fear is both
subjective and objective. In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex
parte Sivakumaran (1988), the House of Lords ruled that, whilst the fear is
subjective, the reasonableness of that fear is an objective test. Moreover, the
House of Lords ruled that the test was one to be applied by the Home
Secretary. If the Home Secretary decides that there is a ‘reasonable chance’, a
‘serious possibility’ or ‘substantial grounds for thinking’ that the person will
be persecuted, the objective test will be satisfied. 
In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Gashi (Besnik)
(1999), the Secretary of State made an order to return the applicant to
Germany, which he had previously been required to leave, having fled there
from Kosovo. The applicant sought to challenge the decision to remove him
on the basis that Germany was not a safe third country, alleging that the
German courts were returning ethnic Albanians to Kosovo. The Queen’s
Bench Division ruled, however, that the German courts respected the
demands of the Convention, and that the Secretary of State had taken all
reasonable and necessary steps to remain abreast of the German courts’
approach. Accordingly, his decision was not unlawful because of
unreasonableness. The Court of Appeal, however, allowed the applicant’s
appeal. The Home Secretary was not entitled to assume that Germany
properly applied the Refugee Convention, and evidence suggested disparities
in treatment between asylum seekers which the Home Secretary had a duty to
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investigate. In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Lul Omar
Adan, Sittampalan Subaskaran and Hamid Aitsegeur (1999), the Court of Appeal
also found that the interpretation of the Convention in Germany and France,
in relation to refugees from Somalia, Sri Lanka and Algeria respectively, was
inconsistent with the requirements of the Convention, and that neither
country applied the Convention in their approach to persecution by non-state
agents.141
In determining whether a person is suffering a well founded fear of
persecution, past persecution is relevant for the purposes of determining a
person’s refugee status. It is a question of fact and degree whether a single
beating amounts to persecution and, in that determination, a court or tribunal
should consider not only the seriousness of the beating but also the risk of
repetition if that person was returned to his or her country of origin.142 A
person does not forfeit the right to the protection of the Convention on the
Status of Refugees even where an asylum seeker had in bad faith and for the
sole purpose of obtaining refugee status acted in such a manner in this
country as to put himself at risk of persecution in his country of origin. While
his claim would need careful scrutiny and his credibility would be low,
nevertheless, he would still be entitled to protection in this country if he could
establish a genuine and well founded fear of persecution if returned to his
home country.143 Moreover, it did not follow that an asylum seeker must be
refused asylum because the asylum seeker, albeit unreasonably, would
engage in certain political or religious activities on his return which would put
him or her at greater risk. The Court of Appeal insisted that a single question
arose in all asylum cases, namely, ‘was there a serious risk that on return the
applicant would be persecuted ...’.144 The adequacy of the protection which
state authorities would provide for a person if returned to his or her country,
from the activities of third parties who posed a risk to a person or group, is
also a relevant consideration in determining whether a person should be
granted asylum. Where the state was unwilling or unable to protect the
person from acts of ill treatment, that factor formed part of the consideration
as to whether the applicant’s fear of persecution was well founded.145 In R v
Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Shokar (1998), the Queen’s Bench Division
ruled that, where a person had suffered ill treatment at the hands of the
Punjabi police, and the authorities would not tolerate police misconduct, the
police could not be termed agents of persecution under the Convention.
In R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another ex parte Shah; Islam and
Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (1997), the House of Lords
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ruled on the meaning of ‘membership of a particular social group’, within
Article 1A of the Geneva Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees,146 for the purposes of refugee status. The appellants were two
Pakistani women, who had been accused of adultery and disobedience to
their husbands, and who had no protection from their families and faced
persecution under Sharia law, and possibly death by stoning, if returned to
Pakistan. The Court of Appeal ruled that they were not members of a
‘particular social group’ for asylum purposes under the Convention.
‘Membership, etc’ meant that ‘members of the group had to share a common
uniting attribute which set them apart from the rest of society, which was
recognised as such by society generally, and which existed independently of
the feared persecution’, and that women did not form such a group. The
House of Lords, however, ruled that the fact that some women in Pakistan
escaped the effects of systematic discrimination was not sufficient ground to
deny Convention protection to particular women. Women in Pakistan were a
social group in that ‘society discriminated on the basis of sex’ and were not
‘entitled to the same fundamental rights as men’.147
In Ouanes v Secretary of State for the Home Department (1997), the Court of
Appeal also considered the characteristics defining social groups for asylum.
The characteristic ‘which defined the social group had to be one which the
members should not be required to change because it was so fundamental to
their individual identities or conscience’. Shared identities by virtue of
employment did not constitute the requisite characteristics for asylum
purposes within the Convention. The application for review by a member of a
group of Algerian government employed midwives was rejected. See, also,
Jain v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2000), in which the Court of
Appeal ruled that although homosexuals did constitute a social group, the
likelihood of persecution had not been made out. Although homosexual
practices were criminal in India, the law was seldom enforced.
In Adan v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Noor v Same; Lazarevic v
Same; Radivojevic v Same (1997), the Court of Appeal was called upon, for the
first time in 46 years, to consider the definition of ‘refugee’ in Article 1A(2) of
the Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 and
1967.148
Under Article 1A(2) of the Convention, an asylum seeker unable to return
to his country of origin might be entitled to recognition as a refugee provided
only that the fear or actuality of past persecution still played a causative part
in his presence in the United Kingdom. In the case of each applicant, the
Immigration Appeal Tribunal decided, in 1996, that the asylum seeker was
not entitled to refugee status. The Court of Appeal considered that what was
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in issue was whether it was always necessary for a person unable to return to
his country of origin to show a current well founded fear of persecution, or
whether a historical fear might sometimes suffice. The Home Secretary argued
that there must be a currently well founded fear of persecution.149
Under Article 1A(2), a refugee was someone who:
1 (a) owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for [a Convention
reason] was outside the country of his nationality, and (b)(i) was unable to
avail himself of the protection of that country, or (ii) owing to such fear,
was unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who
2 (a) not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former
habitual residence, (b)(i) was unable to return to it, or (ii) owing to a well
founded fear of being persecuted for [a Convention reason] was unwilling
to return to it.
Lord Justice Simon Brown ruled that that Article was capable of three
meanings, namely that the applicant: (a) was outside owing to a well founded
fear of persecution still current at the time of the asylum application; or (b) has
at some time, however long in the past, come to be outside on account of such
fear and, for whatever reason, had ever thereafter left; or (c) had come to be
outside or, being already outside, not to return, owing to past persecution and
still remained abroad on that account, in the sense that the causal link
remained operative and had never been broken. It was the latter interpretation
which was to be preferred.
However, the House of Lords, in a unanimous decision on appeal from the
Court of appeal, tightened the interpretation of ‘refugee’. In Adan v Secretary of
State for the Home Department (1998), the House of Lords ruled that it was
insufficient for an asylum seeker to ground his or her claim to asylum on
potential persecution if returned to his or her home country, unless that claim
could demonstrate that that person would be specifically discriminated
against. Accordingly, where the applicant claimed that he or she would be
persecuted because of membership of a particular group involved in a civil
war – in this case in Somalia – the applicant was not to be accorded refugee
status. Unless the applicant could prove that he or she was in particular
danger, over and above that of others in society, the claim would fail. In this
case, every person claiming refugee status had to demonstrate a ‘well founded
fear of persecution, above the risk to life and liberty involved in being caught
in a civil war’. Additionally, the House of Lords ruled, the fear of persecution
must exist at the time they apply for asylum – a fear founded on the time at
which they left the country was not sufficient.150
In reaching decisions as to whether to return an asylum seeker to a third
country, the Home Secretary has to be satisfied that the third country presents
no risk which would breach international obligations, namely, that the third
country would not send the detainee to another country, other than in
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accordance with the Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees 1951 and 1967.151
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Another ex parte Canbolat
(1997) involved an application for judicial review of the decisions of the Home
Secretary to issue a certificate under section 2 of the 1996 Act, authorising the
applicant’s removal from the United Kingdom to France as a safe country for
the purposes of adjudication of her claim for asylum, and of the immigration
officer refusing her leave to enter and removing her from the United Kingdom
to France. The Home Secretary had made enquiries concerning French laws
and procedures, and had satisfied himself that the government of France
would not send the applicant to another country other than in accordance
with the Convention. It was not for the court, in an application for judicial
review, to assess the merits of the case, but to determine whether the Home
Secretary was entitled to come to the opinion he did. Only if the Home
Secretary had reached a decision to which he could not properly have come,
on the material before him, could the court interfere. The appeal was
dismissed.152
The House of Lords considered the meaning of ‘particular social group’ in
Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department (1999). The asylum applicants,
who were citizens of Pakistan and had suffered violence there as a result of
allegations of adultery, sought asylum on the basis that, if they returned to
Pakistan, they would suffer persecution and would be unprotected by the
authorities, and might be liable to death by stoning. They argued that their
return would be contrary to the Convention, and that the persecution they
would suffer would be ‘for reasons of membership of a particular social
group’. The House of Lords held that a particular social group had to exist
independently of the Convention. Women in Pakistan constituted a particular
social group because they were discriminated against as a group and the state
gave them no protection. 
In Kriba v Secretary of State for the Home Department (1998), it was held that,
where an asylum applicant had relied on a letter from Amnesty International
based on an Algerian newspaper report, and that evidence was unchallenged
and uncontradicted, came from an apparently responsible source and was a
vital element in the applicant’s case, it was procedurally unfair to reject the
evidence without giving the applicant the chance to adduce support for it.
National security and the public interest
In 1962, Dr Soblen, an American citizen who had been convicted of espionage
in the United States, fled from the country before being sentenced. Whilst on
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an aeroplane, Dr Soblen cut his wrists, and was landed in London for hospital
treatment. The Home Secretary issued a deportation order on the basis that
his continued presence was ‘not conducive to the public good’. When Dr
Soblen applied for habeas corpus, the Court of Appeal ruled that Dr Soblen
had no right to make representations, and that deportation was an
administrative matter for the Home Secretary.153
In R v Home Secretary ex parte Hosenball (1977), two American journalists,
Philip Agee and Mark Hosenball, were detained with a view to deportation,
on the basis that their work involved obtaining and publishing information
prejudicial to national security. There was no appeal against the Home
Secretary’s decision where national security was pleaded.154 Instead, there
was a right of a hearing before a panel of three advisers to the Home
Secretary. When Hosenball tried to challenge the Home Secretary’s decision in
the courts, the Court of Appeal upheld the deportation order. While
recognising that the rules of natural justice155 had not been complied with in
the decision to deport Hosenball, the Court of Appeal nevertheless ruled that
the requirements of national security prevailed and that, in matters of national
security, the Home Secretary was responsible to parliament, and not to the
courts. 
In Rehman v Secretary of State for the Home Department (1999), the Special
Immigration Appeals Commission considered the Secretary of State’s decision
to refuse an application for indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom
on the basis that the applicant represented a threat to national security, in that
he was allegedly involved in an Islamic terrorist organisation. The applicant
appealed against notice of intention to make a deportation order.156 The
Commission allowed his appeal. The Commission ruled that its jurisdiction
was not restricted to reviewing the Secretary of State’s decision on grounds of
Wednesbury unreasonableness, but rather had a duty to decide all matters of
law and fact raised by an appeal. The definition of national security was a
‘matter of fact’ to be decided by the Commission, which was entitled to
substitute its own view for that of the Secretary of State. National security
should be construed narrowly. A person offending against national security
was one who engaged in, promoted or encouraged violent activity targeted at
the United Kingdom, its system of government, or its people. A person also
offended against national security if he engaged in activity directed at the
destabilisation or overthrow of a foreign government which was likely to take
reprisals against the United Kingdom affecting its security or that of its
nationals. The Secretary of State had not established that the applicant was or
was likely to be a threat to national security. 
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The case of R v Home Secretary ex parte Cheblak (1991) also reveals the
extensive powers of the Home Secretary to detain persons ‘in the interests of
national security’. During the Gulf War, 160 Iraqi and Palestinian citizens
were detained with a view to deportation, on the basis that their presence was
not ‘conducive to the public good’. Abbas Cheblak and his family had been
resident in the United Kingdom for 16 years. In an application for habeas
corpus, the Court of Appeal accepted the Home Secretary’s explanation that
Cheblak had associations with an unspecified organisation which supported
the Iraqi government, and refused to press the Home Secretary for further
information.157
THE IMPACT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998
Section 65 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 provides for appeals to an
adjudicator, or to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, against
decisions relating to a person’s entitlement under the Immigration Acts to
enter or remain in the United Kingdom, where the decisions are tainted by
racial discrimination158 or are unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights
Act 1998.159
Judicial review and the Human Rights Act
It has been seen above that hitherto the courts have exercised caution when
reviewing the wide powers of the Home Secretary in relation to immigration
and asylum, and that in judicial review proceedings the traditional approach
of applying the strict Wednesbury criteria to executive decisions has been
taken. Accordingly, unless it could be shown that the executive’s decision
revealed ‘irrationality, illegality or procedural impropriety’, the courts would
not impugn the decision. However, the Human Rights Act 1998 has effected
significant change to the conventional approach.160
The Human Rights Act 1998 requires that the courts enforce the
Convention rights incorporated under the 1998 Act. The Act also requires new
modes of interpretation which extend far beyond the limited Wednesbury test,
and now include an evaluation as to whether in reaching decisions which
restrict Convention rights the executive has acted in a manner which is
proportionate to the objective being pursued and has only taken such
measures which are necessary in relation to the permitted limitations of rights,
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as stipulated in Convention Articles (for example, inter alia, in the interests of
national security, public safety and public order). The impact of this new
approach is now being felt.
For example, in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Javed;
R v same ex parte Zulfqar Ali; R v Same ex parte Abid Ali (2001), the High Court
ruled that the court had a positive duty to give effect to Convention rights and
to ensure that there was an effective remedy in cases of suspected breach of
Convention rights. The court granted an application for judicial review of the
Home Secretary’s decision – inter alia – to include and retain Pakistan on the
list of designated countries as a country in which there appeared to him to be
no serious risk of persecution, on the ground that that was not justified by that
country’s human rights record. The Home Secretary had argued that the court
was not competent to challenge his decision, unless it could be shown that he
had acted in bad faith. The court rejected that contention. Since the enactment
of the Human Rights Act 1998, the courts must now to give effect to
Convention rights, in particular here Article 3, the prohibition against torture,
inhuman or degrading treatment. The decision to include Pakistan was, on the
evidence, plainly wrong. There was the clearest evidence that two of the
applicants had been tortured in Pakistan in the past and if returned to
Pakistan would be likely again to be the subject of torture amounting to
persecution. In the case of the third applicant, it was clear that the state had
been unable or unwilling to protect him from persecution by non-state agents.
The Home Secretary had erred in law in the designation decision. The order of
the special adjudicator in each case would be quashed. 
In R (Samaroo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2001), the Court
of Appeal ruled that where the legitimate aim of preventing crime and
disorder could not be achieved other than by deportation, the decision maker
had to strike a fair balance between the legitimate aim and the person’s
fundamental rights. The applicant had alleged that deportation violated his
right to family life under Article 8 of the Convention. The Court here
considered the concept of proportionality and stated that the test had to be
applied in two distinct stages. The first was whether the objectives sought
could be achieved by means which interfered less with an individual’s rights.
The second stage involved consideration of whether the measure employed
had an excessive or disproportionate effect on the interests of the affected
person. In this case, the applicant had been convicted for trafficking class A
drugs. The Home Secretary was entitled to regard that as very serious. The
applicant’s challenge was dismissed.
Further unsuccessful challenges have invoked the Human Rights Act. In R
(X) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2001), the Court of Appeal
ruled that the Home Secretary had the power to remove an immigrant whose
application for leave to remain in the United Kingdom had been refused. This
power was exercisable even though the applicant was detained under the
Mental Health Act 1983 (as a paranoid schizophrenic), and the Home
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Secretary could not remove him from the hospital under the Mental Health
Act 1983 without the approval of a mental health review tribunal. In addition,
the refusal of the immigrant’s application for exceptional leave to remain in
the United Kingdom and his order for removal did not violate Article 3 of the
Convention.161 The right to family life, Article 8, was held not to be violated
by the discriminatory treatment of mothers and fathers in relation to
nationality in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Montana
(2000). The Court of Appeal ruled that nationality laws were valid under the
Convention on Human Rights. No significant advantages would accrue from
conferring British nationality, therefore there was no interference with the
right to family life. Having decided that the Secretary of State’s decision was
within the ambit of Article 8, there was no need for the court to consider the
allegation of a violation of Article 14 (the prohibition against discrimination in
the enjoyment of Convention rights).
The proportionality of deportation as a punishment was considered in B v
Secretary of State for the Home Department (Deportation: Proportionality) (2000). B,
an Italian national, had lived most of his life in the United Kingdom. He was
convicted for abuse and the Secretary of State made a deportation order. The
Court of Appeal ruled that the power to deport on the ground of public policy
had to be balanced against B’s right of free movement as an EU national and
his right to family life under Article 8. In this case, the Secretary of State’s
decision was unlawful. 
The right to liberty protected under Article 5 was considered in the Court
of Appeal in R (Saadi and Others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
(2001). The court ruled that the policy of the Home Secretary to detain certain
asylum seekers at a reception centre for up to ten days to enable the speedy
determination of their asylum claim was lawful. The court recognised the
administrative problems caused by the escalating number of asylum
applications (the average number of applications per month from July to
September 2001 was nearly 7,000) and that there was a need for a fast-track
procedure to ensure speedy and efficient processing of applications. The
detention of an applicant pending a decision to give or refuse leave to enter or
the grant of temporary admission was authorised under the Immigration Act
1971. The statutory authority had implied limitations. The detention centre
was provided for the purpose of speedily determining the application of
asylum seekers, limited to a period of up to ten days. There was a severe
restriction on the liberty of claimants who had to be present at all times at the
centre. However, although it was not a decision which the court had easily
reached, it was impossible ‘to condemn as irrational’ a policy which facilitated
the speedy determination of claims. The court ruled that in binding itself to
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the Convention, states were not committing themselves to grant to aliens a
licence to enter their territories and to enjoy liberty within them. The Court of
Human Rights had determined that the right to detain aliens carried the
limitation that detention should not be unduly prolonged. The issue of
proportionality arose and in this case there was no disproportionality.
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
As will be seen in Chapter 23, the attacks in the United States on 11 September
2001 prompted the speedy passage of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security
Act 2001. In relation to immigration, the 2001 Act extends the law in order that
suspected international terrorists may be detained, when certified by the
Secretary of State as threats to national security, and where their removal is
not possible at the present time.162 Such detention is subject to independent
review by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission.163 The Act also aims
to expedite the asylum process in relation to suspected terrorists. Where the
Secretary of State certifies that a person’s removal would be conducive to the
public good, no substantive consideration of the claim to asylum will be
made. The Act prevents judicial review of decisions of the Special
Immigration Appeals Commission, and makes the Commission a superior
court of record. Appeals on a point of law lie from the Commission to the
Court of Appeal.
In order to reduce the possibility of suspected terrorists creating multiple
identities, the Act allows for the retention, for ten years, of fingerprints taken
in asylum and immigration cases.
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CHAPTER 23
INTRODUCTION
The security of the state is of the utmost importance to the integrity and well
being of a nation and to individual citizens whose rights and freedoms are
protected by the security of the state. On the other hand, the rights of citizens
may be adversely affected by the exercise of such powers and there exists the
potential for governments to hide behind the doctrine of national security in
order to prevent scrutiny of executive action. Two principal constitutional
questions arise from state security. The first concerns the extent to which
arrangements secure some form of balance between the competing needs of
state security and protection of the individual. The second issue relates to the
manner in which – and extent to which – the government is held accountable
for powers exercised in the name of state security, either through supervision
of the courts or through the democratic process.
Legal regulation of state security matters is relatively recent. Although the
original Official Secrets Act dates from 1911, it has only been in the past two
decades that statute has regulated the interception of communications,2 and the
security and intelligence services, MI5 and SIS (or MI6), and the government's
signals intelligence organisation, Government Communications Headquarters
(GCHQ). Incorporation of Convention rights under the Human Rights Act 1998
necessitated further clarity in the law, provided by the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000, the main purpose of which is to ensure that
relevant investigatory powers are used in accordance with human rights.
The terrorist bombings in the United States of America in September 2001
ushered in unprecedented international co-operation to combat terrorism. In
Britain, the government reacted swiftly to introduce tighter anti-terrorism
laws. The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which became law in
December 2001, was a reaction to the attacks.
THE SECURITY SERVICES
The terminology
The United Kingdom’s internal Security Service is known as MI5 (MI stands
for Military Intelligence). The Security Service dealing with matters overseas is
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the Secret Intelligence Service, or MI6. The government’s signals intelligence
gathering headquarters is Government Communications Headquarters, or
GCHQ. Special Branch is part of the police forces and has special duties in
relation to public order, the gathering of intelligence and combating
subversion and terrorism. The operations of MI5 and MI6 are co-ordinated by
the Intelligence Co-ordinator, based in the Cabinet Office. In addition, there is
the armed forces wing of military intelligence which, nowadays, is operative
principally, but not exclusively, in Northern Ireland. 
The Security Service (MI5)
Until 1989, the internal Security Service, MI5, was unknown to law.3 It was
not regulated by statute and the Service did not enjoy any special common
law powers. MI5 was established in 1909,4 under the royal prerogative as part
of the defence forces of the realm. The Service is headed by a Director General
who is responsible to the Secretary of State for the Home Office. The Service is
not, however, formally a part of the Home Office and thus occupies a curious
constitutional status. The Director General has access to the Prime Minister on
matters of importance. The Service employs some 2,000 personnel. Since the
ending of the Cold War, approximately 70 per cent of the Service’s resources
are devoted to gathering intelligence about terrorism.5 Moreover, the Security
Services Act 1996 now extends the role of the Service in relation to
investigations relating to ‘serious crime’, particularly the drugs trade. 
Functions of the Service
In 1952, the then Home Secretary, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, issued a directive
to the Director General outlining the functions of the Service:
The Security Service is part of the defence forces of the country. Its task is the
defence of the Realm as a whole, from external and internal dangers arising
from attempts at espionage and sabotage, or from actions of persons and
organisations whether directed from within or without the country, which
may be judged to be subversive of the state.6
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The Profumo affair7
In 1963, the Secretary of State for War, the Rt Hon John Profumo resigned from
office as a result of his lying to the House of Commons over press disclosures
concerning an alleged affair with Christine Keeler, who had associations with a
Russian Naval Attaché. The Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, appointed
Lord Denning to inquire into the security aspects of the affair. In his report,
Lord Denning stressed that the function of the Security Service:
... is to defend the Realm from dangers which would threaten it as a whole,
such as espionage on behalf of a foreign power, or internal organisations
subversive of the state. For this purpose it must collect information about
individuals and give it to those concerned. But it must not, even at the behest
of a Minister or a government department, take part in investigating the
private lives of individuals except in a matter bearing on the defence of the
Realm as a whole.8
Further judicial expression of the role of the Service is found in the judgment
of Taylor J in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Ruddock
(1987).
The function of the Security Service is the defence of the realm as a whole
from, inter alia, the actions of persons who and organisations which may be
subversive of the state ... A warrant to intercept should only issue where there
is reasonable cause to believe that major subversive activity is already being
carried on and is likely to injure the national interest. The material reasonably
likely to be obtained by the interception must be of direct use to the Security
Service in its functions ...
Normal methods of investigation must either have failed or be unlikely to
succeed. Interception must be strictly limited to what is necessary to the
Security Service’s defined functions and must not be used for party political
purposes ...
Despite such strictures, there have been many charges made against the
Service from journalists and from members of the Service themselves.9
Spycatcher10
The most celebrated exposure of the Service came in the form of Peter
Wright’s book, Spycatcher (1987). Among many allegations made by Wright in
Spycatcher was the claim that MI5 had ‘bugged and burgled its way across
London’ without lawful authority.
As an electrical engineer with MI5, Peter Wright’s expertise included
bugging embassies, diplomatic residences and international conferences. In
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1963, Wright was promoted to an interrogator and to the post of Chairman of
an internal committee inquiring into Soviet infiltration of the Security
Services. Wright believed that MI5’s perceived poor performance in the Cold
War years of the 1950s and 1960s was in part due to Soviet infiltration at the
highest point of the Security Service. The defections of two security agents,
Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess, in 1951, and the confession and defection
of Kim Philby, in 1963,11 gave added weight to the security fears. Wright was
further convinced that the then head of MI5, Roger Hollis, was a Soviet agent:
a matter officially denied.12 The revelation in 1979 that Anthony Blunt,
surveyor of the Queen’s art collection and knight of the realm, had been a
KGB13 spy since his recruitment by the Russians whilst a student at
Cambridge University14 revealed the extent to which the Security Services
had become vulnerable to Russian infiltration.
Wright became convinced that Harold Wilson, leader of the Labour Party
and Prime Minister 1964–70 and 1974–76, was planted by the KGB, which
Wright claimed had poisoned the former Labour Party leader Hugh
Gaitskell.15 Wright claimed that MI5 viewed the Labour Party’s electoral
victory of 1974 as against the national interest and instigated a plot to feed
anti-Labour Party information from MI5 files to pro-Conservative
newspapers.16 In 1976, Wright retired and Lord Rothschild introduced him to
the journalist Chapman Pincher. In collaboration with Pincher, Spycatcher was
written, a book which launched one of the most farcical chapters in recent
legal and political history, revealing as much about the secrecy of government
as about the working of the Security Service. 
The government, intent on stopping circulation of Spycatcher, sought an
injunction to restrain publication.17 The basis for the injunction was an alleged
breach of confidence by Wright. Breach of confidence had been employed in
Attorney General v Jonathan Cape Ltd (1976), in the attempt to prevent
publication of Richard Crossman’s Diaries.18 As was seen there, the court
accepted that revelations of Cabinet discussions could be restrained by an
action for breach of confidence but, when weighed against the public interest
in freedom of information, the action failed. 
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State Security
In Spycatcher, Wright alleged that the Service had, over the years, in
addition to ‘bugging and burglary’, interrogated and hounded hundreds of
individuals in an inquiry into the membership of the Communist Party
rivalling that of the McCarthy Inquiry in the United States of America in the
1930s. The allegations made by Wright became a matter of intense political
and legal interest. 
The litigation against Spycatcher commenced in Australia in 1985, and
ultimately failed.19 In 1986, both The Guardian and The Observer newspapers
carried reports of the pending hearing and reproduced some of the Spycatcher
material. Temporary injunctions were obtained by the Attorney General. The
following month, The Sunday Times began serialisation of Spycatcher against
which a further injunction was granted. In 1987, the book was published in
the United States of America. The House of Lords, however, decided that the
injunctions against the press should be continued.20 The matter returned to
the courts for consideration of whether permanent injunctions against the
publication of Spycatcher should be granted. The House of Lords held that the
wide availability of the information and the public interest in freedom of
speech and the right to receive information outweighed the interests of the
Crown in preserving government secrecy.21 Nonetheless, by this time, there
had been suppression of the information for some four years.22 The issue of
the temporary injunctions was taken to the European Court of Human Rights,
wherein it was held that the injunctions granted violated Article 10 of the
Convention: The Observer, The Guardian and The Sunday Times v United Kingdom
(1991).23
One outcome of the Spycatcher affair was the enactment of the Security
Services Act 1989, which placed the Security Service on a statutory basis. The
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 reforms the law relating to the
security services and the interception of communications. 
The Security Services Act 198924
The Act defines the functions of the Service and places the issuing of warrants
under statutory authority. The Act also provided, for the first time, a
complaints procedure for individuals who are aggrieved by actions of the
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Security Service and a Commissioner charged with the task of reviewing the
procedure by which the Home Secretary issues warrants. Section 1 defines the
functions of the Service as being: 
(2) ... the protection of national security and, in particular, its protection
against threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities
of agents of foreign powers and from actions intended to overthrow or
undermine Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent
means.
(3) It shall also be the function of the Service to safeguard the economic well
being of the United Kingdom against threats posed by the actions or
intentions of persons outside the British Islands.
In 1992, the Security Service assumed responsibility for terrorism related to
Northern Ireland. This had previously been under the jurisdiction of Special
Branch. 
The Security Service itself is not defined in the Act. The Secret Intelligence
Service – M16 – did not fall under the control of the Act. Other agencies, such
as Special Branch, which carries out many of the functions of the Security
Service (see below), and GCHQ, are not mentioned in the Act.25 National
security is not defined in the Act. In debate on the Bill, the Home Secretary
stated that the ‘phrase refers – and can only refer – to matters relating to the
survival or well being of the nation as a whole, and not to party-political or
sectional or lesser interests’.26
The duties of the Director General of the Service are set out in section 2.
These are primarily the responsibility ‘for the efficiency of the Service’, and for
ensuring that the Service only collects information necessary for the proper
discharge of its functions, and that the Service does not take any action to
further the interests of any political party. The Director General is required to
report annually to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for the Home
Department, and may otherwise report to them at any time the Director
General so decides.
While the Director General is under a duty to report to the Prime Minister,
there is no duty imposed on the Prime Minister to lay that report before
parliament. There is thus no parliamentary scrutiny of the Director General’s
exercise of power. Attempts in both the House of Commons and the House of
Lords to introduce such scrutiny failed. However, the Intelligence Services Act
1994,27 for the first time, brings parliamentary scrutiny to the work of the
Security Services, both MI5 and MI6 – and to GCHQ. Under the Act, a
Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee is established. As
discussed below, the Committee is not a select committee, and is not given the
Chapter 23: Constitutional and Administrative Law
796
25 This omission is remedied by the Intelligence Services Act 1994, on which see, further,
below.
26 Hansard, HC Vol 143 Col 1113; see, also, Vol 145 Col 217, and see HL Vol 357 Col 947.
27 See Supperstone, 1994.
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powers of a select committee. Furthermore, under the Act, information may
be withheld from the Committee on the basis that ‘the Secretary of State has
determined that it should not be disclosed’.28
The Security Services Act 1996
The Security Services Act 1996 extends the function of the Security Service
into matters concerning ‘serious crime’. The government’s objective was to
enable the Service to investigate ‘organised crime’ and ‘drug trafficking,
money launderers and racketeers’. The Service acts in a supportive role, and
the principal responsibility lies with the conventional law enforcement
agencies.29 However, ‘serious crime’ is not itself defined in the Act. Nor is the
scope of the Service’s jurisdiction entirely clear. Moreover, the Service will
remain under the operation control of the Director General, and will not be
accountable to local police authorities, nor will their operations be supervised
by the Police Complaints Authority.
The Secret Intelligence Service (MI6)30
MI6 is the branch of the Security Services which deals with information
gathering and operations outside the United Kingdom. Whereas a degree of
openness has been established concerning the work of MI5, the work of MI6
remains closely guarded. It was only in 1992 that the Prime Minister
acknowledged publicly for the first time that the Service existed. It is MI6
operations – together with military intelligence and the work of GCHQ –
which gathers intelligence from around the world through espionage and
covert action. In times of war – whether ‘hot’ or ‘cold’ – the Service is of
inestimable value to the protection of the state against outside threats.31 MI6 is
under the control of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and requires its
approval before launching operations. Any politically sensitive matters
require the personal approval of the Foreign Secretary. While, in theory, MI6
is confined to operations outside the United Kingdom, and hands
responsibility over to MI5 once a matter becomes ‘internal’, there have been
doubts expressed as to whether the boundaries are, or indeed can be, so
clearly drawn. 
The functions of MI6
The Intelligence Services Act 1994 defined, for the first time, the statutory
functions of the Service. Section 1 provides that the function of MI6 is to obtain
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29 See HL Deb Cols 398–99, 14 May 1996.
30 See West, 1981; Bloch and Fitzgerald, 1983.
31 It was with MI6 that Paul Henderson, Managing Director of Matrix Churchill worked
during the Iran-Iraq War – a matter which led to a judicial inquiry. See, further, Chapter
11.
and provide information relating to the actions or intentions of persons outside
the British Islands, and to perform other tasks relating to the actions or
intentions of such persons. Such actions must be related to the objectives defined
in the Act, namely in the interest of national security ‘with particular reference to
defence and foreign policies’; the interests of the national’s economic well being
and assisting in the ‘prevention or detection of serious crime’.32
Operations are authorised by the Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, and agent’s activities are regulated by administrative
internal rules. Where action within the British Islands is required, MI5 may
apply to the Home Secretary for a warrant to carry out operations on behalf of
MI6.
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)33
The Government’s Communication Headquarters at Cheltenham34 was
established under the royal prerogative, as part of the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office.35 The principal tasks of GCHQ include the security of
military and official communications and the provision of signals intelligence
(SIGINT) for the government. GCHQ has an annual budget of about £500
million and a staff of some 4,500 personnel, making it the largest of the three
intelligence services in the United Kingdom. 
Legal authority for the interception of international communications was
first provided under the Official Secrets Act 1920, section 4 of which provided
for the interception of ‘telegrams’ under the warrant of the Home Secretary on
the basis of the public interest. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
2000 now provides statutory authority for external warrants issued by the
Secretary of State.36 No warrant may be issued for interference with
individual communications within the United Kingdom, unless the
interception is designed to uncover information relating to the prevention or
detection of terrorism.37 GCHQ co-operates in signals intelligence matters
with its counterparts in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United
States. 
From 1947 until 1984, employees at GCHQ were entitled to belong to
trades unions. In January 1984, the Foreign Secretary announced, without
warning, that this right was to be removed. GCHQ had experienced
disruption for some two years, with a loss of 10,000 working days. In 1983, a
GCHQ employee, Geoffrey Prime,38 was arrested and convicted of spying for
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34 GCHQ has stations abroad including Cyprus.
35 Its original title was the Government Code and Cipher School.
36 Interception of Communications Act 1985, ss 3(2) and 10(1).
37 Ibid, s 3(3).
38 See Report of the Security Commission: GA Prime, Cmnd 8876, 1981, London: HMSO.
State Security
the Soviet Union. Both factors – and the government’s general desire to curb
the power of trades unions – contributed to the banning of unions at GCHQ.39
The legal outcome of the exercise of the prerogative40 in banning union
membership at GCHQ led to Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the
Civil Service (1984), in which the House of Lords ruled in favour of the
government on the basis of national security.41
The Intelligence Services Act 1994 placed GCHQ on a statutory basis.42
The statutory duty of the Secret Intelligence Service and GCHQ is to exercise
its functions ‘in the interests of national security, with particular reference to
the defence and foreign policies of Her Majesty’s government in the United
Kingdom’.43 The Director of GCHQ is responsible for the ‘efficiency of the
agency’44 and has a right of access to the Prime Minister and Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. The Director is under a duty to
report annually to the Prime Minister. The monitoring of communications is
regulated by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, on which, see
below. 
Special Branch45
Established in 1883 to deal with problems of security in relation to Ireland,
Special Branch rapidly expanded to deal with many security matters.
Originally, Special Branch was confined to the Metropolitan Police Force; from
1945, other police forces established Special Branches. Nowadays, each
provincial force has its own Special Branch. Special Branch is staffed by
ordinary police officers under the direction of the Chief Constable. Much of
their work is related to Security Service matters. Other functions include jury
vetting in cases involving national security or terrorism, providing personal
protection and assisting with immigration matters, including keeping watch
at airports and seaports.
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40 Under the Civil Service Order in Council 1982, Article 4, which empowers the minister
to make regulations and issue instructions regarding the conditions of service of civil
service employees. See Forsyth, 1985; cf Wade, 1985.
41 See, further on this case, Chapters 6 and 19. In 1995, the government amended the terms
and conditions of employment of staff at GCHQ. Staff are to be restricted to
membership of a body whose officers and representatives are appointed from, and
answerable only to, GCHQ staff. The conditions of service continue to exclude any form
of industrial action: HL Deb Vol 567 Col 147, 20 December 1995. Note that the incoming
Labour government restored trade union rights to employees at GCHQ.
42 The Australian and Canadian equivalents, the Defence Signals Directorate and
Communication Security Executive respectively, remain regulated under the
prerogative.
43 Intelligence Services Act 1994, ss 1(2)(a) and 3(2)(a).
44 Ibid, s 4.
45 See Bunyan, 1977; Allason, 1983.
Military intelligence and the armed forces
In 1940, the Special Operations Executive (SOE) was formed to supplement
the work of MI5 and MI6, which were geared principally to work in peace
time. Subsequently, the need for special units to operate under military
command, and under cover, became perceived as imperative. Originally
known as L Detachment, Special Air Service Brigade and, later, simply the
SAS, the service was introduced on the initiative of David Stirling of the Scots
Guards, and approved by the Commander-in-Chief. Members of the SAS
were recruited primarily from commandos. A parallel organisation, the
Special Boat Service (SBS), was also established to complement the work of the
SAS.
The SAS has been involved in many operations overseas, in Northern
Ireland and on the mainland, principally working against terrorism. It was,
for example, in 1980, the SAS which stormed the Iranian Embassy in London
to free hostages from terrorists who had occupied the Embassy and, as
discussed below, it was the SAS which was dispatched to Gibraltar to arrest
suspected IRA terrorists.
The SAS is controlled at a political level and a practical, operational level.
In relation to terrorism, a special committee, known as COBRA and chaired by
the Home Secretary, meets with representatives from the Ministry of Defence,
the Security Service (MI5), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the
SAS to decide the appropriate political and military response. In relation to
operational matters, a special unit within the Ministry of Defence, the Joint
Operations Centre (JOC), comprising the Foreign Office, Home Office,
intelligence services and the SAS, activates the SAS at home or overseas.
Exceptionally, the Prime Minister may personally activate the SAS, as in the
Iranian Embassy siege. When the SAS is operational, it exercises the powers of
the police, although formal authority remains with the police, and the police
resume their normal functions once the operation is complete.
The Security Commission46
In 1964, following the Profumo affair, the Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-
Home announced the creation of a Security Commission. The Commission
investigates and reports upon the circumstances in which a breach of security
is known to have occurred in the public service, and upon any related failure
of departmental security arrangements or neglect of duty; and, in the light of
any such investigation, advises whether any change in security arrangements
is desirable.47
The Commission meets at the request of the Prime Minister, who consults
the Leader of the Opposition and the Chairman of the Commission before
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making a reference to the Commission. The Commission has no power of
initiative in relation to the matters it investigates. The Chairman of the
Commission is a senior judge, and the Commission has seven members. The
Commission has undertaken inquiries, inter alia, into the conduct of former
ministers,48 into allegations about the Head of MI5, Roger Hollis,49 into
investigations of security matters in Signals and Communication Units and
into the circumstances surrounding the conviction of Geoffrey Prime for
espionage.50 The Commission has power to call whomsoever it wishes as
witnesses, and to summon documents. Prior to its hearings, the Commission
will frequently have availed itself of the security services to investigate
allegations. No legal representation is allowed for witnesses before the
Commission. The Commission reports, with recommendations, to the Prime
Minister. 
Lustgarten and Leigh evaluate the Commission’s success and future
development. The Commission, in their view, is useful ‘in its narrow and
specific sphere of operation’.51 The authors call for the Commission to be
placed on a statutory basis, with independent powers of investigation, for the
Commission’s powers to be explicitly stated and for greater protection to be
built in for individuals who come before the Commission. 
THE INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS52
The government’s response to the outcome of Malone v United Kingdom (1984),
in which the absence of statutory authority for intercept warrants was held to
have violated Article 8 of the Convention on Human Rights, was to pass the
Interception of Communications Act 1985. The Interception of
Communications Act 1985 made it a criminal offence to intentionally intercept
a communication and provided statutory power for the Secretary of State to
issue warrants ‘in the interests of national security, or for the purpose of
preventing or detecting serious crime or for the purpose of safeguarding the
economic well-being of the United Kingdom’. The powers of the police to
conduct surveillance was given statutory force by the Police Act 1997.
Prior to the Police Act 1997, the power of the police to effect surveillance
remained obscure. In R v Khan (Sultan) (1995), the question of the admissibility
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51 Lustgarten and Leigh, 1994, p 486.
52 See Report of the Committee on the Interception of Communications (the ‘Birkett Report’),
Cmnd 283, 1957, London: HMSO; The Interception of Communications in Great Britain,
Cmnd 7873, 1980, London: HMSO; The Interception of Communications in Great Britain
(the ‘Diplock Report’), Cmnd 8191, 1981, London: HMSO; Williams, 1979; Lambert,
1980; The Interception of Communications in the United Kingdom, Cmnd 9438, 1985,
London: HMSO; Leigh, 1986; Interception of Communications in the United Kingdom, Cm
4368, 1999, London: HMSO.
of evidence acquired as a result of bugging devices was considered by the
House of Lords. The defendant was suspected of being involved in the
importation of drugs. The police installed a listening device in a house which
Khan was visiting. The defence argued that the recording was inadmissible,
there being no statutory authority for such an installation, which accordingly
amounted to a trespass to property and a violation of Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights. The House of Lords rejected the
defence arguments. While accepting that there had been a trespass, and an
invasion of privacy, these factors were outweighed by the fact that the police
had largely complied with the Home Secretary’s Guidelines. Moreover,
Convention rights, not at that time being incorporated into English law, could
not found the basis for a defence. Accordingly, even if the evidence had been
obtained improperly, on the authority of R v Sang (1980), the evidence was
admissible. In Khan v United Kingdom (2000), on an application under the
European Convention of Human Rights alleging violations of Articles 6, 8 and
13, the Court of Human Rights ruled that Articles 8 and 13, but not Article 6,
had been breached.53
Whereas the authority for police surveillance devices was formerly
uncertain, the Police Act 1997 extended the scope of surveillance. Part I of the
Police Act 1997 established a National Criminal Intelligence Service Authority
to provide criminal intelligence to other police and law enforcement agencies,
and placed surveillance techniques under statutory authority.54 The Act was
modelled on the Interception of Communications Act 1985, and placed the
Home Secretary’s Guidelines on a statutory basis. Authorisation may be
given, under section 93(2), for the use of surveillance devices if surveillance
will be of substantial value in the prevention and detection of serious crime,
and the objective cannot reasonably be achieved by other means. Serious
crime is defined as including crimes of violence, crimes involving financial
gain and crimes involving large numbers of persons, or crimes for which a
person with no previous conviction could expect to receive a prison sentence
of three or more years. Authorisation is given by a Chief Officer of Police, or
an officer of rank of Assistant Chief Constable.55 Prior authorisation by a
commissioner, appointed under section 91 of the Act, must be obtained if the
property involved is a private dwelling, a hotel bedroom or office premises,
and also where the surveillance may result in the acquisition of confidential
knowledge, or journalistic or other matters subject to legal privilege.56
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licensing purposes.
55 Police Act 1997, ss 93(5) and 94. Minor amendments to the Act are introduced under the
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.
56 For an unsuccessful attempt to challenge the legality of telephone interceptions, see R v
Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Ruddock (1987): the decision was
reached prior to the Interception of Communications Act 1985. But compare Halford v
United Kingdom (1997), discussed in Chapter 9.
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THE REGULATION OF INVESTIGATORY POWERS ACT 2000
The provisions relating to interception of communications under the 1985 Act
are now repealed and replaced by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
2000 (RIPA), which also amends the Police Act 1997 and the Intelligence
Services Act 1994. The 2000 Act was prompted by two major concerns. The
first was that the 1985 Act regulated intercepts of communications transmitted
via mail and by a public telecommunications system, which at the time of the
legislation covered most data transmissions. Technological advances since
1985, however, have expanded communications systems – through the
internet and email and through telecommunication systems not provided by
public telecommunications providers. Also falling outside the 1985 Act was
data which was ‘encrypted’ and required a ‘key’ to unlock the data. The
second motivation for reform was the influence of the European Convention
on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998. which, when it came into
force in England and Wales in 2000, would make Convention rights
enforceable before the domestic courts and tribunals. As discussed in more
detail in Chapter 19, cases such as Halford v United Kingdom (1997) and Khan v
United Kingdom (2000) (discussed above) had successfully challenged domestic
law. In Halford’s case, the interception of the applicant’s telephone by a private
communications system was unlawful, given the absence of statutory
authority for such intercepts.57
In the Consultation Paper Interception of Communications in the United
Kingdom,58 the Home Secretary stated that:
This revolution in communications technology is one of the imperatives for
change in the law. But so too is the need to protect human rights – this has
been uppermost in our minds in devising these proposals.
803
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evidence acquired through intercepts under warrant into court. The purpose of this
prohibition was to prevent disclosure as to either the existence of a warrant or the fact
that a warrant had been applied for (see R v Preston (1994)). However, it has been held
that evidence acquired through an interception which has been placed on a telephone
line with the consent of a customer, did not preclude the admission of that evidence
into court (R v Choudhary (1997)). Moreover, the prohibition on the admissibility of
evidence at trial was not to be extended to apply in the case of foreign telephone
intercepts, notwithstanding the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the
European Convention on Human Rights relating to privacy. The Court of Appeal,
Criminal Division, so held in R v X, Y and Z (2000). Any alleged violation of Article 8
was not such that Article 6, the right to fair trial, was also violated. Section 9 of the
Interception of Communications Act 1985 was considered by the Court of Appeal in R v
Owen and R v Stephen (1998). At issue was whether the prohibition in s 9 precluded any
investigation into whether an intercept was consensual under s 1(2), which provides
that a person shall not be guilty of an offence under s 1 if that person has reasonable
grounds to believe that the person to whom, or the person by whom, the
communication is sent had consented to the interception. That prohibition applied, even
though the particular circumstances of the case did not fall within the objective of the
1985 Act, namely, to avoid the embarrassment in terms of confidentiality if the
authorities were challenged as to the lawfulness of their actions. 
58 Cm 4368, 1999, London: HMSO.
The Act relates to powers concerning the interception of communications,
intrusive surveillance on residential premises and in private vehicles, covert
surveillance in the course of specific operations, the use of covert human
intelligence sources (agents, informants, undercover officers), the acquisition
of communications data and access to encrypted data. The Act is intended to
ensure that the law clearly states the purposes for which such powers may be
used, which authorities may exercise the powers, who should authorise the
use of power, the use that can be made of material gained, independent
judicial oversight of the exercise of powers and a means of redress for
aggrieved individuals. The Act works in conjunction with existing legislation.
The Act is in five parts: Part I dealing with interceptions of communications
and the acquisition and disclosure of communications data. Part II deals with
surveillance and covert human intelligence sources. Part III relates to the
investigation of electronic data protected by encryption. Part IV governs the
scrutiny of investigatory powers and Codes of Practice. Part V covers
miscellaneous and supplemental matters.
The interception of communications
The Act repeals sections 1 to 10, section 11(2) to (5) and Schedule 1 of the
Interception of Communications Act 1985. Section 1 creates the offences of
unlawful interception and a separate tort of unlawful interception. The offence
of unlawful interception is similar to that under section 1 of the 1985 Act,
which is repealed by the 2000 Act. Unlawful interceptions relate to any
communication in the course of its transmission by means of a public postal
service or public telecommunications system. Conduct has lawful authority
only if it is authorised under section 3 or 4, takes place in accordance with a
warrant under section 5 or, in relation to any stored communication, if it is in
exercise of any statutory power, other than this section, for the purpose of
obtaining information or of taking possession of any document or other
property. Conduct which has lawful authority shall also be taken to be lawful
for all other purposes. A person having the right to control the operation or
use of the system which is intercepted, or having the express or implied
consent of such a person to make the interception, is excluded from criminal
liability.59
The circumstances in which conduct consisting of the interception,
without a warrant, of a communication is lawful are defined in sections 3 and
4. Section 5 regulates interceptions under warrant. The Secretary of State may
issue a warrant authorising or requiring interceptions, but shall not issue an
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interception warrant unless he believes that the warrant is necessary on the
grounds of the interests of national security, or for the purpose of preventing
or detecting serious crime, or for the purpose of safeguarding the economic
well being of the United Kingdom, or for the purpose of preventing or
detecting serious crime by giving effect to the provisions of any international
mutual assistance agreement. The warrant shall not be issued unless the
Secretary of State also believes that the conduct authorised by the warrant is
proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by that conduct. In considering
whether the requirements are satisfied in the case of any warrant, the
Secretary of State must take into account whether the information which it is
thought necessary to obtain under the warrant could reasonably be obtained
by other means. The meaning of ‘safeguarding the economic well being of the
United Kingdom’ under section 5(3)(c) must be read subject to section 5(5),
which states that a warrant shall not be considered necessary unless the
information which it is thought necessary to obtain is information relating to
the acts or intentions of persons outside the British Islands. 
Warrants may only be issued on the application of specified persons,
namely, the Director General of the Security Service, the Chief of the Secret
Intelligence Service, the Director of GCHQ, the Director General of the
National Criminal Intelligence Service, the Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis, the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the chief
constable of any police force under the Police (Scotland) Act 1967, the
Commissioners of Customs and Excise, or a person who is the competent
authority of a country outside the United Kingdom under any international
mutual assistance agreement. Section 7 regulates the persons who may sign
interception warrants and the circumstances in which they may do so. The
warrant must be issued under the hand of the Secretary of State or, in urgent
cases where the Secretary of State has expressly authorised the issue of the
warrant and cases in which the warrant is for the purposes of a request for
assistance made under an international mutual assistance agreement and
either the subject is outside the United Kingdom or the interception relates to
a place outside the United Kingdom, the warrant may be issued under the
hand of a senior official. The senior official who signs the warrant must be
expressly authorised by the Secretary of State to do so, which ensures that the
Secretary of State must give personal consideration to the application. The
warrant must name or describe either one person as the interception subject or
a single set of premises as the premises in relation to which the interception is
to take place. 
Section 8 provides for two different forms which a warrant may take.
Section 8(a) and (b) require that either the person or premises to be intercepted
is named or described on the face of the warrant, and sub-section (2) provides
that the warrant must include details setting out how the intercepted
communications are to be identified. Sub-section (3) provides for certificated
warrants and applies if the conditions in sub-sections (3)(a) and (b) and (4)(a)
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or (b) are met. Where a certificated warrant is required, there must be a
certificate describing the intercepted material, the examination of which the
Secretary of State considers necessary for the purposes for the issue of the
warrant at the time when the Secretary of State issues the warrant, and which
may be read, looked at or listened to by any other person. Any other
intercepted material, though lawfully intercepted, may be so examined.
A warrant issued by a senior officer ceases to have effect at the end of the
fifth working day following the day of the warrant’s issue, but is renewable. A
warrant renewed under the signature of the Secretary of State has effect for six
months. Under section 11, a warrant may be implemented by the person to
whom it is addressed or by that person through or with such other persons as
he may require to give assistance with giving effect to the warrant. A person
required to give assistance under the section 11, who knowingly fails to
comply with his or her duty, is guilty of an offence.60
Section 15 controls the dissemination of intercepted material and is
intended to minimise its disclosure. It is the duty of the Secretary of State to
ensure that the number of persons to whom the material may be disclosed
and the extent to which material may be disclosed or copied is limited to the
minimum that is necessary for the authorised purposes. In relation to
certificated warrants issued under section 8(3) (which require a certificate
certifying the description of intercepted material which the Secretary of State
considers necessary for the purposes of the warrant), section 15 provides that
such material so described may be read or looked at by any person, but that
no other intercepted material, though lawfully intercepted, may be examined.
The material authorised for examination is accordingly subject to ministerial
control. 
Section 16 provides additional safeguards in relation to the disclosure of
information obtained under a section 8(1) warrant which identifies the
material to be examined but does not identify the name or premises which are
subject to the intercept. Section 17 prevents the disclosure of specified61
information relating to intercepts in any legal proceedings. Exceptions to this
prohibition are provided by section 18.
Investigation of electronic data protected by encryption
Part III of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act provides for the
interception of data protected by encryption. The Home Secretary,
commenting on the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, stated that it: 
... will ensure that the United Kingdom’s law enforcement and security
agencies have the power they need to do their job effectively in a changed
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exceeding six months, or to a fine not exceeding the statutory limit, or to both.
61 See Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000, s 17(1)(a)–(g).
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technological world. New communications tools such as the internet offer up
huge legitimate benefits for us all. But serious criminals too have always been
quick to jump on the latest technological bandwagon in their efforts to evade
detection. The ‘e’ prefix can apply to today’s criminals as well as to commerce
...62
Where protected information – defined as electronic data which, without the
key to the data, cannot or cannot readily be accessed or cannot readily be put
into an intelligible form’63 – comes into the possession of ‘any person’ with
statutory power to seize, detain, inspect, search or otherwise interfere with
documents or property, or through the exercise of authorised interception
powers in respect of national security matters, or through disclosure or
through ‘any other lawful means not involving the exercise of statutory
powers’ by the intelligence services, police or customs or excise, and it is
necessary to decode the data through means of a key, a notice of requirement
to disclose the key may be issued. The requirement to disclose a key may be
made in the interests of national security, for the purpose of preventing or
detecting crime or in the interests of the economic well being of the United
Kingdom.64 The Secretary of State is under a duty to ensure that
arrangements are in force for requiring or authorising the section 49 notices.65
Schedule 2 regulates authorisations. In relation to protected information, in
England and Wales, written permission for the giving of section 49 notices,
requiring the disclosure of a key, must be given by a circuit judge, in Scotland,
a sheriff and, in Northern Ireland, a county court judge. The authorised notice
must be in writing or in such a manner that produces a record of its having
been given; describe the protected information to which the notice relates;
specify the ground on which the information is required; specify the office,
rank or position of the person giving the notice; specify the office, rank or
position of the person who granted permission for the giving of the notice;
specify the time by which the notice is to be complied with and must set out
the disclosure that is required and the form and manner in which it is to be
made.66 Detailed provisions relate to the duty of persons given notice.
Paragraph 53 of Schedule 2 relates to offences, and details of defences to
proceedings, including that it was not reasonably practicable to make the
disclosure required before the time in which he or she was required to make it
but that the disclosure was made as soon as reasonably practicable to do so.67
807
62 Home Office, News Release, 28 July 2000.
63 RIPA 2000, s 56.
64 Ibid, s 49.
65 Ibid, s 51.
66 Ibid, Sched 2, para 4.
67 On conviction on indictment, a person guilty of an offence is liable to imprisonment for
a term of up to two years or to a fine, or both, or on summary conviction to a term of
imprisonment not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory
maximum, or to both. 
Safeguards relating to protected information are built into the Act and
apply to the Secretary of State and all ministers in charge of government
departments, all Chief Officers of Police, Commissioners of Customs and
Excise and all persons whose officers or employees include persons with
duties that involve the giving of section 49 notices. These include the
requirement that a key disclosed only be used for obtaining protected
information in relation to which the notice was given, that the uses to which
they key disclosed is put are reasonable and that the use and retention of the
key are proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by its use or retention,
that the key disclosed is stored securely and that all records of a key disclosed
are destroyed as soon as no longer needed for the purpose of enabling
protected information to be put into an intelligible form. The number of
persons to whom the key is disclosed or made available must be limited to the
minimum necessary for enabling protected information to be put into
intelligible form.
Authorisation of surveillance and human intelligence sources
Part II of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 provides a statutory
basis for the authorisation and use by the security and intelligence agencies,
law enforcement and other public authorities, of covert surveillance, agents,
informants and undercover officers. It is intended to regulate the use of such
techniques and ‘safeguard the public from unnecessary invasions of their
privacy’. Section 26 defines the conduct regulated under Part II, and applies to
directed surveillance, intrusive surveillance and the conduct and use of covert
human intelligence sources. Surveillance is ‘directed’ if it is covert but not
intrusive and is undertaken:
(a) for the purposes of a specific investigation or a specific operation;
(b) in such a manner as is likely to result in the obtaining of private
information about a person (whether or not one specifically identified for
the purposes of the investigation or operation); and
(c) otherwise than by way of an immediate response to events or
circumstances the nature of which is such that it would not be reasonably
practicable for an authorisation under this Part to be sought for the
carrying out of the surveillance.
Surveillance is ‘intrusive’ if it is surveillance that either:
(a) involves the presence of an individual, or of any surveillance device, on
any residential premises or in any private vehicle; or
(b) is carried out in relation to anything taking place on residential premises
or in a private vehicle by means of any surveillance device that is not
present on the premises or in the vehicle.
Surveillance is not intrusive if it is carried out by means of a device designed
or adapted principally for the purposes of providing information about the
location of a vehicle, or if it is surveillance consisting of any such interception
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of a communication. Surveillance which is carried out by means of a device in
relation to residential premises or a private vehicle, but which is carried out
without the device being present on the premises or in the vehicle, is not
intrusive ‘unless the device is such that it consistently provides information of
the same quality and detail as might be expected to be obtained from a device
actually present on the premises or in the vehicle’.
A person is defined as a ‘covert human intelligence source’ if he or she
establishes or maintains a personal or other relationship with a person for the
covert purpose of obtaining information or providing access to any
information to another person, or the covert disclosure of information
obtained by the use of such a relationship. The surveillance is covert if, and
only if, it is carried out in a manner that is calculated to ensure that persons
who are subject to the surveillance are unaware that it is or may be taking
place. A purpose is covert if the relationship established or maintained is
conducted in a manner calculated to ensure that one of the parties to the
relationship is unaware of the purpose, and a relationship is used covertly,
and information disclosed covertly, if it is used or disclosed in a manner
calculated to ensure that one of the parties to the relationship is unaware of
the use or disclosure. 
Conduct is lawful for all purposes once authorised, provided that the
conduct of the authorised person is in accordance with the authorisation, and
no civil liability attaches to any conduct which is incidental to any conduct
which is lawful. The conduct authorised includes conduct outside the United
Kingdom. 
Authorisations may only be granted where this is necessary in the interests
of national security; for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of
preventing disorder; in the interest of the economic well being of the United
Kingdom; in the interests of public safety; for the purpose of protecting public
health; for the purpose of assessing or collecting taxes or charges due to a
government department or for any purpose which is specified by an order
made by the Secretary of State. An authorisation must not be granted unless
the designated person believes that the authorised conduct is proportionate to
what is sought to be achieved by that conduct or use. An authorisation must
not be granted unless there are arrangements in place which ensure that there
will be at all times a person having day to day responsibility for the agent, that
there is another person in the relevant authority having general oversight of
the use made of the agent, that there is a person having responsibility for
maintaining a record of the use made of the agent containing such particulars
as may be specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State and that
records that disclose the identity of the agent will not be available to persons
except to the extent that such access to them is necessary.68
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Section 30 specifies the persons entitled to grant authorisations. The
Secretary of State is a designated person for the purposes of authorisation for
directed surveillance and the use of covert human intelligence sources
combined with intrusive surveillance. Otherwise, the persons designated for
the purposes of sections 28 and 29 are senior officers of relevant public
authorities -- being the police, National Criminal Intelligence Service, National
Crime Squad, the intelligence services, Ministry of Defence, Her Majesty’s
forces, Commissioners of Customs and Excise and any other such public
authority granted power by order of the Secretary of State. In relation to
Northern Ireland, the grant of authorisations is also exercisable by the First
Minister and Deputy First Minister acting jointly. Neither the Secretary of
State nor any senior authorising officer shall grant an authorisation for the
carrying out of intrusive surveillance unless he or she believes that the
authorisation is necessary in the interests of national security, for the purpose
of preventing or detecting serious crime, or in the interests of the economic
well being of the United Kingdom, and that the authorised surveillance is
proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by carrying it out. 
Commissioners and the Tribunal
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 repeals section 5 and
Schedule 1 of the Security Services Act 1989 which provided for a Tribunal to
investigate complaints. Section 9 and Schedules 1 and 2 to the Intelligence
Services Act 1994, which also provided for a Tribunal, are repealed and
replaced by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Part IV. The
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act imposes additional functions on the
Security Service Act Commissioner and the Intelligence Services Act
Commissioner, requiring them to keep under review, respectively – so far as
they are not required to be kept under review by the Interception of
Communications Commissioner – the exercise and performance by the
Secretary of State in relation to activities of the Security Service and activities
of the Secret Intelligence Service and of GCHQ, and the activities in places
other than Northern Ireland of officials of the Ministry of Defence and
members of Her Majesty’s forces. Additional functions are also conferred on
the Chief Surveillance Commissioner whose powers derive from the Police
Act 1997. 
The Commissioner, known as the Interception of Communications
Commissioner, is appointed by the Prime Minister. A person may only be
appointed as Interception of Communications Commissioner if he or she
holds or has held a high judicial office. The Commissioner is under a duty to
assist the Tribunal in connection with the investigation of any matter by the
Tribunal, or otherwise for the purposes of the Tribunal’s consideration or
State Security
determination of any matter. It is not the Commissioner’s function to keep
under review the exercise of any power of the Secretary of State to make,
amend or revoke any subordinate legislation. It is the duty of all persons
employed by the Security and Intelligence Services and police to disclose or
provide to the Commissioner all such documents and information as he or she
may require for the purposes of enabling him or her to carry out his or her
functions under Part IV. If it appears to the Commissioner that there has been
a contravention of the provisions of the Act in relation to matters with which
he is concerned, and that the contravention has not been the subject of a report
made to the Prime Minister by the Tribunal, the Commissioner shall report to
the Prime Minister. The Commissioner makes an annual report to the Prime
Minister. The annual report is to be laid before each House of Parliament. If it
appears to the Prime Minister, after consultation with the Interception of
Communications Commissioner, that the publication of any matter in an
annual report would be contrary to the public interest or prejudicial to
national security, the prevention or detection of serious crime, the economic
well being of the United Kingdom or the continued discharge of the functions
of any public authority whose activities include activities that are subject to
review by the Commissioner, the Prime Minister may exclude that matter
from the report laid before each House. 
The Tribunal is the only tribunal to which proceedings under section 7 of
the Human Rights Act 1998 may be brought against any of the intelligence
services, or any other person in relation to conduct by or on behalf of any of
those services.69 Conduct to which proceedings relate is conduct by or on
behalf of any of the intelligence services, conduct relating to the interception
of communications, conduct relating to the acquisition and disclosure of
communications data, conduct relating to surveillance, directed or intrusive
surveillance in Scotland or the use of any agent in Scotland, conduct relating
to protected information under section 46 and entrance into or interference
with property or wireless telegraphy. The conduct in question must have been
conduct by or on behalf of a person holding any office, rank or position with
any of the intelligence services, any of Her Majesty’s forces, any police force,
the National Criminal Intelligence Service, National Crime Squad or
Commissioners of Customs and Excise. The Secretary of State may by order
allocate additional jurisdiction to the Tribunal, but may only do so having
regard to the need to ensure that proceedings allocated to the Tribunal (from
any court or tribunal) are properly heard and considered, and the need to
ensure that information is not disclosed to an extent or in a manner that is
contrary to the public interest or prejudicial to national security, the
prevention or detection of serious crime, the economic well being of the
United Kingdom or the continued discharge of the functions of any of the
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intelligence services. No order may be made unless a draft has been laid
before parliament and approved by a resolution of each House. 
It is the duty of the Tribunal to hear and determine any proceedings
brought, and to consider and determine any complaint or reference made to it.
It is the duty of the Tribunal to investigate any alleged conduct, the authority
for any conduct which it finds has been engaged in, and to determine the
complaint by applying the same principles as would be applied by a court on
an application for judicial review.70 The Tribunal is not under a duty to hear
or determine any complaint which is frivolous or vexatious. Complaints must
be brought within one year after the taking place of the conduct to which it
relates, but the Tribunal may, if it is equitable to do so, extend the time. The
Tribunal has the power to make an award of compensation. In addition, the
Tribunal may order the quashing or cancelling of any warrant or
authorisation and/or the destruction of any records of information. 
The extent to which the Commissioner is able to exercise any effective
control over the Secretary of State is unclear. The weakness of the whole basis
of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is reinforced by the absence of any appeal
therefrom and the prohibition against questioning of the Tribunal and
Commissioner before any court of law. With the exclusion of any form of
judicial scrutiny of the Commissioner’s and Tribunal’s findings, the danger for
the individual is all too apparent. This arrangement is far different from that
pertaining in the United States, where security matters are regarded as being
within the competence of the courts. In United States v United District Court
(1972), the Supreme Court, in a unanimous judgment, declared that:
We cannot accept the government’s argument that internal security matters are
too subtle and complex for judicial evaluation. There is no reason to believe
that federal judges will be insensitive to or uncomprehending of the issues
involved in domestic security cases ... If the threat is too subtle or complex for
our senior enforcement officers to convey its significance to a court, one may
question whether there is probable cause for surveillance.
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act 1984 involves judges and the
Solicitor General in the process of granting warrants.71
PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY OF THE SECURITY SERVICES
Matters of national security and the work of the Security Services have
traditionally been ones on which governments have declined to provide
information to parliament. Parliamentary Committees repeatedly have been
denied the right to investigate the Security Service72 although, since 1979, the
Defence Committee has considered aspects of security. In 1989, the
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government again rejected proposals that a select committee be established to
inquire into the Service.73 In 1994, however, the Intelligence and Security
Committee was established with limited powers to investigate security
matters. The Committee, which has a membership of nine, is established to
‘examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the Security Service,
the Intelligence Service and GCHQ’.74 Membership is confined to non-
ministerial Members of the House of Lords and House of Commons.
Members are appointed by the Prime Minister, after consultation with the
Leader of the Opposition.75 The establishment of the Committee, which is
based in Whitehall, rather than parliament, brings both MI6 and GCHQ under
a weak form of quasi-parliamentary scrutiny although, operating ex post facto,
and lacking the openness of, for example, a select committee, its constitutional
effectiveness must be questionable. The Committee must make an annual
report to the Prime Minister, which must be laid before parliament. However,
should the Prime Minister feel that publication of any matter would be
‘prejudicial to the continued discharge of the functions of the Services, or
GCHQ’, the Prime Minister may exclude such matters from the report.76
The Committee determines its own procedure.77 Where the Committee
requests information from the Director General of the Security Service, the
Chief of the Intelligence Service or the Director of GCHQ, that information
must be supplied unless the relevant person informs the Committee that it
cannot be disclosed on the basis of sensitivity, or where the Secretary of State
has determined that it should not be disclosed. The Secretary of State shall not
refuse to disclose information to the Committee on the basis of national
security alone: the criterion for non-disclosure is whether the Secretary of
State would think it proper not to disclose the information if requested to do
so by a departmental select committee of the House of Commons.78 Schedule
3 defines sensitive information – for the purposes of paragraph 3 – as being:
(a) information which might lead to the identification of, or provide details of,
sources of information, other assistance or operational methods available
to the Security Service, the Intelligence Service or GCHQ;
(b) information about particular operations which have been, are being or are
proposed to be undertaken in pursuance of any of the functions of those
bodies; and
(c) information provided by, or by an agency of, the government of a territory
outside the United Kingdom where that government does not consent to
the disclosure of the information.
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OFFICIAL SECRECY79
The Official Secrets Acts 1911–89
The 1911 Act 
The first Official Secrets Act arrived on the statute book in 1889. The latest Act
is that of 1989. The 1911 Act – which survived virtually untouched until 1989 –
was passed through parliament with one hour’s debate and within 24 hours.
Motivation for the 1911 Act lay in alleged enemy agent activity in the
country.80 The motives behind the 1989 Act were formed largely from the
failure of the earlier Act. As will be seen, section 2 of the Act provided for
numerous offences based on vague criteria of disclosure of information and
juries have on occasion refused to convict, even where it was clear from the
facts and the law that a guilty verdict should have been returned.81 Official
inquiries into the working of the Act revealed deficiencies.82
The Spycatcher case also provided motivation for the government to reform
the law. In the government’s view, members and ex-members of the Security
Services should be under a life long duty of confidentiality in respect of their
work. One defect in the 1911 Act lay in the duty of – and hence liability for –
non-disclosure enduring only for the duration of their employment. 
Section 1 of the 1911 Act provides penalties for spying. It is an offence to
enter into top-secret establishments or to collect, publish or communicate any
official document (which includes official code words, passwords, sketches,
plans, models, articles or notes) or information which might be useful to a
potential enemy, if the actions are carried out ‘for any purpose prejudicial to
the safety or interest of the state’. The accused has no ‘right to silence’ and a
trial may be held in secret, or partly in secret. Section 2 of the Act reverses the
normal burden of proof from the prosecution to the defence. It is not
necessary for the prosecution to prove that the accused is guilty of any
particular act ‘tending to show a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interest of
the state’. Guilt may be established if ‘from the circumstances of the case, or
his conduct, or his known character as proved, it appears that his purpose was
a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interest of the state’. Moreover, any
information or document handed over to another person, without lawful
authority, shall ‘be deemed to have been made, obtained, collected, recorded
or communicated for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the
state unless the contrary is proved’. Penalties for espionage are swingeing.
George Blake, a former MI6 officer convicted of espionage, was sentenced to
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42 years’ imprisonment.83 In 1985, Michael Bettany, a former MI5 officer, was
convicted of attempting to pass official information to the Russians and
sentenced to 23 years’ imprisonment. Geoffrey Prime was sentenced to 35
years for disclosing material whilst employed at GCHQ.84 Not all offences
will lead to a prosecution. Neither Kim Philby nor Anthony Blunt were
prosecuted. Instead, each was offered immunity from prosecution in return
for a confession, an offer declined by Kim Philby, who fled to Moscow.
Section 2 of the 1911 Act (now reformed under the Official Secrets Act
1989) prohibited the disclosure of any official information without
authorisation to anyone not authorised to receive it, and covered some one
million public servants and a further one million government contractors. It
also covered the retention of any document by a person not entitled to retain
the same, failure to take reasonable care of a document, and receiving any
document without authority. Section 2 was capable of generating over 2,000
different criminal offences, including the disclosure of the number of cups of
tea consumed in the MI5 canteen.85
Reform of the Official Secrets Act 191186
The pressure for reform had mounted after the Aitken affair in 1971. The
government announced that a committee was to be set up to examine the
workings of section 2 of the Act. The Committee of Inquiry, headed by Lord
Franks, was highly critical of section 2 and recommended that it be
reformed.87 It was not, however, until 1989 that reform took place.88
The major provisions of the Official Secrets Act 1989
Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911 is repealed and replaced by the 1989
Act. Rather than the catch-all section 2 of the 1911 Act, the 1989 Act creates
offences directed to specific groups of people and information. In relation to
most areas, the prosecution must prove both that the information has been
unlawfully transmitted and that the disclosure of the information is
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‘damaging’. The concept of ‘damaging disclosure’ has, however, not been
incorporated into section 1 which relates to security and intelligence matters.
With this exception, there is a presumption of harm built into the Act. A
further exception relates to those who are not Crown servants or government
contractors in relation to whom the prosecution will have to prove – in
addition to the harm test – that the defendant knew or had good reason to
know that the specific harm was likely to have been caused. In relation to such
information, the disclosure in itself is an offence. There is no longer a defence
of ‘public good’ which applied under section 2 of the 1911 Act.
Security and intelligence
Under section 1 of the 1989 Act, any person who is, or has been, a member of
the Security and Intelligence Services, and any other person who is informed
that the provision of the Act applies to him, is guilty of an offence if ‘without
lawful authority’ he discloses ‘any information, document or other article
related to security or intelligence’. A person who is, or has been, a Crown
servant or government contractor will be guilty of an offence if he makes a
‘damaging disclosure of any information, document or other article relating to
security or intelligence’. In R v Shayler (2002), the House of Lords ruled that a
former member of the Security Services who was prosecuted under the Act
was not entitled to rely on the defence that the disclosure was made in the
public or national interest. There was no contravention of Article 10 of the
European Convention through the restriction of members and former
members of the security forces disclosing information. 
Security and intelligence are defined as being the work of, or work in
support of, the Security and Intelligence Services. A disclosure is defined as
damaging if ‘it causes damage to the work of, or of any part of, the Security or
Intelligence Services’ or if unauthorised disclosure would be likely to cause
such damage. A charge may be defended if the person in question can prove
that, at the time of the alleged offence, ‘he did not know, and had no
reasonable cause to believe’ that the unauthorised disclosure related to
security or intelligence or, in the case of an offence under sub-section (3), he
did not know, or had no reasonable cause to believe, that the disclosure would
be damaging.
Defence
See section 2. Any unauthorised damaging disclosure of information,
documents or other articles relating to defence is an offence. A disclosure is
damaging if ‘it damages the capability of any part of the armed forces, or
leads to loss of life or injury to the forces, or endangers the interests of the
United Kingdom abroad, or obstructs the promotion or protection of those
interests, or is likely to have any of these effects’. It is a defence to prove that
the person did not know, and had no reasonable cause to believe, that such
disclosure would be damaging.
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Section 4 defines ‘defence’ as including the ‘size, shape, organisation,
logistics, order of battle, deployment, operations, state of readiness and
training of the armed forces of the Crown; weapons, stores or other
equipment of those forces; defence policy and strategy, and military planning
and intelligence; and plans and measures for the maintenance of essential
supplies and services that are, or would be, needed in time of war’.
International relations
Under section 3 of the Official Secrets Act 1989, an unauthorised damaging
disclosure, by a person who is or has been a Crown servant or government
contractor, of any information, document or other article relating to
international relations, or confidential information obtained from another
state or international organisation is an offence. A disclosure is damaging if it
‘endangers the interests of the United Kingdom abroad, or seriously obstructs
the promotion or protection of those interests or endangers the safety of
British citizens abroad’, or ‘is likely to have any of those effects’. It is a defence
to prove that the accused did not know, and had no reasonable cause to
believe, that the information fell within sub-section (1), or that its disclosure
would be damaging.
Crime and special investigation powers
Section 4 of the Act makes it an offence to disclose, without lawful authority,
information, documents or other articles which result in the commission of an
offence, or facilitates an escape from legal custody or impedes the prevention
or detection of offences or the apprehension or prosecution of suspected
offenders, or disclosures which are likely to have those effects. It is a defence
to a charge to prove that the person did not know, and had no reasonable
cause to believe, that the disclosure related to prohibited materials or that
disclosure would have any of the damaging effects mentioned.
Authorised disclosures under the Act
A disclosure by a Crown servant (or other notified person) is authorised, if it
is made with lawful authority and if (and only if) the disclosure is made in
accordance with a person’s official duty.89 In relation to government
contractors, a disclosure is lawful only if it is made with official authorisation
or for the purposes of his functions relating to the contract and without
contravening an official restriction. In relation to any other person, a
disclosure is lawful only if it is made to a Crown servant for the purposes of
his functions as such, or in accordance with official authorisation. It is a
defence to a charge to prove that, at the time of disclosure, he believed that he
had lawful authority to make the disclosure in question.
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The duty to safeguard information
Under section 8, Crown servants and government contractors are under a
duty to protect any information, document or other article, which it would be
an offence to disclose under the Act. It is an offence for a Crown servant to
retain an article contrary to his or her official duty, and for a government
contractor to fail to comply with a request for the return or disposal of the
information or document, or to fail to take such care of the information or
document as ‘a person in his position may be reasonably expected to take’. It
is a defence for a Crown servant to prove that he believed he was acting in
accordance with his official duty and ‘had no reasonable cause to believe
otherwise’.
Prosecutions
No prosecution may be instituted other than with the consent of the Attorney
General.90
Penalties
A person convicted of an offence under the Act, other than under section 8(1),
(4) or (5), shall, on indictment, be liable to imprisonment for a two year term,
or a fine, or both. On summary conviction, a person is liable to up to a six
month’s term of imprisonment, or a fine, or both. A person convicted under
section 8(1), (4) or (5) is liable, on summary conviction, to a term of
imprisonment of up to three months or a fine, or both. 
The catch-all nature of section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911 has thus
been reformed. Whether, in fact, the 1989 Act is less swingeing in scope is
another matter. Geoffrey Robertson QC states that the scope of the 1989
legislation, ‘while not the theoretical dragnet of the old section 2, is none the
less considerable’.91
Restrictions on the media: ‘DA’ Notices92
The Official Secrets Acts of course apply to information which might be
revealed by the press, and the doctrine of breach of confidence also represents
a fetter on freedom of information. A further restriction on press freedom is
the ‘DA’ (Defence Advisory) Notice system. DA Notices are requests to
newspaper editors not to publish information. The basis for the system is
entirely extralegal and voluntary. No formal sanction exists for failure to
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comply with a DA Notice. The system was established in 1912.93 A DA Notice
Committee was established, chaired by a Permanent Under Secretary of the
Ministry of Defence, which comprised both newspaper editors and civil
servants.94 At the request of a government department, the committee will
draft a Notice, and advice as to its scope and meaning will be given to the
press by the committee’s secretary. Compliance with a DA Notice will not
affect any right to bring legal action against a newspaper,95 and neither will
non-compliance. The system is vague and defective. It is also contrary to
principle to have a non-legal system which effectively fetters the freedom of
the press. DA Notices are mainly issued to restrict publication of information
‘relating to defence plans and equipment, nuclear weaponry, codes and
communication interception, the Security Services, civil defence and the
photography of defence installations’.96 The system was reviewed in both
1962 and 1980, when retention of the system was recommended. The 1980
inquiry by the Defence Committee of the House of Commons nevertheless
expressed reservations about retaining the system.97
Judicial attitudes to pleas of national security
The principal avenue for legal redress of grievances against the executive in
relation to actions undertaken in pursuit of protecting national security is that
of judicial review, discussed in Chapters 24 and 25. It is apparent that the
courts are exceedingly reluctant to challenge the executive where national
security is pleaded by the government in judicial review proceedings. Whilst
this is, prima facie, regrettable from the point of view of the aggrieved citizen, it
is explained – although not necessarily justified – by the relationship between
the executive, legislature and judiciary. As seen in Chapter 5, the doctrine of
separation of powers, whilst not strictly adhered to under the United
Kingdom’s constitution, is respected by the courts. In no area of policy is this
respect more clearly demonstrated than in matters of national security, which
will frequently, but not inevitably, be linked to the exercise of the royal
prerogative. In Chapter 6, the judiciary’s cautious approach to review of the
prerogative was examined, and it was there seen that the prerogative ensures
for the executive a wide and inadequately defined area of power which is
largely immune from judicial review. It will be recalled that in Council of Civil
Service Unions v Minister for Civil Service (1985) (the GCHQ case), the House of
Lords ruled that the courts have jurisdiction to review the exercise of
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executive power irrespective of whether the source of power was statutory, or
under the common law prerogative. 
Notwithstanding that claim, the House of Lords conceded that matters of
national security fell within the class of powers which were deemed ‘non-
justiciable’ by the courts (by which is meant that the subject matter is one
more appropriately controlled by the executive accountable to parliament
rather than the courts of law). 
Detention in wartime
In Liversidge v Anderson (1942), the House of Lords refused98 to review the
Home Secretary’s power of detention under the Defence of the Realm Acts. It
will be recalled from Chapter 6 that the regulation provided that the minister
had power to order detention of persons whom he ‘had reasonable cause to
believe’ to be of hostile origin or associations and ‘in need of subjection to
preventative control’. 
Detention with a view to deportation in peace time99
In 1962, Dr Soblen, an American citizen who had been convicted of espionage
in the United States, fled from the country before being sentenced. Whilst on
an aeroplane, Dr Soblen cut his wrists, and was taken off the plane in London
for hospital treatment. The Home Secretary issued a deportation order on the
basis that Soblen’s continued presence was ‘not conducive to the public good’.
When Dr Soblen applied for habeas corpus, the Court of Appeal ruled that Dr
Soblen had no right to make representations, and that deportation was an
administrative matter for the Home Secretary.100
In R v Home Secretary ex parte Hosenball (1977), two American journalists,
Philip Agee and Mark Hosenball, were detained with a view to deportation,
on the basis that their work involved obtaining and publishing information
prejudicial to national security. When Hosenball tried to challenge the Home
Secretary’s decision in the courts, the Court of Appeal upheld the deportation
order. While recognising that the rules of natural justice had not been
complied with, the Court of Appeal nevertheless ruled that the requirements
of national security prevailed, and that the Home Secretary was responsible to
parliament, and not to the courts, for matters of security. 
The case of R v Home Secretary ex parte Cheblak (1991) also reveals the
extensive powers of the Home Secretary to detain persons ‘in the interests of
national security’. In 1991, during the Gulf War, 160 Iraqi and Palestinian
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99 On deportation and extradition, see, further, Chapter 21.
100 See R v Home Secretary ex parte Soblen (1963). See, also, Thornberry, 1963.
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citizens were detained with a view to deportation, on the basis that their
presence was not ‘conducive to the public good’. Abbas Cheblak and his
family had been resident in the United Kingdom for 16 years. In an
application for habeas corpus, the Court of Appeal accepted the Home
Secretary’s explanation that Cheblak had associations with an unspecified
organisation which supported the Iraqi government, and refused to press the
Home Secretary for further information.101
Exercise of the Home Secretary’s powers which did result in judicial
criticism occurred in M v Home Office (1992–93). The Home Secretary, Kenneth
Baker, had ignored an order of the court that M should not be returned to
Zaire, where he feared torture. Immigration officials put M on a plane, which
the Home Secretary, refused to have turned back. The House of Lords held
that an injunction could lie against ministers of the Crown, and that they
would be guilty of contempt of court – in their official capacity – for defiance
of orders of the court. 
EMERGENCY POWERS
While, in peace time, the responsibility for maintaining order and detecting
crime lies with the police forces, in times of emergency, further assistance will
be needed if order is to be restored. In this section, the role of the armed forces
in support of the police is considered.
In peace time
Where serious civil unrest occurs, the government, acting in the name of the
Crown, may issue a proclamation declaring a state of emergency under the
Emergency Powers Act 1920, as amended by the Emergency Powers Act 1964.
The proclamation, which has effect for a one month period, confers wide
powers to govern by way of regulations. The grounds for making the order
are stipulated in the Act. Section 1(1) provides that, ‘if it appears to His
Majesty that there have occurred, or are about to occur, events of such a
nature as to be calculated, by interfering with the supply and distribution of
food, water, fuel, or light, or with the means of locomotion, to deprive the
community, or any substantial portion of the community, of the essentials of
life, His Majesty may, by proclamation declare that a state of emergency
exists’. Where a proclamation is made, parliament must be immediately
informed and, if in recess, must be recalled within five days for debate on the
matter.
Where a Proclamation has been made, according to section 2 of the Act,
Orders in Council may confer on a Secretary of State or government
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department, or any person in the Crown’s service, such powers and duties ‘as
His Majesty may deem necessary for the preservation of the peace, for
securing and maintaining the means and distribution of food, water, fuel,
light, and other necessities, for maintaining the means of transit or
locomotion, and for any other purposes essential to the public safety and the
life of the community ...’. No power exists to impose compulsory military
service or industrial conscription, or to make it an offence to take part in an
industrial strike. The powers conferred may continue in force for up to seven
days, unless both Houses of Parliament resolve to extend the period.
Regulations may be made for the summary trial of persons guilty of offences
against the regulations, conviction for which carries a maximum term of
imprisonment of three months, or a fine, or both. Any goods or money
obtained through breach of the regulations may be forfeited.
The use of the armed forces in times of unrest
The use of troops in 1911 in South Wales is the only occasion on which troops
have been brought in to assist the police. During the miner’s strike 1984–85,
the troops were not called in. Instead, the police forces co-ordinated their
operations in order to contain the situation successfully. Where troops are
deemed necessary to aid the police, it is the Home Secretary, acting on the
request of the Chief Officer of police, who has responsibility. As was seen in
Chapter 6, the Home Secretary has the power to issue weapons to police
forces for the quelling of civil disturbance.102
In time of war
The Defence of the Realm Acts 1914–15 conferred wide powers on the Crown
to make Regulations for ensuring public safety and defence of the realm. The
court have ruled that these broad powers include the power to detain a person
without trial on the basis of his or her hostile associations.103 The power to
regulate supplies did not include, however, the power to impose a tax upon
produce.104 Specific power to impose charges in relation to matters regulated
under Defence Regulations was conferred under the Emergency Powers
(Defence) Act 1939. Under the regulations, the Home Secretary was given
power to detain persons whom he had reasonable cause to believe came
within certain categories. The power was regarded by the courts as
reviewable.105 Under the Emergency Powers (Defence) (No 2) Act 1940,
powers were conferred compulsorily to direct labour in support of the war
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effort. Compulsory military service was introduced under National Service
Acts. 
Special powers in relation to Northern Ireland106
In Chapter 3, an outline history of the troubles in Northern Ireland is
provided. It will be recalled that the partition of Ireland, with six counties of
Ulster being separated from the rest of Ireland and becoming the newly
created state of Northern Ireland, did not quell the centuries of disturbances
between the mainly Catholic South of Ireland and the mainly Protestant
newly created Northern Ireland. In order to contain the terrorist activities of
the Irish Republican Army,107 in 1922, the Civil Authorities (Special Powers)
Act108 was passed by the Northern Ireland Parliament. From 1969, British
troops have been used in Northern Ireland in support of the civil authorities.
In 1971 – under this Act – the internment of suspected terrorists was
introduced. In 1973, the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act was
passed at Westminster, amended in 1975 and re-enacted in 1978, 1987, 1991
and 1996.109 In 1974, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act
was passed, initially for a five year renewable term. The Act was subsequently
renewed, although the 1989 Act was not subject to the five year term, but was
subject to annual renewal by parliament, as are parts of the Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Act 1996. The Prevention of Terrorism (Additional
Powers) Act 1996 further extended the law. The law is substantially reformed
by the Terrorism Act 2000, discussed below, and supplemented by the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.
THE TERRORISM ACTS 2000 AND 2001
The Terrorism Act 2000 reforms and extends existing terrorist legislation.110
Whereas the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989
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Provisions) Act 1996 and the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1998, and
makes minor amendments to other relevant Acts. See Inquiry into Legislation Against
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4178, 1998, London: Stationery Office.
required annual renewal, the Terrorism Act has permanent status. In relation
to Northern Ireland, it had been hoped that special provision would no longer
be required for Northern Ireland following the peace settlement. However, in
light of the problems implementing full devolution to Northern Ireland,
special provisions are included in Part VII of the Terrorism Act which are
time-limited to five years.
The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001
prompted a swift response from the British government. The Anti-Terrorism,
Crime and Security Act 2001 builds on existing legislation in order to ensure
that the security forces have the necessary powers to combat terrorist threats
to the United Kingdom. The 2001 Act aims to cut off terrorist funding and to
enable government departments and agencies to collect and share information
in the attempt to avert threats. The Act also alters immigration procedures,
and provides additional powers for the detention of suspected international
terrorists who have been certified by the Secretary of State as a threat to
national security. The Act also enhances the security of nuclear and aviation
industries and aims to improve the security of dangerous substances which
may be used by terrorists. It also extends police powers and facilitates greater
co-operation between police forces. Controversially, the Act also provides for
extended powers of disclosure of information and its retention from public
authorities to the police and security agencies involved in criminal
investigations. A statutory code of practice is to be drawn up in consultation
with industry and the Information Commissioner and approved by
parliament by affirmative resolution procedure.111
Defining terrorism
Whereas under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989,
terrorism was defined as the ‘use of violence for political ends, and includes
the use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the
public in fear’,112 the Terrorism Act 2000 adopts a wider definition, namely:
In this Act ‘terrorism’ means the use or threat, for the purpose of advancing a
political, religious or ideological cause, of action which –
(a) involves serious violence against any person or property,
(b) endangers the life of any person, or
(c) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the
public.113
Action includes action outside the United Kingdom, and references to any
person or to property refer to any person or property wherever situated, and a
reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other
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than the United Kingdom.114 This definition is intended to cover not just
terrorism for political ends, as in the case of Northern Ireland, but terrorism
undertaken for religious or ideological motives, which, while not necessarily
violent in themselves, are capable of having widespread adverse affects.
Examples cited are of disruption to key computer systems or interference with
the supply of water or power where life, health or safety may be put at risk. 
Proscribed organisations
Part II of the 2000 Act relates to proscribed organisations, listed under
Schedule 2.115 The Secretary of State may add or remove an organisation from
Schedule 2 or otherwise amend it, but may only add an organisation if he
believes that the organisation is concerned in terrorism.116 An organisation is
concerned in terrorism if it commits or participates in acts of terrorism,
prepares for terrorism, promotes or encourages terrorism, or is otherwise
concerned in terrorism.117 The Act introduces a Proscribed Organisations
Appeal Commission (POAC),118 to which individuals or organisations may
appeal, having first applied to the Secretary of State for deproscription and
been refused.119
The Commission must allow an appeal if it considers that the Secretary of
State’s decision was flawed when considered in the light of the principles
applicable on an application for judicial review.120 If the appeal is allowed,
the Commission makes an order to that effect. Where an order is made, the
Secretary of State must lay a draft order before parliament or, in urgent cases,
make an order removing the organisation from the list in Schedule 2.121
Appeals from the POAC, on a question of law, lie to the Court of Appeal,
Court of Session or Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland. An appeal may only
be brought with the consent of the Commission or, where the Commission
refuses permission, the permission of the relevant court.122 If an appeal to the
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POAC is successful, and an order made deproscribing the organisation, any
individual convicted of an offence in relation to the organisation, provided the
offence was committed after the date of the Secretary of State’s refusal to
deproscribe, may appeal against his conviction to the Court or Appeal or
Crown Court and the court shall allow the appeal.123 In relation to the above,
reference to the Commission allowing an appeal shall be taken as a reference
to the Commission determining that an action of the Secretary of State is
incompatible with a Convention right, and reference to the refusal to
deproscribe against which an appeal was brought shall be taken as a reference
to the action of the Secretary of State which is found to be incompatible with a
Convention right.124 In order that individuals seeking deproscription should
not be deterred from pursuing an appeal or from instituting proceedings
under section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998, through a risk of prosecution
for offences in relation to a proscribed organisation, section 10 provides that
evidence relating to anything done, and any documents submitted for these
proceedings, cannot be relied on in criminal proceedings for such an offence
except as part of the defence case.
Sections 11 to 13 relate to offences concerning membership of and support
for a proscribed organisation. A person guilty of an offence in relation to
membership under section 11 shall be liable, on conviction on indictment, to a
term of imprisonment not exceeding ten years, to a fine or to both, and on
summary conviction, to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months, to
a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both. It is a defence for a
person charged with an offence under section 11(1) to prove that the
organisation was not proscribed on the last occasion on which he became a
member or began to profess to be a member, and that he has not taken part in
the activities of the organisation at any time while it was proscribed. Section
12 relates to the support for a proscribed organisation and makes it an offence
to invite support, which is not restricted to the provision of money or other
property. It is an offence to arrange, manage or assist in arranging or
managing a meeting which he knows is to support or further the activities of a
proscribed organisation, or one which he knows is to be addressed by a
person who belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed organisation. It is
also an offence to address such a meeting where the purpose is to support the
organisation, or where he knows that the meeting is to be addressed by a
person who belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed organisation. A
meeting for these purposes means a meeting of three or more persons,
whether or not the public are admitted. On conviction on indictment, a person
guilty is liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding ten years, to a fine or
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to both, or on summary conviction to imprisonment for not longer than six
months, a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both. 
The wearing of an item of clothing, or wearing, carrying or displaying an
article in a public place, in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse
reasonable suspicion that that person is a member or supporter of a
proscribed organisation is an offence. On summary conviction, a person guilty
under section 13 is liable to six months imprisonment, a fine not exceeding
level five on the standard scale or to both. 
Terrorist property
Part III of the 2000 Act relates to terrorist property, defined under section 14 to
mean money or other property which is likely to be used for the purposes of
terrorism (including any resources of a proscribed organisation), proceeds of
the commission of acts of terrorism, and proceeds of acts carried out for the
purposes of terrorism. It is an offence to partake in fundraising for the
purposes of terrorism. Inviting others to provide, receiving or providing
money or other property is an offence under section 15. In relation to inviting
support from others or receiving money or other property, there must be an
intention that it should be used, or reasonable cause to suspect that it may be
used, for terrorist purposes. In relation to the provision of money or other
property, knowledge or reasonable cause to suspect that it will or may be used
for terrorism is required. The use or possession of money for terrorist
purposes is an offence under section 16, and involvement in funding
arrangements with knowledge or reasonable cause to suspect that it will be
used for terrorist purposes is an offence under section 17. The concealment,
removal, transfer or other mechanism for controlling terrorist property
(‘money laundering’) is an offence under section 18. It is a defence to prove
that the person did not know and had no reasonable cause to suspect that the
arrangement related to terrorist property. Persons guilty of an offence under
sections 15 to 18 are liable, on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a
term not exceeding 14 years, a fine or to both or, on summary conviction, for a
term of imprisonment not exceeding six months, a fine not exceeding the
statutory maximum, or to both.125 A court before which a person is convicted
of an offence under sections 15 to 18 may make a forfeiture order under
section 23. 
Section 19 imposes a duty on banks and other businesses to report any
suspicion that someone is laundering terrorist money or committing any other
terrorist property offence to the police. Sub-section (5) exempts professional
legal advisers in relation to information obtained in privileged circumstances.
Section 20 relates to information disclosures to the police, and provides that a
person so disclosing is not liable for breaching legal restrictions on disclosure.
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Section 21 covers those co-operating with the police, and provides that a
person does not commit an offence under sections 15 to 18 if he is acting with
the express consent of a constable. 
Part III of the Act introduces new powers for the police, customs officers
and immigration officers to seize cash126 at borders and to seek forfeiture of
cash in civil proceedings. This power enables cash being taken from Northern
Ireland to Great Britain, and vice versa, to be seized, detained and forfeited.
When cash is seized under section 25, the authorities have 48 hours in which
to seek continued detention or forfeiture. If neither of these occurs, the cash
must be returned. Continued detention is authorised under section 26, which
provides for applications by authorised officers or Commissioners of Customs
and Excise to a magistrates’ court or, in Scotland, an application by the
procurator fiscal to the sheriff. A person from whom the cash was seized, the
person on whose behalf it was being transported and any other person may
apply for the cash detained under section 25 to be returned.127 The
application will only be granted if the magistrates’ court or the sheriff is
satisfied that continued detention is no longer justified, for example, because
investigations into the source and use of the cash have been concluded. The
forfeiture of cash may be applied for by an authorised officer or
Commissioners of Customs and Excise to the magistrates’ court or, in
Scotland, by the procurator fiscal to the sheriff. An order for forfeiture may
only be granted if the magistrates’ court or sheriff is satisfied on the balance of
probabilities that the cash is cash relating to terrorist purposes. No criminal
proceedings for an offence under the Act are required.128 Appeals must be
lodged within 30 days, and if successful the cash returned.129 If a forfeiture
order has been made in relation to a proscribed organisation, and the
organisation successfully appeals to the POAC for deproscription, cash which
has been forfeited may be returned following an appeal.130
The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 extends the law in order
to prevent terrorists gaining access to their money. The police may require
financial institutions to provide information on accounts of up to 90 days and
it is an offence for such institutions not to report where there are reasonable
grounds for suspicion that funds are being used by terrorists. In order to
prevent the use or removal of funds, cash and assets may now be seized by
enforcement agencies whenever an investigation is started, rather than when a
person is about to be charged. The 2001 Act also provides for the assets of
126 Defined as coins and notes in any currency, postal orders, travellers’ cheques, bankers’
drafts and such other kinds of monetary instrument as the Secretary of State may
specify by order: Terrorism Act 2000, s 24.
127 Ibid, s 27.
128 Ibid, s 28.
129 Ibid, s 29.
130 Ibid, s 29(6), (7).
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overseas governments or residents who have taken, or are likely to take,
action threatening the economy or a threat to life or property of a UK national
or resident to be frozen by the Treasury.
Terrorist investigations
Part IV of the 2000 Act regulates powers in relation to terrorist investigations,
defined to include the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of
terrorism, an act which appears to have been done for such purposes, the
resources of a proscribed organisation, the possibility of making a
proscription or deproscription order under section 3(3), or the commission,
preparation or instigation of an offence under the Act.131 Sections 33 to 36
give power to the police to designate and demarcate a specified area by
cordons for the purposes of a terrorist investigation. It is an offence to fail to
comply with an order, prohibition or restriction imposed, on summary
conviction being liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three
months, a fine not exceeding level four on the standard scale, or to both. It is a
defence to prove that there is a reasonable excuse for failure to comply.132
Under section 39, where a person knows or has reasonable cause to
suspect that a constable is conducting or proposes to conduct a terrorist
investigation, it is an offence to disclose to another anything which is likely to
prejudice the investigation or to interfere with material which is likely to be
relevant to the investigation. Where a person knows or has reasonable cause
to suspect that a disclosure has been or will be made under any of sections 19
to 21, it is an offence to disclose to another anything which is likely to
prejudice an investigation resulting from the disclosure, or to interfere with
material likely to be relevant to an investigation resulting from the disclosure.
This deterrent measure carries on conviction on indictment, imprisonment for
a term not exceeding five years, a fine or to both or, on summary conviction,
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, a fine not exceeding the
statutory maximum or to both.133
It is also an offence for a person to collect, make a record of, publish,
communicate or attempt to elicit information which is useful to a person
committing or preparing an act of terrorism, or to possess a document or
record containing information which would be useful.134 The offence is
confined to a person who is or has been a constable, a member of Her
Majesty’s Forces, the holder of a judicial office, an officer of any court or a full
time employee of the prison service in Northern Ireland. If it is proved in
criminal proceedings that a document or record was on any premises at the
131 Terrorism Act 2000, s 32.
132 Ibid, s 36(2), (3), (4).
133 Ibid, s 39(7).
134 Ibid, s 103.
same time as the accused, or on premises of which the accused was the
occupier or premises which he habitually used otherwise than as a member of
the public, the court may assume that the accused possessed the document or
records, unless he proves that he did not know of its presence on the premises
or that he had no control over it. It is a defence to prove that he had a
reasonable excuse for his action or possession. Conviction under section 103
on indictment carries a liability to a term of imprisonment not exceeding ten
years, a fine or to both or, on summary conviction, to imprisonment not
exceeding six months, a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both. 
Counter-terrorist powers
A terrorist for the purposes of Part V of the 2000 Act is a person who has
committed an offence under any of sections 11, 12 (membership or support for
a proscribed organisation), 15 to 18 (fundraising and handling money), 54
(relating to weapons training) and 56 to 63 (directing a terrorist organisation
and offences relating to committing or inciting terrorism wholly or partly
outside the United Kingdom), or is or has been concerned in the commission,
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.135 A constable may arrest
without a warrant a person whom he reasonably suspects to be a terrorist.136
A person must be released, unless detained under any other power, within 48
hours. Where a review of a person’s detention has taken place and the review
officer does not authorise continued detention, the person shall be released. A
police officer may make an application for a warrant extending a person’s
detention and, where the officer intends to make an application, the person
may be detained pending the making of the application and conclusion of
proceedings on the application. Where the application is granted, the person
may be detained during the period specified in the warrant. A constable may
apply for a warrant relating to specified premises if he is satisfied that there
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person suspected of terrorism is
to be found there. The warrant authorises entry and search for the purpose of
arresting the person in question.137
Stop and search powers relating to suspected terrorists include the power
to stop and search the person for evidence of being a terrorist, and an arrested
person may be searched. Anything discovered in the course of a search which
the constable reasonably suspects of being evidence that the person is a
terrorist may be seized.138 Specified senior police officers may authorise any
constable in uniform to stop a vehicle in an area or at a place specified in the
authorisation and to search the vehicle, its driver, a passenger and anything in
the vehicle or carried by the driver or a passenger, and may also be granted to
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stop pedestrians.139 The power may only be used for the purpose of searching
for articles which could be used in connection with terrorism, and may be
exercised whether or not the constable has grounds for suspecting the
presence of articles of that kind. Where suspected items are discovered in the
course of a search, they may be seized and retained.140 Authorisations are for
a maximum, renewable, 28 days.141 It is an offence to fail to comply with an
order to stop a vehicle, or to stop, or to wilfully obstruct a constable in the
exercise of the power conferred by an authorisation under section 44. On
summary conviction, a person guilty of an offence is liable to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding six months, a fine not exceeding level five on the
standard scale or to both.142
The Act makes weapons training for terrorist purposes an offence.
Formerly relating only to Northern Ireland under the Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Act 1996, the 2000 Act applies throughout the United
Kingdom. The Act covers conventional firearms and explosives and extends
to cover chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and materials.143 It is an
offence to provide or receive instruction or invite another to receive
instruction in the making or use of defined weapons. It is a defence to prove
that the action or involvement was wholly for a purpose not concerned with
terrorism. A person found guilty on indictment is liable to a term of
imprisonment of up to ten years, to a fine or to both or, on summary
conviction, to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months, to a fine not
exceeding the statutory maximum or to both.144
It is an offence to possess articles in circumstances which give rise to a
reasonable suspicion that such possession is for a purpose connected with the
commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism. Section 57
replicates section 16A of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions)
Act 1989, and reverses the onus of proof, sub-section (2) providing that it is a
defence for a person charged to prove that his possession of an article was not
for a purpose connected with terrorism. Article 6(2) of the European
Convention on Human Rights, provides for the presumption of innocence of
the defendant in criminal trials, and presumes that the prosecution will need
to prove guilt. However, the reversal of the burden of proof does not per se
indicate a violation of the right to fair trial. The government certified that the
Bill complied with the Convention. In Kebeline’s case,145 the House of Lords
refused to set aside a conviction under section 16A on the basis that the
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Attorney General should not have consented to the prosecution in light of the
imminent implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
Terrorism overseas
Sections 59 to 64 of the 2000 Act regulate terrorism overseas. Under section 59,
it is an offence to incite another person to commit an act of terrorism wholly or
partly outside the United Kingdom, if that act would constitute an offence
listed in sub-section (2) in England and Wales, namely, murder, wounding
with intent, offences involving poison, explosions and endangering life by
damaging property. A person found guilty shall be liable to any penalty to
which he would be liable on conviction of the relevant offence. Sections 60
and 61 make equivalent provision in relation to Scotland and Northern
Ireland. Section 62 regulates acts of terrorism outside the United Kingdom
involving causing explosions,146 the use of biological or chemical weapons,
and provides that a person committing such an act is guilty of an offence.
Equally, it is an offence to do anything outside the United Kingdom which
would amount to an offence under sections 15 to 18 if it had been done in the
United Kingdom. Section 64 amends the Extradition Act 1989 to include the
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the Convention for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
Port and border controls
Section 53 and Schedule 7 to the 2000 Act regulate border controls. An
‘examining officer’, being a constable, immigration officer and customs officer
designated for the purposes of Schedule 7 by the Secretary of State and
Commissioners of Customs and Excise, has the power to stop, question and
detain a person, at an airport, hoverport or port or border area, for the
purposes of determining whether he or she is a person suspected of being
concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of
terrorism.147 A place is within a border area if it is no more than one mile
from the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.148 In
relation to a train travelling from the Republic of Ireland to Northern Ireland,
the first place in Northern Ireland at which it stops for the purpose of allowing
passengers to leave is within the border area. Owners or agents of ships or
aircraft employed to carry passengers for reward on journeys between Great
Britain, the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland must not dock or land
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for the purposes of embarking or disembarking passengers at any place other
than a designated port as listed in the Act.149 The Secretary of State may
designate control areas in any port, and specify conditions for or restrictions
on the embarkation or disembarkation of passengers in a control area. The
captains of ships or aircraft travelling between Great Britain, the Republic of
Ireland, Northern Ireland or any of the Islands are under a duty to ensure that
passengers and members of crew do not disembark other than in accordance
with arrangements approved by an examining officer. Section 16 introduces
carding arrangements, which require persons embarking or disembarking in
relation to journeys between Great Britain, the Republic of Ireland, Northern
Ireland or any of the Islands to provide such information as the Secretary of
State, by order, may require. 
A person questioned is required to provide any information requested,
and produce a valid passport or other document establishing his or her
identity. A person may be removed from a ship, aircraft or vehicle for the
purpose of detaining for questioning. A person detained for questioning must
be released no later than the end of a nine hour period beginning with the
time when the questioning begins, unless otherwise detained under any other
power.150
Powers of search are granted to examining officers. The examining officer
may ‘for the purpose of satisfying himself whether there are any persons who
he may wish to question’ search a ship or aircraft; search anything on a ship or
aircraft and search anything which he reasonably believes has been, or is
about to be, on a ship or aircraft. In relation to the person questioned, the
examining officer may search the person, his possessions or a ship or aircraft.
In relation to questioning in border areas, the examining officer has the power
to search vehicles, anything in or on the vehicle, or anything which he
reasonably believes has been or is about to be in or on a vehicle. The search of
a person in border searches must be carried out by a person of the same
sex.151 Property may be detained, for a period of seven days, for the purpose
of deciding whether it may be needed for use as evidence in criminal
proceedings, or in connection with decisions concerning deportation to be
taken by the Secretary of State.152 It is an offence knowingly to fail to comply,
or contravene a prohibition imposed, or wilfully to obstruct or seek to
frustrate a search or examination by an examining officer. On summary
conviction, a person guilty of an offence is liable to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding three months, a fine not exceeding level four on the standard
scale, or both.153
149 Terrorism Act 2000, Sched 7, para 12.
150 Ibid, para 6.
151 Ibid, Sched 7, paras 7 and 8.
152 Ibid, para 11.
153 Ibid, para 18.
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The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 also makes provision for
the extended detention of suspected international terrorists.154 Where the
Secretary of State certifies that a person is a threat to national security and
cannot be deported within a reasonable time, the suspect may be detained.
The Act required the government to derogate from Article 5(1) of the
European Convention on Human Rights.155 The Special Immigration Appeals
Commission (SIAC)156 reviews such detention regularly, and its decisions are
excluded from judicial review. An appeal from the Commission on a point of
law lies to the Court of Appeal.
Where the Secretary of State certifies that the removal of an asylum seeker
would be conducive to the public good, there is an expedited process of
dealing with the application. In relation to asylum and certain immigration
cases, the Act provides for the retention of fingerprints for ten years, in order
to prevent the creation of multiple identities which can be used in terrorist or
criminal activity.
The 2001 Act strengthens security powers in relation to the nuclear
industry and aviation and in relation to chemical and biological weapons. 
Police powers are enhanced under the 2001 Act. Part 10 extends the power
to search for identity. The Act authorises the fingerprinting, photographing
and ordering the removal of face coverings worn to conceal identity. The Act
also provides for the British Transport Police, UK Atomic Energy Authority
officers and Ministry of Defence Police to operate outside their own
jurisdiction to assist local police forces.157
154 Part 4, ss 21–32.
155 See, further, Chapter 19.
156 The Act makes the SIAC a superior court of record. Three members hear appeals, one of
whom holds or has held high judicial office and one of whom is or has been an
immigration judge.
157 On the Terrorism Acts and the European Convention on Human Rights, see Brogan v
United Kingdom (1989), McGann, Favel and Savage v United Kingdom (1995), which are
discussed in Chapter 19.
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CHAPTER 24
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review represents the means by which the courts control the exercise
of governmental power. Government departments, local authorities, tribunals,
state agencies and agencies exercising powers which are governmental in
nature must exercise their powers in a lawful manner. Judicial review has
developed to ensure that public bodies which exercise law making power or
adjudicatory powers are kept within the confines of the power conferred.
Judicial review is concerned with the legality of the decision made, not with
the merits of the particular decision. Accordingly, the task of the judges is to
ensure that the exercise of any power which has been delegated to ministers
and administrative and adjudicatory bodies has been lawful according to the
power given to that body by Act of Parliament. As will be seen below, there is
academic debate concerning the appropriate basis on which the courts
exercise their supervisory jurisdiction. The traditional view has been that the
judge’s task is to ensure that public bodies act within their powers – or intra
vires – and that, provided that the body has acted within its powers as defined
by statute, and according to the common law based rules of natural justice, the
body’s decision will not be challengeable under the public law process of
judicial review.2
From this traditional perspective, judicial review is principally concerned
with questions of jurisdiction and natural justice. The primary question to be
asked is whether a particular person or body with delegated law making or
adjudicatory powers had acted intra vires or ultra vires, and whether the
decision making process entailed the application of natural justice. If the
person or body was acting within its jurisdiction, and respecting the demands
of natural justice, the courts would not interfere with the decision – even if the
decision was in some respect wrong. Nowadays, although the judges still
express their role in the traditional language of ‘vires’, the approach taken is
more robust than before. If a public body, as defined in law, makes an error of
law, the courts – through the process of judicial review – will intervene to
ensure that the body in question reconsiders a matter and acts in a
procedurally correct manner.3
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1 See Craig, 1994a; Wade and Forsyth, 1994.
2 See Chapter 25 on natural justice.
3 See Chapter 25 for further discussion of the concept of ultra vires.
The uncertain and expanding role of judicial review causes controversy.4
Simply expressed, in any society regulated by a complex administrative
machinery, an essential feature of that society is that administrators have a
sphere of power within which, in the interests of certainty and efficiency, they
should be free to operate. The doctrine of ministerial responsibility, discussed
in Chapter 11, ensures that accountability for policy and administration lies
with the relevant Secretary of State, who is accountable to the electorate
through parliament. However, against that argument for non-interference
with matters of administration must be set the demands of individual justice
and fairness. If an individual, or a body of persons, is aggrieved by an
administrative decision, and their rights adversely affected, there exists a
requirement that procedures exist whereby such decisions may be challenged
in the courts. It is through judicial review that the requirements of legality of
the exercise of powers by public bodies is tested. From this perspective,
judicial review exemplifies the application of the rule of law5 in a democratic
society.6 This raises a further question of constitutional significance. To what
extent is it legitimate for a non-elected judiciary to intervene to correct the
administrative process which is controlled through powers granted by the
democratically elected parliament? One response to this question is that
judicial review – with respect to the review of delegated law making and
adjudicatory powers – ensures that parliament’s will is observed, and judicial
review may thus be regarded as an aspect of parliamentary sovereignty.7
As a result of extensive regulation, powers have been conferred by
parliament upon various government departments, administrative bodies and
tribunals – powers which must be exercised within the ‘four corners’ of the
legislation. Traditionally, judicial review has been regarded as unconcerned
with the merits of a particular case, or with the justice or injustice of the rules
which are being applied, but rather as being concerned with the manner in
which decisions have been taken: has this decision maker acted within the
powers given? Most of the rules applied by administrators will be statutory,
but the courts have also – under common law – developed rules which will
apply to decision makers over and above the statutory rules. Thus, decision
makers must not only exercise their powers in the correct manner as
prescribed by the statute, but must also comply with the rules of
reasonableness, natural justice and fairness. In addition, due to the Human
Rights Act 1998 the courts now have the additional task of ensuring – in part
through judicial review – that public authorities do not violate protected
Convention rights. The Human Rights Act has profound implications for
judicial review, affecting not only an expansion in the role of the courts but
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4 See, eg, the differing views of Stephen Sedley J and Professor Ross Cranston expressed
in Richardson and Genn, 1994, Chapters 2 and 3, respectively.
5 For an early expression of this view, see Dicey (1898), 1959, Appendix 2.
6 See Allan, 1985a.
7 See Chapter 7. See, also, Craig, 1999, and Jowell, 1999.
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also requiring different modes of interpretation than hitherto. These issues
will be discussed in the next chapter.
In essence – and subject to changes which have been brought about by the
Human Rights Act 1998, devolution to regional assemblies and the proposed
Freedom of Information Act – the courts seek, by judicial review, to ensure
four principal objectives:
(a) that Acts of Parliament have been correctly interpreted;
(b) that discretion conferred by statute has been lawfully exercised; and
(c) that the decision maker has acted fairly;
(d) that the exercise of power by a public body does not violate human rights.
THE GROWTH IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION8
Judicial review derives from the historical power of the courts to keep inferior
bodies within their legal powers. While ‘public administration’ may be traced
back to Elizabethan times,9 it was in the mid-nineteenth century that
government expanded its legislative and administrative functions into areas
hitherto untouched. The growth in the nineteenth century of industrialisation
resulted in central regulation, for example, of town and country planning, the
provision of housing and housing improvement,10 public health, regulation of
the railways and factory management and schemes for compensation for
injury.11 One consequence of such regulation was the need for mechanisms
for resolving disputes between individuals and the regulatory bodies.
Statutory inquiries became the formal mechanism by which disputes were to
be resolved.
The early twentieth century laid the foundations for the Welfare State. The
introduction of health insurance12 and measures to combat unemployment13
led to the establishment of tribunals of administration and adjudication. The
major reform came with the publication of the Beveridge Report,14 which set
out radical proposals for extensive reforms in social welfare and led to the
introduction of the National Health Service. 
To portray succinctly the administrative system existing nowadays is not
an easy task. As with so much of the institutional framework of the state,
developments have proceeded in a pragmatic, ad hoc fashion. In 1980, the
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8 See, inter alia, Dynes and Walker, 1995.
9 Eg, the Poor Relief Act 1601.
10 Artisans’ and Labourers’ Dwelling Improvement Act 1875; Housing of the Working
Classes Act 1890.
11 Public Health Acts 1848, 1872, 1875; Factory Act 1833; Workmen’s Compensations Acts
1897 and 1906, respectively.
12 National Insurance Act 1911.
13 Labour Exchanges Act 1909 and National Insurance Act 1911.
14 Social Insurance and Allied Services, Cmnd 6404, 1942, London: HMSO.
Report on Non-Departmental Public Bodies15 classified administrative bodies into
executive bodies, advisory bodies and tribunals. The Report cited 489
executive bodies. The work of tribunals and inquiries had earlier been
investigated by the Franks Committee, whose report16 led to the passing of
the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1958. Today, over 40 different tribunals exist,
with jurisdiction over such diverse subject matters as commerce, economic
matters, education, employment, Foreign Compensation, housing, physical
and mental health, immigration, the National Health Service, pensions and
residential homes. 
What is a ‘public body’ for the purposes of judicial review? 
Judicial review is only available to test the lawfulness of decisions made by
public bodies. If judicial review is applied for, and the court rules that the
body whose decision is being challenged is a private body, then the remedy of
the aggrieved individual will lie in private law, not public law, proceedings.
In determining whether or not the body whose decision is being challenged
on an application for judicial review is a public, as opposed to private, body,
the court will look at its functions. The test is not whether or not the authority
is a government body as such but, rather, whether it is a body exercising
powers analogous to those of government bodies. National public agencies
have been a feature of administration since the Reform Act of 1832. The Poor
Law Commissioners established in 1834, for whom there was no responsible
Minister in Parliament (until 1847) are an early example of such an agency.
The post-Second World War nationalisation programmes of the Labour
government between 1945 and 1951 and the expansion of welfare provision,
both then and subsequently, resulted in numerous public bodies being
established which were not government bodies, nor were they part of local
government. Examples of such bodies include the British Broadcasting
Authority, Legal Aid Board (now the Legal Services Commission), Atomic
Energy Authority and British Airports Authority. It has been estimated that,
by 1991, there were some 1,444 public bodies which were not related to
government departments.17 In 1979, the incoming Conservative government
was firmly committed to privatisation. British Gas, British Airways, British
Rail, British Telecom, the water supply industry and electricity industry were
all privatised.18 The drive towards privatisation and reduced state holdings in
many other enterprises19 has not, however, reduced the number of public
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15 Cmnd 7797, 1980, London: HMSO.
16 Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries, Cmnd 218, 1957,
London: HMSO.
17 Public Bodies, 1991, London: HMSO.
18 Civil Aviation Act 1980, Gas Act 1986, Water Act 1989, Electricity Act 1989. Plans to
privatise the Post Office were abandoned in 1994 after a backbench revolt against the
plans.
19 Eg, British Petroleum, British Nuclear Fuels Ltd, Cable and Wireless, Rolls Royce,
Jaguar.
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bodies. Parallelling the privatisation movement has been the growth in
standard setting and regulatory bodies designed to ensure appropriate
accountability of providers to consumers. The Police Complaints Authority,
Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Legal Education and Conduct,
Higher Education Funding Council, and Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority are all examples of such bodies which have been
created under statute.20 Furthermore, there have been a number of regulatory
bodies established on a voluntary basis. The Press Complaints Commission,
the City Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, the Advertising Standards
Authority, the Jockey Club and Football Association are all examples of such
bodies. One question which arises is how the courts determine whether a
body – howsoever established – is a public body and thus amenable to judicial
review of its decisions. The City Panel on Takeovers and Mergers provided an
opportunity for judicial analysis of public and private bodies.
THE COURTS’ INTERPRETATION OF PUBLIC BODIES
In R v City Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ex parte Datafin Ltd (1987), the
Takeover Panel had dismissed a complaint made by a bidder of ‘acting in
concert’ contrary to the rules on takeovers. The bidder applied for judicial
review. The court declined to grant the application on the basis that there
were no grounds for judicial review (on which, see below) but, nevertheless,
rejected the claim made by the City Panel that the court had no jurisdiction to
consider the application. The Panel was subject to judicial review, despite its
lack of statutory or prerogative source of power, because it was a body
exercising public functions analogous to those which could be, or could have
been in the absence of the Panel, exercised by a government department.21
Lord Justice Lloyd stated that, for the most part, the source of the power will
be decisive. Accordingly, if a body is set up under statute or by delegated
legislation, then the source of the power brings the body within the scope of
judicial review. However, Lloyd LJ also recognised that in some cases the
matter would be unclear. Where that situation existed, it was necessary to
look beyond the source of the power and consider the ‘nature of the power’
being exercised. In Lloyd LJ’s view, ‘[i]f a body in question is exercising public
law functions, or if the exercise of its functions have public law consequences,
then that may be sufficient to bring the body within the reach of judicial
review’. 
By contrast with the City Panel on Takeover and Mergers case, in R v
Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club ex parte Aga Khan (1993), the Aga Khan
841
20 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 and Higher
Education Act 1992, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990.
21 See Lee, 1987; and Jowell, 1991.
sought judicial review of the Jockey Club’s decision to disqualify his winning
horse from a race for failing a dope test, and the court ruled that it had no
jurisdiction. The relationship between racehorse owners and the Club, and the
powers of the Club, derived from agreement between the parties and was a
matter of private rather than public law.22 The same principle will be applied
whenever a matter is regulated by contract between two private parties – the
matter is one of private and not public law. There is a fine distinction to be
drawn here. The regulation of a private school, for example, has been held to
be a matter of private law, whereas the regulation of City Technical Colleges,
a non-fee paying publicly funded institution, is a matter of public law.
However, where a pupil attends a private school under a publicly funded
assisted places scheme, that school falls within the jurisdiction for judicial
review in relation to the school’s decision, in particular, the decision to expel a
pupil.23
Under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, public authorities are
defined as including courts and tribunals and ‘any person certain of whose
functions are functions of a public nature’. The Act excludes both Houses of
Parliament and those acting in connection with parliamentary proceedings.
For the purposes of judicial review, section 7 provides that an applicant is
only to have sufficient interest if he or she is a victim of the unlawful act. In
relation to proceedings relating to judicial acts, these may be brought only by
exercising a right of appeal or by an application for judicial review.24
Review and appeal25
Judicial review must be distinguished from an appeal against a decision. The
court and tribunal structure provides a more or less rational appeal structure
for those aggrieved by a judicial decision. The appellate court will have the
power to reconsider the case and to substitute its own decision for that of the
lower court. An appeal may be made on both the law and the facts of the case,
so that a full re-hearing may take place. Judicial review, by contrast, is
concerned solely with the manner in which the decision maker has applied
the relevant rules: it is thus procedural in nature. It is not for the court – in
judicial review proceedings – to substitute its judgment for that of the decision
making body to which powers have been delegated but, rather, to ensure that
the adjudicator has kept within the rules laid down by statute and the
common law. In short, the role of the courts in judicial review is to exercise a
supervisory, not an appellate, jurisdiction. Judicial review ‘is not an appeal
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23 See R v Governors of Haberdashers’ Aske’s Hatcham College Trust ex parte T (1994), per
Dyson J.
24 Human Rights Act 1998, s 9.
25 See Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans (1982).
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from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was
made’.26
Judicial review derives from the courts’ inherent powers to keep decision
making bodies within the bounds of their powers, and to provide remedies
for abuse of power, and its purpose is not to substitute a decision of the court
for the decision of the administrative body. 
Applying for leave for judicial review
For the criteria, see below. It must be noted here that there is no unfettered
right to judicial review. The aggrieved individual must seek leave to apply for
judicial review, and a number of criteria, which are discussed below, govern
the exercise of the discretion to grant or refuse the application for judicial
review. 
The requirement to seek leave for judicial review is controversial, and
there are cogent arguments for its repeal. For example, the JUSTICE-All Souls
Report27 argued for repeal on the basis, first, that the leave requirement is
discriminatory; secondly, that the justification for leave based on eliminating
‘groundless, unmeritorious or tardy harassment’ on the part of applicants can
be dealt with in the same manner as in ordinary litigation;28 and, thirdly, that
the issue of standing is no longer finally determined at the stage at which the
application for leave is considered; see, further, below. However, there is
support for the view that, while the need to seek leave represents a procedural
hurdle which does not exist in other areas of the law, there remains a need to
filter out unmeritorious cases at an early stage. The Law Commission has re-
examined the question of application for leave and concluded that it remains
‘essential to filter out hopeless applications for judicial review by a
requirement such as leave’.29
The outcome of judicial review
Differences also exist in the respective outcomes of appeal and judicial review.
In the case of appeals, where the appeal is successful, it will usually result in a
new decision being substituted for the previous decision.30 In the case of
review, a successful case will usually result in the previous decision being
nullified – or quashed – but no new decision will be put in its place. Instead,
the body in relation to which a successful application for judicial review has
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27 Administrative Law: Some Necessary Reforms, 1988. See, also, Le Sueur and Sunkin, 1992;
Law Commission, Administrative Law: Judicial Review and Statutory Appeals, Consultation
Paper No 226/HC 669.
28 As provided for by RSC Ord 18 r 19.
29 Law Commission, Administrative Law, fn 27.
30 In some instances, a new trial may have to be ordered in order for a fresh decision to be
reached.
been made will be directed to redetermine the case according to the correct
rules and procedure, and it is by no means inevitable that the decision reached
according to the lawful procedure will be more favourable to the individual
than the original decision.31
Furthermore, there is no automatic right to a remedy in judicial review
proceedings: the remedy is discretionary. The matter is contentious.32 In some
cases, the court will decline to grant a remedy. The court may hold, for
example, that, while the decision making process was defective, nevertheless,
the applicant has suffered no injustice, or that, even if a remedy were granted,
the decision maker would reach the same conclusion on the merits, or that the
impact on administration would be too great if a remedy were granted. 
THE CONCEPT OF JUSTICIABILITY
Justiciability is a concept which defines the judges’ view of the suitability of
the subject matter to be judicially reviewed. There are some matters in relation
to which the courts – mindful of the doctrine of separation of powers – prove
to be exceedingly reluctant to review. Matters such as the exercise of
prerogative power and, most importantly, issues of national security, and
matters of high policy, the courts may regard as non-justiciable.
Matters of public policy not for judicial review33
Where a matter complained of involves issues of high policy, the courts will
decline to exercise a supervisory function over such decisions. Matters of
public policy are for determination by the executive, and not the judiciary,
and any purported attempt to control the decision would be regarded as a
violation of the separation of powers and an intrusion into the proper decision
making sphere of the executive. For example, in Nottinghamshire County
Council v Secretary of State for the Environment (1986), it was held that the court
should not intervene to quash guidance drafted by the Secretary of State, on
the authority of parliament, setting limits to public expenditure by local
authorities. Lord Scarman ruled that:
Unless and until a statute provides otherwise, or it is established that the
Secretary of State has abused his power, these are matters of political judgment
for him and for the House of Commons. They are not for the judges or your
Lordships’ House in its judicial capacity. 
Similarly, in Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council v Department of
the Environment (1991), concerning the lawfulness of ‘charge capping’ local
authorities (penalising local authorities for exceeding their budgets), the
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House of Lords ruled that the decision was not open to challenge on the
grounds of irrationality ‘short of the extremes of bad faith, improper motive or
manifest absurdity’. Lord Bridge went on to rule that such decisions, relating
to national economic policy, ‘are matters depending essentially on political
judgment’ and that, in the absence of any evidence of bad faith or abuse of
power, the courts would be ‘exceeding their proper function if they presumed
to condemn the policy as unreasonable’. In R v Parliamentary Commissioner for
Administration ex parte Dyer (1994), Simon Brown LJ held that matters of
national policy were not open to challenge before the courts other than on the
basis of bad faith, improper motive or manifest absurdity. Matters of national
economic policy were for political – not judicial – judgment. See, further,
below.
Judges also adopt a cautious attitude when it comes to reviewing the
exercise of the royal prerogative and will decline so to do in particular where
issues of national security are involved. Many of the matters which the courts
regard as non-justiciable – that is to say, not within judicial competence to
determine – fall within the royal prerogative. However, as discussed in
Chapter 6, the courts will not decline to judicially review a matter simply
because the source of the power exercised is the royal prerogative. The House
of Lords made it clear in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for Civil
Service (1985) that the source of the power was not determinative of whether
the courts would review, but rather the matter to be decided was whether the
subject matter of the application was justiciable or not.34
LIMITATIONS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
It is a first principle of justice and the rule of law that public bodies are
required to act within the scope of the powers allocated to them by parliament
and, accordingly, in principle, judicial review should lie wherever the vires of
administrative action is in question. However, that principle must be set in the
balance against the needs of certain administration, and the necessary
restrictions which may be imposed on individuals or bodies seeking to
disrupt the administrative process, without good cause. The balance to be
struck between these often competing principles is a difficult matter. Where
parliament limits the availability of judicial review, the courts will adopt a
restrictive interpretation to the statutory words, employing the presumption
that parliament did not intend – save in the most express manner – to exclude
the jurisdiction of the courts. A number of different statutory means are
employed in the attempt to limit the availability of judicial review. In
summary, parliament may adopt the following means:
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of Trade (1977); R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Fire Brigades’ Union
and Others (1995); M v Home Office (1993).
(a) the general requirement that applications for judicial review are brought
within three months of the challenged decision;
(b) clauses which are intended to prevent any challenge;
(c) clauses which are designed to limit review to a specified time period in
relation to particular matters where delay needs to be avoided;
(d) ‘conclusive evidence’ clauses.
Attempts to exclude judicial review totally
In R v Medical Appeal Tribunal ex parte Gilmore (1957), the statute provided that
‘the decision on any medical question by a medical appeal tribunal ... is final’.
Under an industrial injuries scheme, compensation for accidental industrial
injuries was set under a tariff. Gilmore lost the sight of both eyes in two
accidents and was assessed at a disablement of 20 per cent. The tariff provided
that the loss of sight in both eyes entitled the applicant to a 100 per cent
assessment. The tribunal had, accordingly, made an error of law. However,
the opportunity for the court to redress the wrong turned on the exclusion of
review in the statute. The Court of Appeal held that the jurisdiction of the
court was not ousted by the statutory words; Denning LJ, stating that:
... the remedy of certiorari is never to be taken away by any statute except by
the most clear and explicit words. The word ‘final’ is not enough. That only
means ‘without appeal’. It does not mean ‘without recourse to certiorari’. It
makes the decision final on the facts, but not final on the law. Notwithstanding
that the decision is by a statute made ‘final’, certiorari can still issue for excess
of jurisdiction or for error of law on the face of the record ... [p 583]
However, in South East Asia Firebricks v Non-Metallic Mineral Products
Manufacturing Employees’ Union (1981), an ‘ouster clause’ succeeded. The
Malaysian Industrial Court, in a successful legal challenge by trades unions,
had ordered employers to take back employees after a strike. Statute35
provided that an award of the Court shall be ‘final and conclusive’ and that ‘...
no award shall be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called
into question in any court of law’. 
The Privy Council, citing Gilmore with approval, nevertheless
distinguished between an error which affected the jurisdiction of the court to
make a determination36 and decisions which, whilst in error, were not of such
a fundamental nature as to deprive the court of jurisdiction. In this case, the
error was within the jurisdiction of the court and, accordingly, the ouster
clause was effective. According to Lord Fraser of Tullybelton:
... the Industrial Court applied its mind to the proper question for the purpose
of making its award. The award was accordingly within the jurisdiction of that
court, and neither party has contended to the contrary ... the error or errors did
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not affect the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court and their Lordships are
therefore of the opinion that section 29(3)(a) effectively ousted the jurisdiction
of the High Court to quash the decision by certiorari proceedings ...
[pp 373–74]
The seminal case on ouster clauses is Anisminic v Foreign Compensation
Commission (1969).37 In 1956, property in Egypt belonging to an English
company was sequestrated by the Egyptian authorities and subsequently sold
to an Egyptian organisation, TEDO. Anisminic then sold to TEDO its mining
business. In 1959, a Treaty signed by the United Kingdom and the United
Arab Republic provided for the return of sequestrated property, other than
property sequestrated in a period during which Anisminic’s property was
taken over. The Foreign Compensation Commission (FCC), established to
make awards of compensation to companies adversely affected by
sequestration of property, ruled that Anisminic did not qualify for
compensation. The Foreign Compensation Order 1962,38 Article 4(1)(b)(ii),
provided that that both the applicant and the successor in title be British
nationals. TEDO – the successor in title – was not a British national and,
accordingly, Anisminic’s claim failed. The Foreign Compensation Act 1950
provided that the decisions of the FCC ‘shall not be called in question in any
court of law’.39
Anisminic sought judicial review of the FCC’s decision. The question for
the court was whether the phrase ‘shall not be questioned’ succeeded in
ousting the jurisdiction of the courts, or whether, notwithstanding that
section, the courts had the power to rule on the lawfulness of the FCC’s
decision. The House of Lords ruled that the jurisdiction of the courts was not
ousted. Accordingly the court had power to review the FCC’s decision, which
it declared to be null and void. The FCC had acted outside its jurisdiction by
misinterpreting the Order in Council and reached a decision based on a
ground which it was not entitled to take into account, namely the nationality
of the successor in title. The nationality of the successor in title, according to
the House of Lords, was not a relevant consideration when the applicant was
the original owner of the sequestered property. The House of Lords ruled
unanimously that section 4(4) did not protect decisions which were taken
outside of jurisdiction. 
The Anisminic decision raises complex issues. The House of Lords
appeared to destroy the distinction between errors of law within the
jurisdiction of the decision making body, which had previously been regarded
as non-reviewable, and errors of law which took the decision maker outside
its jurisdiction and were therefore reviewable. In effect, clauses which
attempted to oust the jurisdiction of the courts appeared to have been
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rendered meaningless. The problem which remains is whether Anisminic
provides clear guidelines as to how to distinguish between those elements of a
tribunal’s decision which, if decided incorrectly, cause the tribunal to exceed
its jurisdiction, and those aspects of a tribunal’s decision which, although
decided incorrectly, do not cause the tribunal to exceed its jurisdiction — in
other words the error is ‘within jurisdiction’. The decision also reveals judicial
emphasis on the rule of law – even in the face of apparently clear words that
parliament does not intend review to take place. In the view of Wade and
Forsyth (1994), the judges in Anisminic have ensured that the courts are ‘the
exclusive arbiters on all questions of law’.
In Pearlman v Keepers and Governors of Harrow School (1979), the Court of
Appeal ruled that the misinterpretation of provisions in the Housing Act 1974,
by the county court, amounted to a ‘jurisdictional error’ which nullified the
court’s decision. Lord Denning MR, in Pearlman, stated that the distinction
between errors which entail an excess of jurisdiction and an error made within
jurisdiction should be abandoned.
The question of exactly which errors of law are ‘jurisdictional’ was
considered in Re Racal Communication Ltd (1981). In Racal, the Director of
Public Prosecutions (DPP) sought an order of the court40 in order to obtain
evidence relating to an alleged offence. The order was refused. Section 441(3)
of the Companies Act provided that no appeal lay from a decision of the judge
hearing the application. Nevertheless, the DPP appealed, and the Court of
Appeal allowed the appeal, relying on Anisminic and Pearlman. Lord Denning
ruled that the ‘no appeal’ clause was of no effect, for the judge had
misconstrued the words in section 411 of the Act. The House of Lords
overturned the Court of Appeal’s decision, approving of Geoffrey Lane LJ’s
dissenting judgment in Pearlman, in which he had held that the judge had
done nothing which was outside his scope of inquiry. A distinction was
drawn between errors made by a tribunal or other administrative bodies,
which would be reviewable, and errors made by a court of law. Lord Diplock,
in Racal, supported the view expressed by Lord Denning MR in Pearlman,
stating that:
The breakthrough made by Anisminic was that, as respects administrative
tribunals and authorities, the old distinction between errors of law that went to
jurisdiction and errors of law that did not was for practical purposes abolished
[p 383].
A further distinction, and limitation to the Anisminic principle, is to be seen in
R v Lord President of the Privy Council ex parte Page (1992). There, the issue
concerned a decision made by a university Visitor, and whether such a
decision was reviewable on the basis of Anisminic. The House of Lords ruled
that it was not. The powers of Visitors were established by the founder of the
university, who had established a body of law and the office of Visitor to
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enforce that ‘domestic’ law. Accordingly, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson, the
Visitor could not ‘err in law in reaching his decision since the general law is
not the applicable law’. Accordingly the Visitor could not act ultra vires by
applying his interpretation of the rules of the university. Jurisdiction to review
did lie in cases where the Visitor acted outside his jurisdiction, or where he
acted without regard to the rules of natural justice. However, there was no
jurisdiction to review decisions taken within jurisdiction. 
Time limits on judicial review
In the attempt to protect decisions from challenges which may impede or
otherwise affect their implementation, statute may provide that there should
be no challenge by way of judicial review other than within a specified time
period. Smith v East Elloe Rural District Council (1956) illustrates the attitude of
the courts to such time limits. In Smith, a challenge to the validity of a
compulsory purchase order was limited, under statute, to a six week period
following the date of confirmation of the order. If not challenged within that
period the order ‘shall not ... be questioned in any legal proceedings
whatsoever’. Mrs Smith did not challenge the order within the time limit but,
some six years later, sought to challenge the order on the basis that the clerk to
the council had acted in bad faith, and that bad faith was a ground on which –
despite the clear wording of the time limit in the statute – the order’s validity
could be impugned. The House of Lords, by a majority, rejected this view. It
was, however, unanimously agreed that Mrs Smith could proceed against the
clerk to the council, for damages, on the basis of bad faith in procuring the
order. Viscount Simonds explained the attitude of the court:
My Lords, I think that anyone bred in the tradition of the law is likely to regard
with little sympathy legislative provisions for ousting the jurisdiction of the
court ... But it is our plain duty to give the words of an Act their proper
meaning, and ... I find it quite impossible to qualify the words ... in the manner
suggested ... What is abundantly clear is that words are used which are wide
enough to cover any kind of challenge which an aggrieved person may think
fit to make. I cannot think of any wider words ... I come, then to the conclusion
that the court cannot entertain this action in so far as it impugns the validity of
the compulsory purchase order ... [pp 750–52]
The Court of Appeal in R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Ostler
(1976) followed the reasoning in Smith. In Ostler, the Highways Act 195941
provided that an aggrieved person had the right to challenge the validity of a
compulsory purchase order – on the basis of ultra vires – within six weeks
from the date of publication of the order. Subject to that right, the order ‘shall
not be questioned in any legal proceedings whatsoever’. The proposed road
building scheme had two stages. The first involved the acquisition of the land
for the main road; the second related to the acquisition of land for the side
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roads which would give access to the main road. Two public inquiries were
held, at the first of which there were allegations that an officer of the
Department of the Environment had given assurances that vehicular access
would be gained by a widening of the access road during the second phase of
the development. Ostler’s business would be affected by the widening of the
access road, but he was unaware of the assurance allegedly given at the
inquiry and did not challenge the decision. At the second inquiry, Ostler
wished to object to the road widening, and wanted to give evidence that he
would have objected at the first inquiry had he known of the secret
undertaking. He was refused permission to give evidence on the basis that his
objection related to the first stage of the development. Ostler subsequently
learned of the undertakings and sought to challenge the compulsory order on
the ground that natural justice had been denied and that the order had been
made in bad faith amounting to fraud. The court accepted that, had Ostler
challenged the order within six weeks, the court would have considered his
complaint. The court was faced with the question as to whether Anisminic
applied, or whether the decision in Smith v East Elloe was the relevant
precedent. Lord Denning MR considered the two precedent decisions and
distinguished between them in three respects. First, the limitation in the Smith
case amounted to a time limitation for review, as opposed to a purported total
ouster of jurisdiction as in Anisminic. Secondly, the decision by the Foreign
Compensation Board in Anisminic was a ‘truly judicial’ decision, whereas that
in Smith was an administrative decision. Thirdly, in Anisminic, the court was
required to consider the ‘actual determination of the tribunal’, whereas, in
Smith, the court was considering the process by which the decision was
reached. Lord Denning concluded:
... the policy of the 1959 Act is that when a compulsory purchase order has
been made, then if it has been wrongly obtained or made, a person aggrieved
should have a remedy. But he must come promptly. He must come within six
weeks. If he does so, the court can and will entertain his complaint. But if the
six weeks expire without any application being made, the court cannot
entertain it afterwards. The reason is because, as soon as that time has elapsed,
the authority will take steps to acquire property, demolish it and so forth. The
public interest demand that they should be safe in doing so. [pp 95–96]
Exclusion of review by ‘conclusive evidence clauses’
Parliament may effectively oust the jurisdiction of the courts by inserting a
clause into statute which provides that a subordinate piece of legislation shall
have effect ‘as if enacted in this Act’, or that confirmation of an order by a
designated minister shall be ‘conclusive evidence that the requirements of this
Act have been complied with, and that the order has been duly made and is
within the powers of this Act’. Such clauses were strongly criticised in 1932 by
the Committee on Ministers’ Powers42 but, nevertheless, they continue to be
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used and have been effective in ousting judicial review. In R v Registrar of
Companies ex parte Central Bank of India (1986), for example, a clause in the
Companies Act 1985 effectively ousted the jurisdiction of the courts. PP Craig
comments that such clauses have ‘passed out of fashion’.43 Nevertheless, the
potential for their use, and their effectiveness, provides the basis for a
damaging exclusion of judicial review.
THE BASIS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Supreme Court Act 1981
The basis for review today lies in section 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981
and the Civil Procedure Rules 1998.
Section 31 provides, in part, that:
(1) An application to the High Court for one or more of the following forms of
relief, namely:
(a) an order of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari;
(b) a declaration or injunction under sub-section (2); or
(c) an injunction under section 30 restraining a person not entitled to do so
from acting in an office to which that section applies, 
shall be made in accordance with rules of court by a procedure to be
known as an application for judicial review.
(2) A declaration may be made or an injunction granted under this subsection
in any case where an application for judicial review, seeking that relief, has
been made and the High Court considers that, having regard to:
(a) the nature of the matters in respect of which relief may be granted by
orders of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari;
(b) the nature of the persons and bodies against whom relief may be
granted by such orders; and
(c) all the circumstances of the case, 
it would be just and convenient for the declaration to be made or for the
injunction to be granted, as the case may be.
(3) No application for judicial review shall be made unless the leave of the
High Court has been obtained in accordance with rules of court; and the
court shall not grant leave to make such an application unless it considers
that the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the
application relates.
Under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, an action must be brought within three
months of the decision against which review is sought. However, shorter time
periods may be specified in statute and these must be complied with.
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STANDING TO APPLY FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW44
The ‘sufficient interest’ test45
The Supreme Court Act 1981 provides that the court must not grant leave for
an application for judicial review ‘unless it considers that the applicant has a
sufficient interest [otherwise expressed as “standing” or locus standi] in the
matter to which the application relates’. The justification for such a
requirement lies in the need to limit challenges to administrative decision
making to genuine cases of grievance and to avoid unnecessary interference
in the administrative process by those whose objectives are not authentic. The
applicant may be an individual whose personal rights and interests have been
affected by a decision, or an individual concerned with official decisions
which affect the interests of society as a whole. Alternatively, the application
may be brought by an interest or pressure group desiring to challenge a
decision which affects the rights and interests of members of that group or
society at large. 
The manner in which the test is applied
The test of ‘sufficient interest’ was provided in R v Inland Revenue
Commissioners ex parte National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses
(1982). The House of Lords’ approach was as follows. The question as to
whether there is standing should be examined in two stages. At the first
instance, standing should be considered when leave to apply is sought. At
that stage, the court is concerned, according to Lord Scarman, to ensure that ‘it
prevents abuse by busybodies, cranks and other mischief makers’. If leave is
granted, the court may – at a second stage, when the merits of the case are
known – revise its original decision and decide that after all the applicants do
not have sufficient interest. 
Individual standing: personal rights and interests
Given the breadth of administrative decision making in a heavily regulated
society, individuals may have their rights or expectations affected in
multifarious ways, as has been seen above. Two further examples from the
case law illustrate the concept of individual standing. In Schmidt v Secretary of
State for Home Affairs (1969), students who had entered the country as
‘students of scientology’ challenged the decision of the Home Office not to
allow them to remain once the permitted period of stay had expired. The
students had a ‘legitimate expectation’ (see below) that they would be
allowed to make representations to the Home Office, which they were denied,
over a matter affecting their individual liberty. The students had ‘sufficient
interest’ for leave to be granted. 
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In R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ex parte Rees-
Mogg (1994), the applicant sought judicial review of the government’s
ratification of the Treaty on European Union without parliamentary consent.
Rees-Mogg was held to have sufficient standing, but the application was
dismissed on the basis that the issue was non-justiciable.46
The standing of interest and pressure groups
Actions in defence of the group’s own interests
A group may have its interests adversely affected by administrative decision
making. By way of illustration, in R v Liverpool Corporation ex parte Liverpool
Taxi Fleet Operators’ Association (1972), Liverpool Corporation had the duty of
licensing taxis and fixing the number of licences to be granted. When the
Corporation announced that the number of licences was to be increased,
without consulting the Operators’ Association, leave to apply for judicial
review was sought. The Association had sufficient standing. Equally, in Royal
College of Nursing v Department for Health and Social Security (1981), the Royal
College had standing to challenge a departmental circular concerning the role
of nurses in abortions.
Both these cases involve organisations seeking to challenge decisions
which affect their own members. Accordingly, the standing requirement is
relatively easy to satisfy, since each of their members would have individual
standing. The position is less straightforward where a group seeks to defend
what it regards as the wider interests of society.
The standing of interest and pressure groups acting in the public interest
Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small
Businesses (1982) provided the test for standing. The facts, in brief, entailed the
employment of casual labour on newspapers, where the workers frequently
adopted false names and paid no income tax. The Inland Revenue
Commissioners (the IRC) entered into an agreement with the relevant trades
unions, workers and employers, to the effect that, if the workers filled in tax
returns for the previous two years, the IRC would not pursue tax due for
previous years. The National Federation (an association of taxpayers) argued
that the IRC had no power to enter into this agreement and sought judicial
review. The IRC defended the action on the basis that the National Federation
did not have sufficient interest – or standing (locus standi) – to apply for
judicial review. The court upheld the IRC’s claim. The House of Lords ruled
that the court had been correct in granting leave at the first stage, but that on
the facts – the second stage – the National Federation lacked sufficient interest
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to challenge the legality of the agreement. The House of Lords ruled that there
was no standing to challenge the particular wrongdoing alleged but that, if
the Revenue had in fact been acting with impropriety, there would have been
standing in a taxpayer to challenge its unlawful acts. In R v Her Majesty’s
Treasury ex parte Smedley (1985), the applicant for review sought to challenge
the decision of the Treasury to pay a sum of money from the Consolidated
Fund, without express parliamentary approval, to meet European
Community obligations. Smedley was thus applying in his own interest and
in the interests of all British taxpayers and electors.47 The court held that he
had standing, although the challenge failed on its merits. A case to be
distinguished from the National Federation case is that of R v Attorney General ex
parte ICI plc (1986). In the ICI case, the application was based on a complaint
that four competitor companies had been assessed at too lenient a rate,
contrary to the Oil Taxation Act 1975. The court held that the company had
standing: it had a genuine and substantial complaint. 
The judges are, however, not united in their approach to the ‘sufficient
interest’ test, which confers on the courts a great deal of discretion. In R v
Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Rose Theatre Trust Company Ltd
(1990), Schiemann J cited a number of propositions which he deduced from
the IRC case. The Rose Theatre case concerned the question of whether a
company which had been incorporated for the purpose of campaigning to
save the historic Globe Theatre site in London had sufficient interest, or locus
standi. Included in the guidelines were that the question of whether sufficient
interest exists is not purely a matter within the discretion of the court; that
sufficient interest did not necessarily entail a direct financial or legal interest;
that the assertion of an interest by a person or a group does not mean that
sufficient interest exists; and that, even where thousands of people joined
together in a campaign, that was not conclusive that sufficient interest existed.
The court ruled that the company did not have sufficient interest.48 However,
in R v Poole Borough Council ex parte BeeBee (1991), the same judge ruled that
two pressure groups, The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the British
Heperetological Society (BHS), had sufficient interest to challenge a decision
of the Council which had granted planning permission to itself for the
development of a heathland with designated ‘special scientific interest’ status.
The BHS had a financial interest in the site, and the WWF had undertaken to
pay any legal costs if necessary.49
A liberal approach to sufficient interest was also taken in R v Secretary of
State for the Environment ex parte Greenpeace Ltd (No 2) (1994). Greenpeace
applied for judicial review to challenge the decision of the Inspectorate of
Pollution to allow the siting of a nuclear reprocessing plant (THORP) at
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Sellafield. It was held that the Inspectorate had not abused its powers in
varying British Nuclear Fuel plc’s licence. However, while Greenpeace lost the
case, the court nevertheless ruled that Greenpeace did have standing to
challenge the decision. It was in the interests of justice to allow Greenpeace –
an organisation with over 400,000 supporters in the United Kingdom – to
bring an action on behalf of all concerned with the project. The court declined
to follow the Rose Theatre decision, but warned that it should not be assumed
that Greenpeace or other pressure groups would automatically be held to
have sufficient interest in any future case. 
Further cases involving successful challenges by pressure groups are that
of R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ex parte World
Development Movement Ltd (1995) (the EOC case) and R v Secretary of State for
the Environment ex parte the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (the RSPB
case) (1995). In the first case, the World Development Movement (WDM)
sought judicial review of the Foreign Secretary’s decision to grant financial aid
to Malaysia for the building of the Pergau dam. The WDM argued that the
Secretary of State had exceeded his powers. The court held that the WDM had
sufficient interest. The WDM played a prominent role in giving advice and
assistance in relation to aid and had consultative status with United Nation’s
bodies. Further, it was unlikely that there would be any other person or body
with sufficient interest to challenge the decision. In the EOC case, the Equal
Opportunities Commission (EOC) sought a declaration that the United
Kingdom was in breach of European Community law obligations in relation
to Article 119 (now Article 141) of the EC Treaty and Equal Pay and Equal
Treatment Directives of the Community. The alleged breach concerned the
Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, which discriminated
between full time and part time employees in relation to redundancy pay and
compensation for unfair dismissal. The House of Lords confirmed that the
EOC had sufficient interest and, moreover, that English law was incompatible
with the requirements of European Community law. In the RSPB case, the
Royal Society had sufficient interest to challenge the decision of the Secretary
of State’s decision affecting the development of land which had hitherto been
a special site for the conservation of birds. 
THE EXISTENCE OF ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
The availability of alternative remedies is a relevant factor in deciding
whether leave will be granted for judicial review. In R v Inland Revenue
Commissioners ex parte Preston (1985), Lord Templeman stated that leave for an
application for judicial review should not be granted ‘where an alternative
remedy was available’. Thus, by way of example, where parliament had set
up under statute a comprehensive appeals structure, judicial review cannot be
used as a means of circumventing this.50 Moreover, the statutory rights of
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appeal must be exhausted.51 If, however, there are exceptional circumstances
– for example, if inordinate delays are experienced in the proceedings – the
court may grant leave to apply for judicial review.52
A MATTER OF PUBLIC – NOT PRIVATE – LAW 
Judicial review is confined to matters of public – as opposed to private – law.
The courts will not seize jurisdiction to review an administrative action or
decision if the matter involved is one of private law. Accordingly, the
respondent must be a public authority, and the right at issue must be a public
right. If the matter is one of public law, the aggrieved person must apply by
way of judicial review and not under any other procedure. 
The ‘exclusivity principle’
In O’Reilly v Mackman (1983),53 the applicants had taken part in a prison riot at
Hull gaol and the Board of Visitors (who exercise disciplinary powers over
prisoners) reduced the remission of sentence as punishment. The applicants
tried to establish that the Board of Visitors had acted contrary to the rules of
natural justice. This they attempted to do by means of an originating
summons or writ.54 It was not contested that the issue was a matter of public
law and that they could have employed the judicial review procedure,
provided that they applied for leave within the requisite three months. No
leave from the court is needed in relation to private law proceedings. The
issue for the court was whether it was an abuse of the process of the court to
use the alternative basis to bring the action. Lord Diplock stated:
If what should emerge is that his complaint is not of an infringement of any of
his rights that are entitled to protection in public law, but may be an
infringement of his rights in private law and this is not a proper subject for
judicial review, the court has power under rule 9(5), instead of refusing the
application, to order the proceedings to continue as if they had begun by writ
... [pp 283–84]
Referring to the procedural disadvantages which had existed prior to the
reforms introduced in 1977 by Order 53,55 Lord Diplock went on to state that:
... now that those disadvantages to applicants have been removed and all
remedies for infringement of rights protected by public law can be obtained
upon an application for judicial review, as also can remedies for infringements
of rights under private law if such infringement should also be involved, it
would in my view as a general rule be contrary to public policy, and as such an
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abuse of the process of the court to permit a person seeking to establish that a
decision of a public authority infringed rights to which he was entitled to
protection under public law to proceed by way of an ordinary action and by
this means evade the provisions of Order 53 for the protection of such
authorities. [p 285]
The decision in O’Reilly has been trenchantly criticised by Professor HWR
Wade.56 The ‘exclusivity principle’ – keeping public and private law rigidly
distinct – was introduced by Lord Diplock in O’Reilly, notwithstanding the
Law Commission’s intention that procedural reforms introduced in 1977 were
not intended to create a rigid distinction between public and private law
proceedings.57 Before that time, although the distinction between public and
private law was drawn, the system was not exclusive. Professor Wade regards
the exclusivity principle, declared in O’Reilly, as amounting to a ‘serious
setback for administrative law’. He goes on to state that:
... it has caused many cases, which on their merits might have succeeded, to
fail merely because of choice of the wrong form of action ... It has produced
great uncertainty, which seems likely to continue, as to the boundary between
public and private law, since these terms have no clear or settled meaning ...
[Wade and Forsyth, 1994, p 682]
Professor Wade regards this as an unnecessary restriction on access to the
courts, a restriction which has been avoided in Scotland, Australia, New
Zealand and Canada. His assessment of the House of Lords’ decision in
O’Reilly is that:
... the House of Lords has expounded the new law as designed for the
protection of public authorities rather than of the citizen. Such are the
misfortunes which can flow from the best intentioned reforms.
Exceptions to the exclusivity principle
The harshness with which the exclusivity principle could operate, led Lord
Diplock in O’Reilly to state that exceptions to the rule would exist, where the
case involved both public and private law elements, particularly where the
public law element was collateral (auxiliary or secondary) to the private law
element. What is evident in this matter is that a balance needs to be struck
between too rigid a rule, which denies individuals the protection of judicial
review, and too lax an approach, which would enable individuals either to
pursue a remedy in judicial review when other procedures are in fact more
appropriate or, conversely, to pursue other remedies when judicial review
would be appropriate, in order to evade the requirements of judicial review. It
is also evident that the judges are struggling to find the correct balance. 
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A public law issue used in defence in private law proceedings
In Wandsworth London Borough Council v Winder (1985), the House of Lords
allowed a matter of public law (the lawfulness of the council’s decision) to be
used as a defence to private law proceedings (possession proceedings).
Winder was a tenant of the local authority, which gave notice that rents were
to be raised. Winder claimed that the increase was unreasonable and contrary
to law. The local authority brought an action for possession of the premises.
Winder defended this action on the basis that the rent increase was outside the
powers of the local authority and void for unreasonableness. On appeal to the
House of Lords, the question for the court was whether Winder could
challenge the local authority’s action by way of a defence based on judicial
review grounds, or whether he should have instigated separate judicial
review proceedings by way of an application to the High Court. The local
authority submitted that Winder should have used judicial review but that,
since he was by then out of time to do so, he could not challenge their decision
by way of a defence to the possession proceedings.
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, citing O’Reilly, acknowledged that it was in the
interests of good administration to protect authorities from unmeritorious or
late challenges, but that this factor had to be weighed in the balance against
the argument for preserving the ordinary rights of private citizens to defend
themselves against unfounded claims. In his opinion, Winder’s action could
not be described as an abuse of the process of the court. Winder had not
selected the procedure, he was merely seeking to defend himself. If the public
interest required that people should not have the right to defend themselves,
then that was a matter for parliament, not the courts.
Cases involving both public and private law issues
In Roy v Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster Family Practitioner Committee
(1992), a further exception to the exclusivity principle emerged, whereby the
House of Lords ruled that the principle did not apply where the proceedings
involved matters of both public and private law. In Roy, a Family Practitioner
Committee was responsible for making payments to general practitioners in
respect of their National Health Service work.58 Dr Roy’s allowance was
reduced by the committee on the basis that he had reduced the amount of his
time spent on National Health Service work. Dr Roy litigated to recover the
sum reduced. At first instance, the judge decided that the decision to reduce
his payments was a matter of public law to be challenged under judicial
review proceedings. On appeal to the House of Lords, it was held that, when a
litigant had a private law right – in relation to a matter which involved an
issue of public law – he was not precluded from pursuing his private law
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right. Accordingly, the fact that the public law issue could have been
determined under judicial review proceedings was not held to deny him a
remedy under private law. In Andreou v Institute of Chartered Accountants in
England and Wales (1998), the applicant had been granted leave to bring
judicial review to challenge the validity of a bylaw of the Chartered Institute,
but failed to observe the time limit. He then commenced a private law action
alleging breach of contractual duty to exercise its bylaw making powers fairly
and to act fairly in its disciplinary proceedings. The Court of Appeal ruled
that the Institute was, in part, a public body. However, here it was appropriate
to proceed under private law since there was a private law right at issue, even
though there was also a public law issue involved.
In R v Peter Edward Wicks (1997), the House of Lords ruled that the validity
of an enforcement notice under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990
could not be impugned in criminal proceedings, but only by the High Court
on an application for judicial review. The defendant appealed against the
Court of Appeal decision, dismissing his appeal against conviction for failure
to comply with the enforcement notice. So long as the enforcement notice was
not a nullity or patently defective on its face, it was valid and would remain so
until quashed. No criminal court had the power to quash, and it was not open
to the defence to go behind the notice and seek to investigate its validity. The
proper course to take was to apply for an adjournment of the criminal
proceedings and apply to the High Court for judicial review in which the
validity of the notice could be attacked.59
A challenge to the vires of subordinate legislation or an administrative act
could be raised in criminal proceedings. The House of Lords so held in
Boddington v British Transport Police (1998). The defendant, in criminal
proceedings on charges of smoking a cigarette in a railway carriage where
smoking was prohibited, sought to argue that the Network South Central’s
decision to post notices banning smoking was ultra vires its powers to bring
the relevant bylaw into force. On appeal, the court had ruled that it was not
open to the defendant to raise that public law defence in criminal proceedings
against him. The House of Lords, however, stated that a defendant was so
entitled, and that, if the defendant managed to rebut the presumption in
favour of the lawfulness of the subordinate legislation or administrative act,
the legislation or act had no legal effect at all and could not found a
prosecution. In the instant case, there was nothing in the bylaws or the
relevant Act to rebut the presumption that the defendant was entitled to
defend himself against a criminal charge on the basis of the validity of the
decision to put no smoking notices in carriages. However, the manner in
which the relevant bylaw had been brought into force was not ultra vires and
accordingly the appeal was dismissed. 
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Broad versus restrictive approaches to standing
O’Reilly and Winder were both considered extensively in Roy v Kensington and
Chelsea and Westminster Family Practitioner Committee (above), in which Lord
Lowry examined the ‘broad’ or ‘liberal’ approach to judicial review and the
‘narrow’ or ‘restrictive’ approach. A broad approach lessens the importance of
the distinction between public and private law and would allow either the
Order 53 procedure to be used or for the pursuit of a private law remedy. A
narrow approach, however, would dictate that if the matter is primarily a
matter of private law then the judicial review procedure is inappropriate.
While Lord Lowry ‘disclaimed any intention of discussing the scope of the
rule in O’Reilly’, he nevertheless went on to make a case for a more liberal
approach. Lord Lowry stated that:
... the Law Commission, when recommending the new judicial review
procedure, contemplated the continued co-existence of judicial review
proceedings and actions for a declaration with regard to public law issues ...
... this House has expressly approved actions for a declaration of nullity as
alternative to applications for certiorari to quash, where private law rights
were concerned: Wandsworth London Borough Council v Winder (1992), p 655, per
Robert Goff LJ.
Citing Goff LJ, Lord Lowry continued:
The principle remains in fact that public authorities and public servants are,
unless clearly exempted, answerable in the ordinary courts for wrongs done to
individuals. But by an extension of remedies and a flexible procedure it can be
said that something resembling a system of public law is being developed.
Before the expression ‘public law’ can be used to deny a subject a right of
action in the court of his choice it must be related to a positive prescription of
law, by statute or by statutory rules. We have not yet reached the point at
which mere characterisation of a claim as a claim in public law is sufficient to
exclude it from consideration by the ordinary courts: to permit this would be
to create a dual system of law with the rigidity and procedural hardship for
plaintiffs which it was the purpose of the recent reforms to remove’: Davy v
Spelthorn Borough Council (1984), per Lord Wilberforce.
In conclusion, my Lords, it seems to me that, unless the procedure adopted by
the moving party is ill suited to dispose of the question at issue, there is much
to be said in favour of the proposition that a court having jurisdiction ought to
let a case be heard rather than entertain a debate concerning the form of the
proceedings.
Lord Slynn advanced the argument for a more flexible approach to the choice
of proceedings in Mercury Communications Ltd v Director General of
Telecommunications (1996). In that case, the effect of O’Reilly v Mackman was
further limited. A dispute arose between Mercury Communications and
British Telecom (BT), both of which are public limited companies licenced by
the Secretary of State under the Telecommunications Act 1984. Mercury
Communications was dependent upon the rental of part of BT’s network. The
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Director General, exercising powers under the 1984 Act, determined the
dispute, and his decision affected the terms of the contract between Mercury
and BT. Mercury initiated private proceedings in the Commercial Court by
originating summons. At first instance, the Director General and BT failed to
have the proceeding struck out, the court applying the O’Reilly principle. On
appeal, however, it was argued, successfully, that this was an abuse of
process. The case went to the House of Lords, which reversed the decision of
the Court of Appeal. Lord Slynn emphasised that when determining the issue
of the choice of private or public law proceedings, flexibility must be retained.
It was recognised that the Director General had statutory functions and
performed public duties. However, this did not eliminate the possibility of
private law proceedings. Since the Director General’s decision had been
imposed as part of a contract, this could be regarded as a contractual dispute.
Accordingly, the commencement of private law proceedings was equally well
suited to determine the issue as judicial review proceedings. The issue of the
appropriateness of proceedings was a matter to be determined by the courts
on a case by case basis. Lord Slynn stated that:
... when it comes to a question of striking out for abuse of process of the court
the discretion exercised by the trial judge should stand unless the arguments
are clearly and strongly in favour of a different result to that to which he has
come. [p 59]
The House of Lords reconsidered the question of the appropriate form of
proceedings once more in O’Rourke v Camden London Borough Council (1997). In
this case, the plaintiff had applied to the local authority for accommodation,
under the Housing Act 1985, on his release from prison. Section 63(1) of the
Housing Act provides that a local authority is under a duty to provide
accommodation in respect of those who are ‘homeless and [had] a priority
need’, and that includes persons who are ‘vulnerable as a result of ... physical
disability or other special reason’. Initially, the authority refused him
accommodation, but subsequently provided accommodation for a 12 day
period, after which the plaintiff was evicted and no alternative
accommodation offered. The plaintiff brought a private action against the
council for wrongful eviction without providing alternative accommodation,
and claimed damages. The House of Lords ruled that the question of whether
section 63 of the Housing Act gave rise to public or private law proceedings
depended on the intention of parliament. The duty to provide accommodation
was a matter of public law and the Act ‘was a scheme of social welfare,
intended on grounds of public policy and public interest to confer benefits at
the public expense not only for the private benefit of people who found
themselves homeless but also for the benefit of society in general’. The
provision of accommodation, and the type of accommodation, was ‘largely
dependent on the housing authority’s judgment and discretion’. Accordingly,
it was ‘unlikely’ that parliament had intended section 63 to give rise to a
private action. 
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The issue of the choice between public and private proceedings returned
to the courts in Trustees of the Dennis Rye Pension Fund and Another v Sheffield
City Council (1997). The plaintiffs were required by the local council to carry
out repairs to certain houses to make them fit for human habitation,60 and
applied for improvement grants from the council under the Local
Government and Housing Act 1989. When the work was complete, the
council refused to pay the grant, on the basis that, inter alia, the repairs had not
been carried out to the required standard. The plaintiff then commenced
private law proceedings for recovery of the money due. The council, however,
argued that, if there were any grounds for complaint, the appropriate process
was an application for judicial review. Accordingly, the council sought to
have the plaintiff’s claim struck out, on the grounds that the private law
proceedings were an abuse of process. The issue went to the Court of Appeal.
Lord Woolf MR regretted that the ‘tactical’ issue of the choice of proceedings
had inevitably led to very substantial costs being incurred ‘to little or no
purpose’. He further criticised the narrow approach taken by the House of
Lords in O’Rourke v Camden London Borough Council. 
The Court of Appeal considered the choice between judicial review
proceedings and other legal action against a public authority. In determining
that question, the court should not be overly concerned with the distinction
between public and private rights, but look to the practical consequences of
pursuing the alternative actions. The court accepted that when a council was
performing its role in relation to the making of grants, it was performing a
public function which did not give rise to private rights. If the choice made
had ‘no significant disadvantages’ for the parties, the public or the courts, it
should not normally be regarded as an abuse of process. The court applied
O’Reilly v Mackman (1982) and Roy v Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster
Family Practitioner Committee (1992). Lord Woolf MR, after a consideration of
these, and other cases, ruled that as a general rule it is contrary to public
policy, and as a result an abuse of the process of the court:
... to permit a person seeking to establish that a decision of a public authority
infringed rights to which he was entitled to protection under public law to
proceed by way of an ordinary action and by this means to evade the
provisions of Order 53 for the protection of such authorities.
However, Lord Woolf made three ‘pragmatic suggestions’ and stated that it is
to be remembered that:
If it is not clear whether judicial review or an ordinary action is the correct
procedure it will be safer to make an application for judicial review than
commence an ordinary action since there then should be no question of being
treated as abusing the process of the court by avoiding the protection provided
by judicial review ...
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If a case is brought by an ordinary action and there is an application to strike
out the case, the court should, at least if it is unclear whether the case should
have been brought by judicial review, ask itself whether, if the case had been
brought by judicial review when the action was commenced, it is clear leave
would have been granted. If it would, then that is at least an indication that
there has been no harm to the interests judicial review is designed to protect ...
Finally, in cases where it is unclear whether proceedings have been correctly
brought by an ordinary action, it should be remembered that, after consulting
the Crown Office, a case can always be transferred to the Crown Office List as
an alternative to being struck out.61
The more liberal approach to procedure was evident in Clark v University of
Lincolnshire and Humberside (2000) in which a student sued her University for
breach of contract after having been failed in her examination following
unproven allegations of plagiarism. She was outside the three month time
limit for judicial review and the University argued that this would have been
the appropriate form of proceeding. The Court of Appeal disagreed, stating
that the distinction between judicial review and private actions was now
limited and that a claim would not be struck out on the basis that the
applicant had proceeded under contract rather than judicial review.
REMEDIES62
Introduction
The granting of a remedy in judicial review proceedings is at the discretion of
the court. Even where the applicant establishes his or her case, the court may
refuse a remedy if there has been a delay in commencing proceedings, or if the
applicant has acted unreasonably, or where the public interest in efficient
administration could be damaged by the granting of a remedy. The available
remedies under public law are the ‘prerogative remedies’ of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, now renamed quashing orders, prohibiting
orders and mandatory orders. In addition, under private law there are the
remedies of declaration and injunction, which may also be granted under
judicial review proceedings.
Certiorari: ‘quashing order’
This remedy overlaps with that of prohibition (below). An order of certiorari –
or quashing order – is one which ‘quashes’ the original decision: accordingly it
is both negative and retrospective in nature: R v Criminal Injuries Compensation
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Board ex parte Lain (1967); O’Reilly v Mackman (1983). The classic dictum is that
of Lord Atkin:63
... whenever any body of persons having legal authority to determine
questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially,
act in excess of their legal authority, they are subject to the controlling
jurisdiction of the King’s Bench Division exercised in these writs. 
Prohibition: ‘prohibiting order’
Prohibition is an order which prevents a body from making a decision which
would be capable of being quashed by certiorari. It is thus protective in
nature. Neither certiorari nor prohibition lie against decisions of the higher
courts. 
Mandamus: ‘mandatory order’
This order is one which compels an authority to act. A mandatory order does
not lie against an authority which has complete discretion to act. A failure to
comply with the order amounts to a contempt of court. Mandatory orders do
lie against the Crown, and may be used to enforce action by a minister or
official.
Declarations
A declaration is a statement of the legal position of the parties, and is not
accordingly a remedy per se. Although lacking coercive force, public bodies
will respond to a declaration and comply with its terms by rectifying its
actions. Declarations are available against the Crown.
Injunctions
Injunctions may be interim or permanent, and positive or negative.
Injunctions may be used to prevent a minister or administrative body from
acting unlawfully. In M v Home Office (1993), the House of Lords held that
injunctions could lie against ministers of the Crown, and that breach of an
injunction could lead to a minister, in his official capacity as representative of
the Crown, being held in contempt of court. See, further, Chapters 6 and 11.
Damages
An applicant for judicial review may be awarded damages in conjunction
with one of the other remedies. Damages will only be awarded if they would
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have been recoverable had the applicant begun an action by writ (that is, a
private law action). 
DEFAULT POWERS
Statute may provide that a minister has powers to act in order to oblige a
decision making body to comply with their statutory duty. For example,
section 9 of the Caravan Sites Act 1968 provided that the Secretary of State had
the power to give directions to local authorities to comply with their statutory
duty to provide adequate sites for Gypsies residing in, or resorting to their
area.64 Other examples of similar powers are found in the Public Health Act
1936, the Education Act 1944, the National Health Service Act 1977, the
Housing Act 1985, the Local Government Act 1985 and the Town and Country
Planning Act 1990. In respect of the Housing Act provisions, in R v Secretary of
State for the Environment ex parte Norwich City Council (1982), the Secretary of
State had the power to act as he ‘thinks necessary’ to ensure that tenants are
able to exercise their ‘right to buy’ from local authorities. His failure to enforce
the local authorities’ duty was itself subject to the control of the courts
through judicial review. Default powers are a backstop, but an important
weapon in ensuring that local authorities and other bodies comply with the
requirements of statute.
Remedies and the Human Rights Act 1998
Section 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 authorises a court to ‘grant such relief
or remedy, or make such order, within its powers as it considers just and
appropriate’. Accordingly, any remedies which a particular court may award
are available for breaches of Convention rights. Declarations, damages,
injunctions or the prerogative orders are available. When awarding damages,
the courts must take into account the principles applied by the European
Court of Human Rights in relation to awards of compensation. Claims for
damages do not lie against the decision of a court which has breached the
Convention, even though courts are defined as public bodies under the Act.
Section 9 of the 1998 Act requires that proceedings against a first instance
court be brought by way of appeal or by judicial review. An exception to this
is provided in section 9(3) and (4), which provide for awards of damages
against the Crown where any judicial body has been guilty of a breach of
Article 5 (the right to liberty). Where there has been a breach of a Convention
right caused by an Act of Parliament, damages cannot be awarded. In this
situation, the consequence will be the making of a declaration of
incompatibility. Only the High Court and courts above have the power to
issue declarations of incompatibility. 
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Judicial review as an adequate remedy has been criticised by the Court of
Human Rights in Z v United Kingdom (2001) and Kingsley v United Kingdom
(2002), discussed at p 920 and Chapter 19.
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With the procedural aspects of judicial review proceedings in mind, attention
can now be turned to the grounds on which judicial review may be sought.
Two principal classes of action may be pursued: those which allege that there
has been a breach of statutory requirements, and those alleging that a decision
has been reached in an unreasonable manner or in disregard of the rules of
natural justice. These broad headings have traditionally been divided into a
number of subheadings. In Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister of State for
Civil Service (1985) (the GCHQ case), the House of Lords took the opportunity
to offer a rationalisation of the grounds for judicial review and ruled that the
bases for judicial review could be subsumed under three principal heads,
namely, illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. It was accepted
that further grounds for review, such as ‘proportionality’ might emerge. Lord
Diplock elucidated the concepts: 
By ‘illegality’ as a ground for judicial review, I mean that the decision maker
must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision making power
and give effect to it. Whether he had or not is par excellence a justiciable
question to be decided, in the event of dispute, by those persons, the judges, by
whom the judicial power of the State is exercisable.
By ‘irrationality’, I mean what can now be succinctly referred to as Wednesbury
unreasonableness.1 It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its
defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who
had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.
Whether a decision falls within this category is a question that judges by their
training and experience should be well equipped to answer ...
I have described the third head as ‘procedural impropriety’ rather than failure
to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural
fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision. This is
because susceptibility to judicial review under this head covers also failure by
an administrative tribunal to observe the procedural rules that are expressly
laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred,
even though such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice.
That is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in
course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible
adoption in the future of the principle of ‘proportionality’ which is recognised
in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European
[Economic] Community ... [pp 410–11]
The court’s attitude to proportionality is discussed later in this chapter, when
consideration is given to the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporates
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1 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation (1948). See, further,
below, p 870 ff.
European Convention rights into domestic law. It is important, however, to
acknowledge at this stage that the traditional approach to judicial review –
outlined below – is changing markedly, led by the influence of European law
under the law of the European Community and by the Convention on Human
Rights. Depending particularly on how the law develops under the Human
Rights Act 1998, it may well prove that judicial review, as hitherto
understood, is undergoing fundamental change.
THE TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES
Ultra vires refers to action which is outside – or in excess of – powers of
decision making bodies. While judges continue to use the term ultra vires, it is
nowadays too limited a term to encompass the whole ambit of judicial review.
It may be preferable, therefore, to regard judicial review as the control of
discretion and the regulation of the decision making process by the courts. By
way of example, in R v Hull University Visitor ex parte Page (1993), Lord
Browne-Wilkinson adopted the traditional language of ultra vires:
If the decision maker exercises his powers outside the jurisdiction conferred, in
a manner which is procedurally irregular or is Wednesbury unreasonable, he is
acting ultra vires his powers and therefore unlawfully. 
Two cases illustrate this rule. In R v Richmond upon Thames Council ex parte
McCarthy and Stone Ltd (1992), the local planning authority implemented a
scheme of charging £25.00 for informal consultation between corporation
officers and property developers. The House of Lords held that the imposition
of the charge was unlawful. Such a charge was neither incidental to the
planning function of the local authority, nor could a charge be levied on the
public without statutory authority. The council had misconstrued its powers
and, accordingly, acted ultra vires. Further, in Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham
Council (1992), the council attempted to increase its revenue through financial
investments which, for success, were dependent upon the fluctuation in
interest rates. The House of Lords ruled that the council had no power to enter
into ‘interest rate swaps’ which were purely speculative in nature. Such
speculation was inconsistent with the statutory borrowing powers conferred
on local authorities and neither conducive to nor incidental to the exercise of
those powers. 
Difficulties with the traditional ultra vires doctrine2
The ultra vires principle is consistent with the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty and, to some extent, with the concept of the rule of law. However,
there are objections to the courts holding so tenaciously to a concept which, in
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some respects, is inappropriate to describe what the courts actually do in the
control of administrative powers.3 The judges cling to the ultra vires doctrine
as a means of protecting their constitutional position. As has been seen in
Chapters 5 and 7, the judges are not entrusted with constitutional powers to
invalidate Acts of Parliament, and judicial decisions are susceptible to being
overruled by Acts of Parliament.4 With the supremacy of parliament in mind,
the judges exercise care to maintain a sufficient separation of powers. It is for
this reason that judges are cautious about reviewing the exercise of
prerogative powers and limit their role in relation to parliamentary privileges
to ruling on the existence and scope of privilege. Keen awareness of this
constitutional position explains the hold which the traditional doctrine of ultra
vires has for judges. Ultra vires is entirely consistent with the supremacy of
parliament and the rule of law. However, the doctrine of ultra vires cannot
explain adequately the judges’ power to rule, as they do, on certain aspects of
decision making. While the judges declare that matters of ‘high policy’ are not
for them to decide, when judges rule on ‘unreasonableness’ or, as Lord
Diplock classifies the concept, ‘irrationality’, the judges come close to ruling
on the merits of a particular decision. Furthermore, as shall be seen below, the
concept of ‘error of law’ fits uneasily with the concept of ultra vires. 
For reasons such as these, the concept of ultra vires is nowadays regarded
by many as an inadequate rationale for judicial review. The preferred view is
that the courts need not resort to fictions such as the ‘intention of parliament’
or the technicalities of ‘jurisdictional facts’ and ‘errors of law’ (on which, see
below), but that rather the courts will intervene wherever there has been an
unlawful exercise of power. As Dawn Oliver expresses the matter, ‘judicial
review has moved on from the ultra vires rule to a concern for the protection of
individuals, and for the control of power’.5
Traditional terminological and classificatory difficulties in
judicial review
While Lord Diplock, in the GCHQ case, offered a rationalisation of the
headings of review, the question of terminology and classification remains
difficult and sometimes obscure. This problem should be recognised at the
outset. It should also be borne in mind that the categories are by no means
watertight and discrete: in many instances, there will appear overlaps
between the headings. By way of illustration, a decision maker may act ultra
vires by taking into account irrelevant considerations. Depending upon the
magnitude of the irrelevant consideration, he or she may also be acting
irrationally. 
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Irrationality: Wednesbury unreasonableness
Acting for improper motives, failing to take account of relevant
considerations, failing to respect the requirements of natural justice and
fettering a discretion by adopting a rigid policy will all amount to
unreasonableness as understood by the courts. The term ‘unreasonableness’
may thus be seen as an ‘umbrella concept’ which subsumes all the major
headings of review. 
‘Irrationality’ is a concept which takes the courts further from reviewing
the procedures by which a decision has been made and testing its legality, and
closer to substituting the court’s own view of the merits of the decision. The
terms ‘irrationality’ and ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ appear to be used at
the judge’s own preference.6 Alternative expressions such as ‘arbitrary and
capricious’, ‘frivolous or vexatious’ and ‘capricious and vexatious’ are also
used on occasion to express the same concept.7 ‘Acting perversely’ has also
been used to judicially express the idea of unreasonableness.8
Early expression was given to the concept in two cases, Rooke’s Case (1598)
and Keighley’s Case (1609). In Rooke’s Case, Coke LJ proclaimed:
... and notwithstanding the words of the commission give authority to the
commissioners to do according to their discretions, yet their proceedings ought
to be limited and bound with the rule of reason and law. For discretion is a
science or understanding to discern between falsity and truth, between wrong
and right, between shadows and substances, between equity and colourable
glosses and pretences, and not to do according to their wills and private
affections ...
The classic case of more recent times is that of Associated Provincial Picture
Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation (1948). The local authority had the power
to grant licences for the opening of cinemas subject to such conditions as the
authority ‘thought fit’ to impose. The authority, when granting a Sunday
licence, imposed a condition that no children under the age of 15 years should
be admitted. The applicants argued that the imposition of the condition was
unreasonable and ultra vires the corporation’s powers. The authority argued
that there were no limits on the conditions which could be imposed in the
statute. Lord Greene MR alluded to the many grounds of attack which could
be made against a decision, citing unreasonableness, bad faith, dishonesty,
paying attention to irrelevant circumstances, disregard of the proper decision
making procedure and held that each of these could be encompassed within
the umbrella term ‘unreasonableness’. The test propounded in that case was
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whether an authority had acted, or reached a decision, in a manner ‘so
unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it’:
Lawyers familiar with the phraseology commonly used in relation to exercise
of statutory discretion often use the word ‘unreasonable’ in a rather
comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a
general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person
entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law.
He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider.
He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what
he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and
often is said, to be acting ‘unreasonably’. Similarly, there may be something so
absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers
of the authority ... 
The court is entitled to investigate the action of the local authority with a view
to seeing whether they have taken into account matters which they ought not
to take into account, or, conversely, have refused to take into account and once
that question is answered in favour of the local authority, it may still be
possible to say that, although the local authority have kept within the four
corners of the matters which they ought to consider, they have nevertheless
come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever
have come to it. In such a case, again, I think the court can interfere. [p 229]
‘Unreasonableness’ was employed to challenge a bylaw which prohibited
singing ‘in any public place or highway within fifty yards of any dwelling
house’ although, on the merits of the case, the challenge failed.9 In Roberts v
Hopwood (1925), the council, in adopting a policy of paying higher wages than
the national average for its workers, was unreasonable, for the discretion of
the council was limited by law – it was not free to pursue a socialist policy at
the expense of its rate payers. The House of Lords ruled that, irrespective of
the wording of the statute, the council had a duty to act ‘reasonably’; its
discretion was limited by law.10
The standard of reasonableness imposed by the courts is high: to impose
too low a standard would in effect mean the substitution of judicial discretion
for administrative discretion. It is for this reason that Lord Greene, cited
above, states that a decision is unreasonable if it is ‘so absurd that no sensible
person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority’, and
Lord Diplock, in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service
(1985), regarded unreasonableness as entailing a decision ‘... so outrageous in
its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person
who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at
it’. 
In Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough
Council (1977), the Secretary of State for Education directed a newly elected
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local authority to implement plans, devised by the predecessor council, to
introduce comprehensive schooling and abolish grammar schools.11 At the
election, there had been a change in the political composition of the council,
which resulted in the change of policy. The Secretary of State’s power was to
direct an authority as to the exercise of its powers if he was satisfied that the
authority was acting unreasonably. The Secretary of State argued that the new
council would not be able to organise the necessary system of selective entry
required for grammar schools in time for the new academic year, and that the
authority was therefore unreasonable. 
The matter went to the House of Lords. The court had to determine the
extent of the Secretary of State’s discretion under section 68 of the Education
Act. The wording of the section was subjective: ‘... if the Secretary of State is
satisfied.’ It fell to the court to determine whether, in the circumstances of the
case, the Secretary of State had acted lawfully according to the court’s
interpretation of whether the Secretary of State did in fact have reasonable
grounds for believing that the authority had acted unreasonably. Applying
the Wednesbury reasonableness test to the decision of the local authority to
retain grammar schools, the House of Lords ruled that the authority had not
been unreasonable and, as a result, the Secretary of State’s directions were
unlawful. 
In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Brind (1991), the
House of Lords re-examined the reasonableness of the exercise of the Home
Secretary’s discretion to issue a notice banning the transmission of speech by
representatives of the Irish Republican Army and its political party, Sinn Fein.
Despite the issue involving a denial of freedom of expression, the court ruled
that the exercise of the Home Secretary’s power12 did not amount to an
unreasonable exercise of discretion. 
In R v Radio Authority ex parte Bull (1995), Amnesty International (British
section) sought judicial review of the Radio Authority’s decision to refuse to
accept advertisements ‘inserted by or on behalf of any body whose objects are
wholly or mainly of a political nature’ or an advertisement which ‘is directed
towards any political end’ under section 92(2)(a) of the Broadcasting Act 1990.
The Divisional Court ruled that the authority had a wide measure of
discretion and that the court would not interfere with its decision so long as it
was not unreasonable. The Court ruled, further, that Article 10 of the
European Convention did not significantly affect the construction of section
92; that the authority had to strike a balance between competing interests
including freedom of speech; that the authority’s interpretation had been in
accordance with the purposes of the Act.
In R v Broadmoor Special Hospital Authority ex parte S (1999), the Court of
Appeal, dismissing an appeal from an application for judicial review, ruled
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that the hospital’s policy of conducting routine and random searches of
patients without their consent was lawful. The applicants had claimed that the
power to search could not be implied into the Mental Health Act 1983, and
that, if such power existed, it was irrational and its exercise unlawfully
fettered the hospital’s discretion because it was not subject to any exception on
medical grounds. The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of an implied
power of search, ruling that it was consistent with a ‘self-evident and pressing
need’13 to enable the hospital to fulfil its primary function of treating patients
and ensuring a safe and therapeutic environment for both patients and staff.
Since the hospital’s policy was in the interests of all, it had to be permitted to
override medical objections raised in individual cases.14
In R v National Lottery Commission ex parte Camelot Group plc (2000),
following Lloyd v McMahon (1987) and Doody (1994), the High Court ruled on
procedural fairness, holding that a decision to carry on exclusive negotiations
with only one of the two rival bidders for a licence to run the National Lottery
was unlawful. While there was a wide discretion under National Lottery Act
1998, the decision was conspicuously unfair to Camelot.
Onerous conditions attached to decision
A decision by an authority may also be unreasonable if conditions are
attached to the decision which are difficult or impossible to perform. For
example, in Pyx Granite Co Ltd v Ministry of Housing and Local Government
(1958), Lord Denning MR in the Court of Appeal held that planning
conditions ‘... must fairly and reasonably relate to the permitted development’
and must not be so unreasonable that it can be said that parliament clearly
cannot have intended that they should be imposed.
Accordingly, in the Pyx Granite case, the condition that permission be
conditional upon the company constructing a road ancillary to the
development at its own expense when so required by the authority and to
grant a public right of passage over it was ultra vires. Pyx Granite was followed
in Hall and Co Ltd v Shoreham-by-Sea Urban District Council and Another (1964).
The defendant council granted planning permission for a development,
subject to conditions, which included the requirement to construct an ancillary
road over the entire frontage of the site and subject to the right of public
passage. While the objective of the council was viewed as ‘reasonable’, the
terms of the conditions requiring the plaintiffs to construct a road at their own
expense, for public use and without compensation, were not reasonable. The
ultra vires conditions were fundamental to the whole planning permission
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which was, accordingly, void. Equally, in R v Hillingdon London Borough
Council ex parte Royco Homes Ltd (1974), planning permission was also tied to
conditions. The conditions were that Royco Homes make properties
constructed available for occupation by those on the council’s housing waiting
list and, further, that for ten years the houses be occupied by persons subject
to security of tenure under the Rent Acts. The conditions were unreasonable
and ultra vires.
According to Lord Widgery CJ, the conditions represented:
... the equivalent of requiring the applicants to take on at their own expense a
significant part of the duty of the council as housing authority. However well
intentioned and however sensible such a desire on the part of the council may
have been, it seems to me that it is unreasonable ... [p 732]
Where an authority makes a decision which is in part good, but in part bad –
perhaps because of attaching onerous conditions to planning permission – the
court may either invalidate the entire decision or sever the bad part of the
decision from the good. The decision in Agricultural Horticultural and Forestry
Industry Training Board v Aylesbury Mushrooms Ltd (1972) illustrates the
principle. There, the Training Board was under a mandatory statutory duty to
consult certain organisations and trades unions before reaching a decision.
The Board failed to consult the Mushroom Growers Association. The court
held that the decision was good, and could remain, in relation to those
associations which had been consulted, but bad in relation to the Mushroom
Growers Association, and that the Board had a duty to reconsider their
decision after consultations with the Association. 
In some cases, it will not be possible to sever a part of a decision from the
whole decision, in which case, the entire decision may be invalidated.15 For
example, in Director of Public Prosecutions v Hutchinson (1990), the local
authority passed a bylaw which prohibited unauthorised access to Greenham
Common air force base. The Act of Parliament, under which the authority
purported to exercise its powers, provided that no bylaw should be passed
which affected the rights of registered commoners in the area. In an action for
trespass against anti-nuclear protesters, the defendants pleaded the invalidity
of the bylaw. The House of Lords ruled that the bylaw was invalid and, as a
result, the protesters escaped conviction for trespass. 
Errors of law and errors of fact16
The problem concerning the role of the courts and the extent to which it is
appropriate for there to be judicial intervention in administration, discussed in
Chapter 24, is clearly illustrated in relation to errors of law and errors of fact.
The question for determination is whether, and to what extent, administrators
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enjoy a measure of discretion in decision making, which empowers them to
make determinations of fact which are immune from judicial review. Before
considering the courts approach, it is necessary to define the terms error of
law and error of fact. 
An error of law may take several forms. An authority may wrongly
interpret a word to which a legal meaning is attributed. For example, where
an authority is under a duty to provide ‘accommodation’, the question arises
as to whether the quality of what they have, in fact, provided amounts, in law,
to accommodation. Does the accommodation have to be of a particular
quality, or be particularly suited to what the applicant needs?17 Questions
may also arise as to whether there has been a legal exercise of power in
relation to the objectives of relevant legislation, or whether a discretion has
been properly exercised, or whether relevant considerations have been taken
into account, or irrelevant considerations excluded from the decision making
process. An error of law will be reviewed by the courts. An error of fact is an
error which the courts will be more reluctant to review. Administrators are
given powers to exercise in relation to their specialised area, and it is the
decision maker who has all the factual information to hand on which to base a
decision. For the courts to intervene in this matter, would – unless some
caution is exercised – amount to the courts taking over the very role of the
administrators. Nevertheless, there may be some errors of fact which are of
such a fundamental nature that they cause a decision to be unlawful. Ian Yeats
offers the following illustrative example of the role of fact in administrative
decision making. He writes:
In the simplest situations, the facts which have to be found and the law which
has to be determined can be presented as a series of preconditions which have
to exist before the duty can be performed or the power exercised. A board is
empowered (or obliged) to take some action in respect of ‘dilapidated dwelling
houses in Greater London’. The ability (or duty) to act in respect of a particular
building depends on establishing that it is (1) in Greater London, (2) a dwelling
house and (3) dilapidated. If the board finds that the three conditions are
satisfied, it may (or must) proceed. If it finds that any one of them is not
satisfied, then it cannot.
A disgruntled property owner invites a court to review the board’s findings:
the court has to decide whether, and how far, it should defer to the board’s
views. If the complaint is that the premises are not in Greater London, the
court is likely to intervene. The question defines in the most literal way the
area in which the board has competence, can easily be resolved by a court, and
is unlikely to occur frequently. The question is not about the correctness of the
decision on the building’s fate, but about whether the board whose decision is
under review had the function of determining it. If the complaint is that the
house is not dilapidated, the court will be reluctant to intervene. That is a
question involving elements of judgment which naturally appear to have been
remitted to the board and which it, rather than the court, has the facilities and
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probably the specialised expertise to answer; if the court were to agree to
answer it, every decision of the board would be potentially reviewable. If the
complaint is that the premises do not constitute a dwelling house, the issue is
less clear-cut. The court might think it proper to impose its view, partly
because the problem might be posed in a narrowly legal form, that of
identifying the correct sense in which the expression ‘dwelling house’ was
used in the legislation. [pp 131–32]
When the court considers whether there has been an error of law, it is seeking
to discover the correct definition of the legal words in the relevant statute.
When the court is considering whether there has been an error of fact, the
court is trying to determine whether the facts of the case ‘fit’ with the
interpretation of the statute. 
Historically, the judges have assumed the power to adjudicate on matters
which are termed ‘errors on the face of the record’. Errors on the face of the
record – that is to say, evidence from the documentation that the decision
maker has made a wrong decision in law – will cause the judges to rule that
the decision was defective, even if the decision maker was acting inside
jurisdiction (intra vires). Such a power does not sit easily alongside the concept
of ultra vires, the very basis of which is to strike down decisions which have
been taken ultra vires (outside jurisdiction). 
As has been seen, if an authority is to act intra vires, it must conduct itself
according to a correct interpretation of the law. However, what is of the
essence in relation to error of law is that the authority misinterprets or
misunderstands the powers which it has been granted and, accordingly, acts
ultra vires whereas, when an authority uses powers for the wrong purpose, the
authority has correctly interpreted its powers but used them towards the
wrong objective. As has been said, an error of law may manifest itself in
several ways. It may be that an authority misinterprets its legal powers, as in
Perilly v Tower Hamlets Borough Council (1973), where the local authority
believed – erroneously – that it was obliged to consider applications for stall
licences in a street market in the order in which they were received. The effect
of this was to deny a licence to Perilly even though his mother, by then
deceased, had held a licence for some 30 years. The licence granted to an
incoming applicant in preference to Perilly was set aside by the court. 
The seminal case is that of Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission
(1969), discussed in Chapter 24. It will be recalled that the House of Lords
held the decision of the Commission to be ultra vires. The decision made by
the Commission was so wrong that, in law, it did not amount to a decision at
all. As a result, the section preventing the questioning of the Commission’s
decision in a court of law was not relevant or binding on the court, for the
ruling of the Commission – being so wrong in law – resulted in the
Commission acting outside its jurisdiction, and nothing in the Act prohibited
a court of law from reviewing what was, in law and in effect, a nullity. The
House of Lords ruled that:
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If the inferior tribunal, as a result of its misconstruing the statutory description
of the kind of case in which it has jurisdiction to inquire, makes a purported
determination in a case of a kind into which it has no jurisdiction to inquire, its
purported determination is a nullity.
Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission destroyed the distinction
between errors of law which ‘went to jurisdiction’ (that is, deprived the
decision making body of power to determine the question) and errors of law
within jurisdiction. In Anisminic, the House of Lords ruled that, in effect, the
old distinctions were obsolete in relation to the decisions of administrative
and other bodies (but not necessarily inferior courts of law).18 Lord Diplock
has reasserted his support for this view in Re Racal Communications Ltd (1981)
and O’Reilly v Mackmann (1983). In the former case, Lord Diplock confirmed
the ‘breakthrough’ achieved in Anisminic. In O’Reilly, Lord Diplock went
further and asserted that the distinction had been rendered obsolete in
relation both to tribunals and inferior courts. This approach was confirmed by
the House of Lords in R v Hull University Visitor ex parte Page (1993). Professor
HWR Wade’s evaluation of these cases is that ‘it is clear now that they made
an important extension of judicial review in English law ...’.19
The House of Lords returned to the questions of jurisdictional errors in R v
Monopolies and Mergers Commission ex parte South Yorkshire Transport Ltd (1993).
Under section 64(1)(a) of the Fair Trading Act 1973, the Secretary of State has
power to refer a merger of companies to the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission (MMC). The jurisdiction of the MMC was to consider mergers
which result in more than 25 per cent of services being supplied by one
company ‘in a substantial part of the United Kingdom’. The merger between
two bus companies resulted in services being provided in an area which
comprised 1.65 per cent of the United Kingdom, with a population of 3.2 per
cent of the total United Kingdom population. The companies sought judicial
review of the MMC’s investigation, on the basis that the facts relating to the
land area did not amount to a ‘substantial part of the United Kingdom’. The
House of Lords found in favour of the MMC. The court ruled that the MMC
had directed itself properly as to the meaning of ‘substantial’. However, it was
also recognised that what amounted to ‘substantial’ could be interpreted in
different ways, and that persons might reasonably disagree about that
interpretation. Lord Mustill ruled that, in such a situation, a decision would
only be ruled unlawful if the decision ‘is so aberrant that it cannot be classed
as rational’. Thus, where the statute provides broad criteria, over the meaning
of which reasonable persons might reasonably disagree, the court will be slow
to step in and substitute its judgment, unless the decision maker’s decision
falls outside what the court regards as a reasonable interpretation of a word
which is essentially imprecise. 
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Applying the South Yorkshire case, the Court of Appeal in R v Ministry of
Defence ex parte Walker (1999) ruled that the court should respect a Ministry’s
interpretation of what constituted military activity for the purpose of
excluding soldiers from criminal injuries compensation for injuries while in
service. Only if the interpretation was irrational would the court intervene,
and there was no irrationality in choosing to exclude from the scheme a
feature peculiar to army life abroad. There was also no unfairness in not
having informed soldiers going into active service of the exclusionary rule.
Errors of fact raise difficult questions. As has been seen, an error of law
will be made when the decision maker acts contrary to the requirements of
legality – or, in other words, he has broken one of the rules for lawful decision
making. Errors of fact are more complex. If a decision maker bases his
decision on a misunderstanding of the factual situation of the case, he will
reach a decision which is wrong. The question which then arises is whether
the courts will review such an error in judicial review proceedings. In general,
the answer to that question is that the courts will be very cautious. After all,
the courts will often not have the expertise to assess the factual situation, and
may have great difficulty in deciding whether a factual error has resulted in
the wrong decision. The courts have traditionally approached this matter by
dividing errors of fact into two categories. The first relates to reviewable errors
of facts, which are jurisdictional, and the other category is that of non-
reviewable, non-jurisdictional facts. 
Professor Wade illustrates a jurisdictional fact as follows:
A rent tribunal ... may have power to reduce the rent of a dwelling house. If it
mistakenly finds that the property is a dwelling house when in fact it is let for
business purposes, and then purports to reduce the rent, its order will be ultra
vires and void, for its jurisdiction depends upon the facts which must exist
objectively before the tribunal has power to act. [Wade and Forsyth, 1994,
p 286]
On the other hand, other mistakes will not have this effect. Professor Wade
illustrates as follows:
Many facts on the other hand will not be jurisdictional, since they will have no
bearing on the limits of the power. A rent tribunal’s findings as to the state of
repair of the property, the terms of the tenancy, and the defaults of landlord or
tenant will probably not affect its jurisdiction in any way and will therefore be
immune from jurisdictional challenge. [p 287]
The question to be asked, therefore, is whether the mistake of fact is one which
is central to the decision maker’s power of decision. Only such crucial errors
of fact will be reviewed by the court. In addition, if a decision is reached on
the basis of facts for which there is no evidence, or based on essential facts
which have been proven wrong, or been misunderstood or ignored, the court
will quash the decision (p 320).
Two cases further illustrate the courts’ approach to law and fact, and
demonstrate that the judges will – depending upon the circumstances of the
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case – adopt either a strict approach or a more lenient approach to the matter.
In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Khawaja (1984), the
House of Lords was required to rule on two questions. The first question was
whether the phrase ‘illegal immigrant’ in the Immigration Act 1971, covered a
person who had been granted permission to enter the country through fraud
or deception as well as a person who secretly entered the country without any
leave. On this point, the House of Lords held that it could. The second
question concerned the standard of proof which the immigration officer had
to apply. It was argued that the correct standard to be applied was whether
the immigration officer had reasonable grounds for his decision. The House of
Lords rejected that view, holding that, because the liberty of the person was
involved, the standard of proof that deception had taken place was one of a
high degree of probability. 
In R v Hillingdon London Borough Council ex parte Pulhofer (1986), the House
of Lords approached the matter rather differently. Under the Housing Act
1985,20 local authorities are under a duty to provide accommodation for
homeless persons as defined by the Act. For the purposes of their decision, the
House of Lords had to interpret the meaning of ‘accommodation’. The House
of Lords adopted a very broad interpretation of the word, refusing to import a
standard of reasonableness of accommodation which would protect the
individual from being placed in unsuitable housing. Unlike the decision in
Khawaja, where the House of Lords introduced a standard of proof which was
protective of the individual against the administration, in Pulhofer, the court’s
ruling protected the administration – the housing authority – and not the
individual. The Housing and Planning Act 1986 reverses the House of Lords’
decision in Pulhofer, and requires that ‘accommodation’ be accommodation
which it is reasonable for a person to continue to occupy. It can be seen from
these two cases, that the interpretation of the question of law can dictate a
very different outcome, depending upon the judicial approach taken. 
When the issue concerns individual rights, for example, the courts will be
slow to adopt an approach which has the effect of delimiting those rights. Tan
Te Lam and Others v Superintendent of Tai A Chau Detention Centre and Another
(1996), decided by the Privy Council, illustrates the point well.21 The
applicants were detainees in Hong Kong, having arrived there by boat from
Vietnam. They were detained in detention centres, pending decisions as to
whether to grant or refuse permission to remain in Hong Kong, or, if a
decision to refuse permission were made, pending their removal from Hong
Kong and repatriation to Vietnam. The applied for writs of habeas corpus to
test the legality of their detention. By the time the appeal reached the Privy
Council, the applicants had been detained for long periods of time, the longest
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being 24 months, pending determination of refugee status, followed by a
further 44 months. Citing Woolf J, as he then was, in R v Governor of Durham
Prison ex parte Singh (1984), the Privy Council endorsed the view, first, that the
power to detain could only be exercised during the period necessary, in all the
circumstances, to effect removal; secondly, that, if it becomes clear that
removal is not going to be possible within a reasonable time, further detention
is not authorised; thirdly, that the person seeking to exercise the power of
detention must take all reasonable steps to ensure removal within a
reasonable time. 
In Khawaja v Secretary of State for the Home Department (1984), discussed
above, the House of Lords had earlier considered the legality of a detention
order pending removal, as an illegal immigrant, from the United Kingdom.22
There was a dispute of fact as to whether the applicant had obtained leave to
enter as a result of fraud. The House of Lords ruled that the issue of whether
the applicant was an illegal immigrant was a matter which had to be
established before it could be determined whether there was any power to
detain with a view to deportation. That question ‘was a precedent or
jurisdictional fact which, in the case of deprivation of liberty, had to be proved
to exist before any power to detain was exercisable at all’.
In relation to Tan Te Lam and Others (1996), the question was analogous to
that in Khawaja. As Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated:
The issue therefore in the present case is whether the determination of the facts
relevant to the question whether the applicants were being detained ‘pending
removal’ goes to the jurisdiction of the director to detain or to the exercise of
the discretion to detain. In their Lordships’ view the facts are prima facie
jurisdictional. If removal is not pending, within the meaning of section 13D,
the director has no power at all [to detain].
Further, as Lord Browne-Wilkinson said:
The case is analogous to one where a continuing discretion to detain is
conferred on A if a notice has been served on B and no counternotice has been
served by B. If there was a dispute as to whether a notice or counternotice had
been served, it must prima facie be for the court to determine the question: if no
notice has been served, A’s power has never arisen; if a counternotice has been
served, A’s power has come to an end.
The detainees were ordered to be released.
Using powers for the wrong purpose
Powers conferred must be used for the purpose for which they were granted.
In Attorney General v Fulham Corporation (1921), the authority was empowered
under statute to establish washhouses for the non-commercial use of local
residents. The Corporation decided to open a laundry on a commercial basis.
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The Corporation was held to have acted ultra vires the statute. Westminster
Corporation v London and Northern Western Railway Company (1905), however,
represents a case where a charge of wrong purpose failed. The Corporation
had power, under section 44 of the Public Health Act 1891, to provide public
conveniences and had constructed them midway under the street with access
gained by means of a subway. The Railway Company which owned stock in
adjacent buildings claimed that the power had been used improperly. The
House of Lords disagreed, stating that ‘the primary object of the council was
the construction of the conveniences with the requisite and proper means of
approach thereto and exit therefrom’.
Thus, where a public authority uses a power for the purpose intended by
parliament and reasonably provides a facility incidental to – or
complementary to – the power conferred, the authority is acting within its
powers. It can of course be argued that the Corporation’s prime objective was,
in fact, the provision of a subway; nevertheless, that objective – if it was the
primary objective – did not invalidate the action. 
The Westminster Corporation case was further considered in R v Inner
London Education Authority ex parte Westminster City Council (1986), which
provided an opportunity for the Divisional Court to consider the issue of two
purposes being pursued under one power. On the facts of the case, it was held
that, in pursuing two purposes in relation to education funding, the Council
had allowed an ‘irrelevant consideration’ to dominate its decision making and
that, accordingly, it had acted ultra vires. On the question of ‘two purposes’,
Lord Justice Glidewell cited both Professor Wade and Professor Evans.
Professor Wade writes:
Sometimes, an act may serve two or more purposes, some authorised and
some not, and it may be a question whether the public authority may kill two
birds with one stone. The general rule is that its action will be lawful provided
the permitted purpose is the true and dominant purpose behind the act, even
though some secondary or incidental advantage may be gained for some
purpose which is outside the authority’s powers. There is a clear distinction
between this situation and its opposite, where the permitted purpose is a mere
pretext and a dominant purpose is ultra vires. [Wade and Forsyth, 1994, p 388]
The test which Professor Evans prescribes is:
What is the true purpose for which the power was exercised? If the actor has in
truth used his power for the purposes for which it was conferred, it is
immaterial that he was thus enabled to achieve a subsidiary object ...
Were any of the purposes pursuing an unauthorised purpose? If so, and if the
unauthorised purpose has materially influenced the actor’s conduct, the power
has been invalidly exercised because irrelevant considerations have been taken
into account. [Cited in de Smith, 1980, pp 330–32]
Acting in a manner inconsistent with the purpose of an Act was seen in
Padfield v Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1968). Under the
Agricultural Marketing Act 1958, a Committee of Investigation was
established to make inquiries, if the minister ‘so directed’, into complaints
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made to the minister concerning the operation of, amongst other products,
milk. South Eastern dairy farmers complained that the Milk Marketing Board
had fixed prices in a manner prejudicial to farmers in the South Eastern region
of the country. The minister refused to refer the matter to the Committee of
Investigation. The farmers challenged the minister’s decision. The House of
Lords granted an order of mandamus, requiring the minister to consider
properly whether he should exercise his discretion to refer. The House of
Lords ruled by a majority23 that, while the minister was not obliged to refer
every complaint made, neither did he have an unfettered discretion to refuse
to refer a case. The result was something of a hollow victory for the farmers,
since the incoming minister, having referred the matter to the committee,
which upheld the complaint, rejected the committee’s recommendations.24
In R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ex parte World
Development Movement (1995), the government was held to have acted
unlawfully in relation to aid money paid to Malaysia. In 1988,25 the United
Kingdom government signed an agreement with the Malaysian Prime
Minister, Mahathir Mohamed, for the sale of arms valued at £1.3 billion.26 In
1989, Britain offered £234 million towards the building of the Pergau Dam. In
1991,27 the deal went ahead, despite warnings from officials that the project
was uneconomic and a waste of public funds. The monies were paid out of the
Overseas Development Administration (ODA) budget. Under international
law, any linkage between aid monies and arms sales is prohibited. While the
government denied any such link, a House of Commons Foreign Affairs
Committee inquiry concluded that the government had, in effect, made such a
link. Furthermore, under section 1 of the Overseas Development and Co-
operation Act 1980, the Foreign Secretary is empowered to authorise
payments only ‘for the purpose of promoting the development or maintaining
the economy of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or the
welfare of its people’. The High Court ruled that the Foreign Secretary had
acted unlawfully, in part because the project was ‘economically unsound’, and
also because the aid did not promote the development of a country’s economy
as required by law. As a result, some £55 million already spent on the project
had to be returned to the ODA.28
Relevant and irrelevant considerations in decision making
The following section considers relevant and irrelevant considerations which
are taken into account in decision making. To a large extent, there is at best a
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fine line between using powers for the wrong purpose and the relevancy of
considerations. Categorisation is a limited, although organisationally useful,
device: the essential point to remember is that the heart of the matter lies in
whether or not discretionary powers have been exercised lawfully or not,
irrespective of the headings under which cases may be grouped.29 One case
which straddles the boundaries of using powers for an improper purpose and
taking irrelevant considerations into account is that of R v Somerset County
Council ex parte Fewings (1995). The local authority decided to ban stag hunting
on land owned by the council and designated for recreational purposes.30
Laws J accepted that, in some circumstances, stag hunting could legitimately
be banned – for example, where the hunt would damage rare flora, or if the
animals themselves were rare. Here, however, the motivation behind the ban
was the moral objection of the councillors to hunting. Laws J ruled that:
If the activity in question is permissible under the general law, as is the practice
of deer hunting, it is by no means to be prohibited on grounds only of the
decision maker’s distaste or ethical objection where the reach of his statutory
function on its face requires no more than the making of objective judgments
for the management of a particular regime. [p 530]
On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the decision was upheld, but on narrower
grounds. The Court ruled that the Council’s mind had not been directed to
relevant statutory provisions, and it had not considered, as it was required to
do, whether a ban of hunting would be for the general public benefit.
A case which illustrates the intermingling of grounds for review is that of
Wheeler v Leicester City Council (1985). In Wheeler, the House of Lords
thoroughly examined the concepts of unreasonableness and of fairness, and
here the interaction between bad faith, unreasonableness and procedural
impropriety can be discerned. In 1984, the Rugby Football Union announced a
tour to South Africa, with a team including three members of the Leicester
Football Club. At the time, the government was opposed to any sporting links
with South Africa. Leicester City Council – with a 25 per cent immigrant
population – was virulently opposed to the proposed tour. The Leicester Club
secretary attended a meeting with the leader of Leicester Council, at which he
was asked to support the government’s – and the council’s – policy of
opposition to the South African regime of apartheid. The club’s response was
to assert its opposition to apartheid but to stress that they were not constrained
from playing in South Africa as a result of governmental opposition, which
had neither made such tours illegal nor subject to sanctions on those who
visited South Africa. As a result of the club’s refusal to comply with the City
Council’s request that they withdraw from the tour, Leicester City Council
resolved that the club would be suspended from using a local playing field for
a 12 month period, the ban to be reviewed after a year and a new decision to be
29 See Taylor, 1976.
30 Under the Local Government Act 1972, s 120.
taken based on the club’s attitude to South Africa at that time. The House of
Lords ruled that a political policy – however morally justified – could not
provide the lawful basis on which to deprive the club of engaging in its lawful
activities.
As can be seen, the two purposes tests involves the issue of irrelevant
considerations. That is to say, a subsidiary or secondary purpose being
pursued may – if it dictates the decision making process – invalidate that
process. Here, attention is turned to situations where an authority fails to take
account of relevant considerations, or takes into account irrelevant
considerations which materially affect the decision reached, and may be held
to be acting ultra vires. Many of the cases involve the fiduciary duty which is
owed by local authorities to their rate payers. In Roberts v Hopwood (1925), for
example, the local authority was empowered by statute to pay its workers ‘as
it thought fit’.31 Nevertheless, when the council decided to pay wages which
were higher than the national average and to pay men and women equally, it
was held to have been acting beyond its powers. Its duty to its ratepayers
overrode its desire to better the lot of its workers.32 The court held that the
council was pursuing a policy of ‘philanthropic socialism’ which was
inconsistent with its duties to its ratepayers. Compare Roberts v Hopwood with
Pickwell v Camden London Borough Council (1983), in which the council had paid
additional monies to its manual workers in order to secure settlement of an
industrial dispute. It was held that the payments were reasonable. 
Similar considerations applied in Bromley London Borough Council v Greater
London Council (1983). There, the Greater London Council, wishing to increase
passenger numbers – and thereby reduce the traffic congestion on the roads –
by decreasing fares on public transport, sought to pay for this by seeking a
higher level of subsidy for London Transport by increasing the rates payable
by ratepayers, the burden of which would fall on the residents of London
boroughs. The House of Lords held the Greater London Council to be acting
ultra vires. The House of Lords ruled that, whilst section 3 of the Transport
(London) Act 1969 conferred a wide discretion on the authority, and that
grants could be levied to supplement the income from transport fares, that
discretion was limited by London Transport’s basic obligation to run its
operations on ordinary business principles, which their fare reduction policy
contravened. As in Roberts v Hopwood (1925), the council could not use its
grant making powers to achieve a social policy which was inconsistent with
those obligations: the Greater London Council (GLC) was using its powers for
the wrong purpose. Moreover, the rate reduction was also invalid in so far as
it involved a breach of fiduciary duty owed by the council to its rate payers.
The fact that the policy had been part of an election mandate was not
sufficient justification for the policy. The members of the council were
Chapter 25: Constitutional and Administrative Law
884
31 Under the Metropolis Management Act 1855, s 62.
32 See, also, Prescott v Birmingham Corporation (1955); Taylor v Munrow (1960).
The Grounds for Judicial Review
representatives of the people, not delegates thereof. Accordingly, they were
not irrevocably bound to fulfil election promises but, rather, must act in the
interests of all constituents – not just those constituents who were users of
London Transport.
This view on the doctrine of mandate – or responsibility to electors – may
be contrasted with the decision in Secretary of State for Education v Tameside
Metropolitan Borough Council (1977), discussed above, pp 871–72. It will be
recalled that the Labour controlled Council in March 1975 proposed a scheme
of comprehensive education to come into effect in 1976. In 1976, a
Conservative Council was elected. The Party had conducted its election
campaign in large part on the education platform. On entering office, the
council reversed the education policy of the previous administration. The
Secretary of State issued a direction under section 68 of the Education Act
1944, ordering the council to implement the comprehensive schooling policy
of the previous local council. The House of Lords laid much emphasis on the
wishes of the electorate. Lord Wilberforce declared that:
... if he [the Secretary of State] had exercised his judgment on the basis of the
factual situation in which this newly elected authority were placed – with a
policy approved by the electorate, and massively supported by the parents –
there was no ground, however much he might disagree with the new policy
and regret such administrative dislocation as was brought about by the
change, on which he could find that the authority were acting or proposing to
act unreasonably ...
Where an irrelevant consideration does not affect the outcome of a decision,
the court may hold that the authority is acting intra vires. For example, in R v
Broadcasting Complaints Commission ex parte Owen (1985), the Broadcasting
Authority – with the statutory responsibility of ensuring fairness in the
allocation of broadcasting time for political parties at election time – refused to
consider a complaint that a political party had been given too little
broadcasting time. That decision was challenged in the courts. However,
while the Commission had some good reasons for not considering the
complaint, it had also erred by giving weight to an irrelevant consideration,
namely, that the task would be burdensome. The court nevertheless held that
the Commission was acting within its lawful discretion. 
Whether or not a local authority may not take into account considerations
relating to financial resources when assessing an individual’s needs was
considered by the Court of Appeal and House of Lords in R v Gloucestershire
County Council and Another ex parte Barry; R v Lancashire County Council ex parte
Royal Association for Disability and Rehabilitation and Another (1997).33 Under the
Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970, a local authority is under the
duty to identify the needs of disabled persons, and to meet such needs. The
Court of Appeal held that neither a third party’s resources, nor the needs of
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others could be relevant to making the assessment of needs in relation to a
disabled person. If that were to be the correct interpretation of the statute, a
local authority with no funds to meet needs could avoid its duty to assess the
needs and make the necessary provision. That would fly in the face of the
plain language of the 1970 Act. In the House of Lords, however, that decision
was reversed. By a majority of three to two, the House of Lords ruled that the
resources of the authority were a relevant consideration. Lord Nicholls of
Birkenhead conceded that the argument put forward by Lord Lloyd,
dissenting, that a person’s needs were unaffected by local authority resources
was an ‘alluring argument’, but one which he could not accept. The argument,
he stated, was flawed by a ‘failure to recognise that needs for services cannot
sensibly be assessed without having some regard to the cost of providing
them’.
The reasoning of the majority in the House of Lords in Barry, was followed
in R v Sefton Metropolitan Borough Council ex parte Help the Aged and Others
(1997). In that case, the needs of an elderly woman who was admitted to a
nursing home, and the cost of meeting those needs, were in issue. Having
considered the case of Barry, the Court of Appeal ruled that a local authority
was entitled to have regard to its own limited financial resources. However,
where a need existed, the authority was under a statutory duty to make
arrangements to meet that need and lack of resources was no excuse. The
authority could not, from the time that a person was assessed as being in
need, fail to meet their statutory duty. Financial considerations were
uppermost in the decision in R v Cambridge Health Authority ex parte B (1995),34
in which the Court of Appeal held that the courts could not make judgments
about how health authorities decide to allocate a limited budget. The health
authority had refused to fund further chemotherapy or a second bone marrow
transplant for a ten year old girl with only a few weeks to live.
Notwithstanding that decisions relating to human life had to treated with the
greatest seriousness, the court could not substitute its judgment about the
allocation of financial resources for that of the authority.
In R v East Sussex County Council ex parte Tandy (1998), the House of Lords
ruled that, although a local education authority could have regard to its
resources when deciding which of two alternative ways of providing suitable
education should be chosen, resources were irrelevant when determining
what sort of education was suitable under the Education Act 1993, section 298
of which defines suitable education as ‘efficient education suitable to his age,
ability and aptitude and to any special educational needs he may have’. The
effect of taking resources into account would be to downgrade a statutory
duty to a mere power. 
In B v Harrow London Borough Council (2000), the House of Lords ruled
that, when considering the impact of the cost of meeting special educational
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needs to the pupil’s own local authority and another authority to which the
parents had expressed a preference, it was to the home authority’s resources
that attention must be paid.
The question of a local authority’s financial resources came before the
Court of Appeal again in R v Camden and Islington Health Authority ex parte E
(2001). The applicant had been detained under the Mental Health Act 1983,
and a tribunal ordered her conditional discharge. The health authority tried,
but could not provide, the specified psychiatric care. The 1983 Act imposed a
duty on health authorities to provide after-care facilities for the benefit of
discharged mental patients. The ‘nature and extent’ of those facilities had to
fall within the discretion of the health authority, having regard to other
demands on its budget. The court considered the right to liberty guaranteed
under Article 5 of the Convention. Whether it was necessary to detain a
patient in hospital might well depend on the level of facilities available for
treatment within the community; Article 5 did not lay down any criteria over
the state’s duties to provide facilities, nor had the European Court. If release
was conditional on the provision of treatment which a health authority could
not reasonably meet, the continued detention of the patient did not violate
Article 5.
Acting in bad faith
In Cannock Chase District Council v Kelly (1978), Megaw LJ cited Lord Greene in
Wednesbury: ‘... bad faith, dishonesty – those of course stand by themselves.’
Megaw LJ went on to say that: 
... bad faith or, as it is sometimes put, ‘lack of good faith’, means dishonesty;
not necessarily for a financial motive, but still dishonesty. It always involves a
grave charge. It must not be treated as a synonym for an honest, though
mistaken, taking into consideration of a factor which is in law irrelevant ... [p 6]
To some extent, any decision which is ultra vires may involve ‘bad faith’
whenever there has been a failure to decide a case in the manner required by
law. Some decisions however, may have inadvertently breached the
requirements of legality, whereas others will reveal an improper motive and
unreasonableness, and more clearly demonstrate that the decision maker
acted in ‘bad faith’. 
Fettering discretion
An authority may act ultra vires if, in the exercise of its powers, it adopts a
policy which effectively means that it is not truly exercising its discretion at
all. This principle is explained in R v Port of London Authority ex parte Kynoch
(1919),35 in which it was held that an authority could not adopt a rigid policy
35 See Galligan, 1976.
which had the effect of ensuring that applications of a certain category would
invariably be refused. In Kynoch, the applicant sought judicial review of the
decision of the Port of London Authority to refuse him permission to
construct a wharf on land he owned adjoining the Thames river. Permission
was refused on the basis that the Authority itself had a duty to provide the
facilities. The challenge to the Authority’s decision failed, on the basis that it
appeared to the court that the Authority had given genuine consideration to
the application on its merits. 
Compare Kynoch with British Oxygen Co v Board of Trade (1971) in which
Kynoch was judicially considered. In BOC, the House of Lords upheld the right
of the Board of Trade to have a general policy, provided that the policy did
not preclude the Board from considering individual cases. Lord Reid
considered the scope of discretion, asserting that:
There are two general grounds on which the exercise of an unqualified
discretion can be attacked. It must not be exercised in bad faith, and it must not
be so unreasonably exercised as to show that there cannot have been any real
or genuine exercise of the discretion. But, apart from that, if the minister thinks
that policy or good administration requires the operation of some limiting rule,
I find nothing to stop him ...
What the authority must not do is to refuse to listen at all.
The application failed. The Board of Trade had not adopted a rigid and
invariable policy which rendered the consideration of applications a mere
sham exercise in which there was no possibility of a fair consideration of the
merits because of the adoption of a rigid policy.
However, in H Lavender & Sons Ltd v Minister of Housing and Local
Government (1970), a different conclusion was reached. Lavender had applied
for planning permission to extract sand and gravel from high grade
agricultural land. The local planning authority refused permission and
Lavender appealed to the Minister of Housing and Local Government. The
appeal was dismissed, the Minister of Housing and Local Government being
persuaded by the Minister of Agriculture that such land should be preserved
for agricultural purposes. Accordingly, the minister ruled that:
It is the minister’s present policy that land should not be released for mineral
working unless the Minister of Agriculture is not opposed. In the present case,
the agricultural objection has not been waived and the minister has therefore
decided not to grant planning permission for the working of the site. 
The decision was set aside. The minister was entitled to have a policy but, in
reality, in this instance, the minister’s decision had been based solely on
another minister’s objection. The minister, therefore, did not open his mind to
Lavender’s application and thereby fettered his discretion. In reality, the
decision to refuse planning permission was that of the Minister of Agriculture
who had no power to determine such matters.
In Stringer v Minister of Housing and Local Government (1970), the court
considered the legality of a minister’s policy to restrict development of land
which could interfere with the Jodrell Bank telescope. The court held that the
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minister’s general policy was lawful, provided that the policy did not result in
his failing to take into account relevant issues in each individual application
for planning permission. 
Sagnata Investments v Norwich Corporation (1971) illustrates the same point.
The Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act of 1963 provided that the grant or
renewal of a permit to run amusement arcades was to be ‘at the discretion of
the local authority’. Sagnata Investments applied for a licence which was
turned down on the basis that the council had a policy never to grant permits
for arcades in Norwich. There was no objection to Sagnata Investments itself;
rather, no application – whatever its merits – would have succeeded because
of the council’s policy. The court held that the council had failed to exercise its
discretion under the Act and had paid no regard whatsoever to the merits of
the application. The council’s decision was therefore quashed.36
In R v Chief Constable of North Wales Police and Others ex parte AB and
Another (1997),37 the Queen’s Bench Division ruled that the policy of the
North Wales police to disclose information to members of the public
concerning the presence of a former paedophile offender was not unlawful.
The court recognised that, in general, good public administration involved not
disclosing damaging information about individuals unless there was sound
justification for so doing. The applicants for judicial review, who were
married, had both been convicted of serious sexual offences against children,
and had served long prison sentences. The Lord Chief Justice recognised the
tension between the rights of former offenders and the interests of the
community. The police had not adopted a policy of blanket disclosure, but
had carefully considered the case on its merits, and accordingly had not
fettered its discretion. The decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal.38 The
Master of the Rolls, Lord Woolf, recognised that, in such cases, there was a
balance to be struck between providing protection for children who might be
at risk, and the position of the offender who had already served his sentence
and wished to re-establish himself in the community. There was also a need to
avoid driving offenders ‘underground’. The position of the police was
‘difficult and sensitive’. Disclosure should only be made when there was a
‘pressing need for such disclosure’. The action of the police had been neither
irrational, nor was the policy unlawful. 
In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Dinc (1998), the
applicant had been sentenced to five years’ imprisonment and the judge had
recommended that he be deported at the end of his term of imprisonment. In
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(2002).
38 Reported as R v Chief Constable of North Wales Police and Others ex parte Thorpe and
Another (1998), and see the government’s proposals for arrangements on release of
paedophiles from prison, HL Deb, Vol 589, Col 479, 5 May 1998.
1995, the Secretary of State accepted the recommendation and made the
deportation order. The applicant sought judicial review of that decision. The
court ruled that the Secretary of State had fettered his discretion by relying on
the judge’s view and had given disproportionate weight to it. This had led
him to leave out of account relevant factors.39 In R v North West Lancashire
Health Authority ex parte A (1999), the Court of Appeal ruled that a health
authority had adopted a policy which was invalid, by allocating low priority
for the public funding of procedures which it considered to be clinically
ineffective, which included gender re-assignment surgery. The Court of
Appeal stated that the policy was over-rigid and did not amount to a genuine
policy subject to individually determined exceptions.
The House of Lords’ decision in R v Secretary of State for the Home
Department ex parte Simms (1999) is also significant in demonstrating the
courts’ refusal to allow a strict policy to undermine individual rights. The
decision in Simms was reached on common law principles and before the
Human Rights Act 1998 came into force, but nevertheless the approach taken
is consistent with post-Human Rights Act cases. It may be compared with the
House of Lords’ decision in Daly, discussed below, in which a prison policy
was held to violate a Convention right.40 In Simms, the applicants had been
convicted of murder but continued to plead their innocence; they had been
refused permission to appeal against their convictions. The prisoners wished
to pursue their claim to justice through the press. The Home Secretary had
adopted a policy which imposed a blanket ban on journalists interviewing
prisoners with a view to publication, on the basis that such publicity could
undermine prison control and discipline. The House of Lords overruled the
Court of Appeal’s decision upholding the ban. Lord Steyn concluded – in the
language of proportionality and human rights41 – that ‘these provisions are
exorbitant in width in so far as they would undermine the fundamental rights
invoked by the applicants in the present proceedings and are therefore ultra
vires’.
The decision of the House of Lords in R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the
Home Department (2001)42 is also important in demonstrating the movement
away from the traditional test of Wednesbury unreasonableness towards the
doctrines of necessity and proportionality. The House of Lords ruled that the
policy of excluding prisoners from their cells while prison officers conducted
searches – which included scrutinising privileged legal correspondence – was
unlawful. Lord Bingham stated that the conclusion had been reached
according to common law principles, but accepted that the same result could
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have been achieved if the analysis had proceeded on the basis of the European
Convention.43 Lord Cooke was explicit in recognising the limitations of the
traditional Wednesbury approach, stating that before long it would be accepted
that the Wednesbury case was an unfortunately retrogressive decision in
English law. 
The dicta in Simms and Daly both illustrate the willingness of the judges in
the House of Lords to develop and expand common law doctrines in a
manner which brings them into line with the European concepts of necessity
and proportionality. It may be said that the conventional Wednesbury test is
dead, or nearly so – superseded by proportionality, as discussed further
below. That this is a more vigorous form of scrutiny was recognised by Lord
Steyn in Daly. This, however, does not mean that the courts are moving away
from the review of the decision making process and towards a review on the
merits of decisions: rather it suggests that the ‘more sophisticated’ approach
will lead to the ‘intensity of review’ being ‘somewhat greater’ (per Lord Steyn
in Daly).
Unauthorised delegation
Where powers are conferred by statute, the general rule is that they may not
be delegated unless that delegation is authorised by law. Not all delegations
will be unlawful. The courts will not hold, for instance, that a minister must
exercise each and every power personally. It is accepted that that, where
statute confers powers on ministers, the powers are, in fact, exercisable on his
behalf by the personnel of his department. As explained in Local Government
Board v Arlidge (1915), ‘a minister cannot do everything himself’.44 In Arlidge –
an early and seminal case which ensured the conduct of government under
the supervision of the courts – the court held that, whilst a minister could
lawfully delegate his power of determination to a subordinate, he,
nevertheless, remained constitutionally and personally accountable to
parliament for the conduct of his department.45
This principle was well illustrated in Carltona v Works Commissioners
(1943). The Commissioners were given powers, under wartime regulations, to
requisition property. Carltona’s property was requisitioned, the order for
requisition being signed, for and on behalf of the Commissioners, by a civil
servant with the rank of assistant secretary. Lord Greene MR stated that:
It cannot be supposed that the particular statutory provision meant that in
every case the minister in person should direct his mind to the matter.
Constitutionally the decision of such an officer is the decision of the minister;
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the minister is responsible to Parliament. If the minister delegated to a junior
official then he would have to answer to Parliament ... 
The decision in Arlidge may be compared with that of Barnard v National Dock
Labour Board (1953). In Barnard, disciplinary powers delegated by statute to the
London Dock Board were subdelegated to a port manager. That delegation
was held to be ultra vires, on the basis that such a disciplinary function could
not lawfully be delegated to another and must be exercised by the Board to
whom the power was granted. Similarly, in R v Talbot Borough Council ex parte
Jones (1988), where a local councillor applied for local authority housing. The
housing tenancy committee resolved that the applicant should be given
priority status and that her rehousing, subsequent to divorce, should be
decided by the chairman and vice chairman of the committee, according to the
Council’s Standing Orders,46 in consultation with the Borough Housing
Officer. In 1986, the Housing Officer allocated her a house. In proceedings for
judicial review, it was held that the decision to allocate housing could not
lawfully be subdelegated from the chairman and vice chairman of the
committee to the Housing Officer. The decision was also void on the grounds
that irrelevant considerations had been taken into account and that relevant
considerations – the needs of others on the waiting list – had been ignored.
In Oladehinde v Secretary of State for the Home Department (1990), the
question of authorised delegation came before the House of Lords. The
applicants wished to challenge notices of intention to deport them. The notices
were issued by immigration inspectors. The applicants argued that the powers
under the Immigration Act 1971 were conferred upon the Secretary of State
and could not be delegated. The House of Lords dismissed the appeal. The
Act provided specific matters which could not be delegated by the minister,
and the court would not infer further restrictions. Provided that the decision
was taken by officials of suitable grading and experience, they were
unchallengeable.
Failure to act
An authority may be under a statutory duty to take action and, depending
upon the specificity of that duty, may be held to be acting unlawfully if it fails
to act. This is a difficult area of law, in that some duties imposed by statute are
clear and precise, and hence enforceable by the courts, whereas others may be
of a general, non-specific nature and thus not court-enforceable: all will turn
on the wording of the statute. Statute may stipulate the objective to be
achieved but leave it to a local authority or other public body to determine the
manner in which the objective should be achieved. Furthermore, in many
cases, statute will provide that the Secretary of State shall have default
powers, by the use of which he can compel a local authority to act should it
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fail so to do, in which case, the courts may be reluctant to permit the pursuit of
an alternative remedy.47 In R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte
Norwich (1982), the authority had the duty to sell council housing to tenants48
at a discounted rate. If a tenant exercised his or her right to buy, and the
council did not respect that right, the minister could exercise his powers to
ensure compliance with the legislation, if satisfied that a tenant’s right had
‘not effectively and expeditiously’ been recognised. The council argued that
this policy was reasonable. However, the Court of Appeal rejected that
argument, since the council had no discretion in light of the statutory right to
buy. The failure of the council to implement the ‘right to buy’ legislation was
to be controlled by the minister. Should the minister, in the exercise of his
powers, act ultra vires, the court will control the exercise of power by judicial
review. However, the courts may not be willing to rule against the minister
merely because the court takes a different view of the merits of the case (per
Lord Denning).
An example of powers which are inextricably linked to resource
availability can be seen in relation to health care provision. The Secretary of
State for Health is under an obligation to provide hospital beds for those in
need. If, in contravention of this clear requirement, a patient is denied a
hospital bed, an action for judicial review will lie but, if the minister claims
inadequate resources, the judges may be reluctant to hold a minister to be in
breach of his duties. A more appropriate avenue of redress for a complainant
may be to the Health Service Commissioners.49
Judicial review of Home Secretary’s powers in relation to penal
elements in mandatory life sentences
In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Pierson (1995), the
Court of Appeal ruled on the legality of the Home Secretary’s decision to fix
the penal element of a mandatory life sentence at twenty years, having
rejected the recommendation of the judges that the term should be fifteen
years. An incoming Home Secretary adhered to his predecessor’s decision.
The Home Secretary had the power, under section 35 of the Criminal Justice
Act 1991, to release on licence a prisoner serving a mandatory life sentence
which he could exercise after consulting the trial judge and the Lord Chief
Justice and if release was recommended by the Parole Board. On an
application for judicial review, the Court held that the decision was not
irrational and that there was nothing in law to stop the Secretary of State
exceptionally revising upwards the period originally determined, on the
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ground that it did not adequately meet the requirement of retribution and
deterrence. On appeal to the House of Lords, however, the decision of the
Court of Appeal was reversed. By a majority of three to two, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson and Lord Lloyd of Berwick dissenting, the House of Lords ruled
that the Home Secretary had not been entitled to set the appellant’s tariff
period at 20 years when it had been shown that his predecessor in office had
proceeded on the wrong basis by taking into account aggravating
circumstances, in particular premeditation, when originally fixing the tariff. In
doing so, the former Home Secretary had exceeded his powers for, by taking
into account aggravating circumstances, the Home Secretary had not left the
tariff period unchanged but had, in effect, increased the penal element in the
sentence. Lord Steyn and Lord Hope of Craighead asserted that, once the tariff
is set and communicated to the prisoner, the tariff cannot be raised. 
Lord Goff asserted that the Home Secretary had exceeded his powers
because the policy statement relied on by the Home Secretary could not have
retrospective effect and, therefore, could not apply to the appellant’s case
where the tariff period for retribution and deterrence had already been fixed
and under the earlier policy statement was not liable to be increased. Given
the differing bases for the decision, and the narrow majority in the House of
Lords, there is no firm proposition as to the Home Secretary’s right to increase
the tariff. The current Home Secretary, Jack Straw, has restated that in his
view he still has this power.
The Home Secretary’s power to set a tariff period of imprisonment again
came under scrutiny in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte
Venables; R v Same ex parte Thompson (1996).50 In this case, two child killers of a
child aged two and a half applied for judicial review of the Home Secretary’s
decision to fix a tariff period of 15 years for each child, on the basis that this
reflected the requirements of retribution and deterrence. The two boys had
been detained at Her Majesty’s pleasure following their conviction. 
The House of Lords ruled, by a majority of three to two, that there was a
distinction between a sentence of detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure and a
life sentence imposed on an adult murderer. The order for detention
concerned the authority to detain indefinitely and, accordingly, the Home
Secretary had to decide from time to time, taking into account the punitive
element, whether detention was still justified. A mandatory life sentence, on
the other hand, involved an order of custody for life which meant that the
Home Secretary had to decide whether and when release was justified.
Furthermore, the Home Secretary was under a duty51 to take into account the
welfare of the child when exercising his discretion in relation to child
offenders. It was, accordingly, unlawful for the Home Secretary to adopt a
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policy which treated as irrelevant the progress and development of the
detained child. Secondly, the court ruled by a majority of three, that, in fixing
a tariff, the Home Secretary was under the same duty as a judge, and was
required to remain detached from public opinion. The Home Secretary had
accordingly misdirected himself and his decision was tainted with procedural
unfairness as a result.52
In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Hindley (2000),
however, the right of the Home Secretary to determine the length of the penal
element of a prison sentence to be served by a person convicted of murder
was upheld by the House of Lords. As noted above, the Home Secretary’s
powers derive from the Criminal Justice Act 1991, which makes it clear that
the Home Secretary has discretion as to the length of the penal element. The
question which arose was whether the Home Secretary had the right to set a
whole life tariff, which had the effect that Hindley’s case could not be
considered by the Parole Board. Hindley had been convicted in 1965. In 1982,
the then Lord Chief Justice stated that a term of not less than 25 years was
appropriate. In 1985, the Home Secretary reached the decision that the
applicant should serve 30 years. In 1990, the Home Secretary decided that the
applicant’s sentence should be for her whole life, a decision upheld in 1997 by
the new Home Secretary. The House of Lords ruled that there was no reason
of principle which stated that crimes which were ‘sufficiently heinous’ should
not be met with a whole life tariff. The Home Secretary was prepared to
constantly re-assess the decision in light of further information and it could
not be said that he had unlawfully fettered his discretion.
In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Stafford (1997), the
Court of Appeal ruled that section 29 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997
conferred an ‘extraordinary, wide discretion’ on the Home Secretary. That
discretion permitted the Home Secretary to refuse to release a mandatory life
sentence prisoner, after the expiry of the term of imprisonment imposed, on
the basis that the prisoner, once released, might commit some imprisonable
offence, or not comply with the terms of his life sentence, even though the risk
of him committing serious sexual offences for which he had been sentenced
was thought to be low. The court declared that the imposition, in effect, of a
further substantial term of imprisonment, by the exercise of executive
discretion, without trial, ‘lay uneasily with ordinary concepts of the rule of
law’. On appeal to the House of Lords, the Court of Appeal’s decision was
affirmed.
The power of the executive to determine the length of a sentence which
should be served in order to satisfy the needs of ‘retribution and deterrence’ in
light of the seriousness of a crime has been a long standing feature within the
legal system. It is one, however, which has come increasingly under review by
the courts in judicial review proceedings and by the Court of Human Rights
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in Strasbourg. The power to determine the length of a sentence is one which
confuses the executive and judicial role. From the executive’s point of view, it
is a power which is exercised on behalf of society – and in relation to which he
or she is answerable to the democratically elected House of Commons – to
give recognition to the needs of justice where particularly serious crimes have
been committed. The most high profile case is that of Myra Hindley, discussed
above, who by 2002 had served 37 years in prison and had repeatedly been
refused release.53 From the point of view of the separation of powers, the
executive’s power is incompatible with the need to keep judicial and executive
functions separate.
PROCEDURAL IMPROPRIETY
Under statute
Failure to comply with procedures laid down by statute may invalidate a
decision. The courts distinguish between those procedural requirements
which are mandatory, the breach of which will render a decision void, and
those which are directory, which may not invalidate the decision taken. In
London and Clydesdale Estates Ltd v Aberdeen District Council (1979), the House
of Lords emphasised the inherent vagueness in the distinction and stressed
that the court would not draw a hard and fast line: it is all a matter of degree
and the particular circumstances of the case must be examined. However, in
some cases, the requirement to adhere to procedural correctness is clear. For
example, in Bradbury v Enfield London Borough Council (1967), the Education
Act 1944 provided that, if a local education authority intends to establish new
schools or cease to maintain existing schools, notice must be given to the
minister, following which, public notice must be given in order to allow
interested parties to comment.54 The Council breached the requirement of
public notice and the plaintiffs sought an injunction. The Council claimed that
educational chaos would occur if they were required to comply with the
procedural requirements. That plea met with little sympathy in court. Lord
Denning stated that:
... if a local authority does not fulfil the requirements of the law, this court will
see that it does fulfil them. It will not listen readily to suggestions of ‘chaos’.
The department of education and the council are subject to the rule of law and
must comply with it, just like everyone else ... I can well see that there may be a
considerable upset for a number of people, but I think it far more important to
uphold the rule of law. Parliament has laid down these requirements so as to
ensure that the electors can make their objections and have them properly
considered. We must see that their rights are upheld. [p 1324]
Chapter 25: Constitutional and Administrative Law
896
53 In total, there are 22 convicted killers who are expected to die in prison unless there is a
change in the law.
54 Education Act 1944, s 13.
The Grounds for Judicial Review
Further, as has been seen earlier, in the Aylesbury Mushroom case,55 the court
ruled that the statutory requirements of consultation56 with organisations or
associations which represented substantial numbers of people could not be
avoided by consultation with the largest representative body of all
agricultural horticultural and forestry industry, workers – the National
Farmers’ Union. The Board claimed that consultation with the National
Farmers’ Union involved consultation with all smaller representative bodies; a
claim rejected by the court. For true consultation to take place in accordance
with law, there must be communication with the representative organisations
and the opportunity given of responding thereto, without which ‘there can be
no consultation’. 
However, on occasion, although an authority is under a duty to act, and
fails to act, the court may nevertheless uphold the decision made, provided
that the decision making process was otherwise fair and the failure to act does
not affect the quality of the decision reached. This was the position in Berkeley
v Secretary of State for the Environment and Another (1998). In this case, in a
planning application by Fulham Football Club to redevelop part of its land to
provide apartments and a riverside walk, the Secretary of State was
required57 to consider the environmental impact of the proposed
development, and to issue an ‘environmental statement’. Notwithstanding the
failure of the Secretary of State to comply with the regulations, planning
permission was granted. On appeal to the Court of Appeal against the refusal
of the court below to quash the planning permission, the Court of Appeal
ruled that the Secretary of State’s failure to act did not invalidate the decision.
The planning application had been referred to the Secretary of State who had
appointed an inspector. A public hearing had been held, at which the
applicant had been heard and at which the environmental impact of the
proposed development had been fully considered. The court found that ‘the
procedures adopted, although flawed, had been thorough and effective [so as]
to enable the inspector to make a comprehensive judgment on all the
environmental issues’. 
The Court of Appeal re-examined the effect of non-compliance with
procedural requirements laid down in statute in R v Secretary of State for the
Home Department ex parte Jeyeanthan; Ravichandran v Secretary of State for the
Home Department (1999). The Home Secretary had failed to comply
substantially with the requirements of the Asylum Appeals Rules by not
including a declaration of truth in an application for leave to appeal from a
special adjudicator to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. However, the asylum
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seeker had not been affected by the omission, which was treated as an
irregularity capable of being cured by the Tribunal. The court ruled that, in
determining the effect of non-compliance with a procedural requirement, the
court should consider what the legislator had intended to be the consequences
of non-compliance, rather than merely whether the requirement was
mandatory or directory. Neither of the applicants had in any way been
affected by the omission and, other than to discipline the Secretary of State,
there could be no reason to treat his successful application for leave as a
nullity.
Breach of natural justice
Of course, there is a wealth of authority on what are and what are not the rules
of natural justice. The rules have been described in various ways, as an ‘unruly
horse’, I think, in one decision, and there is no doubt that what may be the
rules of natural justice in one case may well not be the rules of natural justice in
another. As has frequently been said, and there is no harm in repeating it, all
that the rules of natural justice mean is that the proceedings must be conducted
in a way which is fair ... fair in all the circumstances.58
That the rules of natural justice are not rigid and determinate is emphasised
by Lord Bridge in Lloyd v McMahon (1987):
... the so called rules of natural justice are not engraved on tablets of stone. To
use the phrase which better expresses the underlying concept, what the
requirements of fairness demand when any body, domestic, administrative or
judicial, has to make a decision which will affect the rights of individuals
depends on the character of the decision making body, the kind of question it
has to make and the statutory or other framework in which it operates.
The rules of natural justice are common law rules – although, in many
instances, their requirements may be made statutory. The fundamental dictate
of justice is that those affected by decision makers should be dealt with in a
fair manner. In order for this to be achieved, there may be several
requirements which must be fulfilled. 
The rule against bias: nemo iudex in causa sua59
The essence of justice lies in a fair hearing. The rule against bias is strict: it is
not necessary to show that actual bias existed, the merest appearance or
possibility of bias will suffice: ‘... justice should not only be done but should
manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.’60 The suspicion of bias must,
however, be a reasonable one. Both financial or personal interest in a case may
disqualify a person from adjudicating. 
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Financial bias
In Dr Bonham’s Case (1609), Lord Coke held that members of a board which
determined the level of physicians’ fines could not both impose and receive
the fines, thus giving early judicial expression for the requirement of freedom
from bias. An early expression of the absolute requirement not only to be
impartial in fact, but also to be demonstrably and clearly free from the merest
suspicion of bias is found in Dimes v Grand Junction Canal Ltd (1852). In Dimes,
Lord Cottenham LC held shares in the canal company involved in litigation.
The House of Lords set aside the decision in which he had adjudicated despite
the fact that:
No one can suppose that Lord Cottenham could be in the remotest degree
influenced by the interest ... It is of the last importance that the maxim that no
man is to be judge in his own cause should be held sacred.
Thus, the mere existence of a financial interest, even where it does not, in fact,
result in actual bias but may present the appearance of bias will be sufficient
to disqualify a judge from adjudication.
In R v Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy (1924), the applicant had been
charged with dangerous driving and convicted. On discovering that the clerk
to the magistrates’ court was a solicitor who had represented the person suing
McCarthy for damages, McCarthy applied for judicial review based on bias on
the part of the clerk. The clerk had retired with the magistrates when they
were considering their verdict. It was accepted that the magistrates neither
sought advice nor were given advice by the clerk during their retirement.
Nevertheless, McCarthy’s conviction was invalidated on the basis of the
possibility of bias. 
The question of financial bias again arose in Metropolitan Properties Co v
Lannon (1969), where an application was lodged by a property company in
order to challenge a decision of a rent assessment committee on the basis that
Lannon, a member of the committee had, in his professional capacity as a
solicitor, given advice to tenants of a close business associate of the property
company. Lord Denning MR ruled that, while there was no actual bias:
... the court looks at the impression which would be given to other people.
Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless, if right minded persons
would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on
his part, then he should not sit. And, if he does sit, his decision cannot stand ...
The court will not inquire whether he did, in fact, favour one side unfairly.
Suffice it that reasonable people might think he did. The reason is plain
enough. Justice must be rooted in confidence: and confidence is destroyed
when right minded people go away thinking: ‘The judge was biased.’ [p 599]
A financial interest in a case which does not go beyond the financial interest of
any citizen does not disqualify judges from sitting. Thus, for example, in
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Bromley London Borough Council v Greater London Council (1983), the fact that all
the judges in the Court of Appeal were themselves both taxpayers and users
of public transport in London did not disqualify them from hearing the case. 
The same position prevails in the United States of America61 but, there, the
issue of the financial interests of federal judges is expressly covered by statute.
The Ethics in Government Act 1978 requires that Supreme Court and Federal
judges must make a public declaration of ‘income, gifts, shares, liabilities and
transactions in securities and real estate’.62
Other bias
Judges – as with any other person – may exhibit bias by virtue of race, sex,
politics, background, association and opinions.63 When adjudicating,
however, they must be demonstrably impartial. This impartiality involves:
... the judge, listening to each side with equal attention, and coming to a
decision on the argument, irrespective of his personal view about the litigants
...
and, further, a requirement that:
Whatever his personal beliefs, the judge should seek to give effect to the
common values of the community, rather than any sectional system of values
to which he may adhere.64
The seminal case on bias is the Pinochet case.65 In Pinochet, extradition
proceedings against the former Chilean Head of State were challenged on the
basis that one of the Law Lords, Lord Hoffmann, had links with Amnesty
International, the charitable pressure group which works on behalf of political
prisoners around the world, which had been allowed to present evidence to
the court. It was accepted that there was no actual bias on the part of Lord
Hoffmann, but there were concerns that the public perception might be that a
senior judge was biased. As a result, the proceedings were abandoned and re-
heard by a new bench of seven judges.
The Court of Appeal reconsidered judicial bias in the Locabail (UK) Ltd v
Bayfield Properties Ltd (2000) cases. The court distinguished the two rules
relating to disqualification, the first being where the judge had an interest in a
case which he decided, as in Dimes v Grand Junction Canal (1852), and where he
would be automatically disqualified. The second rule was that based on
examination of all the relevant circumstances, where there was a real danger
or possibility of bias, as in R v Gough (1993). In relation to the circumstances
surrounding Timmins v Gormley, one of the Locabail cases, which concerned the
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publication, by the Recorder who adjudicated in a personal injury case, of
articles which were allegedly biased in favour of claimants and against
insurers, the court ruled that, taking a broad common sense approach, a lay
observer with knowledge of the facts could not have excluded the possibility
that the Recorder was biased. While it was not inappropriate for a judge to
publish in his area of expertise, and that such contributions could further
rather than hinder the administration of justice, nevertheless, it was always
inappropriate for a judge to use intemperate language about subjects on
which he had adjudicated or would have to adjudicate. The appeal was
allowed and a retrial ordered.66
Uncertainty in the test for bias
There has been uncertainty and inconsistency in the interpretation of ‘bias’. In
R v Gough (1993), opposing counsel presented two different tests for bias. The
first suggested criterion was whether a reasonable and fair minded person
sitting in the court and knowing all the relevant facts would have had a
reasonable suspicion that a fair trial of the defendant was not possible – the
‘reasonable suspicion’ test. The second suggested test was whether there was
a real likelihood of bias. The question to be asked is whether there was a ‘real
danger’ that a trial may not have been fair as a result of bias – the ‘real
likelihood’ test.67 The House of Lords declared that the correct test was
whether there was a real likelihood, in the sense of a real possibility, of bias of
the part of a justice or member of a tribunal. 
Where a judge feels that he has a bias against one of the parties to litigation
he may disqualify himself from sitting on the case, as did Lord Denning MR
in Ex parte Church of Scientology of California (1978). There, counsel for the
Church requested that he disqualify himself as a result of eight previous cases
involving the Church on which he had sat. 
The right to a fair hearing:68 audi alteram partem
It is a fundamental requirement of justice that, when a person’s interests are
affected by a judicial or administrative decision, he or she has the opportunity
both to know and to understand any allegations made, and to make
representations to the decision maker to meet the allegations. By way of
example, a fair determination of a case may involve one or more of the
following:
(a) the right to being given notification of a hearing; 
(b) the right to be given indications of any adverse evidence;
(c) the right to be given an opportunity to respond to the evidence;
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67 At p 727; see, also, R v Spencer (1987).
68 See Rawlings, 1986.
(d) the right to an oral hearing;
(e) the right to legal representation at a hearing;
(f) the right to question witnesses.
The basic requirement is that – irrespective of the decision making body,
whether ‘judicial’, ‘quasi-judicial’ or ‘administrative’ – the individual should
be treated fairly in the decision making process.
‘Judicial’, ‘quasi-judicial’ and ‘administrative’ functions: the distinctions
The courts have long been struggling with the distinction between ‘judicial’,
‘quasi-judicial’ and ‘administrative’ functions in an attempt to bring the ever-
expanding administration of government departments under judicial control.
Two lines of thought were apparent. The first emphasised the distinction
between a body which was exercising powers under restrictive rules and a
body which was conferred with a wide measure of administrative
discretionary power.69 The second line of thought placed great weight on the
absence of any true distinction between judicial and administrative functions,
regarding the former as but a specialised form of the latter.70 As a result of
conceptual confusion, the phrase ‘quasi-judicial’ came to be used to cover
those functions which were not easily compartmentalised into either one or
other concept. As a result, differing legal consequences would follow from the
classification: the rules of natural justice being less rigorous in the case of the
exercise of power by those bodies which were deemed to exercise ‘quasi-
judicial’ or ‘administrative’ functions.
An early expression of the requirement of a hearing is to be found in
Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1893). There, Cooper had – without
giving notice to the Board, as required by law – started to erect a house. The
Board had the power to demolish buildings built without the requisite
permission, and exercised their power so to do. Cooper applied for – and
recovered – damages from the Board for trespass to his property. Byles J held
that the plaintiff should have been given a hearing before the Board exercised
their powers, even though there was no express statutory requirement that
they do so:
... although there are no positive words in a statute requiring that the party
shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law shall supply the omission of
the legislature.71
However, such a dynamic and protective judicial attitude was not to be found,
for example, in Nakkuda Ali v Jayaratne (1951). In Nakkuda Ali, the Privy
Council held that there was no duty to give a hearing to a dealer when his
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licence was under consideration – and was revoked – because the statute
made no such express provision and the court concluded that there was no
duty on the licensing board to ‘act judicially’. 
Judicial rejection of the classifications
Ridge v Baldwin (1964) represents a classic case which reveals judicial
insistence on procedural fairness irrespective of the type of body determining
a question.72 Ridge, the Chief Constable of Brighton, had been suspended
from duty following charges of conspiracy to obstruct the course of justice.
Despite Ridge having been cleared of any allegations against him, the judge
made comments which were critical of Ridge’s conduct. Subsequently, Ridge
was dismissed from the force.73 Ridge was not invited to attend the meeting
at which the decision to dismiss him was reached, although he was later given
an opportunity to appear before the committee which confirmed its earlier
decision. Ridge appealed to the Home Secretary,74 who dismissed his appeal.
Ridge then sought a declaration that the dismissal was ultra vires, on the basis
that the committee had violated the rules of natural justice. The following
extract is taken from Lord Reid’s judgment, in which the opportunity was
taken to review the doctrine.
The principle of audi alteram partem goes back many centuries in our law and
appears in a multitude of judgments of judges of the highest authority. In
modern times opinions have sometimes been expressed to the effect that
natural justice is so vague as to be almost meaningless ... It appears to me that
one reason why the authorities on natural justice have been found difficult to
reconcile is that insufficient attention has been paid to the great difference
between various kinds of cases in which it has been sought to apply the
principle. What a minister ought to do in considering objections to a scheme
may be very different from what a watch committee ought to do in considering
whether to dismiss a chief constable ... [p 64]
... I would think that the authority was wholly in favour of the appellant, but
the respondent’s argument was mainly based on what has been said in a
number of fairly recent cases dealing with different subject matter. Those cases
deal with the decisions of ministers, officials and bodies of various kinds which
adversely affected property rights or privileges of persons who had no
opportunity or no proper opportunity of presenting their cases before the
decisions were given ... [p 68]
Lord Reid proceeded to discuss the authorities in relation to differing
functions which had led to the judicial conclusion that differing cases required
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different levels of respect for the requirement of a hearing, and concluded
that:
... So I would hold that the power of dismissal in the Act of 1882 could not then
have been exercised and cannot now be exercised until the watch committee
have informed the constable of the grounds on which they propose to proceed
and given him a proper opportunity to present his case in defence ... [p 79]75
The right to a hearing founded a challenge in Re Pergamon Press Ltd (1971),76
in which the directors of two companies refused to answer questions unless
given a judicial-style hearing. The court ruled, however, that, although the
inspectors appointed to investigate the companies were under a duty to act
fairly, this must be weighed against the interests of good administration.
The duty to act ‘fairly’ and concept of ‘legitimate expectation’
Irrespective of the labelling attached to the body in question, there exists a
duty to ‘act fairly’. This principle can be clearly seen in the case of Re HK (An
Infant) (1967), wherein it was held that, whilst immigration officers were not
obliged to hold a hearing before deciding an immigrant’s status, they were
nevertheless under an obligation to act fairly. The duty to give a hearing will
be higher if a ‘legitimate expectation’ has been created in the mind of the
complainant by the public body concerned.77
A legitimate expectation will arise in the mind of the complainant
wherever he or she has been led to understand – by the words or actions of
the decision maker – that certain procedures will be followed in reaching a
decision. The complainant may have been led to believe, for example, that
there would be an oral hearing, or that he would be able to make formal
representations. Where such expectations have been created, the decision
maker is not free simply to ignore the procedures which have been indicated.
Two considerations apply to legitimate expectations. The first is where an
individual or group has been led to believe that a certain procedure will
apply. The second is where an individual or group relies upon a policy or
guidelines which have previously governed an area of executive action. 
The Court of Appeal ruled in R (Bibi) v Newham LBC (2001) that a local
authority which made promises which gave rise to legitimate expectations
that the applicants would be provided with accommodation with security of
tenure had to be honoured to the extent that the expectation was taken into
account when allocating the applicants’ position on the housing list. The
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applicants were refugees and accepted by the authority as homeless. The
authority wrongly thought that it was under a duty to provide
accommodation with security of tenure. However, the promise that such
accommodation would be provided founded a legitimate expectation which
had to be considered.
However, while the concept of legitimate expectation has, according to the
Court of Appeal, achieved an important place in developing the law of
administrative fairness, whether such an expectation has been raised is
dependent upon the circumstances in which statements are made, and
whether in an instant case they could be taken as propounding a policy or
merely statements applicable to particular cases. In R v Secretary for the Home
Department ex parte Behluli (1998), the Home Secretary had ordered the
removal of the applicant to Italy under section 2 of the Asylum and
Immigration Act 1996. The applicant argued that he had a legitimate
expectation that his case would be dealt with in accordance with the Dublin
Convention.78 The Court of Appeal ruled, however, that the statements relied
on by the applicant fell short of the requirements necessary to establish to the
requisite degree of clarity and certainty that the Secretary of State would deal
with all applications for asylum in accordance with the Convention and not in
accordance with the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 and rules made
thereunder.
The giving of assurances
By way of illustration, in Attorney General for Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu (1983),
the applicant had been an illegal immigrant for some years. He was
eventually detained and an order was made for his deportation. The Director
of Immigration had given a public undertaking that illegal immigrants such as
Ng Yuen Shiu would not be deported without first being interviewed. The
assurance was also given that ‘each case would be treated on its merits’. Lord
Fraser of Tullybelton in the Privy Council ruled that there was no general
right in an alien to have a hearing in accordance with the rules of natural
justice. Nevertheless, a ‘legitimate expectation’ had been created in the mind
of the immigrant and, accordingly, breach of the requirement of fairness
justified the order for his removal from Hong Kong to be quashed. A public
body cannot give undertakings which conflict with its statutory duty. In R v
Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte Preston (1985),79 the House of Lords
ruled that if it should do so, it was in principle entitled to go back on its
undertaking. However, if the authority made an assurance and then exercised
its statutory power in a manner which caused unfairness, that exercise could
be viewed as an abuse of power and the undertaking upheld by the courts.
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Fairness may involve the due consultation of interested parties before their
rights are affected by decisions. For example, in R v Liverpool Corporation ex
parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators Association (1972), the corporation had given
undertakings to the taxi drivers to the effect that their licences would not be
revoked without prior consultation. When the corporation acted in breach of
this undertaking, the court ruled that it had a duty to comply with its
commitment to consultation.80
On legitimate expectations, the Court of Appeal considered the power of
the Home Secretary to re-certify a country as safe for asylum seekers in R
(Zeqirl) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2001). The Home Secretary
decided to remove an asylum seeker to Germany, and the Court of Appeal
ruled that although he had power to re-certify Germany as a safe country, to
remove the asylum seeker to Germany was unlawful since it frustrated the
asylum seeker’s legitimate expectation that his application would be
substantively determined in the United Kingdom.81
The Court of Appeal in R v North and East Devon Health Authority ex parte
Coughlan (1999)82 ruled that a decision by a health authority to close a home
for the severely disabled at which the applicant resided, and to transfer her to
the care of a local authority, was unlawful. The applicant had been assured by
the predecessor to the health authority that the home was her home for life,
thus creating a legitimate expectation which no public interest overrode.
Furthermore, under Article 8 of the Convention on Human Rights, everyone
had a right to respect for his home and the judge had been entitled to treat the
case as one in which there would be an unjustifiable breach of Article 8.
The Coughlan decision has significant implications for judicial review. The
Court of Appeal moved beyond the traditional test of procedural impropriety,
thereby developing the law relating to legitimate expectations. The Court of
Appeal identified three differing situations which would give rise to differing
approaches to review. The first related to a public body which had to consider
previous policy or representations before changing that policy. Here, review
on Wednesbury grounds was appropriate. The second class of case concerned
the legitimate expectation of being consulted, in which case the court would
look closely at the reasons for the change of policy and whether that decision
was fair. The third class of case is where a promise by a public body had
brought about a ‘substantive legitimate expectation’ on the part of the
applicant. Here the court’s approach would be more intensive. It would, in
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Craig and Schonberg’s analysis, ‘decide whether the frustration of the
expectation was so unfair that to take a new and different course of action
would amount to an abuse of power’, and once the legitimate expectation had
been established, ‘the court would have the task of “weighing the
requirements of fairness against any overriding interest relied upon for the
change of policy”’.83 Accordingly, there are two standards of review, one
where the decision was irrational in the Wednesbury sense, and one on the
basis of abuse of power, which was for the court to determine. Policy changes
on the part of public authorities are not unusual nor unlawful in the general
case, nor should the courts, as the Court of Appeal recognised, jeopardise ‘the
important principle that the executive’s policy making powers should not be
trammelled’. Where, however, a substantive legitimate expectation has arisen
– as in Coughlan – through the express promise made in precise terms, and
was relied on by the applicant, the decision was unlawful.
Acting in a manner so as to create an expectation
A public body may act in a manner which creates an expectation in the mind
of a person or body. For example, in R v Secretary of State for Health ex parte US
Tobacco International Inc (1992), the company had opened a factory in 1985,
with a government grant, for the production of oral snuff. The government
made the grant available notwithstanding its awareness of the health risks of
the product. In 1988, however, the government – having received further
advice from a committee – announced its intention to ban snuff. The company
sought judicial review, relying on a legitimate expectation based on the
government’s action. The court ruled, however, that, even though the
applicant had a legitimate expectation, that expectation could not override the
public interest in banning a harmful substance.
The existence of policies and/or guidance
In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Asif Mahmood Khan
(1984), the Home Office had published a circular stating the criteria to be used
for determining whether a child could enter the United Kingdom. When the
applicant sought to bring his nephew into the United Kingdom from Pakistan,
entry was refused. In judicial review proceedings, it was established that the
immigration rules did not specify any particular criteria, but that the Home
Department’s circular did so specify. It was also established that the criteria
used in determining whether to allow the child into the country were different
from that provided under the circular. The Home Secretary had acted ultra
vires: he had created legitimate expectation and was not free to employ
different criteria.84
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A further challenge to the powers of the Home Secretary can be seen in R v
Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Ruddock (1987). The Home
Secretary had authorised the interception of telephone calls without statutory
authority.85 The basis on which the Home Secretary decided to intercept calls
was provided in a circular. The applicant claimed that the Home Secretary
had failed to follow the criteria laid down in the circular. The court held that
the applicant had a legitimate expectation that the criteria would be followed
but, nevertheless, the applicant lost the case because it was held that the
minister could have come to the judgment that the criteria were applied and
that he was not acting unreasonably. The decision, which appears to weaken
the binding nature of legitimate expectations, is explainable in light of the
alleged national security aspects of the case. The applicant had been a leading
member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, which the government
feared was being influenced by the Communist Party.
The concept of legitimate expectation based on the existence of procedural
guidelines may also be seen in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for Civil
Service (1985), where it was clear that, had issues of national security not been
involved, the courts would have protected the legitimate expectations of
employees at GCHQ not to have their right to be members of a trades union
removed without consultation. However, there remains uncertainty about the
extent to which judges will accept and apply the concept of legitimate
expectation.
A change made to a policy which had been embedded in an agreement
between prison inmates and prison authorities was considered by the Court of
Appeal in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Another ex parte
Hargreaves and Others (1996). The agreement stated that prisoners could apply
for home leave after serving one third of their sentence, subject to good
behaviour. The Secretary of State decided, however, that only prisoners who
had served half their sentence could apply for home leave. Hargreaves and
others unsuccessfully applied for judicial review. They subsequently appealed
to the Court of Appeal. 
The Court of Appeal held that the agreement between the prison inmates
and the prison authorities did not give rise to a legitimate expectation which
could be enforced by judicial review. Furthermore, the Home Secretary’s
decision to change the policy was not to be tested against the overall fairness
of that decision, but rather whether the policy was unreasonable in the
Wednesbury sense. On that test, the Home Secretary’s decision was not
unlawful. The Court of Appeal expressed regret, however, that the documents
on which the prisoners relied were ‘other than completely clear and
unambiguous’, and called for greater clarity in the future.
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Uncertainty in the doctrine of fairness
The principles of fairness have not, as can be seen above, been given either
universal or consistent interpretations. For example, in McInnes v Onslow Fane
(1978), Megarry VC stated that:
... the further the situation is away from anything that resembles a judicial or
quasi-judicial decision, and the further the question is removed from what may
reasonably be called a justiciable question, the more appropriate it is to reject
an expression which includes the word justice and to use instead terms such as
‘fairness’ or the ‘duty to act fairly’. [p 1530]
In Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (1985), the House
of Lords once again turned to the apparent differences in the concepts, Lord
Roskill seemingly rejecting the phrase ‘natural justice’ in favour of the duty to
‘act fairly’. Lord Roskill asserted that:
The phrase [natural justice] might now be allowed to find a permanent resting
place and be better replaced by speaking of a duty to act fairly. But the latter
phrase must not in its turn be misunderstood or misused. It is not for the
courts to determine whether a particular policy or particular decisions taken in
fulfilment of that policy are fair. They are only concerned with the manner in
which those decisions have been taken and the extent of the duty to act fairly
will vary greatly from case to case as indeed the decided cases since 1950
consistently show. Many features will come into place including the nature of
the decision and the relationship of those involved on either side before the
decision was taken. [p 414]
In Hardie v City of Edinburgh Council (2000), a teacher who was informed that
he would be removed from the list of supply teachers and not employed again
following allegations by a pupil of professional misconduct, and consideration
of reports concluding that such misconduct had taken place, was entitled to
judicial review. Natural justice required that fair notice of the allegations
made and an opportunity to comment on the reports should have been given,
and that the report should have been communicated to the applicant before a
decision was reached.
In Director General of Fair Trading v Proprietary Association of Great Britain
(2000), the Court of Appeal took the opportunity to review the test of bias as
laid down by the House of Lords in R v Gough (1993) to determine whether
that test was in line with the jurisprudence of the Court of Human Rights. The
court ruled that a ‘modest adjustment’ of the Gough test would bring it into
line with the European Court. The correct approach to be applied was, first,
for the court to ascertain all the circumstances which had a bearing on the
suggestion that a judge was biased. It then had to ask whether those
circumstances would lead a ‘fair-minded and informed observer’ to conclude
that there was a real possibility, or a real danger – the two being the same –
that a tribunal was biased.
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The right to make representations
Inevitably, the extent to which the individual is enabled to make
representations to a decision making body will be inextricably linked to the
question of the right to a hearing. Where there exists no right to an oral
hearing, the question becomes one of the extent to which – and means by
which – the view of the individual can be put to the decision making
authority. It may well be the case that the opportunity to make written
submissions will satisfy the requirements for justice and fairness. For example,
in Lloyd v McMahon (1987), local government councillors were in breach of
their statutory duty to set the level of local rates. When the district auditor
came to determine the issue, the applicants claimed the right to an oral
hearing, and that the absence of such a hearing amounted to a breach of the
rules of natural justice and was, accordingly, ultra vires. The court disagreed,
holding that, since the auditor had given notice of the case against them and
had considered written representations from them, he had acted fairly and,
accordingly, lawfully. 
The requirements of fairness mean that where a body was exercising penal
powers which involved the imposition of a penalty which was more severe
than would normally be expected, it had to give the person affected the
opportunity of making representations on the issue. The High Court so held
in R (Gutta) v General Medical Council (2001). The Medical Council had found
Dr Gutta guilty of serious professional misconduct and resolved to have her
name erased from the register and that her suspension should take effect
immediately, rather than after an appeal had been heard, as was normal. The
Council was under a duty to give notice of its intention to make such an order,
give the opportunity to make representations and give adequate reasons for
reaching its conclusion.
The right to question the ‘other side’
It is not invariably the case that, where there is to be an oral hearing, it should
be conducted according to the strict rules which would apply in a court of
law. Accordingly, it should not be assumed that a party will be entitled to
cross-examine the ‘other side’. However, in Errington v Wilson (1995), it was
made clear that Justices of the Peace must observe the rules of natural justice
and, in particular, allow cross-examination under certain circumstances. A
food authority had seized batches of cheese which it believed to be
contaminated with listeria monocytogenes. The authority then sought a
destruction order from the justice of the peace. The magistrate refused to
allow cross-examination of witnesses called by the authority. The court held
that, given the nature of the proceedings, the magistrate was required to allow
cross-examination if the proceedings were to be fair; and that, given the
difference of opinion between experts on crucial points, Errington had been
denied natural justice. 
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The admissibility of evidence and attendance of witnesses
In R v Board of Visitors of Hull Prison ex parte St Germain (No 2) (1979), prisoners
who had been involved in a prison riot were charged with breaches of the
Prison Rules. In the course of the hearing, hearsay evidence was given to the
court on behalf of a number of officers who were unable to attend the hearing.
The decision of guilt on the charges was challenged by judicial review
proceedings, on the basis that the Board of Visitors had breached the rules of
natural justice. Lane LJ, while not ruling that hearsay evidence could never be
admissible, nevertheless ruled that, in the particular circumstance of the case,
the Board should have ruled the hearsay evidence inadmissible. The decision
of the Board was quashed by order of certiorari. Similar issues were under
scrutiny in R v Commissioner for Racial Equality ex parte Cottrell and Rothon
(1980). The Commissioner had received a complaint of unlawful
discrimination by Messrs Cottrell and Rothon, a firm of estate agents. The
company had been given the opportunity to make representations – both
written and oral – to the commissioners. No witnesses were available at the
hearing. Nevertheless, the Commission issued a non-discrimination notice.86
The company sought to have the decision quashed, relying in part on R v
Board of Visitors of Hull Prison ex parte St Germain (No 2) (1979). Noting the
absence of any statutory requirement to provide an opportunity to cross-
examine witnesses in the course of a hearing, and distinguishing between the
facts of St Germain, the Court of Appeal ruled that there was no breach in the
rules relating to fairness.
In R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ex parte Guinness plc (1990), the
Takeover Panel refused to grant an adjournment of the inquisitorial
proceedings in order to allow witnesses to attend. The court expressed anxiety
about this refusal, but declined to hold that the Panel had acted unlawfully. 
A different conclusion was reached, in R v Army Board of the Defence
Council ex parte Anderson (1991). The applicant for judicial review had made
allegations of racial discrimination87 which resulted in him taking absence
without leave. Members of the Board considered his allegation of
discrimination on the basis of circulated papers, and did not meet for the
purpose of reaching its decision. The complainant had requested, but been
refused, an oral hearing, and had also requested, but been refused, the
disclosure of documents relating to his case. The Board decided that whilst
there was some prima facie evidence of discrimination, it was insufficient to
warrant either an apology or an award of compensation. Anderson sought
judicial review of the Army Board’s decision. Counsel for the Board reverted
to the distinction between administrative and judicial functions. Taylor LJ, in
the course of ruling that such a distinction was unnecessary, held that, should
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the distinction have been a necessary one, he would characterise the role of
the Army Board, in connection with the complaint, as judicial rather than
administrative. Applying the principles established in Lloyd v McMahon
(1987), and rejecting the arguments advanced by the Army Board, Taylor LJ
ruled that four principles applied to the standard of fairness required in a
hearing such as that of the Board: 
(1) There must be a proper hearing of the complaint in the sense that the
board must consider ... all the relevant evidence and contentions before
reaching its conclusion. This means, in my view, that the members of the
Board must meet ...
(2) The hearing does not necessarily have to be an oral hearing in all cases ...
Provided that they [the board] achieve the degree of fairness appropriate
to their task it is for them to decide how they will proceed and there is no
rule that fairness always requires an oral hearing ...
What it [the board] cannot do ... is to have an inflexible policy not to hold
oral hearings. 
The board fettered its discretion and failed to consider the requirements for
an oral hearing in the present case on its own merits.
(3) The opportunity to have the evidence tested by cross-examination is again
within the Army Board’s discretion. The decision whether to allow it will
usually be inseparable from the decision whether to have an oral hearing.
The object of the latter will usually be to enable witnesses to be tested in
cross-examination, although it would be possible to have an oral hearing
simply to hear submissions.
(4) Whether oral or not, there must be what amounts to a hearing of any
complaint under the 1976 Act. This means that the Army Board must have
such a complaint investigated, consider all the material gathered in the
investigation, give the complainant an opportunity to respond to it and
consider his response.
On the duty of disclosure of documents, Taylor LJ ruled that:
Because of the nature of the Army Board’s function pursuant to the 1976 Act, ...
I consider that a soldier complainant under that Act should be shown all the
material seen by the board, apart from any documents for which public
interest immunity88 can properly be claimed.
The decision of the board was quashed by order of certiorari.
The rights of prisoners have also been scrutinised in relation to the
requirement that they have sufficient information in order to challenge a
Home Secretary’s decision as to their detention or release. Under the Criminal
Justice Act 1991, the Home Secretary has a statutory duty to release, on the
direction of the Parole Board, discretionary life prisoners after they have
served a ‘tariff period’ (section 34). The period to be served is considered by
the trial judge. In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Doody
(1993), the House of Lords ruled that the prisoner was entitled to know the
length of the tariff period recommended by the trial judge, and other relevant
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factors, in order that he may make written representation to the Home
Secretary concerning the date fixed for consideration by the Parole Board of
his sentence.89 The failure to respect the entitlement to know the period
recommended in order to make written submissions, led to the Home
Secretary’s decision being quashed. 
In R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Slot (1997), a property
owner was denied natural justice where a planning authority determining her
application did not allow her to make independent representations, and
refused to give the applicant a copy of objections lodged. The decision was
quashed. Further, in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte
McAvoy (1997), a prisoner whose security status was under review, had the
right to the ‘gist’ of the reports to the review body, in order that he could
make representations knowing the case he had to meet. 
The availability of legal representation
Whether or not legal representation is available as of right will also depend
upon the nature of the hearing and the nature of the rights affected. There is
no general right to legal representation and, in some cases, it may prove to be
either unnecessary or counterproductive to the proceedings and, accordingly,
the courts have been unwilling to concede a general right to representation.90
Where the proceedings are before a tribunal, the right to be represented is at
the discretion of the tribunal.91 The general principle, according to the Royal
Commission on Legal Services, is that ‘it is desirable that every applicant
before any tribunal should be able to present his case in person or to obtain
representation’.92
Whereas legal representation is rarely denied before tribunals,93 such
representation is inextricably linked to the financial means of the applicant or
to the availability of Legal Aid (now referred to as Legal Help). It may be
more appropriate, in many instances, for applicants to be represented by non-
lawyers. A range of organisations offer representation. The Citizens Advice
Bureaux, trades unions, social workers, specialist agencies,94 the Free
Representation Unit, friends or relatives may all be allowed to appear before
tribunals. The essential criterion for representation is that the tribunal should
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not adopt a rigid policy, but rather should exercise a genuine discretion in
relation to the availability of representation.95
Failure to give reasons96
According to Lord Denning MR, the giving of reasons is ‘one of the
fundamentals of good administration’.97 Unless a decision maker provides
adequate information as to the basis on which a decision has been reached,
any possible protection which could be given to an aggrieved person is
adversely affected. 
Under the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992, there exists a statutory duty to
give reasons, on request, where decisions are reached by tribunals, public
inquiries, or under specific statutes. Under common law, however, there is no
such duty,98 although the argument that there should be such a duty is strong.
A decision making body is under a ‘general duty’ to give reasons, and any
departure from the requirement to give reasons will require sound
justification. Where an authority fails to give reasons for a decision which is
challenged subsequently by judicial review proceedings, the failure to give
reasons may cause the court to consider that there were no good reasons
whatsoever for the decision. Lord Keith expressed it thus:
... if all other known facts and circumstances appear to point overwhelmingly
in favour of a different decision, the decision maker who has given no reasons
cannot complain if the court draws the inference that he has no rational reason
for his decision.99
The courts have developed a number of exceptions to the general rule that no
reasons need be given at common law. The courts may hold, for example, that
a failure to give reasons will prejudice an applicant’s chances of successfully
applying for judicial review,100 or that a failure to give reasons amounts to
arbitrariness,101 or that legitimate expectations have been created which
demand that any departure from that expectation be explained or, more
sweepingly, that in the interests of fairness, reasons must be given.
In R v Civil Service Appeal Board ex parte Cunningham (1991), for example,
the Court of Appeal, while again stating that there was no general duty to
give reasons, held that the Civil Service Appeal Board – which determined the
applicant’s compensation for unfair dismissal – was under a duty to give
reasons, for its powers were analogous to the judicial powers of an industrial
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tribunal. Fairness demanded that the Board give reasons, in the same manner
as required for tribunals.102
The duty to give reasons must now be evaluated in light of the House of
Lords’ decision in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Doody
(1993). As seen above, pp 912–13, in Doody, the applicants, who were serving
mandatory life sentences, sought information as to the basis on which the
decision concerning the period for their mandatory detention had been
reached. The House of Lords laid down two justifications for the requirement
that information be given. First, if reasons were not given to the applicants,
the possibility of their successfully applying for judicial review would be
frustrated. Secondly, a failure to give reasons adversely affected the concept of
fairness. Lord Mustill, while acknowledging that there remained no general
duty to give reasons, stated that a duty would be implied under certain
circumstances. Where, as in Doody, the applicant did not know the reasons for
a decision, it was impossible to make any effective representations in support
of his case. Without the knowledge of any case against him, the applicant was
denied the very information which would found the basis of making
representations in support of his case. The Home Secretary was, accordingly,
under a duty to provide reasons both on the basis that the giving of reasons
was a prerequisite to an application for judicial review, and on the basis of
requirements of fairness. 
In R v Ministry of Defence ex parte Murray (1997), the Divisional Court ruled
that, although there was no general overriding principle of law which
required decision makers to give reasons for their decisions, the duty of
fairness required that reasons be given, where demanded by the
circumstances of the case. The applicant had been convicted by court martial
of wounding. The court martial reached its conclusion and passed sentence
without giving reasons. The applicant’s conduct, which was ‘entirely out of
character’, and to which he pleaded guilty, was caused by ingestion of an anti-
malarial drug. Where there was no explicit duty of fairness in statute, the
courts would require that reasons be given where fairness demanded it. In
this case, the applicant, his regiment and his family were entitled to reasons. 
In R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority ex parte Leatherland and
Others (2000), the High Court ruled that the Criminal Injuries Compensation
Authority was obliged as a matter of procedural fairness to provide proper
reasons, together with at least the gist of any supporting evidence, for its
decisions to reduce or refuse claims for compensation. A practice of
withholding such material until the day of any appeal hearing was bad
administration and unfair. 
However, not all bodies will be under a duty to give reasons on the basis
of fairness. In R v Universities Funding Council ex parte Institute of Dental Surgery
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(1994), for example, the Divisional Court ruled that the Higher Education
Funding Council was not under a duty to give reasons as to why an academic
institution was given a downgraded research grading which resulted in a loss
to the Institute of research funds. Such matters were, in the court’s opinion,
matters of academic judgment, and a duty to give reasons for a decision could
not, in this case, be founded on the requirements of fairness alone.103 Sedley J
stated that there were two classes of case emerging. The first class was
exemplified in the Doody case, where the nature of the process requires, in the
interests of fairness, reasons to be given. The second class is illustrated by Ex
parte Cunningham (1992), in which the majority of the court held that there was
something peculiar to the case which required reasons to be given in the
interests of fairness. In the Institute of Dental Surgery case, provided the
decision was based purely on academic judgment, and did not involve any
irrelevant or improper factors being taken into account, the decision would
not be impugned on the basis that reasons had not been given for the decision.
TRS Allan is critical of the decision. In his view, ‘if the requirement of reasons,
where it exists, reflects the demands of fairness and reasonableness, its denial
in the present case must cause one to doubt whether the Institute was treated
either fairly or reasonably’ (1994, p 210).
In Selvanathan v General Medical Council (2000), the court ruled that the
Professional Conduct Committee of the General Medical Council should
always give a brief explanation for their determination, whether or not they
found a medical practitioner guilty of serious professional misconduct, and
their decision on the question of penalty. Fairness required that reasons be
given, so that the losing party could decide in an informed fashion whether or
not to accept the decision to appeal against it. Given that the Committee was
composed of medical practitioners and lay members, it was not expected that
detailed reasons for their findings of fact be given, and a general explanation
of the basis for their determination would be sufficient in most cases.
The duty of the Crown Prosecution Service to give reasons for its decisions
was considered by the Divisional Court in R v Director of Public Prosecutions ex
parte Manning (2000). The applicant’s brother had died of asphyxia while
being restrained by prison officers whilst on remand in prison. At a coroner’s
inquest, the jury returned a verdict of unlawful killing. However, the Crown
Prosecution Service concluded that, while there was a prima facie case against a
prison officer, there was no realistic prospect of a successful prosecution. The
applicant then requested the reasons for the Crown Prosecution Service’s
decision, but was refused. He then sought judicial review. It was held that
while there was no absolute obligation on the Service to give reasons for a
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decision not to prosecute, a violent death in custody gave rise to great
concern. Further, since a jury had returned a verdict of unlawful killing
implicating an identifiable person, there was an expectation of a plausible
explanation for the decision and of solid grounds to support the decision. 
In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Al Fayed (1997), the
court of first instance ruled that there was no duty to give reasons for refusing
applications for naturalisation under section 44(2) of the British Nationality
Act 1981. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeal ruled that the Home
Secretary had a duty to indicate to the applicant the area(s) of concern on
which he was basing his refusal, in order that the applicant may have an
opportunity to allay the Home Secretary’s concerns. The Home Secretary’s
decision was quashed. In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte
Moon (1995), the court ruled that the Secretary of State’s refusal to explain his
reasons for concluding that the entry of the Reverend Sun Myung Moon
would not be conducive to the public good was unfair and contrary to the
rules of natural justice. 
The duty of a professional judge to give reasons was upheld by the Court
of Appeal in Flanner v Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd (2000), setting aside the
judgment of the court in a claim for damages for professional negligence. In
general, it was the duty of a judge to give reasons; the extent of the duty
would depend on the circumstances, but, where the dispute involved
opposing reasons and analysis, the judge must explain why he preferred one
case over the other.104 In Stefan v General Medical Council (1999), the health
committee of the General Medical Council had suspended the applicant
indefinitely because of her medical condition. No reasons were given. The
court stated that the common law rule against a general duty to give reasons
was changing and might have to be reconsidered in light of the Human Rights
Act 1998 (on which, see below). Although there was no general duty to give
reasons, nevertheless, in light of the nature of the appeal and the importance
for the practitioner, they ought to have done so. 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW105
The doctrine of proportionality106
From a judicial review perspective, the Human Rights Act 1998, which
incorporates Convention rights into domestic law, presages significant
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developments.107 The Human Rights Act provides an additional basis on
which the legality of actions of public authorities will be tested. The Act
provides for judicial review to extend to the review of administrative action to
determine its compatibility with Convention requirements. As has been seen
above, a fundamental concept utilised in domestic judicial review cases has
conventionally been that of ‘reasonableness’.108 At issue is whether a public
body, in its exercise of administrative discretion, has acted within the bounds
of reasonableness conferred by the legislation, under which are subsumed the
concepts of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. Both the
European Court of Justice of the European Community and the European
Court of Human Rights – which are separate institutions and operate under
separate jurisdictions109 – have long employed the concept of
‘proportionality’, and it is this concept – traditionally been regarded with
some suspicion by domestic judges – which has now become applicable.110
The doctrine of proportionality is one which confines the limits of the
exercise of power to means which are proportional to the objective to be
pursued. The doctrine has taken firm roots in the jurisprudence of, for
example, the United States of America, Canada and the law of many
continental European countries. Both the European Court of Justice of the
European Community111 (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights112
adopt proportionality as a test against which to measure the legality of actions
of authorities.113 In R v Home Secretary ex parte Brind (1991), the House of
Lords was not yet prepared to accept that the concept represented a separate
and distinct head of judicial review.
Where issues of European Community law or the European Convention
on Human Rights are involved, the doctrine is one which must be considered
if the English interpretation of European law is to be consistent with that of
the European Court of Justice and the Court of Human Rights. In Stoke-on-
Trent City Council v B & Q plc (1984), for example, Hoffmann J was prepared to
adopt the ECJ’s proportionality test when considering the compatibility of the
Shops Act 1950 and the free trade provisions of the EC Treaty.
Consistent with the requirements of the Convention, any action which
prima facie violates protected rights, must be justified on the basis that the
infringement is justifiable on the grounds set out in the Convention Articles:
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thus, the action taken must be judged according to whether or not that action
was proportionate to the objective behind the action. The Convention is
replete with state discretion – the ‘margin of appreciation’ – allied to criteria
such as ‘necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security,
public safety or the economic well being of the country, for the prevention of
disorder or crime for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of
rights and freedoms of others’.114
The time has now been reached and the doctrine of proportionality has
been adopted in domestic courts of law. In Brind, Lord Ackner asked pithily
whether the Secretary of State had ‘used a sledgehammer to crack a nut’. In
several pre-Human Rights Act cases, it is clear that the courts have been using
the doctrine of proportionality but without making explicit references thereto.
For example, in R v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council ex parte Hook (1976),
a market stall holder had had his licence revoked for urinating in public. Lord
Denning MR quashed the decision, partly on the basis that the penalty – the
loss of the licence – was disproportionate to the ‘offence’.115
Proportionality was also evident in R v Chief Constable of Sussex ex parte
International Trader’s Ferry Ltd (1999). In that case, judicial review had been
sought regarding the Chief Constable’s decision to restrict the deployment of
police officers to assist the exporters, who were being obstructed by
demonstrators. In the House of Lords, Lord Slynn stated that when answering
the question of whether ‘appropriate measures’ had been taken, the correct
approach was to ask ‘whether the steps taken were proportionate’, and that
the Chief Constable had ‘shown here that what he did in providing police
assistance was proportionate to what was required’. In his judgment, Lord
Cook took the opportunity to consider proportionality and the Wednesbury
test of unreasonableness, stating that ‘the European concepts of
proportionality and margin of appreciation produce the same result as what
are commonly called Wednesbury principles’, and re-defined the
reasonableness test to the more simple formula of ‘whether the decision in
question was one which a reasonable authority could reach’.
With the Human Rights Act 1998, proportionality moves centre stage. In
interpreting the Act, section 2 requires that domestic courts and tribunals
‘must take into account’ the judgments and decisions of the Court of Human
Rights. Under section 6, courts and tribunals are public authorities under the
Act and are therefore under a duty not to violate Convention rights.
Furthermore, most Convention rights are not absolute and unqualified, but
allow states to impose limitations on specified grounds, commonly in the
interests of ‘public safety’ or ‘national security’. Restrictions on the exercise of
rights – derogations – must also commonly be ‘prescribed by law’ and
‘necessary in a democratic society’.116 The combined effect of these provisions
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necessitates that courts follow the reasoning of the Court of Human Rights,
and that includes the doctrine of proportionality. The domestic courts have
traditionally been wary of the doctrine, on the basis that it requires judges to
go beyond an analysis of the legality of the decision making process on the
grounds of legality, rationality and procedural propriety, and to address two
further questions. The first is, where a breach of a right is found to have
occurred, was the offending action justified as being both necessary and
proportionate to the objective being sought? This requires the courts not only
to look at the processes involved in reaching decisions, but to evaluate
whether on the facts the decision maker adopted the approach which least
undermined the right in question. That exercise involves the judges looking to
the merits of decisions, rather than the process of decision making – which has
been the conventional concern of judicial review – and blurs the line between
review and appeal. Constitutionally, that alters the position of the judges vis à
vis the executive. 
However, the question arises as to whether the doctrine of proportionality
applies only where fundamental human rights are in issue, or whether it will
come to pervade all aspects of judicial review. Any judgment on that issue
would be premature and must await further case law. However the issue was
addressed by Lord Slynn in R (Alconbury Developments Ltd and Others) v
Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (2001), where he
stated that:
I consider that even without reference to the Human Rights Act the time has
come to recognise that this principle [proportionality] is part of English law,
not only when judges are dealing with [European] Community acts, but also
when they are dealing with acts subject to domestic law. Trying to keep the
Wednesbury principle and proportionality in separate compartments seems to
me to be unnecessary and confusing.
On the other hand, Jeffrey Jowell QC has stated that ‘The new constitutional
approach will not affect all our judicial review. There will no doubt remain
areas where traditional techniques of reasoning and justification will suffice to
ensure standards of legal, fair and reasonable administration based upon the
practical morality familiar to our common law’ (2000, p 682).
The giving of reasons, whether by courts or administrative bodies,
assumes increased importance in light of the Human Rights Act 1998. Article 5
of the Convention (the right to liberty and security) expressly states that
persons arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he or she
understands, of the reasons for the arrest. Article 6 of the Convention protects
the right to a fair trial in the determination of civil rights and obligations or of
criminal charges. While the giving of reasons is not an explicit requirement in
Article 6, it is implicit in facilitating the right of appeal. 
The judicial review process was scrutinised by the European Court of
Human Rights in Kingsley v United Kingdom (2001). The Court ruled that the
applicant’s right to fair trial, guaranteed by Article 6, had been violated. The
applicant had been refused a certificate to hold a management position in the
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gaming industry, by the Gaming Board of Great Britain. He sought judicial
review, alleging bias on the part of a supervisory board. The nature of judicial
review proceedings which restricted the court to examining the quality of the
decision making process rather than the merits of the decision meant that the
applicant had not received a fair trial as required by the Convention. 
The Court examined the composition of the panel which decided that the
applicant was not a fit and proper person to hold a certificate, and concluded
that it did not present the necessary appearance of impartiality to amount to
an independent and impartial tribunal. However, the Court went on to assert
that even where an adjudicatory body did not comply with the requirements
of Article 6, there would be no breach of the Article if the proceedings were
subject to ‘subsequent control by a judicial body that had full jurisdiction and
did provide the guarantees of Article 6(1)’. In the judicial review proceedings
the court considered that even if there had been unconscious bias on the part
of the board, its decision had to stand because of the application of the
doctrine of necessity. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the court accepted
that the applicant had an arguable case, and that there was a real risk of bias,
but concluded that the decision had to stand, since the decision could only be
made by the board and could not be delegated to an independent tribunal.
The Court of Human Rights ruled that where a complaint was made of a lack
of impartiality, the concept of full jurisdiction required that the ‘reviewing
court not only considered the complaint but had the ability to quash the
impugned decision and to remit the case for a new decision by an impartial
body’. In the present case, the domestic courts were unable to remit the case to
an impartial tribunal; neither the High Court nor the Court of Appeal had ‘full
jurisdiction’ within the meaning of Article 6 and there was a violation of the
Convention.
The Freedom of Information Act 2000
As discussed in Chapter 11, the Freedom of Information Act gives legislative
force to the Labour government’s commitment to more open government. An
Information Commissioner has been appointed, with jurisdiction to
investigate allegations that public authorities and bodies have failed to
provide information and documents requested. The Act, it will be recalled,
introduces the principle that information and documents will be disclosed,
subject to a test of harm which justifies official non-disclosure. The
Commissioner’s decisions are published and are subject to judicial review.
The effect of the Freedom of Information Act on judicial review will, however,
arguably be to reduce the number of applications for judicial review, in
particular on the basis of failure to give reasons. This appears to be supported
by the government’s announcement that it did not intend to appeal against
the decision in the Al Fayed case, but rather indicated that it would give
reasons for refusing citizenship. Judicial review, as seen in the previous
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chapter, is concerned with the decision making process rather than the merits
of the decision, and provides a discretionary remedy, which requires the
decision maker to reconsider the matter in accordance with the correct
procedure. Provided that the decision making process is in accordance with
the requirements of law and the principles of natural justice, the decision will
not be impugned. Under the Freedom of Information Act, however, where a
public body – which is widely defined – fails to give reasons for its decision,
recourse may be had to the Commissioner who has wide ranging powers to
investigate, and has the power to order disclosure. Where a public body
refuses to supply, for example, reasons for its decision, and the Commissioner
orders it to disclose reasons, should the public body then continue to refuse to
disclose, with no justification, that refusal may be deemed to be analogous to
contempt of court. Furthermore, should the body concerned reveal to the
Commissioner that it had no rational basis for its decision, that decision may
then be impugned on the basis of irrationality. The citizen may, accordingly,
find a more efficient and effective remedy under the jurisdiction of the
Commissioner than the courts. 
Chapter 25: Constitutional and Administrative Law
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CHAPTER 26
INTRODUCTION
In the United Kingdom, the past 30 years have seen a major expansion in
mechanisms for citizens to complain against government departments and
other public bodies. When a citizen has a complaint against the administration
of government, that complaint could be pursued in courts or tribunals or
through parliament via the constituency Member of Parliament. However,
these means for the redress of grievances have been proven inadequate and,
as a result, alternative and additional mechanisms have been introduced.
The word ‘ombudsman’ is Swedish, and means a representative of the
people. In Sweden, the office of Justitieombudsman was established in 1809.
Finland introduced a similar office in 1919, as did Denmark in 1955. In 1963,
Norway followed, with a parliamentary ombudsman, the model which had
been adopted by New Zealand in 1962. During the 1970s, countries
throughout the world adopted some form of office of ombudsman.
COMMISSIONERS FOR ADMINISTRATION 
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
The existing scheme of Commissioners for Administration is given overleaf.
Note that in addition, there exist a number of ombudsmen in the private
sector, for example, the Banking Commissioner, Building Societies
Commissioner, Corporate Estate Agents Commissioner, Pensions
Commissioner,2 Personal Investment Authority Ombudsman, Prisons
Ombudsman, Investment Commissioner, Insurance Commissioner,
Commissioner for Trades Union Members and the press and media and
telephone information services. 
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1 See Harlow and Rawlings, 1997; Birkinshaw, 1995.
2 It has been held that the Pensions Ombudsman is required to observe the statutory
procedure within the Pensions Schemes Act 1993 and the rules of natural justice: see
Seifert v Pensions Ombudsman and Others; Lynch and Another v Pensions Ombudsman and
Another (1996). See, also, Miller v Stapleton (1996); Hamar v Pensions Ombudsman (1997).
Commissioners for Administration
Commissioner Date of introduction
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration3 1967
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration4 and 1969
Commissioner for Complaints (Northern Ireland)5
Health Service Commissioners: England, Wales and 1972
Scotland6
Local Government Commissioners: England, Wales7 1974
and Scotland8 (Scotland 1975)
Legal Services Commissioner9 1990
European Union and Community Ombudsman10 1992
Scottish Parliamentary Commissioner11 1998
Welsh Administration Ombudsman12 1998
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3 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967. As amended by the Parliamentary and Health
Service Commissioner Act 1987; Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1994.
4 Parliamentary Commissioner (Northern Ireland) Act 1969.
5 Commissioner for Complaints (Northern Ireland) Act 1969.
6 National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1972; National Health Service Reorganisation
Act 1973; Parliamentary and Health Service Commissioners Act 1987; Health Service
Commissioners Act 1993; Health Service Commissioners (Amendment) Act 2000.
7 Local Government Act 1974; Local Government and Housing Act 1989, s 23.
8 Local Government (Scotland) Act 1975.
9 Courts and Legal Services Act 1990.
10 EC Treaty, Article 195, introduced under the Treaty on European Union 1992.
11 Scotland Act 1998. See Scotland Act 1998 (Transitory and Transitional Provisions)
(Complaints of Maladministration) Order 1999, SI 1999/1351.
12 Government of Wales Act 1998.
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THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONER 
FOR ADMINISTRATION13
The movement towards establishing a Parliamentary Commissioner for
Administration (or ombudsman) began in 1959. In that year, the British
section of the International Commission of Jurists, JUSTICE, established an
inquiry into grievances against the administration. The resultant report14
advocated setting up an additional avenue for the redress of grievances, the
office being modelled on the same lines as those of the ombudsmen in
Scandinavian jurisdictions. As the report stated, there appeared to be:
... a continuous flow of relatively minor complaints, not sufficient in
themselves to attract public interest, but nevertheless of great importance to
the individuals concerned, which give rise to feelings of frustration and
resentment because of the inadequacy of the existing means of seeking
redress.15
The existing machinery was found wanting: parliamentary Question Time
was inadequate to deal with the volume of problems arising; if a complaint
was made directly to the government department, the department
investigated the complaint; if a Member of Parliament attempted to
investigate, he could not gain access to all departmental documentation.
Accordingly, the report advocated establishing a permanent office,
independent of the executive and accountable only to parliament, removable
from office only after a successful address had been moved to both Houses of
Parliament. The report recommended that a select committee should be
established to consider the Commissioner’s reports and to give parliamentary
authority to the work of the Commissioner. The report also recommended
that the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration’s office should be
one which supplemented, rather than undermined, existing procedures for
complaint. Complaints, at least initially, concerning maladministration16
should be routed through Members of Parliament, rather than directly
addressed to the Parliamentary Commissioner. This would preserve to
Members of Parliament the opportunity to resolve a matter of complaint but,
failing their ability to do so, confer the right to refer the matter to the
Parliamentary Commissioner for investigation and report.
The government’s response to the report was cautious. Concern was
expressed as to the interference in the running of government,17 and that the
Commissioner’s role would be incompatible with the doctrine of ministerial
responsibility. Furthermore, the government felt that:
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13 See Pugh, 1978. See, also, Clothier, 1984 and 1986.
14 The Citizen and the Administration (the ‘Whyatt Report’), 1961.
15 Ibid, para 76.
16 On which, see below.
17 Lord Chancellor, HL Deb Vol 244 Cols 384–85.
... there is already adequate provision under our constitution and
Parliamentary practice for the redress of any genuine complaint of
maladministration, in particular by means of the citizen’s rights of access to
Members of Parliament.18
The incoming Labour government, however, accepted the need for an office to
complement the existing complaints machinery.19 Thus, in 1967, the
Parliamentary Commissioner Act was passed. Being a constitutional
innovation, the provisions as to procedure, jurisdiction and powers of
enforcement were restrictive.
The constitutional position of the Commissioner
By 1983, the office of Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration had
been operative for 15 years, and the Commissioner20 took the opportunity to
review the working of his office in his annual report. He described his office in
the following manner:
The office of Parliamentary Commissioner stands curiously poised between
the legislature and the executive, while discharging an almost judicial function
in the citizen’s dispute with his government, and yet it forms no part of the
judiciary. It is from the centre of that triangle that I have been able to
appreciate the virtues of our unwritten and therefore flexible constitutional
arrangements and still more the goodwill of those men and women, legislators
and administrators who govern us.
THE COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE
Complaints must be in writing, and made to the constituency Member of
Parliament.21 The complaint must be made within 12 months of the day on
which the person became aware of the matters alleged, unless the time period
is extended by the Commissioner, on the basis that an investigation is
necessary.22 The complaint must relate to maladministration and not the
merits of a decision or the policy being pursued. This restriction has led to
some 43 per cent of complaints made being rejected by the Commissioner.
The requirement that complaints be made initially to Members of
Parliament reinforces the view that the Commissioner is a supplement to the
parliamentary process rather than a substitute. This restricted right of access,
however, causes difficulties for complainants, and is not a model adopted
elsewhere.23 In the majority of countries having some form of parliamentary
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18 Attorney General, 666 HC Col 1125.
19 The Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, Cmnd 2767, 1965, London: HMSO.
20 Sir Cecil Clothier who held office from 1979–85.
21 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, s 5(1)(a).
22 Ibid, s 6(3).
23 See the JUSTICE Report, Our Fettered Ombudsman, 1977, and the Select Committee
Report, Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (Review of Access and Jurisdiction),
HC 615 (1978–79), London: HMSO.
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ombudsman, complaints are made directly to the ombudsman. Moreover, this
filter mechanism has not been adopted in relation to the Health Service
Commissioner, the Commissioners for Local Government or the Complaints
Commissioner for Northern Ireland.24
Jurisdiction
Section 5(1) of the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 provides that a
member of the public may make a complaint and the Commissioner may
investigate that complaint where, subject to the rules on jurisdiction, the
person ‘claims to have sustained injustice in consequence of
maladministration’.25 Before examining that concept, it must be noted that
there are a number of restrictions to the jurisdiction of the Parliamentary
Commissioner, which result in a large number of complaints each year not
being investigated.
Excluded matters
The work of the police,26 of nationalised industries, the Cabinet Office, Prime
Minister’s Office, Parole Board, tribunals, Bank of England, Criminal Injuries
Compensation Board and government commercial and contractual
transactions are all excluded.27 The Commissioner may not investigate any
matter where the complainant has a right of ‘appeal, reference or review’ to a
tribunal, or a remedy in any court of law, unless it would be unreasonable to
expect the complainant to have resort to such a remedy.28 The Commissioner
thus has a discretion as to whether or not a complaint should be accepted. It
has been indicated that, where the legal process would be too cumbersome,
slow or expensive in relation to the objective to be gained, the complaint will
be accepted.29
The interaction between legal proceedings and complaints to the
Commissioner was well illustrated in 1975. The government decided to
increase the licence fee for television sets. In advance of the fee increase,
individuals renewed their licences at the existing rate. The Home Office then
decided to revoke the 36,000 licences issued at the cheaper rate. A number of
complaints were referred to the Commissioner, who found maladministration
on the part of government, inter alia, for not giving sufficient warning of the
increases and for inefficiency. The Commissioner, however, ruled that the
government was acting on legal advice and therefore should not be
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24 There is, however, a ‘filter’ procedure for the Parliamentary Commissioner for Northern
Ireland.
25 See below for the meaning of ‘maladministration’.
26 Which has its own internal complaints procedures.
27 See HC 322 (1983–84), London: HMSO.
28 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, s 5(2).
29 See McMurtie, 1997.
sanctioned. Judicial review proceedings were commenced to determine the
lawfulness of the Home Secretary’s decision, as a result of which the
complainants established a legal remedy.30 It may be argued that the
Commissioner was wrong in exercising his discretionary jurisdiction in this
case, since it should have been foreseen that an action in judicial review would
lie.
The departments and matters which the Commissioner is precluded from
investigating are wide ranging. Schedule 3 of the Parliamentary
Commissioner Act 1967 sets out the excluded matters, the most significant of
which are:
• Action taken in matters certified by a Secretary of State or other Minister of
the Crown to affect relations or dealings between the government of the
United Kingdom and any other government or any international
organisation of States or government.
• Action taken in connection with the administration of the government of
any country or territory outside the United Kingdom which forms part of
Her Majesty’s dominions or in which Her Majesty has jurisdiction.
• Action taken by the Secretary of State under the Fugitive Offenders Act
1967 or the Extradition Act 1989.
• Action taken by or with the authority of the Secretary of State for the
purposes of investigating crime or of protecting the security of the State,
including action so taken with respect to passports.
• The commencement or conduct of civil or criminal proceedings before any
court of law in the United Kingdom.
• Any exercise of the prerogative of mercy.
• Action taken in matters relating to contractual or other commercial
transactions ... being transactions of a government department.
• Action taken in respect of appointments or removals, pay, discipline,
superannuation or other personnel matters, in relation to:
the armed forces, any office or employment under the Crown.31
• The grant of honours, awards or privileges within the gift of the Crown,
including the grant of Royal Charters.
Departments and matters within the Commissioner’s jurisdiction
Schedule 2 of the Act lays down those Departments subject to the jurisdiction
of the Commissioner. The Parliamentary and Health Service Commissioners
Act 1987 extended the Commissioner’s jurisdiction to cover some non-
departmental bodies, and the complete list of Departments and bodies within
the Commissioner’s jurisdiction is now found in Schedule 1 to the 1987 Act, as
amended by the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1994, which provides that
the following bodies shall be subject to investigation by the Commissioner:
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Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service; Agricultural Wages
Committee; Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food; Arts Council; British
Council; British Film Institute; British Library Board; Building Societies
Commission; Certification Officer; Central Statistical Office of the Chancellor of
the Exchequer; Charity Commission; Office of the Minister for the Civil
Service; Civil Service Commission; Co-operative Development Agency;
Countryside Commission; Countryside Council for Wales; Crafts Council;
Crofters Commission; Crown Estate Office; Customs and Excise; Data
Protection Registrar; Ministry of Defence; Development Commission;
Educational Assets Board; Department of Education and Science; Central
Bureau for Educational Visits and Exchanges; Office of the Director General of
Electricity Supply; Department of Employment; Department of Energy;
Department of the Environment; Equal Opportunities Commission; Office of
the Director of Fair Trading; English Heritage; Equal Opportunities
Commission; Export Credits Guarantee Department; Foreign and
Commonwealth Office; Forestry Commission; Register of Friendly Societies;
Office of the Director General of Gas Supply; Health and Safety Commission;
Health and Safety Executive; Department of Health; Highland and Islands
Development Board; Historic Buildings and Monuments Commission; Home
Office; Horseracing Betting Levy Board; Housing Corporation; Housing for
Wales; Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority; Central Office of
Information; Inland Revenue; Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce;
Land Registry; Legal Aid Board; Scottish Legal Aid Board; Lighthouse
Authorities; Lord Chancellor’s Department; Lord President of the Council’s
Office; Medical Practices Committee; Scottish Medical Practices Committee;
Museums and Galleries Commission; National Debt Office; Department of
National Heritage; Trustee of the National Heritage Memorial Fund;
Department of National Savings; Nature Conservancy Council for England;
Commission for the New Towns; Development Corporations for New Towns;
Northern Ireland Court Service; Northern Ireland Office; Ordnance Survey;
Office of Population Censuses and Surveys; Registrar of Public Lending
Rights; Office of Public Service and Science; Public Record Office; Scottish
Record Office; Commission for Racial Equality; Red Deer Commission,
Commission of the Registrars of Scotland; General Register Office, Scotland;
Agricultural and Food Research Council; Economic and Social Research
Council; Medical Research Council; Natural Environment Research Council;
Science and Engineering Research Council; Residuary Bodies; Office of the
Commissioner for the Rights of Trades Union Members; Royal Mint; Scottish
Courts Administration; Scottish Legal Aid Board; Scottish Office; Central
Council for Education and Training in Social Work; Department of Social
Security; Sports Council; Sports Council for Wales; Office for Standards in
Education; Stationery Office; Office of the Director General of
Telecommunications; English Tourist Board; Scottish Tourist Board; Wales
Tourist Board; Board of Trade; Department of Trade and Industry; Traffic
Director for London; Agricultural Training Board; Clothing and Allied
Products Industry Training Board; Construction Industry Training Board;
Hotel and Catering Industry Training Board; Plastics Processing Industry
Training Board; Road Transports Industry Training Board; Department of
Transport; Treasury; Treasury Solicitor; Independent Tribunal Service; Urban
929
Development Corporations; Development Board for Rural Wales; Office of the
Director General of Water Services; Welsh Office.
The Commissioner’s discretion
Where a matter falls within the Commissioner’s jurisdiction, the
Commissioner has discretion as to whether to accept the complaint.32 Section
5(5) provides that the Commissioner shall act ‘in accordance with his own
discretion’. Because of the breadth of discretion conferred on the
Commissioner, both in relation to accepting complaints and in the conduct of
investigations, judicial review of his decisions is unlikely to succeed. For
example, in Re Fletcher (1970), the applicant sought an order of mandamus to
force the Commissioner to investigate a complaint. The House of Lords
refused, relying on the broad discretion conferred on the Commissioner by
statute. In R v Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration ex parte Dyer
(1994), the applicant sought judicial review of the Commissioner’s
investigation into her complaints against the Department of Social Security.
The applicant was dissatisfied with a report of the Commissioner and sought
judicial review on four grounds. The allegations were, first, that the
Commissioner had not investigated all her complaints; secondly, that she had
not been given the opportunity to comment on the draft reports; thirdly, that
the Commissioner, having heard her complaints, refused to reopen the
investigations; and, fourthly, that the Commissioner was wrong in holding
that he could not reopen the inquiry. The Queen’s Bench Division held that it
had jurisdiction to review the work of the Commissioner. Lord Justice Simon
Brown declared that he could see nothing in the Commissioner’s role or the
statutory framework in which he operated which is ‘so singular as to take him
wholly outside the purview of judicial review’. Nevertheless, the court would
be slow to review given the breadth of discretion conferred under the Act.33
The meaning of ‘maladministration’
Maladministration is the key concept relating to the Commissioner’s
jurisdiction, but it is not defined in the Act. The concept derives from the
Whyatt Report of 1961, where it was described as a term which ‘was not of
precise meaning’. The failure to define the concept in the Act was deliberate.
The minister responsible for introducing the legislation, Mr Richard
Crossman, felt that the Act was of such an innovatory nature that time would
be needed to adjust to the Act’s introduction and that no rigid criteria should
be set. In the House of Commons, Mr Crossman described maladministration
as including ‘bias, neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, ineptitude,
perversity, turpitude, arbitrariness and so on’.34
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33 Cf R v Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration ex parte Balchin (1997), in which
judicial review was granted, and the Parliamentary Commissioner found to have fallen
into error.
34 Official Report HC 734 Col 51.
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The courts have examined the concept of maladministration in relation to
the work of Local Government Commissioners. For example, in R v
Commissioners for Local Administration ex parte Bradford Metropolitan Borough
Council (1979), maladministration was described as ‘faulty administration’ and
‘bad administration’, whereas, in 1980, Lord Donaldson MR explained that
maladministration is primarily concerned with the manner in which
authorities reach or implement decisions, and is not concerned with the
quality of the decision itself.35 In R v Local Commissioner for Administration in
the North and North East England ex parte Liverpool City Council (2000), the Court
of Appeal ruled that the failure of local councillors to follow the National
Code of Local Government Conduct, and failure to observe the requirement to
declare financial interests when taking part in decisions relating to planning,
was maladministration. 
Maladministration is a more restrictive concept than is employed in other
jurisdictions. In Denmark, for example, the ombudsman may examine
‘mistakes’ and ‘unreasonable decisions’ and, in Norway, the ombudsman can
investigate decisions which are ‘clearly unreasonable’. In the United
Kingdom, being tied to the concept of maladministration, the Commissioner is
not concerned with the merits of any decision taken, nor the fairness or
otherwise of the rules governing any situation, but rather with the manner of
the application of the rules.
The Commissioner’s investigation and report
In the exercise of his jurisdiction, the Commissioner is vested with strong
powers by the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967. The Commissioner has
the same powers as a court in respect of requiring the attendance of witnesses
and the right of examination, and the production of documents, subject to the
protections of Cabinet proceedings and documents and such information as a
person would not be compelled to disclose to a court of law (section 8). To
obstruct the Commissioner in the performance of his duties under the Act,
without lawful excuse, may be certified as a contempt.
Under section 10, where the Commissioner accepts jurisdiction and
investigates a complaint, a report of the findings are sent to the principal
officer of the department concerned and, if the matter has not been remedied,
or is unlikely to be, he may lay a special report before each House of
Parliament. The Commissioner’s Annual General Report is laid before
parliament. The Commissioner has no power to grant a remedy or to grant
compensation. He does, however, make recommendations as to the
appropriate remedy, and as to levels of suitable compensation.
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The volume of complaints
The evidence indicates that, whilst a high number of complaints are rejected
(either because they relate to matters not within the Commissioner’s
jurisdiction, whether relating to an excluded department or relating to matters
of policy, or because they reveal no prima facie case of maladministration),
once a complaint is admitted for investigation, the prospect of a finding of
maladministration – at least in part – is high. In 1992, for example, of 186
completed investigations, 177 (or 95 per cent) cases were found to reveal
maladministration.
In terms of his investigations, the Commissioner has reported that 50 per
cent of his time is consistently devoted to complaints about tax and social
security – the two largest departments in terms of contact with, and effect on,
individuals. In 1999–2000, the Department of Social Security was the subject of
41 per cent of all referrals, the Inland Revenue the subject of eight per cent.
The Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions in 1999–2000
accounted for 7.5 per cent of complaints. Of the problems encountered in
terms of maladministration, these are put down to the sheer scale of the
administrative function and the necessary complexity of laws. The impersonal
nature of services, the forms and lack of access to administrators and
problems of delay also feature highly.
As to the level of success achieved, the Commissioner reported that, in all
cases where injustice had been found to have occurred through
maladministration, the remedy proposed by the Commissioner had been
accepted.
THE PROBLEM OF ACCESSIBILITY 
AND PUBLIC AWARENESS
On accessibility, the Commissioner has questioned his own position.36 As
seen, prior to reform, discussed below, access to the Commissioner could only
be gained through a Member of Parliament, and not directly. Of the 100 plus
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36 Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration Annual Report for 1983 (1983–84), London:
HMSO. And see Report of the Select Committee on the Parliamentary Commissioner for
Administration: The Powers, Work and Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman (1992–93), London:
HMSO.
Year Number of complaints
1997–1998  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1,459
1998–1999  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1,506
1999–2000  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1,612
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national ombudsmen around the world, the British Commissioner was unique
in having no powers of initiative, being dependent upon references from the
MP ‘filter’. In the report for 1988, the Commissioner considered the difficulties
in increasing public awareness about the Commissioner’s role and powers,37
despite regular press notices, press and radio and television interviews and
the booklet available from Citizens Advice Bureaux and public libraries. In the
Commissioner’s report of 1990,38 the problem of public awareness was again
alluded to.
The Commissioner himself has noted that public awareness is most
usually raised through some major issue or scandal. Two illustrations may be
cited. The first major investigation arising out of a number of complaints was
into the non-payment of compensation by the Foreign Office to 12 persons
who had been prisoners of war in the Sachsenhausen camp.39 Monies had
been made available by the German government and distributed by the
Foreign Office to former detainees. The Commissioner found there had been
maladministration40 and the government awarded compensation to the
complainants.
The Barlow Clowes affair resulted in hundreds of complaints being made
to the Commissioner concerning the collapse of the Barlow Clowes
company.41 In 1988, the group of companies collapsed, causing significant
losses to shareholders. The Department of Trade and Industry has
responsibility for licensing such investment companies.42 Following the
company’s collapse, numerous shareholders complained to Members of
Parliament, 159 of whom referred the complaints to the Parliamentary
Commissioner. The Commissioner made five findings of maladministration
on the part of the Department of Trade and Industry, including errors, lack of
information before making decisions, delay in instigating a formal inquiry, a
failure to appreciate that auditors would not find the relevant information and
insufficient rigour in exercising its regulatory role – all of which resulted in
injustice.
The government initially rejected the Commissioner’s findings and
recommendations as to compensation, arguing both that no investment is free
of risk and that those with larger amounts of money should accept a higher
level of responsibility and therefore loss. The Commissioner expressed
disappointment that the government did not unreservedly accept his report.
His recommendation was that compensation should be payable to investors at
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HMSO.
38 Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration Annual Report for 1990 (1990–91), London:
HMSO.
39 See Bradley, 1992b.
40 Third Report of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, HC 54 (1967–68),
London: HMSO; and see Gregory and Drewry, Part I and Part II, 1991.
41 See Gregory and Drewry, Part I and Part II, 1991.
42 Under the Prevention of Fraud (Investment) Act 1958; now Financial Services Act 1986.
a rate of 90 per cent for losses incurred under £50,000, and 85 per cent for
losses under £100,000. The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry accepted
the recommendations, but maintained that the government had no legal
liability to compensate investors, and claimed that the Department’s handling
of the case was ‘within acceptable range of standards reasonably to be
expected of regulators’. The Secretary of State went on to say that
compensation was being made only because of the Parliamentary
Commissioner’s recommendations.43
The losses caused to egg manufacturers over allegations made by officials
concerning the salmonella virus resulted in charges of maladministration and
compensation of £600,000 being paid by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries
and Food.44 The Animal Health Act 198145 provided that, where the
salmonella virus was found in flocks, the flock should be slaughtered and
compensation paid for the loss of the healthy birds. No compensation was
payable for the diseased birds. The Ministry fixed the level of compensation –
irrespective of the proportion of the flock infected by the virus – at 60 per cent
of the value of the healthy birds. On investigation, the Commissioner found
that inadequate compensation had been paid.46
It has been seen above that the government is, in general, prepared to
accept the findings of the Commissioner and to implement his
recommendations. In December 1991, the Financial Secretary to the
Treasury47 stated that ‘I am not aware of any circumstances in which [the
Parliamentary Ombudsman’s] recommendations have been ignored. This is
the basis on which the government has tended to work – and has, as far as I
am aware, always worked – in that we do accept and implement the
recommendations that are made’.48 This commitment was reiterated by the
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster49 in 1993, when he stated that
‘invariably, in the end, [the government] accepted the Commissioner’s say-
so’.50 However, it has also been seen above that, in relation to the Barlow
Clowes affair, the government deviated from this normally accepted practice
and, while prepared to offer compensation, did so ‘without admission of fault
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46 Fourth Report: Compensation to Farmers for Slaughtered Poultry, HC 519 (1992–93), London:
HMSO.
47 Mr Francis Maude MP.
48 Second Report from the Select Committee on the PCA: The Implications of the Citizen’s Charter
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London: HMSO, Q 11.
49 Then the Rt Hon William Waldegrave MP.
50 First Report from the Select Committee on the PCA: The Powers, Work and Jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman, HC 33 (1993–94), London: HMSO, Q 733.
51 Observations by the government to the Report of the PCA on Barlow Clowes, HC 99
(1989–90), London: HMSO, para 43.
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or liability’.51 The government has proved to be more obdurate in relation to
the 1995 report of the Commissioner, relating to financial damage caused by
the prolonged plans to build the Channel Tunnel Rail Link.
The Channel Tunnel Rail Link (the CTRL) is a stretch of railway line,
designed to take high speed cross-channel trains. The government’s original
intention was that the CTRL would be financed by the private sector.
However, when private funding was not forthcoming, the project could not
proceed. In 1990, the Secretary of State for Transport announced that the route
was to be reconsidered. The project was thus kept alive, but uncertainty
surrounded the area of south east England in which it was to built. As a result,
thousands of properties were ‘blighted’ and owners unable to sell their
homes. The route was finally decided in 1994.
In February 1995, the Commissioner52 laid a special report before the
House.53 The special report was only the second such report to be made in the
history of the office of Commissioner.54 The basis for the laying of a special
report is that the Commission considers that injustice has been caused to
persons as a result of maladministration and that the injustice has not been, or
will not be, remedied. In the Commissioner’s report on the CTRL project, the
Commissioner considered that maladministration had occurred in the
Department of Transport between June 1990 and April 1994. The
Commissioner’s view was that the Department of Transport ‘had a
responsibility to consider the position of ... persons suffering exceptional or
extreme hardship and to provide for redress where appropriate’55 and that
the government had a duty to consider the position not just of all citizens, but
also of individual citizens harmed by its action. The Commissioner found that
‘no special consideration was given to that aspect of good administration and
it is on that basis that I criticise the department’.56 The Commissioner
recommended that individuals who had suffered exceptional hardship should
receive compensation from the government. The government’s reaction was
to state that it was not its policy to compensate those affected by generalised
blight, and that, in relation to those individuals who had suffered exceptional
hardship, it was too difficult to define criteria to identify such individuals.
With this, the Commissioner disagreed. While he accepted that there were
definitional difficulties, he did not ‘accept at all that it is technically beyond a
government department’s capabilities’ to establish the relevant criteria.57
The Commissioner’s report and the government’s response was
considered by the Select Committee on the Parliamentary Commissioner for
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52 Mr William Reid CB.
53 Pursuant to the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, s 10(3).
54 The first was in 1977–78, which also involved the Department of Transport.
55 Fifth Report of the PCA: The Channel Tunnel Rail Link and Blight, HC 193 (1994–95),
London: HMSO, para 46.
56 Ibid, Q 1.
57 Ibid, Q 1.
Administration (see, further, below). In its report,58 the committee agreed
with the Commissioner’s assessment of the evidence. The committee stated
that:
The department failed to provide any material to contradict this finding when
invited to do so by the committee. At no point was direct and comprehensive
consideration given to the question of whether it was either desirable or
possible to offer ex gratia compensation to those exceptionally afflicted by the
generalised blight of the CTRL project. 
The committee considered that at the heart of the matter lay the definition of
maladministration. In his annual report for 1993, the Commissioner included
in his definition ‘failure to mitigate the effects of rigid adherence to the letter
of the law where that produces manifestly inequitable treatment’.59 Endorsing
this definition, the committee stated that the definition implies:
... an expectation that when an individual citizen is faced with extraordinary
hardship as a result of strict application of law or policy, the executive must be
prepared to look again and consider whether help can be given. That the
department did not do. It never considered the possibility of distinguishing
cases of extreme hardship from the mass of those affected adversely by
blight.60
The committee concluded that:
1(i) ... the Department of Transport should have considered whether any ex
gratia payments were due when the CTRL project entered the period of
uncertainty caused by problems of funding between June 1990 and April
1994;
(ii) ... it is desirable to grant redress to those affected to an extreme and
exceptional degree by generalised blight, in line with the principle that
maladministration includes a failure to mitigate the effects of rigid
adherence to the letter of the law where that produces manifestly
inequitable treatment;
(iii) ... it should be possible to distinguish a small number of cases of
exceptional hardship.
The committee recommended that:
... the Department of Transport reconsider its response to the Ombudsman’s
findings, accept his conclusion that maladministration has occurred and
consider arrangements to determine whether there are householders who
merit compensation on the grounds of exceptional hardship. That is very much
a matter for the department’s judgment, a point the Ombudsman emphasised.
It would be most regrettable if the department were to remain obdurate. In
such an event, we then recommend that as a matter of urgency a debate on this
matter be held on the floor of the House on a substantive motion in
government time.61
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This highly critical report on the actions of the Department of Transport and
the government’s failure to respond positively to the Commissioner’s report
represents a landmark case in the complex tri-partite constitutional
relationship between the Commissioner, his select committee and parliament,
and the executive. In 1997, the government finally agreed to pay
compensation of £5,000 to property owners whose property value had been
adversely affected by the delay in reaching decisions over the routing of the
CTRL.62
The Select Committee63
The Parliamentary Commissioner is aided by a select committee, which
considers the annual and special reports of the Parliamentary Commissioner
and Health Service Commissioner and takes evidence from the
Commissioners and others, including government departments and health
authorities, on matters arising from reports in order to ensure that all
reasonable efforts are made to tighten up procedures, prevent the repetition of
faults and provide any appropriate remedies.
The Select Committee represents the formal link between the
Commissioner and parliament. The committee is able to exert pressure on
government departments to comply with the recommendations of the
Commissioner.
The Parliamentary Commissioner and ministerial responsibility
One aspect of the office of Commissioner which caused concern when the
office was proposed was the relationship between the Commissioner and
ministers, and the impact of the Commissioner’s office on the doctrine of
ministerial responsibility. The view of the government at the time was that
ministerial responsibility and the office of the Commissioner were
irreconcilable. As noted above, in the Attorney General’s view, there already
existed ‘adequate provision’ under the constitution for the redress of
grievances.
JUSTICE replied that:
The Commissioner would help to make ministerial responsibility more
effective. He would penetrate the screen which Ministers interpose between
Members of Parliament and government departments and he would keep
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63 See Gregory, 1982.
Parliament informed about administrative practices which were open to
criticism. The responsibility of the Minister would remain as it is – neither
more nor less.
The government’s policy of making administration more open and accessible
has an impact on the work of the Parliamentary Commissioner. Three major
developments reflected this commitment. The Citizen’s Charter provided that
public bodies must state their objectives, must publicise the standards of
service to be expected by consumers and establish complaints procedures for
dissatisfied customers.64 Specific services must publish their own
individuated Charter. By March 1994, there were 38 Charters in existence.65
The establishment of ‘Next Step Agencies’,66 the task of which is to achieve
greater efficiency in the delivery of public services, also affects the role of the
Commissioner. The setting up of Agencies, the head of which are responsible
for operational matters and accountable to parliament through select
committee inquiries, has the effect of reducing the size of the central Civil
Service and introducing greater management efficiency and accountability.
The minister remains responsible to parliament for policy matters. In relation
to the Parliamentary Commissioner,67 his powers of investigation, report and
recommendation continue to extend to Agencies. However, complaints made
by the public to Members of Parliament about operational matters are to be
directed to the chairman of the board of the Agency. Complaints regarding
matters of policy remain within the political domain and the responsibility of
ministers. 
REFORM OF THE OFFICE OF 
PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONER68
The office of Commissioner suffers from a number of drawbacks. Individuals
have – unlike in most other jurisdictions – no right of direct access to the
Parliamentary Commissioner. The concept of maladministration is relatively
narrow and is linked to injustice suffered as a result of a decision.
Furthermore, while the 1987 Act has extended the bodies into which the
Commissioner has jurisdiction to investigate, there remain a significant
number of matters outside his jurisdiction. Many of these relate to matters
which fall under the royal prerogative,69 which, as has been seen, is subject to
inadequate parliamentary scrutiny and to limited judicial review.
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66 See Improving Management in Government: The Next Steps, 1988, London: HMSO.
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The question of direct access to the Commissioner was again considered
by the Select Committee in 1993–94.70 The committee conducted a survey of
Members of Parliament in order to ascertain their views on the filter. Of the
333 Members who responded, the committee reported that 38.4 per cent were
in favour of direct access to the Commissioners, whereas 58.0 per cent were
against direct access.71 The committee commented that:
It is clear that many Members value their role as champions of their
constituents’ complaints and are unwilling to see this constitutional function in
any way bypassed or diminished.72
The Commissioner himself, however, argued forcibly that the filter was
‘potentially disadvantageous to complainants’, in part because individuals
may feel that their Member of Parliament would be unwilling to help them
and because of the administrative burden on Members of Parliament in
transmitting material to the Commissioner. JUSTICE and the National
Consumer Council also argued for reform of the system. The committee
summarised the objections to the MP filter as follows:
(a) The public should have direct access to the Commissioner as a matter of
right.
(b) The filter is an anomaly, almost unknown in other ombudsman systems.73
No such requirement exists, for instance, in the case of the Health Service
Commissioner.
(c) Individuals with complaints may be unwilling to approach an MP, while
desiring the ombudsman’s assistance.
(d) The filter means that the likelihood of individuals’ cases being referred to
the Commissioner will largely depend on the views and practice of the
particular constituency MP. Some look with more favour on the Office of
the Commissioner than others.
(e) The filter acts as an obstacle to the Commissioner effectively promoting his
services.
(f) The filter creates an unnecessary bureaucratic barrier between the
complainant and the Commissioner, involving considerable paperwork for
MPs and their offices.74
The committee concluded, however, that the advantages of retaining the filter
system outweighed these significant disadvantages. The committee was
particularly concerned to retain the role of the Member of Parliament in the
investigation of complaints, and about the potentially vast increase in the
number of complaints being received by the Commissioner if the filter was
removed.75
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The question of the jurisdictional basis of maladministration has also been
subject to consideration. The JUSTICE-All Souls Report of 198876
recommended no change to the definition.
COMMISSIONERS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, 
SCOTLAND AND WALES 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales each have a Parliamentary
Commissioner for Administration with similar powers and functions as the
United Kingdom Parliamentary Commissioner. In Northern Ireland there is
also a Police Ombudsman.77
THE HEALTH SERVICE COMMISSIONERS
The National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1972 and National Health Service
Reorganisation Act 197378 introduced separate Health Service Commissioners
for England, Wales and Scotland. The Parliamentary Commissioner for
Administration undertakes the role of Health Service Commissioner. The
Commissioner reports directly to the Secretary of State for Health, but his
reports are laid before both Houses of Parliament and will be considered by
the Parliamentary Commissioner Select Committee.
Jurisdiction
Section 109 of the Health Service Act 1977 provides that the following are
subject to investigation by the Health Commissioner: regional, district and
special health authorities; family health services authorities; Mental Health
Act Commission; Dental Practice Board; and National Health Service Trusts.
The Commissioner may investigate any matter relating to an alleged
failure to provide a service it is meant to provide, and any other action taken
by or on behalf of the authority. The jurisdiction is thus much broader than
‘maladministration’. However, the complaint must be one which involves
injustice or hardship suffered as a result of failures under the two headings for
complaint. Individuals have the right of direct access to the Commissioner.
Excluded matters
Section 116(2)(b) of the Health Service Act 1977 provides that the
Commissioner shall not investigate complaints about services provided by
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family doctors, dentists, opticians and pharmacists. This broad exclusion was
justified on the basis that the services provided are provided independently,
under contracts with local family health services authorities which have
jurisdiction to adjudicate on complaints. The most significant exclusion from
jurisdiction related to clinical decisions. The Health Service Commissioners
(Amendment) Act 1996, however, extends the jurisdiction of health service
commissioners. Section 6 removed the statutory bar which prevented the
Commissioner from investigating complaints concerning clinical judgment,
thus correcting one of the most significant former jurisdictional exclusions.
Service committees which consider allegations against doctors, dentists,
opticians and pharmacists originally could not be investigated by the
Commissioner, under Schedule 13, paragraph 19 of the National Health
Service Act 1977. Personnel matters were also excluded, as are commercial
transactions, and inquiries set up by the Secretary of State into aspects of the
National Health Service. Sections 1 and 2 of the Health Service Commissioners
(Amendment) Act 1996, however, now bring the providers of general medical,
dental, ophthalmic and pharmaceutical services and people in the
independent sector who provide services to NHS patients within the
Commissioners’ jurisdiction. 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMISSIONERS79
The Local Government Act 1974 established Commissioners for Local
Administration, for England and Wales. England is divided into three areas,
each represented by one or more Commissioners.80 The Scottish system is
established under Part II of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1975.
Commissioners are appointed by the Crown and hold office ‘during good
behaviour’.
Jurisdiction
The Commissioners have jurisdiction to investigate any complaint of
maladministration involving council committees, their Members and officers
of the council. Police authorities and water boards are also subject to
investigation.81 The Local Government Act 198882 brings development
corporations and the Commission for New Towns within the Commissioner’s
jurisdiction. Since 1989, the public has the right of direct access to the
Commissioner, a reform which resulted in a 44 per cent increase in complaints
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79 Recommended by the JUSTICE Report, The Citizen and His Council: Ombudsmen for Local
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80 Local Government Act 1974, s 23.
81 Ibid, ss 25, 34(1).
82 Local Government Act 1988, s 29, Sched 3.
by the year ending March 1989 and by March 1990 in a further 25 per cent
increase in complaints.
Maladministration causing injustice
The concept of maladministration used for the Parliamentary Commissioner is
adopted for the Local Commissioners. Maladministration resulting in injustice
has been found to include incomplete record keeping and the failure to give
reasons for decisions, and a finding of maladministration may be made where
an authority fails to have adequate complaints procedures. Inadequate school
places, and unreasonable delays in processing applications for improvement
grants have also been found to amount to maladministration. Shortages of
staff and financial resources will not excuse a council from a finding of
maladministration.
Section 31 of the Act provides that an authority need only consider a
Commissioner’s report if it has been found that the maladministration in
question has resulted in injustice. Mere maladministration is not enough.
Remedies
Where a finding of maladministration resulting in injustice has been made,
section 31 of the Local Government Act 1974 imposes a duty on authorities to
consider the report and to advise the Commissioner of any action taken to
comply with the findings, or proposed action. Section 31 of the 1974 Act has
been amended to provide that authorities may make ‘any payment’ to the
aggrieved person that it thinks appropriate.
Not every decision of the Commissioners will be accepted. In 1986, for
example, the Select Committee on the Parliamentary Commissioner noted that
19 per cent of local authorities who had adverse reports made by the
Commissioners had ignored the recommendations.83 The Local Government
and Housing Act 1989 provides that local authorities have three months in
which to respond to the Commissioner’s report and that they should notify
the Commissioner of any action taken, or action which they are proposing to
take in response to his report.84 If the Commissioner is not satisfied with the
response he may issue a further report. Where the local authority proposes
not to act in response to the report, the matter must be referred to a full
council meeting; see, further, Chapter 10.
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Excluded matters
Schedule 5 to the Local Government Act excludes matters relating to the
internal regulation of schools, personnel matters, action taken concerning the
commencement of legal proceedings and criminal investigations, commercial
and contractual matters.
Judicial review and Commissioners for Administration
Judicial review of decisions of Commissioners is an available form of redress,
although the breadth of discretion conferred on Commissioners often renders
their decisions beyond challenge. In Law Debenture Trust Group plc v Pensions
Ombudsman (1999), the Chancery Division allowed an appeal against a finding
of maladministration by the Pensions Ombudsman. The complainant had
applied to trustees of his pension scheme for early retirement following an
injury. The trustees concluded that he was not incapacitated, having carried
out video surveillance. The court ruled that the only basis available to the
Ombudsman for overturning the decision of the trustees was on the ground of
perversity, and that such a finding would have to be expressed in clear terms
in the Ombudsman’s decision, which had not been done. Further, a finding of
perversity could only be made after consideration of the Wednesbury criteria
with respect to unreasonableness. The Ombudsman was wrong to find that
surveillance per se amounted to maladministration.
In R v Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration ex parte Balchin (1998),
the Queen’s Bench Division quashed a decision of the Parliamentary
Commissioner. The Commissioner had found maladministration in relation to
property blighted by a road scheme in Norfolk, but following judicial review
his decision was quashed, whereupon a second ombudsman investigated the
matter. The second decision included fresh findings based on new evidence. It
was disputed whether the Commissioner had made a finding as to whether, if
there had been any maladministration, that had caused any injustice to the
applicants. The court held that the decision on maladministration was flawed
since his reasoning was inadequate, and that there had been a failure to give
reasons for findings on the principal controversial issues. The application was
granted and certiorari ordered.
Complaints
Housing matters form the basis for approximately 40 per cent of complaints
each year, with complaints about planning accounting for approximately 30
per cent of complaints. Education, social services, local taxation and
environmental health each comprise approximately five per cent of
complaints.
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THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER
The Freedom of Information Act 2000, discussed in Chapter 24, represents a
step in the direction of more open government by conferring on citizens a
legal right, subject to limited exceptions, to access to information held by
public bodies. An Information Commissioner has been appointed who is
independent of parliament and accountable to the courts. The Commissioner’s
jurisdiction comes into play after there has been a complaint made to a
department or other public body, and that body has conducted an internal
inquiry which produces no satisfactory outcome. Complaints are made by the
public via a Member of Parliament. The Commissioner has wide powers to
investigate complaints, including the right of access, under warrant, to enter
and search the records of public authorities and, where it is suspected that
information is being, or will be, suppressed, to remove that information. There
is no right of appeal from the Commissioner to the courts, but his or her
decisions are amenable to judicial review. The Commissioner lays an annual
report before parliament, and issues reports on investigations undertaken. 
EUROPEAN UNION AND COMMUNITY OMBUDSMAN85
The Treaty on European Union 1992 introduced the office of ombudsman,
appointed by the European Parliament. Under Article 195, the ombudsman is
appointed for the life of a Parliament, and may be removed by the Court of
Justice, at the request of the Parliament, on the basis that ‘he no longer fulfils
the conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he is guilty of
serious misconduct’. The ombudsman is completely independent in the
exercise of his duties, and may not seek or take instructions from any body.
Citizens of the European Union have the right of direct access to the
ombudsman, and complaints may be referred by a Member of the European
Parliament. The ombudsman has jurisdiction to hear complaints relating to
institutions of the Union and to require national government bodies to
provide information relating to complaints. Where a finding of
maladministration is made, the matter is referred to the relevant institution
which has a period of three months in which to respond. The ombudsman
submits an annual report to the European Parliament. The complaint must
relate to maladministration on the part of institutions of the Union. The
European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, acting in their
judicial role, are excluded from the ombudsman’s jurisdiction.
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NAME LIVED REIGNED
William the Conqueror 1027 – 1087 1066 – 1087
William II 1056 – 1100 1087 – 1100
Henry I 1068 – 1135 1100 – 1135
Stephen ?1097 – 1154 1135 – 1154
Henry II 1133 – 1189 1154 – 1189
Richard I 1157 – 1199 1189 – 1199
John 1167 – 1216 1199 – 1216
Henry III 1207 – 1272 1216 – 1272
Edward I 1239 – 1307 1272 – 1307
Edward II 1284 – 1327 1307 – 1327
Edward III 1312 – 1377 1327 – 1377
Richard II 1367 – 1400 1377 – 1399
Henry IV 1367 – 1413 1399 – 1413
Henry V 1387 – 1422 1413 – 1422
Henry VI 1421 – 1471 1422 – 1461
Edward IV 1442 – 1483 1461 – 1470
1471 – 1483
(Henry VI was
briefly restored to
the throne in 1470)
Edward V 1470 – ?1483 1483
Richard III 1452 – 1485 1483 – 1485
Henry VII 1457 – 1509 1485 – 1509
Henry VIII 1491 – 1547 1509 – 1547
MONARCHS OF BRITAIN
Edward VI 1537 – 1553 1547 – 1553
Mary I 1516 – 1558 1553 – 1558
Elizabeth I 1533 – 1603 1558 – 1603
James I 1566 – 1625 King of Scotland:
1567 – 1625  
(James VI);
King of England:
1603 – 1625 
Charles I 1600 – 1649 1625 – 1649
Interregnum 1649 – 1660 –
Charles II 1630 – 1685 1660 – 1685
James II 1633 – 1701 1685 – 1688
William and Mary 1650 – 1702 1689 – 1702
Anne 1665 – 1714 1702 – 1714
George I 1660 – 1727 1714 – 1727
George II 1683 – 1760 1727 – 1760
George III 1738 – 1820 1760 – 1820
George IV 1762 – 1830 1820 – 1830
William IV 1765 – 1837 1830 – 1837
Victoria 1819 – 1901 1837 – 1901
Edward VII 1841 – 1910 1901 – 1910
George V 1865 – 1936 1910 – 1936
Edward VIII 1894 – 1972 1936 (abdicated)
George VI 1895 – 1952 1936 – 1952
Elizabeth II 1926 – 1952 –
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NAME PARTY DATES
Sir Robert Walpole 3 April 1721 – 
11 February 1742
The Earl of Wilmington 16 February 1742 –
2 July 1743
The Hon Henry Pelham 25 August 1743 –
10 February 1746
The Earl of Bath 10 – 12 February 1746
The Hon Henry Pelham 13 February 1746 – 
6 March 1754
The Duke of Newcastle 6 March 1754 – 
26 October 1756
William Pitt (the elder) 16 November 1756 
– 6 April 1757
The Duke of Devonshire 6 April – 8 June 1757
Earl Waldegrave 8 – 12 June 1757
The Duke of Devonshire 12 – 29 June 1757
William Pitt (the elder) 19 June 1757 – 
5 October 1761
The Duke of Newcastle 5 October 1761 – 
26 May 1762
The Earl of Bute 26 May 1762 – 
8 April 1763
George Grenville 10 April 1763 – 
10 July 1765
Marquess of Rockingham 10 July 1765 – 
12 July 1766
William Pitt (the elder) 30 July 1766 – 
12 March 1767
The Duke of Grafton 12 March 1767 – 
28 January 1770
Lord North 28 January 1770 – 
20 March 1782
PRIME MINISTERS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Marquess of Rockingham 27 March 1782 – 
1 July 1782
The Earl of Shelburne 3 July 1782 – 
24 February 1783
The Duke of Portland 2 April 1783 – 
19 December 1783
The Hon William Pitt Tory 19 December 1783 – 
(the younger) 14 March 1801
Henry Addington Tory 14 March 1801 – 
10 May 1804
The Hon William Pitt Tory 10 May 1804 – 
(the younger) 23 January 1806
Lord Grenville Whig 31 March 1807 – 
6 September 1809
The Duke of Portland Tory 31 March 1807 – 
6 September 1809
Spencer Perceval Tory 4 October 1809 – 
11 May 1812
The Earl of Liverpool Tory 8 June 1812 – 
17 February 1827
George Canning Tory 10 April 1827 – 
8 August 1827
Viscount Goderich Tory 31 August 1827 – 
8 January 1828
The Duke of Wellington Tory 22 January 1828 – 
15 November 1830
Earl Grey Whig 16 November 1830 – 
9 July 1834
Viscount Melbourne Whig 16 July 1834 – 
17 November 1834
The Duke of Wellington Tory 17 November 1834 – 
10 December 1834
Sir Robert Peel Conservative 10 December 1834 – 
8 April 1835
Viscount Melbourne Whig 18 April 1835 – 
30 August 1841
Sir Robert Peel Conservative 30 August 1841 – 
30 June 1846
Lord John Russell Whig 30 June 1846 – 
23 February 1852
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The Earl of Derby Conservative 23 February 1852 – 
19 December 1852
The Earl of Aberdeen Coalition 19 December 1852 – 
1 February 1855
Viscount Palmerston Whig-Liberal 6 February 1855 – 
19 February 1858
The Earl of Derby Conservative 26 February 1858 – 
10 June 1859
Viscount Palmerston Whig-Liberal 12 June 1859 – 
18 October 1865
Earl Russell Whig-Liberal 29 October 1865 – 
26 June 1866
The Earl of Derby Conservative 6 July 1866 – 
25 February 1868
Benjamin Disraeli Conservative 28 February 1868 – 
3 December 1868
William Gladstone Liberal 3 December 1868 – 
17 February 1874
Benjamin Disraeli Conservative 20 February 1874 – 
18 April 1880
William Gladstone Liberal 23 April 1880 – 
23 June 1885
Marquess of Salisbury Conservative 23 June 1885 – 
27 January 1886
William Gladstone Liberal 1 February 1886 – 
20 July 1886
Marquess of Salisbury Conservative 25 July 1886 – 
11 August 1892
William Gladstone Liberal 15 August 1892 – 
3 March 1894
Earl of Rosebery Liberal 5 March 1894 – 
25 June 1895
Marquess of Salisbury Conservative 25 June 1895 – 
12 July 1902
Arthur Balfour Conservative 12 July 1902 – 
4 December 1905
Sir Henry Liberal 5 December 1905 – 
Campbell-Bannerman 7 April 1908
Herbert Asquith Liberal 7 April 1908 – 
26 May 1915
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Herbert Asquith Coalition 26 May 1915 – 
7 December 1916
David Lloyd George Coalition 7 December 1916 – 
19 October 1922
Andrew Bonar Law Conservative 23 October 1922 – 
20 May 1923
Stanley Baldwin Conservative 22 May 1923 – 
22 January 1924
James Ramsey MacDonald Labour 22 January 1924 – 
4 November 1924
Stanley Baldwin Conservative 4 November 1924 – 
5 June 1929
James Ramsey MacDonald Labour 5 June 1929 – 
24 August 1931
James Ramsey MacDonald National 25 August 1931 – 
Government 7 June 1935
Stanley Baldwin National 7 June 1935 – 
Government 28 May 1937
Neville Chamberlain National 28 May 1937 – 
Government 10 May 1940
Winston Churchill Coalition 10 May 1940 – 
23 May 1945
Winston Churchill Conservative 23 May 1945 – 
26 July 1945
Clement Attlee Labour 26 July 1945 – 
26 October 1951
Winston Churchill Conservative 26 October 1951 – 
5 April 1955
Sir Anthony Eden Conservative 6 April 1955 – 
9 January 1957
Harold Macmillan Conservative 10 January 1957 – 
13 October 1963
Sir Alec Douglas-Home Conservative 18 October 1963 – 
16 October 1964
Harold Wilson Labour 16 October 1964 – 
19 June 1970
Edward Heath Conservative 19 June 1970 – 
3 March 1974
Harold Wilson Labour 3 March 1974 – 
16 March 1976
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James Callaghan Labour 5 April  1976 – 
28 March 1979
Margaret Thatcher Conservative 4 May 1979 – 
22 November 1990
John Major Conservative 27 November 1990 –
2 May 1997
Anthony Blair Labour 2 May 1997
to present
951

APPENDIX III
953
MEMBER COUNTRY STATUS
Antigua and Barbuda Monarchy under Queen Elizabeth II
Australia Monarchy under Queen Elizabeth II
The Bahamas Monarchy under Queen Elizabeth II
Bangladesh Republic
Barbados Monarchy under Queen Elizabeth II
Belize Monarchy under Queen Elizabeth II
Botswana Republic
Britain Monarchy under Queen Elizabeth II
Brunei Darussalam National Monarchy
Cameroon Republic
Canada Monarchy under Queen Elizabeth II
Cyprus Republic
Dominica Republic
Fiji Republic
The Gambia Republic
Ghana Republic
Grenada Monarchy under Queen Elizabeth II
Guyana Republic
India Republic
Jamaica Monarchy under Queen Elizabeth II
Kenya Republic
Kiribati Republic
Lesotho National Monarchy
Malawi Republic
Malaysia National Monarchy
Maldives Republic
Malta Republic
Mauritius Republic
MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
Mozambique Republic
Namibia Republic
Nauru Republic
New Zealand Monarchy under Queen Elizabeth II
Nigeria* 
(Membership suspended 1995) Republic
Pakistan Republic
Papua New Guinea Monarchy under Queen Elizabeth II
St Kitts and Nevis Monarchy under Queen Elizabeth II
St Lucia Monarchy under Queen Elizabeth II
St Vincent and the Grenadines Monarchy under Queen Elizabeth II
Samoa Republic
Seychelles Republic
Sierra Leone Republic
Singapore Republic
Solomon Islands Monarchy under Queen Elizabeth II
South Africa Republic
Sri Lanka Republic
Swaziland National Monarchy
Tanzania Republic
Tonga National Monarchy
Trinidad and Tobago Republic
Tuvalu Monarchy under Queen Elizabeth II
Uganda Republic
Vanuatu Republic
Zambia Republic
Zimbabwe Republic
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Judiciary,
See also Separation of powers
appointment 109, 114
background 114
bias 116–18, 899–900
conventions 114
Crown liability 116
definition 108–09
disqualification 115–16
educational background 114
executive and 126–29
fact-finders, as 131–32
financial interests 116–17
‘good behaviour’ 114–15
immunity from suit 116
impartiality 117
inquiries, appointments in 131–32
legal practice 115
legislators, as 124–26
legislature and Lord Chancellor 
See Lord Chancellor
length of office 114–15
misbehaviour by 115
MPs as 116
opinions 117
parliament and 123–26
criticism, rules against 123
legislators, judiciary as 124–26
sub judice rule 124
supremacy of parliament 124
personal beliefs 117
personal interest 116
Pinochet case 117–18
political bias 117, 900
racial bias 117, 900
racial discrimination 660
removal 115
retirement 115
royal prerogative, control of 167–73
salaries 115
sexual bias 117, 900
socio-economic background 114
subjudice rule 124
tenure 114–15
Juries,
anonymity of jurors 99
challenging juror 99
decision of jury 99
eligibility 99
excusing juror 9
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fair trial, right to 651
historical background 98
origins of trial by 98
representativeness 99
rule of law 98–99
selection 99
summoning 99
United States 99
Justiciability,
judicial review 844–45
meaning 844
Juveniles, offences by 613
Kelsen, Hans 87
parliamentary sovereignty 183, 186–87
Land Authority for Wales 392
Land registry 109
Law Commission,
areas reviewed by 474
establishment 474
reports 474
role 474
Law Lords 522–23
Law Officers of the Crown 128
League of Nations 594
Legal advice 616
See also Access to legal advice
Legal aid,
rule of law 97–98
Legal representation 617
See also Access to legal advice
Legislation,
bills, See Bills
delegated legislation 
See Delegated legislation
implied repeal, doctrine of 197–98
Northern Ireland Assembly 369–70
process 
See Legislative process
secondary legislation 
See Delegated legislation
Legislative process,
bills 
See Bills
Community law 495–96
delegated legislation 
See Delegated legislation
devolution 471
financial procedures 
See House of Commons, financial 
procedures
House of Commons 471
royal assent 495
scrutiny by House of Lords 495
Legislature,
See also Parliament
definition 108
executive as member of 120
judiciary and 123–26
legitimate expectation 904–14
separation of powers 108, 123–26
Legitimisation,
citizenship by 752
Liaison committee 506–07
Libel,
blasphemous 687–88
Liberalism,
rule of law 81
Liberty and security of the person, 
right to,
arrest 611–12
detention 611–12, 612–13
European Convention on 
Human Rights 610–13
Her Majesty’s pleasure, 
detention during 613
Human Rights Act 1998 646
juveniles, prosecution of 613
life licences 611
life sentencing 646
mental patients, detention of 646
military proceedings 613
secure accommodation orders 646
Licensing,
local government 404
Life peers 521–22
Life, right to,
abortion 605
‘Bloody Sunday’ inquiry 645
death penalty 604
European Convention on 
Human Rights 604–06
euthanasia 605
Human Rights Act 1998 645
plastic bullets, use of 605
withdrawal of medical treatment 645
Life sentences 893–96
Local authorities,
See also Local government
racial discrimination 659
Wales 386
Welsh Assembly, relationship with 392
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Local government,
See also Local authorities
advantages 401–02
audit 414–16
best value 416–18
boundaries, local authority 402
central government and 410–18
financial controls 410–11
generally 410
revenue 411–12
Commissioner for Local 
Administration 418 
See also Commissioner for 
Administration
committees 409
community charge 411
complaints 418–20
compulsory competitive 
tendering 405
compulsory competitive 
tendering, abolition of 416–18
consultation 406
council tax 413
councillors,
corruption 407–08, 408
disqualification 407
election 407–08
payments 407
qualification 407
standards of conduct 407–08
courts and 419–20
current structure 403
decentralisation 401
democracy 401
economic, social and environmental 
well-being, promotion of 406
education 405, 416
elections,
arrangements 406
close connection with locality 407
corrupt practices 407
councillors 407–08
disqualifications 407
expenditure 407
first past the post system 407
illegal practices 407
process 406
proposals for scheme 406
qualifications 407
report on scheme 406
standards of conduct 407–08
England 66
European Union and 
Community 419
executive arrangements 409–10
expenditure 412–14
fiduciary duty 420
financial controls over 509
fragmentation 405
functions 404–06
allocation between 
authorities 405–06
bylaws 404
consultation 406
distribution 405–06
economic, social and environmental 
well-being, promotion of 406
education 405
finance 404
fragmentation 405
generally 404
housing 405
law making 404
local laws 404
operational efficiency 405
regulation 404
services, provision of 404
shared responsibilities 405
taxation 404
generally 401
Grant Related Expenditure 
Allocation 413
grant related expenditure 
assessments (GREAs) 412
historical development 401
housing 405
judicial review of decisions 419–20
See also Judicial review
law making 404
licensing 404
licensing 404
Local Government Act 1999 414
Local Government Act 2000 409–20
management 509
market forces 418
meetings 419
members’ interests 408
National Non-Domestic Rate 411, 413
number of councils in Britain 403
officers 409
overspending 412–13
poll tax 411
powers 401, 404–06
privatisation 418
Rate Support Grant 411, 412
rationale 401
regional aid 419
Register of Members’ Interests 408
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regulation 404
revenue 411–12
Scottish Parliament 385
services, provision of 404
size of 403–04
Standard Spending Assessment 413
standards committee 408
statutory basis 401
structure 403, 404
taxation 404
value 402
Wales 67
Widdicombe Committee 401–02
Local Government Commissioners 941–43
excluded matters 943
generally 941
judicial review 943
jurisdiction 941–42
maladministration causing injustice 942
remedies 942
volume of complaints 943
Locke, John 13, 79
parliamentary sovereignty 179
rights 591–92
London,
See also Greater London Authority; 
London Mayor
Cultural Strategy Group for 401
Fire and Emergency Planning 
Authority 399
Greater London Authority 16
Greater London Council (GLC) 393
Metropolitan Police 398–99
London Development Agency 398
London Mayor,
accountability 396–97
air quality strategy 400
ambient noise strategy 400
appointment of staff 396
Biodiversity action 400
Cultural Strategy Group for 
London 400–01
duty 396
elections 393
environmental functions 400
generally 393
London Development Agency 398
London Fire and Emergency 
Planning Authority 399
media 400–01
municipal waste management 
strategy 400
planning 399–400
publication of strategies 396
reports 400
responsibilities 396
spatial development strategy 399
sport 400–01
staff appointments 396
state of the environment report 400
strategy 396
transport functions 397
Lord Chancellor 109–14, 528
accountability 109–14
administration of courts by 109
appointment 647
Cabinet, as member of 110
conventions 111
court service, responsibility for 109
Department 113
dismissal 110
European Convention on Human 
Rights 618
executive, member of 110–11
fair trial, right to 647
functions in relation to courts 109
historical background 109
House of Lords, Speaker of 111
human rights 112
impartiality 111–12
judicial appointments 109
judicial proceedings 111–12
law reform 110
Minister of Justice, proposals for 113–14
office of 109
origins of office 109
President of the Supreme Court 109
responsibility 109
role 109–14, 112
separation of powers 109–14
Speaker of the House of Lords 111
violation of separation of powers 109
Lord paramount of the soil 142
Lord Spiritual 523
Lords, See House of Lords
Loss of confidence vote 154–55, 460
Maastricht Treaty 230–33
Mackintosh, JP 31
Magistrates,
appointment 109
dismissal 109
Magna Carta 19, 749
Maguire Seven 99
Maitland, FW 105, 137, 144, 311
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Maladministration,
Scottish Parliament 380
Malaysia, constitution of 12
Mandamus 864
Mandatory order 864
Marital rape 93, 666, 667, 740
European Convention on 
Human Rights 619
Markesinis, Professor 148
Marry and found a family, right to 627
prisoners 627
transsexuals 627
Marshall, Geoffrey 17, 107, 133, 149, 150
Marxism,
rule of law 86
Matrix Churchill 336–37, 510–11
Maxwell pension fund 510
May, Erskine 549, 552
Media,
Calcutt Committee 695
official secrets, restrictions 
on disclosure of 818–19
parliamentary privilege 583–84
Press Council 695
privacy and 695–78
Medical records,
contempt of court 691–92
Meetings,
Cabinet 319
Crown 309
freedom of assembly 700–01, 
707–10
Greater London Authority 394
local government 409
Privy Council 3122
processions, regulation of 706–07
public 701
Scottish Parliament 375
Welsh Assembly 386
Members of Parliament 463–66
allowances 464
backbenchers 463
Code of Conduct 465, 577, 581
disqualification 120
front-benchers 463
political parties 465
resignation 465
salaries 464
women, representation of 464
Memoirs 345
Mental illness, persons suffering 
from 434
Mental patients,
Human Rights Act 1998 653
Mercy 157–60
commutations of sentence 157–60
generally 157
nolle prosequi 160
pardons 157–60
Metropolitan Police 398–99
MI5 791–97
See also Security services
Director General 792, 796
establishment 792
functions 792
Profumo affair 793
Spycatcher 793–95
status 792
MI6 796–98
See also Security services
authorisation of operations 798
function 797–98
internal matters 797
warrants 798
Military,
intelligence 800
proceedings 614–15
Mill, JS 666
parliament 455, 473
Minister for the Civil Service 315
Minister of Justice, proposals for 113–14
Ministerial responsibility 341–59
aspects of 341
collective 34, 341–45
agreements differ 343
Cabinet papers 343–44
confidentiality 344
generally 341
meaning 341–42
memoirs 345
rationale 342
sub-rules 342
underlying principles 342
conduct of ministers of the Crown 354–59
conventions 34
Crichel Down 346–47
generally 341
individual responsibility 347–49
definition 345
department, for 345–46
evaluation 349
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financial probity 351–52
generally 341
judicial review and 838
memoirs 345
morality of public office,
financial probity 351–52
Nolan Committee 353
Nolan Committee 416
personal conduct 350–51
post-Crichel Down 347–49
premature disclosure of 
confidential information 353
vetting of prospective ministers 418–19
Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration 937–38
Public Service Committee report 357
response of government to 357–58
response of government to 
report 357–58
Scott Inquiry 355–59
vetting of prospective ministers 358–59
White Paper 
Modernising Government 326
Monarchical constitutions 14–15
Monarchy, See Crown
Money Bills 472
Montesquieu 106
Montesquieu, Baron 13
More, Thomas 79
MPs, See Members of Parliament
Munro, Professor Colin 133
National Crime Squad 720
National Intelligence Service 720
National Non-Domestic Rate 411, 413
National security,
See also Official secrets; Security 
services; State security
contempt of court 692–93
freedom of expression 677
judicial attitudes 819–20
Natural justice,
See also Judicial review
bias, rule against 898
breach 899
fairly, duty to act 904–14 
See also Fairly, duty to act
nemo iudex in causa sua 898
rules 898
Natural law 594–95
Aquinas, St Thomas 78
Bracton 79
Christian thought 78–79
Cicero 78
common law 79–80
international law 77–78
ius civilis 78
ius gentium 78
ius naturale 78
Locke, John 79
More, Thomas 79
Paine, Thomas 79
Plato 77
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 79
Socrates 78, 79
Neill Committee 582
New Age Travellers,
freedom of assembly 709
New Zealand,
judicial review 857
ombudsman 923
Next Step Agencies 938
Nolan inquiry 416, 572–73
Nolle prosequi 160
Non-departmental public bodies 325
Non-statutory agencies 160–61
Non-violence, committal to 369
North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) 227
North-South Ministerial Council 366, 373
Northern Ireland,
See also Terrorism
Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985 56
Anglo-Irish Treaty 1921 51–52
Assembly 
See Northern Ireland Assembly
Belfast Agreement 1998 366
British-Irish Council 373
civil war 1919–1922 50
Constitution of the Irish 
Free State 1937 52
decommissioning by IRA 366
devolution 16, 365–73
See also Northern Ireland 
Assembly
early history 44–47
Easter Rising 1916 50
emergency powers 823
equal opportunities 372–73
Equal Opportunities 
Commission 365, 372
generally 44
Good Friday agreement 57–58
Home Rule, movement towards 47–50
1007
human rights 372–73
Human Rights Commission 365, 372
joint declaration 1993 57
North-South Ministerial Council 373
Northern Ireland, self-government 
between 1920–1972 52–53
Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration 940
partition 50–51
peace settlement 1998 57–58
power sharing 1973 55
prorogation of the Northern Ireland 
Parliament 1972 54–55
self-government between 
1920–1972 52–53
terrorism, prevention of 700
‘troubles’ 53–54
Northern Ireland Assembly 365–73
background 365–66
Bills 369–70
Commission 368
constituencies 368
contractual functions 368
defamation 372
deputies 367
disqualification from membership 368
documents 371
elections 368
eligibility for membership 368
Equality Commission for 
Northern Ireland 373
exclusion of member 365
exclusion of minister 368–69
executive 366–67
First Minister 367
generally 365–66
human rights 372–73
legislation 369–70
members’ interests, register of 372
ministerial offices 367–68
allocation 367
‘d’Hondt system’ 367
number 367
powers of ministers 367
power sharing in 365
Presiding Officer 368
privilege 372
proceedings 368–69
property 368
register of members’ interests 372
resolution of devolution issues 370–71
restoration order 366
revocation 366
Secretary of State,
exercise of power 366
prohibition on proposed 
action by minister 367–68
restoration order 366
revocation of legislation 367
revocation of restoration 
order 366
suspension order 366
staff and services 368
standing orders 369
status of Northern Ireland 366
subordinate legislation 367
suspension 366
unique features 365
voting 368
voting systems 444
witnesses 371
Norway,
ombudsman 923, 931
Nozick, Robert 85
rule of law 85
Obey law, duty to 86–87
disobey, duty to 90–91
Dworkin, Professor Ronald 89–90
existence of duty 87
Finnis, Professor JM 89
Fuller, Lon 90
Hart, HLA 90–91
law and order view 86–91
Nazi laws 90–91
positivism 86
public protest 87
Rawls 86–87
right to disobey law 88–90
Obscenity,
broadcasting 684–86
cinemas 684–86
corrupt public morals, 
conspiracy to 686–87
defence 684
deprave or corrupt, tendency to 683–84
electronic storage of data 683
imports 684
meaning 683
obscene publications 18, 625, 683
post, sending indecent/
obscene materials through 684
public good defence 684
publication of article 683
tendency to deprave and 
corrupt 683–84
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theatres 684–86
video recordings 684–86
Obsolescence, doctrine of 165
Obstructing police 704
Official secrets,
authorised disclosures 817–18
crime and special investigative 
powers 817
criminal offences 815
‘DA’ notices 818–19
defence 816–17
duty to safeguard information 818
generally 791
international relations 817
media restrictions 818–19
Official Secrets Act 1911 814–15
Official Secrets Act 1989 815–18
penalties 814, 818
prosecutions 818
reform 815
security and intelligence 816
unauthorised disclosure of 
information 815
Oliver, Dawn 869
Ombudsman 923–44
Denmark 923, 931
European Union and Community
Ombudsman 944
examples of UK 924
existing scheme in UK 923–24
generally 923
Health Service Commissioner 940–41
Information Commissioner 944
Local Government Commissioners 941–43
meaning 923
New Zealand 923
Norway 923, 931
origins 923
Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration 
See Parliamentary Commissioner 
for Administration
private sector 924
public sector 924
Sweden 923
Opinions 271
Opposition 121, 466–67
Bills, role in passage of 476
Order Book 468
Orders in Council 313, 388
Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) 227
Paine, Thomas 7, 79, 179
rights 592–93
Pairing 468
Pardons 157–60
Parens patriae 168
Parliament,
accountability 4, 6
adjournment 458–59
consolidated Fund Bills, following 
consideration of 459
daily adjournment debates 458
effect 458
emergency debates 459, 502
generally 458
holidays, before 458
bicameral nature 455
Bills 
See Bills
constitutionalism 455
dissolution 
See Dissolution of parliament
electoral system, See Electoral system; 
General elections; Voting systems
emergency debates 459
European law 495–96
evaluation 455
functions 455–56
government 466–67
High Court of 126
House of Commons 
See House of Commons
House of Lords 
See House of Lords
judiciary and 123–26
criticism of 123
legislators, judiciary as 124–26
sub judice rule 124
supremacy of parliament 124
legislative process, See Bills
life of 457
limits on powers of 11
maximum duration 456
Mill, JS 455
opposition 121, 466–67
organisation of business 459–60
privilege, See Parliamentary 
privilege
prorogation 459
publications, See Publications
purpose 456
Question Time 121
racial discrimination 660
resolutions 195
royal prerogative 136
1009
scrutiny 455
security services, scrutiny of 812–13
select committees 121
session, parliamentary 457
state opening 309
summary of functions 456
summoning 457–58
supremacy, See Parliamentary 
sovereignty
televised proceedings 469
understanding 455
urgent matters 459
Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 535–39
exclusions 537
generally 535–36
suspension motions 539
use 537–38
Parliamentary Commissioner 
for Administration 924–40, 1105–23
access 938, 939
accessibility 932–37
background 925
Barlow Clowes 933–34
Channel Tunnel rail link 934–37
Citizen’s Charter 938
complaints to 926–38
access 926–27
discretion of Commissioner 930
excluded matters 927–30
extension of time period 926
filter mechanism 926–27
investigation 931
jurisdiction 927–31, 938
legal proceedings 927–28
maladministration 926, 930–31, 940
MPs, initial complaint to 926–27, 939
report 931
requirements 926
time limits 926
volume of 932
writing requirement 926
constitutional position 926
departments and matters within 
jurisdiction 928–30
discretion 930
establishment 925
excluded matters 927–28
filter 939
government response to findings 934
investigation 931
jurisdiction 927–31, 938
JUSTICE Report 925, 937–38
legal proceedings 927–28
maladministration 930–31, 940
ministerial responsibility 937–38
MPs, initial complaint to 926–27, 939
nature of office 926
Next Step Agencies 938
Northern Ireland 940
public awareness 932–37
reform 938–40
report 931
review of workings of 926
royal prerogative 938
Sachsenhausen camp prisoners 933
Scotland 940
Select Committee 937, 939
volume of complaints 932
Wales 940
Parliamentary privilege 549–88
arrest, freedom from 551–52, 553–54
Bill of Rights 561–62
breach of privilege 565–66, 579–81
bribery 587
cash for questions,
Downey Report 578
Code of Conduct 581
Commissioner for Standards 578–79
Committee of Privileges 563
composition and procedure 
of parliament 563–64
constitutional significance 549–50
consultancies,
general 574
paid 574
contempt of court 565, 579–81
courts and 558–61
early conflict 564–65
courts, role of 550
criminal law, no immunity 
from 553
defamation 549, 561, 680–81
definition 549–50
Downey Report 578
enforcing rules 579–80
extension 550
freedom of speech 550, 552–53
proceedings in parliament 554–57, 587
use and misuse 557–58
gifts 575–76
historical background 550, 551
hospitality 575–76
House of Lords,
members’ interests 586
privilege 585–86
law and custom of parliament 550
lex et consuetudo parliamenti 550
meaning 549
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members’ interests,
breach of privilege 579–81
cash for questions 571–72, 582
clarification of register 575
Code of Conduct 581–82
enforcing obligations 576–77
general consultancies 574
generally 567
gifts 576–77
hospitality 575
Nolan inquiry 572–73
number of MPs having agreements 
with PR/ lobbying firms 573
paid consultancies 574
register 569–71
rules regulating 567–69
Neill Committee 581
Nolan inquiry 572–73
paid consultancies 574
principle privileges 551–53
proceedings in parliament 554–57, 587
publication of parliamentary 
proceedings 582–88
constructive contempts 583
determination of issues of privilege and
contempt 585
generally 582–83
media and privilege 583–84
unauthorised disclosure of parliamentary
proceedings 584–85
purpose 549
reform 587
royal prerogative compared 549
sources of the constitution 24
unauthorised disclosure of 
parliamentary proceedings 716–17
Parliamentary sovereignty 177–224
academic arguments against 212–15
Acts of Parliament, supremacy of 195–96
Acts of Union,
alternative interpretations 204–05
Dicey, AV 203–04
Acts of Union 203–04
Ireland 1800 203
Scotland 1706 200–02
arguments against 212–15
Austin, John 181
common law 190–92
constitutional reform,
devolution 220–22
generally 220
Human Rights Act 1998 222–24
referendum 222
delegated legislation 485, 486
devolution 220–22
Dicey, AV 177, 180, 192–211
extrinsic limits 196
generally 192
implied repeal 197–98
intrinsic limits 196
predecessor, no parliament 
may bind 197
proclamations 195
resolutions of parliament 195
successor, no parliament 
may bind 197
treaties 195
unlimited law making power 192–95
effectiveness of law 183–87
European Convention on 
Human Rights 630
European Union and 4–5
European Union and 
Community 215–24
application of community law 216–20
extra-legal rule as ultimate rule 187–88
extrinsic limits 196
general elections 210
generally 177
grants of independence 198–200
Hart, HLA 182–83, 187, 205–06
Hobbes 178
Human Rights Act 1998 222–24
implied repeal, doctrine of 197–98
international relations 211
interpretations 177–80
intrinsic limits 196
judiciary and 124
Kelsen, Hans 183, 186–87
law making power, unlimited 192–95
legal authority,
political sovereignty 
distinguished 180
supreme 177
limits 196
Locke, John 179
non-legal constraints on powers 210
origins 191–92
Paine 179
political authority,
legal sovereignty distinguished 280
supreme 177–78
predecessor, no parliament 
bound by 197
proclamations 195
questioning validity of Act 
of Parliament 209–11
redefinition theories 205–09
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referendum 222
resolutions of parliament 195
Rousseau 178–79
separation of powers and 105, 124
social contract 177–78
source in the UK 189–90
sources of the constitution 24
successor, no parliament 
bound by 197
treaties 195–96
ultra vires 868–69
unlimited law making power 192–95
validity of law 183–87
written constitutions and 188–89
Party whips,
House of Lords 531
Passports,
royal prerogative 164–65
Peers,
eligibility for office 434–35
Penalty notices 747–48
Personal interest,
judiciary 116
Personal property, protection of 743–47
Petition of Right 1628 19–20
Pinochet case 117–18
Planning law,
Human Rights Act 1998 654
Plastic bullets, use of 605
hostage takers 605
SAS killing of suspected 
terrorists 605–06
Plato 77, 665
Police 713–48
associations, membership of 720
Chief Constables of police 719
co-operation between police 
forces 720
Codes of Practice 718
complaints 721–22
covert surveillance 621–22
Customs and Excise, 
co-operation with 720
detention,
inhuman treatment 608
equipment, supply of 170
exercise of discretion 720–21
freedom of expression 677
guidance notes 718
Home Office circulars 718
Home Secretary,
Metropolitan Police 717
other police authorities 717–18
Human Rights Act 1998 722–24
impartiality 720
judicial control and police 
policy 720–21
judicial review 720–21
legal status of police officers 719–20
liability of police, legal 722–24
London 398–99
Metropolitan Police 398–99
National Crime Squad 720
National Intelligence Service 720
organisation of the police 716–17
police authorities 717–18
functions 718
Metropolitan Police 717
political activity 720
powers, See Police powers
racial discrimination 659
trade unions 720
training 720
welfare 720
Police powers,
admissibility of evidence 740–41
answering questions put 
by police 724–25
areas, police 716–17
arrest, See Arrest
bail 734–35
body samples 726, 728
breathalyser tests 725
bugging 725–26
caution 729
Central Police Training and 
Development Authority 720
company investigations 725
damages or costs awards 
against police 719
detention,
conditions 735
following arrest 734
legal advice, right to 735–37
drug trafficking 725
entry,
common law rights 744
other than to arrest, power 747
statutory powers 744–46
European Convention on 
Human Rights 617–18
fingerprinting 726–27
fraud investigations 725
habeas corpus 741–42
helping police with inquiries 726
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identification of suspects 726–27
identity parades 727
inquiries, helping police with 726
interview,
conditions 805
tape recordings 728–29
legal advice, tight to 735–37
motorists, stopping 724–25
obstructing police 704
penalty notices 747–48
personal property, protection of,
entry, rights of 744
generally 743–44
interception of communications 743
premises, search of 747
searching suspects property 746
questioning 724–25
regulation of police 717
reliability of evidence 740–41
road blocks 725
search,
arrested person, of 728
person of 727
premises 747
property of suspect 747
servant of Crown, police 
officer as 719
silence, right to 737–39
stop and search powers 725
surveillance 725–26
suspects, protection of,
arrest, See Arrest
caution 729
helping police with inquiries 726
identification of suspects 726–27
interview conditions 728
samples 728
searches 727–28
tape recording of interviews 728–29
tape recording of interviews 728–29
terrorism, prevention of 725, 726
vicarious liability 719
video identification 727
voluntary attendance at station 726
Political parties,
Cranborne money 440–41
donations 443–44
funding 440–43
broadcasts 441
Cranborne money 440–41
donations to political parties 443–44
Election Commission 443–44
Houghton Committee 441
indirect state assistance 441
membership, from 441
Political Parties, Elections and 
Referendums Act 2000 443–44
regulation 443–44
select committee 441
Short Money 440
state funding 441–43
voluntary contributions 441
Political Parties, Elections and 
Referendums Act 2000 443–44
registration 440
Short Money 440
Poll tax 411
Ponsonby Rule 167
Pornography 18
Port and border controls,
terrorism 832–33
Positive law 594–95
Positivism 86
Possession orders,
Human Rights Act 1998 654
Possessions, enjoyment of,
Human Rights Act 1998 657
motor vehicles, seizure of 657
public interest 657
smuggling 657
Post, sending indecent/obscene 
materials through 684
Preaching,
breach of the peace 703
Pregnancy,
sexual discrimination 669–71
Prerogative 
See Royal prerogative
Pressure groups,
standing 853–55
Presumption of innocence 651
Prime Minister,
accountability 156
appointment,
general election 155–56
general election, following 155–57
generally 155
retirement of incumbent 156–57
royal prerogative 155–57
Cabinet formation 317–19
changing 316
choice of 316–17
Conservative Party 316
death 316
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dismissal 316
dissolution of parliament 
requested by 148–49, 459
First Lord of the Treasury 314
functions 317–18
Cabinet, formation of 317–18
generally 313
historical development 313
House of Commons,
membership 315
Labour Party 317
Liberal Democrats 317
Minister for the Civil Service 315
office of 313–17
other officers, holder of 314–15
peers as 315
power of office 314
prime ministerial government, 
whether now 314
private office 321–22
Question Time 498–99
resignation 316
retirement of incumbent 156–57
security services reporting to 796
support required by 314
Treasury 15
weekly audience with Crown 310
Prisoners,
detention 607–08, 609
expression, freedom of 656
Human Rights Act 1998 653
marry and found a family, right to 627
Sachsenhausen camp prisoners 933
Privacy,
See also Private and family life, 
respect for
breach of confidence 696–97
celebrities 696–97
Human Rights Act 1998 696–98
media and 695–78
public interest 696–97
Private and family life, respect for 620–24
access arrangements with 
children 623
aircraft noise 623
births and deaths, 
registration of 620–21
covert surveillance 621–22
family 622
generally 620
gypsies 622
homosexuality 624
individual privacy 620–22
interception of 
communications 620–21
Jehovah’s Witnesses 622
sexual life 623–24
surveillance 621–22
transsexuals 621
Private Members’ Bill,
See also Bills
examples 472
meaning 472
Private notice questions 501
Privatisation,
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